Running Head: NEGOTIATION
Negotiation
Leigh L. Thompson
Jiunwen Wang
Brian C. Gunia
Kellogg School of Management
Northwestern University
Annual Review of Psychology, 2010
Negotiation
Abstract
Negotiation occurs whenever people cannot achieve their own goals without the cooperation
of others. Our review highlights recent, empirical research that investigates this ubiquitous,
social activity. We selectively review descriptive research emerging from social psychology and
organizational behavior. This research examines the behavior and outcomes of negotiators
located at five levels of analysis: intrapersonal, interpersonal, group, organizational, and virtual.
At each level, we review research on negotiation processes and outcomes, and we discuss the
implications of various processes and outcomes for the two functions of negotiation: value
creation (integrative negotiation) and value claiming (distributive negotiation).
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INTRODUCTION
Anytime people cannot achieve their goals without the cooperation of others, they are
negotiating. By this definition, negotiation is a ubiquitous social activity. Research on
negotiation has been influenced by a wide variety of fields, including mathematics, management,
organizational behavior, social psychology, cognitive psychology, economics, communication
studies, sociology, and political science. The products of this multidisciplinary approach have
been intense theoretical development and an impressive body of empirical findings.
Negotiation research has undergone several phases, characterized by different paradigms of
thought. For example, during the 1980s, negotiation research was heavily influenced by game
theory and behavioral decision theory. During the 1990s, negotiation research was strongly
influenced by social psychology. At the turn of the millennium, negotiation research has become
decidedly cognitive in flavor. Each generation of research has provided scholars with a new
vantage point from which to examine the complex dance of negotiation.
One of the most important theoretical distinctions in negotiation scholarship is the one
defining normative and descriptive research (Raiffa 1982). Normative research, largely derived
from game theory, economics, and mathematics, proposes optimal models of the negotiation
problem and prescribes what people would do if they were wise and all-knowing (cf. Luce &
Raiffa 1957, Nash 1951). In this review, we focus on descriptive research, which recognizes that
negotiators do not always behave in a game-theoretic, optimal fashion. The way negotiators
actually behave usually departs significantly from normative, economic models (but not
necessarily from behavioral economic models; Camerer 2003). For example, whereas normative
models predict that people willshould almost always defect in a prisoner’s dilemma or social
dilemma, actual defection rates are dramatically lower than 100% (Camerer 2003, Komorita &
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Parks 1995). Moreover, normative models of negotiation dictate that parties should reach Paretooptimal settlements, defined as agreements that cannot be improved upon without hurting one or
both of the parties’ outcomes. However, very few negotiators reach Pareto-optimal outcomes on
a regular basis (Thompson 2009, Thompson & Hastie 1990).
Our focus is limited to descriptive research influenced by social psychology and its close
cousin, organizational behavior---both of which have strongly influenced negotiation research
since 1980. We focus on empirical studies that examine the individual negotiator within one or
more of five systems---intrapersonal, interpersonal, group, organizational, and virtual. We use
these systems as a guide for organizing our review. Within each system, we focus on two
overarching themes: integrative negotiation and distributive negotiation, described further below.
The Intrapersonal, Interpersonal, Group, Organizational, and Virtual Systems
We use the term “intrapersonal system” to signify the ways that negotiation behavior and
outcomes depend upon the perceptions and inner experiences of the negotiator. For example, the
intrapersonal system might include research on how an individual’s sense of psychological
power influences his or her negotiation behavior, satisfaction, and outcomes. The interpersonal
system refers to the ways that negotiators’ behavior and outcomes depend upon the presence of
the other party or parties---negotiations in the context of others, and the dyadic aspects of
negotiation behavior. Investigations of how a focal negotiator’s mood influences the other
party’s behavior and the ultimate negotiation outcome exemplify this system. The group system
encompasses social dynamics that extend beyond a single dyad---for example, group identity,
cultural identity, coalitions, and conformity. The organizational system represents a higher level
of analysis and examines the negotiator as embedded in a larger network or marketplace. For
example, some studies at this level investigate how negotiators choose optimal counterparties in
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a marketplace of negotiators. Finally, the virtual system focuses on how negotiators’ medium of
interaction---such as face-to-face, phone, or email---affects the nature and quality of negotiation
processes and outcomes. Several studies have investigated whether negotiators are more likely to
discover mutual value when negotiating face-to-face or via computer (cf. Morris et al. 2002,
Naquin & Paulson, 2003, Purdy et al. 2000).
Integrative and Distributive Negotiation
Whereas the independent variables or causal factors underlying negotiation have been highly
eclectic and strongly influenced by the contemporary theoretical milieu, the dependent variables
under investigation have remained consistent across several decades. The main reason for this
consistency is the influence of economics on negotiation research. Within negotiation research,
the two dependent variables that appear in virtually every published study of negotiation are
negotiation processes and outcomes.
Negotiation processes include negotiators’ behaviors, cognitions, emotions, and motivations.
For example, much social psychological research has focused on negotiator satisfaction and the
perceived relationship between the parties (see Curhan et al. 2006 for a review). Negotiation
outcomes include the integrative and distributive features of the agreement. By “integrative,” we
mean the extent to which the negotiated outcome satisfies the interests of both parties in a way
that the outcome cannot be improved upon without hurting one or more of the parties involved
(i.e., Pareto optimality) (Pareto 1935). A classic example of Pareto optimality is the story of the
two sisters who quarreled bitterly over a single orange (Fisher & Ury 1981). The sisters resolved
the dispute by cutting the orange in half, such that each sister received exactly 50%. Later, the
sisters discovered that one only needed the juice whereas the other only needed the rind;
unfortunately they had failed to realize this during the negotiation itself. Cutting the orange in
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half was not an integrative outcome, because another feasible solution would have
simultaneously improved both sisters’ outcomes---one sister could have received all of the juice
and the other all of the rind. This solution would have fully maximized both parties’ interests.
The fact that another feasible solution would have been better for both parties suggests that the
actual outcome was suboptimal or Pareto inefficient, as opposed to integrative.
The distributive aspect of negotiation refers to how negotiators divide or apportion scarce
resources among themselves. For example, in the classic ultimatum game (Güth et al. 1982, Ochs
& Roth 1989), one person (“player 1”) receives a fixed amount of money (say $100) to divide
with another person. Player 1 proposes a split of the $100; if player 2 agrees, the proposed split
takes effect. If player 2 rejects the proposal, each party gets $0. The split that Player 1 proposes
can be perceived to be fair or acceptable to player 2, leading player 2 to accept the offer. In this
case, the distributive aspect of the negotiation is the proportion of the original $100 that each
negotiator receives.
Recently, the initial focus on the economic outcomes of negotiation has widened to include
investigations of subjective outcomes. Whereas rational behavior in negotiation is usually
equated with the maximization of economic gain, joint or individual, some have argued that it is
equally appropriate to consider social-psychological outcomes, such as the quality of the
relationship, the degree of trust between parties, each negotiator’s satisfaction, and each person’s
willingness to negotiate with the other in the future. In an attempt to measure subjective
concerns, Curhan and his colleagues surveyed people on what they value in negotiation (Curhan
et al. 2006). Four distinct considerations emerged: feelings about instrumental outcomes (i.e.,
how much money they made), feelings about themselves (e.g., how competent they were in the
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negotiation), feelings about the process (e.g., whether the conversation was constructive) and
feelings about the relationship (i.e., whether the negotiation preserved or strengthened it).
