Development
https://doi.org/10.1057/s41301-022-00343-2
THEMATIC SECTION
The Structural Power of the State‑Finance Nexus: Systemic Delinking
for the Right to Development
Bhumika Muchhala1,2
© Society for International Development 2022
Abstract
The current era of financial hegemony is characterized by a dense financial actor concentration, an exacerbated reliance of
many South countries on private credit and an internalized compliance of South states to financial market interests and priorities. This structural power of finance enacts itself through disciplinary mechanisms, such as credit ratings and economic
surveillance, compelling many South states to respond to creditor interests at the expense of peoples’ needs. As a human
rights paradigm, the Declaration on the Right to Development has the active potential to redress the structural power of
finance and the distortion of the role of the state through upholding the creation of an enabling international environment for
equitable and rights-based development on two levels of change. First, structural policy reforms in critical areas of debt, fiscal
policy, tax, trade, capital flows and credit rating agencies. Second, systemic transformation through delinking as articulated
by dependency theorist Samir Amin, which entails a reorientation of national development strategies away from the imperatives of globalization to that of economic, social, and ecological priorities and interests of people.
Keywords Austerity · Debt colonialism · Dependency theory · Delinking · Discipline · Epistemology · Financialization ·
Neoliberalism · Role of the state
For over four decades, the ascendance of economic austerity
as a multifaceted political and economic project has become
a normative paradigm that many nations and governments
in the Global South pursue. A consensus of political and
economic elites across institutions, governments and the
private financial sector have normalized a bias towards fiscal austerity frameworks globally, with particularly pernicious effects on marginalized and vulnerable communities
across the Global South (Peck 2010; Blyth 2013). These
effects involve a deepening and reproduction of social inequalities, economic dispossession such as loss of livelihoods
and employment or taxation targeted at the poorest and a
broader undermining of the social contract through the erosion of public services and goods. Two years into a global
pandemic, it is not an unreasonable proposition that austerity
measures enacted over the last several decades have exacerbated the effects of the pandemic, with deeply unequal
* Bhumika Muchhala
bhumika@twnetwork.org; muchb368@newschool.edu
1
Third World Network, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
2
The New School, New York, USA
effects both within and among nations. The dominant features of austerity—which include inadequate and failing
public services in education, health and social protection,
and income inequality driven in part by regressive taxation
and a deflated role for the state constructed by privatization
schemes—have led to a systematic erosion of the resilience
of public systems and of a social contract that safeguards
redistribution of wealth, resources and public goods towards
equity and the fulfilment of human rights.
Founded on the neoclassical economics claim of a nonideological, pragmatic and economic ‘truth’ (Harvey 2005;
Sassen 2009), fiscal austerity often acts as a hegemonic and
disciplinarian mechanism by which nations secure the confidence and approval of global capital markets and creditors. Contrary to the widespread perception that the state
has retreated since the establishment of neoliberal economic
policies in the 1970s, austerity has deliberately repositioned
the state to serve the interests of the market at the expense
of the public through the recalibration of institutions, universal rules, policy norms and legal protections, in ways that
protect and strengthen the private sector (Slobodian 2018).
This distortion of the role of the state illustrates how financialization in practice, as opposed to theory or concept, does
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B. Muchhala
not always enact the self-regulation of markets as autonomous entities. The developmental role of the state in guiding
economic development and structures, retaining ownership
of key sectors such as industry and banking, and allocating resources to meet the social and economic needs of its
people, is effectively disabled through structural adjustment
and fiscal austerity frameworks that position private firms
and market financing to shape decision-making, own key
public sectors and direct the allocation of financial resources
towards foreign debt repayments rather than addressing
domestic needs.
The international institution responsible for the diffusion
of fiscal austerity policies across many parts of the Global
South through the disbursement of conditional loans and
production of national macroeconomic surveillance reports
is the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Fiscal austerity frameworks include macroeconomic policies oriented
towards reducing budget deficits by way of reducing public
expenditures and increasing taxation, often through indirect
taxation (Stubbs et al. 2017). In many ways the archetypal
unapologetic neoliberal institution, the IMF has the power
to shape and manage the social provisioning of its borrower
governments. Governance power in the Fund’s Executive
Board is disproportionately skewed towards rich countries,
which hold over half of the voting power; developing countries, which together constitute 85% of the world’s population, have a minority share. For example, for every vote
that the average person in the Global North has, the average
person in the Global South has only one-eighth of a vote
(Hickel 2018).
Today, in the wake of a global health pandemic, followed
by a conflict-induced food and fuel price inflation shock and
international monetary policy tightening, sovereign debt burdens across the Global South have exponentially multiplied,
generating systemic crisis and debt defaults in many nations.
Total debt in the developing world now stands at a 50-year
high (World Bank 2022b). In middle-income countries, sovereign debt stands at a 30-year high, with the number of
emerging markets with sovereign debt trading at distressed
levels has more than doubled in the first six months of 2022
(IMF 2022). And 60% of low-income countries are in debt
distress or high risk of debt distress, while middle income
countries are also facing increasing debt (IMF 2022). The
World Bank stated that ‘over the next 12 months, as many as
a dozen developing economies could prove unable to service
their debt’ (World Bank 2022a). The implication is nothing
less than the greatest debt crises and defaults in developing
economies in a generation.
