An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of Performance-Based Budgeting on State
Government Expenditures
By
Yanxia Qi
Department of Accounting and Finance
School of Business Administration
China University of Petroleum- Beijing
18 Fuxue Road, Changping
Beijing, China 102249
qiyx@cup.edu.cn
and
Yaw M. Mensah
Center for Governmental Accounting Education and Research
Rutgers Business School, Rutgers University
94 Rockafeller Road,
Piscataway, NJ 08854, USA
mensah@business.rutgers.edu
April 08, 2012
Keywords: Economic Effects; Future-Oriented Spending; Performance-Based Budgeting;
Social Spending; State Government Expenditures;
JEL Classification: H72; H75; M49
1
An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of Performance-Based Budgeting on State
Government Expenditures
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the economic effects of the adoption and implementation
of performance-based budgeting (PBB) at the state government level. We examine
the association between the implementation of PBB and aggregate state
expenditures from the General Fund and Other State Funds, and further analyze
whether PBB affects combined functional spending: Future-oriented expenditures
(Public Education, Higher Education, and Transportation), Social expenditures
(Public Aid, and Public Health/Medicaid), Public safety expenditures (Correctional
Facilities) and Other expenditures. We find that the implementation of PBB is
negatively associated with total expenditures from General Fund and positively
associated with total expenditures from Other State Funds. The effect of PBB on
combined functional spending is significantly negative for Future-oriented
expenditures and Socially-oriented expenditures from the General Fund, but there is
a positive relationship between PBB and Future-oriented expenditures
(transportation projects) and Socially-oriented expenditures from dedicated Other
State Funds. We conclude that PBB is effective in getting state governments to
reorganize their spending priorities.
2
An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of Performance-Based Budgeting on State
Government Expenditures
1. Introduction
Published empirical research on the real economic effects of alternative
budgeting systems among state and local governments is sparse. Nevertheless, it is
accepted wisdom that the implementation of an appropriate budgeting system can
influence the financial efficiency and/or effectiveness of government. As noted by
Tyer and Willand (1997), governments at all levels across the US have
successively been changing their budgeting systems, transitioning from line-item
budgeting to program budgeting to incremental and zero-based budgeting, and
finally, in many cases, to performance-based budgeting (PBB).
The origins of PBB can be traced to the accounting reforms proposed by the
Hoover Commission, a body appointed by President Truman in 1947 to make
recommendations to reorganize the Executive Branch of the Federal Government
(Kelly and Rivenbank, 2003). Under The Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of
1950, the federal government required its agencies to provide performance and
program costs to support budget requests. State governments began to transition to
PBB because of the belief that it provided the flexibility to enable them to perform
efficiently and effectively using their limited resources.
In introducing PBB, state legislatures were effectively granting state agencies
more flexibility in the use of their budgeted resources. In turn, the state agencies
were held accountable for the services and products they provided. The underlying
idea is that the state agencies were thereby provided the proper incentive to deliver
services and products efficiently and effectively because their performance was
measured against clearly defined objectives. As part of this incentive system, full
3
disclosure of the budgets and the achievements of the state agencies were to be
made to the citizens of the state. This, in turn, provided an incentive for state
legislatures to reduce spending on functions or programs deemed to be ineffective,
and to provide additional resources to those programs or functions judged to be
relatively effective. In theory, at least, the implementation of PBB should be
associated with changes in spending priorities or greater accountability for the funds
expended. Greater efficiency or effectiveness of state governments should also be
associated with a more favorable economic climate, leading to relatively faster
economic growth.
As support for these expectations, a variety of national organizations including
the National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO), the Government
Accounting Standards Board (GASB), Government Accountability Office (GAO),
the Government Finance Officers Association, and the National Academy of Public
Administration, have conducted surveys to assess the effect of the adoption and
implementation of PBB in state governments. According to a GASB survey (2002),
more than 50 percent of all respondents (state and local officials) indicated that the
implementation of performance measures had increased the efficiency and the
effectiveness of their various governmental programs, and approximately 70 percent
agreed that their governmental entity has been better off since implementing
performance measures.
In spite of the belief expressed in the surveys that PBB has been beneficial in
increasing efficiency or effectiveness of state governments, there are few empirical
studies of its effectiveness. Among the studies to date, only three actually use
empirical data to examine the issue: Klase and Dougherty (2008), Lee and Wang
(2009), and Ho (2011). Of these three, only Klase and Dougherty (2008) focus on
the effect of PBB on state governments.
Given this background, we examine whether the adoption and implementation
of PBB has any real economic effects. Presumably, because PBB places emphasis
on program outcomes and output, its adoption should result in greater emphasis on
4
outcome effectiveness relative to funds expended. Thus, there are a priori reasons to
theorize that the implementation of PBB will have differential effects on the
decision choices of state governments (particularly the legislature). Systematic
consideration of results in PBB has the potential to “improve expenditure
prioritization (the capacity to allocate limited resources to where they will do the
most good)” (Robinson and Last, 2009, p.2) and “encourage line ministries to spend
more efficiently and effectively by making them aware that their performance will
influence their level of funding and by reducing or streamlining the controls that
impede good performance” (Robinson and Last, 2009, p.3). This reasoning
motivates the examination of spending by functional area at the state level as well as
on total spending.
In the sections which follow, we first examine the literature on the
progression from line-item budgeting to PBB, and the motivation behind the
eventual adoption of PBB. We also review the literature on the effects on spending
and other behavior associated with the implementation of PBB. In Section 3, we
present our methodology, including our data sources, and the statistical analyses we
performed. In Section 4, we present our findings, and the sensitivity tests we
conducted to evaluate the robustness of our results. Our conclusions are presented in
Section 5.
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Examined
2.1 Evolution of Budgeting Systems
State government budgeting systems have evolved over the past century to
meet various needs, including achieving financial control over expenditures,
management, planning, setting priority for scarce funds, and achieving greater
accountability (Legislative Research Commission, 2001). Because the initial focus
of budgeting was on financial controls over expenditure and to guard against misuse
of funds, it is not surprising that line-item budgeting (LIB) was the first budgeting
5
system to be developed and implemented widely. LIB provides control over
expenditure by specifying allowable spending on inputs. Problems with LIB that
became apparent over the years included the sole emphasis on inputs, and the failure
to consider the objects of the expenditures in any systematic way. The expansion of
governmental activity during the New Deal and World War II heightened interest in
performance budgeting in order to use financial resources efficiently (Tyer and
Willand, 1997). However, with the introduction of performance budgeting (PB), the
difficult problem of output measurement and the little ability to apply cost
information began to emerge as significant hindrances to true budget reform. Schick
(1971) found that performance budgeting as a reform was superficial in state budget
practices in the 1950s.
The next major movement in budget came in the 1960s with the introduction of
Planning and Programming Budgeting systems (PPBS) at the federal level and its
adoption by some state governments. PPBS was designed to increase the efficiency
of resource allocation and to emphasize long-range planning (Tyer and Willand,
1997). Although PPBS received some support through being adopted by some states,
Schick (1971) notes that it failed to live up to its potential at both the federal and
state level. At the state level, it appeared to have failed to actually penetrate state
decision-making even though most states said they were using or developing it.
Fiscal crises in the mid-1970s forced governments to find ways to justify the
use of resources. To meet this need, the concept of Zero-Based Budgeting (ZBB)
was introduced as a way to set priorities among different programs and to foster
accountability. ZBB was different from the incremental budgeting system (which
typified LIB, PB, and PPBS) in one significant respect. Under the incremental
budgeting system, the funding for existing programs was assumed to be maintained
at existing levels unless the state government made a deliberate decision to change
spending priorities. Naturally, changing established spending patterns established in
the past encountered enormous political difficulties, and thus, the ability to fund
new programs in the midst of the financial crises was difficult. In this setting, ZBB
6
promised to give the state governments the structure to overcome bureaucratic
inertia and change the spending priorities (Chan, 2002). However, because ZBB
required complicated time-consuming and burdensome deliberations, it soon proved
infeasible as a budgeting system for state governments.
Given these difficulties with the previous systems, the 1990s saw considerable
interest in a results-oriented budgeting system that emphasized efficiency and
effectiveness, namely Performance-Based Budgeting (PBB). The National Advisory
Council on State and Local Budgeting (1998, p. 3) argued that: “A good budget
process moves beyond the traditional concept of line item expenditure control,
providing incentives and flexibility to managers that can lead to improved program
efficiency and effectiveness”.
2.2 Motivation for Adopting PBB and Perceived Effects of Implementation
As noted previously, the PBB system was advocated as a means to improve the
performance of state governments in delivering services and products to its citizens
more efficiently and effectively. By focusing on expected outcomes relative to the
amounts to be expended, and then subsequently comparing the actual outcomes to
the expectations, it is hoped that budgetary discipline can be imposed by the
legislature and the executive branch. For example, the Little Hoover Commission
(State of California, 1995) concluded in the letter to the California Legislature that
“PBB is a valuable mechanism with winners on all sides”. Specifically, the
commission argued that policy makers gain a better understanding of the impact of
varying levels of expenditures, and also ensure accountability without blanket
restrictions that stifle innovation. In addition, program managers are provided the
flexibility to change their internal processes and increase their relative efficiency to
reach their goals. Finally, programs are more customer-focused, and the public can
see a clear connection between spending and services provided.