INTRAPERSONAL LEVEL
Negotiation research at the intrapersonal level of analysis clearly recognizes the multiparty
nature of negotiation, but it emphasizes how the inner experience of the negotiator impacts
negotiation processes and outcomes, and vice-versa. We focus on three interrelated intrapersonal
constructs that have received significant research attention in recent years---power, gender, and
affect. Many studies of power, gender, and affect in negotiations follow from research stimulated
by the work of Steele (Steele & Aronson 1995), Banaji (Blair & Banaji 1996), Greenwald
(Greenwald et al. 1996), Bargh (Bargh & Pietromonaco 1982), and others on the behavioral
effects of unconscious priming. This research examines how subtle, below-threshold activation
of concepts influences above-threshold behaviors. In negotiations, above-threshold behaviors
substantially impact negotiation processes and outcomes, which may unconsciously activate
other cognitions and behaviors.
Power
Power refers to an individual’s relative ability to alter other people’s outcomes (Keltner et al.
2003). Several studies examine psychological power as a state, operationalized through priming,
but others examine power as a trait or individual difference. Although negotiators may have
several sources of structural power (French & Raven 1959), the most commonly investigated
source of power is the negotiator’s best alternative to a negotiated agreement (“BATNA”: Fisher
& Ury 1981).
A negotiator’s BATNA has become the primary indicator of a negotiator’s relative power in
negotiation. The BATNA concept was formally introduced by Fisher and Ury in 1981; however,
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the concept actually traces back to the social exchange theory of Thibaut & Kelley (1959).
Exchange theory cites rewards (borrowed from psychology) and resources (borrowed from
economics) as the foundation of interpersonal exchanges. Rewards refer to the benefits a person
enjoys from participating in a relationship (Thibaut & Kelley 1959), whereas resources are any
commodities, material or symbolic, that can be transmitted through interpersonal behavior (Foa
& Foa 1975) and give one person the capacity to reward another (Emerson 1976). Satisfaction
with an exchange relationship is derived in part from the evaluation of the outcomes available in
a relationship. Outcomes are equal to the rewards obtained from a relationship minus the costs
incurred.
People in social exchanges compare the outcomes of the current exchange with the outcomes
they could achieve in an alternative exchange---these alternative outcomes are operationalized as
the “comparison level of alternatives,” or CLalt. When the CLalt exceeds the outcomes available
in a current relationship, the person is more likely to leave the relationship. The concept of CLalt
is parallel to BATNA. When one’s BATNA is better than an agreement one can reach with a
particular negotiation counterpart, one should choose to not agree and exercise the BATNA
instead.
Negotiators’ BATNAs are strongly related to their reservation points (RPs). RPs are the
quantification of a negotiator’s BATNA (Raiffa 1982). According to Raiffa (1982), a
negotiator’s RP is the point at which a negotiator is indifferent between reaching a deal with
party A or walking away from the table and exercising hisher BATNA. For a seller, prices
exceeding reservation points are acceptable; for a buyer, prices less than reservation points are
acceptable. RPs are generally operationalized as the value attached to a negotiator’s BATNA,
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plus or minus the value of any idiosyncratic preferences they attach to reaching agreement versus
exercising the BATNA.
Just as BATNA traces to Thibaut & Kelley’s (1959) earlier concept of CLalt, reservation
price traces to Walton & McKersie’s (1965) concept of resistance point, described in their book
A Behavioral Theory of Labor Relations. Resistance point is a negotiator’s subjectively
determined bottom line---the point at which negotiators are indifferent between reaching
agreement and walking away, in the midst of the negotiation. Walton & McKersie (1965)
postulated that negotiators who had more attractive resistance points were in a more powerful
position because they could simply offer the other party just enough to meet their resistance
point and claim the rest (the surplus) for themselves. Although the concept of reservation price
has largely displaced the concept of resistance point in recent academic research, resistance
points provided an important theoretical step toward specifying the concept of bargaining zone.
Bargaining zone is basically the overlap between two negotiators’ RPs---the buyer’s RP minus
the seller’s RP. If this number is positive, a zone of possible agreement (ZOPA) is said to exist;
if it is negative, no ZOPA exists.
Research studying the effects of power have documented that there is a strong, causal
relationship between the attractiveness of a negotiator’s BATNA and the negotiator’s ability to
claim resources in a given negotiation (Galinsky & Mussweiler 2001, Magee et al. 2007,
Mussweiler & Strack 1999). Negotiators with attractive BATNAs are considered “powerful”;
these negotiators are decidedly more assertive in negotiations. For example, powerful people
move first, both by initiating negotiations and by making the first offer (Magee et al. 2007).
When power is primed (by instructing people to write about a time when they felt powerful or to
perform a word-completion task involving words about power), these individuals often make the
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first offer in negotiations. If the concept of BATNA is a measure of structural power, then
chronic tendencies to dominate others in social relationships reflect personal power. Both
structural and personal power can improve negotiators’ outcomes by leading them to make the
first offer (Galinsky & Mussweiler 2001, Magee et al. 2007, Mussweiler & Strack 1999).
Although having power may increase a negotiator’s propensity to make a first offer, this may
depend on the nature of the negotiation. Specifically, it is reasonable to assume that if both
negotiators have attractive BATNAs, their motivation to reach mutual agreement is not as high
as that of two negotiators with very poor alternatives. Thus, the effects of one’s power in a
negotiation may depend on the size of the bargaining zone. Given that BATNAs establish the
minimum level of benefits one would receive, irrespective of what occurs in the negotiation,
their influence quickly diminishes once benefits equivalent to the BATNA value have been
attained.
In fact, strong BATNAs improved negotiators’ outcomes more when the bargaining zone
was small rather than large (Kim & Fragale 2005, Magee et al. 2007).When the bargaining zone
was large, power tended to derive more from a negotiator’s contribution to the negotiation. In
this case, contribution refers to the benefits that a negotiator contributes beyond the value of the
counterparty’s BATNA. For instance, if the counterparty is selling a house and has a BATNA
(e.g., another buyer offering $200K for the house) and the negotiator offers $210K for the house,
the difference, or $10K, is the contribution.
Once an offer equaled the value of one’s BATNA in Kim and Fragale’s research, outcomes
depended more on the extent to which the counterparty could contribute value beyond the
BATNA. Contributions thus exerted an important influence on negotiation outcomes, especially
as the potential agreement became more valuable (relative to negotiators’ BATNAs).
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Gender
Power is manifested and expressed by negotiators in many ways. For example, power can
depend upon structural factors (e.g., BATNA) or on personal characteristics. A negotiator’s
structural power can change when environmental conditions change, but personal power is, for
the most part, fixed. For example, a negotiator who is selling her house and has currently an
attractive offer from a very motivated buyer has a lot of structural power; however, if the buyer
suddently withdraws the offer on the house (perhaps due to a failed home inspection), the
negotiator’s power plummets. Conversely, a negotiator who is a vice president of a major
company and has a lot of personal charm also holds high power, which is more resilitent to
temporary fluctuations of the market (except in the case of losing her job!). One important and
thoroughly researched source of personal power is gender.