The critical need for fiscal liquidity in many developing
countries is, in great measure, generated by the fact that public revenues already in contraction by the economic downturn induced by the COVID-19 pandemic are being spent
on servicing debt payments. In the absence of a sovereign
debt restructuring mechanism in which all creditors, including private, bilateral, and multilateral, participate toward the
objective of reducing debt-distressed nations’ debt stocks,
the role of the IMF in providing conditional financial assistance has heightened to an unprecedented level. As of
August 2021, approximately 221 loans have been arranged
with 88 developing countries (Kentikelenis and Stubbs
2021). Through both loans and country surveillance reports,
the Fund has advised 154 developing countries in 2021 and
159 in 2022 to commence fiscal consolidation measures, following a temporary and targeted duration of fiscal spending
in 2020 to respond to the immediate health and economic
damage inflicted by the pandemic (ILO 2022).
The fiscal consolidation measures in current loans
include, for example, public expenditure reductions and
public wage bill cuts and caps, including in some instances
the privatization of public sectors, which have historically
constrained equitable public services in education, health,
social protection, water, and public transport. Measures
also include regressive revenue generation measures such
as consumption and value-added taxes, which extract revenue from vulnerable households, who experience both
lower and less affordable access to social services alongside
declining income to meet basic needs. Narrow targeting of
social protection programmes is a key part of consolidation measures, which exclude the majority of low-income
communities, while labour flexibilization measures which
augment the precarity and wage insecurity of workers, and
especially women workers, are commonplace. Monetary
measures, such as increases in bank loan interest rates and
weakening the accountability of central banks to people’s
needs, are also a central part of IMF loans (Munevar 2020;
Tamale 2021).
The current fiscal consolidation, or austerity, measures
are projected to be premature and more severe than in the
aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2007–2008 (IDP
et al. 2021). They are projected to affect approximately 85%
of the world population in 2022. A key point of discernment here is that 80% of the affected population are in developing countries across the Middle East and North Africa,
sub-Saharan Africa, South and East Asia and the Pacific,
and Latin America and the Caribbean. A significant literature of impact analysis illustrates how austerity has led to
increases in inequalities that persist over the medium term,
material deprivations and lower living standards, intergenerational cycles of poverty, intensified discrimination and a
subterranean stream of social fissure and emotional-spiritual
alienation (Cornia et al. 1987; Williams 1994; Bullard et al.
1998; Garuda 2000; Forster et al. 2019). Most recently, Lang
(2021) shows a correlation between increases in inequality
due to IMF loan programmes, documented by both relative
and absolute losses of income by the poor. The gendered
nature of austerity and the channels through which women
The Structural Power of the State-finance Nexus
and girls are adversely affected, as well as involuntarily
become ‘shock absorbers’ of fiscal consolidation measures,
are also detailed in a rich body of feminist economics analysis (Sen and Grown 1987; Elson and Cagatay 2000; Seguino
et al. 2010). Mitigation measures such as spending floors and
cash transfers are only implemented around half the time and
have not protecting social spending budgets from protracted
cuts (ILO 2021). Meanwhile, as opposed to universal social
protection measures, the temporary and targeted nature
of assistance schemes, where access is often mediated by
income thresholds or employment categories, means that
many who need assistance do not receive it.
Critics, advocates, and social movements for global
economic justice warn that with an additional 100 million
pushed into poverty as a direct result of the pandemic and
an economic recession exacerbated by the war in Ukraine,
a ‘lost decade’ for the Global South is imminent (UNCTAD 2021; World Bank 2022a). Mass protests and counter
movements have surged across the globe over the course
of decades, decrying austerity’s devastating toll and castigating it for deepening social injustices (Ortiz et al. 2022).
Meanwhile, the empirical, data-based evidence, across time,
geography, and context, demonstrating that austerity has neither restored income growth nor reduced unemployment has
only mounted over the years, including by academic research
illustrating how the economic methodology in support of
austerity is conceptually flawed (Blyth 2013; Herndon et al.
2013).
Structural Power of Finance
The structural power of finance today stems from several
shifts that have occurred since the 1970s. These include, in
summary, the steep increase in financial actor concentration,
the growing reliance of states on private credit, and the ways
in which the state intervenes in financial markets. A brief
elaboration follows. First, the consolidation of the world’s
top five banks has mushroomed from 17% in 1970 to 52% in
2020 (Roos 2019: 63). This was accompanied by a centralization of global credit markets, seen by the share of loans
made and number of assets held by a decreasing amount of
financial institutions. For example, while there were 14,434
banks in the US in 1980, approximately the same number as
in 1934, this number halved to 7,100 by 2009 (Haldane et al.
2010). A second shift is the state’s growing dependence on
private credit through the market issuance of international
sovereign bonds (ISBs). Some key features of private debt
that are critical for a debt architecture to address are: issuance of bonds with high and variable interest rates, foreign
currency denomination and the lack of enforceability over
private lenders to ensure comparability of treatment in debt
restructuring exercises—all of which generates systemic
risk in the debt profile of developing countries. The creditor composition of sovereign debt has made a sharp turn
over the last few decades from official bilateral creditors,
nearly all of whom were Paris Club members, to commercial creditors as well as non-Paris Club bilateral creditors.
Consequently, by 2021, low- and middle-income economies
owed five times as much to commercial creditors as they did
to bilateral creditors (World Bank 2022b).
This increased exposure to private creditors, in the exogenous context of the COVID-19 pandemic followed by
food and fuel price inflation and international monetary
tightening as well as the systemic context of the absence
of a multilateral debt restructuring mechanism that ensures
private creditor cooperation, has created a perfect storm of
vulnerabilities for the Global South. Furthermore, many
developing country states now finance their public expenditure through foreign currency denominated borrowing by
private lenders far more than they do through taxation, creating ever-proliferating debt stocks that must be financed with
an ever-greater share of national foreign exchange revenue.