However, such discipline can be effective only if the political will also exists to
close, for example, inefficient agencies or sharply reduce their appropriations.
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Because such actions are likely to have strong political consequences, it is far from
self-evident that, in actual implementation, PBB will necessarily have any
measurable effects on observed efficiency and effectiveness.
For this reason, a review of the literature on the benefits of PBB as perceived
by state government officials is informative. Surveys of state officials to determine
the perceived effectiveness of their budgeting systems have been carried out by both
national organizations and individual researchers. Appendix I summarizes the
results reported in surveys conducted by national organizations on the perceptions
of state officials about the effectiveness of their budgeting systems.
The results in Appendix I show a wide variety of methods used by a diverse
group of organizations. However, despite the differences in survey methods, the
general conclusion to be drawn from these studies is that PBB is widely seen by the
state officials and legislatures who are using that system to be successful in inducing
consideration of outcome and performance measures in making spending decisions.
In addition to the surveys by national organizations, numerous researchers have
also conducted surveys of state governments to determine how PBB is being
implemented, what the determinants of a successful adoption of PBB were, and
whether PBB (as implemented) was perceived to be successful. Among these are
Broom (1995), Melkers and Willoughby (1998), Jordan and Hackbart (1999), Joyce
and Sieg (2000), Melkers and Willoughby (2001), Melkers and Willoughby (2005),
Moynihan (2005), Hou, Lunsford, Sides, and Jones (2011), and Pattison (2011).
Appendix II presents a summary of the major findings from these studies.
The results in Appendix II show that, although PBB has been gaining in
popularity since 1990, it has not been universally adopted. Furthermore, even
among the states which have adopted PBB, its degree of penetration in the actual
decision-making processes among legislators and the executive branch is diverse. In
particular, there appears to be a difference between “performance funding” and
“performance budgeting”, according to Jordan and Hackbart (1999). In the case of
“performance funding”, the spending priorities are established using the PBB results
8
of the prior year, with more effective programs receiving more funding if needed,
and the less effective ones receiving reduced funding. In the case of “performance
budgeting”, the only stipulation is that the budget adopted includes both input and
output measures. Jordan and Hackbart (1999) found only 10 states used both
performance funding and performance budgeting, 34 states used performance
budgeting and 13 other states used some form of performance funding.
According to GAO’s 2005 survey, state officials use performance information
(including outcome measures and performance evaluations) to identify the potential
impact of proposed policy changes, and based on these analyses, make policy
decisions that reduce costs while maintaining program effectiveness. If such is the
degree to which state officials use PBB information, then an empirical examination
of state spending patterns should provide some evidence of systematic benefits from
the implementation of PBB, particularly when contrasted with other states where
PBB is not implemented.
2.3 Empirical Studies of Effects of the Implementation of PBB
Empirical studies of the actual effect of PBB implementation on spending
behavior or efficiency are relatively sparse. The few studies conducted do not
necessarily arrive at the same conclusions. Stiefel, Rubenstein, and Schwartz (1999)
analyzed the relationship between the performance of public schools in Chicago and
patterns of budget allocation by constructing and using adjusted performance
measures. They concluded that, even though the total spending differences between
low-performing schools and high-performing schools were small, there were
significant differences in the distribution of discretionary spending across function.
They concluded that “high performing schools average almost five percentage
points more discretionary spending on instruction and less on instructional support
and administration” (p. 82).
Kluvers (2001) surveyed municipalities in Victoria, Australia which were
known to be using PBB, and reported that “the question of whether performance
9
indicators, if used, had provided useful information was answered in the affirmative
by an overwhelming majority of survey respondents. However, this result is
tempered by the fact that only a small number of councils reported actually using
performance indicators”. Kluvers further concluded that managers tended to use the
performance indicators primarily to allocate resources or to increase
productivity..Furthermore, the use of performance indicators appeared to foster a
changed attitude toward planning and to influence
could influence spending over
time.
Crain and O’Roark (2004) examined the impact of PBB innovation on state
expenditures in the US by using panel data from 1970 through 1997. They
concluded that PBB did have an impact on state spending per capita by at least
two percentage points , but also find that PBB didn’t affect all state government
programs equally.
Melkers and Willoughby (2005) surveyed local government officials in 47
countries and 168 cities in the United States. They found that the presence of
performance measures in budget documentation (which they called
performance-measurement transparency was significantly correlated with budget
effects in a negative direction (b = - 0.147, significant at 0.05 level). At the same
time, they found that the comprehensive use of performance measures across
departments (which they called performance-measurement density) had a much
stronger and positive influence on the budget (b = 0.341, significant at 0.01
probability level).
Rather than relying on the survey on state budget officials, Klase and
Dougherty (2008) conducted an empirical analyses using
the available data for the
50 states for the years 1986-2001. Employing a fixed effect model with five PBB
implementation variables (three reflect different PBB implementation phases, and
the other two reflect budget officials’ perceptions), they found that the
implementation of performance budgeting has a statistically significant and positive
effect on state per capita expenditures. They also found that states with PBB
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implementation legislation tended to spend an average of $332 per capita more than
states without implementation legislation.
Lee and Wang (2009) analyzed the effect of PPB practices on spending
behavior across three countries, the United States, Taiwan, and China (Guangdong
Province) over multiple years before and after PBB implementation. They reported
that that PBB had differential impact on the spending growth rate in different
countries (regions): there was a significant relationship between PBB and spending
growth in Taiwan (coefficient of 20.103). However, the regression coefficients were
negative for the United States (- 0.192) and China (-0.1903) but not statistically
significant.
Ho (2011) conducted a case study of PBB exercise in the city of Indianapolis
in the years from 2008 to 2010 to examine the budget implications of applying
performance information at the sub-departmental program level. The regression
results indicated that the number of performance measures in a department was
significantly and positively correlated with program budget variation. However,
after controlling for other factors.he also found that the number of outcome-related
performance measures had significantly negative effects on program budget
variation
While many researchers found that PBB could play an important role in
resource allocation, there are also questions about the degree to which the
implementation of PBB have yielded incremental benefits. Jordan and Hackbart
(1999) argued that allocation decisions were hardly affected by performance
reporting: “in those states undertaking performance funding, only a marginal share
of the funds (estimated at 3 percent) were subject to the influence of performance
evaluation”. Willoughby and Melkers (2000) found that performance measurement
was most essential for managerial decisions and communication purposes, even
though its impact on appropriation outcomes was quite limited.
Melkers and Willoughby (2001) concluded that:
“[F]ew states indicate any
link between performance information and actual appropriations. This was not
11
alarming, however, given the time-consuming nature of performance measurement
development and data-collection processes.” (p.62). However, four years later,
Melkers and Willoughby (2005) confirmed that: “[M[ost markedly, and
substantiating past research about state governments, few claimed performance
measurement as effective in determining appropriation levels…..[T]his is not
surprising, considering the intent behind most performance-related initiatives has
been much broader than simply cutting costs” (p. 186).
A more recent study by Hou, Lunsford, Sides, and Jones (2011) examined
variations in PBB practices in 11 sample states in different time periods using a
series of anonymous interviews. They concluded that PBB had not been fully
exploited and that just a part of its design purpose had been achieved. They also
concluded that PBB was relied on much more by the states during economic upturns
than during economic downturns.
2.4 Hypotheses Examined
Before describing the hypotheses we examine in this study, it is important to
describe the expenditure classifications provided by state governments in the
sources that we used. Budget reporting by state governments, in general, conform to
general guidelines issued by the National Advisory Council on State and Local
Budgeting, Government Finance Officers Association (1998) and the National
Association of State Budget Officers (1999). State government expenditures are
divided into four main (aggregate) categories, according to the revenue source:
Expenditures from General Fund (TEXP_GF), Expenditures from Federal Fund,
Expenditures from Other State Funds (TEXP_OSF), and Bonds. The General Fund
(GF) is the fund into which revenues from various state taxes are deposited. Other
State Funds (OSF) are funds generated from user-fees and other revenue sources
whose usage is restricted by law, while Federal Funds are the funds provided by the
Federal Government. Under the Bonds category are the expenditures from the sale
of bonds, most often to finance capital projects. We focused in this paper on the
expenditures in the General Fund and the Other State Funds because we could not
12
identify any plausible reason why expenditures of funds in the Federal Funds and
Bonds should be influenced by the budgeting system in use.
