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I IANGO Workshop ▶ International Advocacy NGO Workshop IBFAN ▶ International Baby Food Action Network (IBFAN) IBLF ▶ International Business Leaders Forum (IBLF) Ibn Khaldun JAN KÜENZL Basic Biographical Information Born in 1332 in Tunis (Tunisia) to an upper class family of functionaries, Ibn Khaldun became one of the most famous intellectuals in Islamic history. He received a traditional education in Koran studies, Arabic language, Islamic jurisprudence, math, logic, and philosophy. He traveled the whole Arabic world, and lived in Tunis, Granada, and Cairo. He held several high profile posts in politics, law, and education and even was jailed for 22 months due to an accusation of intrigue against a ruler of Fes. His fame derives from his book Universal History and especially from its introduction, the ‘‘Muqaddimah’’ (also known as the ‘‘Prolegomena’’). In 1400 he met Timur Lenk (Tamerlan) as an ambassador of the besieged Damascus. Ibn Khaldun died 1406 in Cairo (Egypt). If traditional historiography was basically a linear chronology of rule, Ibn Khaldun was interested in the causes of social and political developments. He explained his main topic of interest, the rise and fall of dynasties, as dependent on social, cultural, and environmental factors. Khaldun’s central concept is the asabiyyah, a kind of solidarity, ésprit de corps or community spirit. According to Khaldun, asabiyyah is particularly strong in relatively small communities with low social and cultural stratification and strong kinship ties, which were in Khaldun’s world, the Bedouin tribes at the periphery of the Arab empires. By contrast, urban societies are weakened due to the decline of asabiyyah which leads to their conquest by the strong tribes. The subsequent assimilation of the conquerors to the urban sociocultural framework closes the circle. The idea of group cohesion through some kind of solidarity determining the strength of a political entity and therefore its geopolitical fate was indeed new at Khaldun’s age. When the Muqaddimah became known in nineteenth-century Europe, Khaldun’s methods and ideas influenced thinkers like Marx, Durkheim, and Vico. Cross-References ▶ Civil Society Theory: Marx ▶ Durkheim, E. ▶ Social Cohesion ▶ Solidarity References/Further Readings Khaldun, I. (1967). The Muqaddimah: An introduction to history (F. Rosenthal, Trans.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Mahdi, M. (1957). Ibn Khaldun’s philosophy of history. London: Allen & Unwin. ICA ▶ International Co-operative Alliance (ICA) Major Contributions Ibn Khaldun is considered as the precursor of modern sociology and historiography due to his achievement in developing a whole new, secular approach to the reception of history. ICBL ▶ International Campaign to Ban Landmines H. Anheier, S. Toepler (eds.), International Encyclopedia of Civil Society, DOI 10.1007/978-0-387-93996-4, Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010 # 844 I Identity ICNL ▶ International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) ICVA ▶ International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) Identity CHRISTINA SCHWABENLAND London Metropolitan University, London, UK Introduction Identity, how we come to perceive ourselves and our surroundings in the ways that we do, is a concept which challenges and engages social, political, and organizational theorists alike. Within the area of organization studies, organizational identity is usually regarded as comprising those characteristics that give its members a sense of distinctiveness, often also of being unique in some way. These characteristics may also be seen as providing the organization with its strategic advantage (Dhalla, 2007). Definition Identity can be understood as referring to the collective set of characteristics that render a person or an organization as recognizable, or known. These characteristics serve to create and maintain a sense of similarity with who share similar characteristics and a sense of distance or separation from those who do not. Organizational identity overlaps with similar concepts such as image, reputation, culture, and more recently, branding (Klein, 2000). Within the literature identity is seen as the way in which organizational members perceive their organization. Image refers to the ways they present the organization to its external audiences and stakeholders while reputation is the way in which they actually perceive it (Dhalla, 2007; Linstead et al., 2004). Organizational culture is one of the contributing elements of identity. The idea of branding embraces identity, image, and reputation and also may include some sense of the organization’s values and principles. Linstead et al. (2004) point out the processes by which such meanings come to be created and known are profoundly iterative; each influences the other and so the boundary between the organization and its environment is very porous. They comment that ‘‘these images are projected outward and may the be absorbed back into the company’s meaning system to affect identity, that is who we are and who we think we are is always in interaction with who others think we are’’ (Linstead, 2004: 101). Clegg et al. suggest that organizational identity arises from the relationship between ‘‘temporal’’ and ‘‘spatial’’ (or cultural) differences (Clegg et al., 2007: 495). Historical Background Interest in organizational identity is usually regarded as originating with work of Albert and Whetten (1985) who regarded it as being primarily stable and changing only slowly only over long periods of time or in response to particular crises (Dhalla, 2007; Albert & Whetten, 1985). However in recent years new contributions to theorizing about identity have come from feminist, gender, post structuralist and postcolonial critics and from queer theory. Taking their inspiration from de Beauvoir’s famous proposition that ‘‘one is not born a woman but rather becomes one’’ they suggest that identity is fluid, ever changing, a work in progress. While the earlier work regarded identity as enduring over time, these later theorists question this, regarding identity as inherently problematic and as shifting, multiple, and intersectional, resulting form processes of becoming and performing (Butler, 1999; Moya, 2000). From this perspective important questions can be asked about the roles organizations and civil society actors play, the different ways in which their meaning is being constructed and in relationship to what other vested interests. Identity as a concept has also been inextricably linked to identity politics, the political and emancipatory struggles that come together around the articulation of what is perceived to be a shared attributes and usually one which is experienced as a source of discrimination, oppression, or neglect. These struggles are characterized by political platforms based on a shared sense of what people are (such as gender, race, caste, tribe, religion) rather than what they do (such as struggles for workers’ rights). Identity can best be understood as a relational concept; we define ourselves in relation to others, definitions characterized by perceived differences and similarities. While much of the work on organizational identity is applicable more generally, the following sections draw Identity out issues of specific relevance to the civil society sector and its organizations. Key Issues Identity and Civil Society The various attempts to define civil society and its organizations describe a space located between state and market whose boundaries are fuzzy and contours are vague. Keane comments that ‘‘global civil society. . . . is never a fixed entity but always a temporary assembly, subject to reshuffling and reassembly . . . . a form of self-reflexive dynamic marked by innovation, conflict, compromise, consensus, as well as rising awareness of the syncretic architecture, the contingencies and dilemmas of global civil society itself ’’ (Keane, 2003: 7). Anheier et al. describe it as ‘‘the sphere of ideas, values, institutions, organizations, networks, and individuals located between the family, state, and market and operating beyond the confines of national societies, politics, and economics’’ (Anheier et al., 2001). Schwabenland (2006) suggests that civil society organizations occupy ‘‘a social space in which societies and cultures construct questions about the good society and test out new and evolving responses [which is] contested and fought over and its boundaries endlessly debated’’ (Schwabenland, 2006: 6). These descriptions of civil society share two characteristics. The first is its ambiguity, which Billis, in one of the first attempts to create a model of the sector refers to as its inherent ‘‘messiness’’ (Billis, 1989). The second is that the boundaries of this space are determined by the other sectors, the state and the market. This suggests that our understandings of civil society are profoundly influenced by the ways in which we position its activities and organizations in relation to these other constructs of society. There have been many attempts to delineate this territory by establishing its defining characteristics. Each illuminates some areas of interest and obscures others and each has vociferous apologists and opponents. The dialectic between difference and distinctiveness underpins many of these debates about identity. Definitions, or narratives that focus on difference, what it is not, i.e., ‘‘nongovernmental’’ or ‘‘nonprofit’’ primarily try to define it in relation to these sectors. The first narrative is that of civil society in a relationship of constant reaction to the state, whether against state action or inaction, hegemony, corruption, or indifference, or of ‘‘filling the gaps’’ where the state retreats (or never went). In I this narrative the associations of civil society, formal or informal, do the things that government does not, whether it is running hospitals or schools or experimenting with innovative models of service delivery and civic engagement. They also develop their campaigning strategies in terms of what they want the state to do, or not to do. The state represents the norm against which the sector defines itself and evaluates its activities. The competing narrative is that of civil society’s relation to the corporate sector and this underpins many of the activities of social enterprise and micro-credit initiatives. These different conceptualizations of the civil society sector are constructed through explorations, or ‘‘patrolling’’ (6, Perri, 1994: 2–3) the boundaries of the sector’s constantly changing relationships with the other two sectors. As the roles of the market and state differ across time and location the space that is claimed by civil society also differs accordingly. The third narrative is about the distinctiveness of the civil society sector, what the sector is as opposed to what it is not, and is concerned with identifying a set of intrinsic qualities, or values that are shared (Blake et al., 2006) such as ‘‘civility’’ (Anheir, 2007; Keane, 2003) ‘‘the pursuit of common public good’’ (Tandon & Mohanty, 2002: 6), ‘‘the sense within NGOs and publics at large that civilians live in one world and that they have obligations to other civilians living beyond their borders, simply because they are civilians’’ (Keane, 2003: 36). The Johns Hopkins global mapping project combines these approaches in identifying five characteristics of civil society institutions: that they are formalized in some way, independent from the state, nonprofit distributing, self governing and voluntary (Salamon et al., 2004: 9–10). From a postcolonial perspective such attempts to define a single set of ‘‘universal’’ attributes and values are inherently flawed. The question arises of how these values are chosen and by whom. Munck notes that they generally have a Western or Eurocentric bias (Munck, 2006). One criticism which can be made of all of these definitional projects in identity construction is that the differences between organizations occupying this space may be greater than the differences across sectors. For instance, social enterprises and micro-credit initiatives may share more in common with small, profit making enterprises. Large, welfare orientated service providers may share more in common with state run services (especially if they originally were state run enterprises that have been contracted out to the civil society sector). However, Keane comments that ‘‘empirically minded researchers. . . .point out that the quest to map and measure the contours of global civil society is essential 845 I 846 I Identity for clarifying its empirical scope and complexity, its strategic or political capacity and its normative potential’’ (Keane, 2003: 4). Identity and Civil Society Organizations Creating organizations: For many civil society organizations their identity is inextricably linked to their founding (Schwabenland, 2006; Billis, 1989). People come together with likeminded individuals to create an organization out of a shared concern or sense of purpose. For the founders this can be profoundly empowering because it involves them defining for themselves what problems they face and what changes they want, and the very creation of the organization lends legitimacy and gives presence to those aspirations. With it comes ‘‘the recognition of solidarity and common cause with others who share those concerns and the establishment of a shared endeavor, the excitement of creating some thing new’’ (Schwabenland, 2006: 49). Therefore, some of the element of that founding vision whether it be the nature of the problem to be addressed, the group of people whose needs are to be met or the values that the founders brought to the new organization are likely to make up key elements of the organization’s identity. For example, in India many civil society organizations celebrate ‘‘founders’ day’’ (Schwabenland, 2006). Others are known by their founder’s philosophy such as the Gandhian organizations. The move from an informal grouping to a more formal organization is marked by the need for clear rules of engagement and also the creation of a legal identity (Billis, 1989). This involves choosing a name for the new organization. Many organizations become named by the social problem they have identified. Others chose names that commemorate the founders, affirm allegiance to particular values, religions, or political orientations; still others chose more ambiguous names that allow the organization more strategic maneuvring room. The new organization has to give itself legitimacy through representing itself as unique in some way, by doing some thing that isn’t being done already, doing it differently, or better than other organizations, or for different people with different needs and perspectives. Many organizations have their roots in social movements that have coalesced around a sense of shared identity such as the women’s, gay, and disability liberation movements and have played a significant role in the demands for recognition and legislative protection. Tomei (2003) notes that the valuing of diversity as an integral element of the search for social justice was invoked in social movements asserting the presence and significance of a multiplicity of differences outside the traditional axes of race and gender. Taking power to define your own needs and solutions legitimizes the perspectives of the creators, their uniqueness, the specificity of their visions. However critics of identity politics also point out that this process also creates exclusivity. Drawing a boundary involves determining the criteria for membership. By creating an organizational response to the needs of marginalized groups the boundaries that the organization sets may serve to increase their sense of separation and difference. These boundaries between the organization and its environment and the discourses of difference that sustain them separate an issue or a problem from the wider whole of which it is a part. A further challenge is that as the organization creates its own sense of identity by implication it also ‘‘fixes’’ the identity of others as equally stable and unchanging. Managing organizations: A strong sense of identity can be enormously important in decision making, creating a sense of direction (Dhalla, 2007) and steering an organization through crises. Schwabenland’s research (2006) suggested that at times of change and threat managers may resort to the founding visions to determine future actions. When that sense of identity is shared it can become an important motivating force. Inculcating a sense of identity can be achieved through attention to the organization’s culture, its stories and rituals and to the images it uses to present itself. Campaigning and advocacy: Civil society organizations engage in campaigning work to influence the development of public policy. This involves representing the wishes and needs of their constituents. But representation is one aspect of identity that has been the subject of much critique from postcolonial theorists (Said, 1993; Spivak, 1988) who question how that representation is done, who does the representing and with what kinds of legitimacy, what representations of the ‘‘other’’ are proposed and what constructions of the other are made possible (or impossible) by those representations. These questions, along with the debate about when a shared sense of identity is a source of renewed strength and when it becomes a ghetto, are at the heart of many of the debates around identity politics (Kwek, 2003; Moya, 2000; Alcoff, 2000). This is one of the criticisms of identity leveled by many feminist theorists: that constructs of identity can become imprisoning. Furthermore, the ways in which an organization’s client group or its campaigning issues are perceived can be a source of tension between the different roles of fundraising and lobbying on the one hand, and advocacy Identity on the other; where representations of clients as needy can be effective in generating resources but also maintain people in marginalized positions. The influence of social movements and identity based civil society organizations on human rights and antidiscrimination legislation is profound. However, making identity the focus of campaigning and organizing raise uncomfortable questions about the balance between empowerment through the expression of difference and empowerment through the expression of commonality. Future Directions The popularity of the various definitional and mapping projects and the debates, at times quite rancorous, within the sector about the nature of its subsectoral boundaries need to be understood against the backdrop of the near universal withdrawal of the state from the direct provision of services, a ‘‘voluntarisation’’ of the public sphere, and the increasing interest in social responsibility and ethics from the private sphere, a ‘‘corporatising’’ of voluntarism. These dynamics are causing fundamental shifts and realignments in the relationships both across and within sectors. These trends, which show little sign of stabilizing in the near future, are regarded as both a threat and an opportunity – a threat to the independence of the sector and an opportunity for more influence and increased funding. Accompanying these developments come increasing regulation and demands for transparency, demands which often function as powerful drivers of compliance (Schwabenland & Tomlinson, 2008). Against these threats, an expression of uniqueness may be a potentially powerful weapon to fight being insidiously co-opted into the public or private sectors. Cross-References ▶ Advocacy ▶ Brands and Branding ▶ Civil Society and Ethnicity ▶ Civil Society and Gender ▶ Civil Society: Definitions of and Approaches ▶ Civil Society Theory: Keane ▶ Civil Society-Business Relations ▶ Civility ▶ Government-Nonprofit Sector Relations ▶ Human Rights ▶ Legitimacy ▶ Lobbying ▶ Social Enterprises ▶ Social Movements I 847 References/Further Readings Albert, S., & Whetten, D. (1985). Organizational identity. In B. M. Staw & L. L. Cummings (Eds.), Research in organizational behaviour (Vol. 7, pp. 263–295). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. Alcoff, L. M. (2000). Whose afraid of identity politics? In P. M. L. Moya & M. R. Hames-Garcia (Eds.), Reclaiming identity: Realist theory and the predicament of postmodernism (pp. 312–345). Hyderabad: Orient Longman. Anheir, H. (2007). Reflections on the concept and measurement of global civil society, Voluntas, 18(1), 1–16. Anheir, H., Galsius, M., & Kaldor, M. (2001). Introducing global civil society. In H. Anheir, M. Galsius, & M. Kaldor (Eds.), Global civil society (pp. 3–22). New York: Oxford University Press. Billis, D. (1989). A theory of the voluntary sector: Implications for policy and practice Working paper no. 5, London: Centre for Voluntary Organizations, London School of Economics (LSE). Blake, G., Roblinson, D., & Smeardon, M. (2006). Living values. Newham: Community Links Foundation. Butler, J. (1990, 1999). Gender trouble: Feminism and the subversion of identity. London/New York: Routledge. Clegg, S. R., Rhodes, C., & Kornberger, M. (2007). Desperately seeking legitimacy: Organizational identity and emerging industries. Organization Studies, 28(4), 495–513. Dhalla, R. (2007). The construction of organizational identity: Key contributing external and intra-organizational factors. Corporate Reputation Review, 10(4), 245–260. Keane, J. (2003). Global civil society? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Klein, N. (2000). No logo. Canada: Knopf. Kwek, D. (2003). Decolonising and re-presenting culture’s consequences. In A. Prasad (Ed.), Postcolonial theory and organizational analysis. New York: Palgrave. Linstead, S., Fulop, L., & Lilly, S. (2004). Management and organization: A critical text. Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan. Moya, P. M. L. (2000). Introduction. In P. M. L. Moya & M. R. Hames-Garcia (Eds.), Reclaiming identity: Realist theory and the predicament of postmodernism. Hyderabad: Orient Longman. Munck, R. (2006) Global civil society: Royal road or slippery path? Voluntas, 17, 325–332. 6, Perri (1994). The question of independence: The future of charities and the voluntary sector, Working Paper No. 3, London: Demos. Said, E. (1993). Culture and imperialism. London: Chatto and Windus. Salamon, L. M. et al. (2004). Global civil society; dimensions of the nonprofit Sector: Dimensions of the non-profit sector (Vol. 2). Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, published in association with the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project. Schwabenland, C. (2006). Stories, visions and values in voluntary organizations. Aldershott: Ashgate. Schwabenland, C., & Tomlinson, F. (2008). Managing diversity or diversifying management? Critical Perspectives on International Business, 4(2–3). Spivak, G. C. (1988). Can the subaltern speak? In C. Nelson & L. Grossberg (Eds.), Marxism and the interpretation of cultures. Houndsmill: Macmillan. Tandon, R., & Mohanty, R. (2002). Civil society and governance. New Delhi: PRIA. Tomei, M. (2003). Discrimination and equality at work: A review of the concepts. International Labour Review, 142(4), 401–418. I 848 I Imagine Canada Illich, Ivan JENNY ELMACO Basic Biographical Background A polymath, a polyglot and a polemic, Ivan Illich was born September 4, 1926 in Vienna, Austria. His family was of mixed descent – on his mother’s side Sephardic Jews, on his father’s, an aristocratic Catholic Dalmatian family. Although his father’s business and diplomatic ties protected them in the 1930s, their Jewish roots forced him, his mother and twin brothers to leave Hitler-controlled Austria in 1941 for Italy. He entered the University of Florence where he majored in chemistry. At the age of 24, he graduated from the University of Salzburg with a Ph.D. in history. He prepared for the priesthood at the Gregorian University in Rome and became ordained in 1951. Deciding to pursue his studies, he went to the United States in 1951, where he instead chose to serve as assistant pastor in an Irish-Puerto Rican parish in New York City. Because of his popularity among his constituents, at a tender age of 30, he was made a monsignor. From 1956 to 1960, he accepted an assignment as vicerector to the Catholic University of Puerto Rico, where he organized an intensive training center for American priests in Latin American culture. Illich moved to Cuernavaca, Mexico, in 1961 and established the Center for Intercultural Documentation (CIDOC) whose purpose was to train American missionaries for work in Latin America. From 1964, he directed research seminars on ‘‘Institutional Alternatives in a Technological Society,’’ with a special focus on Latin America. Despite its popularity and success, CIDOC was riddled with controversy due to its unorthodox teaching and was closed in 1976. Increasingly discordant with the policies of the Catholic Church, he resolved to voluntarily resign from priesthood. Meanwhile, his thirst for knowledge urged him to travel and study oriental languages and culture. And his love for history and philosophy encouraged him to teach in several universities among them the University of Marburg, Germany and Pennsylvania State University, USA. Ivan Illich lived the end of his life mainly in Germany. He died in Bremen on December 2, 2002. books from the 1970s–1980s on technological development (Tools For Conviviality, 1973), energy, transport, and economic development (Energy And Equity, 1974), medicine (Medical Nemesis, 1976) and work (The Right To Useful Unemployment And Its Professional Enemies, 1978, and Shadow Work, 1981). In his 1982 book, Gender, Illich claims that industrial society deforms the ‘‘dyssymetric complementarity’’ of men and women into a ‘‘legally engineered equality’’ where women are usually disenfranchised. In the mid- to late 1980s Ivan Illich shifted his attention to an exploration of literacy practices in ABC: The Alphabetization of the Popular Mind (1988) and In the Vineyard of the Text (1993). The latter traverses how revolutions in technology affect the method of text comprehension. Yet a common thread in his writings was his critique of institutions as a consequence of modernity which strengthened the need for an active civil society and called for societal engagement and dialog. Cross-References ▶ Civil Society and Gender ▶ Civil Society and Social Inequality References/Further Readings Cayley, D. (1992). Ivan Illich in conversation interviews with. Toronto, ON: Anansi Press. Gabbard, D. A. (1993). Silencing Ivan Illich: A foucauldian analysis of intellectual exclusion. New York: Austin & Winfield. Kaller-Dietrich, M. (2008). Ivan Illich (1926–2002), sein Leben, sein Denken. Verlag der Provinz: Weitra. Sachs, W. (1992). The development dictionary: A guide to knowledge as power. London: Zed Books. Imagine Canada SHARILYN HALE Address of Organization 2 Carlton Street, Suite 600 Toronto, Ontario, M5B 1J3 Canada www.imaginecanada.ca Major Contributions Deschooling Society (1971) revealed Ivan Illich to the world with the argument that universal education is not feasible and thus he is convinced that schooling promotes inequality and social stratification. He wrote six Introduction Imagine Canada is a national umbrella organization for the nonprofit sector in Canada. Established in 2005, Imagine Canada provides resource and capacity building Independent Sector tools and opportunities for charities and nonprofits, encourages the community engagement of businesses, conducts and disseminates sector related research and publications, and engages in national public policy initiatives. It supports and is supported by a membership base of more than 1,300 charities, nonprofits, and businesses. Brief History Imagine Canada was launched in 2005, uniting the Canadian Centre for Philanthropy (CCP) and the Coalition of National Voluntary Organizations (NVO), with the aim to better serve the nonprofit sector in Canada in the areas of advocacy, research, and corporate citizenship. I standards of accountability and transparency. Approved participants use a trustmark that signals to the public their compliance with the Code’s fundraising and financial accountability standards. In addition to the Nonprofit Library Commons, Imagine Canada provides The Canadian Directory to Foundations and Corporations which is Canada’s largest bilingual fundraising database and a valuable resource to charities seeking funds. Cross-References ▶ Codes of Ethics and Codes of Practice ▶ Umbrella Organizations Mission/Objectives Imagine Canada’s mission is to advance knowledge and relationships to foster effective and sustainable charitable and nonprofit organizations. The organization is increasingly seen as an important voice of the charitable sector in Canada. Independent Sector ELIZABETH LEVI Address of Organization Activities Imagine Canada’s key areas of activity include: signature research of issues and trends within the sector, community programs such as the Caring Company Program which promotes good corporate citizenship, member services and resources, the online Non Profit Library Commons which is the largest collection of Canadian nonprofit literature, and an active program to influence and shape public policy related to the sector. Structure and Governance Imagine Canada is a registered Canadian charity. It is governed by a 13 member Board of Directors comprised of leaders from the nonprofit and business sectors across Canada. Led by a CEO, eight staff run the day-to-day operations of the organization. Funding In 2006, Imagine Canada’s operating budget was $6,270,000 CAD. This was supported through government grants, corporate and foundation donations, membership fees, and revenue from publications and sales. Major Accomplishments/Contributions In 2008, Imagine Canada launched the Ethical Code Program. A revision to the previous code for member organizations, the new program was developed to demonstrate the sector’s heightened commitment to uphold high 849 1602 L Street, NW, Suite 900 Washington, DC 20036 USA www.independentsector.org Introduction Independent Sector is an American forum that brings together over 600 organizations and their leaders to strengthen the nonprofit community of charities, foundations, and corporate giving programs. The Independent Sector is nonpartisan and strives to lead, advocate, and mobilize the charitable community to further a ‘‘just and inclusive society and a healthy democracy of active citizens, effective institutions, and vibrant communities.’’ Brief History In 1978–1979, an Organizing Committee was convened to create a new entity to raise the standards of practice and knowledge-sharing across the nonprofit sector. This national coalition of organizations, foundations, and corporate philanthropies was formally established as the Independent Sector (IS) in 1980. Two distinguished members of the founding group brought their visionary leadership to key roles at IS. Brian O’Connell became the first President and CEO, continuing after his retirement in 1995 as President Emeritus to the present. John W. Gardner served as Chairperson of IS from 1980 to 1983, remaining as Chair Emeritus until his death in 2002. I 850 I Independent Sector Mission/Objectives/Focus Areas Independent Sector frames its vision as working to create a ‘‘just and inclusive society and a healthy democracy of active citizens, effective institutions, and vibrant communities.’’ This vision underpins the organizational mission, ‘‘To advance the common good by leading, strengthening, and mobilizing the charitable community.’’ Independent Sector’s core values that define its activities include: Independence, including serving as a ‘‘leading voice for the common good;’’ Interdependence as it encourages cooperation and collaboration; Inclusiveness and Diversity; Transparency, Integrity, and Accountability; and Operational Excellence. Activities Independent Sector convenes an annual conference which was attended by over 900 leaders from over 560 nonprofit organizations in 2008. Annual conference participants gathered to explore how to use the voice of the nonprofit sector more effectively to strengthen communities and improve the lives of their citizens. Independent Sector conducts and publishes research and position papers on important contemporary issues in the sector. As an active advocate, Independent Sector monitors and speaks out to promote public policy to benefit the nonprofit sector, with a focus on protecting nonprofit rights, charitable giving, and federal and state budget issues. In addition, staff, volunteers, and governing bodies who work in and serve the nonprofit sector can access Independent Sector guides and reports to achieve and maintain high standards of ethical practice and efficiency. publications. Independent Sector counts among its donors for general support some of America’s leading foundations, including the Ford, Gates, Robert Wood Johnson, MacArthur, and Surdna Foundations, among others. Major Accomplishments/Contributions Independent Sector convenes The Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, which in 2007, published Principles for Good Governance and Ethical Practice: A Guide for Charities and Foundations. The volume focuses on ethical conduct, accountability, and transparency. Over 50,000 copies have been distributed to leaders, professionals, and volunteers in nonprofit organizations. Among its many publications, Independent Sector released The New Nonprofit Almanac & Desk Reference, a comprehensive summary of data and information for managers, researchers, and volunteers about the scope and size of the nonprofit sector in the United States. The Almanac was prepared by the Independent Sector in collaboration with the Urban Institute in 2002. In addition, Independent Sector has assembled several hundred research studies and listings of local, state, national, and international work on charitable behavior as a resource for scholars and practitioners through its Giving and Volunteering Research Clearinghouse. Independent Sector maintains a high profile advocacy effort at the state and federal level, including representing the sector at hearings before the US Congress. With its frequent press releases which are covered by the major news outlets in the United States, Independent Sector serves as a significant voice in the media on behalf of the voluntary sector. Independent Sector is also expanding its sphere to focus on international as well as national issues. Structure and Governance The membership of Independent Sector includes leading American philanthropies, foundations and organizations, and has grown steadily to its current roster of some 600 member organizations. The Independent Sector is governed by a Board of 23 officers and members, including Diana Aviv, Chief Executive Officer, and leaders from preeminent American public sector organizations. Fifteen board Committees guide the organization, which is made up of a staff of over 40 professionals and administrative support personnel. Funding The annual operating budget of Independent Sector as stated in the Annual Report of 2007 was $6.7 million. General and program-specific funding support is provided by philanthropic, corporate, and individual donors and revenue from membership dues, conference fees and Cross-References ▶ Advocacy ▶ Gardner, John W. ▶ O’Connell, Brian ▶ Umbrella Organizations References/Further Readings O’Connell, B. (1997). Powered by coalition: The story ofiIndependent sector. New Jersey: Jossey-Bass. The Panel on the Nonprofit Sector (2007). Principles for good governance and ethical practice: A guide for charities and foundations. Available in hard copy or PDF download, from http://report.nonprofitpanel.org/ principles The Panel on the Nonprofit Sector (2005). Strengthening transparency, governance, and accountability of charitable organizations: A final report to congress and the nonprofit sector. Available in hard copy or PDF download, from http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/Report/ index.html Informal Sector Informal Sector MARTHA CHEN Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA Introduction The formal–informal dichotomy – largely applied to the economy but also to institutional arrangements – has been a dominant theme in development discourse for more than half a century. The dichotomy has been largely applied to the economy: early on, to the modern market economy vis-à-vis the traditional subsistence economy; and, later on, to the formal market economy vis-à-vis the informal market economy. It has also been applied to institutional arrangements: notably, formal versus informal property rights (as in the case of common property management); formal versus informal social insurance mechanisms (e.g., burial or mutual health societies); and, more recently, formal versus informal organizations (as in the case of membership-based organizations of the poor, of workers, and of other categories of persons). This entry focuses on the formal–informal dichotomy in the economy but also, in less detail towards the end, among membership-based organizations of workers. The informal economy is the diversified set of economic activities, enterprises, and workers that are not regulated or protected by the state. Since its ‘‘discovery’’ in the early 1970s, the informal economy and its role in economic development have been hotly debated. Contrary to early predictions, the informal economy has continued to grow and has appeared in new forms. Today, it represents a significant share of the global economy and workforce. Some observers view the informal economy in positive terms, as a ‘‘pool’’ of entrepreneurial talent, a ‘‘cushion’’ during economic crises, or a source of livelihood for the working poor. Others view it more problematically, arguing that informal entrepreneurs deliberately avoid regulation and taxation. Each of these perspectives is right in regard to specific components or aspects of the informal economy. Definition The informal economy is the diversified set of economic activities, enterprises, and workers that are not regulated or protected by the state. Originally applied to selfemployment in small unregistered enterprises, the concept of informality has been expanded to also include wage employment in unprotected jobs. The self-employed in small unregistered or unincorporated enterprises include: I employers; own account operators (both heads of family enterprises and single person operators); and unpaid but contributing family workers. Wage workers without worker benefits or social protection include: employees of informal enterprises; informal employees of formal firms; casual or day laborers; unregistered or undeclared workers; industrial outworkers (also called homeworkers); most domestic workers; and some temporary or part-time workers. So defined, the informal economy comprises half to three-quarters of the non-agricultural labor force in developing countries. When informality in agriculture is also measured, the share of informal employment in total employment is higher still: as high as 90% in some countries in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. Although comparable estimates are not available for developed countries, evidence suggests that non-standard jobs and self-employment represent a sizeable (more than 25%) and growing share of total employment in Western Europe and North America. Historical Background Over the years, the debates on the informal economy have crystallized into four schools of thought regarding the informal economy. The dualist school sees the informal sector as comprised of marginal and survivalist activities – distinct from and not related to the formal sector – that provide income for the poor and a safety net in times of crisis. According to this school, the persistence of informal activities is due largely to the fact that not enough modern employment opportunities have been created to absorb surplus labor in developing countries. The structuralist school subscribes to the notion that informal enterprises and informal wage workers are subordinated to the interests of large capitalist firms, supplying cheap goods and services. Structuralists see formal and informal modes of production as inextricably linked and attribute the persistence and growth of the informal economy to the nature of capitalist development. The legalist school, on the other hand, sees the informal sector as comprised of ‘‘plucky’’ micro-entrepreneurs who choose to operate informally in order to avoid the costs, time, and effort involved in formal registration. According to the legalists, cumbersome government rules and procedures create barriers to formalization and thus stifle the productive potential of informal entrepreneurs. The related voluntarist school assumes that informal entrepreneurs deliberately seek to avoid regulations and taxation and, in some cases, to deal in illegal goods and services. According to this school of thought, informal entrepreneurs choose to operate illegally – or even criminally – in order to avoid taxation, commercial 851 I 852 I Informal Sector regulations, electricity and rental fees, and other costs of operating formally. Given the heterogeneity of the informal economy, there is merit to each of these perspectives as each school reflects one or another ‘‘slice of the (informal) pie.’’ But the informal economy as a whole is more heterogeneous and complex than the sum of these perspectives would suggest. From an institutional perspective, membership-based organizations are organizations whose governance structures respond to the needs and aspirations of their members. Trade unions are membership-based but most of them are formal in structure and not directly concerned with organizing informal workers. Cooperatives are membership-based organizations but, again, not all of them are focused on the informal workforce and some of them have formal contractual arrangements that make them akin to formal firms. However, there are a large and growing number of membership-based organizations of informal workers that are akin to either trade unions or cooperatives but not formally constituted or registered. Until the late 1990s, the formal labor movement was reluctant to organize informal workers – because either it did not want to concede that informal employment was expanding, it saw informal employment as largely selfemployment or viewed informal jobs as ‘‘bad jobs,’’ and/ or it did not have the financial or human resources to do so. Meanwhile, the informal workforce, in many countries around the world, was organizing or being organized. The largest trade union of informal workers in the world – the Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) of India – was established in 1972: it now has over one million members, all working poor women. Most membership-based organizations of informal workers tend to be small. But what they lack in size, they often make up for in numbers. Take the case of street vendor associations. There are scores or hundreds of street vendor associations in most cities in the developing world. For instance, in Sao Paulo, Brazil, there are estimated to be over 700 associations of street vendors. Consider the case of home-based women workers thought to be among the least visible and least organized of informal workers. A recent survey found over 500 organizations of home-based workers in Bangladesh and over 300 in Pakistan. In addition to local and national organizations of informal workers, there are regional and international organizations. There are regional organizations of homebased workers (called HomeNets) in South and South East Asia and of waste pickers in Latin America. There is an international association of street vendor organizations called StreetNet International. While the national, regional, and international associations tend to be registered – that is, formal – organizations, their member organizations are often unregistered or informal. A related issue for the international labor movement is that many of the organizations of informal workers, whether registered or not, are not trade unions: they might be worker cooperatives, producer groups, issue-based organizations, or locality-based associations. However, like trade unions, many of them are membership-based organizations (with elected leaders) and engage in collective bargaining. Moreover, some of the membership-based organizations of informal workers are registered as trade unions but are not recognized by the formal labor movement. This was the case for many years of SEWA. Registered in 1972 as a trade union, SEWA did not gain formal recognition by the national and international labor movement for over 30 years. Key Issues and Future Directions The recent renewal of interest in the informal economy stems from the recognition that the informal economy is growing and represents a feature of modern capitalist development, not just traditional economies. Given its size, significance, and permanence, several dimensions of the informal economy in today’s global economy need further conceptualization and empirical analysis. First, the segmentation within the informal economy by employment status, sex, and other variables needs further analysis, including differences in average earnings, poverty risk, and other characteristics associated with different segments. Second, the continuum of employment relations between pure ‘‘formal’’ relations (i.e., regulated and protected) at one pole and pure ‘‘informal’’ relations (i.e., unregulated and unprotected) at the other, with many categories in between, needs further analysis. Also, the linkages between units and workers along this continuum need to be better understood. Finally, the costs and benefits of working at different points along this continuum need to be better measured and understood. Mainstream economists – particularly those who subscribe to the voluntarist school of thought – tend to focus on the benefits of working informally to the relative neglect of the costs of doing so. However, recent studies have shown that there are often substantial costs – many of which remain ‘‘hidden’’ – associated with working informally. The new interest in member-based organizations of informal workers stems from two global trends: the growing number and share of workers that are engaged informally, and the declining number and share of workers that belong to formal trade unions. Some observers believe that the future of the international labor movement lies in being able to organize informal workers and Information Technology/Internet joining forces with existing organizations of informal workers. Given the size and significance of the global informal workforce, it is important to understand the structure, strategies, and effectiveness of the growing movement of informal worker organizations. What structures and strategies characterize the MBOs of informal workers? What policies and institutions do they seek to influence? What factors account for their success or failure? What are challenges do they face? How can policy best help them? A related issue is the respective roles and relationships in addressing poverty, inequality, and other social issues of (a) membership-based organizations of the working poor in the informal economy compared to membership-based organizations of the poor more generally; (b) membership-based organizations of informal workers compared to formal trade unions that directly organize informal workers; and (c) membership-based organizations of the working poor or of the poor more generally and non-governmental organizations that are not membership-based but work with the working poor or the poor more generally. Most importantly, as some observers would suggest, are membership-based organizations of the working poor or the poor in general central to achieving equitable growth and poverty reduction? Finally, it is important in an increasingly complex world to question the usefulness of the formal–informal dichotomy in the realm of either the economy or institutional arrangements. However, as long as the policy and regulatory environment is constructed around the notion that some economic activities, enterprises, workers, and organizations are formal while others are not, the dichotomy construct will prove to be useful. Moreover, the solution to the dichotomy – constructed or real – may not be to formalize all economic activities, enterprises, workers, and organizations: especially if formalization means adhering to regulations that were constructed around the notion of a dualistic economy. What is needed in a complex world in which most economic activities, enterprises, workers, and organizations fall along a continuum between formality and informality is a complete rethinking of theoretical models as well as policy and regulatory regimes to take into account and encompass the complexity and hybrid nature of the economy and institutional arrangements in the early twenty-first century. I References/Further Readings Chen, M. A., Vanek, J., Lund, F., Heintz, J., Jhabvala, R., & Bonner, C. (2005). Progress of the world’s women 2005: Women, work, and poverty. New York: UNIFEM. Chen, M. A., Jhabvala, R., Kanbur, K., & Richards, C. (2007). Membershipbased organizations of the poor. London/New York: Routledge. de Soto, H. (1989). The other path: The economic answer to terrorism. New York: Harper Collins. Guha-Khasnobis, B., Kanbur, K., & Ostrom, E. (2006). Linking the formal and informal economy: Concepts and policies. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press. International Labour Office. (1972). Employment, incomes and equality: A strategy for increasing productive employment in Kenya. Geneva: International Labour Office. International Labour Office. (2002). Women and men in the informal economy: A statistical picture. Geneva: International Labour Office. Available online at: http://www.ilo.org/public/english/ employment/ gems/download/women.pdf. Maloney, W. F. (2004). Informality revisited. World Development, 7, 1–20. Moser, C. N. (1978). Informal sector or petty commodity production: Dualism or independence in urban development. World Development, 6, 1041–1064. Portes, A. (1994). The informal economy and its paradoxes. In N. Smelser & R. Swedberg (Eds.), The handbook of economic sociology. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Tokman, V. (1978). An exploration into the nature of the informalformal sector relationship. World Development, 6, 1065–1075. Information Technology/Internet PAUL-BRIAN MCINERNEY University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA Introduction Over the past decade, the Internet has evolved rapidly into a worldwide communications medium. Consisting of many technologies, the Internet provides people and organizations with the ability to create, deliver, and consume multimedia content. Yet, the growth of the Internet has been exponential and uneven. From its humble beginnings as an experiment in data sharing, the Internet has exploded into a cacophony of messages from commerce, government, and civil society interests. As such, the Internet affords many opportunities for and threats to civil society. Cross-References ▶ Cooperatives and Employee Ownership ▶ Labor Movements/Labor Unions ▶ Membership and Membership Associations ▶ Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) 853 Definition Information technologies are hardware and software designed to collect, process, and store digital data. Information technology takes various forms from databases I 854 I Information Technology/Internet and communications software to computer networks and Personal Digital Assistants. The Internet is a widely distributed network of computer servers, which allow users to communicate and exchange data. The Internet is the infrastructure for information and communications technologies such as the World Wide Web and email. Historical Background The Internet grew out of the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), formed during the early stages of the Cold War by the United States government. (Abbate [1999]; Hafner and Lyon [1996] provide more complete histories of the Internet.) ARPA contracted with private and university researchers to build a robust telecommunications infrastructure that could withstand devastating damage in the event of nuclear war. The result of their efforts was the Internet, a widely distributed computer network. The Internet was an innovation over previous computer networks because of its use of packet-switching. Packet switching separates data into discrete ‘‘packets’’ at the source, sending them across a distributed network. Packets are routed along the way by electronic ‘‘switches’’ and reassembled at the destination. Packet switching adds robustness to the computer network by allowing packets to travel on the fastest (though not necessarily the shortest) routes across the network, bypassing nodes that are busy or incapacitated. Because it used public funds, the protocols developed for the ARPA project that led to the Internet were public domain, i.e., open to anyone to modify and improve. Many university researchers contributed code to the project. In exchange, their universities were granted network nodes for participating in the project. Academic researchers used the newly formed computer network to share data, access to mainframe computers, and collaborate on scientific research. The early use of the Internet endowed the technology with an ethos of openness and freedom. Such an ethos dominated the Internet until the 1990s, when commercial interests began exploiting the technological infrastructure for profit. However, even as commercial interests began to dominate the Internet, the hardware and software necessary to use the technology became available to more civil society organizations. In the 1980s, the nonprofit Institute for Global Communications (IGC) made Internet technologies available to progressive groups throughout the United States, expanding to Great Britain by the end of the decade. Through affiliated projects, IGC has helped nongovernmental organizations around the world gain access to the Internet, reaching 130 countries by the mid-1990s. As a result, the Internet has proven a powerful communications medium for civil society organizations around the world. Key Issues Studies about the Internet and civil society highlight the potential of the Internet for expression and mobilization, but highlight several key issues (for a full review, see DiMaggio et al., 2001). The most significant issue identified in the literature is structural inequality regarding access to and use of the Internet, known as the digital divide. Other important issues concerning civil society use of the Internet include public deliberation and discourse, privacy, and the effects of the Internet on organizational form. Structural Inequality and the Internet The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (1999) first identified a ‘‘Digital Divide’’ in the United States in the late 1990s. The digital divide refers to the structural inequality that prevents disenfranchised populations from accessing and effectively using the Internet. DiMaggio et al. (2004) have found that the digital divide is a multidimensional problem consisting of access, knowledge, and motivation. Van Dijk (2006) notes that as Internet penetration improves in developing countries, age and education become the leading determinants of Internet use, with younger and more educated populations being more likely to use the Internet effectively. The Pew Internet and American Life Project found that 73% of Americans had access to the Internet (Madden, 2006). The same study found that only 29% of people with less than a high school diploma go online while 89% of people with college degrees do so. Only 26% of Americans over 65 go online, compared to 84% of 18– 29 year-olds. While access issues are becoming less problematic in the United States, they remain troublesome globally. Even in China, where over 137 million people use the Internet, penetration is estimated at only 10% of the population (Fallows, 2007). China’s digital divide resembles that of the United States, with the additional dimension of a rural/urban split. Such a pattern is found throughout the developing world. Norris (2001) provides the most comprehensive study of the global digital divide to date. She suggests ‘‘human capital,’’ defined as individual skills and capacity gained through education, is the most significant predictor of Internet use worldwide. Similarly, civil society organizations face an ‘‘Organizational Divide’’ regarding their access and use of the Internet. Kirschembaum and Kunamneni (2001) first Information Technology/Internet recognized that nonprofit and grassroots organizations lacked access to the Internet and the expertise to use it. Corder (2001) compared nonprofit organizations with public sector agencies to find that the former lagged behind the latter, which made interactions and partnerships between them difficult, especially when it comes to sharing information. However, more recent surveys have painted a more complex and nuanced picture of civil society organizations’ use of information technologies. Princeton Survey Research Associates (2001) finds that while most of the nonprofit organizations surveyed had access to the Internet, only half had Websites, most of which were large organizations. Surveying nonprofit organizations in New York City, Seley and Wolpert (2002) find that most have access to the Internet, but that information technologies are often underutilized. Their study finds that a lack of expertise and funding for training as the dominant reasons nonprofit organizations do not take fuller advantage of information technologies. Forster (2003) finds the organizational divide in terms of access had been largely overcome and that most of their staffs were using the Internet, but that nonprofit organizations surveyed desired more training to take advantage of information technologies. In an early study on nonprofit organizations’ use of the Internet, McNutt and Boland (1999) found that while many nonprofit organizations were using the Internet for advocacy, those surveyed reported expertise was the most important factor in determining their use of the Internet. Similarly, Robertson (2001) explains that foundation funding for information technology investments, in terms of both computers and training, are the primary reason that nonprofit organizations are not using the Internet and implementing more interactive Web content effectively. I communities afford the types of interactions necessary for actors to organize for social change while ‘‘virtual’’ communities often splinter people into ever smaller factions, leaving them communicating only with those with whom they already agree. Similarly, Van Alstyne and Brynjolfsson (1996) argue that unfettered virtuality can lead to a ‘‘cyberbalkanization.’’ Putnam (2000) also warns of the overly-individualizing effects of the Internet and its ability to undermine the production of social capital. Few empirical studies have been done to assess the ‘‘real’’ community-building potential of the Internet. However, in a unique natural experiment, Hampton and Wellman (2003) test the propinquity thesis and find that virtuality enhances real community: neighbors with virtual ties are more likely to have and enact real ties. The Internet also allows civil society organizations to create and maintain ties and collective identities among activists as well as mobilize constituents. Diani (2000) shows that while the Internet is not effective for creating new ties, it effectively reinforces existing ties and mobilizes networks of activists. Haenfler (2004) shows how the Internet helps maintain activists’ collective identities in distributed social movements, which is necessary for mobilization. Smith (2001) provides strong evidence that the Internet helps activists mobilize global networks, vastly facilitating transnational movements. Her research focuses on how activists used the Internet to protest the 1999 World Trade Organization talks in Seattle. Since then, activists have used the Internet to organize protests worldwide. McInerney and Berman (2003) assembled a database of transnational civil society organizations using the Internet to mobilize against the First Iraq War, which shows the breadth of activism online. Privacy Public Deliberation and Discourse The Internet’s ethos of openness provides civil society actors with the ability to communicate directly with constituents. As the technologies of online publishing grow easier to use and affordable web design and communications tools become more widely available, more people and groups have the opportunity to voice their opinions. The result aligns with recent trends toward segmentation in society. Wellman (1997) shows how communities of interest displace geographical communities, enabling people to find others who share their political disposition and social likeness and allowing them to organize online. Similarly, Wellman and Gulia (1999) claim that electronic networks create virtual communities with real social effects. However, Calhoun (1998) warns against equating virtual and geographical communities: ‘‘real’’ The literature on privacy and the Internet presents stark warnings for civil society. In particular, Naughton (2001) describes civil society use of privacy protections through such technologies as encryption, but offers stark warnings about government restrictions on private use of encryption software. Dennis (2007) and others provide empirical evidence of China’s disregard for individual privacy online in the government’s quest to suppress oppositional voices. China and similar government control of the Internet poses threats to freedom as well as privacy. Similarly, the dominance of commercial interests online undermine the ability of civil society organizations to freely express their interests and concerns. These trends lead Baird (2002) to call for new forms of governance if the Internet is to remain a domain of public expression. 