This debt-generating cycle of lending and borrowing has
generated a symbiotic, or at least tightly bound, relationship
between domestic political and financial elites and global
finance. Consequently, the state’s autonomy from finance
weakens.
A third shift is the ongoing restructuring of the state
apparatus through the critical role of state actors, central
banks and international financial institutions as lenders
and market participants since the 1980s. This has unfolded
despite the dominant narrative of the diminished state freeing space for unfettered financial liberalization and deregulation (Slobodian 2018). This turn toward the imbrication
of state with finance, facilitated through the dependence on
external financing since the 1970s, can be viewed through
Strange’s (1988) conceptualization of the formation of a
‘state-finance nexus’. Streeck (2011) refers to the emergence of private creditors as a second constituency alongside national citizens, exercising unprecedented political
influence, and importantly, structural power, over the state.
In turn, the debtor, or borrower, state must ‘take care to
gain and preserve (the financial market’s) confidence by
conscientiously servicing the debt it owes them and making it appear credible’ (Streeck 2011: 27). The dynamic of
external dependency is situated in the proposition that if the
state requires access to credit from the international financial
markets as well as institutional lenders, state administrators
will do everything possible to ‘keep their creditors happy
and not to scare away potential investors’ (Roos 2019: 58).
What exactly is required from the state in the endeavour to
‘keep their creditors happy’, within a web of explicit asymmetry of structural power between state and finance? At face
value, the minimum requirement is repayment of the borrowed amount, including accrual of interest, to creditors.
B. Muchhala
However, the expectation that undergirds debt repayment
is the uncoded/unwritten and yet authoritative priority of
assuring ‘market confidence’ or demonstrating ‘sound macroeconomic fundamentals’ (IMF 2014, 2015, 2020, 2021).
In other words, the foundational mechanism that activates
the structural power of finance over the state is the task of
reassuring lenders that the state’s budget is under control.
As Ostry et al. admitted from within the IMF, ‘…it is
surely the case that many countries (such as those in southern Europe) have little choice but to engage in fiscal consolidation, because markets will not allow them to continue borrowing’ (Ostry et al. 2016: 40). While the reference here is
to states that are defaulting on their debt, or in the throes of
debt crises, the expectation to maintain the general trajectory
of ‘fiscal discipline’ via consolidation permeates beyond
recurrent inflections of debt distress. As the annual surveillance reports of the IMF illustrate, even in the absence of
signs pointing to debt distress, namely the core statistic
of national debt-to-GDP ratios, the Fund’s macro-policy
advice to most developing countries is to keep budgets in
line by ensuring ‘sound and macroprudential indicators’
(IMF 2015). As the political scientist Lindblom articulates,
political leaders find themselves bound to the responsibility
to maintain a healthy investment climate under all conditions, and to immediately restore business confidence whenever key indicators start trending downwards (Lindblom
1982). The unavoidable message here is that maintaining
good standing in the omnipresent eyes of finance requires
an internalization of the austerity ethos. This point is not
explicit, in that it is not written out verbatim. However, the
effect is a resounding compliance across the Global South
toward reigning in public expenditure, promoting privatization and, importantly, prioritizing the repayment of debt over
and above national and domestic expenditure and investment
priorities (Ortiz and Cummins 2012, 2013, Ortiz and Cummins 2019; Ortiz et al. 2015, 2017; Kentikelenis and Stubbs
2021). The growing dependence of the state on private credit
thus leads directly to the internalization of debtor discipline
within the borrowing country’s state apparatus.
Fiscal consolidation frameworks are the core policy
content of IMF loans and surveillance reports, in which
austerity measures such as reducing public budgets, enacting regressive income taxation, and privatizing stateowned enterprises act as either conditions for the loan or
recommendations which may be reinforced by influential
actors such as credit rating agencies (Peck 2010). Other
mandates such as, for example, financial, environmental,
and labour deregulation, liberalization of trade tariffs and
government procurement and increasing the independence
of central banks are also often present in loans and surveillance documents (ILO 2022). Despite not possessing
a formal or encoded global consensus, much less a legally
binding mandate, austerity is embedded into the bedrock
of the global political economy as a given, a quid pro quo,
an unnegotiable reality in which resistance, dissent, and
refusal to perform the norm of servicing finance capital
before and over people and nation is not expected to come
from the state polity (Harvey 2005).
Multiple dimensions of institutional and relational
restructuring have occurred from national to global levels.