Another division of expenditures is provided by function. In general, state
governments provide functional expenditures by aggregate funding source in six
categories: Elementary and Secondary Education Expenditures (ESE), Higher
Education Expenditures (HE), Public Assistance Expenditures (PA), Medicaid
Expenditures (ME), Corrections Expenditures (CE), Transportation Expenditures
(TE), and All Other Expenditures (OTH). The OTH varied from from state to state,
but it typically included Employers Contribution to Pensions, Employer
Contributions to Health Benefits, Child Health Insurance Program, Public Health,
Community and Institutional for Mental Health, Community and Institutional for
Development for the Disabled, Environmental Programs, Parks and Recreation,
Housing, and General Aid to Local Government.
Based on the literature to date, it is reasonable to expect that the
implementation of PBB will have some observable effect, although the exact nature
of these effects is open to question. Since the adoption and continued
implementation of PBB are not costless, its continued existence can only be justified
if state officials see some associated marginal benefit. Thus, because surveys have
repeatedly shown that officials in states which have adopted PBB believe it has
some value, we theorize that its implementation will lead to some cost savings.
Specifically, because the expenditures from the General Fund are subject to
relatively more discretion on the part of the legislature or the executive branch, we
hypothesize that PBB will be relatively more effective in restraining expenditures
from the General Fund:
H1.1: Effect on Aggregate State Expenditures from the General Fund
The implementation of PBB is expected to be associated with relatively lower
state expenditures in the General Fund.
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Expenditures from the Other State Funds (OSF) are restricted by law to
specific purposes for which the associated revenues are raised. This limitation
implies a matching of the expenditures to the output, suggesting that under PBB,
higher expenditures may be expected because of the linkage to output. This leads to
the second hypothesis:
H1.2: Effect on Aggregate State Expenditures from Other State Funds
The implementation of PBB is expected to be associated with relatively
higher state expenditures in Other State Funds.
Robinson and Last (2009) have noted that PBB can make “fiscal space for new
spending initiatives” without an increase in aggregate spending through its ability to
impose aggregate fiscal discipline and expenditure prioritization. If so, then it is
reasonable to expect that PBB will have differential effects on functional spending.
Classifying expenditures by function bring to bear the issue of the immediate or
long-term impact of the spending. As noted by Mandl, Dierx, and Ilzkovitz (2008),
government spending can be divided into two broad classes: (1) Future-oriented,
and (2) spending with immediate social or economic impact.
Because PBB is designed to relate outputs to the associated inputs, we
hypothesize that it may have the unfortunate effect of focusing on outputs that are
immediately measurable. If so, future-oriented projects funded from the General
Fund may tend to face decreased funding, while such projects funded from
designated funds (Other State Funds) will tend to receive more funding under PBB.
The rationale here is that, for General Fund future-oriented projects, the inability to
immediately identify the expected outcomes in full may result in either reduced
funding or funding at levels not different from other programs. In contrast, if the
funds for the future-oriented projects were dedicated (as in the case of Other State
Funds projects), the restriction on the diversion of the funds to other purposes will
force PBB implementers to pay more attention to the future expected benefits. Thus,
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we expect Other State Funds future-oriented projects to receive increased funding
under PBB. This reasoning leads to the following two formalized hypotheses:
H2.1: Future-Oriented Programs Funded From General Fund (EDU_GF and
TRA_GF)
Programs with future-oriented outcomes (Primary, Secondary and Higher
education, EDU_GF; and Transportation expenditures, TRA_GF), if funded from
General Fund , will tend to be funded at relatively lower levels under PBB.
H2.2: Future-Oriented Programs Funded From Other State Funds (EDU_OSF and
TRA_OSF)
Programs with future-oriented outcomes (EDU_ OSF and TRA_ OSF), if
funded from Other State Funds , will tend to be funded at relatively higher levels
under PBB.
Our expectations regarding the effect of PBB on expenditures with immediate
social impact are similar tothe argument made for General Fund expenditures but
different from Other State Fund expenditures.. Specifically, in the General Fund
case, the primary emphasis of PBB in relating inputs to outputs means that funds
will be scaled back from programs if there is insufficient evidence of positive
outcomes, given the
competing needs for the funds. In contrast, when funds are
specifically designated for a specific purpose, PBB is expected to lead to higher
relative spending for programs funded from Other State Funds. More formally, the
following two hypotheses are formulated:
H3.1: Social Programs Funded From General Fund (SOC_GF)
Programs oriented towards providing immediate social benefits (Public Aid,
and Public Health/Medicaid) will tend to be funded at relatively lower levels under
PBB when funded from the General Fund.
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H3.2: Social Programs funded from Other State Funds (SOC_OSF)
Programs oriented towards providing immediate social benefits (Public Aid,
and Public Health/Medicaid) will tend to be funded at relatively higher levels under
PBB when funded from Other State Funds.
We have no a priori expectations about how PBB might affect spending under
either Public Safety (Correctional Facilities – denoted PS), or in the Other
Expenditures (OTH) category, whether funded from General Funds or from Other
State Funds.
3. Methodology
3.1 Data Sources and Sample Selection
For this study, we collected state budget data for all 50 states for fiscal year
2000-2009 from the NASBO publication, Budget Processes in the States (published
in 1999, 2002, and 2008), and from the annual The Fiscal Survey of States
(published by the National Governors Association and NASBO). To determine if a
state was using PBB for any particular year, we used the first reference, and then
cross-checked from the second source to verify when changes in budgeting and
financial management systems were adopted or legislated. From these sources, we
adopted a dummy variable for states using PBB (i.e, score of unity if PBB is
implemented, and zero otherwise).
In most cases, states indicated that more than one budgeting system was in use.
Since each budget approach may affect spending, in order to isolate the independent
effect of PBB, we also identified other budget approaches used by the state. The
alternative budgeting systems were (a) Program Budgeting (PROG); (b) Incremental
Budgeting (INCR); and (c) Zero-based Budgeting (ZERO).1 We coded these other
budgeting systems the same way as we coded PBB. Because of the failure to include
outcomes in any systematic way in establishing the budget targets in the PROG and
INCR methods, our a priori expectations are that both will be associated with
higher spending. In contrast, we expect both PBB and ZERO to be associated with
16
lower spending where General Fund expenditures are concerned.2
Studies aimed at explaining overall efficiency levels need to take exogenous
and multifaceted factors into account (Mandl, Dierx, and Ilzkovitz, 2008). These
exogenous factors include state population, income level and politics which can shape state
expenditure. For this reason, we included the following control variables in the study:
(1) total resident state population (POP);
(2) state average unemployment (UNEM);
(3) the proportion of the state’s House of Representatives held by Democrats
(HD_DEM), and by Republicans (HD_REP);
(4) the proportion of the state’s Senate held by Democrats (SD_DEM) and by
Republicans (SD_REP);
(5) whether the Governor for the state for that year was a Democrat
(GOV_DEM), or a Republican (GOV_REP);
(6) whether both houses of the Legislature and the Governor were of the same
party ( coded as Single-Party Control, SPC).
For purposes of this analysis, we recoded the control of the legislature as
dummy variables, with HD-DEM and SD-DEM representing the Democratic Party
holding a simple majority of the seats in the House and Senate respectively. Given
that the seats held by Independents for 49 states were not significant (less than 2
percent), the dummy variables for Democrats and Republicans were judged to be
self-exclusive, with only one of them appearing in the regressions.3
The expected signs for the control variables are positive for POP and GDP_PC,
and negative for UNEM. Both population and per capital income are expected to be
associated with higher spending, either because of need, or because of greater
affordability. On the other hand, high unemployment is likely to lead to greater
stress on a state’s finances, thus leading to a decrease in total spending. Among the
political factors, HD_DEM, SD_DEM, and GOV_DEM are all expected to be
positively signed (while conversely, HD_REP, SD_REP, and GOV_REP would be
negatively signed). This reflects the common perception that the Democratic Party
17
tends to believe in bid government while the Republican Party believes in reducing
the size of government at all levels. At the same time SPC (single party control) is
expected to be positively signed, reflecting the belief that total political dominance
by one political party is more likely to lead to unrestrained spending than when the
political power structure is divided between the two main political parties.
3.2 Regression Model Estimated
To derive the regression equation that we estimated, we began with the
assumption that the key underlying economic factors which drive the level of
aggregate expenditures by state governments from their own internal resources (i.e,
excluding federal government grants) are a multiplicative function of total
population (POP), the gross domestic product per capita (GDP_PC), and the rate of
unemployment (UNEM). Two factors underlie this assumption: (1) it seems much
more likely that a percentage change on total population (or any of the other factors)
would be better reflected by a percentage change in total expenditures that a simple
linear increase; and (2) the effect of the economic factors on total expenditures are
more likely to be multiplicative and joint than independent and linear. That is, the
effect of one percentage increase in the total population of the state will interact
with the current gross domestic product per capital (or the unemployment rate) to
affect the level of state expenditures. Thus, the multiplicative regression model
seems to us to be a more logical model to estimate than a linear regression model.