855 I 856 I Information Technology/Internet Changing Organizational Structure of Civil Society Organizations Fulk and DeSanctis (1995) explain that communications technology and organizational form are interdependent: decentralized technologies shape decentralized organizations. The Internet changes the form of civil society organizations. Earl and Schussman (2003) find that social movement organizations that implement Internet technologies become, on the whole, more decentralized and deliberative. Saidel and Cour (2003) find that nonprofit organizations also witness internal reorganization when they implement Internet technologies, especially regarding their administrative tasks and staff. However, staff at these formal organizations reported feeling their jobs were becoming more technical and therefore distanced from the service missions of the organization. Berlinger and Te’eni (1999) report similar tensions between technical and missionbased directives in their study of leaders of religious congregations. The research thus points to differential outcomes for formal and informal organizations that use the Internet, but more research is necessary to draw conclusions. Ebrahim (2003) finds that the structure of interorganizational relations shifts as NGOs and their funders engage in power struggles mediated by information needs and flows facilitated by information technologies. Similarly, Burt and Taylor (2003) find NGOs using information technologies strategically when communicating with other civil society actors, but that such use reflects the values of the organizations. Bach and Stark (2004) explain the ways that civil society organizations have coevolved with the Internet. Examining the case of Eastern European NGOs, the authors show how the decentralized, collaborative nature of the Internet has led to more decentralized and collaborative civil society organizations. As Bach and Stark (2002) note elsewhere, civil society organizations also become knowledge communities, interacting with one another, their host nations, and the world. While highlighting the potential, empirical research about Internet and information technologies remains ambivalent about the ability of these technologies to enhance or contribute to a healthy civil society. Levine (2004) warns that the digital divide, commercialization, and privacy will have to be addressed if the Internet is to enhance people’s abilities to effectively contribute to civil society. Becker and Wehner (2001) argue that the Internet strengthens civil society groups because it give voice to those without access to mass media. Castells et al. (2006) provide evidence that the Internet transforms civil society by allowing people to distribute information more freely, thus increasing the autonomy of civil society groups. International Perspectives Despite the entry of commercial actors into the space, the technological infrastructure along with the pervasive ethos of openness and freedom affords great opportunities for civil society organizations across the world. The literature about civil society organizations using the Internet and information technology is replete with examples of successful global information campaigns. For example, Martinez-Torres (2001) provides an in-depth case study of how the Zapatistas exploited the potential of the Internet to access the global stage. Electronic communiques circulated by the movement reached people all over the world, who put pressure on Mexico, eventually leading to concessions with the Mexican government. Naughton (2001) provides several more cases, explaining how the Internet and civil society align with a libertarian ethos. However, Naughton warns that commercial intrusion and government control infringe on civil society’s use of the Internet and threatens freedom online and off. Castells (1997) demonstrates how the Internet empowers civil society actors independent of their goals or ideas of progress. Thus, human rights groups and hate groups come to have equal voices online. One under-examined barrier to global civil society’s use of the Internet is the dominance of the English language. Much of what is published online is in English, preventing non-English speakers from reading such materials and contributing to the global dialog. The extent of this barrier has been covered by journalists, but its depth and impact have yet to be studied systematically. Future Directions There remains much work to do regarding the Internet and civil society. The Internet is constantly evolving. Advances and innovations take place regularly and spread rapidly. While many individual users take advantage of these changes, civil society organizations are generally slow to adopt new technologies. Research is needed to determine why this is the case and what it means for the future of civil society. While some studies point to a lack of time, money, and expertise as barriers to technology adoption among nonprofits, newer technologies are less expensive and easier to adopt. Many of the studies noted above were conducted in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when the Internet penetration was much lower, but growing rapidly. More recent technologies, including the Web 2.0, RSS (Rich Site Summary or Really Simple Syndication) feeds, Wikis, podcasting, tagging, social bookmarking, blogs, social networking, and the increase in user-developed multimedia content (such as pictures and video on websites like Flickr and YouTube) are radically transforming the Internet and its potential uses for Information Technology/Internet civil society. These newer Internet technologies have already played a role in changing the fortunes of politicians in the United States and abroad and may provide civil society actors with more immediate global connections for their platforms. Beyond these technologies, mobile Internet devices, such as web-enabled cellular phones show great promise as organizing tools for individual users and information distribution tools for civil society organizations. Much of the current research remains speculative: it explains the potential of Internet technologies for civil society without empirical data about actual use. As such, more systematic, empirical research is necessary to explain the recursive relationship between the Internet and civil society. As Orlikowski (1992) explains, technologies are reconstituted in use. The Internet changes and is changed by civil society. Research is needed to uncover and theorize the structurational processes by which the Internet and civil society are mutually reconstituted. On a practical level, scholars also need to conduct more research that helps individual users better access and use the Internet and informs civil society organizations about how they might use the Internet more effectively in their work. Cross-References ▶ Civil Society and Social Capital in China ▶ Civil Society and Social Capital in US and Canada ▶ Civil Society and Social Inequality ▶ Civil Society, Late 20th and 21st Century ▶ Coalitions and Networks ▶ Cyber-Communities ▶ Digital Divide ▶ Dotcauses ▶ Global Civil Society ▶ MoveOn.org ▶ Organizational Forms and Development ▶ Public Sphere ▶ Social Capital ▶ Social Movements References/Further Readings Abbate, J. (1999). Inventing the internet. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Associates, Princeton Survey Research. (2001). Wired, willing and ready: Nonprofit human service organizations’ adoption of information technology. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University. Bach, J., & Stark, D. (2002). Innovative ambiguities: NGOs use of interactive technology in Eastern Europe. Studies in Comparative International Development, 37, 3–25. Bach, J., & Stark, D. (2004). Link, search, interact: The co-evolution of NGOs and interactive technology. Theory, Culture & Society, 21, 101–117. Baird, Z. (2002). Governing the internet: Engaging government, business, and nonprofits. Foreign Affairs, 81, 15–20. I Becker, B., & Wehner, J. (2001). Electronic networks and civil society reflections on structural changes in the public sphere. In C. Ess & F. Sudweeks (Eds.), Culture, technology, communications: Towards and intercultural global village (pp. 67–85). Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Berlinger, L. R., & Te’eni, D. (1999). Leaders’ attitudes and computer use in religious congregations. Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 9, 399–412. Burt, E., & Taylor, J. (2003). New technologies, embedded values, and strategic change: Evidence from the U.K. voluntary sector. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 32, 115–127. Calhoun, C. (1998). Community without propinquity revisited: Communications technology and the transformation of the public sphere. Sociological Inquiry, 68, 373–397. Castells, M. (1997). The power of identity. Malden, MA: Blackwell. Castells, M., Fernandez-Ardevol, M., Qui, J., & Sey, A. (2006). Electronic communication and socio-political mobilization: A new form of civil society. In M. Glasius, M. Kaldor, & H. Anheier (Eds.), Global civil society 2005/06 (pp. 266–285). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Corder, K. (2001). Acquiring new technology: Comparing nonprofit and public sector agencies. Administration and Society, 33, 194–219. Dennis, K. (2007). Technologies of civil society: Communication, participation, and mobilization. Innovation, 20, 19–34. Diani, M. (2000). Social movement networks virtual and real. Information Communication & Society, 3, 386–401. DiMaggio, P., Hargitta, E., Celeste, C., & Shafer, S. (2004). Digital inequality: From unequal access to differentiated use. In K. Neckerman (Ed.), Social inequality (pp. 355–400). New York: Russell Sage Foundation. DiMaggio, P., Hargittai, E., Neuman, W. R., & Robinson, J. P. (2001). Social implications of the internet. Annual Review of Sociology, 27, 307–336. Earl, J., & Schussman, A. (2003). The new site of activism: On-line organizations, movement entrepreneurs, and the changing location of social movement decision making. Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change, 24, 155–187. Ebrahim, A. (2003). NGOs and organizational change: Discourse, reporting and learning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fallows, D. (2007). China’s online population explosion: What it may mean for the internet globally and for US users. Washington, DC: Pew Internet and American Life Project. Forster, J. J. (2003). Revolution or evolution?: A longitudinal study of technology use by nonprofit organizations 2000–2002. Pittsburgh, PA: Bayer Center for Nonprofit Management, Robert Morris University. Fulk, J., & DeSanctis, G. (1995). Electronic communication and changing organizational forms. Organization Science, 6, 337–349. Haenfler, R. (2004). Collective identity in the straight edge movement: How diffuse movements foster commitment, encourage individualized participation, and promote cultural change. The Sociological Quarterly, 45, 785–805. Hafner, K., & Lyon, M. (1996). Where wizards stay up late: The origins of the Internet. New York: Touchstone. Hampton, K., & Wellman, B. (2003). Neighboring in Netville: How the internet supports community and social capital in a wired suburb. City & Community, 2, 277–311. Kirschenbaum, J., & Kunamneni, R. (2001). Bridging the organizational divide: Toward a comprehensive approach to the digital divide. Oakland, CA: PolicyLink. Levine, P. (2004). The internet and civil society. In V. V. Gehring (Ed.), The internet and public life (pp. 79–99). New York: Rowman & Littlefield. 857 I 858 I INGOs Madden, M. (2006). Internet penetration and impact. Washington, DC: Pew Charitable Trust. Martinez-Torres, M. E. (2001). Civil society, the Internet, and the Zapatistas. Peace Review, 13, 347–355. McInerney, P.-B., & Berman, D. (2003). IT and activism around the war in Iraq. New York: Social Science Research Council. McNutt, J. G., & Boland, M. (1999). Electronic advocacy by nonprofit organizations in social welfare policy. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 28, 432–451. Naughton, J. (2001). Contested space: The internet and global civil society. In H. Anheier, M. Glasius, & M. Kaldor (Eds.), Global Civil Society Yearbook 2001 (pp. 147–168). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Norris, P. (2001). Digital divide: Civic engagement, information poverty, and the internet worldwide. New York: Cambridge University Press. National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA). (1999). Falling through the net: Defining the digital divide. Washington, DC: Department of Commerce. Orlikowski, W. (1992). The duality of technology: Rethinking the concept of technology in organizations. Organization Science, 3, 398–427. Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community. New York: Simon & Schuster. Robertson, B. (2001). Beyond access: A foundation guide to ending the organizational divide. Washington, DC: National Committee on Responsive Philanthropy. Saidel, J. R., & Cour, S. (2003). Information technology and the voluntary sector workplace. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 32, 5–24. Seley, J. E., & Wolpert, J. (2002). New York city’s nonprofit sector. New York: The New York City Nonprofits Project. Smith, J. (2001). Globalizing resistance: The battle of Seattle and the future of social movements. Mobilization: An International Journal, 6, 1–19. Van Alstyne, M., & Brynjolfsson, E. (1996). Electronic communities: Global villages or cyberbalkans. Paper presented at the 17th Annual International Conference on Information Systems, Cleveland, OH. van Dijk, J. A. G. M. (2006). Digital divide research, achievements and shortcomings. Poetics, 34, 221–235. Wellman, B. (1997). An electronic group is virtually a social network. In S. Kiesler (Ed.), Culture of the internet (pp. 179–208). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Wellman, B., & Gulia, M. (1999). Virtual communities as communities: Net surfers don’t ride alone. In M. A. Smith & P. Kollock (Eds.), Communities in cyberspace (pp. 167–194). New York: Routledge. INGOs STEPHEN COMMINS UCLA, Los Angeles, CA, USA Introduction International Nongovernmental Organizations (INGOs) are nonprofit organizations that provide various types of services in low and lower-middle income countries. These organizations are ‘‘international’’ because they raise funds in developed countries and utilize these funds in other countries. They operate in a variety of sectors: economic development; humanitarian emergency; environmental; human rights. For the purpose of this entry, INGOs will be confined to economic development and humanitarian emergencies, as these are the sectors where the term INGO is most frequently used. Definition The term ‘‘Nongovernmental Organization,’’ as opposed to charity or voluntary association, has its origins in the evolution of the United Nations system and the definition of roles of state and nonstate actors. In some ways, the term ‘‘nongovernmental’’ is so broad as to be meaningless (is a table, a ‘‘non-water’’ object?) yet it has become the common terminology of international development. NGOs are not part of any agency of government, whether national, regional, or local, and are thus distinct from government organized and managed NGOs (GONGOs). International NGOs are NGOs that receive funds in more than one country (i.e., United Kingdom, Sweden, Canada, etc.) and either fund or directly manage programs in several other low and lower middle income countries. Historical Background All of the organizations described as INGO were founded after 1900 and before 1955, with the oldest being Save the Children-UK (part of the International Save the Children Alliance), which was founded in 1919. The largest INGOs all emerged in response to situations of conflict (Save the Children, World War I; PLAN International, Spanish Civil War; Oxfam, World War II; CARE, World War II; World Vision International, Korean War). Other INGOs include Medécins Sans Frontières, ActionAid, and Christian Children’s Fund, and comparable INGOs in human rights are Amnesty International and in environmental issues, WWF. Over several decades of organizational evolution, these NGOs moved from a sole focus on emergencies to welfare models to various forms of what were termed community development. The community development emphasis generally has sought to reduce poverty through various mechanisms, but in practice the main NGOs have operated in a service delivery approach. INGOs are mission driven, their work based on particular founding principles or values, which have evolved over decades. Both the operational and governance structures of INGOs are highly diverse, ranging from somewhat centralized (PLAN and World Vision) management and operation systems, to more federal to loosely affiliated (Save the Children and Oxfam). INGOs Up until the mid-1980s, INGOs were relatively small players in the global aid scene. They experienced rapid expansion after the 1980s, as they were the ‘‘favored child’’ of donor agencies. They were supposed to be able to work closer to the grassroots, with less overhead and less politicized assistance. By the mid-1990s, an alternative view had emerged, with increasing criticism from civil society organizations in developing countries, from researchers and from within the INGOs themselves. The major change for INGOs in terms of growth and thus changes in operational structure came through their growth in the past two decades, as they received more public and private funding. Both OECD bilateral agencies and multilateral agencies identified certain attributes of NGOs that include the major INGOs. The shift to funding INGOs began with the goal of increasing local ownership of programs and outcomes. This eventually led to the counter criticism that INGOs were more donor driven than community focused and it is a criticism that pushed many INGOs to adjust their roles and relationships with local NGOs to promote increasing ownership of development processes. INGOs were assumed to be effective at improving design, execution, and outputs of development objectives and bringing community knowledge and innovation in many program areas. They were also seen as strengthening engagement between decision makers and communities, building space for participatory development, complementing the role of the state and the market, and also acting as partners in humanitarian interventions. Thus, beginning the 1980s, public sector donors increasingly designated a higher proportion of their funds to be spent through INGOs and Southern NGOs (SNGOs), believing they were more flexible, focused, community-based, and efficient. At first, most bilateral donors provided funding through ‘‘their’’ NGOs, in other words AUSAID provided funds through Australian NGOs, DFID through UK NGOs, etc. Over the 1990s, these donors began to shift their support directly to SNGOs and donors have challenged the role of international NGOs (INGOs). The donor model has been changing, with more direct funding of Southern NGOs, rather than those Southern NGOs that are branches of or mirror images of INGOs, or formed only to access funding. Key Issues INGO Operations Even as INGOs work to improve their relationships with local organizations, they also struggle with the challenge I of management from a long distance. Every INGO has invested time and resources, and reinvented their systems, in order to try to improve communication and coordination between global headquarters and national offices, as well as front line program staff. A basic organizational system drives the demand for information, which means that field staff send their reports to national offices and global headquarters, which are then reviewed internally and transmitted to donors. This is the aspect of the information sharing learning model most commonly carried out in INGOs. However, when information dissemination stops at this point, a crucial opportunity for additional learning is missed. If the global office collects field reports, reviews, and compiles the material for ‘‘best practices,’’ and then provides it to the field offices, valuable data can be transformed into immediately useful knowledge. Field staff can also benefit from generating the primary reports, reading the compiled headquarters reports, and responding to any perceived inaccuracies or discrepancies. The most commonly reported concern from field offices is the unresponsiveness of headquarters to their needs, the flip side of the concerns from their global offices. While requiring field reports, global headquarters staff have challenges in sharing back to field offices their own work and global systems overview. This makes it difficult to establish dual accountability and an effective information system. No INGO would claim to have resolved the challenge, which remains complicated by distance, size, and diverse operating environments. External Relations INGOs by their size and spread must manage a complex set of relationships with OECD government donors that provide funding for general support, for general programs and for specific projects. These relationships tend to result in INGOs developing their own internal expertise for bidding for and managing government and multilateral (such as UNDP or World Food Programme) contracts. Along with their relationship with OECD government donors and multilateral organizations, INGOs also must work with ‘‘host’’ governments in each country where they work. This often involves dealing with increasingly complicated government/NGO relations. Over the past two decades, most developing country governments have established more stringent and systematic regulations for INGOs. This relates back to the issues of relations between global headquarters and country field staff, and the tasks involved in management ‘‘at a distance.’’ Though international charities have a history over centuries of various international programming, the 859 I 860 I INGOs specific identity and relationships between INGOs, governments or international diplomacy emerged primarily after World War II. INGOs received the acknowledgement of their voice at the United Nations during the development of UN agreements in 1943 and 1944. The access of NGOs was outlined in Article 71 of the UN Charter and affirmed by many subsequent decisions. By 2000, about 2,500 NGOs had consultative status with the United Nation and many thousands more had official arrangements with other organs in the UN system and other intergovernmental bodies. INGOs and NGO coalitions have been the most visible manifestation of the global engagement of INGOs that has expanded significantly since 1990. The various UN summits in the 1990s highlighted the arrival of global civil society and the active presence of a vast array of NGOs, but also illustrated some of the tensions over the resources and voice of the large INGOs. The Earth Summit in Rio in 1992 set the pace for intense NGO participation in world conferences, with 17,000 NGO representatives participating in the NGO parallel forum and 1,400 directly involved in the intergovernmental negotiations. NGOs helped make the conference a success, claimed an important place in the conference declaration and played a key role in developing postconference institutions, like the Commission on Sustainable Development. Three years later, the Fourth World Conference on Women in September 1995 attracted an estimated 35,000 civil society representatives to Beijing to the parallel forum and over 2,500 to the intergovernmental negotiations. Other events such as the World Summit on Social Development, the World Conference on Human Rights and the International Conference on Population and Development all were venues where INGOs were part of a large collection of diverse civic society representatives. INGOs discovered that they were most effective at influencing policies when they were part of larger policy coalitions, sharing different strengths and resources, and seeking to align their advocacy efforts. INGOs are often key players in various civil society networks on international economic policies, which provide a forum for diverse voices and views to come together. These platforms range from civil society coalitions on specific issues to civil society forums at are linked to international conferences and negotiations. At the same time, serious tensions arose about who ‘‘speaks’’ for civil society at the global level. An example of some of the tensions facing INGOs in their relation with ‘‘global civil society’’ can be found in the World Social Forum which began as a countermovement to the World Economic Forum, and the internal debates within the WSF highlighted how many individuals and organizations in the ‘‘global South’’ are skeptical of INGOs. They frequently criticized the INGOs are lacking a coherent alternative vision. The tension between system maintainers, system reformers and system transformers becomes especially sharp in regards to the WSF, relations with the World Bank and IMF, and countervailing visions. The WSF experience has illustrated the difficulties in establishing an effective civil society infrastructure that allows diverse groups to participate effectively in the different forums. Over the next decade, INGOs and their participation in different networks will remain one of the interesting forums for internal civil society debates on who speaks for whom. Along with the challenges of defining their place within civil society at the global level, INGOs face equally complex challenges with civil society in local contexts. INGOs programmatically must manage a range of complex upwards and downwards relationships, INGOs have to manage multiple accountabilities, to donors and beneficiaries – and there are increasing demands towards ‘‘downward accountability.’’ In their public statements and mission, INGOs see their primary responsibility is to the populations they serve. Yet, of necessity, INGOs must also respond to and be attuned to the expectations of the donors who make their work possible. The relationship between INGOs and local organizations are complex in ways that require attention and astute responses. NGOs experience tensions over the use of funds and program priorities, as well as the problem of subcontracting. INGOs, in particular in emergency relief situations, often operate as implicit or explicit subcontractors for multilateral and bilateral donors. When they begin to work with local NGOs or grassroots organizations, there is a danger that due to pressures of time and the larger operational structure within which they must function, the relationship will be established on a contractual basis for solely instrumental purposes. A further risk is that the pressure to ‘‘go operational’’ will reduce the ability of international NGOs to assess their potential counterparts. In recent years, donors have become increasingly more active in placing restrictions on the use of their funds. So there may be substantial pressure to utilize funds quickly or in ways that may not serve the best interests of the disaster victims. All of these factors create conflict within an INGO because those who receive the goods and services are not the ones who pay for them, which raises up issues of accountability by INGOs. Accountability is a process by which INGOs and their leaders provide information about their programs and the INGOs justification for how they spend their resources. It provides or should provide a mechanism towards building relations with local communities in ways in which they can access INGO decision-making, make complaints or criticisms, and request changes in programming and staff. In theory, the ways in which INGOs describe working with local partners and INGO partnership language is about accountability. While INGOs have all adopted the language of partnership, INGOs remain the keeper of the funds, and this has led to increased criticism of their distance from the communities. Many civil society organizations will express discomfort with mismatch between the resources and relative political immunity of INGOs compared to their own poorly resourced offices and the political risk they experience as local organizations. This mismatch may not surprise or trouble them because they recognize that it is ‘‘their war’’ or ‘‘their disaster’’ but INGO power and influence can lead to other asymmetries in the development of civil society. As grant-givers, the wealth of international NGOs can begin to control local civil society by dictating its shape and priorities. Indeed, some INGO leaders are pondering whether they should restructure some of their systems so that they are more transparently ‘‘donors’’ rather than ‘‘partners,’’ especially as the INGOs continue to seek new models for both their humanitarian and community development work. INGO Programs INGOs are best known by their programs in both humanitarian and community development, and these programs define them in ways that are often difficult to see from a global level. The area of programming under ‘‘humanitarian’’ operations involves the response to natural disasters, both sudden onset (floods, cyclones, earthquakes) and slow onset (famines), and to conflict. INGOs have achieved their greatest international visibility in responding to sudden onset disasters such as the Asian Tsunami or Hurricane Mitch, to famines such as Ethiopian famine of 1984, and to conflicts, particularly internal wars such as Sudan, Somalia, or Bosnia. Two notable changes have occurred within INGOs in the past decade. One involves a deliberate effort to shift some programming from disaster response to disaster risk reduction, and the other involves more attention to the underlying nature of conflicts and avoiding negative impacts from aid programs (under the rubric of ‘‘do no harm’’). The goal of disaster risk reduction is to lessen poor communities’ vulnerability by increasing their capacities to prepare for, to cope with and to mitigate the adverse I effects of disasters. Aware and organized communities can work with local government to implement policies and programs recognizing people’s needs and interests and promoting a safer environment The place of risk reduction in the cycle of disaster management linking preparedness and recovery represents a perennial challenge for the humanitarian system. Much of what is spent on humanitarian response could, it is argued, be spent to greater effect in terms of saving lives and livelihoods through disaster risk reduction measures. In addition, responses to disasters when they happen would be better in many ways if people were better prepared to manage the necessary responses. And there is a real cycle whereby future risks would be mitigated by incorporating the concept of risk reduction into the recovery efforts that are in fact a large part of what is done under the heading of humanitarian action. At the World Conference on Disaster Reduction in 2005 the ‘‘Hyogo framework’’ was agreed by 168 nations. The Framework offers guiding principles, priorities for action, and practical means for achieving disaster resilience for vulnerable communities. The end of the Cold War was seen as an opportunity for greater international cooperation, but turned out to be a time when INGOs faced exceptionally daunting challenges in complex emergencies. While there were many brutal wars before 1989, and thus there may be a fallacy in the view that 1989 was the date on which complex humanitarian emergencies increased, it may instead be the case that the removal of superpower restraints on client states has also been accompanied by growing awareness of the spread of such emergencies. These are characterized by the breakdown of political, economic, and social orders, and by the targeting of civilian populations for violence. The cruel realities of recent complex emergencies can be found in the earlier civil wars in which NGOs gained important experiences in the 1970s and 1980s. For example, there were many significant and brutal emergencies before 1989 (such as Afghanistan, Mozambique, Cambodia, and El Salvador), but these were overshadowed by the Cold War, and many were somewhat muted by the actions of different external actors. They share with more recent crises the character of being political, rather than natural, emergencies. The Cold War was a time of vicious, proxy wars, and while the patrons have been removed, the arms and sources of conflict have not. The growth of complex emergencies was illustrated by documented in the increased number of refugees after 1990, and notably the growing numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs), and the higher proportion of official development 861 I 862 I INGOs assistance (ODA) spent on emergency relief. One result of the recognition of the realities of working in long-term complex emergencies was the rethinking of the role of INGOs in these conflicts. The harsh lessons from experiences such as Rwanda, Somalia, and Bosnia point to the need for INGOs to give serious attention to how they operate in such contexts. Humanitarian operations are constantly challenged by crises that rapidly materialize and quickly change. Consequently, how prepared INGOs are to respond to a crisis will often mean the difference between survival or death for those affected. Catalyzed by the serious challenges presented to humanitarian agencies by back to back crises in Kosovo, East Timor, Mozambique, and Central America in the late 1990s, humanitarian organizations have taken significant steps to improve, systematize, and professionalize their emergency preparedness over the last decade. Contingency planning has emerged as a key tool used by humanitarian practitioners use to ensure they are as prepared as they can be to respond to the needs to those affected by natural disasters, conflicts, and other crises around the world. INGOs approach to community development has evolved through various approaches to individual welfare, social welfare, basic service delivery, and more recently various models of economic development or community empowerment, sometimes linked (not always clearly) to what is termed rights based development. There are wide spectrums of programs that come under the label ‘‘development’’ or ‘‘community development,’’ both between INGOs and within INGOs. Community development as used by INGOs has several meanings, as it is used as an analytic tool, as a programming tool, as a proxy for sectors such as agricultural development, and for various finance programs. Community