To exert influence in a negotiation, gender must be activated or made salient (Kray &
Thompson 2005). In a series of investigations modeled after Steele & Aronson (1995), Kray et
al. (2001) did just this. Specifically, they investigated whether the mere activation of gender (and
its accompanying stereotypes) impacts negotiation performance. The authors reasoned that
women are stereotypically viewed as less assertive and agentic than men. Because many people
see negotiation as a situation requiring assertive and agentic behavior, stereotypically female
traits may seem inconsistent with negotiation once the connection is made salient. For these
reasons, the mere mention of negotiation might create an internal conflict within women: On one
hand, they may believe that performing well requires them to engage in counterstereotypical
behaviors. On the other hand, they may believe that others expect them to behave in an
accommodating, nonassertive fashion.
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Kray et al. (2001) hypothesized that the mention of gender might operate much like
stereotype threat (Steele & Aronson 1995). Salient gender might thus operate like a low-power
state, preventing women from acting assertively. In their study, women did, in fact, get worse
outcomes than did men in mixed-gender negotiations, when an implicit gender stereotype was
subtly activated. However, it was reasoned that explicit activation of the gender stereotype may
allow women to counteract it. As predicted, explicitly activated gender stereotypes led to a
stereotype-reactance effect, in which women actually outperformed men by claiming more
resources (presumably in an attempt to defy the stereotype). Women effectively said, “Well,
unassertive behavior and accommodation may be the cultural stereotype of women, but it is
surely not me!”
In another series of studies, Kray and colleagues (2004) reasoned that negotiation, like other
social activities, can be construed as either a masculine or feminine activity. The masculine
construal of negotiation involves agency and assertiveness. It is possible to construe successful
negotiation as understanding human behavior, perceiving nonverbal cues, and building trust.
Arguably, these skills are more consistent with the classic female stereotype. Indeed, women
outperformed men when traditionally feminine traits were linked with negotiation success, and
each gender outperformed the other when the other gender was linked with negotiation
ineffectiveness (Kray et al. 2001).
The implications of stereotype activation may also depend on whether negotiators have high
or low power (Kray et al. 2004). Specifically, activation of an explicit male stereotype led to
negotiated outcomes that favored the high-power negotiator, whereas activation of an explicit
female stereotype led to more integrative, win-win outcomes that were beneficial for both
parties, much like the sisters who discovered the juice-and-rind tradeoff.
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Other studies (Small et al. 2007) examine gender differences in the willingness to initiate
negotiation (Babcock et al. 2006, Bowles et al. 2007; but see Gerhart & Rynes 1991), tracing
these differences to power differentials. Because women traditionally have less power than do
men in U.S. society (Eagly & Wood 1982), they initiate negotiations less often; however, this
difference is attributable to the fact that situations framed as “negotiation” conflict with
politeness norms that prevail in low-power groups (Babcock et al. 2006). Consistent with this
reasoning and the links between gender and power, framing negotiations as opportunities to
“ask” eliminated gender differences in negotiation initiation, as did priming psychological power
(Kray et al. 2001). Along similar lines, Bowles et al. (2007) traced differences in the initiation of
negotiation behavior to observers’ reactions. Both male and female observers penalized female
job candidates for initiating negotiations. Consistent with Small et al.’s (2007) politeness
argument, participants rated women who initiated negotiations as less nice and more demanding.
Moreover, women were less likely than were men to initiate negotiations with a male (but not a
female) evaluator.
Another stream of gender research examines what happens when women do, in fact, initiate
negotiation. Although gender differences in actual negotiation behavior have received exhaustive
research attention (e.g., Deal 2000, Gerhart & Rynes 1991, Major et al. 1984, Stevens et al.
1993, Watson 1994), recent meta-analyses (Stuhlmacher & Walters 1999, Walters et al. 1998)
characterize such differences as modest and context dependent. According to these metaanalyses, women negotiate slightly more cooperatively than do men, but situational factors such
as relative power of the negotiator, integrative potential of the task, and mode of communication
often override this effect. In addition, other individual differences (i.e., social motives) explain
cooperation in negotiation more readily than gender does. For example, negotiators with a
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prosocial motive behave more cooperatively (and achieve better outcomes) than do those with an
egoistic motive (De Dreu et al. 2000). Gender differences seem to explain relatively little
variance by comparison, and it is possible that the variance they do explain reflects underlying
gender differences in social motives.
There are behavioral implications of gender-dependent power. For example, does
maintaining steady eye contact have different power implications for male and female
negotiators (Swaab & Swaab 2009)? In some conditions, negotiators had the potential to make
eye contact (i.e., visual access), but in other conditions, negotiators did not. When negotiators
made eye contact (and when visual access was possible), agreement quality was maximized for
women but minimized for men (Swaab & Swaab 2009). Apparently, women and men had
different affective experiences during negotiation. When men made eye contact, perceived power
differences were exacerbated, creating a sense of discomfort that undermined agreement quality.
Affect
Forgas’s (1995) affect infusion model considers the impact of mood on cognitive processing,
identifying two overarching conditions under which mood is likely to affect information
processing. The first condition is when situations require cognition about difficult, peripheral
subjects; the second is when situations require judgment of obscure, atypical subjects (Forgas
1995). According to the affect infusion model, the adoption of information processing style also
depends on a combination of factors such as the novelty, complexity, and salience of the task,
and the personality, motivation, affective state, and cognitive capacity of the person involved in
the judgment process.
The implication for negotiation processes and outcomes is that feeling good or feeling bad
should have important consequences for negotiator cognition and strategies (Lanzetta 1989). In
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one study, positive mood generated superior individual outcomes in negotiations with integrative
potential by producing cooperative negotiation strategies (Forgas 1998). In another study,
positive mood decreased evasive and equivocal communications, especially in high-conflict
negotiations (Forgas & Cromer 2004).
One line of research qualifies these findings by demonstrating that the impact of affect
depends on power. For example, the quality of integrative agreement was better predicted by the
chronic, positive affect of high-power negotiators than that of low-power negotiators (Anderson
& Thompson 2004). Apparently, the more powerful negotiator’s emotions were more influential
than the less powerful negotiator’s emotions. Furthermore, trait-positive effect, combined with
high structural power (i.e., a strong BATNA), helped negotiation dyads reach more integrative
agreements without harming either negotiator’s individual outcomes (Anderson & Thompson
2004). Recently, investigations of negative affect such as anger expressions have also been
examined (Sinaceur & Tiedens 2006). Anger expressions produced concessions from negotiators
with a poor BATNA, presumably because the angry negotiator communicated “toughness.” This
finding contrasts somewhat with earlier investigations in which feelings of high anger and low
compassion produced lower joint outcomes, but not lower individual outcomes (Allred et al.
1997). Similarly, when negotiators expressed positive affect, negative affect, or neutral affect in
a take-it-or-leave-it ultimatum, positive-affect negotiators were most likely to have their
ultimatum accepted. Negative-affect negotiators were the least successful (Kopelman et al.
2000).
Other affective research examined the relationship between economic outcomes, negotiator
behavior, and satisfaction (an affective response to negotiation). For example, a negotiator’s
focus on RP or aspirations influences his feelings of success in a negotiation (Thompson 1995).
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Negotiators with low RPs felt more successful than did those with high RPs, even though their
final settlements were identical. Furthermore, negotiators with low aspirations felt more
successful than did negotiators with high aspirations, even though the final settlement was
identical. Aspirations influenced negotiators’ perceptions of success more than did RPs. In
general, aspirations, relative to RPs, exerted a more powerful influence on the demands people
made to others in negotiations and how successful they felt about negotiated outcomes.