Based on the reasoning above, aggregate state government expenditures can
be expressed as:
Expenditures = POPGDP_PCUNEM
Taking the natural log of both sides yields:
Log(EXP) = log + 1 log (POP) + log(GDP_PC) + log(UNEM) + e
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(2)
To this basic relationship, the control variables discussed earlier were added,
namely the political factors and the other budgetary systems (other than PBB). This
leads to the main regression equation that is estimated:
Log(EXP)i,t = log + 1 log (POP)i,t + log(GDP_PC)i,t + log(UNEM)i,t
+ HD_DEM)i,t + SD_DEM)i,t + GOV_DEM)i,t + SPC)i,t
+PBB)i,t + PROG)i,t +INCR)i,t +ZERO)i,t + ei,t
(3)
where,
EXP = total expenditure by state and year (with different definitions of expenditures;
specifically;
TEX_GF & TEX_OSF = Total expenditure by state and year from the General Fund
and Other State Funds respectively;
EDU_GF & EDU_OSF = Educational expenditures from the General Fund and
Other State Funds respectively;
TRA_GF & TRA_OSF = Transportation expenditures from the General Fund and
Other State Funds respectively;
SOC_GF & SOC_OSF = Social expenditures from the General Fund and Other
State Funds respectively;
PS_GF & PS_OSF = Public safety (correctional facilities) expenditures from the
General Fund and Other State Funds respectively;
OTH_GF & OTH_OSF = Other expenditures from the General Fund and
Other State Funds respectively.
subscript i = 1 to 50 for different states;
subscript t =1to 10 for year 2000 to year 2009.
The adoption of the multiplicative regression form allows the following
intuitive interpretation of the results. First, the coefficients estimated represent
elasticities of the dependent variables with respect to changes in the independent
variables. Thus, for the coefficients, taking the exponent enables the percentage
effect on total expenditures of the implementation of the alternative budgetary
systems to be estimated. For example, a statistically coefficient of -0.05 would
imply that, with the adoption of PBB, a state’s total spending would be expected to
decline to 95.1 percent (exponent of -0.05) of the current expenditure level.
19
3.3 Descriptive Statistics of the Data
Table 1 presents a summary of the information gathered from NASBO’s
periodic Budget Processes in the States, and from the annual The Fiscal Survey of
States for the years 2000 to 2009. A value of 1 indicates that the state was indicated
to be using PBB either as the sole budgeting system or as one of several systems
that may be in use during that year.
********************************
Insert Table 1 here
********************************
As shown in Table 1, there were 15 states which implemented PBB and
disclosed relevant information about PBB in state budgeting reports for all 10 years.
These are Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Louisiana, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New
Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Texas, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin and
Wyoming. The gravest issue involving the consequentiality of adoption dates is that
some states adopted PBB for several years only to abandon them some years later
(NCSL, 2008). In Table 1, Alabama, Arkansas, Maine and West Virginia are shown
to have demonstrated this pattern. However, Arkansas resumed PBB in 2009. Some
other states discussed and possibly even initiated PBB in some agencies (e.g.,
California), but never got unto the PBB bandwagon by implementing it across the
board in all state agencies.
********************************
Insert Table 2 here
********************************
Table 2 presents a summary of the key variables used in the study. For
TEXP_GF, the range was from $370 million (5.914 in log term) to $102,950 million
(11.542 in log term), with a mean of $6,573.64 million. Per capital GDP (GDP_PC)
averaged $39,648.95, while the average population was 3.660 million. Table 2 also
presents the range of values for spending by function in the 50 states. The values for
20
the seven functional areas varied greatly. But one observable fact is that, over the
years 2000 to 2009, the major categories of spending at the state level were
EDU_GF (mean of $4.211 billion), OTH_OSF (mean of $1.851 billion), and
OTH_GF (mean of $1.680 billion).
Additional insights provided by the data in Table 2 are the means of the
political factors and the budgetary systems. From the means provided, it can be
inferred that across all 50 states and the 10 years covered by the study, the
Democratic Party was the majority party in the state Houses of Representatives 51.9
percent of the time, 46.9 percent of the time in the majority in the state Senates, and
in the gubernatorial mansion 46.3 percent of the time. Finally, the mean of SPC at
0.46 indicates that one single party controlled the House, Senate, and the
gubernatorial post at the state level on average is 46 percent of the time.
On the budgeting practices side, PBB was implemented 45.9 percent of the
time, while PROG was practiced a dominant 83.5 percent. Incremental budgeting
was implemented 70 percent of the time, and Zero-based budgeting was
implemented only 28.8 percent of the time. Note that states rarely adopted and
implemented only one budgeting system, so the relative frequencies of
implementation provide enough richness in the data to enable the relative
effectiveness of the different systems to be inferred, albeit only indirectly.
4. Results
The availability of continuous data for 10 years provided a basis for applying
a panel analysis approach. To aid in choosing beween the fixed effects and the
random effects approaches, the Hausman test for random effects was performed for
all versions of the regression analyses. In all cases but one, the Hausman test could
not reject the null hypotheses of no correlation between the effects and regressors.
Thus, the generalized least squares coefficients from the random effects were both
consistent and efficient, while the fixed effects coefficients were consistent but
21
inefficient. The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test also indicated a rejection of
the null hypotheses that the variances of the groups were zero. Thus, the use of a
pooled regression model was confirmed to be inappropriate for the data.
Finally, to deal with heterocedasticity, all the t-values reported in this paper are
based on White’s robust standard errors. Although various fixed effects and random
effects panel models were tried out, the method which tended to yield the most
consistent results was Nerlove’s (1971) variance components model. As a test of
robustness of both the multiplicative model and the random effects panel approach,
we also provide results obtained with a one-way (time) fixed effects model and a
cross-sectional OLS model for specific years.
4.1 Aggregate Expenditures
To enable Hypotheses 1.1 and 1.2 to be evaluated, Equation (3) was estimated
with TEXP_GF and TEXP_OSF as the dependent variables. The results are
presented in Table 3, with TEXP_GF in the first set of columns, and TEXP_OSF in
the second set.
********************************
Insert Table 3 here
********************************
With TEXP_GF as the dependent variable, all the economic variables are
significant and have the expected signs – POP and GDP_PC are positive, and
UEMP is negative. However, two of the political factors (HD_DEM and SD_DEM)
have negative signs instead of the positive signs expected. The results here suggest
that at the state level, control by the Democratic Party of the House and the Senate
is associated with lower spending from the General Fund, while the presence of a
Democratic Governor is associated with higher spending from the General Fund.
Finally, single party control is associated with lower spending from the General
Fund, contrary to our prior expectations. This finding may reflect the fact that, with
a slight majority of the House of Representatives in the sample period held by
22
Democrats while the Senate was held by Republicans (in a slight majority), the
resulting conflict of ideologies may result in budgets proposed in the Democratic
majority House being always subject to negotiations that wind up trimming the
budget.
Turning now to the budgetary systems, the results in Column A of Table 3
support Hypothesis 1.1. Specifically, PBB is associated with a two percent reduction
in General Fund expenditures (exponent of -0.02 = 98 percent). In contrast, PROG
is associated with a 2.4 percent increase in spending (exponent of 0.023 = 1.024),
while INCR is linked to a 4.2 percent increase in spending. Finally, ZERO is also
associated with an increase in spending of 7.4 percent (exponent of 0.072 = 1.074).
The second set of columns in Table 2 allows Hypothesis 1.2 to be evaluated. In
considering the factors that affect expenditures from Other State Funds (which are
dedicated for specific expenditure purposes), we note that per capital income is not
statistically significant. This is reasonable since the funds here are generated
principally based on usage, unlike the General Funds where a wealth or income
effect is to be expected. Here SPC is significant and positive, consistent with the
expectation that a single party in control of all levers of political power is likely to
spend more freely than when negotiations with the opposition party is needed.
Turning now to the budgetary system, the results here also support Hypothesis
1.2. The coefficient for PBB is a positive 0.037, implying that PBB is associated
with a 3.8 percent increase in relative spending. The other two budgeting systems
(PROG and INCR) also have positive coefficients, but the estimated increase in
spending under these alternative approaches (36.7 percent and 39.6 percent
respectively, based on exponents of 0.313 and 0.334) are much higher than that of
PBB. Note that ZERO has a negative sign. Thus, the results suggest that the
emphasis on outcomes implied by PBB and ZERO can lead to meaningful relative
restraints on spending.
4.2 Panel Analysis – Functional Spending
The findings that PBB implementation is associated with reduced aggregate
23
spending for expenditures in the General Fund but more spending where the Other
State Funds are concerned lend even more importance to the hypotheses involving
functional spending. Table 4 presents the results of evaluating Hypotheses 2.1 and
2.2 using Equation (3) and the Nerlove (1971) variance components method.
********************************
Insert Table 4 here
********************************
The first two set of columns in Table 4 show the evaluation of the hypothesis
that PBB is expected to result in relative spending restraints for General Fund
future-oriented expenditures. We classified educational expenditures (EDU_GF)
and transportation expenditures (TRA_GF) as meeting this standard of being
future-oriented. The results in these first two sets of columns support this hypothesis.