Within the state, a contradictory dynamic underpins the
phenomenon of external financing, in that it simultaneously enables and constrains the agency of state authorities. On the one hand, it supplies the material financial
resources for expenditure it would not otherwise have,
while at the same time requiring the state to maintain a
constant effort to restrain that very expenditure to maintain
repayments of debt owed to creditors and lenders within
a web of ever-increasing dependency. At the global level
of international institutions, the IMF was restructured
from an international monetary coordination agency into
a de facto lender of last resort for South borrowers in debt
distress. This transmogrification of the Fund since the
late 1970s significantly altered the international financial
architecture toward conferring structural power to private, national, and institutional creditors and ascribing to
the IMF the role of ‘fiscal disciplinarian’ over borrowing
countries in exchange for providing emergency financing
and loans (Buira 2003). Starting in the 1980s, recurrent
payments’ imbalances, pressures for currency devaluation, and the macroeconomic instability associated with
intermittent financial-economic crises in Latin America,
Asia, and Russia, the Global South turned with increasing frequency to IMF loans and signaling effects to financial (creditor) markets delivered by surveillance reports
(Thacker 1999). The balance of power between debtor and
creditor became increasingly tilted as the policy conditions within Structural Adjustment Programs—enforced by
the Fund’s emergency financing programmes in response
to the recursive debt crises over the last four decades—
revealed the extent to which social policy expenditure, as
well as the economic redistribution from wealthy to poor
that supports social policy, was eroded in order to maintain
debt repayments and prevent sovereign default. The effect
of the Fund as an enforcing agent of fiscal austerity measures has served to protect the balance sheets of the big
commercial banks and investors from their own imprudent
lending decisions (Roos 2019). By the late 1990s, scholars from Robert Wade to Jagdish Bhagwati were shedding
light on the pervasive and wholly unaccountable role of a
‘Wall Street-Treasury-IMF complex’ and its entrenchment
of a pro-creditor bias in international crisis management
(Wade and Veneroso 1998). As such, the enactment of
austerity measures becomes depoliticized and internalized
into normative compliance by most Global South states.
The Structural Power of the State-finance Nexus
Disciplinary Mechanisms
Disciplinary mechanisms play a foundational role within the
political rationality of austerity by reinforcing and operationalizing its structural power. In conceptualizing disciplinary
neoliberalism, Gill (2008) illustrated how a financialized
political economy employs the structural power of capital
to impose discipline on public institutions and to reroute
accountability relationships of the state from citizens to
markets. A multitude of financial-political mechanisms and
arrangements discipline the South into enacting a national
austerity agenda. For example, central bank independence
(CBI), or the distancing of the central bank’s function and
mandate from the national government, reduces national
policy space for alternative policy options. Research by
economic scholars observes that ‘strengthening CBI helps
the IMF in nudging a government into painful austerity
and reform measures, ultimately leading to greater (loan)
program compliance’ (Reinsberg et al. 2021). In practice,
CBI becomes another binding constraint on the capacity of
countries to use available policy space to pursue developmental policies toward national autonomy and economic and
social development. One of the most effective disciplinary
channels is that of sovereign ratings issued by Credit Rating
Agencies (CRAs), which in turn influence a state’s ability to
access credit, which includes the terms of that credit, such
as borrowing costs. Aside from the disciplinary effect of
CRAs, the reinforcement of austerity measures is cyclically
implanted into its rating methodology.
CRAs are supposed to act as a bridge between lenders
and borrowers by reducing the information asymmetry
through the provision of ‘objective, independent and expert
information on issuers or borrowers of bonds and other
debt instruments and fixed-income securities’ (Li 2021: 7).
It’s overriding concern is the credit worthiness of the borrower nation, that is, the ability of a state or an enterprise
to observe its obligations to the debt. Upon evaluating the
borrowers’ financial, political, and economic circumstances,
CRAs provide their opinion or judgment in letter form; for
example, credit ratings such as A, B, C and so forth. Credit
ratings not only influence investor decisions on where to
lend money to, they also determine the ease or difficulty of
accessing external finance and shape the pricing of the debt
instruments that South states repay, such as the interest rates
(Partnoy 2017). As market makers and movers, a negative or
downgraded rating has attendant repercussions of threatening both access to and terms of external finance, reputational
damage, and capital outflows, for example (Lewis 2011).
The significance of the repercussions renders the force of
CRAs much greater than merely incentivizing an economic
house that is ‘in order’, rather the effect is that of disciplining
South states into ‘economic order’. In this way, CRAs are
ascribed with disciplinary power over South states, which
is further entrenched by the monopoly formation of three
agencies which control more than 94% of outstanding credit
ratings. Another challenge is the conflict of interest generated by the ‘issuer pays’ model, where agencies deliver rating judgments to the very financial clients who pay them for
assessments, raising questions over the objectivity, motives
and legitimacy of the ratings methodology (Li 2021).
Austerity is not only strengthened by the methodology
CRAs employ in producing sovereign ratings, but also cyclically reinforced, particularly during recurrent inflections of
crisis (Sager and Hinterleitner 2016). Academic research
shows how CRA methodology in sovereign ratings are determined by an explicit preference for countries implementing
austerity measures. Efforts to endorse fiscal consolidation,
decrease spending and, therefore, reduce debt, are viewed
as ‘credit positive’ (Ferri et al. 2003). Conversely, stimulus packages that facilitate economic and social recovery
from crises but that increase fiscal deficits and debt levels
in the short term are assessed as ‘credit negative’, despite
the necessity of stimulus measures in times of crisis. The
message pronounced by the CRA monopoly is undeniable,
in that more austerity leads to higher ratings and therefore
easier and cheaper market access. Austerity is in fact seen
as a signal to capital markets that a government is willing
to repay its debt obligations, creating a cyclical dynamic
that has been called the ‘downgrade-austerity viciouscircle’ (Sager and Hinterleitner 2016: 27). In the context
of the ongoing global pandemic, CRAs have downgraded
numerous South states, or have placed them on a ‘negative
watch’. This plays the role of signaling that ‘spending what
is needed on pandemic response could invite ratings downgrades’ (Financial Times 2020). Out of the wide range of
disciplinary mechanisms deployed by powerful financial
actors and institutions, that of CRAs is perhaps one of the
most effective in generating an internalization of the austerity bias across the South.