Along similar lines, negotiators might feel dissatisfied when the counterparty acceptstheir
first offer (Galinsky et al. 2002). Apparently, when the counterparty immediately accepts one’s
first offer, a counterfactual thought process is produced (e.g., “oh no, I should have asked for
more!”). This counterfactual thought process results in dissatisfaction, even when negotiators’
outcomes were objectively superior to agreements reached later in negotiations. Thoughts about
how much better they could have done overwhelmed negotiators’ objective outcomes. These
findings are consistent with studies demonstrating that negotiators’ satisfaction depends heavily
on the comparison value on which they focus attention: Negotiators who focused on their target
price consistently achieved better outcomes but were less satisfied than those who focused on
their BATNA (Galinsky et al. 2002). Yet, focusing on the target price during a negotiation and
the BATNA after a negotiation allows negotiators to achieve superior outcomes without the
accompanying dissatisfaction.
An array of negative cognitions and emotions can confront negotiators who fail to reach
deals (O’Connor & Arnold 2001). For example, negotiators who failed to reach agreement (i.e.,
impassed) found themselves caught in a distributive spiral such that they interpreted their
performance as unsuccessful, experienced negative emotions, and developed negative
perceptions of their counterpart and the process. Moreover, they were less willing to work with
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their counterpart in the future, planned to share less information and behave less cooperatively,
and lost faith in negotiation as an effective means of managing conflicts (O’Connor & Arnold
2001).
INTERPERSONAL LEVEL
Economic and Social Psychological Foundations
Traditionally, negotiation at the interpersonal level has been viewed via the lens of mixedmotive interaction. The concept of mixed-motive interaction was first introduced by economist
Thomas Schelling (1960) to refer to situations where two or more parties face a conflict between
two motives: cooperation (the integrative aspects of negotiation) and competition (the
distributive aspects). In negotiations, individuals must cooperate to avoid impasse and reach
mutual agreement, but compete to gain sufficient resources for themselves. Two-person
bargaining is thus a classic example of a mixed-motive interaction. Indeed, Lax & Sebenius
(1986b).
The interpersonal system in negotiation was also richly stimulated by basic research in the
areas of emotional contagion, mimicry, and behavioral synchrony (Chartrand & Bargh 1999).
One finding in these areas, for example, is that people tend to engage in face rubbing, foot
shaking, and smiling more in the presence of someone who engages in that behavior (Chartrand
& Bargh 1999). Another is that behavioral mimicry increases liking and rapport between
interaction partners (Tiedens & Fragale 2003). Beyond behavioral mimicry, more complex
interpersonal mimicry such as mood contagion (see Neumann & Strack 2000) and dominance
complementarity (see Tiedens & Fragale 2003) have also been documented. Mood contagion
effects demonstrate that people easily assume the moods of others. Dominance complementarity
findings demonstrate that people respond to others’ dominant behavior with a submissive stance,
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and vice versa. Furthermore, they demonstrate that when one party complements dominant
behavior with submissive behavior, this facilitates interpersonal liking (Tiedens & Fragale 2003).
Interpersonal Effects of Emotions in Negotiation
Emotions influence negotiations at the interpersonal as well as intrapersonal level. In fact,
research on emotions in negotiation bridges the intrapersonal and interpersonal level. Two
specific emotions, anger and happiness, have received particular attention from negotiation
researchers (Van Kleef et al. 2004a). Participants in one study received information about the
emotional state (anger, happiness, or none) of their opponent (Van Kleef et al. 2004a). Consistent
with the research noted above, participants conceded more to an angry opponent than to a happy
one. Apparently, people used emotion information to infer the other’s limit (i.e., their RP), and
they adjusted their demands accordingly. However, this effect was absent when the other party
made large concessions. Angry communications (unlike happy ones) induced fear and thereby
mitigated the effect of the opponent’s experienced emotion. Negotiators were especially
influenced by their opponent’s emotions when they were motivated to consider them (Van Kleef
et al. 2004b).
The processes and mediators behind the interpersonal effects of emotions may be influenced
by the extent to which individuals are motivated to process information systematically and
deeply (De Dreu & Carnevale 2003, Van Kleef et al. 2004b). For instance, participants in one
study (Van Kleef et al. 2004b) received information about the opponent’s emotion (anger,
happiness, or none).Those in the angry condition received a message saying “this offer makes me
really angry,” whereas those in the happy condition received a message saying “I am happy with
this offer.” As predicted, negotiators conceded more to an angry opponent than to a happy one,
but only when they had low (rather than high) need for cognitive closure---a measure of their
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chronic motivation to process information systematically. Also, participants were only affected
by the other’s emotion under low rather than high time pressure, because time pressure reduced
their capacity for information processing. Finally, negotiators were only influenced by their
opponent’s emotions when they had low (rather than high) power, presumably because highpower negotiators had less need and were less motivated to process this information. These
results support the motivated information-processing model, which argues that negotiators are
only affected by their opponent’s emotions if they are motivated to consider them.
Interpersonal Improvisation in Negotiation
Other research has utilized a more qualitative approach to unpack interpersonal processes in
negotiations. Beyond the focus on economic outcomes in negotiations, negotiators may
sometimes also be focused on relationship processes and outcomes (McGinn & Keros 2002).
Specifically, McGinn & Keros (2002) highlight the improvisation and the logic of exchange
in socially embedded transactions. Socially embedded transactions take into account that
negotiators can have deep social ties or share mutual social ties with one another. This is in
contrast to the arm’s length transaction between individuals, in which individuals share little
familiarity or affect and no prolonged past or expected future ties (Granovetter 1973, Podolny &
Baron 1997, Uzzi 1997).
By improvisation, McGinn & Keros (2002) conjecture that most people at the outset of a
negotiation do not construe it as such. This is because whereas arm’s length transactions are
often guided by a logic of profit maximization, embedded transactions (such as between friends)
go beyond the focus on outcomes alone; they tend to focus on rules of friendships as opposed to
rules of the market.
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In a qualitative fashion, McGinn & Keros (2002) used a sense-making lens to illuminate
microprocesses underlying socially embedded transactions, investigating how social networks
affect the logic of exchange governing the transaction. Transcript analysis of two-party
negotiations revealed that most pairs of negotiators quickly coordinated a shared logic of
exchange and improvised in accord with its implied rules throughout their interaction. The
improvisation took the form of opening up, working together, or haggling. Negotiators used three
dynamic processes---trust testing, process clarification, and emotional punctuation---when they
had difficulty moving the interaction toward a coherent, mutually agreed-upon pattern. Social
embeddedness, or the extent to which an individual shares other social connections with another
individual (Granovetter 1973), eases coordination within negotiation (McGinn & Keros 2002).
Subjective Value in Negotiation
As noted above, negotiators have noneconomic, relational concerns as well as economic
ones. Besides their concern with economic gains, negotiators are also concerned about their
feelings about the self, the negotiation process, and the relationship (Curhan et al. 2006).
Moreover, the “subjective value” accrued from these components of negotiation have longlasting impact (Curhan et al. 2009). For example, the subjective value that actual managers
derived from job offer negotiations predicted their subsequent job attitudes and turnover
intentions better than the economic value they achieved: Subjective value measured at the outset
of a negotiation predicted managers’ job satisfaction and likelihood of quitting a full one year
later. Curiously, negotiators’ economic outcomes (i.e., their actual salaries) did not predict
satisfaction, nor turnover. Arguably, the subjective value gained from a negotiation may have
more long-lasting impact than the actual economic gains from the negotiation.