In the case of EDU_GF, PBB has a coefficient of -0.056, while both PROG and
INCR have positive coefficients. However, ZERO also has a negative coefficient
(-0.059). Thus, the use of PBB and ZERO both result in reduced spending on the
more future-oriented educational spending.
Turning attention to transportation spending from the General Fund, we should
note that nine states do not expend General Fund resources on transportation
projects. Moreover, even for the states where some funding for transportation is
made out from General Fund, the level of spending is relatively low. Thus, for most
states, most transportation spending is made out of the dedicated Other State Funds.
Within this limitation, we note that PBB has the sole, statistically significant
negative coefficient (-0.709) among the budgetary systems. In contrast, ZERO has a
positive and statistically significant coefficient. The second set of columns in Table
4 presents the results for expenditures made from the dedicated Other State Funds.
Hypothesis 2.2 presents the expectations that PBB will tend to encourage increased
spending in this context. The results here are a little mixed. For EDU_OSF, the
coefficient for PBB is not statistically significant. However, of the budgetary
24
practices, only PROG has a statistically significant coefficient (a positive 0.278).
For TRA_OSF, the observed coefficient for PBB is positive and statistically
significant (consistent with Hypothesis H2.2). However, the coefficients for both
PROG and INCR are also significant and positive. Their relative magnitude
compared to PBB’s (0.210 and 0.147 compared to 0.115) indicates that PBB has a
greater restraining effect than these other two budgetary systems. ZERO has a
negative (and statisticaly significant) sign here as well, lending weight to the
argument that Zero-based budgeting tends to have a very pronounced influence in
lowering spending.
We theorized in Hypothesis 3.1 that PBB would tend to constrain spending on
social programs when the programs are funded from the General Fund, but will
have the opposite effect if funded from the dedicated Other State Funds. The results
of estimating Equation 3 with SOC_GF and SOC_OSF as the dependent variables
are presented in Table 5.
********************************
Insert Table 5 here
********************************
The results in Table 5 show that, consistent with Hypothesis 3.1, the expected
negative sign for PBB is observed for the expenditures from the General Fund.
However, PROG and ZERO both also have negative coefficients. Thus, the
restraining effect of PBB on social spending from the General Fund is not unique to
PBB. The second set of columns present the case where SOC_OSF is the dependent
variable. Here again, consistent with Hypothesis 3.2, a positive sign is observed for
PBB which is matched by ZERO and INCR. However, both ZERO and INCR have
much higher coefficients (0.441 and 0.190 respectively), compared to PBB (with a
coefficient of 0.187). Thus, it would appear that the spending increases under PBB
is more restrained than under ZERO and INCR
********************************
25
Insert Table 6 here
********************************
Table 6 presents the results for the estimation of Equation 3 for the other
expenditures for which we have no a priori expectation about how PBB would
affect spending behavior. The results in Table 6 show that PBB, PROG and ZERO
all have negative coefficients for PS_GF, so it is not clear that PBB has any relative
advantage here. For the cases where OTH_GF, PS_OSF, and OTH_OSF are the
dependent variables, PBB is not statistically significant. However, the coefficients
for the other three budgetary systems are significant in the case of OTH_OSF, with
those for PROG and INCR being positive while ZERO’s is negative.
4.3 Robustness Tests
The results reported so far are based on a multiplicative regression model
estimated using the variance components estimation method of Nerlove (1971). We
have also used all the sample observations available. To determine if the results
reported so far as robust to alternative specifications, two other approaches were
tried. The first approach involved estimating a linear model using a one-way (time)
fixed effects panel analysis with the sample restricted only to states that used either
PBB over the entire period, or did not use PBB at any time during the 10-year
period. The second approach restricted the analysis to the three specific years (2000,
2002, and 2008) where the NASBO comprehensive surveys were actually
conducted to determine the budgetary systems in use. Ordinary least squares were
used to estimated the relationships in this case.
********************************
Insert Table 7 here
********************************
The results of restricting the sample only to the subset of states which used
PBB or did not use PBB over the sample period are presented in Table 7. As is
26
apparent from the table, PBB has a negative coefficient (-3.309) in the regression
with untransformed TEXP_GF as the dependent variable. It is the only one of the
four budgetary systems that is statistically significant, so its effect in reducing
expenditure levels is apparent. In the second regression with TEXP_OSF as the
dependent variable, PBB has a positive coefficient. Although both PROG and
ZERO also have positive coefficients, the fact that PBB has coefficient signs
consistent with what was observed previously lends additional credibility to the
previous results.
********************************
Insert Table 8 here
********************************
Table 8 presents the results when the sample is restricted only to the three
years when the surveys of the states were carried out. These results are also based
on OLS, unlike the fixed effect and random effect panel results presented earlier.
The results show that, in 2000, 2002, and 2008, PBB has negative coefficients
(although only significant in 2008) when TEXP_GF is the dependent variable.
When attention is shifted to the case where TEXP_OSF is the dependent variable,
PBB has a positive coefficient in both 2002 and 2008, although they are not
statistically significant. The consistency of the signs with the a priori expectations
expressed in Hypothesis 1.1 and 1.2 lends additional credibility to the results
reported earlier.
5. Conclusions
This paper has attempted to examine the empirical evidence in support of the
notion that there are real economic effects to the implementation of PBB. This is a
logical position to take since many states have attempted, in various guises and in
different periods, to implement PBB. Thus, given the expenditure of time and effort,
27
and the results from surveys of state budget officials that PBB is seen as making a
contribution, there is a keen interest in actually examining the evidence to determine
if there are demonstrable benefits.
Our results, based on the data for all 50 states over the period 2000 to 2009,
demonstrate that there is detectable reduction in aggregate spending from the
General Fund of about two percent. For programs funded through the dedicated
Other State Funds, PBB implementation is associated with an aggregate spending
increase of about 3.8 percent. In the functional spending area, there is evidence that
PBB is associated with reduced spending for programs with a future-orientation
(education and transportation) when they are funded from the General Fund. In
contrast, when these projects are funded from the dedicated Other State Funds, PBB
is associated with an increase in expenditures of about 12.2 percent for
transportation projects. This same trend is evident for socially-oriented expenditures
where PBB is associated with a reduction of about 0.8 percent for expenditures from
the General Fund. In contrast, for socially-oriented programs funded from dedicated
Other State Funds, PBB is associated with a 20.5 percent increase in relative
spending.
The results of this study should serve as a wake-up call to skeptics. PBB has, in
fact, led to shifts in spending patterns which are suggestive of potential
improvements in the efficiency and effectiveness of governments. However, further
research is needed in this area. In particular, while this study has focused on the
effect of PBB on expenditure behavior, measures of outcomes are needed before any
inference about improved efficiency or effectiveness can be made. Thus, efforts to
measure and report outcomes are a very necessary part of the effort to improve
government effectiveness and efficiency. Empirical studies such as this one which
offers evidence of the real effect of alternative budgeting systems on government
expenditure behavior are useful as exploratory steps.
28
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32
Appendix I
Surveys conducted by national organizations on the effectiveness of states budgeting systems
Organizations
Method
Results
Survey experiences of several states
PBB stresses holding departments accountable for outcomes, prioritizing spending based on a
that are considered on the leading edge
program’s ability to successfully reach goals, and comparative data allows policy makers to
of the PBB movement.
understand the array of results that can be accomplished through different levels of spending.
Program Policy Analysis and
In-depth study of five states and survey
They find that there are benefits to be found in any implementation of performance-based
Government Accountability
of these and the remaining 45 states.
efforts, and state agencies reported a greater focus on results, opportunities for re-engineering
Little Hoover Commission,
State of California (1995)
The Florida Office of
(OPPAGA) (1997)
GASB (2002)
GAO (2005)
and a heightened sense of mission.
Survey of state budget offices, state
They find that the percentage of respondents from state budget offices who found performance
agency staff, and local government by a
measures to be “very effective” or “effective” on “affecting cost savings” , “improving
large mail survey in order to address
effectiveness of agency programs”, “reducing duplicative services” and “reducing/eliminating
survey group’s perceptions of the
ineffective services/programs” are 13.8%, 23.5%, 15.7% and 9.6% respectively.
impact of performance measurement on
But higher percentage of state budget offices (more than 30%) think that performance
cost savings, efficiency, effectiveness
measurement can lead to “improving communication between departments and programs”,
and program results, enhanced
“improving communication with the executive budget office ”, and “improving communication
communication, and so on.
with the legislature and legislative staff” (p. 20).
Survey five states: Arizona, Maryland,
Texas, Virginia, and Washington.
They find that “performance information has influenced legislative budget deliberations in the
states examined. Although a number of factors, including political choice, influence budget
decisions, when legislators do use performance information they find specific types of
33
performance information useful in performing different functions. They use outcome measures
and performance evaluations in budget deliberations to identify potential impacts of a proposed
policy change, make policy decisions that reduce costs while maintaining effectiveness, and
make changes to improve program effectiveness” (p. 3).
