S. Florea
The Role of NGOs in Post-Conflict
reconstruction: A Partnership with the
United Nations
Simona FLOREA
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ABSTRACT
The increasing amount of internal conflicts has put a pressure on the international community
to find more efficient ways of dealing with their devastating effects. In these regards, the UN
has come to recognize the importance played by Non-Governmental Organizations and Civil
Society Organizations as operational bodies.
The purpose of this research is to define the role of NGOs in post-conflict reconstruction. This
definition encompasses the description of different post-conflict phases, the issues arising in
these areas as well as the reasons behind them.
The study is based on the following statement of purpose: the role of NGOs in the field of
international intervention has proven to be quintessential for successful reconstruction of
war-torn societies.
The nature of internal conflicts and their effects, the international community as well as its
aim and issues faced in reconstruction are addressed. Concepts related to reconstruction are
defined and distinguished form one another.
The role of NGOs in post-conflict reconstruction and their relationship to UN funds and
specialized agencies are discusses and analyzes. The strengths and weaknesses of NGOs are
presented and analyzed.
The last part of the study addresses the conflict in the Province of Kosovo demonstrate the
relationship between theories and practice. Kosovo is described and used as a case study
showing that the main characteristics identified in the first part can be found and applied to
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present reconstruction efforts in post-conflict states. The reconstruction process and the
obstacles met by the UN bodies and NGOs are addressed.
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TABLE of CONTENTS
Introduction
4
Methodology
6
Research results and conclusion
9
Research parameters
9
1. New type of wars faced by the international community
12
1.1. Conflicts of the 1990’s
12
1.2. The international community
15
1.2.1. The United Nations
15
1.2.2. UN specialized agencies
18
1.2.3. The NGO community
19
2. Post-conflict reconstruction: where does it start?
22
2.1. The transitional phase
25
2.1.2. Gaps within the transitional phase
28
2.2. The reconstruction phase
30
2.2.1. Reconstituting legitimacy of the government
31
2.2.2. Re-establishing security
32
2.2.3. Rebuilding effectiveness
32
2.3. Issues in reconstruction
33
2.3.1. Elections: Issues and Importance
35
2.3.2. Implementation of the rule of law
36
3. NGOs in post-conflict reconstruction
38
3.1 History
38
3.2 The NGO-UN relationship
39
3.3 The strengths of NGOs
41
3.4 The weaknesses of NGOs
46
3.4.1 NGOs and governments
47
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3.4.2 NGOs and resource distribution
48
3.4.3 NGOs and funding
49
4. Conclusion
52
5. Recommendations
54
ANNEX: Country study- Kosovo
57
1. Introduction
58
2. Background
58
2.1. The Kosovo conflict
60
3. Reconstruction developments in Kosovo
61
3.1. Reconstituting legitimacy of a governing body
62
3.1.2. Elections and Power Sharing
62
3.1.3. Development of the Civil Society
64
3.2. Re-establishing security
65
3.2.1. Reconstruction of homes and job generation
67
3.3. Rebuilding effectiveness
68
3.4. Issues in reconstruction
70
3.4.1 Gaps within the transitional phase in Kosovo
71
4. NGOs in Kosovo
73
4.1. Service provision
75
5. Conclusion
77
Bibliography
79
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INTRODUCTION
The aim of this study is to define the role of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in
post-conflict reconstruction. This definition encompasses the description of different postconflict phases, the issues arising in these areas as well as the reasons behind them.
The thesis is based on the following statement of purpose: the role of NGOs in the field of
international intervention has proven to be quintessential for successful reconstruction of
war-torn societies. The obstacles related to the work of NGOs in post-conflict reconstruction
need to be dealt with. Additionally the relationship between NGOs and UN agencies needs to
be strengthened. These tasks need to be accomplished in order for the international
community to attain successful results in the field.
The study first introduces the new type of wars and conflicts and their effects on various
societies. Secondly, the international community is briefly presented as well as its aim in
reconstruction. In order to provide a clear understanding of the reconstruction phase and the
issues faced by the international community, concepts related to reconstruction will be
defined and distinguished form one another.
The second part of the study deals with the reconstruction phase and issues faced by the UN
and NGOs in achieving their goals.
The third section discusses and analyzes the role of NGOs in post-conflict reconstruction and
their relationship to UN funds and specialized agencies. Furthermore the strengths and
weaknesses of NGOs are presented and analyzed.