Financial Dependency Rooted
in Liberalization
While several dependency theorists unpack the dynamics of financial dependency, Samir Amin’s articulation
directly addresses the politics of lending from the core to
the periphery.1 Amin proposed that the periphery is prone
1
The core–periphery model is a spatial metaphor which describes
and attempts to explain the structural relationship between the materially rich or metropolitan ‘core’ and a less wealthy ‘periphery’, either
within a particular country, or more commonly, as applied to the relationship between developed and developing societies. The use of the
core–periphery model in this context assumes that the world system
of production and distribution is the unit of analysis. It also assumes
that underdevelopment is not a simple descriptive term that refers
to a backward, traditional economy, but rather a concept rooted in a
B. Muchhala
to a ‘chronic tendency towards deficits in the external balance of payments’ that generates a parallel chronic tendency
‘towards the need for external financing’ (Amin 1976: 252).
In Amin’s analysis, the periphery lacks the integrated internal market that many core regions possess, in terms of a
dynamic feedback loop between productive sectors of the
economy and domestic revenue, investments and markets.
Such a nexus is critical to supporting economic self-reliance
and a diversified productive sector. The disproportionate
reliance on exporting a narrow range of agricultural and
other commodities, and labour-intensive and low-technology products, does not always generate domestic revenue
and employment to scale. Furthermore, the export-oriented
development model constructed through successive waves
of trade liberalization, is typically dependent on consumer
and buyer markets in the core. This leads to a structural
dependence on borrowing foreign exchange to meet their
financing needs (Amin 1976; Sundaram and Rock 1998).
Consequently, the economic articulation of the periphery
conforms ‘to the needs of accumulation at the core’, often
resulting in a continual fiscal imbalance in the periphery’s
public budget (Amin 1976: 238). Production and revenue in
the periphery being subject to competitive pressures with
other peripheral regions, as well as national expenditure
needs often outweighing national revenue. This imbalance
of the budget, or balance of payments, is then overcome by
‘structural adjustment’, or reducing the public expenditure
side of the ledger. The disarticulation of domestic economies in the periphery is then rooted in great measure within
externally focused productive capacities that systematically
generates financial dependency on the core to access credit
in order to, for example, pay for imports, finance investments and expenditures as well as maintain debt and interest
payments arising out of borrowing (Gunder Frank 1974).
Through this lens of dependency theory, the formation of
the ‘debtor’ or ‘borrower’ state across the periphery is characterized by a continual accrual of debt that is rooted in the
asymmetrical structures and conditions of production created by the legacies of economic colonialism.
In the contemporary context of inequalities in the global
political economy, the constraints, and barriers that the
South experiences are systemic, in that they are embedded
into the very design and function of international trade and
Footnote 1 (continued)
general theory of imperialism. The core–periphery model thus suggests that the global economy is characterized by a structured relationship between economic centers which, by using military, political,
and trade power, extract an economic surplus from the subordinate
peripheral countries and regions. One major factor in this is the inequality between wage-levels between core and periphery, which make
it profitable for capitalist enterprises to locate part or all of their production in underdeveloped regions.
finance. Obstacles to economic diversification are woven
into trade and investment rules that prohibit the use of the
very industrial policy tools and strategies that facilitated
employment generation, value-added production, backward
and forward linkages between primary commodities and
manufactured goods as well as food security, for example,
within industrialized countries (Rodrik 2007; Chang 2009).
Insufficient diversification in domestic economic sectors
reduces the possibilities of generating financial resources,
and financial autonomy, from within domestic production
(UNCTAD 2014). Other significant political economy
challenges to generating sustained and sufficient domestic
revenue include intellectual property rights controlled by
industrialized countries and their outright refusal to agree
to technology transfer clauses in trade, climate and financial
negotiations and agreements, as well as trade liberalization
and privatization requirements encoded into trade agreements and loan conditions (South Centre 2015).
A key dimension of systemic liberalization is that of free
capital flows, and its prerequisite capital account deregulation. Financial liberalization, underpinned by currency
deregulation, creates surges of ‘hot money’ inflows from
North to Global South when interest rates are low in the
North and high in the South. When this calculus starts to
reverse directions, surges of outflows result, triggering currency depreciations which may trigger financial and debt
crises as the cost of debt servicing and import payments
increases with a weaker currency (Akyuz 2013; UNCTAD
2014). In the context of a pervasive anxiety over volatile
capital outflows, and the domino effects of financial instability, economic recession, and debt crisis, many South governments have turned to a strategy of self-insurance. In other
words, governments have over the decades self-insured their
economies through accumulating foreign exchange reserves
as a buffer in times of financial crisis and capital outflows, as
well as building local debt markets to raise capital. Developing countries have increased their reserve holdings from
an average of about 5% of GDP in 1990 to an average of
30% in 2018 (Ito and McCauley 2019: 5). Central banks
and sovereign wealth funds in Asia and among oil exporters
have emerged as prominent players, and sources of funds in
international capital markets. Approximately 66% of foreign
exchange reserves are held in dollars, while the euro share of
foreign exchange reserves is about 25% (Ito and McCauley
2019: 5).