They also reach the conclusion “during periods of fiscal stress, states supplemented existing
tools with priority-setting and efficiency initiatives to respond to revenue shortfalls” (p. 12).
States that received the highest grades (Washington, Utah, Virginia) are making better
The Pew Center on the States
Grading 50 states to evaluate how
(2008)
states manage resources.
management a top priority. On the contrary, states that received lower marks have limited
performance information. Great strides in efficiency and effectiveness in some states which
using PBB to mold their budgets hold out evidence that PBB is a promising tool for managers
and policy makers, and meet the expectations and demands of citizens.
NASBO (2008)
The Pew Center on the States
(2009)
Demonstrating the diversity in state
By 2008, nearly all states had begun collecting some form of performance measurements,
budgeting practices by state-by-state
however only 39 states require the reporting of performance measurements in conjunction with
compilation of data.
agency budget requests, and only 25 states claim to be utilizing full PBB.
Surveys the implementation of PBB
Concludes that PBB can help achieve a better economic and fiscal future, and can also help
and its effects in Virginia, Utah,
states make “smart” spending decisions in boom years and “intelligent” budget cuts when
Maryland and Indiana.
necessary in lean years.
In 2010, performance for 50% of measures are moving in favorable direction, 23.1% are
holding steady while 26.9% are moving in an unfavorable direction.
Department of Budget and
Management (DBM), State of
Annual performance report.
Maryland (2011)
According to the summary of performance by priority area , “A safer Maryland, green
Maryland, and education have the most measures moving in a favorable direction, each with
50% or more of the measures moving favorably”, and “efficient government and economic
growth have the largest number of measures moving in an unfavorable direction”.
Senate Research Center, State
Provide a step-by-step explanation of
PBB is a part of strategic planning and can affect the amount an agency is appropriated by the
of Texas ( 2011)
the budget process in Texas.
legislature.
34
Appendix II
Surveys conducted by researchers on the effectiveness of states budgeting systems
Researcher
Method
Main Results
They found that agency managers, legislators, stakeholders use the information of performance
Broom (1995)
Case studies of PBB in five states
based systems. And the authors were optimistic that performance information would gain wider
use in budget decision-making mainly because performance-based efforts are being “sustained,
nurtured and refined”.
31 states have legislation that requires performance-based budgeting, and about 16 states have
Melkers and
Survey PBB requirements in 47 out of 50
Willoughby (1998)
states
some form of performance-based budgeting instituted by administrative requirements.
They also think that while states are requiring performance information in budget submissions,
the effectiveness and contribution of performance measures to the budget process in the states
remains unclear.
They find that 3 states strongly agree and 23 states agree that “performance indicators are an
important tool for making budget allocation decisions”(p. 78). Along with the survey, they
developed performance budget model and performance funding model, and regression results
Jordan and Hackbart
(1999)
Based on response of state executive-branch
show that : the number of budget analysts has significant and positive effects on performance
budget officers from 46 of the 50 states, they
budgeting and performance funding ; per capita income, tax effort, pre-audit function and
analyze the role of performance budget and
republican governors can not influence the usage of performance budgeting or funding
performance funding.
significantly.
The authors find only 10 states indicated that they both used performance budgeting and
performance funding, 34 states use some form of performance budgeting and 13 states use some
form of performance funding.
Joyce and Sieg
Using data from exhaustive surveys in 49 of
Almost half of the states have made some attempt at developing a statewide cost accounting
35
(2000)
the 50 states, and analyze the extent to which
performance information is available and
system, but only 10 of them were using these measures to set targets for performance.
“Turning to use of measures by the central budget office, in only four states—Missouri, Texas,
used
Louisiana, and Virginia—is the use of performance measures by the budget office extensive; 19
at each stage of the budget process
other states report ’some’ use. As might be expected, there is even less use of performance
information in state legislatures”(p.26).
The budgeters been surveyed indicate that “performance budgeting has been most successful in
improving the effectiveness of agency programs and improving decision making in
Melkers and
Willoughby
(2001)
Survey legislative and executive budgeters
from the 50 states.
government”. They further list the different opinions on effects of PBB between
executive-branch budget officers and Legislative budget officers, and get that “executive-branch
budget officers ranked performance budgeting’s effect on cost savings and in reducing duplicate
services almost equally. Legislative budget officers indicated that performance budgeting has
been most effective in reducing duplicative services” (p. 60).
Examine the effects of performance
measurement on budgetary decision making,
Melkers and
Willoughby (2005)
communication, and other operations at local
governments level in U.S. by analyzing data
drawn from the local government
respondents from administrators and
The survey’s mean respondents show that many administrators and budgeters describe
performance measurement as “somewhat effective” for budgeting: the means of budget effects
on “affecting cost savings”, “changing appropriation levels” , “reducing / eliminating ineffective
services / programs” , and “reducing duplicative services” are 1.97, 1.79, 1.78 , and 1.77 of 4.
budgeters in 47 counties and 168 cities.
Select three states with high (Virginia),
Moynihan (2005)
medium (Vermont), and low (Alabama)
experience and competence in managing for
results
One of the find is that the benefit of international reputation for innovative and results-oriented
government for State of Virginia “depend on having a system in place that could plausibly claim
to enhance performance” (p. 229).
Hou, Lunsford, Sides,
Examine variations on PBB implementation
They get two important conclusions, one is that states used PBB more in up economies than in
and Jones (2011)
in 11 states in the United States across three
down economies, another is for most states PBB is used more successfully as a management tool
36
different periods by Interviewing with State
as apposed to as a budgeting tool. But the one anonymous interview they conduct in 2010 also
Government Budget Officials.
show an official’s opinion , “the economic downturn has highlighted the importance of
performance measurement and reporting. When there is less funding, the use of the fund is
carefully scrutinized”, and so they believe that PBB is becoming more important in Maryland as
the economy worsens (p. 375).
Explain the less strong effect of PBB in lean times by discussion with a number of state budget
Pattison (2011)
Commentary on a paper and providing some
officers, and find that with the downturn in revenue in economic crisis, “state officials consider
opinions of state budget officers on PBB.
that they have not had sufficient time or resources to devote to using performance information in
order to determine where to cut and by how much” (p. 389).
37
Table 1
Performance-based Budgeting (PBB) in State Governments
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Alabama
Alaska
States
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
2009
Source: from the NASBO publication, Budget Processes in the States (published in 1999, 2002, and 2008), and the annual
The Fiscal Survey of States from 2000-2009 (published by the National Governors Association and NASBO).
38
Table 2
Summary Statistics of Variables Used in Study
Variables
TEXP_GF (log)
TEXP_OSF (log)
EDU_GF (log)
TRA_GF (log)
SOC_GF (log)
PS_GF (log)
OTH_GF (log)
EDU_OSF (log)
TRA_OSF (log)
SOC_OSF (log)
PS_OSF (log)
OTH_OSF (log)
Economic Factors
POP (log)
GDP_PC (log)
UNEM (log)
Political Factors
HD_DEM
SD_DEM
GOV_DEM
SPC
Budgeting Systems
PBB
PROG
INCR
ZERO
N
497
497
497
310
497
497
494
491
490
434
480
481
Mean
8.791
8.346
8.003
3.072
6.907
6.038
7.427
6.647
6.658
5.275
3.294
7.524
Std Dev
1.051
0.943
1.167
2.046
1.203
1.162
1.116
1.402
0.974
1.681
1.271
1.130
Minimum
5.914
4.844
3.871
0
3.807
0
0.693
0.693
2.398
0
0
1.386
Maximum
11.542
10.191
10.822
7.875
9.887
9.175
10.059
9.376
8.821
8.771
5.883
9.905
Untransformed
Means
6,573.64
4,211.62
2,990.94
21.59
999.04
419.03
1,680.75
770.49
778.98
195.31
26.95
1,851.83
497
497
497
8.205
10.588
1.595
1.008
0.177
0.299
6.200
10.189
0.833
10.518
11.089
2.588
3,660.62
39,648.95
4.93
497
497
497
497
0.519
0.469
0.463
0.461
0.500
0.500
0.499
0.499
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
497
497
497
497
0.459
0.835
0.700
0.288
0.499
0.372
0.459
0.453
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
Explanatory Notes
TEXP_GF
= Total expenditures from the General Fund
TEXP_OSF
= Total expenditures from the Other State Funds
EDU_GF
= Educational Expenditures (both public and higher education) from General Fund
TRA_GF
= Transportation Expenditures from General Fund
SOC_GF
= Social Expenditures (public aid and public health/Medicaid) from General Fund
PS_GF
= Public Safety Expenditures (correctional facilities) from General Fund
OTH_GF
= Other Expenditures (miscellaneous) from General Fund
EDU_OSF
= Educational Expenditures (both public and higher education) from Other State Funds
TRA_OSF
= Transportation Expenditures from Other State Funds
SOC_OSF
= Social Expenditures (public aid and public health/Medicaid) from Other State Funds
PS_OSF
= Public Safety Expenditures (correctional facilities) from Other State Funds
OTH_OSF
= Other Expenditures (miscellaneous) from Other State Funds
PBB
= Performance-Based Budgeting (dummy variable)
PROG
= Program Budgeting (dummy variable)
INCR
= Incremental Budgeting (dummy variable)
ZERO
= Zero-Based Budgeting (dummy variable)
POP (log)
= Population (in thousands before the log transformation).