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Negotiation
However, one potentially important consideration is whether subjective value conflicts with
economic value in negotiations. To examine this, negotiators who held relational goals were
compared with negotiators who held economic goals. If relational goals hinder economic gain,
then it would be reasonable to expect negotiators to underperform relative to economically
motivated negotiators (Curhan et al. 2008). Indeed, negotiators in egalitarian organizations
reached less-efficient (i.e., worse) economic outcomes but had higher relational capital than did
those who negotiated in hierarchical organizations. By directly pitting economic gain against
relational considerations, this study showed how the structure of one’s environment (egalitarian
versus hierarchical) can influence one’s own goals and therefore negotiation outcomes.
Trust and Tactics
Mutual trust is an essential ingredient in effective organizations (see Dirks & Ferrin 2001)
and negotiations (Kimmel et al. 1980). Trust, defined as the intention to accept vulnerability
based upon positive expectations of the counterpart’s behavior and intentions (Rousseau et al.
1998), allows negotiators to exchange the information necessary for integrative agreements.
Distrusting negotiators are reluctant to share information or ask questions, believing that their
counterparts will take advantage of shared information and respond to their questions
dishonestly. Conversely, trusting negotiators believe their counterparts will use information to
identify integrative agreements. They also tend to believe information that the counterpart shares,
accepting it as sincere and accurate (Parks et al. 1996). As a result, trusting negotiators exchange
more information about preferences and priorities and achieve more integrative outcomes (Butler
1995, Kimmel et al. 1980, Pruitt & Kimmel 1977, Weingart et al. 1993).
Despite the importance of trust, violations of trust are common (see Elangovan & Shapiro
1998 for a review), jeopardizing the integrativeness of negotiation outcomes. Given the mixed-
21
Negotiation
motive nature of negotiation, it is tempting for negotiators to use deception to maximize their
personal gain. Yet, deception is likely to compromise trust. Thus, an important question is when
people will lie in negotiations. People tend to lie when the lures of temptation and uncertainty
align with powerless and anonymous victims (Tenbrunsel & Diekmann 2007). The more
negotiators stand to gain economically, the more likely they are to lie (Bazerman, Tenbrunsel
and Wade-Benzoni 1998). Moreover, the more uncertainty negotiators have about material
factors, the more likely they are to lie. Of course, liars often garner a reputation as such, making
it more difficult for them to win counterparts’ trust in the future (Glick & Croson 2001).
Given that negotiators may sometimes resort to deceptive tactics in negotiations, another
important consideration is how interpersonal trust broken by deceptive behavior can be restored.
One theory holds that broken trust can never be fully restored, even if the trust breaker performs
a series of consistently trustworthy actions (Schweitzer et al. 2006), such as fulfilled promises,
apologies, and consistently reliable behavior. A promise to change behavior can significantly
speed the trust recovery process, but prior deception harms the effectiveness of a promise in
accelerating trust recovery. Another perspective holds that apologies can effectively restore trust
when the trust violation concerns a matter of competence, but not when it concerns a matter of
integrity (Kim et al. 2004).
In a given negotiation, tactics such as threats, bluffs, and disclaimers can affect negotiators’
relationships and the grounds for their trust. For example, a buyer-seller simulation with two
negotiation periods examined the behavioral and attitudinal consequences of threats, bluffs, and
disclaimers (Shapiro & Bies 1994). Some negotiators received a threat stated as a disclaimer,
whereas others did not. Changes in negotiators’ evaluations of their partner and negotiation
outcomes were examined after some were led to believe their partner had stated a false threat (a
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Negotiation
bluff). Negotiators who used threats were perceived as more powerful, but they were also
perceived as less cooperative and achieved lower integrative agreements than those who did not
use threats.
Relationships and Negotiations
Perhaps the most straightforward question one could investigate about the interpersonal
aspects of negotiation is whether people involved in a relationship can fashion integrative
agreements better than strangers can. Kelley (1982) studied how couples negotiate problems of
interdependence. Yet, the first study that truly examined how people in relationships, versus
strangers, negotiate was Fry, Firestone and Williams’ (1983) study of dating couples.
Paradoxically, strangers were more likely to reach win-win (mutually beneficial agreements)
than were dating couples, although the effect did not reach conventional levels of significance.
The authors’ reasoning was that couples (and perhaps friends) are uncomfortable asserting their
own needs and therefore are more willing to settle for suboptimal agreements.
The orientation that friends bring to a negotiation seems to dictate the outcomes they achieve.
Pairs of friends who are similar in communal orientation are most likely to capitalize on joint
interests (Thompson & DeHarrport 1998). However, when friends are dissimilar in communal
orientation, their ability to identify compatible issues declines precipitously. Friends who are
high in communal orientation are more likely to allocate resources equally than are friends low
in communal orientation. The existence of friendships also has significant implications for one’s
negotiation outcomes (Seidel et al. 2000). Seidel and colleagues analyzed more than 3000 actual
salary negotiations and found that having friends in high places within the relevant organization
improved salary negotiation outcomes.
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Negotiation
Whereas the studies reviewed above tend to focus on economic outcomes, negotiations also
involve symbolic resources such as identity and legitimacy. Glynn (2000) studied identity and
legitimacy during a musicians’ strike at the Atlanta Symphony Orchestra. Glynn analyzed the
musicians and administrators as competing parties vying for the legitimacy to define the core
identity of the orchestra. Embedded within the multilayered negotiation, Glynn reports, “were
conflicts over status and power and, implicitly, control over the resources that would confer such
status and power” (p. 291). This study illustrates that relationships not only influence
negotiations, but negotiations can reconstitute and reshape relationships.
GROUP LEVEL
The group system focuses on how group dynamics influence negotiation processes and
outcomes. In this section, we selectively focus on four major streams of research at the group
level: social and group identity, relational and collective identity, group culture, and teams and
the discontinuity effect. Some of this research uses paradigms derived from game theory (e.g.,
social dilemmas), but we include it in this review because it speaks directly to descriptive
negotiation research.
Social and Group Identity
According to the group identity perspective, which is part of a larger social identity tradition
(e.g., Tajfel et al. 1971), the stronger an individual’s group identity, the less sharply he or she
distinguishes between self-interest and collective interest. For negotiation, this implies that
distributive (personal gains) are less focal than integrative (mutual gains) for negotiators who
consider counterparts members of their group. This conjecture has been examined most directly
in the social dilemma literature, which examines situations where individual and collective
interest are largely opposed.
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Negotiation
There are two perspectives concerning choice in a social dilemma situation. From a purely
economic point of view, the rational choice is to defect because it yields greater outcomes. Of
course, if everyone defects, then the collective welfare of the group suffers. The social
psychological viewpoint is that defection is undesirable and people are best served when
everyone puts self-interest aside and chooses to maximize group interests. Kramer & Brewer
(1984) pioneered the study of group identity in social dilemma and negotiation research. By
emphasizing the common fate among group members and the salience of a superordinate group
identity, they showed that the degree of cooperation in social dilemmas increases (Brewer &
Kramer 1986, Kramer & Brewer 1984). Another way of inducing group identity is to extend the
length of time a person expects to be part of a group. In one study (Mannix & Loewenstein
1993), people who expected to be part of a group for a long time were more concerned with the
welfare of the group than were people who anticipated a fleeting interaction. Moreover,
negotiators who perceived that other group members would leave cooperated less than did those
who expected the group to remain intact (Mannix & Loewenstein 1993).