Self-insurance against the volatility in external financing
flows through the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves
generates an inequity bias (Ocampo 2019). Global South
reserves are essentially invested in rich countries’ assets,
which creates a perverse reality where developing countries
are systematically lending to rich countries at low- or zerointerest rates. As developing countries accumulate reserves,
global imbalances between surplus and deficit countries are
The Structural Power of the State-finance Nexus
worsened and a deflationary bias is created, in that dormant
reserve holdings have a contractionary effect on the world
economy. This asymmetry of global reserves entrenches
systemic inequity and instability into international financial architecture. Meanwhile, reserve accumulation is not
a systemic or sustainable solution to prevent financial vulnerability and instability, or the threat of conditional loans
enforcing austerity measures from the IMF. In the absence of
both a normative acceptance of capital account regulations,
or capital controls, by international capital and financial
markets, and in particular credit rating agencies, as well as
the lacuna of an adequate global financial safety net, developing countries are left with little option but to accumulate reserves as a form of self-insurance. The large sums of
financial resources frozen in reserves are essentially foregone development resources, which, if invested in social and
economic development needs, could yield higher long-term
returns, and allow countries to reorient from extraversion to
domestic economic autonomy and self-sufficiency. A key
force that works against the prioritization of capital controls
is neoclassical economic theory, and the internalization of its
rationale among policymakers in countries across all development levels (Chang 2018). Neoclassical rationale suggests
that capital account regulations can drive up the cost of capital and curb incoming investments. Neoclassical economists
present evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis that
capital controls increase market uncertainty and carry the
risk of reducing the availability of external finance, which
in turn lowers investment levels (Rodrik 2007).
The above only begins to illustrate a complex and historical web of constraints on the policy space for equitable
development generated by multiple forms of liberalization
which serve to hollow out domestic revenue generation, and
economic sovereignty for social development and tackling
climate change, in large parts of the South. Augmenting
these systemic trade and financial forces of economic disarticulation is the financial drain from the South to the North
through corporate and investor tax evasion and avoidance,
which further strengthens the South’s necessity of having to
turn toward external financing. Recent research illustrates
that the South lost approximately $7.8 trillion due to tax evasion and avoidance carried out primarily by firms and investors in industrialized countries during the 10-year-period
from 2004 to 2013 (Spanjers and Kar 2015). Most critically,
the African continent incurs loses of approximately $90 billion a year through tax evasion and other forms of illicit
financial outflows (UNCTAD 2021). Empirical research conducted in 2018 quantifies financial drain from the Global
South through unequal exchange since 1960 amounting
to $62 trillion, and when accounting for lost growth in the
South, almost $152 trillion (Hickel et al. 2021).
In light of the multiple dimensions of trade, financial and
tax deregulation and liberalization that generate layered
forces of fiscal drain, many South nations have little recourse
but to raise financing by issuing sovereign bonds at high
interest rates in order to attract investors. Part and parcel
of attracting investors is the project of maintaining investor
and market confidence, which drives the implicit priority of
South policymakers to maintaining a ‘macroprudential and
sound’ economic and financial landscape. In other words,
domestic economic and financial indicators, such as the fiscal deficit, inflation rate, interest rate and overall balance
of payments, for example, must be amenable to investors
and markets, on a constant and consistent basis. Even while
exogenous shocks, such as the current food and fuel price
inflation, or the global financial crisis induced by the U.S.
mortgage crisis in 2007–2008, have adverse impacts on the
macroeconomic and financial stability of the South by no
direct doing of their own, South nations must confront the
adverse market consequences. For example, capital outflows
and currency depreciations result in many South governments yielding toward increasing sovereign bond spreads
and tightening domestic monetary policy in order to assure
and secure market confidence. In this way, the accountability
gap apparent in many South regions on the part of policymakers to deliver and ensure economic and social rights,
public services, and climate financing toward achieving the
SDGs and the Paris Climate Agreement, for example, can
be understood as a consequence of how the structural power
of finance demands that states fulfil the interests of creditors
over at the expense of communities.
Right to Development: Challenges
and opportunities for policy change
and systemic transformation
The Right to Development (RTD) was first proposed by a
Senegalese jurist, Keba M’baye, in 1972, and was awarded
its first legal recognition in the 1981 African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights (Kunanayakam 2013). The
Declaration on the Right to Development (DRTD) was
adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 41/128 of
4 December 1986. The Declaration defines development in
its preamble as ‘a comprehensive economic, social, cultural
and political process, which aims at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population and of all
individuals on the basis of their active, free and meaningful
participation in development and in the fair distribution of
the benefits resulting therefrom’. RTD reflects a rethinking of development strategies in response to the failure of
growth-centered neoclassical and neoliberal narratives and
frameworks by underscoring a development that integrates
the structural and systemic, the individual and the collective, the national and the international, with awareness of
the indivisible and interdependent nature of development.
B. Muchhala
The 1993 Vienna Declaration and Program of Action, the
2000 Millennium Declaration, and most recently, the Durban
Declaration and Program of Action reaffirmed the RTD as a
universal and inalienable human right.
The origin of RTD is within the debates of the NonAligned Movement (NAM) of the 1960s–1970s, which campaigned for the creation of a New International Economic
Order (NIEO), which is explicitly mentioned in the 1986
Declaration (Piron 2002). The objective of NAM countries
was to reorient the international human rights system from
being weaponized against the South through civil and political rights and instead expand to development as a collective
human right which requires reforms to unequal international
economic relations. The context of the Cold War defines
the political forces within which a polarizing and reductive
dichotomy was reinforced between civil and political rights
on the one hand and economic and social rights on the other.