GDP_PC (log) = Gross domestic product of the state (per capita)
UNEM
= State unemployment rate (as of July 1 of each year)
HD_DEM
= Democratic Party in the majority in the state's House of Representatives (dummy variable)
SD_DEM
= Democratic Party in the majority in the state's Senate (dummy variable)
GOV_DEM
= Governor of the state is a member of the Democratic Party (dummy variable)
SPC
= Single party control of the House of Representatives, the Senate, and the Governorship.
39
TABLE 3
Two-way Random Effects Analyses of the Effect of PBB and Other
Budgetary Systems on Aggregate Expenditures (Nerlove Variance
Components Method) - Test of Hypotheses 1.1 and 1.2
Dependent Variable
Expected
sign
Intercept
Economic Factors
POP (log)
GDP_PC (log)
UNEM (log)
Political Factors
HD_DEM
SD_DEM
GOV_DEM
SPC
Budgeting Systems
PBB
PROG
INCR
ZERO
Dependent Variable
Expected
log (TEXP_GF)
Coefficients
T-value #
sign
-9.757
-70.43
***
+
+
-
0.967
1.020
-0.137
2075.6
81.55
-36.83
***
***
***
+
+
+
+
-0.010
-0.009
0.018
-0.047
-15.84
-11.76
26.11
-67.7
+
+
-
-0.020
0.023
0.041
0.072
-28.75
16.66
31.91
35.22
Time series Length
Number of cross sections
Variance components for Cross Sections
Variance components for Time Series
Variance components for Error
10
50
0.099
0.019
0.016
Adjusted R-Square (Degrees of Freedom)
0.5088
log (TEXP_OSF)
Coefficients
T-value #
3.192
1.25
+
+
-
0.524
0.054
-0.085
16.99
0.25
-1.87
***
***
***
***
***
+
+
+
+
-0.046
-0.177
0.016
0.118
-3.65
-16.30
2.17
15.74
***
***
*
***
***
***
***
***
+
+
+
-
0.037
0.313
0.334
-0.169
3.21
15.19
13.92
-12.01
**
***
***
***
unbalanced
10
50
3.993
0.086
0.089
485
0.090
Hausman Test for
Random Effects
m Value
Pr>m
2.41
0.996
5.96
0.876
Breusch Pagan Test (Two
way) for random effects
m Value
411.64
345.43
<0.000
1
Pr > m
<0.0001
All variables are explained in Table 2.
# = T-values based on White'& Huber's robust standard errors.
& = significant at probability of 0.10 (2-tailed).
* = significant at probability of 0.05 (2-tailed).
** = significant at probability of 0.01 (2-tailed).
*** = significant at probability of 0.001 (2-tailed).
Exponent of coefficients
PBB
PROG
INCR
ZERO
0.980
1.024
1.042
1.074
1.038
1.367
1.396
0.844
40
&
unbalanced
485
TABLE 4
Two-way Random Effects Analyses of the Effect of PBB and Other Budgetary Systems on Future-oriented Expenditures
(Nerlove Variance Components Method) - Test of Hypotheses 2.1 and 2.2
Funding from the General Fund
Expected
log (EDU_GF)
log (TRA_GF)
sign
Coefficients T-value #
Coefficients T-value #
Intercept
Economic Factors
-7.662
-46.93
***
-4.995
-0.19
***
Funding from dedicated Other State Funds
Expected
log (EDU_OSF)
log (TRA_OSF)
sign
Coefficients T-value #
Coefficients T-value #
-11.206
-2.06
*
-3.547
+
0.367
+
-7.03
***
9.98
***
0.809
363.14
***
1.357
2.77
**
0.307
6.71
***
-
0.014
0.10
0.027
1.61
POP (log)
+
1.093
984.26
***
0.691
5.35
GDP_PC (log)
+
0.622
41.90
***
0.449
0.19
UNEM (log)
Political Factors
-
0.067
17.80
***
-1.497
-1.90
HD_DEM
+
-0.094
-54.46
***
0.113
0.44
+
0.233
9.27
***
-0.086
SD_DEM
+
0.010
10.27
***
0.211
0.91
+
-0.194
-6.06
***
GOV_DEM
+
0.003
3.83
***
-0.306
-1.24
+
0.201
10.00
SPC
Budgeting Systems
+
-0.005
-10.25
***
-0.227
-1.06
+
0.094
5.28
PBB
-
-0.056
-61.79
***
-0.709
-2.65
+
0.001
0.06
PROG
+
0.037
31.40
***
-0.430
-1.13
+
0.278
3.31
INCR
+
0.087
61.54
***
0.573
1.62
+
0.086
ZERO
-
-0.059
-29.48
***
0.848
2.40
-
-0.042
&
**
*
41
-20.27
***
0.015
3.24
***
***
0.016
4.98
***
***
-0.004
-1.53
0.115
22.13
***
0.210
46.51
***
1.39
0.147
23.51
***
-1.34
-0.091
-18.53
***
***
( TABLE 4 continued)
Time series Length
Number of cross sections
Variance components for Cross Sections
Variance components for Time Series
Variance components for Error
10
50
0.329
0.005
0.023
unbalanced
Adjusted R-Square (Degrees of Freedom)
0.2976
485
Hausman Test for
Random Effects
m Value
Pr>m
Breusch Pagan Test (two
way) for random effects.
m Value
Pr > m
1.76
0.992
10
41
5.016244
0.211617
0.853142
0.1033
10
50
4.086
0.047
0.215
296
0.0596
3.54
0.9815
18.18
0.0011
10
50
0.332
0.015
0.066
479
0.1859
1.81
0.999
713.3
122.04
503.41
403.78
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
0.492
0.651
1.773
2.336
1.001
1.320
1.089
0.959
All variables are explained in Table 2.
# = T-values based on White's robust standard errors.
& = significant at probability of 0.10 (2-tailed).
* = significant at probability of 0.05 (2-tailed).
** = significant at probability of 0.01 (2-tailed).
*** = significant at probability of 0.001 (2-tailed).
Exponent of coefficients
PBB
PROG
INCR
ZERO
0.946
1.037
1.091
0.943
42
1.122
1.234
1.158
0.913
478
TABLE 5
Two-way Random Effects Analyses of the Effect of PBB on Social
Expenditures
(Nerlove Variance Components Method) - Test of Hypothesis 3
General Fund
Expected
sign
Other State Fund
Expected
log (SOC_GF)
Coefficients
Intercept
Economic Factors
T-value #
sign
-9.778
-37.31
***
log (SOC_OSF)
Coefficients
T-value #
3.985
0.57
POP (log)
+
1.052
654.39
***
+
1.160
43.34
GDP_PC (log)
+
0.760
32.86
***
+
-0.871
-1.37
UNEM (log)
Political Factors
-
-0.002
-0.38
-
0.187
0.99
HD_DEM
+
-0.022
-18.06
***
+
-0.059
-0.84
SD_DEM
+
-0.045
-38.32
***
+
0.217
3.45
***
GOV_DEM
+
0.039
39.20
***
+
0.095
2.52
*
SPC
+
Budgeting Systems
-0.018
-19.19
***
+
-0.060
-1.51
PBB
-
-0.008
-5.59
***
+
0.187
2.69
PROG
+
-0.013
-7.70
***
+
0.092
1.17
INCR
+
0.066
28.45
***
+
0.190
1.77
&
ZERO
-
0.005
2.08
*
-
0.441
3.99
***
Time series Length
Number of cross sections
10
50
unbalanced
10
48
Variance components for Cross Sections
0.302
1.925
Variance components for Time Series
0.027
0.068
Variance components for Error
0.021
0.363
Adjusted R-Square (Degrees of Freedom)
0.291
Hausman Test for
Random Effects
m Value
Pr>m
4
0.970
1.53
0.999
Breusch Pagan Test
(two way) for random
effects.
m Value
448.38
306.2
<0.0001
<0.0001
Pr > m
485
0.0966
All variables are explained in Table 2.
# = T-values based on White'& Huber's robust standard errors.
&
= significant at probability of 0.10 (2-tailed).
*
= significant at probability of 0.05 (2-tailed).