These studies suggest that making group identity salient tends to activate different
negotiation processes producing different outcomes. Yet, the importance of group identity in
mixed-motive interactions such as negotiation has not gone unchallenged. Kerr & KaufmanGilliland (1994) examined the impact of social identity on cooperation in social dilemmas. In a
carefully constructed set of studies, they found strong support for the idea that it is negotiators’
verbal promises that increase cooperation in social dilemmas, not simply the extent to which
negotiators feel identified with their group.
Relational and Collective Identity
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Negotiation
Recently, work on identity has moved from the extent to which individuals feel they are a
part of their group to the nature of the identity. For example, Markus & Kitayama (1991) focused
on whether people hold independent or interdependent identities, or self-construals. A person
who holds an independent self-construal defines him or herself in terms of the attributes,
preferences, and traits that make him or her unique and autonomous. In contrast, a person with
an interdependent self-construal is more likely to define himself or herself in terms of his or her
social and group relationships (Gardner et al. 1999, Markus & Kitayama 1991). In a one-on-one
dispute-negotiation context, Seeley, Gardner and Thompson (2007) primed independent versus
interdependent self-construals and found that negotiators with interdependent self-construals
were more generous than were independent negotiators. However, this effect completely
reversed in a team-on-team context, such that teams with independent self-construals (i.e., highly
defined by their own attributes) were more generous than teams with interdependent selfconstruals (i.e., defined with reference to the other team). All of these effects held primarily for
high-power negotiators. The implication is that interdependent self-construals seem to evoke a
benevolent use of power in dyadic contexts but a more exploitative use of power in intergroup
contexts.
Very little research has examined the possibility of reverse causality between negotiation and
social identity---that the negotiation process itself could influence people’s identity. Thompson
(1993) examined how negotiation affects intergroup relations. People who negotiated with an
out-group member developed more favorable evaluations of the out-group, whereas people who
negotiated with an in-group member were more likely to show in-group favoritism. However,
when the negotiation situation dictated that negotiators could not reach a mutually beneficial
agreement, the positive effects of interpersonal negotiation disappeared. Thus, negotiation with
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Negotiation
out-group members improves intergroup relations in negotiations with integrative potential.
Furthermore, outcomes are comparable regardless of the counterpart’s group membership.
Whereas individuals expecting to negotiate with out-group members thought they would obtain
lower outcomes than those expecting to negotiate with in-group members, the value of the actual
outcomes achieved did not differ.
Culture
One important aspect of identity is culture, or the distinctive characteristics of a particular
social group (Lytle et al. 1995). Culture is manifest in a group’s values, beliefs, norms, and
behavioral patterns. An underlying feature of Western cultures is the use formal logic and
avoidance of contradiction (Nisbett et al. 2001). In contrast, in non-Western cultures, cognition is
characterized by a holistic system of thought. Individuals view themselves as embedded and
interdependent with a larger social context. They also tend to focus their cognitive attention on
relationships and context (Peng & Nisbett 1999).
One result of this difference in systems of thought is that negotiators from different cultures
make more or less use of emotional appeals. Emotional appeals are relatively inconsistent with
formal logic. Thus, negotiators from non-Western cultures tend to make more emotional appeals
than do U.S. negotiators (Drake 1995). For instance, Taiwanese negotiators used more normative
statements referring to social roles and relationships than did U.S. negotiators (Drake 1995).
Conversely, U.S. negotiators used more statements emphasizing logic and reasoning than did
Taiwanese negotiators.
Another important cultural difference between Western negotiators and non-Western
negotiators is the motivation that they bring to the negotiating table. Motivation is the focused
and persistent energy that drives cognition and behavior (Mook 2000). Motivation impacts how
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Negotiation
negotiators approach negotiations and evaluate outcomes. In Western cultures, negotiators tend
to judge negotiation outcomes by the joint profit that accrues and the value that they themselves
claim (Lax & Sebenius 1986c; Neale & Bazerman 1992). However, in non-Western cultures,
negotiators may care more about relational capital---the mutual trust, knowledge, and
commitment that can accrue from negotiating---more than economic outcomes ). ( (Gelfand et
al. 2006)
For example, Japanese negotiators place a high value on relational capital: They prefer and
even insist on negotiating with people with whom they have a relationship or social network,
even if it means forgoing potential economic benefits (Graham & Sano 1989, Yamagishi &
Yamagishi 1994). Indian managers, on the other hand, may assume lower relational capital in the
form of mutual trust than do American managers, and negotiations may serve to reaffirm their
assumptions (Gunia et al. 2009). In two studies, Indian managers’ lower level of trust led to low
joint gains relative to the gains of American managers.
Culture also has important effects on how individuals perceive causality. Psychological
research has demonstrated that members of Western cultures tend to make the fundamental
attribution error more often than do members of non-Western cultures (Nisbett et al. 2001, Peng
& Nisbett 1999). That is, they underestimate the impact of situational factors and overestimate
the impact of others’ dispositional factors in causing events (Ross 1977). The result for
negotiation is that U.S. negotiators tend to make dispositional attributions for their counterpart’s
behaviors and discount potential situational attributions (Morris et al. 1999). Dispositional
attributions for negative behaviors lead to negative consequences in negotiations. Specifically,
dispositional attributions led to competitive perceptions of the situation and counterpart, resulting
in a preference for adversarial instead of collaborative procedures.
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Negotiation
Groups and the Discontinuity Effect
A central question in group research is whether “two heads are better than one” (Insko et al.
1987, 1988, 1990; Schopler et al. 1991, 1993). This question was first addressed using a simple
prisoner’s dilemma game in which negotiators were offered a cooperative (trusting) choice or a
defecting (self-interested, exploitive) choice. Overwhelmingly, one-on-one negotiators made
more cooperative choices than did group-on-group negotiators, under identical payoffs. Insko et
al. (1987) coined the term “discontinuity effect” to describe the empirical finding that one-onone negotiation behavior cannot be simply extrapolated to group-on-group negotiation behavior.
Schopler & Insko (1992) argued that the discontinuity effect was driven by group members’ fear
of being exploited by the out-group as well as their greed for additional payoffs.
Thompson et al. (1996) examined the discontinuity effect in a markedly different negotiation
paradigm, in which parties’ interests were not completely opposed and a mutually attractive,
optimal outcome existed but was not apparent to negotiators. This paradigm was similar to the
sisters-and-orange parable in the introduction. In terms of integrative outcomes, group-on-group
configurations produced more integrative agreements than did solo-on-solo or solo-on-group. In
terms of distributive outcomes, groups earned more than solos. The authors reasoned that in such
a negotiation, information processing is paramount; indeed, groups asked more relevant
questions, shared more information, and formed more accurate judgments than did solos (see
also Peterson & Thompson 1997). The group-on-group configuration apparently allowed
negotiators to seek and process more of the relevant information.
Morgan & Tindale (2002) attempted to resolve the disparate findings between Insko et al.