The DRTD’s articles and principles have the active potential to redress the structural power of finance and the distortion of the role of the state. Specifically, the DRTD centers
the creation of an enabling international environment for
structural policy change that upholds principles of sovereign
equality, social justice, and equity; free, active and meaningful participation; fair distribution of the benefits of development and fair distribution of income; self- determination and
permanent sovereignty over natural wealth and resources;
and equality of opportunity for development for all nations
and individuals who make up nations. Articles 2.3, 3.3 and
4.2 of the DRTD stipulate that States have the right and duty
to cooperate with each other in order to enable the formulation of national development policies toward promoting ‘a
new international economic order’ that achieves the above
principles through the realization of all human rights (DRTD
1986, Art 4(2)).
As a human rights paradigm, the RTD’s contributions
include two distinct differences from dominant human rights
discourses focused on civil and political rights. First, the
ambit of ‘rights-holders’ is expanded from individuals to
that of states as well, in that states have the right to formulate appropriate national development policies. The crucial
implication of this expansion is that states can have human
rights claims against other states, and possibly against the
international community, in cases where global economic
governance constrains the ability of states to develop
national development policies. This integration of extraterritorial obligations2 opens critical space to address the
2
Extraterritorial obligations (ETOs) are human rights obligations
states have beyond their national borders towards people living in
other countries. These obligations are crucial for human rights to
assume their role as a legal basis for regulating globalization and creating an enabling international environment for the universal fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights (ETO Consortium 2022).
Given the transboundary nature of many of today’s human rights
challenges, including climate change and eco-destruction, tax eva-
elimination of the obstacles toward creating an enabling
international environment for development, rather than
being limited to obligations and responsibilities in conventional human rights frameworks. Second, the RTD claims
that International Financial Institutions (IFIs), such as the
World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and World Trade
Organization are key international development actors, and
thereby have a role to play in the realization of the RTD. In
this way, the RTD addresses global governance of policies
and norms in ways that more conventional human rights are
limited or ill-equipped from doing so.
What are the ways forward to redress, reform and ultimately begin to dismantle the complex web of structural
financial power, underpinned by trade and financial liberalization, which together generate systemically unequal
relations of external dependency across many parts of the
South? Which are the dimensions of transformation that are
required? This article seeks to advance two levels of change
that are, in many ways, already in motion, and can be further
supported and strengthened on the multiple scales of global
to national and local.
Structural Policy Reforms
First, the structural policy reforms and, in some cases, fundamental transformations, in the scaffolding of the international financial architecture. This involves the advocacy and
analysis for reform on debt, fiscal policy, tax, trade, capital
flows and credit rating agencies that have been articulated
by policymakers, civil society, academics, and social movements over the decades. The key global process that has
sought to address the changes is arguably the United Nations
Financing for Development (FfD), whose original mandate
is to create the precise enabling international environment
highlighted in the RTD, in order to make possible an inclusive and sustainable economic development in the South.
Across the three FfD conferences held thus far, from Monterrey (2002) to Doha (2008) and Addis Ababa (2015), the
original purpose of the FfD process is to facilitate an international financial system that counters the asymmetry of
Footnote 2 (continued)
sion or corporate impunity, it is impossible to guarantee human rights
universally without adhering to both domestic and extraterritorial
obligations. While the universality of human rights has been a cornerstone of the international human rights system since its initial days,
States continue to show reluctance to recognizing and implementing
the extraterritorial dimensions of their human rights obligations. This
reductionism has led to major gaps in the international protection of
human rights, in particular economic, social and cultural rights (ESC
rights). These gaps have become more severe with the advancement
of globalization over the past few decades.
The Structural Power of the State-finance Nexus
power and resources between markets and states. Since its
origins, the FfD process strive to build an intergovernmental
foundation to mobilize and commit greater political will for
an enabling international environment for just development.
While the current politics of the annual ECOSOC Forum on
FfD Follow-up (established through the Addis Ababa Action
Agenda) have, in many ways, shifted away from its original
ethos of structural reform, the understanding that the lived
realities of many developing nations are directly linked to
international actors, from investors to institutions, is perhaps
even more relevant today. The origins of the FfD process
also recognize that current inequalities between and among
nations are significantly shaped by a colonial history that
either constructed or reinforced the material and relational
basis of multiple registers of inequalities, including class,
gender, race, ethnicity, caste, sexuality, ability and so on.
Amidst myriad geopolitical obstacles, the FfD Conferences, as well as other global institutions and processes,
have generated traction on some policy change. However,
an effective mechanism for debt, a governance body for tax,
and policy consensus on capital account regulations and fiscal austerity, continue to hang in the balance, stymied by the
lack of consensus and political will, in large part from rich
countries. Some of the central policy reforms that activate
the RTD by countering financial concentration and lack of
accountability are the following:
the WTO and regional to bilateral trade agreements to
life-saving public health products, as well as to tackle climate change through environmentally sound and climate
change related technologies.
Put an end to the harmful phenomenon of
investor-state dispute settlement system (ISDS), the
defining feature of investment treaties, through which
a foreign investor can bring governments to an international arbitration tribunal and seek significant monetary compensation for measures that impact current or
future profits for the investor. Measures that have been
subjected to challenge include, for example, human
rights, public interest, and environmental regulations.
• An international consensus on capital account regula-
tion on both outflows and inflows as a permanent policy
tool to curb exchange rate volatility, reduce the volume
of speculative portfolio investments, tackle liquidity and
solvency crises, as well as for the pre-emptive prevention
of currency and debt crises.
• Create publicly owned and multilateral credit rating
agencies that promote global public goods and avoid
being both market evaluators and market players simultaneously. Regulate and reduce reliance on existing
credit rating agencies, including by suspending sovereign
downgrades during times of debt distress to prevent the
worsening of debt distress.