The fourth section includes broad recommendations for the NGOs and UN agencies active in
post-conflict reconstruction.
The last part of the study presents the conflict in the Province of Kosovo. Kosovo is described
and used as a case study in order to provide a lucid picture as well as to show that the main
characteristics identified in the first part can be found and applied to present reconstruction
efforts in post-conflict states. Lastly, it discusses the reconstruction process and the obstacles
met by the UN bodies and NGOs as well as their weak cooperation and the recognition of the
need to strengthen their relationship.
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METHODOLOGY
This study is benefited from research conducted during a three-month internship with the
World Health Organization (WHO) at three different locations namely New York, Belgrade
and Pristina (Kosovo). The major part of the study is however based on research carried out in
Geneva.
The persons interviewed include United Nations staff members working in different
specialized agencies, such as WHO, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), United
Nations Development Group (UNDG) and staff members of different Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs) based in Geneva. The NGOs include the World Vision, Quaker UN
and World Young Women’s Christian Association (YWCA). The selection of these persons
was based on the advice of my supervisors. The interviews carried out in Geneva were
established through networking. The selection of persons interviewed in Geneva was mainly
based on the NGO oriented focus of research.
List of persons interviewed:
Ardita Tahirukaj- Health promoting Schools Adviser, WHO Pristina
Burbuque Dobranja- Public Information Officer, UNDP, Kosovo
Claudia Seymour- UNICEF, UNDG/ECHA, New York and Liberia
Conor Lyons- Coordinator of the UN Volunteer Programme, UNDP, Kosovo
Daniel Perez- NGO SECTION/DESA, New York
Deirdre Keogh- Programme Analyst, UNDP, Kosovo
Gerry McWeeney- Healthy Environment Programme Manager, WHO Pristina
Luigi Migliorini M.D.- Head of Office, WHO Belgrade
Mark Bowden- Senior Coordinator of UNDG, New York
Mark-Andre Dorel –ECOSOC, (specialized on transitional countries in Africa), New York
Michelle Federoff- Deputy of Head of Office, NGO SECTION/DESA, New York
Mytaher Haskuka- National Programme Analyst, UNDP, Kosovo
Dr. Melita Vujnovic- Liaison Officer, WHO Belgrade
Dr. Richard Alderslade- Senior External Relations Officer on Health Policy, WHO New
York
Dr. Serap Sener- Head of Office, WHO Prisitina
Sofia Carrondo- Deputy Resident Representative, UNDP Pristina
Musimby R.A. Kanyoro- General Secretary, World YWCA Geneva
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David Atwood- Quaker UN
Tom Getman- World Vision
The collection of data consists of interviews with the UN and NGO staff members, attendance
at UN meetings and teleconferences, online and telephone discussions. The interviews were
not structured with open-ended questions with the purpose of not constraining the
interviewees. The interviews were not recorded as was advised and also due to the risk of
diminishing the quality of information received. The notes were transcribed and analyzed.
The length of the interviews varied from forty-five minutes to an hour and fifteen minutes.
The interviews were produced to fit the context and the knowledge of the interviewee based
on their position and expertise.
In regards to the transition and reconstruction in Kosovo the following questions were asked:
1. What kind of transition is the one taking place in Kosovo?
2. When did Kosovo enter the transition phase?
3. What were the events that determined the beginning of the transition phase?
4. When did the initiation of reconstruction activities take place?
5. Which are the predominant types of activities (i.e. emergency/reconstruction or both)
in the transition phase in Kosovo?
6. What are the main problems faced in the transition period in Kosovo?
7. What types of gaps can be identified in the field of transitional work in Kosovo?
8. Which are the major INGOs and local NGOs in the field of transition in Kosovo?
9. One of the frequently arising issues in the field of transitional work is the lack of
cooperation and coordination amongst the actors involved. How is the present
situation in Kosovo?
10. Lack of funding for the reconstruction activities is another main issue arising the
transitional field. How is the funding situation in Kosovo?
11. From the ‘lessons learned’ in the post-conflict transitional states ‘Country Studies’, the
lack of a common vision of the end-state and shared goals were identified to be
imperative for a successful transitional response. Might one say this is achieved?
12. Which are the main donors in the transitional field of work in Kosovo?
13. Which are the most funded activities?
14. Which are the less funded activities?
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Interview with World YWCA, Quaker UN
1. What would you say are the strengths of NGOs?
2. Their weaknesses have been criticized by many could you counter some of the main
criticisms against NGOs?