(1987) and Thompson et al. (1996). Morgan and Tindale’s insight was that the disparateappearing findings used dramatically different negotiation tasks: Insko and colleagues used a
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Negotiation
prisoner’s dilemma task, whereas Thompson and colleagues used an integrative bargaining task;
the tasks differ in many important ways (see Thompson 2009 for a review of the differences). In
Morgan & Tindale’s (2002) study, negotiators were allowed to reach an agreement on either a
cooperative or competitive integrative bargaining task in one of three formats (group versus
group, group versus single, or one-on-one). Next, negotiators were asked to choose between
maintaining the agreed-upon settlement or defecting within a prisoner’s dilemma payoff
structure. Groups continued to show the discontinuity effect, such that they opted to defect. This
was true even when they had performed better than the solo negotiator with whom they had just
negotiated. Groups shared motives for defection that differ depending upon the nature of the task
and opponent (Morgan & Tindale 2002).
ORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL
The organizational system represents a higher level of analysis than the previous levels; it
examines the negotiator as embedded in a larger network or marketplace. This level of analysis is
crucial because in organizations and in markets, dyads rarely operate in isolation from their
social context. Instead, each negotiator individually typically participates in multiple dyadic
relationships, and these dyadic relationships aggregate to form a complex social structure that
surrounds each dyad and influences trust, expectations, and interpersonal perceptions.
Heider (1958) documented that two people can be connected by a third party, who
strengthens or disturbs the relationship among the two. Contemporary sociologists have also
documented how dyadic relationships and interpersonal behavior may be influenced by the
overall network structure in which the dyad is embedded (e.g., Burt & Knez 1996, Coleman
1990, Granovetter 1985). Despite these foundations, relatively little research has examined how
negotiation dyads operate within their larger social context. In this section, we review three
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Negotiation
streams of negotiation research at the organizational level. The first two examine how
interpersonal connections (choosing negotiation partners and reputations) influence negotiation
processes. The third looks at how organizational or institutional forces impact negotiations.
Choice of Negotiation Partner
A critical issue facing employees and employers, buyers and suppliers, and joint venture
partners is whom to select as a negotiation partner. The vast majority of studies in the existing
negotiation literature have simply assigned negotiation partners (Tenbrunsel et al. 1999). One of
the earliest studies that examined this problem of search and deliberation in partner choice was
Sondak & Bazerman’s (1989) study of matching in quasi-markets. In this paradigm, a large
market of buyers and sellers was created and negotiators were told to partner with whomever
they pleased, to make a deal. The main finding was that substantial economic suboptimality
exists as the result of selection mismatches. People may choose to negotiate with their friends,
even though the integrative potential of negotiating with a stranger may be higher (see also
Northcraft et al. 1998). Similarly, when people had the option to choose their friend as
negotiation partner in a simulated housing market, they often stopped searching and reached a
deal with the friend---overlooking other, potentially fruitful negotiation relationships. Ultimately,
this led to market inefficiencies (Tenbrunsel et al. 1999).
Reputation and Negotiation Through Time
One consideration that influences the integrative and distributive outcomes negotiators
achieve in organizational systems is their reputation. Much sociological and macro
organizational research has documented the importance of reputation in markets (e.g., Raub &
Weesie 1990). In one investigation (Glick & Croson 2001), the impact of reputations among
management students in a semester-long negotiation course were examined. Students rated one
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Negotiation
another on the basis of firsthand experience, from least cooperative to the most cooperative. Four
reputational profiles emerged: the “liar-manipulator” (who will do anything to gain advantage),
“tough-but-honest” (very tough negotiator who makes few concessions but will not lie), “niceand-reasonable” (makes concessions), and “cream puff” (makes concessions and is conciliatory
regardless of what the other does). Once reputations spread through a market, behavior changed.
People acted much tougher when dealing with perceived liar-manipulators, for example.
Furthermore, people used tough or manipulative tactics in a defensive fashion with liarmanipulators and tough-but-honest negotiators, but used them in an opportunistic fashion with
cream puffs (Glick & Croson 2001).
Other research examined how reputation is related to history of negotiation behavior, also in
an MBA class (Anderson & Shirako 2008). The development of reputations was tracked among
individuals who engaged in multiple negotiation tasks across several weeks. Reputations were
only mildly related to the actual history of behavior. However, the link between reputation and
behavior was much stronger for some individuals than others. The link was strongest for those
who were well known and received the most social attention. In contrast, behavior had little
impact on the reputations of lesser-known individuals.
Another, similar perspective suggests that dyadic negotiation is not an isolated event, but
rather influences subsequent dyadic negotiations (O’Connor et al. 2005). Specifically, the quality
of the deals negotiators reached at any point in time were strongly influenced by their previous
bargaining experiences. Negotiators who reached an impasse in a prior negotiation were more
likely either to impasse in their next negotiation or to reach deals of low joint value relative to
those who had reached an initial agreement. Notably, the impact of past performance on
subsequent deals was just as strong for negotiators who changed partners on the second occasion.
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Negotiation
These results highlight the role of bargaining history as a predictor of negotiation behavior.
Moreover, they suggest that, at least in some cases, negotiations should be conceptualized as
interrelated exchanges rather than discrete incidents.
Organizations also impact negotiations via institutional forces. One perspective actually
holds that organizations or institutions may serve as barriers to negotiations (Wade-Benzoni et al.
2002). Specifically, normative factors (obligations, operating procedures), cognitive factors
(cultural values, cognitive frameworks), and regulatory factors (regulations and laws) may
impede negotiations. For example, organizations with cultures emphasizing strict adherence to
procedure may discourage negotiation by explicitly prohibiting it (normative factor) or by
preventing employees from even perceiving it as a viable alternative (cognitive factor). The
value-laden lens that organizationally embedded actors bring may lead to impasse or prevent
people from reaching economically efficient outcomes.
VIRTUAL LEVEL
Given the ubiquity of computer-mediated communication technology in business
communications, consumer transactions, and interpersonal relationships, virtual negotiation is
currently a fertile ground for research (Nadler & Shestowsky 2006).
A straightforward question one might ask is whether negotiation is best conducted face-toface or via computer-mediated communication technology. Answers to this question are
surprisingly mixed (see Nadler & Shestowsky 2006 for a review). In some cases, negotiators
who interact via computer-medicated technology are less likely to reach integrative outcomes
than are negotiators who interact face-to-face (Arunachalam & Dilla 1995, Barefoot &
Strickland 1982) or via paper and pencil (Griffith & Northcraft 1994). On the other hand, some
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Negotiation
studies report no reliable effect of communication medium (Morris et al. 2002, Naquin &
Paulson 2003, Purdy et al. 2000).
With regard to confidence and satisfaction, parties who negotiate face-to-face feel more
confident in their performance and satisfied with their negotiation outcome than do those who
negotiate via computer (Naquin & Paulson 2003, Purdy et al. 2000, Thompson & Coovert 2003).
Moreover, compared to parties who negotiate face-to-face, parties who negotiate via email desire
less future interaction with their counterpart (Naquin & Paulson 2003). Despite these differences
in subjective outcomes, studies that examined the emotional content of messages in email and
face-to-face negotiations found no differences between the two mediums (Morris et al. 2002).
Moderators and Mediators
Though the effects of information technology on interpersonal outcomes in negotiation may
currently seem inconclusive, some studies have identified important mediators that may help to
explain the effects of technology on negotiation in the future. For instance, negotiators behave
more honestly when negotiating face-to-face than via writing (Valley et al. 1998). The
communication medium in which bargaining takes place also affects the efficiency and
distribution of outcomes (Valley et al. 1998). Face-to-face communication may facilitate more
truth-telling and trust than communication via writing, thus influencing negotiation outcomes.