• A transparent and binding sovereign debt workout mecha-
nism within a multilateral framework for debt crisis resolution that addresses unsustainable and illegitimate debt
and provides systematic, timely and fair restructuring of
sovereign debt, including debt cancellation, in a process
convening all creditors, from bilateral, multilateral to
private.
• An inclusive intergovernmental body to facilitate international tax cooperation in the form of a UN global tax
convention, where all countries have a seat at the table
and equal say in determining tax rules toward the goal of
eliminating illicit financial flows.
• Countering the bias toward fiscal austerity through a
fiscal policy rooted in sustained and long-term public
investment in, for example, public health, education and
social security, universal social protection floors, progressive taxation of income and capital and protections
for informal sector workers.
• Review and reformulate global trade rules under which
developing countries have increasingly lost the policy
space to support the development of domestic agriculture and key manufacturing sectors, including in critical health and food production, in order for the South
to engage in international trade pursue while ensuring
national self-reliance in critical sectors. Addressing the
constraints posed by intellectual property rights within
The legitimacy, and resilience, of such proposals for
structural policy reform is exactly that globally united
social movements support them, driving the momentum
through their action and voice. Structural change allows for
the developmental role of the state to mediate between the
logic of global finance and the economic and social rights of
people, through global cooperation, to shape policy content.
In the absence of mediation, the calculus of the raw power
of material and resource asymmetry erodes the welfare of
people and communities, often in irreversible ways.
Systemic Delinking
A second way forward proposed here is that of systemic
transformation through delinking. First articulated in
dependency theory, Samir Amin proposed that delinking
from the unequal global production system is a prerequisite for economic sovereignty, in that the South must reorient itself from continual adjustment to the North by compelling the international economic system to meet their
needs (Amin 1990). Delinking does not require cutting
all ties to the global economy; rather, it opens some space
to reorient national development strategies away from the
imperatives of globalization to that of economic, social,
B. Muchhala
and ecological priorities and interests of people. The aim
is to reconstruct the global economy so that the South,
even with its divergences and differences in resources,
access, and interests, can meet their needs rather than
having to unilaterally adjust to the needs of a global system overpowered by a handful of wealthy countries and
regions. For this objective of greater agency, argued Amin,
nations of the South need to strengthen their own productive systems in ways that prioritize the rights of people
rather than the demands on international capital.
Delinking as a strategy entails a turning away from an
excessive focus and reliance on the external sector at the
expense of the internal sector. As such, it is a rerouting
from the global consensus on following a country’s comparative advantage through an export-oriented development model. Amin stressed that not only would strong
domestic support be required to delink from unequal terms
of integration in the global economy, strong South-South
cooperation and alternative institution building are also
critical (Amin 1990: 25–35). Other aspects of delinking
would involve investments in long-term projects, such as
infrastructure, with the goal of improving the quality of
living for most people in the country, rather than maximizing short-term consumption or profit (Kvangraven 2021).
This is, of course, easier said than done. As the world
grows more interconnected, possibilities for delinking
become more challenging.
A key point within the strategy of delinking is that the
specific conditions that allowed for the advancement of
capitalism in Western Europe in the nineteenth century
are not possible to reproduce elsewhere. A new model of
an equitable, rights-based and climate-responsive needs to
be shaped by new ideas that are not necessarily rooted in
neoclassical economic theory or the imperatives of financialization. Delinking also requires a conscious engagement with a pluralism of economic knowledge, methods,
and praxis (Quijano 2007; Mignolo 2009). At least nine
major schools of economics and various other smaller
schools can be considered in delinking, including feminist, ecological, Marxist, Keynesian, developmentalist and
structuralist (Chang 2018). Where neoclassical economic
theory says that societies are made up of rational and selfish individuals, risk is calculable, choices, exchange and
consumption is most important and the free market will
automatically correct inefficiencies; structural, feminist
and development economics says societies are composed
of gender unequal class structures, the world is complex
and uncertain, the most important domain of economies
is production and human welfare, including the care and
informal economies, and the state must use active fiscal
policy to redistribute income to the poor, diversify economies, create jobs and protect local and small businesses.
Conclusion
Structural policy change and systemic delinking are merely a
few examples out of many other strategies toward resolving
the structural asymmetries, policy contradictions and political tensions of an unjust international financial, economic,
and social order. It is beyond the scope of this article to
address the myriad and complex arenas of law, social theory, culture, gender and racial capitalism, for example. All
dimensions of our complex world need to be examined for
the explicit purpose of regenerating old and new pathways,
intentionally in the plural, toward justice, sustainability, and
equity for the vast majority of people and places today.
Ultimately, delinking is about reclaiming the often-unequal configuration of terms, criterion, frameworks, and conditions by which the Global South engages with the world
economy. This calculus then shapes the balance of power
within which local and national economies and societies
confront opportunities, constraints, and a panoply of grey
spaces in-between. Delinking also alters the imaginary of
economy and society through the imperative of structural
and knowledge power, opening spaces for sustained transformations. Such spaces generate the possibility of reaching
beyond the technocratic and positivist policy surface of economic policy and into the underpinning logics and forms of
power, from structural to knowledge, that produces enduring
economic ideologies and its attendant inequalities. Integrating both structural and epistemic delinking into a critical
political economy understanding of the international financial and economic system is neither prescriptive, definitive
nor exhaustive; it is merely one place from which to initiate a
reconceptualization of the political economy of development
rooted in the terrain of power, history, and politics.
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