3. What can easier be accomplished by NGOs in comparison to the UN? Could you give
some examples?
4. What would you say is the role of NGOs in post-conflict reconstruction?
5. Are NGOs implicated in the organizations and supervision of elections in post-conflict
states? If Yes- How? Why?
6. What complications do NGOs face when working with the UN?
7. What and how could it be improved?
While interviewing staff at the World Vision the following questions were added to the above
ones.
1. What implications have you experienced when working with the UN?
2. What would you say are the most common problems faced by NGOs in post-conflict
reconstruction?
3. Has the World Vision carried out any activities in Kosovo that you are familiar with?
In addition to the initial questions a series of “why?”, “give some more examples”, what is
your personal experience?” were added.
The secondary data was obtained through literature, unpublished literature, also called “grey”
literature consisting of UN and NGO internal reports and documents, the UN intranet,
publications received from the NGO Liaison Services (NGLS) the Internet and newspaper
articles. Most of the used internal documents and reports were recommended and/or given by
the supervisors, other UN staff members or by the interviewees.
The analysis of data was based on the interviews and secondary data obtained throughout the
research. This was done by a comparison between the interviews and secondary data.
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Research results and conclusion
In transitional post-conflict states the main issues faced by the international actors are those
concerning coordination and cooperation and a lack of clarity in the definition of the
transitional phase thereby resulting in lack of donor funding as well as a negative impact on
reconstruction. The role played by NGOs has increased in term of importance during the past
twenty years as have their presence, and their recognition as necessary operational partners in
post-conflict reconstruction. The recent past and present situation in Kosovo is used as an
example to strengthen the identified common characteristics of reconstruction and NGO- UN
relation.
Research parameters
The difficulties faced during my research concern the definition and clarification of terms
such as: What are Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and how there are distinguished from
NGOs. Also problematic has been identifying the difference between peace-building and
reconstruction since both consist of by and large, the same activities.
The reconstruction phase has more of an economic element to it than peace building, which is
a more social/political concept. That said, there is a lot of overlap between the terms.
Linguistic precision is unfortunately not carefully observed among users, as the CSO/NGO
definition debate shows.1
In my dialogue with a number of UN personnel, NGO staff and others involved in this area of
work there was a common theme however their opinions differed greatly. It appears that due
to the pressure NGOs face to prove themselves to the rest of the international community they
seem to be more sensitive and more aware of these terms. Moreover and to my surprise, the
more recent articles are more careful when using terms and concepts in comparison to the
older ones. The more recent articles try to provide clear definitions instead of using the terms
loosely.
Due to the fact that my research has been limited to the availability of only a relatively small
number of interviewees, it runs the risk of generalizing the criticisms and counter-criticisms
regarding the issues arising in the relationship between NGOs and the UN in post-conflict
1
Discussion, Professor King, Webster University Geneva
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reconstruction. The subject is very broad. Increasing the number of interviews would have
involved and amount of additional research and analysis that would have exceeded the
amount required for an MA thesis in international relations. While the end result of the
present thesis is rather broad, I believe that it is accurate.
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1. NEW TYPE OF WARS FACED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
In the late 1980’s and early 1990’s at the end of the Cold War the global order changed. The
threat of war among states appeared to have diminished and the expectations of peace
breaking out were steadily increasing over the globe. Instead of the expected peaceful
transition from controlled economy to market economy and from communism to democracy,
a new type of conflict arose in the developing countries and former colonized states.
1.1 The conflicts of the 1990’s
The proliferating conflicts of the 1990’s, multiplying in different regions of the world were
not a new phenomenon. These conflicts had been protracted for long periods of time but had
been kept at bay during the Cold War by the former super powers.
The nature of war in the 1990’s had taken a new shape. Along with the end of one of the two
super powers, the number of interstate wars was drastically reduced but only to be replaced by
intrastate wars. These “new” type of wars were/are based on ethnicity, race, religion natural
resources and power. By breaking all the formerly accepted rules of war, these conflicts target
civilians, men, women, children and the elderly indiscriminately. These wars are stateless in
nature, not controlled by any state government and organized by non-state groups with the
objectives of self-determination. 2
These conflicts leave societies with destroyed infrastructure, paralyzed commerce, devastated
agriculture, high unemployment and absent foreign investment. The traditional sources of
authority in post-conflict societies are usually destroyed or greatly undermined in the absence
of a legitimate governing body. The police and judicial systems are usually considered a part
of the problem, with democratic practices and institutions often minimal or non-existent.