development is sometimes used as a proxy for pro-poor growth, economic empowerment, and other phrases that imply that the programs will reduce inequality and improve the overall economic status of poor households. In the past, INGOs tended to also use the term to distinguish their programs from market based economic development that they viewed as having the potential to increase inequality, at least in the short term. Whatever their mechanisms for program implementation (i.e., direct program management, funding through partner agencies) INGOs remain vulnerable to several criticisms. Often, whatever the description, the programs could be labeled as primarily social welfare models with resource transfers, not programs directly capable of promoting long term economic growth and improved livelihoods. Further, critics argue that INGOs cannot demonstrate consistent results in terms of improved well-being across a large number of projects. Internal evaluations in the past few years have raised troubling questions regarding NGO impact, which parallels European bilateral donor evaluations in the late 1990s which were unable to find consistent evidence that INGOs contributed to improved well-being compared to other aid programs. While larger INGOs have sought to move from service delivery to promoting economic development, smaller, more narrowly focused agencies, such as FINCA and Opportunity International, or the Grameen Bank, have established approaches that are built around the utilization of financial instruments that might promote economic growth in low income communities. Partly due to the alternatives being promoted by other agencies, as well as the criticisms of their ‘‘welfare’’ system, many of the larger INGOs have also adopted various approaches within their larger operations, leading the blossoming of MED, MFI, Household Economic Security or Livelihoods Security. The success of many microfinance, microcredit, or microenterprise programs has challenged the INGOs to consider whether and how to change their programmatic approaches or mix of programs. Currently there is no common INGO view on the role of the market, the importance of relative equity, the use of different financial instruments at different levels of the poverty pyramid, or the priorities between reducing relative and absolute poverty. Within INGOs, as well as among researchers, there is widespread concern over the lack of economic development expertise within INGOs, common understanding of core issues or agreement on what type of economic development each INGO is promoting. Future Directions This note has identified some of the ongoing challenges for INGOs, such as management at a distance, relations with government and funders, accountability with connections to communities and programming models. Emerging issues for INGOs that are beginning to gain more attention include new ways to address urban poverty, climate change, and security in complex emergencies. Urban poverty is increasing at a faster rate than rural poverty, and is receiving less attention, making it a major future challenge for INGOs which have admittedly focused their programs and, more importantly, their program models on rural poverty. Urban contexts are different from rural contexts with regard to the spatial concentration of poverty and the number of people at risk from them. The concentration of hundreds of thousands or several million people in one geographic area creates INGOs particular problems in terms of poverty reduction, social services and economic development. The dynamics of poverty will be different, for example, the range of infectious and parasitic diseases that can spread rapidly amongst concentrated populations due to the close proximity of people, or the potentially dangerous industrial processes and industrial wastes. In 2008, for the first time in history, more people are living in cities than in rural areas, with 90% of slums located in low and lower middle income countries. INGOs have begun to give attention to climate change as a global issue that receives attention for global response mechanisms, but it is at the community level where the most significant impacts will be experienced, especially by poor and highly vulnerable groups. Recent trends have highlighted the potential severe impact on poor countries and communities. The majority of large scale disasters are related to extreme weather events. Twelve of the last 13 years (1995–2007) rank among the 12 warmest years (since 1850) in the instrumental record of global surface temperature. Changes in weather patterns include a rise in global sea level average, an increase in precipitation, and an increase in tropical cyclone activity. INGOs are just beginning to address how they will respond programmatically to reducing climate risk in their operations. A distinct but equally daunting challenge has emerged at the nexus between staff security and the humanitarian ethos. The humanitarian ethos has been based on the accepted neutrality of aid personnel, and their ability to work in situations of conflict with respect from all warring parties. There is well documented evidence of the deliberate targeting of humanitarian and United Nations personnel, including fatality, assault, and armed robbery, in a number of countries. Most aid worker victims are deliberately targeted for political and/or economic purposes, rather than being randomly exposed to violence. A recent survey showed that politically motivated incidents have increased by 208% from 1997 to 2005, and between July 2007 and June 2008, the United Nations Department of Safety and Security reported 63 deaths of international and national staff of nongovernmental organizations as a result of deliberate acts, the highest number of deaths on record for targeted violence. Among the key factors in the deterioration in the security environment of humanitarian workers has been the increase in predatory warlord type organizations, the appearance to some military factors of close cooperation with military and political actors by INGOs, and the view that INGOs are agents of outside interests. Even in I 863 the disaster responses, such as the Asian Tsunami, some ethnic and political factors believed that humanitarian action has been inextricably associated with states parties, ethnic, or religious favoritism, or other outside agendas. INGOs are struggling with how to deal with civil/military relations, whether with national militaries or UN authorized troops. Cross-References ▶ Accountability ▶ Action Aid ▶ Amnesty International ▶ CARE ▶ Civil society in Post-Conflict Scenarios ▶ Donor, Donor Intent ▶ Effectiveness and Efficiency ▶ Global Civil Society ▶ GONGOs ▶ Grameen Bank ▶ Intermediary Organizations and Field ▶ Médecins Sans Frontières ▶ NGOs and Humanitarian Assistance ▶ NGOs and International Relations, UN ▶ NGOs and Socioeconomic Development ▶ NGOs and Sustainable Development ▶ Nongovernmental Organizations, Definition and History ▶ Oxfam ▶ Save the Children ▶ Transnational Forums and Summits ▶ World Social Forum ▶ World Vision ▶ WWF-World Wide Fund for Nature References/Further Readings Alnoor, E. (2003). Accountability in practice: Mechanisms for NGOs. World Development, 31(5), 813–829. Catherine, A. (June 2006). Trends in government support for NGOs: Is the golden age behind us? Geneva: UNRISD. Edwards, M. (1999). NGO performance: What breeds success? New evidence from South Asia. World Development, 27(2), 361–374. Fowler, A. (2000). NGO futures: Beyond aid: NGDO values and the fourth position. Third World Quarterly, 21(4), 589–605. Hulme, D., & Edwards, M. (Eds.) (1997). Too close for comfort? NGOs, states and donors. Basingstoke/New York: Macmillan. Jordan, L., & Tuijl, P. V. (Eds.) (2006). NGO accountability: Politics, principles and innovations. London: Earthscan. Koch, D. -J., Dreher, A., Nunnenkamp, P., & Thiele, R. (2008). Keeping a low profile: What determines the allocation of aid by nongovernmental organizations? World Development, 37, 5. Lister, S. (2000). Power in partnership? An analysis of an NGO’s relations with its Partners. Journal of International Development, 12(2), 227–239. I 864 I Institut Pasteur Logister, L. (2007). Global governance and civil society. Some reflections on NGO legitimacy. Journal of Global Ethics, 3(2), 165–179. Mawdsley, E., Townsend, J., & Porter, G. (2005). Trust, accountability and face-to-face interaction in North-South NGO relations. Development in Practice, 15(1), 77–82. Mitlin, D., Hickey, S., & Bebbington, A. (2007). Reclaiming development? NGOs and the challenge of alternatives. World Development, 35(10), 1699–1720. Nelson, P. (2000). Heroism and ambiguity: NGO advocacy in international policy. Development in Practice, 10(3 & 4), 478–490. Ossewaarde, R., Nijhof, A., & Heyse, L. (2008). Dynamics of NGO legitimacy: How organizing betrays core missions of INGOs. Public Administration and Development, 28(1), 42–53. Pearce, J., & Eade, D. (Eds.) (2000). Development, NGOs and civil society. Oxford: Oxfam/Kumarian. Salm, J. (1999). Coping with globalization: A profile of the northern NGO sector. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 28(1), 87–103. Sanyal, P. (2006). Capacity building through partnerships: Intermediary nongovernmental organizations as local and global actors. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 35(1), 66–82. Sogge, D. (1996). Compassion and calculation. London: TNI/Pluto Press. Tvedt, T. (2006). The international aid system and the non-governmental organizations: A new research agenda. Journal of International Development, 18, 677–690. Institut Pasteur ANAEL LABIGNE, REGINA LIST Address of Organization 25, rue du Docteur Roux 75724 Paris France www.pasteur.fr Introduction Founded by renowned French scientist Louis Pasteur and incorporated as a private foundation headquartered in Paris, the Institut Pasteur promotes research into infectious and parasitic diseases, as well as the study and teachings of all aspects of microbiology. It is named after Louis Pasteur (1822–1895), its founder and first director. Brief History Louis Pasteur is known for many scientific accomplishments, including the development of the rabies vaccine, the process of pasteurization, and more broadly, the field of microbiology. The Institut Pasteur was founded by Pasteur in 1887, thanks to international donors willing to support his efforts to further develop the vaccine against rabies and conduct research on other infectious diseases. The Institut opened its doors in November 1888. Its first teaching course in microbiology was offered by Emile Roux in 1889. Mission/Objectives/Focus Areas According to organizational materials, the overall mission of the Institut Pasteur is to contribute to the prevention and treatment of disease. The Institut is guided by a set of principles that incorporates an original scientific approach, a desire to apply its findings to improve public health, professional ethics, and an openness to sharing knowledge broadly. Research carried out in the field and in the laboratory at its Paris headquarters and its 30 institutes around the world focuses on infectious diseases, including influenza, AIDS, malaria, and the plague. The national institutes tend to concentrate on those diseases affecting their own local populations. Activities The Institut engages in three main types of activity. Key is its research in biology, specifically viral, bacterial, and parasitic deseases. The Institut ensures a linkage between basic research carried out over the long-term, without which no fundamental discovery can be made, short-term projects that take the necessary steps to obtain results, and rapidly progressing technologies. The Institut also has programs to educate young scientists and trainees from around the world, most of which are scientists, pharmacists, or medical doctors. The Institut also promotes public health more broadly by providing vaccinations, screenings, and other services at its medical centers. Structure and Governance The Institut Pasteur is governed by an independent Board of Directors and General Assembly. An Executive Board and President oversees its general operations, while a Scientific Council composed of a mix of Pasteur researchers and external members oversees its research. Some 2,600 people work on the Institut’s Paris campus. Funding The Institut seeks to maintain its autonomy through increasing commercialization of its research results and growing sponsorships and major gifts. It derived the majority of its 2007 annual budget of more than €233 million from private sources, including income from its own activities, donations, bequests, sponsorships, income on assets, and reserves. About one quarter of its budget is covered by government contributions. Major Accomplishments/Contributions Research emerging from the Institut Pasteur and its network have impacted the prevention and treatment of Instituto Ethos de Empresas e Responsabilidade Social numerous infectious diseases including tuberculosis, diptheria, and hepatitis, among others. Since 1900, ten Nobel Prizes have been awarded to researchers at the Institut Pasteur, most recently the 2008 Nobel Prize in Medicine to Professors Françoise Barré-Sinoussi and Luc Montagnier for their discovery of the human immunodeficiency (AIDS) virus in 1983. The Institut Pasteur has an international network of institutes, eight have been granted the official status of regional, national, or international centres by the World Health Organization. Cross-References ▶ Philanthropy, Definition of References/Further Readings Institut Pasteur. (2007). Une fondation au service de la recherche et de la santé. Rapport annuell. Paris: Institut Pasteur. Direction de la Communication et du Mécénat. Vallery-Radot, R. (1960). The life of Pasteur. New York: Dover. Instituto Ethos de Empresas e Responsabilidade Social I social inequalities still persist, and government initiatives have failed to reduce unjust conditions. Grajew and the founding members of the Ethos Institute contend that private companies must also accept their social responsibility. Having been successful in promoting their purposes for over a decade, the Ethos Institute has become nationally and internationally recognized. Mission/Objectives Dedicated to the reduction of social inequalities, the Ethos Institute’s main concern is to encourage businesses to concentrate on social responsibility. In order to concretize their mission, the Ethos Institute published a six point plan. First, businesses must understand and incorporate the concept of progressive socially responsible corporate behavior. Second, policies and practices must be implemented to meet high ethical standards. Third, companies must assume responsibility towards all those affected by these activities, including employees, clients, suppliers, the community, shareholders, etc. Fourth, businesses must convince their shareholders of the importance of socially responsible behavior in the long-term return of their investments. Fifth, innovative and effective ways of working with the community towards a common state of well-being must be identified. Lastly, companies must contribute to sustainable social, economic and environmental development. MARTIN HÖLZ, CHARLOTTE ANHEIER Activities Address of Organization Rua Dr. Fernandes Coelho, 85, 10 Andar 05423-040, São Paulo Brazil www.ethos.org.br Introduction Established in São Paulo, Brazil, the Instituto Ethos (Ethos Institute) is a nongovernmental and nonprofit organization that seeks to strengthen corporate social responsibility (CSR) and sustainable development by offering business opportunities which establish a commitment to social activities. Internationally recognized, Ethos Institute has many partner organizations throughout the world. Brief History Led by Oded Grajew, cofounder of the World Social Forum, a group of businessmen founded the Ethos Institute in February 1998. Grajew, a successful Ashoka fellow who also established the ABRINQ Foundation, became the organization’s first president. Although Brazil’s economy is among the top ten largest worldwide, extreme 865 The Ethos Institute maintains five basic strategies for fostering corporate social responsibility and sustainable development. First, to strengthen CSR, the Ethos Institute runs several network programs and media campaigns (e.g., ‘‘National Week for Citizenship and Solidarity’’) and awards several prizes. Second, in order to improve and widen the existing CSR activities, the Ethos Institute holds an annual conference and publishes an annual survey regarding ‘‘Social Responsibility Indicators.’’ Third, the Institute considers itself as a platform of exchange which allows it to run several information services such as newsletters and other publications. Fourth, in order to have an effect on markets, the Ethos Institute edits an annual index of successfully socially responsible companies. Lastly, it participates in several institutions to improve the statemarket relationship with regard to CSR. Further, in March of 2004 the Ethos Institute founded the UniEthos as an educational nonprofit institution. Structure and Governance The Ethos Institute consists of a directory and four councils, which include a deliberative council, an advisory board, a fiscal council and an international advisory I 866 I InterAction board. As of early 2009, the Ethos Institute claimed a membership of more than 1,300 businesses and a staff of some 60 individuals. Funding US foreign development assistance as well as enhance the impact and accountability of NGOs towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Lastly, InterAction also aims at collaborating with other international NGO networks to achieve its objectives. Supported mainly through membership dues, the Ethos Institute had a budget of $2 million in 2001. Brief History Major Accomplishments In terms of strengthening corporate social responsibility and sustainable development on a national and an international level, the Ethos Institute acts as a role model: ‘‘Ethos has been able to increase the visibility of corporate responsibility in the media, between and within companies’’ (Raufflet, 2008: 104). In 1984, 22 US-based NGOs decided to form InterAction with the main objective of achieving greater impact regarding American international development policies. The membership base has since then grown to include most major US-based NGOs with an international presence. Mission/Objectives/Focus Areas Cross-References ▶ Ashoka ▶ Corporate Social Responsibility ▶ World Social Forum References/Further Readings Oliveira Neto, V. de (2002). ETHOS: Corporate social responsibility. ReVista Harvard Review of Latin America (Edition ‘‘Giving and Volunteering in the Americas: From charity to solidarity’’), from http://www.drclas.harvard.edu/revista/articles/view/24 Raufflet, E. (2008). Creating the context for corporate responsibility. The experience of Instituto Ethos, Brazil. Journal of corporate citizenship, 30, 95–106. Specific areas of InterAction’s focus include advocacy to both the public as well as the US government, the effectiveness of international aid interventions, disaster response, and refugees. Other cross cutting issues that InterAction prioritizes are gender and diversity, as well as strategic impact of interventions. InterAction’s three main goals consider firstly the promotion of a stronger national agenda towards development and humanitarian assistance, engaging on the government and cabinet levels. Secondly, it aims to demonstrate and enhance NGO accountability and impact in development and humanitarian action. And lastly InterAction aspires to be the voice and prime representative of US international NGOs in building alliances and common agendas with NGO networks around the world and with other strategic partners. InterAction Activities JANINE SCHALL-EMDEN Address of Organization 1400 16th Street, NW, Suite 210 Washington DC, 20036 USA www.interaction.org/ Introduction InterAction (formally the American Council for Voluntary International Action) is a US-based coalition of over 165 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), collectively receiving around $6 billion annually for international development from the American public. InterAction’s focus is to advocate for an increase and improvement of InterAction’s recent publications include: US Contributions to Reducing Global Poverty: InterAction worked with three member organizations (Bread for the World, Oxfam America and the World Wildlife Fund) to produce a comprehensive analysis of US government support for attaining the MDGs. Monday Developments: InterAction’s flagship publication provides in-depth news and commentary on global trends that affect relief and development work. InterAction Member Activity Reports: Member Activity Reports provide information on InterAction’s member organizations in selected countries. 2007 reports focused on the nations of Afghanistan, Colombia, Haiti, Somalia, Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe. Member Profiles 2007–2008: This publication provides a detailed portrait of over 165 US-based NGOs working in Interest and Pressure Groups international development, disaster relief, humanitarian assistance and aid. Structure and Governance InterAction members voted in a new Board of Directors in early 2008 composed of 28 civil society leaders and chaired by Charlie MacCormack, the current President of Save the Children. The organization’s 40 strong staff is organized in seven different departments according to InterAction’s six focus areas (see mission/objectives/focus areas section) in addition to the executive office. Funding For the 2007 financial year, InterAction recorded total revenues of $5,097,069 and expenses of $5,992,398, excesses of which were absorbed by their net assets. Currently the value of InterAction’s net assets is of $2,229,621. InterAction’s main donors include the American Jewish World Service (AJWS), private foundations (including the Gates, Packard and Ford Foundations), US government agencies (such as the US Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration as well as USAID), and international organizations (World Bank and International Monetary Fund). Major Accomplishments/Contributions The primary accomplishment of InterAction was to form a strong partnership with international and national allies and boost support for development initiatives. In this regard the organization has assisted in increasing the visibility and impact of NGOs in the United States through their communications and advocacy efforts. The organization has also been able to open the possibility of a cabinet-level agency focused on the world’s poor. Cross-References ▶ Advocacy ▶ Bread for the World ▶ INGOs ▶ NGOs and Humanitarian Assistance ▶ NGOs and Socioeconomic Development ▶ NGOs and Sustainable Development ▶ Oxfam ▶ Umbrella Organizations ▶ WWF-World Wide Fund for Nature References/Further Readings http://www.interaction.org/files.cgi/6311_Annual_Report_2007.pdf http://www.interaction.org/files.cgi/5739_IA_Goals.pdf I 867 Interest and Pressure Groups ROBERT DALZIEL University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK Introduction The interest or pressure group can be a powerful way to hold people and organizations accountable for their actions in a democracy. At the same time, there is the pluralist idea that it is to some extent possible to avoid extremes in politics through the development of interest and pressure groups in society that serve the interests of a wide range of individuals and groups. More specifically, at different times, there will be different opportunities for individuals to benefit from working together and forming interest or pressure groups to try to achieve collective goals. Indeed, the job of lobbying and making sure your views are heard may be made easier through engagement in organized and coordinated interest and pressure group activity. An interest or pressure group will often want to be involved in shaping or determining the outcomes of a policymaking process or decisions about priorities for action to allocate important resources. There is often solidarity and task oriented or ideological benefits derived from the act of associating and deciding on collective goals. However, there may also be material benefits derived from the act of associating including rewards that have a monetary value. Definition Pressure and interest groups are nonprofit and often voluntary organizations representing the views of individuals that share some political, social, or other goals. They are not political parties and consist of individuals that come together to articulate a collective view on a particular issue or cause and try to influence policymaking processes and the actions of others. However, pressure and interest groups can vary widely in the way that they are structured and the strategies that they use to gain access to politicians and articulate their views. On the one hand, they may focus on a single issue and consist of a small membership and a few employees. On the other hand, they may have views on a number of issues and consist of a large membership and many employees. Interest groups frequently attempt to rally support for a cause and maintain established practice and ways of working whilst pressure groups try to rally support for a cause and change established practice and ways of working. The different groups might raise their profile by lobbying politicians I 868 I Interest and Pressure Groups and trying to influence decisions, the targeted dissemination of information, and campaigns to promote their cause and political objectives. It is possible to use the terms interest group and pressure group interchangeably to describe similar types of organizational activity. For example, an interest or pressure group can represent the shared views and concerns of a particular section of society, which can include certain businesses, professions, or employees. A wide range of interest and pressure groups can emerge that reflects the various communities of interest that exist at the different levels of international, national, regional, and local government. On the one hand, sectional interest or pressure group activities can include business and trades union action to protect the interests of their members. On the other hand, public interest or pressure group activities might include lobbying on a particular issue such as heath inequalities or crime levels and disband as soon as the issue has been resolved or is no longer viewed as important (Berry, 1977). Meanwhile, a person’s reasons for getting involved in an interest or pressure group can vary from wanting to obtain some type of specific personal reward to recognizing some wider sense of civic duty and a desire to change an aspect of state policy or governance. group. In the 1990s and 2000s the importance of public interest groups as a means for individuals to get involved in political processes has increased. Some early definitions of the interest or pressure group include only private formally organized associations. Such definitions excluded influential formally organized interest or pressure groups that are not private including the various incarnations of national, regional, and local government or their agencies and institutions such as the military. In turn, a narrow definition of the interest or pressure group would exclude many informally organized entities including influential political and professional elites. Meanwhile, interest and pressure groups that manage to become the experts in an area and represent a particular clientele improve their chances of survival. Such groups tend not to engage in public demonstrations or acts of civil disobedience preferring a less confrontational approach that includes debates and encouraging members to contact decision makers directly. The small number of interest or pressure groups routinely engaging in confrontational activities can meaningfully be characterized as outsiders with regard to formal or bureaucratic decision-making processes (Binderkrantz, 2005). Historical Background Key Issues Truman (1951) used a pluralist view of collective activity to suggest that interest groups largely emerge spontaneously as individuals with shared interests come together. However, he also elaborated on the role of the new interest group and how it can create social tensions and uncertainties that impact on the interests of other potential groups that are stimulated to take action to ensure their interests are represented. In the 1960s, Olson (1965) suggested individuals are less likely to voluntarily contribute to a collective enterprise in situations where the outputs or outcomes are public goods benefitting group members and outsiders. He concluded that it is only in situations where groups are not too large and members stand to obtain special benefit from collective activity that there is a presumption that individuals will want to contribute in the absence of coercion. Other commentators have countered that the relationship between the level of collective activity and the size of groups is more complex than Olson originally indicated. For example, Salisbury (1969) used exchange theory to understand interest group membership and the way that group leaders and members can benefit from each others inputs to a group. In the early 1980s, Cook (1984) proposed that the organizers of an interest group offer certain benefits to potential members in exchange for the price of their affiliation with the Some commentators have challenged the pluralist view of the role of interest and pressure groups and their ability to represent effectively the views of different sections of society. For example, Schattschneider (1935) says, ‘‘The heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper class accent’’ and suggests interest and pressure group operations are often biased towards the better off in society. Insider groups have privileged access to policymakers whilst outsider groups do not. In addition, insider groups are more likely to know their way around a political system whilst outsider groups are disadvantaged by a lack of forewarning about policymaking intentions and reduced capacity to take preemptive action. However, the acquisition of insider or outsider status by a group will often involve both a decision by government and a decision by the group concerned (Grant, 1989). Sometimes it is also possible to distinguish between insider and outsider groups based on the strategies that they use to achieve their goals. For example, insider groups may aim to persuade government through debate and contact with influential individuals whilst outsider groups that take an ideological approach are more likely to eschew the dominant political system. On the other hand, some outsider groups may wish to become insiders but lack the necessary understanding of the political system to attain such status or they may be Interest and Pressure Groups potential insider groups that have not yet attained their desired goal. Organizations that offer to back an interest or pressure group often expect to receive some sort of benefit from their lobbying or campaigning activities. At the same time, interest or pressure group capacity to provide policymakers with information that helps with policy development and understanding competing interests and the implications of alternative decisions on a policy issue can be important (Maloney et al., 1994). However, an interest or pressure group risks being unable to end a relationship with an organization that it depends on for resources that ensure its survival (May & Nugent, 1982). Meanwhile, different types of interest and pressure group approaches to lobbying and campaigning may not be easy to separate and may be combined in an overall influence strategy (Beyers, 2004). There are also issues concerning interest or pressure group ability to organize and how easily shared views can be translated into cogent and well-prepared arguments. An interest or pressure group’s capacity to achieve such goals may depend on the extent to which it is able to obtain adequate resources to function up effectively and build a strong sense of organizational purpose and member commitment to organizational goals (Maloney et al., 1994). International Perspectives An important factor that will influence or determine what types of interest or pressure groups emerge and can develop is differences in national political opportunity structures. Different population profiles and social and economic circumstances will help to shape of the wider political environment and encourage or discourage collective action on issues. Furthermore, national and local governments can take action to change people’s views on issues or arrange to deal with their concerns or grievances through a process of accommodation. At the same time, political cycles and events may weaken or destabilize a national government and provide opportunities for new protest and pressure groups to emerge. In this situation, people may be encouraged to participate in collective action to protest against some policy or lobby officials because they feel they have an increased chance of being successful. However, a lack of formal opportunities for people to voice their concerns and grievances may cause them to become frustrated and angry, which encourages participation in more extreme and violent kinds of protest. Future Directions Changes in the political environment can help to facilitate or constrain interest and pressure group activity and I attempts to form coalitions or alliances. However, governments may want to encourage interest and pressure group involvement in debates and decision-making processes to try to solve complex social problems. Indeed, democratic government may be seriously undermined in situations where there are few or inadequate opportunities for interest and pressure group involvement in the development of policy. Policymaking is more legitimate when a wide range of interests is encapsulated in its formulation. Meanwhile, interest and pressure groups need to be constantly thinking about how they are going to meet changing member and citizen demands for action on issues (Hojnacki, 1997). These issues include considering and dealing with the detrimental effects of globalization and environmental degradation. The resources that interest and pressure groups are able to obtain, the extent of conflict over issues, and their relations with government and other institutions will continue to influence decisions about the strategies used to achieve organizational goals. In turn, interest, and pressure group access to politicians and policymakers and the way that decision-making processes work (or not) will continue to impact on what views and ideas are considered more relevant than others are. It is likely many interest and pressure groups that want incremental policy change will continue to pursue insider negotiation strategies whilst those desiring change that is more radical will adopt outsider strategies (Maloney et al., 1994). But, even for insider groups policymaking influence is not equal for all participants. While a wide and diverse set of policy participants are involved in consultation, only a restricted number have significant influence. This might help to explain why outsider strategies have been on the rise not only in their use but also in terms of their effectiveness (Binderkrantz, 2005). Cross-References ▶ Advocacy ▶ Associations, Definitions and History of ▶ Associative Democracy ▶ Civic Action ▶ Civil Society and Democracy ▶ Coalitions and Networks ▶ Collective Action ▶ Government – Nonprofit Sector Relations ▶ Grassroots Associations ▶ Lobbying ▶ Membership and Membership Associations ▶ Social Movements ▶ Solidarity 869 I 870 I Interest Politics References/Further Readings Berry, J. M. (1977). Lobbying for the people: The political behavior of public interest groups. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Beyers, J. (2004). Voice and access: The political practices of European interest associations. European Union Politics, 5(2), 211–240. Binderkrantz, A. (2005). Interest group strategies: Navigating between privileged access and strategies of pressure. Political Studies, 53(4), 694–715. Cook, C. E. (1984). Participation in public interest groups: Membership motivations. American Politics Quarterly, 12(4), 409–430. Grant, W. (1989). Pressure groups, politics and democracy in Britain. London: Philip Allen. Hojnacki, M. (1997). Interest groups’ decisions to join alliances or work alone. American Journal of Political Science, 41(1), 61–87. Maloney, W. A., Jordan, G., & McLaughlin, A. M. (1994). Interest groups and public policy: The insider/outsider model revisited. Journal of Public Policy, 14(1), 17–38. May, T., & Nugent, N. (1982). Insiders, outsiders and thresholders: Corporatism and pressure group strategies in Britain. Paper presented at the Political Studies Association conference. Canterbury: University of Kent. Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Salisbury, R. H. (1969). An exchange theory of interest groups. Midwest Journal of Political Science, 13(1), 1–32. Schattschneider, E. E. (1935). Politics, pressures and the tariff (p. 166). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Truman, D. B. (1951). The governmental process: Political interests and public opinion. New York: Knopf. interest groups, being the backbone of interest politics, are not defined by the ubiquitous prevalence of ‘‘interest’’ but by their three main characteristics: (a) organization, including membership, leadership, and the like; (b) activities, denoting strategies to influence decision-makers; (c) boundaries, separating them from other entities operating on the political market. Attempts to define interest groups have focused mainly on these three attributes, as follows: Organization By and large, the element of organization was regarded as an important conceptual component of the interest group definition. Some scholars, however, expanded the characterization of interest groups to include unorganized publics, as long as they shared an interest, even latent, such as women, taxpayers, or redheads (Truman, 1951; Almond & Bingham Powell, 1988). In general, however, the literature on interest groups has focused on organizations, permanently constituted and collectively governed, as the basic unit of observation and analysis. Bird watchers, card players, and those attending picnics in the park are engaged in highly esteemed social activity (Putnam, 2000) but they are not interest groups in the classic sense. Activities Interest Politics YAEL YISHAI University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel Introduction Interest politics emerged as the cornerstone of modern political science, seeking to free the discipline from the formal legalist tradition and to enhance understanding of the informal workings of the political system, operated by interest groups, in various forms and shapes. Definition Interest groups have been defined in a variety of ways, and with little precision. On the one hand ‘‘interest’’ is the driving force of political activity on both the elite and the public level. As noted by Schmitter (2008: 195), ‘‘the answer to ‘why did he or she act politically?’ will usually be: ‘because it was in his or her interest to do so.’’’ Yet Interest groups are defined in terms of what they do. Their major function is to influence government. This does not mean that they do not engage in other activities, for example, enlisting support or attracting media attention, but their attempt to exert an impact on political decisionmaking distinguishes interest groups from typically apolitical organizations like motorcycle clubs or sea divers. Here too, there are notable exceptions to this definition. Verba and Nie (1972), for example, regard interest groups also as organizations involved in ‘‘community affairs.’’ Generally however, interest politics is taken to be the purview of organizations that ‘‘engage in activities to seek specific policy or political goals from the state’’ (Petracca, 1992: 7). With activity taken as the basis of any definition, another ambiguity requires clarification. Often interest groups have been defined by what they do, meaning ‘‘pressure groups’’ (Grant, 1989). Still, interest groups obviously do not rely solely on pressure to promote their goals but often persuade, inspire, or sway their targets in a variety of ways, using multiple strategies. Boundaries Interest groups are defined by their distinction. They are not part of the state and its agencies, nor are they part of Interest Politics the market. They represent society and are not identified with decision-makers, whom they attempt to influence. This view is not unanimously held. Almond and Bingham Powell (1988), for example, noted that what counts in order to qualify as an interest group is the common denominator and its conversion into political action. In this respect, say, the armed forces or the Ministry of Health can be perceived as ‘‘institutional interest groups,’’ being ‘‘institutional’’ for obvious reasons. But they are also interest groups because they attempt to secure a greater share of resources of the available stock and they exert influence on decision- makers to further their goals. Another point of contention in the literature concerns the distinction between interest groups and the market. By virtue of their nonprofit goals, the former are separate from the latter. But the notion that corporations belong to the realm of interest groups is also prevalent (Salisbury, 1984). Grassroots civic associations attempting to prevent the construction of a high-rise building in the neighborhood, mobilized for action on a temporary basis, are unmistakably separate from the market. But well established economic interest groups, such as industrialists’ associations or other members of the business community, are not as far removed from the market as one would assume. Finally, the boundary between interest groups and political parties is not clear cut. Some scholars argue persuasively that interest groups must be distinguished from political parties (Schlozman & Tierney, 1986) by virtue of their role in society. Parties nominate candidates for elective office and seek control of government. Interest groups may endorse candidates, but their members do not run for office (Wilson, 1981; Yoho, 1998). They wish to influence decision-makers rather than make authoritative decisions themselves. Yet in multiparty systems the distinction between interest groups and political parties is problematic, either because the two are hardly more than fronts for each other or because interest groups often try their luck in the electoral arena (Yishai, 1994; 1998). This is the case regarding pensioners’ parties, women’s parties and others focusing on specific policy issues rather than fulfilling their aggregative roles (for a comprehensive discussion of interest groups and political parties relations see Thomas, 2001). To sum up, interest groups may be defined in many ways because different scholars emphasize different elements of group structures, activities, and boundaries. Yet it has generally been held that interest groups consist of citizens who have a shared attitude or interest, operating outside the state and the market, who organize in an attempt to influence public policy. I 871 Historical Background Historical Conceptualization of Interest Groups The term interest group was coined in the twentieth century in the United States, where groups easily formed, interests flourished, and government policy was subject to public pressure. But long before to the existence of the title ancient scholars, among them Aristotle, had been preoccupied with conflicts between people and groups and were well aware that individuals have interests they wish to promote. Still, even Alexis de Tocqueville (1969), the great advocate of voluntary activity, did not make a clear distinction between interest groups and political parties. In the early twentieth century the term ‘‘lobby’’ and its variations became established as the closest existing synonym of what later became known as interest groups. Analysis, however, focused on individuals engaged in lobbying activity rather than on the organization they represented (Yoho, 1998). In the literature ‘‘interest group’’ first appeared in Arthur F. Bentley’s The Process of Government, published as early as 1908 (Bentley, 1967). But he too regarded such groups as a factor shaping referenda-voting by people sharing the same interest. A further step toward the definition of interest group was taken by Peter Odegard in Pressure Politics (1928). By the mid-twentieth century the conceptualization of interest politics had established a firm foothold in scholarship, although, as noted by Yoho (1998), the term still lacked precision and consistency. Even David Truman, who devoted his seminal book The Governmental Process (1951) to interest politics, included in his analysis political parties making claims on government. Toward the end of the twentieth century ‘‘interest groups’’ became the term most preferred by political scientists to describe organized activity attempting to influence authoritative decisions. Since the 1970s the interest politics arena has much expanded with the inclusion of ‘‘public interest groups.’’ These are groups seeking a collective good, the achievement of which will not selectively and materially benefit the membership or activists of the organization (Berry, 1977: 7). Environmental groups, women’s movements and civil rights groups belong to this category. In the past they were considered social (or at best, political) movements. In contemporary scholarly terminology, they are part and parcel of the interest group arena. To the list one may add citizen groups that advocate material policies as part or all of their influence efforts, such as neighborhood associations and also groups involving selfactualization and personal growth purposes (Berry, 1999), as long as they are contenders for public policy. I 872 I Interest Politics Historical conceptualization of interest groups evolved also along ideological lines. Initially, the term paralleled competition and conflict. It was associated with greed and regarded as a despicable vice (Hirschman, 1977; Schmitter, 2008) imbued with dangerous emotions. At present, the pursuance of interests is regarded not only as part and parcel of the political process but as a necessary, though not sufficient, condition, for democratic government. In practice and in theory, interest politics has turned into the hub of democratic politics. Perspectives and Approaches The study of interest politics has evinced three major perspectives. The first, the pluralist perspective, assumed that interest groups largely reflect the distribution of salient interests in society, and that their activity contributes to sustaining democracy. Although not all interest groups were created equal, few remain without access to any resources necessary for both their survival and for pursuing influence (Dahl, 1967). Influence tactics were considered benign, engaging mainly in providing technical information to elected officials. The salience of the issue at stake had a marked effect on its processing and on governmental response. The second perspective tilted toward economics. The key term employed by the proponents of this approach was transactions, executed between interest groups and their members on the one hand and public officials on the other. The idea of transactions was first broached by Mancur Olson (1965), who suggested that selective benefits offered by interest groups are traded for involvement and participation. As these were available only to well established organizations, the universe of interest politics was biased in favor of the haves (Schattschneider, 1960). Institutional rules governing interest politics further reinforced bias in representation. Accordingly, the democratic picture painted by the pluralists was flawed and unsound. Hidden agendas further curbed the influence potential of social groups (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962). The third perspective is termed neopluralist, and its proponents are critical of the economic model and the pluralist model alike. Regarding the former, neo-pluralists widely dispute the theory of selective incentives due to the variety of compensations, the decline of membership organizations, and the ineffective transactions taking place in interest politics. They question the pluralist approach because it overlooks the fact that mobilization for action does not reflect the distribution of interests in society. Influence is far more restricted by structures and institutions than what the pluralists contend, and some groups have very little chance of getting what they want. The neo-pluralists (Lowery & Gray, 2004) emphasize the multiple facets of the influence process and the linkages and feedbacks between the stages and the actors involved. Interest politics, accordingly, is complex, fluid, contextual, and uncertain. Variation, generated by complexity and competition, is emphasized. They also take note of the obstacles to mobilization and to choice of venues and influence tactics, and are aware of the imposition of structures. In short, neo-pluralists seek to reject some of their predecessors’ assumptions and to adopt others. Contemporary literature on interest politics reflects these three perspectives, keeping the discussion alive and intense. Key Issues The key issue engaging students of interest politics is the ‘‘influence production process’’ (Lowery & Gray, 2004). The great riddle of the process is determining the circumstances under which influence is at its highest. Put differently, the underlying question is how much power interest groups have, and how power is distributed among different groups. Answers, though inconclusive, deal with the operationalization of ‘‘influence’’ and with evaluating resources at the disposal of interest groups. It is generally agreed that influence is a vague concept. To construct reliable indicators, and to measure them empirically, whether qualitatively or quantitatively, is a daunting task. The lively discussion of different ‘‘faces of power,’’ some of which are hidden, unknown even to the actors themselves, adds difficulty to gauging influence. Yet ‘‘control over outcomes’’ has turned into a key issue in studying interest politics (Dur & Bievre, 2007). Unfortunately, the fundamental question of ‘‘Who gets what, when, and how?’’ as regards interest politics remains open and knowledge is still largely fragmentary. How interest groups accumulate resources is the second focus of attention. Research has been conducted on mobilization, with some scholars explaining influence as lying on the individual level (in leaders or prospective followers) while others accentuate the environment, particularly ‘‘niches’’ making group mobilization possible (Baumgartner, 2001), or institutional structures creating adequate conditions for impact. The availability of resources is considered a necessary, though not a sufficient, condition for group influence. Group maintenance is another issue occupying researchers (Nowness & Lipinski, 2005). Mobilization does not guarantee longevity. In fact, data reveal a fairly high death toll, as problems of maintenance are created from the moment a group enters the political scene. Selection of leadership, tactics, and policy has proven to affect group maintenance. Once a group elicits resources and ensures its Interest Politics longevity the choice of strategies is a crucial question. Resources and strategies afford only a partial explanation of influence. The political opportunities available to interest groups (Kitschelt, 1986), as well as the cultural norms guiding their activity, are also part of the research agenda attempting to tackle the origins and magnitude of influence (Cigler & Loomis, 2007). International Perspectives Although interest politics is a universal phenomenon, variations in outlook are noticeable across continents and cultures. In the United States, the cradle of modern interest politics, the emphasis was once on individuals coordinating their activity to protect their benefits or promote an idea they believed in. The Jacksonian idea presumed that every citizen was capable of influencing the functions of government, and every group could gain access to the core of power. Individual civil responsibility and involvement was the product of this process. The name of the game was pluralism, which the configuration of interest groups displayed with great accuracy. The pluralist arena was ever changing, since interest groups confronted both each other and the government in shifting patterns of competition. A natural dynamism created a diversity of groups whose ability to appeal to the many concerns of each individual guaranteed that no one interest would monopolize power. Furthermore, the essence of pluralism was a well defined boundary between interest groups and the political decision-making process, where the former were seen as working from outside the institutions of government. In Western Europe the focus was overwhelmingly on organizations, permanently constituted and collectively governed, rather than on individuals or on shifting configurations of groups. An alternative to pluralism was offered by Phillip Schmitter (1974), who formulated a theory of neo-corporatism to explain interest politics in Europe. Neo-corporatism denied the free market perspective offered by pluralists, and put the state at the heart of interest politics. A neo-corporatist regime involves the state’s formal recognition of the power of ‘‘strategic actors’’ among interest groups that have met certain threshold criteria. These groups are granted formal rights to influence governmental decisions through routine participation in policy-making bodies, including committees, boards, and councils. The number of partners to the government in the process of policy making is quite limited. They are mainly representatives of economic sectors such as business associations, trade unions, and professional groups. In a neo-corporatist regime the opportunity for change is limited because both institutions and culture shield existing structures. Yet scholars have I noted that in recent decades economic organizations have been joined by post-materialist movements (Inglehart, 1990), including, for example, women, environmentalists, and peace advocates, all of whom form comprehensive systems of interest intermediation. A third way is presented by studies of developing countries or societies undergoing far-reaching transitions, where political culture is not ripe for civic action and participation in civil life is rudimentary. Under these circumstances the organization of interests is not spontaneous as in the United States, or structural as in Europe, but instead has an elitist quality. Interest groups are products of elite mobilization or party colonization. Social penetration by government agencies or political parties is the hub of the elitist configuration of interest politics. Yet it is assumed that interest groups, in their various forms and shapes, play a key role in both democratization and economic development. At the start of the twenty-first century all three approaches are challenged. Students of US politics have found that individuals are evidently manipulated, and their interest in politics is minor. People tend to ‘‘bowl alone’’ (Putnam, 1995), and many remain outside the influence process. European scholars note that neo-corporatism in its sheer form belongs to the past and that the interest arena is becoming much more open and pluralistic. The decline of the nation-state, yielding some of its authority to the European Union, has had a substantial impact on interest politics. The widespread erosion in the power of political parties has contributed to increasing the autonomy of interest groups. In this respect interest politics is becoming a universal phenomenon, removed from the peculiarities of region or culture. The impact of globalization on the one hand, and the individuation sweeping the contemporary world on the other, blur the distinction between different regimes of interest politics. The positive role played by interest groups in the process of economic development has also been challenged. Olson (1982) maintained that interest politics is to blame for the decline of nations. Others do not share the hope that interest groups (better known as NGOs in Africa and Asia) will propel developing nations to leap forward to prosperity and democracy. Despite the fortune invested by international organizations in sustaining a civic infrastructure, poor countries remain poor. Interest politics has failed to play the role of a magic bullet. Future Directions Globalization, the expansion of electronic communication, and the commodification of public life have 873 I 874 I Interest Politics contributed to shaping the fledgling research agenda of interest politics. Until recently, studies largely confined themselves to national boundaries, and paid less attention to regions. But lately discussion has increasingly focused on transnational/regional efforts, as well as on transboundary tactics, in which interest groups choose to direct their energies at international bodies and/or economic actors (this last trend has been termed ‘‘private politics’’: Hendry, 2006). The strategies employed by interest groups and their cross-country efforts to influence both national and supranational decision-making are likely to constitute major areas of future research. Political scientists are particularly intrigued by the strategies of interest groups vis-à-vis the European Union. What they do in Brussels is a major preoccupation, and will probably continue to be. The reason for this close attention is that the EU is less and more of a state at one and the same time. The access of interest groups to the EU’s agencies, the resources at their disposal, the strategies they employ, the coalitions they join, and their influence on the European decision-making process are on the front line of contemporary and possibly future research. Likewise, globalization has shifted concern with interest politics from First World countries to the Third World. The unique patterns of interest politics in developing nations is part of an incipient research agenda. In the study of states in the process of development the terms ‘‘civil society’’ and ‘‘interest groups’’ are used interchangeably, because the research focus is often on state-society relationship rather than on the state’s liaison, or conflict, with specific groups. A further outcome of the interchangeability of interest politics with civil society is the growing interest in underprivileged and marginalized groups, including ethnic minorities, the poor, women, immigrants, and the like. A major prospective research area is the impact of the electronic revolution on interest politics. How do interest groups cope with the decline in membership, and the loosening structural ties with affiliates in the era of digital revolution? Finally, there is a growing tendency to make the deliberation of interest politics more useful and practical. In addition to the question of ‘‘why do organized interests lobby?’’ there have been attempts to offer some research-based advice on the enhancement of efficiency in influence strategies. This includes contribution to political candidates (in the United States, via PACs), resorting to litigation, and particularly resorting to various forms of communication as a means of influence. Increasingly, the study of interest politics is inclining toward administration and economy, employing theories of rational choice and entrepreneurship. Some scholars lament the theoretical decline of interest politics research, and current reviews of the field bemoan the lack of interest in general theoretical designs (Baumgartner & Leech, 1998); nevertheless, constant attempts are being made to rectify the situation by addressing both empirical and theoretical questions of interest politics. Cross-References ▶ Advocacy ▶ Association, Definition of and history ▶ Associative Democracy ▶ Business and Employers’ Associations ▶ Citizens Coalition for Economic Justice ▶ Civic Participation ▶ Collective Action ▶ Corporatism ▶ Federations, Nonprofit ▶ Grassroots Associations ▶ Interest and Pressure Groups ▶ Lobbying ▶ Mancur, Olson ▶ Membership and Membership Associations ▶ Networks ▶ Nonprofit Organizations ▶ Peasant and Farmers’ Organizations ▶ Political Organizations ▶ Professional Associations ▶ Public Sphere ▶ Self Help Groups ▶ Social Entrepreneurship ▶ Social Movements ▶ Theories of Nonprofit Sector, Political References/Further Readings Almond, G. A., & Bingham Powell, G. (1988). Comparative politics today: A world view (4th ed.). Glenview, IL: Scott Foresman/Little Brown. Bachrach, P., & Baratz, N. (1962). Two faces of power. American Political Science Review, 50, 947–952. Baumgartner, F. R. (2001). Interest niches and policy bandwagons: Patterns of interest groups involvement in national politics. Journal of Politics, 63(4), 1191–1213. Baumgartner, F. R., & Leech, B. L. (1998). Basic interests: The importance of groups in politics and political science. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Bentley, A. F. (1967). The process of government: A study of social pressures. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Berry, J. M. (1977). Lobbying for the people. The political behavior of public interest groups. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Berry, J. M. (1999). The new liberalism. The rising power of citizen groups. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Cigler, A. J., & Loomis, B. A. (Eds.) (2007). Interest group politics (7th ed.). Washington, DC: CQ Press. Dahl, R. A. (1967). Pluralist democracy in the United States. Chicago: Rand McNally. Intermediary Organizations and Field Dur, A., & De Bievre, D. (2007). The question of interest group influence. Journal of Public Policy, 27(1), 1–12. Grant, W. (1989). Pressure groups, politics and democracy in Britain. New York: Philip Allan. Hendry, J. R. (2006). Taking aim at business: What factors lead environmental non-governmental organizations to target particular firms. Business and Society, 45, 47–86. Hirschman, A. O. (1977). The passions and the interests. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Inglehart, R. (1990). Culture shift in advanced industrial society. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Kitschelt, H. (1986). Political opportunity structure and political protest: Anti-nuclear movements in four democracies. British Journal of Political Science, 15(1), 57–85. Lowery, D., & Gray, V. (2004). A neopluralist perspective on research on organized interests. Political Research Quarterly, 57(1), 163–175. Nowness, J. J., & Lipinski, D. (2005). The population ecology of interest group death: Gay and lesbian rights interest groups in the United States 1945–1998. British Journal of Political Science, 35, 303–319. Odegard, P. H. (1928). Pressure politics: The story of anti-saloon league. New York: Columbia University Press. Olson M. (1968). Please change the data in the text. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. Olson, M. (1982). The rise and decline of nations. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Petracca, M. P. (1992). The rediscovery of interest groups. In M. P. Petracca (Eds.), The politics of interests. Interest groups transformed. Boulder, CO.: Westview. Putman, R. D. (1995). ‘‘Bowling Alone. America’s Declining Social Capital.’’ Journal of Democracy 6, 65–78. Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling alone. The collapse and revival of American community. New York: Simon & Schuster. Salisbury, R. H. (1984). Interest representation. The dominance of institutions. American Political Science Review, 78, 64–76. Schattschneider, E. E. (1960). The semisovereign people. New York: Holt/ Rinehart/Winston. Schlozman, K. L., & Tierney, J. T. (1986). Organized interests and American democracy. New York: Harper & Row. Schmitter, P. C. (2008). The changing politics of organized interests. West European Politics, 31(1–2), 195–210. Schmitter, P. C. (1974). Still a century of corporatism? Review of Politics, 36, 85–131. Thomas, C. (Ed.) (2001). Political parties and interest groups. Shaping democratic governance. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Tocqueville, A. de. (1969). Democracy in America. Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor. Truman, D. (1951). The governmental process: Public interests and public opinion. New York: Knopf. Verba, S., & Nie, N. (1972). Participation in America. New York: Harper & Row. Wilson G. K. (1981). Interest Groups in the United States. New York: Oxford University Press. Yishai, Y. (1994). Interest parties. The thin line between groups and parties in the Israeli electoral process. In K. Lawson (Eds.), How political parties work. Perspectives from within. Westport, CT: Praeger. Yishai, Y. (1998). ‘‘Civil Society in Transition. Interest Politics in Israel.’’ The Annals. The American Academy of Political and Social Science 555, 147–162. Yoho, J. (1998). The evolution of a better definition of ‘‘Interest Group’’ and its synonyms. The Social Science Journal, 35(April), 231–243. I 875 Intermediary Organizations and Field PAUL DEKKER The Netherlands Institute for Social Research The Hague, The Netherlands Introduction In the field of nonprofit and civil society studies, specific kinds of organizations are sometimes exclusively labeled as intermediary organizations or ‘‘intermediaries.’’ According to Anheier and List (2006: 137) they ‘‘exist primarily in the social service delivery fields, where they tend to connect smaller organizations and the people they serve to the local delivery system, as well as in the field of international development and humanitarian relief, where they often mediate between foreign funding agencies and local government agencies or community organizations.’’ According to another nonprofit dictionary an intermediary is ‘‘a person or group who links the money and time of donors with the needs that nonprofit groups seek to meet. Furthermore, consultants, trainers, counselors, and program officers serve as intermediaries in the nonprofit sector. They run their own companies as intermediary nonprofit organizations or work for foundations, support centers, fund-raising firms, and the like.’’ (Smith et al., 2006: 95). Te’eni and Young (2003) see a future for nonprofits in the network economy as ‘‘trusted intermediaries to help people cope with a deluge of complex information.’’ Improved information technologies may undermine the advantages of nonprofit service providers because of information asymmetry and the public goods arguments, but information intermediation is a promising niche for nonprofits in the network economy. Focusing on internally operating organizations, Sanyal (2006: 67) writes about intermediary NGOs as ‘‘a new type of NGO that aims to create linkages between local issues and global institutions to be distinguished from conventional service providing NGOs.’’ As a last example somewhat outside the sphere of civil society, the labor market has specific ‘‘intermediaries’’ as well, meaning organizations that connect workers with employment (job placement, training, etc.). All these specific intermediary organizations or intermediaries are assumed to have a main task in mediating activities such as bringing together policy-makers, professionals, funders, and other stakeholders to foster collective action, to coordinate separately operating organizations and programs, to develop common procedures and quality standards, to integrate agenda-setting I 876 I Intermediary Organizations and Field and interest representation, and to build a common infrastructure for information and research. However, intermediary organizations are not seen as an exclusive type of organization, which can be distinguished from other types in the way leisure organizations can be distinguished from business organizations, or churches from labor unions. Being ‘‘intermediary’’ means being in-between and that applies to almost every organization in some respect. Calling organizations intermediary means that one focuses on their mediating role, on the intermediary functions of organizations and not on their resource mobilization, internal planning processes, service-delivery aspects, etc. In this perspective, all organizations could be analyzed as intermediary organizations, but the concept is dominantly applied to voluntary associations and other nonprofit organizations that link between individual citizens and various levels of government. This entry will further focus on intermediary organizations in this sense: not as a separate organizational type, but to highlight intermediate functions of organizations in civil society in general. Definition The same organization can be called a voluntary association, a nonprofit, an interest or pressure group or an intermediary organization, dependent upon one’s focus: does one want to illuminate the fact that the organization is set up voluntarily by citizens, that it has economic characteristics comparable with for-profits, that it represents interests and tries to influence government, or that it has connecting and mediating functions? As an intermediary organization it establishes ‘‘a link between different spheres of society’’ (Van Deth, 1997: 2). One may distinguish here between horizontal intermediary roles between (groups of) individuals, sectors of social and economic life, etc. on the one hand and, on the other, vertical intermediary roles between different levels of social or economic structures and governance. Most literature is dominantly or exclusively focused on vertical intermediary roles of organizations connecting individuals with the macro-institutions of society, in particular government. Whereas interest and pressure group literature looks ‘‘bottom up’’ from the needs and wants of individual citizens to the attempts of organizations to influence political decision making and other input in the political system, the conceptualization of intermediary organizations includes the ‘‘top down’’ perspective as well, with interest in how organizations transmit information from the political system to the people, help to implement policies and legitimize political decisions, or try to discipline and moderate their rank and file. Similar to, but not full equivalents of, these intermediary organizations are the ‘‘intermediate associations’’ of Mark Warren and the ‘‘mediating structures’’ of Peter Berger and Richard John Neuhaus. Warren (2001: 39) describes intermediate or secondary associations (‘‘civic groups, sports clubs, religious associations, and the like’’) as something between the primary associations of family and friendships, and the tertiary associations such as interest groups and professional organizations in which members hardly know each other and hardly share more than the specific purpose of the organization. Mediating roles between society and state are ascribed to the intermediate associations and they are, with a reference to De Tocqueville, assumed to be virtuous for democracy. Berger and Neuhaus (1996: 158) define mediating structures as ‘‘those institutions that stand between the individual in his private life and the large institutions of public life.’’ They are ‘‘Janus-faced’’ institutions, looking upward and downward, in one direction protecting individuals from the alienation of modern life and empowering people, and in the other direction strengthening popular legitimacy of the state and other large institutions. Whereas Warren’s intermediate associations are a subsample of all organizations that can be considered as intermediary organizations, the mediating structures of Berger & Neuhaus are a broader category, including nonorganizations such as families and neighborhoods. The basic function of intermediary organizations is by definition mediation, which means (organizing and stimulating) communication, representation of interests, mutual understanding, and the search for common goals and strategies of the parties involved. More specifically as regards the role of civil society, voluntary and nonprofit organizations as intermediaries between citizens and the state, various functions, expected effects or contributions for democracy are mentioned in the literature. Warren (2001: 70–93) mentions development effects on individuals in the organizations (such as growth of feelings of political efficacy, becoming better informed about social and political issues, and learning political skills and civic virtues); public sphere effects or contributions to the formation of public opinion and collective judgments (public communication and deliberation, and representations of difference and of commonality); and institutional effects or contributions to the democratic functioning of institutions of governance (among other things by representation, resistance, legitimation of the state and providing alternative structures of governance). Similar functions are mentioned by Fung (2003), who Intermediary Organizations and Field describes six ways associations are supposed to enhance democracy: through the intrinsic value of associative life, fostering civic virtues and teaching political skills, offering resistance to power and checking government, improving the quality and equality of representation, facilitating public deliberation, and creating opportunities for citizens and groups to participate directly in governance. Wnuk-Lipinski (2007) distinguishes control, articulative, integrative, and educational functions that private organizations have in a pluralist democracy. In particular the individual (development and educational) functions these authors mention can be found as well in organizations without any link with politics and the political system; in intermediary organizations, however, they will have a higher political relevance. Historical Background Intermediary organizations have a long history in the thinking about civil society, with both supporters and sceptics. Charles Taylor (2003) has made a useful distinction between an ‘‘M-stream’’ (referring to Montesquieu and including De Tocqueville) and an ‘‘L-stream’’ (referring to Locke and including the philosophers of the Scottish enlightenment). The ideal of civil society in the L-stream is development of societal self-governance against political power. Society is ideally based on the voluntary cooperation of citizens; they may delegate tasks to the state but they do this conditionally and preserving the primacy of society. In the M-stream the ideal of civil society is more concerned with creating the right balance, mediation, and buffering between political and societal powers. Political power is a given fact and society is a political construction to start with. More balanced and more strictly regulated relationships between the political power and societal powers help to protect the freedoms of individuals and make society more civilized. After Montesquieu, de Tocqueville discovered voluntary associations in America as an equivalence of the social power of the estates in France. De Tocqueville analyzes these voluntary associations as buffers against direct political and state interventions in social life, as organizations to represent political interests and as alternatives for public authorities as regards the production of public goods. Basically de Tocqueville saw voluntary organizations to a large extent as intermediary organizations between individuals or private groups and the state. They were for him primarily an ‘‘updating of Montesquieu’s pouvours intermediaries’’ (Villa, 2006: 236), not spontaneously originated citizen’s initiatives completely independent of politics and the state. In present-day ideals of the civil society, its apolitical character and distance from the I 877 state are often stressed and intermediary roles are sometimes seen with scepticism. This antistatist effect is understandable given the origins of the present debates about civil society in the struggles against totalitarian communist states and concerns about bureaucratic welfare states in the west. However, intermediary organizations have a long history in the discussion about civil society, and the ideal of a stateless civil society should not be labeled as (neo-)Tocquevillian. Key Issues The benefits and drawbacks of the links of intermediary organizations government and their integration in policy networks are disputed in various respects. One issue concerns the effects on the internal democracy of the organizations and the relationship between leadership and rank-and-file. Is there a trade-off between effectiveness in relationships with politicians, bureaucrats, and officials of other organizations against member involvement and internal democracy? A strong intermediary position might stimulate concentration of power at the top level of organizations, as well as professionalization and bureaucratization. Discussion about member preferences, goals of the organization and strategic options might have to be restrained to remain a valuable and trustworthy partner of government (cf. MüllerJentsch, 1985). Another issue concerns negative societal effects. Intermediary organizations can dominate or even monopolize interest representation and negotiations to the detriment of weaker and unorganized interests. This can reinforce social inequality in access to the political system as well as the dominance of policy fields with well organized interests over weaker fields and general interests. This issue is discussed for instance in relation to the strong integration of socioeconomic interest groups and public authorities in (neo)corporatist arrangements (cf. Streeck & Schmitter, 1985). A third issue concerns the consequences for parliament and government. What room is left for parliamentary decisions at the moment government and the ‘‘social partners’’ or other sets of intermediary organizations agree about policies? What room does government have if the organizations in a policy field already agree about what has to done? These are not only issues for political disputes, but also of scientific debates. Positions differ from the position that voluntary associations are ‘‘making democracy work’’ (Putnam, 1993) to the position that vested special interest groups contribute to ‘‘stagflation and social rigidities’’ (Olson, 1982). I 878 I Intermediary Organizations and Field International Perspectives Countries differ with respect to the actual development of and appreciation for intermediary organizations and structures between individual citizens and the state. In some countries there is not much need for intermediation because the state does not accept much responsibility for social welfare and the well-being of its citizens; in other countries there is not much room for it, because the state (i.e., local government) is directly connected to citizens by delivering public services and offering opportunities to individual citizens for influencing politics and administration. In the terminology of Salamon and Anheier (1998), the former represents the ‘‘liberal’’ or ‘‘statist’’ model, while the latter represents the ‘‘social-democratic’’ model of third sector regimes. In their fourth, ‘‘corporatist’’ model, a high level of social welfare government spending is combined with a large scale nonprofit sector. In this model private nonprofits provide services on behalf of the state, paid for primarily with tax money. These nonprofits are well positioned to develop intermediating roles between citizens and the state: they communicate government policies to the public and public needs to bureaucrats and politicians. Single service providers, their umbrella organizations and organizations representing professional, employee, and employer interests, all develop intermediary functions. Wishes and wants of individual citizens are aggregated and transformed into organizational interests and these are negotiated, not only in relations with public bodies, but also in relations with nonprofits with competing interests. Countries differ in the way these relationships have developed, but in different forms an intermediary field has developed in which organizations deal with government and with one another. Sometimes public authority is formally or de facto delegated to the negotiating bodies of nonprofits, which creates corporatist arrangements in the traditional sense through which socioeconomic interest groups cooperate with public authorities and with each other in policy making and the governance of industrial relations (cf. Streeck & Schmitter, 1985). Western Europe has various examples of regions and countries with well developed intermediary fields. In Belgium (Flanders) and The Netherlands this field is often referred to as ‘‘societal midfield’’ (in Dutch ‘‘maatschappelijk middenveld’’). In both countries it developed strongly from the last quarter of the nineteenth century till the 1960s in a process of religiously and politically segmented growth of third sector organizations: from parties, unions, and employer organizations to newspapers, broadcasting companies and sports clubs, and to hospitals, schools and social housing associations. These were organized in ‘‘pillars,’’ which had important vertical intermediary functions between citizens and the state, but also important horizontal roles at the level of national and local elites. Although the cultural drive of ‘‘pillarization’’ faded away decades ago, part of the organizational infrastructure is remains and there is still a high level of acceptance of a large semipublic space between the state and private life with strong intermediary organizations (cf. Dekker, 2004). This is still very different from, for instance, France, where, in a much more ‘‘statist’’ tradition there are clear borders between public and private, and there is not much room for nonprofits crossing this border. Here, intermediation between citizens and the state takes place more often in temporary collective mass action than through vested organizations and procedures. Different again is the situation in Germany, which never had ‘‘pillarization’’ to the same degree as The Netherlands or Flanders, but where the politico-religious social welfare umbrella organizations (‘‘Wohlfahrtsverbände’’) nowadays are for this policy field much more important intermediaries than the pillarized leftovers in the low countries. Still another situation exists in Austria, where social-economic layers (‘‘Lager’’) still structure intermediary processes in large parts of the society. These few examples from Western Europe demonstrate the huge diversity of national patterns of intermediary organizations and fields. Future Directions This diversity among member states of the European Union suggests that national traditions are strong and general trends may have limited impact. Nevertheless a few factors seem to be relevant for the future of intermediary organizations in civil society everywhere. One factor is the cultural modernization trend of individualization, including processes of decreasing submissiveness towards authorities and diminishing loyalties as members of organizations, as well as growing feelings of individual political competence and efficacy. These cultural shifts undermine the position of vested intermediary organizations. So do developments in information technology, which among others make it easier to create direct links between governments and individual citizens, and to create new media and make old mass media more interactive. Intermediary organizations become superfluous as sources of information and public opinion. Related to this seems to be a rise of populist attitudes in the public and among political (contra-) elites in many countries. The rejection of intermediary institutions is at the heart of these attitudes. Against these threats to intermediary organizations there are a few foreseeable challenges and opportunities that might strengthen existing organizations and lead to new intermediaries. One felt in many places is the lack of legitimacy of party politics and parliamentary International Advocacy NGO Workshop governance. In new democracies attempts are made to build up ‘‘civil society from above’’. This applies to the European Union as such (creating various consulting bodies and procedures for a ‘‘civil society’’ of Brusselslocated NGOs) as well as for its new member states of communist origin. In the older democracies, new forms of direct democracy and interaction with individual citizens may turn out not to be an alternative, and the next step might be the search for more deliberative and binding forms of democracy which requires more intermediary organization. Another base for new intermediaries may develop at the local and regional level of the ‘‘network society.’’ From integrated social services to labor market schemes for disadvantaged groups and projects for neighborhood renewal, new forms of cooperation between public and private actors are developing and are in need of coordination and interest representation. A final factor is the imminent information overload for citizens because of the development of information technologies. As already mentioned in the introduction this can offer opportunities to nonprofits as ‘‘trusted information intermediaries’’ (Te’eni & Young, 2003). Taken together, threats and opportunities may result in a weakening of intermediary roles of broad multifunctional mass organizations and the growth of intermediaries for specific fields and processes. Cross-References ▶ Civil Society and Democracy ▶ Civil Society Theory: de Tocqueville ▶ Civil Society Theory: Montesquieu ▶ Corporatism ▶ Interest and Pressure Groups ▶ Locke, John ▶ Nonprofit Organizations, Functions of ▶ Olson, Mancur ▶ Putnam, Robert References/Further Readings Anheier, H. K., & List, R. A. (2005). A dictionary of civil society, philanthropy and the non-profit sector. London: Routledge. Berger, P. L., & Neuhaus, R. J. (1996 [1977]). In M. Novak (Ed.), To empower people: from state to civil society. Washington, DC: AEI. Dekker, P. (2004). The Netherlands. In A. Evers, & J. L. Laville (Eds.), The third sector in Europe Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. (pp. 144–165). Fung, A. (2003). Associations and democracy. Annual Review of Sociology, 29, 515–539. Maloney, W. A., & Rossteutscher, S. (Eds.) (2007). Social capital and associations in European democracies. London: Routledge. Müller-Jentsch, W. (1985). Trade unions as intermediary organizations. Economic and Industrial Democracy, 6, 3–33. Olson, M. (1982). The rise and decline of nations. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. I Putnam, R. D. (with L. Leonardi en, R.Y. Nanetti) (1993). Making democracy work. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Salamon, L. M., & Anheier, H. K. (1998). Social origins of civil society. Voluntas, 9, 213–248. Sanyal, P. (2006). Capacity building through partnerships. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 35(1), 66–82. Smith, D. H., Stebbins, R. A., & Dover, M. A. (2006). A dictionary of nonprofit terms and concepts. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Streeck, W., & Schmitter, Ph. C. (1985). Community, market, state – and associations? In W. Streeck, & Ph. C. Schmitter (Eds.), Private interest government. London: Sage. Taylor, C. (2003 [1989]). Modes of civil society. In C. M. Elliott (Ed.), Civil society and democracy. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. (pp. 43–62). Te’eni, D., & Young, D. R. (2003). The changing role of nonprofits in the network economy. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 32(3), 397–414. Van Deth, J. W. (1997). Introduction. In J. W. Van Deth (Ed.), Private groups and public life. London: Routledge. (pp. 1–23). Villa, D. (2006). Tocqueville and civil society. In C. B. Welch (Eds.), The Cambridge companion to Tocqueville. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (pp. 216–244). Warren, M. E. (2001). Democracy and association. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Wnuk-Lipinski, E. (2007). Civil society and democratization. In R. Dalton & H. D. Klingemann (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of political behavior. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (pp. 675–692). International Advocacy NGO Workshop L. DAVID BROWN Address of Organization c/o CIVICUS CIVICUS House 24 GwiGwi Mrwebi Street Newtown, Johannesburg, 2001 South Africa www.civicus.org/csn/iango-workshop Introduction The IANGO Workshop is a network of leaders of international advocacy NGOs and networks that meets annually. Workshop members are concerned with a wide range of issues – development, human rights, environment, labor rights, governance, women’s rights – but they are all interested in effective policy influence on global issues. Brief History The IANGO Workshop grew out of conversations among leaders of IANGOs, CIVICUS, and the Hauser Center for 879 I 880 I International Baby Food Action Network (IBFAN) Nonprofit Organizations at Harvard University. A CIVICUS-Hauser Center team convened and facilitated an initial 2-day meeting of 20 IANGO leaders hosted in 2003 by Transparency International in Berlin. Discussions identified a wide range of issues on which participants felt there might be productive discussions. Subsequent annual meetings have been hosted by members in Oxford, Amsterdam, London, Geneva, Berlin, and Barcelona and the network now includes 25–30 members. Mission The mission and goals of the IANGO Workshop include four concerns. Members seek to learn from each other about the difficult and constantly-changing challenges of civil society advocacy across international boundaries. The Workshop also enables coalitions among members on issues that warrant united stands. Individual IANGO leaders often use the opportunity to discuss the challenges of leading IANGOs with others in similar positions. Finally, the Workshop creates task forces to enable collective action on issues that affect all IANGOs. Activities The annual Workshop provides a vehicle for work on these goals as well as a forum for reporting on task force activities and identifying emerging issues. Annual workshops often engage outside resources on critical emerging issues. Coalition building initiatives sometimes catalyze joint action, such as campaigns on global trade initiatives and the UN norms on corporations. Participants often consult each other outside the Workshop as IANGO leaders draw on each others’ expertise. Issues of wide import, such as civil society legitimacy and accountability, have catalyzed discussion and activities over extended periods. The Workshop produced, for example, the International NGO Charter of Accountability to establish global standards for its signatories. Funding The IANGO Workshop is supported by the time and resources of its members. It has received some funding from foundations to enable participation by small and Southern-based IANGOs and the CIVICUS-Hauser Center team. It receives no government funding. Accomplishments The most visible contribution of the Workshop is the Charter of Accountability, which has been widely recognized as a step in enhancing the legitimacy and accountability of international civil society. Continued participation by busy IANGO leaders suggests they see the Workshop as a useful resource. Cross-References ▶ Accountability ▶ Advocacy ▶ CIVICUS ▶ Coalitions and Networks ▶ Governance ▶ Human rights ▶ INGOs References/Further Readings Brown, L. D. (Ed.) (2008). Negotiating sector credibility. In Creating credibility: Legitimacy and accountability for transnational civil society (pp. 97–118). Sterling, VA: Kumarian Press. International Baby Food Action Network (IBFAN) LAWRENCE S. CUMMING Structure and Governance The annual IANGO Workshop is hosted by different members. Its Steering Committee is composed of past, present, and future host IANGOs, a representative of smaller members, and the CIVICUS-Hauser Center convener/facilitators. The Secretariat for the Workshop is at CIVICUS, and it continues to draw on CIVICUS and the Hauser Center to develop and lead the annual Workshop. CIVICUS is also the Secretariat for the Charter of Accountability, which now has a Board composed of its signatories. Address of Organization c/o Geneva Infant Feeding Association Avenue de la Paix 11 1202 Geneva Switzerland www.ibfan.org Introduction The International Baby Food Action Network (IBFAN) consists of ‘‘over 200 public interest groups working International Baby Food Action Network (IBFAN) around the world to reduce infant and young child morbidity and mortality’’ (IBFAN website). Brief History Though the health and nutritional advantages of breastfeeding have long been known in professional circles, awareness became more widespread during the 1970s. In1979, the Infant Formula Action Coalition (INFACT) launched a campaign in the United States against the bottle feeding marketing practices of the Swiss based company, Nestle. In the years that followed, the campaign became truly international. IBFAN and its affiliates have always promoted breast feeding, most especially in countries and communities without reliable supplies of clean water. IBFAN itself was founded in late 1979 following a WHO and UNICEF convened international meeting on Infant and Young Child Feeding. IBFAN is one of the longest surviving a single-issue civil society organizations in the world. In 1981, the World Health Assembly International adopted the Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes. The Code continues to be the reference point for all subsequent action. Mission/Objectives IBFAN aims to improve the health and well-being of babies and young children, their mothers and their families through the protection, promotion, and support of breastfeeding and optimal infant feeding practices. IBFAN works for universal and full implementation of the International Code and subsequent Resolutions of the World Health Assembly. Activities The international movement that constitutes IBFAN was instrumental in putting the marketing of baby foods firmly onto the global health agenda. Through ongoing vigilance, IBFAN continues to subject new marketing strategies to rigorous public scrutiny and to bring current thinking on infant nutrition to the attention of delegates at the World Health Assembly, national governments and other interested parties. Structure and Governance IBFAN is an international network of diverse groups working on infant feeding issues, including mother support groups, consumer associations, development organizations, citizens rights groups and various others. I 881 Some are entirely volunteer operated while others are staffed. IBFAN is regionally based and structured. Representatives from each region, as well as other groups with specialist responsibilities, make up the IBFAN Coordinating Council. The first point of contact about IBFAN activities are the regional representatives listed on the network’s Website. Funding As a very decentralized network, IBFAN’s own operating costs are minimal. Most funds are generated and spent by the regional and national entities. Revenue is generated by membership fees, publications, and short term grants for specific projects (research, publications, conferences, and so on). Donors include governments, various NGOs and UNICEF regional offices. IBFAN and its regional affiliates do not accept financial support from industries which manufacture or sell breastmilk substitutes. Major Accomplishments/Contributions The signature accomplishment of IBFAN was the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (1981). Thirteen (13) subsequent World Health Assembly resolutions have kept the code up-to-date, and some 63 countries have passed legislation incorporating most or all of the Code’s provisions. IBFAN has been of critical importance in keeping official fest to the fire. In 1998 IBFAN received the Right Livelihood Award for its ‘‘committed and effective campaigning over nearly 20 years for the rights of mothers to choose to breastfeed their babies, in the full knowledge of the health benefits of breastmilk, and free from the commercial pressure and misinformation with which companies promote breastmilk substitutes’’ (Websites). Cross-References ▶ Coalitions and Networks ▶ INGOs ▶ Nongovernmental Organizations ▶ UNICEF References/Further Readings Alain, A. (1989). IBFAN: On the cutting edge. Development Dialogue, 2, 5–38. Baby Milk Action. (2004). History of the campaign. Briefing Paper, from www.babymilkaction.org Right Livelihood Award. (1988). IBFAN, from www.rightlivelihood.org I 882 I International Business Leaders Forum (IBLF) International Business Leaders Forum (IBLF) Activities 15-16 Cornwall Terrace London, NW1 4QP UK www.iblf.org The IBLF maintains five programs under its direct leadership. These programs support international tourism, affordable access to technology, cross-sector partnerships in arts and sciences, as well as youth oriented business and career initiatives. In correlation with these programs, the IBLF hosts conferences all year around and across the globe to make businesses more aware of their growing responsibility to develop sustainable business standards. Since 2007, the Forum has begun raising money for a $25 million endowment to further its activities in the name of its late CEO Robert Davies. Introduction Structure and Governance The International Business Leaders Forum (IBLF) is an independent nonprofit organization providing ‘‘strategic counsel’’ to corporations in order to establish responsible business standards in developing economies. In the attempts to do so, the Forum has nurtured a large network of business leaders spanning across continents to over 90 countries. The governing structure of the IBLF is led by a Board of Trustees at the head including ‘‘senior leaders’’ from its 18 Principal Business Supporters who advise on how best to achieve the Forum’s mission. In addition, there is a separate group of five Chairmen who develop regional partnership programs as well as IBLF specific projects. Lastly, the Forum’s management has an International Advisory Board which promotes IBLF’s own international growth and leadership strategy. The President and founder of the IBLF is the HRH Prince of Wales. CHRISTOPHER S. BIGGERS Address of Organization Brief History The IBLF was founded in February 1990 when the Prince of Wales and a group of international business leaders convened a meeting to discuss the issues of globalization in Charleston, South Carolina. Among its first projects, the IBLF embarked on programs aiding transitional economies in Eastern Europe as well as those much further afield in South East Asia. Subsequently, the Forum has partnered with the United Nations, the European Union, the World Bank, and countless philanthropic organizations around the world to promote sustainable development. Since 1994, the Forum has published studies on diverse topics from the business community’s response to HIV/AIDS in developing countries to the implementation of human rights in business standards. Funding There are three tiers of affiliation through which the IBLF receives financial resources including Corporate Partners, Development Partners, as well as Philanthropic Donations. Since the Forum is linked with over 70 of the world’s leading companies producing over $2 trillion in profit, the IBLF largely obtains funding through the contributions of its corporate partners. However, the Forum does receive indirect assistance from multinational government agencies vis-à-vis its development partnerships. Major Accomplishments Mission The mission and objectives of the IBLF are three pronged: a focus on sustainable development, improving the opportunity of employment and entrepreneurship, and enabling corporations to contribute to solving health and human development issues. Much of the Forum’s agenda has its origin in the United Nations Brundtland Report which has defined the IBLF’s primary focus, ‘‘sustainable development,’’ as development ‘‘that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.’’ In order to accomplish this objective, among others, the IBLF has become an active partner of the UN’s Millennium Development Goals and the UN Global Compact. Among the IBLF’s most recent achievements includes campaigns with the World Bank which have helped raise standards of the footwear and garment industry in South East Asia. Furthermore, the Forum has created three independently assessed awards – the GAIN Business Award, the Rio Tinto Alcan Prize, and the World Business and Development Prize – creating incentives to further corporate reforms adopting sustainable ‘‘best practice’’ policies. Cross-References ▶ Corporate Social Responsibility ▶ United Nations ▶ UN Global Compact ▶ World Bank International Campaign to Ban Landmines References/Further Readings United Nations. (1987). Brundtland report: Our common future general assembly document A/42/427, from http://www.un-documents.net/ wced-ocf.htm International Campaign to Ban Landmines LAWRENCE S. CUMMING Address of Organization 9 Rue de Cornavin CH-1201 Geneva Switzerland www.icbl.org I and sale, transfer, or export of antipersonnel landmines’’ (Website). Activities The Campaign initially came into being to raise awareness of the problem of anti personnel mines and to press for a binding international agreement. It promotes increased international resources for humanitarian mine clearance and mine victim assistance programs. Since the signing of the Ottawa Treaty, it has continued to press for universalization of the Treaty’s coverage, full compliance with its terms and other related goals. It participates in the periodic official meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty Progress Review Process. It produces a number of publications, most notably the annual Landmines Monitor Report, and continues to advocate vigorously for ancillary goals, a good example being a ban on cluster bombs. Structure and Governance Introduction The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) describes itself as ‘‘an international network of 1,400 Non Governmental Organizations in ninety (90) countries (including) human rights, demining, humanitarian, children’s, veterans’, medical, development, arms control, religious, environmental, and women’s groups . . . who work locally, nationally, regionally, and internationally to ban antipersonnel landmines’’ (ICBL website). Brief History The Campaign was founded in 1991 by Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, Medico International, the Mines Advisory Group, Physicians for Human Rights and the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation. A mere 6 years later (December, 1997) the movement’s efforts culminated in the signing of the International Mine Ban Treaty, known also as ‘‘the Ottawa Treaty.’’ The ICBL is a truly international civil society movement that emerged in many and diverse countries, coalesced and manifested itself as an idea whose time had come. It represented a groundswell that encouraged and converged with what might be termed a ‘‘states-swell’’ at an historic moment in the early 1990s when a critical mass of governments and multilateral agencies had become convinced of the urgent need to act on the landmines problem. The Campaign has always functioned as a remarkably broad, diverse, multi-centric, volunteer led global network. Each national committee pursues its own priorities, but all the while sharing a common vision and engaging in a mutually beneficial exchange of views and experience and building an international movement. From 1993 till 1998 the network was coordinated by a Campaign Steering Committee consisting of the six original members plus additional national members from Asia, Africa and Europe. In 1998, the Steering Committee became the Co-ordination Committee and expanded yet again to include other organizations from around the world committed to the mission. Since 2005, the network has been governed by a five member Management Committee and a 21 member Advisory Board. Though it initially did not have an international office, its day-to-day affairs are now managed by a small secretariat of seven persons, most of whom are based in Geneva. Funding Financial support for the ICBL and its work has come from a variety of sources including 18 national governments, three United Nations agencies, the Holy See as well as the large and diverse array of members and endorsers. Accomplishments Mission The Campaign characterizes itself as a ‘‘flexible network of organizations that share common objectives. . . . The International Campaign to Ban Landmines is committed to an international ban on the use, production, stockpiling, 883 The signature accomplishment of the Campaign was the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. This goal was reached in as a result of being able to work in close harmony with the International Committee of the Red Cross, United Nations agencies and sympathetic governments which shared the I 884 I International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) vision and took up the cause. The successful outcome is now a classic case of effective international civil society and state collaboration. The Campaign and its then Coordinator, Jody Williams of the United States, one of the key activists responsible for bringing the initiative into being were jointly awarded the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize. A more recent and no less significant achievement is the Convention on Cluster Munitions formally signed by 94 governments in December, 2008. Though, technically, another campaign called the Cluster Munitions Coalition led this effort, it built upon the ICBL experience, and many of the same actors were involved. Cross-References ▶ Coalitions and Networks ▶ Dotcauses ▶ Human Rights Watch ▶ INGOs ▶ International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement References/Further Readings International Campaign to Ban Landmines. (1999). International Campaign to Ban Landmines. Landmine Monitor Report (annual). International Campaign to Ban Landmines. (1998–2008). Landmine Monitor Report, and annual editions. Millennium Development Goal Campaign. (n.d.). Chapter 2: Case study, ‘‘The International Campaign to Ban Landmines’’ (ICBL), CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation and Millennium Development Goals Campaign Office, from www.civicus.org/mdg/2-cs.htm Montlake, S. (2003, September 25). International effort to stop land mines bears fruit. Christian Science Monitor. Williams, J. (1999, September 3). The international campaign to ban landmines – a model for disarmament initiatives? Nobelprize.org. Williams, J. et al. (Eds.) (2008). Banning landmines: Disarmament, citizen diplomacy and human security. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. whose main goal is to facilitate the development of the civil society through the improvement of the legal frameworks that regulate the operation of NGOs in each country. It operates through cooperation and alliances with local governments or organizations and currently has presence in four continents. Brief History The ICNL was founded in 1992 by Leon E. Irish and Karla W. Simon, both professors of law and experts on taxation and civil society, among other subjects. Over time the organization has quickly grown from a two-person team with few local projects funded privately, to an international and sustainable institution with offices on four continents. After the departure of its founders in 2002 (who then founded the International Center for Civil Society Law) ICNL continued to grow and expand its activities, currently providing technical assistance to more than 90 countries. Mission/Objectives/Focus Areas In the beginning, the institution’s main concerns were the registration and taxation laws that not-for-profit organizations had to confront. At the present time its aim has become broader and ICNL now seeks to promote legal environments for civil society and freedom of association and public participation around the world. The ICNL also embraces four core values, which it seeks to promote across all of its activities: ‘‘reform results from an indigenous and transparent process; sustainability is achieved through capacity-building; programs must incorporate public participation and consensus-building; and healthy civil society features the principles of selfgovernance, accountability, and transparency.’’ Activities International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) FRANCISCO MARTINEZ Address of Organization 733 15th Street, NW, Suite 420 Washington, DC 20005-2112 USA www.icnl.org Introduction The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) is an international nongovernmental organization (NGO) The state of development of the NGO sector and its necessities are not uniform in every country, therefore the characteristics of ICNL’s activities also vary from case to case. To describe them in a general manner, however, it can be said that each project addresses its particular situation through one or more of the following areas of focus: legal framework for civil society; civil society sustainability; good governance and accountability; publicprivate partnerships; self-regulation; public participation and advocacy; or educational initiatives. Since 1998, the ICNL also publishes the International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law (IJNL), a quarterly journal focused mainly on legal frameworks and regulation regarding the NGO sector. The journal, as well as, a knowledge center containing legal documents, court cases, and other documentation from several countries, is available free of charge at the ICNL’s website. International Committee on Fundraising Organizations I Structure and Governance Introduction The ICNL has a Board of Directors and an Advisory Council and the member composition of both instances accounts for the international character of the institution. Besides the central office in Washington, DC, smaller international offices have been set up and alliances with other organizations have been established, gaining presence in Budapest, Hungary; Sofia, Bulgaria; Almaty, Kazakhstan; Kiev, Ukraine; and Moscow, Russia. Most countries have public interest and benefit organizations that raise funds from the public for various good causes. The goodness of the cause is often acknowledged by numerous tax and regulatory breaks. The quality of the goods and services that charitable organizations produce are, however, typically difficult to assess. In addition, charitable organizations are arguably as susceptible to mismanagement and fraud as their for-profit brethren, and quite possibly more so due to the nature of the goods and services that they produce and the lack of incentives for the state to provide effective enforcement. This leaves charitable organizations particularly susceptible to mismanagement and fraud (e.g., Ortmann & Schlesinger, 2003, for a discussion and relevant references). The resultant credibility, or fundraising, problem – how do donors know that their money is spent efficiently and for the advertised purpose (e.g., for victims of a tsunami)? – can be addressed in various ways. Certification is one such scheme. Contrary to self-regulatory activities, certification involves a third party that – after an investigation – assures potential donors that a certified organization is likely to spend the donated funds in ways that are both responsible and in line with the advertised purpose. In the older European Union member states one finds a stable and slowly growing set of such certification agencies (Ortmann & Svitkova, 2007), many of which are members of the International Committee on Fundraising Organizations. In addition to European certification agencies such as the Deutsches Zentralinstitut für soziale Fragen in Germany and the Stiftung ZEWO in Switzerland, a Taiwanese initiative has been added recently, and two non-secular certification agencies outside Europe have been members for a long time. Funding At the end of 2007 the net assets were of US$6,566,685. In the year 2007 the ICNL registered total public support revenue of US$5,406,880, most of which was provided by the US Government and pass-through grants (in particular, ICNL has engaged in several collaborative initiatives with the United States Agency for International Development, USAID). Cross-References ▶ Charity Law ▶ Freedom of Association ▶ INGOs ▶ Law, Foundations ▶ Law, Nonprofit Associations References/Further Readings Simon, K., & Irish, L. (1998, September). Legal mechanisms to encourage development partnerships. The International Journal of Not-forProfit Law, 1(1). Blue, R., Galaty, M., & Green, A. (2006). ICNL: The CEE/SEE Program: Impact and potential. Retrieved on February 10, 2009, from www.ngo.ee/orb.aw/class = file/action = preview/id = 9329/ ICNLCEEEvaluationFINAL.pdf Brief History International Committee on Fundraising Organizations The ICFO was founded in 1958, and formally incorporated in 1990 in Holland as a Dutch Association. Mission and Activities ANDREAS ORTMANN Address of Organization Secretary General ICFO Burkhard Wilke c/o Deutsches Zentralinstitut für soziale Fragen/DZI Bernadottestr. 94 D-14195 Berlin Germany www.icfo.de The ICFO acts as an international forum for discussion and debate on accreditation issues. It also aims to improve and strengthen national accreditation procedures through the exchange of information and coordinated development of standards and supports national initiatives towards independent certification organizations. ICFO has formulated its own set of standards for good governance and management for charitable organizations. On this basis, it now offers charities with an international structure to be monitored by ICFO. The standards cover membership and responsibilities of the governing body, the 885 I 886 I International Co-operative Alliance (ICA) fulfillment of public benefit goals, fiscal control, management, and reporting, fundraising practices, and the provision of public information. Although the role of the ICFO is that of an international forum for discussion and debate on accreditation issues, it also seems to take on more representation tasks towards international supranational organizations such as the EU as it has become better known. Structure and Governance As of the writing of this article, the ICFO has a ‘‘Constitution’’ that establishes, at least formally, the Annual General Membership (AGM) meeting as the key decision making body. The AGM elects the board (or removes members of the board), ratifies the acts of the board, and determines the dues levels (currently about €1,600). It also might terminate membership. Funding The ICFO finances itself almost exclusively from membership dues. Major Accomplishments/Contributions There is no hard evidence of its success, although theoretical analysis (Ortmann & Svitkova, 2007) and anecdotal evidence (e.g., the reliance of state agencies on the certification agencies in some countries) suggest strongly that this model of quality assurance is promising and, especially in light of the notoriously unaccountable and intransparent charity sector in Europe, well on its way to becoming a veritable success story. Cross-References ▶ Accountability ▶ Governance, Organizational ▶ Stiftung ZEWO ▶ Theories of Nonprofit Organization, Economic ▶ Transparency References/Further Readings Ortmann, A., & Schlesinger, M. (2003). Trust, repute, and the role of the nonprofit enterprise. In H. Anheier & A. Ben-Ner (Eds.), The study of the nonprofit enterprise New York: Kluwer/Plenum.(pp. 77–114). Ortmann, A., & Svitkova, K. (2007). Certification as a viable quality assurance mechanism in transition economies: Evidence, theory, and open questions. Prague Economic Papers, 16(2), 99–114. Ortmann, A., & Svitkova, K. (forthcoming). Does self-regulation work? Evidence and caveats informed by theory. In M. K. Gugerty & A. Prakash (Eds.), Nonprofit clubs: voluntary regulation of nonprofit and nongovernmental organizations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Van Broekhoven, R. (2008). Engaging donors’ trust. ICFO, from www.icfo.de International Co-operative Alliance (ICA) DAMIEN ROUSSELIERE Address of Organization 15, route des Morillons 1218 Grand-Saconnex Geneva Switzerland www.ica.coop Introduction The International Co-operative Alliance (ICA) is an independent, nongovernmental organization which ‘‘unites, represents and serves cooperatives worldwide.’’ Its members are national and international cooperative organizations in all sectors of activity (agriculture, banking, fisheries, health, housing, industry, insurance, tourism, and consumer cooperatives). Other organizations (controlled by cooperatives or promoted by the cooperative movement) can be admitted as associate members. In all, 221 member organizations from 87 countries represent more than 800 million individuals worldwide. The ICA flag, composed of the seven colors of the rainbow, was adopted in 1925 at the suggestion of Charles Gide. English, French, German, Russian, and Spanish are the official languages of the Alliance. Brief History After a first tentative effort in Paris in 1867 – the meeting was prohibited by the prefect of police – the successful attempt at an international alliance coincided with the setting up of national federations in England and France. It was encouraged by theorists, such as George Holyoake and Charles Gide, and by patricians, such as Edward Greening, Edward Vansittart Neale, and Emile de Boyve, who in 1886, at the Plymouth Congress, first suggested its formation. The ICA was created at the London Congress in 1895 with delegates coming from 13 national groups (Europe, Argentina, Australia, India, and the United States). Since its foundation, the ICA has met in Congress every two or three years, interrupted only by the two world wars, neither of which broke the unity of the Alliance. Because of an ideology characterized by political neutrality, it survived also the Cold War when other international movements such as the Socialist International and the World Federation of Trade Unions split. In 1982, the ICA moved from London to Geneva. In order International Co-operative Alliance (ICA) to face the challenges of globalization, the 1992 congress at Tokyo agreed a new decentralized structure based on the regions of Europe, Africa, Asia and the Pacific, and the Americas. I 887 of Cooperatives is celebrated in common on the first Saturday of July every year, since 1995. The theme for the celebration underscores the contribution of the movement to resolving global issues addressing both the Cooperative Movement and the UN. Mission/Objectives/Focus Areas The ICA’S main objectives are to promote ‘‘the world cooperative movement: to promote and protect cooperative values and principles; to facilitate the development of economic and other mutually beneficial relations between its member organizations.’’ With the definition of cooperative principles and the statement on cooperative identity, the ICA initiated debates and gave shape to the image of a worldwide cooperative movement. Three reviews were undertaken and presented to congresses in 1937, 1966, and 1995, which, based on the Rochdale principles, modernized the idea of cooperation, and tried to maintain its relevance. Structure and Governance The ICA is composed of one Head Office (in Geneva, Switzerland) and four Regional Offices (Belgium, India, Kenya, and Costa Rica). The ICA is organized as an association, a corporate body regulated by the Swiss Civil Code. Only the European Regional Office (Cooperatives Europe) has a separate legal entity. The ICA has nine specialized bodies which enable different types of cooperatives to organize around their own interests: agricultural, banking, consumer, fisheries, health, housing, tourism, insurance, and workers. There are also four thematic committees: communication, gender equality, human resource development, and research. Activities The collection and dissemination of information on all aspects of cooperative development, resources, and statistics is an important function of the ICA. Published since 1907, the Review of International Co-operation is the official journal of the ICA and presents discussion of issues that affect cooperatives around the world and a selection of research papers from the Annual International Co-operative Research Conference. In 2006, the first index of the world’s largest cooperatives, the ICA Global 300, was published in order to demonstrate the scale of the cooperative movement globally. With its consultative status accorded in 1946, the ICA was one of the first nongovernmental organizations officially recognized by the United Nations (UN). The fight against poverty, the preservation of international peace through the creation of decent work, and the economic development, linked with the improvement of living standards, represent the main points of collaboration between ICA, International Labour Office (ILO), and the UN. With them and other international institutions, the Committee for the Promotion and Advancement of Co-operatives (COPAC) was established in 1971. The ILO and the ICA have been working together since the 1920s to promote cooperatives, and have collaborated in the adoption of ILO Recommendation no 193 on the Promotion of the Cooperatives adopted in June 2002. A new campaign (Cooperating out of Poverty) follows the signing of a partnership agreement to promote decent work and reduce poverty through cooperatives in February 2004. First celebrated by the ICA in 1923, the ICA International Co-operative Day and the UN International Day Funding The ICA’s work is financed primarily through members’ contributions. The subscription formula is based on a universal basic rate, the number of members in a cooperative, and a regional weighting system (to take account of socioeconomic differences between countries). The Alliance reported total expenditures of more than CHF3.8 million for 2007. Accomplishments In 1995, a new set of cooperative principles was accepted, along with a statement of cooperative identity. Based on seven principles (voluntary and open membership; democratic member control; member economic participation; autonomy and independence; education, training and information; cooperation among cooperatives; concern for community) and six values (self-help, self-responsibility, democracy, equality, equity, and solidarity), the ICA defines a cooperative as ‘‘an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly-owned and democraticallycontrolled enterprise.’’ Cross-References ▶ Cooperatives and Employee Ownership ▶ Cooperatives, History and Theory of ▶ Desroche, Henri ▶ Gide, Charles ▶ Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers ▶ United Nations I 888 I International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) References/Further Readings Birchall, J. (1997). The international co-operative movement. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Emmanuel, J., & MacPherson, I. (Ed.) (2007). Co-operatives and the pursuit of peace. Victoria: New Rochdale Press. Rhodes, R. (1995). The international co-operative alliance during war and peace 1910–1950. Geneva: International Co-operative Alliance. coordination fora. As an advocacy alliance for humanitarian action, ICVA assists its members to increase the quality, accountability, and visibility of their work by finding ways to ensure local engagement in international response mechanisms. Activities International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) EVELYNE SCHMID Address of Organization 26-28 Avenue Giuseppe Motta 1202 Geneva Switzerland www.icva.ch Introduction The International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) is a global network for humanitarian policy and advocacy. In particular, ICVA supports the work of its member agencies in influencing national and international policies, advocating for the protection of refugees and displaced persons, and coordinating humanitarian response, as well as representing the humanitarian perspectives of NGOs vis-à-vis governments and international agencies. Brief History ICVA is one of the oldest global NGO alliances. It was founded on 6 March 1962 as a merger of three existing NGO networks: the Conference of Nongovernmental Organizations Interested in Migration; the Standing Conference of Voluntary Organizations Working for Refugees; and the International Committee for World Refugee Year. These organizations decided to broaden the focus to the humanitarian, social, and development spheres. In 1997, ICVA’s finances and functions were restructured and now focus on humanitarian and forced displacement issues. Over the years, membership has increased to over 75 nongovernmental, nonprofit agencies. To achieve its mission, ICVA engages in informationsharing, advocacy, representation of its members and of crisis-affected populations at international fora and humanitarian reform projects. In addition, ICVA participates in the Global Humanitarian Platform, a forum bringing together NGOs, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and the United Nations. It is also involved in the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, the main mechanism for the coordination of humanitarian assistance among UN agencies established by the United Nations General Assembly. Structure and Governance ICVA is an association under Swiss Law. A General Assembly of members is responsible for the strategic formulation and review of programs and for the election of an Executive Committee. The Secretariat is based in Geneva. Funding ICVA is financed through income from its membership (approximately $270,000 in 2007) and from institutional and government donors. Total expenditures for core costs amounted to approx. $635,000 in 2007. Accomplishments In 1963, ICVA was awarded the Nansen Medal. The award recognizes outstanding contributions to alleviate the suffering of refugees. It is named after Fridtjof Nansen, the explorer and scientist who was the first High Commissioner for Refugees at the League of Nations. Cross-References ▶ Coalitions and Networks ▶ Federations, Nonprofit ▶ Human Rights ▶ INGOs ▶ International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement ▶ NGOs and Humanitarian Assistance Mission References/Further Readings ICVA attempts to bring the experience and views of members at the field level to international policy and ICVA (2007). Annual Report 2007, from http://www.icva.ch/doc00003053. pdf; 11/17/2008 International NGO Training and Research Centre International NGO Training and Research Centre CLAUDIA BODE-HARLASS Address of Organization Oxbridge Court Osney Mead Oxford, OX2 0ES UK www.intrac.org Introduction The International NGO Training and Research Centre (INTRAC) describes itself as a ‘‘non-profit organisation working in the international development and relief sector.’’ According to the organization it is an ‘‘independent commentator, innovator and partner’’ to nongovernmental and civil society organizations around the globe. Brief History INTRAC was established in 1991 with the aim of providing management training and research services for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) working in the development sector. While initially the organization was focusing on northern based NGOs, it has continuously expanded its range to include organizations based in southern and eastern countries as well. Mission INTRAC is dedicated to strengthening civil society organizations (CSOs) around the world in order to help them to achieve developmental goals such as the establishment of sustainable livelihoods and just societies. The organization believes that the creation of democratic societies depends on an active civil society which can hold its governments accountable and introduce new and innovative views, strategies, and actions. In order to fulfill these tasks, INTRAC’s aim is to improve the organizational effectiveness and program performance of NGOs and CSOs. Activities INTRAC uses a variety of different methods to strengthen CSOs, linking academic knowledge and analysis with practical work while in all cases following the participatory approach. The organization conducts for example research on global development trends and practices leading to the publication of a number of books, I 889 papers, and policy briefs. Furthermore, it provides consultancy services for NGOs and CSOs which includes organizational capacity building and special training courses. Besides, INTRAC provides an international platform for NGOs and CSOs in the development sector bringing together people from all over the world in its annual conferences. The organization’s work in all fields and countries can be reviewed in its annual reports. Structure and Governance INTRAC is a registered UK charity based in Oxford. Its 20 permanent staff members are supported by a number of associates and consultants working on a project basis. The organization is governed by a board of trustees which is headed by the Executive Director. I Funding The total budget of the year 2007 was £2.2 million, showing an increase of almost half a million pounds since 2006. INTRAC is funded by a variety of nongovernmental and religious organizations working in the development field such as Save the Children Sweden, Christian Aid or Concern Worldwide. But its donors also include a number of governmental agencies including the international development agencies of Sweden, Denmark, Canada, and Norway as well as the Dutch Foreign Ministry. Accomplishments The organization is distributing a monthly electronic newsletter to more than 7,000 subscribers all around the world. Its more extensive newsletter ‘‘ontrac’’ which is focusing on the analysis of development trends is published three times a year not only in English but also in French, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish, Chinese, and Arabic. Cross-References ▶ NGOs and Socio-Economic Development ▶ Nongovernmental Organizations, Definition and History References/Further Readings Bakewell, O., James, R., Hailey, J., Lipson, B., & Hunt, M. (2008). Praxis series collection -3 books: Sharpening the development process/capacity building for NGOs/capacity building framework. Oxford: INTRAC. Brehm, V. M. (2004). Autonomy or dependence? North – South NGO partnerships (INTRAC Briefing Paper No. 6). Oxford: INTRAC. Pratt, B. (Ed.) (2003). Changing expectations? The concept and practice of civil society in international development (INTRAC NGO Management & Policy Series No. 16). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 890 I International Organization for Standardization (ISO) International Organization for Standardization (ISO) CHRISTOPHER KAAN Address of Organization 1, ch. de la Voie-Creuse Case postale 56 CH-1211 Geneva 20 Switzerland www.iso.org Introduction The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) is an international organization which creates and fosters standards for goods and management systems. While ISO is formally a nongovernmental organization (NGO), it has governmental institutions among its members, and some of the private organizations have strong governmental ties. Brief History ISO was founded in 1946 during a Conference in London by the unification of two predecessors: the International Federation of the National Standardizing Associations, which was established in New York in 1926 and administered from Switzerland, and the United Nations Standards Coordinating Committee, established only in 1944 and administered in London. Despite the different order of words in the long version, the organization decided to use the abbreviation ISO for its name. This refers to the Greek term ‘‘isos,’’ meaning equal or identical. Since its beginning the ISO has slowly grown to one of the most important standard-setters in industry and services throughout the world. Especially the shift away from product standards to more comprehensive management standards has increased the outreach and impact of the organization tremendously. Mission The mission of ISO is the creation of international standards for industry and other business. The ISO administers a variety of standards, ranging from product standards in great diversity over process standards up to management system standards. Activities The major activity of ISO is creation and negotiation of international standards. For each standard, the ISO assembles a Technical Committee (TC) consisting of about 50 representatives to pursue the drafting process. The TCs are then supported by subcommittees and Working Groups where the majority of the discussions take place. ISO standards are nonbinding rules, but they have become increasingly relevant for intra-industry trade. Especially the management system standards for the quality management (ISO 9000) or for environmental management (ISO 14001) have reached a nearly obligatory status for suppliers and subcontractors. Structure and Governance The ISO is a membership organization which is composed by the national standard-setting bodies. Each country is represented by one standard-setting body. These bodies vary in their nature: while in developing countries they tend to be public institutions like ministries or agencies, they tend to be private organizations like business associations in developed countries. Major strategic decisions in ISO like final adoption of a standard are taken by the General Assembly in which all members are represented and which meets once a year. It also elects the ISO Council, which represents the members between sessions and which drafts the proposals for the decision-making process. ISO has an international secretariat headed by a Secretary-General in Geneva. Funding The work of ISO is financed by two different sources. First, the member organizations have to pay a subscription fee which serves to finance the International Secretariat. The work of the TCs is funded differently. For each TC, the ISO searches for a hosting organization (usually one of the member organizations). These organizers need to pay all the costs to uphold the operations of the respective committee, e.g., costs of the meetings, travel costs for participants, management costs and many more. Major Accomplishments The major accomplishment of the ISO is the acceptance of its standards all over the world. In many countries ISO norms are being adopted by standard-setting bodies, either in whole scale or in part. Furthermore, some ISO standards are now recognized by the World Trade Organization as legitimate public standards and guidelines. Critics point to this quasi-public acceptance as a major problem of ISO. Because of the private nature of the organization and the low participation of civil society organizations, they deny any democratic nature of this process. Furthermore, other criticism declares that developing countries lack the capacity to participate on the same level as the developed countries and ISO standards thereby have a strong northern bias. International Planned Parenthood Federation I Cross-References Mission ▶ INGOs ▶ Legitimacy ▶ World Trade Organization The IPPF works to ensure that everyone has the right to ‘‘access good sexual and reproductive health care and services.’’ The federation believes that such rights must be recognised as universal human rights. The IPPF works for gender equality and the elimination of gender biases which often put women at risk. It promotes choices for individuals and encourages them to take control of their sexual and reproductive health. References/Further Readings Clapp, J. (1998). The privatization of global environmental governance: ISO 14000 and the developing world. Global Governance, 4, 295–316. Murphy, C., & Yates, J., (2008). ISO, the International Organization for Standardization: Global governance through voluntary consensus. London/New York: Routledge. Raines, S. S. (2001). Perceptions of legitimacy and efficacy of International Environmental Standards: The impact of the participation gap. Global Environmental Politics, 3(3), 47–73. International Planned Parenthood Federation REBECCA DIBB Address of Organization 4 Newhams Row London SE1 3UZ UK www.ippf.org Introduction The International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), through its worldwide movement in 180 countries, advocates for sexual and reproductive health rights for all and provides services to individuals and communities. 891 Activities According to the IPPF, ‘‘approximately 32 million visits a year are made to over 58,000 IPPF facilities worldwide.’’ Their services include ‘‘counseling, gynecological care, HIV-related services, diagnosis and treatment of sexually transmitted infections, infertility services, mother and child health, emergency contraception and abortionrelated services.’’ The federation’s 10-year strategic framework plan 2005–2015 established the ‘‘five As’’ which outlines five priority work areas– Adolescents/young people, HIV/AIDS, Abortion, Access, and Advocacy. The IPPF designs tool-kits and guides on best ways to work and provide services on sexual and reproductive health issues. Structure and Governance The IPPF’s highest policy-making body is the Governing Council, comprising of 30 members, which meets twice a year. The IPPF has 152 member associations across the world which must meet the federation’s 65 membership standards. The federation has six regional offices in Africa (Nairobi, Kenya), Arab World (Tunis, Tunisia), Europe (Brussels, Belgium), South Asia (New Delhi, India), East, South-East Asia and Oceania (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia) and the Western Hemisphere (New York, USA). The IPPF works through a set of global indicators to ensure that the federation can measure their performance ‘‘against the strategic framework.’’ Brief History Funding The powerful campaign that women had the right to control their own fertility, as promoted by Elise Ottesen-Jensen from Sweden and Dhanvanti Ramu Rau from India, among other women, triggered the formation of the IPPF in 1952 at the Third International Conference on Planned Parenthood in Bombay, India. The federation initially worked on a very small budget before it began expanding alongside the increasing recognition of the importance of family planning and reproductive health. Sweden was the first country to give the IPPF a government grant in 1966 and in 1981 the first major world conference on family planning was sponsored by key stakeholders – IPPF, UNFPA, and the Population Council. According to the IPPF’s 2007 financial statements ‘‘the overall income received by IPPF in 2007 was US$120.6 million.’’ The majority of the IPPF’s funding is from government sources, but funding also comes from the private sector, the European Commission and the United Nations ‘‘in particular UNFPA and UNAIDS.’’ In 2007, the IPPF’s ‘‘overall expenditure was US$101.8 million.’’ Major Accomplishments The IPPF can be seen as the strongest advocate for sexual and reproductive health and rights globally. It has an important voice internationally and the IPPF has consultative status with the United Nations (UN) and I 892 I International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement participative status in the Council of Europe. The federation has been actively involved in following up on the Programme of Action after the landmark International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) held in 1994 in Cairo. The IPPF lists some of its key achievements in 2007/2008 as providing over 15 million sexual and reproductive health services to young people, Member Associations providing over 650,000 abortion-related services and nearly 3.3 million HIV-related services. Cross-References ▶ Federations, Nonprofit ▶ Human Rights ▶ INGOs ▶ United Nations References/Further Readings Frances, D. (1973). The IPPF: 21 years of achievement. Journal of Biosocial Science, 5(4), 413–419. International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement PATSY KRAEGER Address of Organization The International Committee of the Red Cross 19 avenue de la Paix CH 1202, Geneva Switzerland www.icrc.org The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies Chemin des Crêts, 17 Petit-Saconnex, CH 1211, Geneva Switzerland www.ifrc.org Movement Website www.redcross.int Introduction The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement incorporates the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies as well as the 186 national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies with 97 million volunteers, staff, and supporters. Brief History The idea for the Movement came about as a result of a bloody battle, the Battle of Solferino, Italy in 1859. In 1863, the international committee for the relief of military wounded was established and, in 1876 was renamed the International Committee for the Red Cross. In 1864, a Geneva Convention was established for the treatment of wounded armies in the field. Between 1899 and 1949, additional Geneva conventions and protocols were established as well as several Hague Conventions regarding the treatment of military wounded in the field. In 1965, the ICRC developed a Proclamation of the Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and in 1986, statutes for the ICRC and the Federation were developed. Since 1989, the movement has focused on conventions regarding the rights of children, weapons of mass destruction, to agreements on the organization of the movement as well as issues surrounding the creation of the International Criminal Court. In 2006, the movement adopted a third emblem in addition to the red cross and red crescent. Mission The mission of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement is ‘‘to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found, to protect life and health, and ensure respect for the human being, in particular in times of armed conflict and other emergencies, to work for the prevention of disease and for the promotion of health and social welfare, to encourage voluntary service and a constant readiness to give help by the members of the Movement, and a universal sense of solidarity towards all those in need of its protection and assistance.’’ In pursuing its mission, the Movement shall be guided by its fundamental principles: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and, universality. Activities The movement operates through agreed upon principles of cooperation ‘‘to ensure a concerted, rational and rapid humanitarian response to the needs of the victims of armed conflict or any other situation of internal violence.’’ The ICRC structures the cooperation between itself, the Federation and the 186 national societies in four areas. Operational cooperation covers such activities as health care, first aid, transporting war casualties, food distribution and restoring family links. The ICRC also coordinates the movement’s activities in order to maximize its mandates and skill sets. There is cooperation on national capacity building where the ICRC shares its expertise on international humanitarian law, emergency aid and health care with the national societies. Finally, the ICRC International Society for Third-Sector Research (ISTR) leads the design and implementation of policies for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. Structure and Governance The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies together constitute the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. The ICRC, the Federation and the National Societies are independent bodies. Each has its own individual status and exercises no authority over the others. In conflict situations, the ICRC will take the lead and direct the role of its partner societies pursuant to the 1997 Seville Agreement. The bodies of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement are the International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, the Council of Delegates of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and the Standing Commission of the Red Cross and Red Crescent. Funding The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement bodies are separately funded. The ICRC and the Federation receive funding from government, corporate, and individual giving and the Federation also receives membership dues. The 186 national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies may receive funding from the ICRC and the Federation, as well as other public funding from governments, corporations, foundations, and individuals. In 2005, the ICRC budget was approximately 970 million Swiss Francs. The Federation is projecting expenses of $260 million for 2009 and 2010. Major Accomplishments Among its other achievements, Henry Dunant, the founder of the Red Cross won the first Nobel Peace Prize in 1901. The International Committee for the Red Cross subsequently won the prize again in 1917 and 1944 due to its humanitarian efforts during both world wars. And in 1963, the ICRC and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies won the Nobel Peace Prize on the occasion of the Movement’s 100th anniversary. Cross-References ▶ Dunant, Henry ▶ INGOs ▶ QUANGOs References/Further Readings Borton, J. (2007). Recent trends in the International Relief System. Disasters, 17(3), 187–201. I 893 Hutchinson, J. F. (1996). Champions of caring. Boulder, CO: Westview. Lavoyer, J. P. (1995). Refugees and internally displaced persons: International humanitarian law and the role of the ICRC. International Review of the Red Cross, 305, 162–180. Reychler, L., & Paffenholz, T. (2001). Peacebuilding: A field guide. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. International Society for Third-Sector Research (ISTR) ELIZABETH LEVI Address of Organization 559 Wyman Park Building 3400 N. Charles Street Baltimore, MD 21218-2688 USA www.istr.org Introduction The International Society for Third-Sector Research (ISTR) is an international association registered as a nonprofit organization in the United States. ISTR is dedicated to promoting research and education in and about civil society, philanthropy, and the nongovernmental sector. ISTR brings together scholars and others to exchange and advance knowledge on a global as well as local level about the third sector, human well being and international development. As of 2008, ISTR was comprised of 748 members from around the world. Brief History The International Society for Third Sector Research (ISTR) was founded in 1992, and from its establishment, has been housed in the Johns Hopkins University Institute for Policy Studies. ISTR also became the home of the scholarly journal, Voluntas: the International Journal of Voluntary and Non-Profit Organizations, which had been established 2 years earlier in England. Mission/Objectives/Focus Areas ISTR describes its mission as striving to ‘‘promote the development of high quality research and education internationally on Third Sector related issues, theories, and policies; and to enhance the dissemination and application of knowledge about the Third Sector as widely as possible throughout the world.’’ ISTR is I 894 I International Trade Union Confederation committed to engaging researchers across the globe, welcoming those from all academic disciplines, with an emphasis on increasing the number of Third Sector research practitioners in Central and Eastern Europe and in developing nations. in global civil society and the corresponding growth in scope and breadth of third sector research. ISTR’s gatherings and publications serve to support high quality research as third sector scholars work to create and make new knowledge available and accessible to the field. Activities Cross-References ISTR publishes the interdisciplinary research and policy journal, Voluntas, four times a year offering scholarly theory, empirical studies and critical commentary. Every two years, ISTR convenes a major conference in a different country to bring members and colleagues in the field together to expand knowledge and new research about the third sector. ISTR also convenes Regional Network meetings for more locally focused researchers to gather to pursue high level discussion of region-specific issues. A quarterly newsletter keeps members updated on new developments, publications and research initiatives. ISTR also publishes occasional reports, which focus on regional or thematic issues in the third sector. ▶ Professional Associations ▶ Third Sector References/Further Readings Hodgkinson, V., & Painter, A. (2003). Third sector research in international perspective: The role of ISTR. Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 14(1), 1–14. Salamon, L. M. (1994). The rise of the nonprofit sector. Foreign Affairs, 73(4), 109–122. Salamon, L. M., & Anheier, H. K. (1998). Social origins of civil society: Explaining the nonprofit sector cross-nationally. Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 9(3), 213–248. Structure and Governance ISTR is managed through a central secretariat, staffed by the Executive Director, Margery Daniels, and a Program Assistant. An international board of 15 scholars and research professionals governs ISTR, complemented by three ex officio members, including the past president, the Editor of Voluntas, and the liaison to Johns Hopkins University, the host institution for ISTR. International Trade Union Confederation FLORIAN REHLI Address of Organization Funding The 2006 Annual Report records the annual operating budget as $379,000. Just over half of funding support for operations is derived from grant revenue, with about one quarter of the funding generated through institutional grants for support of the annual ISTR conference. Additional funding is generated by membership dues, conference fees, and publications. Accomplishments/Contributions In its early years, ISTR’s journal and conference themes reflected the importance of defining the growing third sector among ISTR’s international constituents of researchers and practitioners, particularly for those from developing countries with a less clearly established nongovernmental sphere of activity and accompanying scholarship. ISTR convened the 2008 ISTR biennial conference in Barcelona, Spain, which drew its largest audience to date: over 600 participants from over 60 countries. The conference theme, ‘‘The Third Sector and Sustainable Social Change: New Frontiers for Research’’ reflects new challenges Boulevard du Roi Albert II no: 5, Bte 1 1210 Brussels Belgium www.ituc-csi.org Introduction The International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) is by far the world’s largest and most important trade union federation. Currently it represents 168 million workers in 155 countries and territories and has 311 national affiliates. Brief History The ITUC was formed on 1 November 2006 when the former World Confederation of Labor (WCL) and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) merged. The Founding Congress of the ITUC was held in Vienna and was preceded by the dissolution congresses of both the WCL and the ICFTU. Before, the history of international trade unionism had been marked by long periods of division and adversity. Islamic Relief Mission The ITUC’s primary mission is the worldwide promotion and defense of workers’ rights and interests. In its constitution, the ITUC states that it exists to unite and mobilize the democratic and independent forces of world trade unionism in giving effective representation to working people, wherever they work and in whatever conditions. In this regard, it strives in particular for the universal respect of fundamental rights at work and the strengthening of the rights of women, migrant workers, young people and disabled people at the workplace. Activities To pursue its mission, the ITUC pursues a multilevel strategy combining international cooperation between trade unions, global campaigning, and advocacy with the major global institutions. On the national level, the ITUC supports trade union movements through the coordinated provision of international development assistance to strengthen capacities and membership. On the international level, the ITUC works closely together with the International Labor Office, other specialist agencies of the United Nations and other international trade union movements to strengthen worker’s rights and the representation of workers in the informal and formal economy. In its ‘‘Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights,’’ the ITUC gives an overview of trade union rights and major violations of these rights all over the world. Structure and Governance The regional organizations of the ITUC are the Asia-Pacific Regional Organization (ITUC-AP), the African Regional Organization (ITUC-AF) and the American Regional Organization (TUCA). In Europe, the ITUC cooperates closely with the European Trade Union Confederation. The ITUC currently has 311 national affiliates. Its member organizations are required to be independent of outside influence and to have a democratic structure. The Congress of the ITUC consists of delegates representing the member organizations and elects a General Council and a General Secretary. While the General Council directs the activities of the ITUC and establishes the annual budget, the General Secretary is the representative and spokesperson of the ITUC and leads the Secretariat. Funding The activities of the ITUC are primarily financed by annual affiliation fees which depend on the number of members of the member organizations. The General Secretary may also organize fundraising campaigns for defined I 895 purposes and apply for financing from private and public sources such as the European Union Commission. Accomplishments Given the short history of the ITUC, it is too early to identify major accomplishments. Nevertheless, the fact that the major global trade union federations now try to work together regardless of ideological and sociopolitical orientations is a promising sign. Researchers and politicians agree on the necessity of a globalized union movement to effectively promote worker’s rights in the twenty-first century. Cross-References ▶ Federations, Nonprofit ▶ Freedom of Association ▶ Labor Movements/Labor Unions References/Further Readings Carew, A. et al. (Eds.) (2000). The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. Bern, Switzerland: Russell Lang. ITUC (2006). Constitution and standing orders. Brussels: International Trade Union Confederation, from http://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/ Const-ENG-W.pdf, 5/12/2008 ITUC (2008). Annual survey of violations of trade union rights 2008, from http://survey08.ituc-csi.org/survey.php?IDContinent=0&Lang=EN, 5/12/2008 INTRAC ▶ International NGO Training and Research Centre Islamic Relief ELIZABETH LEVI Address of Organization 19 Rea St South Digbeth Birmingham, B5 6LB UK www.islamic-relief.com Introduction Islamic Relief Worldwide (IR) describes itself as ‘‘an international relief and development charity’’ which strives to I 896 I Islamic Relief alleviate suffering of the poorest people across the globe. For 25 years, Islamic Relief Worldwide has operated as an independent nongovernmental organization, headquartered in the United Kingdom, from which it delivers programs and coordinates with partners and field offices around the world to respond to disasters and emergencies. Islamic Relief Worldwide also supports sustainable economic and social development in communities in need across the world, providing its services on a nonsectarian basis. through community-based capacity-building. Caring for orphans and children in need takes the form of protecting basic rights of children through education, health, social welfare and shelter programs, and includes IR’s wellestablished orphan sponsorship program. Campaigning and advocacy activities are achieved through partnerships with international NGOs to address global poverty and increasing awareness of the humanitarian Islamic values of Islamic Relief while maintaining an inclusive approach in all IR endeavors. Brief History Structure and Governance Islamic Relief (IR) was established in Birmingham, United Kingdom, in 1984. Dr. Hany Abdel Gawad El-Banna was a physician who attended a medical conference in the Sudan in 1983. Dr. Hany was moved by the devastation of the famine he observed there and returned to the UK to create IR to assist people in poverty. Since that time, Islamic Relief has grown to expand its offices and operations worldwide, continuing disaster relief, and broadening its focus on humanitarian aid in medical, social, and educational spheres. Islamic Relief Worldwide is a global organization, headquartered in the UK, where it is governed by a seven-member Board of Trustees, chaired by Dr. Essam A El Haddad. A six-member Executive Committee of professionals guides the day to day operations of the organization, led by Saleh Saeed, who became Chief Executive Officer in 2008. The worldwide headquarters coordinates two groups of partner organizations. The first is Islamic Relief Partners, which function as separate legal entities under their own jurisdiction of fundraising and local activities. The second group is comprised of over 20 Islamic Relief affiliated implementing partners, which are locally registered NGOs, working through field offices to provide programs on the ground, integrating with IR Worldwide headquarters through formal reporting and monitoring structures. There is over 100 staff working in the Birmingham headquarters that support over 1,500 staff and volunteers in over 30 countries where IR conducts programs. In addition, IR operates a subsidiary clothes recycling business with 50 employees in Birmingham, UK. Mission/Objectives/Focus Areas In its 2007 Annual Report, Islamic Relief Worldwide affirms its vision of a ‘‘caring world where the basic requirements of people in need are affirmed.’’ This is accomplished through its mission, ‘‘inspired by Islamic values’’ to assist in the development of ‘‘safe and caring communities; help the poor to enjoy self-reliance with dignity; and to make it possible for those who wish to support others to reach people in need of their help.’’ Islamic Relief strives to achieve these overarching aims by providing help without bias, mitigating the impact of disasters through relief and rehabilitation, and promoting sustainable development, while advocating for the poor, aligning efforts to support achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. Activities In addition to its response to disaster and emergency response, Islamic Relief Worldwide conducts humanitarian programming in six sectors. Education activities focus on long term development emphasizing access to formal and vocational learning opportunities. Providing access to health and water activities is conducted with a focus on awareness and training, particularly of mothers and children, and providing sustainable water and sanitation facilities. Promoting sustainable livelihoods is conducted Funding The Islamic Relief Worldwide 2007 Annual Report records charitable expenditures of £31.7 million, with the majority of funding support distributed in the form of emergency relief (36%), leading seven other funding areas of education, hunger alleviation, education, employment, health, water and sanitation, child and orphan welfare, and advocacy. Revenues are generated primarily through donations (close to 60%); 12 overseas funding partners (23%); and grants from institutional funders (18%). Major Accomplishments/Contributions In 1984, Queen Elizabeth II honored Islamic Relief founder Dr. Hany El-Banna for exceptional achievement and service ISTR with the Order of the British Empire. Among the accomplishments highlighted in the 2007 Annual Report were responses to natural disasters in Pakistan and Bangladesh by providing rescue, emergency food, medical care and temporary shelter. In Chad and Darfur, where long term conflict endures, IR provided emergency relief, shelter, water, sanitation, health, and education services in refugee camps, with an emphasis on maternal and child healthcare. In the politically destabilized and war torn regions of Somalia and Iraq, IR provided clean water, emergency food and shelter rations. I 897 References/Further Readings Benthall, J., & Bellion-Jourdan, J. (2003). The charitable crescent: Politics of aid in the Muslim world. London: I.B. Tauris. Ghandour, A.-R. (2004). The modern missionaries of Islam. In F. Weissman (Ed.), In the shadow of ‘‘Just Wars’’: Violence, politics, and humanitarian action, by Medecins San Frontiers. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. ISO ▶ International Organization for Standardization (ISO) Cross-References ▶ Faith-Based Organizations ▶ INGOs ▶ NGOs and Humanitarian Assistance ▶ Philanthropy and Religion, Islam ISTR ▶ International Society for Third-Sector Research (ISTR) I