However, negotiators may sometimes behave less cooperatively when they have visual
access to one another than when they do not (Carnevale & Isen 1986, Carnevale et al. 1981). In
one investigation, researchers examined the influence of positive affect and visual access on the
process and outcome of negotiation in an integrative bargaining task (Carnevale & Isen 1986).
Only when negotiators were face-to-face and not in a positive affective state were there heavy
use of contentious tactics, reduced tradeoffs, and few integrative solutions. In other words, when
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Negotiation
negotiators had visual access and were potentially experiencing negative affect, they were more
likely to use contentious tactics.
Other research has examined contexts in which email negotiations may fail or succeed. For
instance, Moore et al. (1999) proposed that there were “long” and “short” routes to success in
electronically mediated negotiations. A long route to success would involve many of the aspects
of deliberate cognitive processing; a short route would involve more heuristic, superficial
processing of information (Fiske 1988, Sloman 2002).
To understand why email negotiations often fail, another study (Moore et al. 1999) examined
two distinct elements of negotiators’ relationships: shared membership in a social group and
mutual self-disclosure. Some participants negotiated with a member of an out-group (a student at
a competitor university), whereas others negotiated with a member of an in-group (a student at
the same university). In addition, some negotiators exchanged personal information with their
counterparts, such as their hometown and hobbies, whereas others did not. When neither
common in-group status nor a personalized relationship existed between negotiators, email
negotiations were more likely to end in impasse. These results were attributable to the positive
influence of mutual self-disclosure and common group membership on negotiation processes and
rapport between negotiators, especially in a relatively impersonal context like email.
CONCLUSION
Our review has focused on a subset of research findings that have strongly impacted the field
of negotiation. The research findings span several decades, but the investigations meaningfully
build upon one another because the key criteria by which scholars evaluate the quality of
negotiation has remained essentially unchanged since the dawn of negotiation research. Modern
negotiation research has greatly benefitted from its economic roots, which have provided
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Negotiation
rigorous methods by which to measure the mutual value created by two or more parties, each
motivated to pursue their own interests. The robust empirical fact that most negotiators fail to
fully maximize their own gains (as well as mutual gains) when seated at the bargaining table has
greatly fueled the fires of negotiation research.
Our focus on intrapersonal, interpersonal, group, organizational and virtual systems has
allowed us to examine the wide lens through which the apparently simple task of negotiation
may be meaningfully studied. The intrapersonal system provides the most close-up view of
negotiation, taking us into the mind and heart of the negotiator, who is either anticipating or
engaging in a negotiation. The interpersonal system is particularly meaningful in negotiation
research because the dyadic process allows us to examine the presence or absence of
interpersonal phenomena such as behavioral synchrony and mutual gaze, which cannot be
reduced to the individual level. The group and organizational systems have been influenced by
rich social psychological, as well as sociological and organizational, traditions. Negotiation
research, like the universe, appears to be expanding rather than contracting. Indeed, the virtual
level has allowed globally dispersed researchers themselves to collaborate while investigating
negotiation at a virtual level. Rather than reporting to a physical laboratory, today’s research
participants often negotiate via computer with people they will never meet.
It is curious how some research topics within the domain of social and organizational
psychology sustain themselves over time, whereas others are mere flashes in the pan.
Negotiation and bargaining research, by nearly any standard, has withstood the test of time.
There are several reasons for its longevity. First, the multidisciplinary nature of negotiation has
brought scholars together, especially from social psychology and organizational behavior and
also from game theory and economics. These multidisciplinary collaborations have created a rich
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Negotiation
network of negotiation scholars that lead to shared volumes, conferences, and even jobs and
research positions, thereby ensuring the longevity of the field. Nearly every business school
offers a course in negotiation that many MBA students take, requiring a cadre of trained faculty
members. The faculties often receive their training in PhD programs or in postdoctoral programs
that focus primarily on negotiation. Graduate students are attracted to such positions and develop
research ideas that are relevant to the broad array of negotiation theory.
A second factor that has contributed to the continued popularity of negotiation research is the
fact that it is considered an essential business, if not a life, skill. The demand for negotiation
skills spurs the development of negotiation books, courses, seminars, cases, and teaching
materials that require theoretical rigor and background. The existence of a normative theory by
which to evaluate the performance of negotiators provides a foundation for meaningful research
and theory. The existence of descriptive theory provides meaningful insights into negotiations as
they typically unfold.
If there is a downside to negotiation research it might be that negotiation has done more
taking than giving, meaning that often the negotiation scholarship is essentially about social or
organizational phenomena that could frankly be studied as easily in other contexts. For example,
one might study behavioral synchrony or mirroring in negotiation, but it is equally plausible to
study these same phenomena in other contexts, like small, collaborative teams or job interviews.
Similarly, more than two decades of research have focused on extending Kahneman et al.’s
(1982) research on judgment biases (e.g., framing, anchoring, overconfidence) to two-party
negotiations (for a review, see Neale & Bazerman 1994). Despite this prodigious borrowing, our
review suggests that negotiation research has yielded many insights of its own and is poised to
yield many more in the future.
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Negotiation
SUMMARY POINTS
1.
Intrapersonal processes such as one’s psychological power and mood impact negotiation
processes and outcomes.
2.
Interpersonal processes such as display of emotions also impact negotiation processes
and outcomes.
3.
When negotiation takes place not between individuals but rather between groups, group
identity, culture, and structure of negotiation will affect whether groups (teams of negotiators) do
better than solo negotiators.
4.
The social context and network in which one is embedded also influences negotiations,
through choice of negotiation partner and formation of reputation.
5.
When negotiations are not face-to-face but rather are computer mediated, many variables
come into play in determining whether computer-mediated negotiations harm or facilitate
negotiations.
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
The authors are not aware of any biases that might be perceived as affecting the objectivity of
this review.
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Negotiation
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GLOSSARY
Negotiation: an interpersonal decision-making process necessary whenever we cannot
achieve our objectives single-handedly. Negotiations include not only the one-on-one business
meetings, but also multiparty, multicompany, and multimillion-dollar deals. People negotiate in
their personal lives (e.g., with their spouses, children, schoolteachers, neighbors) as well as in
their business lives
Integrative: negotiations are integrative when all creative opportunities are leveraged and no
resources are left on the table
Pareto-optimal: Pareto optimality, or Pareto efficiency, is an important concept in economics
with broad applications in game theory, engineering, and the social sciences. The term is named
after Vilfredo Pareto, an Italian economist who used the concept in his studies of economic
efficiency and income distribution. Informally, Pareto-optimal situations are those in which any
change to make any person better off would make someone worse off
Distributive: a negotiation is distributive when negotiators are mainly concerned about their
own economic outcomes and not the joint outcomes of all negotiating parties
Best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA): determines the point at which a
negotiator is prepared to walk away from the negotiation table. In practice, it means that the
negotiators should be willing to accept any set of terms superior to their BATNA and to reject
outcomes that are worse than their BATNA
Reservation point: determined not by what the negotiator wishes and hopes for, but rather by
what her BATNA represents. A reservation point is a quantification of a negotiator’s BATNA
with respect to other alternatives
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Bargaining zone: the range between negotiators’ reservation points. Between a buyer and a
seller, the bargaining zone will be between the highest price a buyer is willing to pay and the
lowest price a seller is willing to sell for
54