** = significant at probability of 0.01 (2-tailed).
*** = significant at probability of 0.001 (2-tailed).
Exponent of coefficients
PBB
PROG
INCR
ZERO
0.992
0.987
1.068
1.005
1.205
1.096
1.209
1.554
43
***
**
unbalanced
422
TABLE 6
Two-way Random Effects Analyses of the Effect of PBB and Other Budgetary Systems on Functional
Expenditures from General Funds (Nerlove Variance Components Method)
Funding from the General Fund
Expected
sign
log (PS_GF)
Coefficients
Intercept
Economic Factors
Funding from dedicated Other State Funds
log (OTH_GF)
T-value #
Coefficients
log (PS_OSF)
T-value #
-14.231
-26.99
***
-4.481
-1.87
Coefficients
T-value #
Coefficients
1.893
0.71
0.770
71.54
***
-0.477
-1.93
&
0.066
1.33
0.083
3.27
T-value #
13.835
1.33
0.270
2.21
-0.807
-0.91
-0.267
-1.28
***
-0.056
-1.10
POP (log)
+
1.025
214.20
***
0.903
82.18
GDP_PC (log)
+
1.090
22.79
***
0.544
2.55
UNEM (log)
Political Factors
-
0.244
14.86
***
-0.763
-7.99
HD_DEM
+
0.049
23.00
***
0.006
0.50
SD_DEM
+
-0.027
-8.89
***
-0.028
-2.08
*
-0.177
-8.35
***
-0.094
-2.83
**
GOV_DEM
+
-0.000
-0.17
-0.116
-9.30
***
-0.044
-2.38
*
-0.115
-3.82
***
SPC
Budgeting Systems
+
0.030
13.25
***
-0.040
-3.95
***
0.014
0.94
0.102
3.75
***
PBB
?
-0.041
-13.23
***
-0.008
-0.60
-0.000
-0.02
0.080
1.56
PROG
?
-0.100
-15.73
***
0.019
0.67
0.102
2.57
**
0.421
4.93
***
INCR
?
0.080
17.28
***
0.056
2.42
-0.073
-2.54
**
0.233
4.99
***
ZERO
?
-0.172
-10.83
***
-0.020
-0.89
-0.014
-0.52
-0.126
-2.59
**
44
***
log (OTH_OSF)
*
***
*
*
( TABLE 6 continued )
Time series Length
Number of cross sections
10
50
unbalanced
10
50
unbalanced
10
50
unbalanced
10
50
Variance components for Cross Sections
0.927
0.929
1.226
13.062
Variance components for Time Series
0.009
0.129
0.012
0.181
Variance components for Error
0.072
0.131
0.186
0.244
Adjusted R-Square (Degrees of Freedom)
Hausman Test for
Random Effects
m Value
Pr>m
Breusch Pagan Test (two
way) for random effects.
m Value
Pr > m
0.1454
2.48
0.996
485
0.1402
5.82
0.885
482
0.0655
1.47
0.999
468
0.0345
10.34
0.411
99.23
183.29
209.56
299.5
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
<0.0001
All variables are explained in Table 2.
# = T-values based on White's robust standard errors.
&
= significant at probability of 0.10 (2-tailed).
*
= significant at probability of 0.05 (2-tailed).
** = significant at probability of 0.01 (2-tailed).
*** = significant at probability of 0.001 (2-tailed).
Exponent of coefficients
PBB
PROG
INCR
ZERO
0.960
0.904
1.083
0.842
0.992
1.019
1.058
0.980
1.000
1.108
0.929
0.986
45
1.083
1.524
1.262
0.881
unbalanced
469
Table 7
Analysis of the Effect of PBB on Aggregate Expenditures with
Sample Restricted to States either Implementing PBB in All Years or
not Implementing in Any Year (Model Estimated is a One-way
(Time) Fixed Effects Panel Analysis)
Time fixed effects (omitted)
Intercept
TEXP_GF
Coefficient T-value
None significant
1.118
0.04
POP (log)
2.059
15.46
GDP_PC (log)
0.140
UNEM
TEXP_OSF
Coefficient T-value
None significant
-4.614
-0.47
0.571
15.63
0.91
0.021
0.53
-0.749
-0.35
0.666
0.86
HD_DEM
1.099
1.55
0.162
0.23
SD_DEM
3.483
4.12
-1.223
-3.03
**
GOV_DEM
0.131
0.21
1.532
3.02
**
SPC
-1.069
-0.84
-0.149
-0.4
PBB
-3.309
-4.03
0.970
2.96
**
PROG
-0.520
-0.28
1.255
2.11
*
INCR
0.511
0.55
0.362
0.86
ZERO
0.284
0.8
1.296
3.73
Economic Factors
***
***
Political Factors
***
Budgeting Systems
***
Number of states included in analysis
- No PBB implemented in any year
- PBB implemented in all years (2000-2009)
MSE
R-Square
34
19
15
20.809
0.926
34
19
15
10.334
0.7111
F Test for Fixed Effects
F Value
Pr > F
2.52
0.0085
1.85
0.0587
Breusch Pagan Test
(One Way)
m Value
Pr > m
1.03
0.3105
1.28
0.2571
All variables are explained in Table 2.
& = significant at probability of 0.10 (2-tailed).
* = significant at probability of 0.05 (2-tailed).
** = significant at probability of 0.01 (2-tailed).
*** = significant at probability of 0.001 (2-tailed).
46
***
Table 8
OLS Regression Analysis of Total Expenditures on PBB and Control Variables by Specific Year of Survey Report
Dependent Variable =TEXP_GF
2000
Coefficients
Intercept
Economic Factors
2002
T-value
Coefficients
Dependent Variable = TEXP_OSF
2008
T-value
-7.939
-2.66
**
-8.452
-1.97
*
POP (in million)
1.698
13.16
***
1.868
10.36
GDP_PC (in $M)
0.168
2.94
**
0.227
2.70
UNEM (in percent)
Political Factors
-0.113
-0.37
-0.375
HD_DEM
-0.397
-0.61
SD_DEM
2.243
2.50
GOV_DEM
0.614
SPC
Budgeting systems
Coefficients
2000
T-value
-3.700
-0.66
***
2.376
11.63
**
0.247
-0.82
0.649
0.55
2.585
1.86
0.80
1.201
0.563
0.87
-0.949
PROGT
INCRT
PBBT
Coefficients
2002
T-value
2008
Coefficients
T-value
-5.357
-1.81
0.463
6.23
-0.027
-0.61
0.957
2.63
1.623
1.41
2.526
1.20
***
0.577
5.73
3.32
***
-0.051
-1.55
-1.277
-2.26
**
0.140
0.50
2.497
1.63
-1.311
-1.84
3.744
2.47
0.031
0.04
-1.970
-1.95
1.21
-1.825
-1.45
-1.135
-1.48
-0.817
0.879
0.95
-1.702
-1.10
-0.498
-0.68
-0.95
-1.437
-1.38
-4.757
-3.52
-0.146
0.777
0.90
-0.500
-0.49
-0.229
-0.16
0.066
0.07
-0.205
-0.17
0.079
-0.652
-0.38
0.909
50
1.072
ZEROT
-0.682
-0.56
Adjusted R- Square
0.927
Sample size
50
All variables are explained in Table 2.
&
= significant at probability of 0.10 (2-tailed).
*
= significant at probability of 0.05 (2-tailed).
** = significant at probability of 0.01 (2-tailed).
*** = significant at probability of 0.001 (2-tailed).
*
&
Coefficients
-2.060
-0.43
0.717
8.85
-0.025
-0.36
0.550
1.09
0.321
0.19
0.325
0.21
-0.95
3.193
3.09
-0.597
-0.72
-0.481
-0.49
-0.15
1.172
1.24
0.224
0.21
0.569
0.73
3.255
3.01
1.173
1.02
0.04
0.927
1.02
0.931
0.90
0.485
0.40
0.59
0.9133
50
1.588
1.28
0.5935
49
2.999
2.02
0.6262
49
0.399
0.37
0.6489
50
47
*
***
***
*
&
&
T-value
***
**
*
**
*
***
***
1
Program budgeting may be defined as a budget approach in which inputs of resources and
outputs of services are identified by programs without regard to the number of
organizational units involved in performing various aspects of the program. Line-Item
Budgeting is an approach under which the planned expenditures are grouped by
administrative entities and objects of expenditure (usually functions). Incremental
Budgeting is a budgeting approach under which the current budget prepared using a
previous period’s budget or actual performance as a basis with incremental amounts added
for the new budget period. Zero-based budgeting is a budgeting approach which starts from
a "zero base" and every function within an organization is analyzed for its needs and costs.
The implemented budget is based on the estimated needs and costs without regard to past
expenditures.
2
On the expected expenditure-reduction effects of Zero-based Budgeting, see LaFaive
(2003). The pros and cons of Incremental Budgeting are often contrasted with those of
Zero-based Budgeting since they are seen as the most direct opposites.
3
The data on the legislature make-up of the states were obtained from The 2012 Statistical
Abstract,The National Data Book published by the US Census Bureau. State economic data
(population, unemployment, and gross domestic product) were similarly collected from the
US Census Bureau sources.
48