3
Under these described conditions, the conflicts are more likely to continue or worsen rather
than end. Their importance is screened to the international community through their domino
2
KING, John: “The New Warfare and the Need for an Interactive Military”, in Humanitarian Action, Security
and the Military, The Ninth Annual Humanitarian Conference of Webster University, Geneva, Refugee Survey
Quarterly, UNHCR, Volume 23 Number 4, 2004, Oxford University Press, pp. 48-57
3
HIERONYMI Otto: ‘’ Ethnic and Nationalistic Intolerance-The Threat for International Order’’, in Internal
Conflicts: The Role of Humanitarian Action Proceedings of the 3rd Webster University Humanitarian
Conference, International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, 1998, pp.143-148
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effect and contagious nature of quickly spreading to the neighboring countries thus affecting
whole regions.
The wars started in the early 1990’s in former Yugoslavia serve as perfect examples of the
devastating effects internal conflicts have on societies and regions as a whole. These wars
were based on self-determination of various groups of people depending on religion and/or
ethnicity. The last conflict taking place, in this region was the ethnic conflict in the Serbian
and Montenegrin Province of Kosovo in 1997. Kosovo is presently suffering from lack of
political and economic institutions, expertise and knowledge, infrastructure and ongoing
tensions. 4
In the Great Lake Sub-region; Burundi, Tanzania, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC) the internal conflicts have been based on control of power and natural
resources, and ethnicity. They have left the societies of this region in poverty, with millions of
people dead and a massive number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).5
Furthermore, the conflict in Sierra Leone which started in 1991 and ended eleven years later
left the country with a devastated infrastructure, a destroyed economy, and collapsed national
institutions. During this conflict 50.000 people were killed while 500.000 were forced to
migrate to neighboring countries displacing up to 700.000 other persons. 6
The war in East Timor, currently Timor Leste, started in 1974 due to the power vacuum
produced by the absence of its former colonial power, Portugal. After its colonization by
Indonesia, East Timor was given its independence and relapsed into conflict once again. The
country was left with seventy percent of its infrastructure and public administration destroyed
and with no people that knew how to run the country.7
The Republic of Congo is still at risk of relapse into conflict and has been the case ever since
the conflict started in 1997. The international community had established a cease-fire
4
Cf. the Proceedings of the 8th Annual Webster University Conference on The Economic and Social
Consequences of Humanitarian Crises. Refugee Survey Quarterly, Oxford University Press, 2003
5
UNDG,2002, “Country Studies: The Great Lake Region”
6
UNDG,2002, “Country Studies: Sierrea Leone”
7
UNDG,2002, “Country Studies: East Timor Leste”
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agreement in 1999 but the crisis resumed in 2000 and again in 2002. Currently the main cities
are destroyed and 800.000 people are displaced.8
After the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1989 and the conflict prior to the occupation in
1978, Afghanistan was left with competing leaders dependent on “opposing flows of
politically motivated military assistance”. The rest of the population survived on “politically
motivated humanitarian aid”, which was cut off after the 9/11 attacks. The country suffers
from destroyed agriculture, commerce, and a lack of national institutions, thereby not being
able to improve its status on its own.9
The increasing frequency of internal conflicts raised concern within the UN regarding its
ways of reacting to situations of massive violence, humanitarian emergencies, and breakdown of authorities and human rights abuses taking place within states rather then between
states. The nature of the UN’s rights, obligations and responsibility to intervene as well as its
capacity to do so was raised. The UN had formerly been dealing with state sovereignty and
was restrained by Article 2(7) of the UN Charter to intervene in matters within the domestic
jurisdiction of states. These matters had therefore been dealt with by the UN on an ad hoc
basis lacking developed plans and programs of intervention. 10
The devastating effect of these conflicts in their respective regions soon came to convince the
UN Security Council that new methods of intervention were needed and that the UN had to
get involved. Peace-keeping operations were the initially predominant mechanisms used to
deal with these conflicts. They were originally developed during the post-war decolonization
period and used as means of filling the power vacuums caused by the absence of the colonial
powers. The peace-keeping operations were established for the purpose of enabling
negotiation for permanent settlement of post-colonial conflicts.11
Thereafter, the regional organizations were expected to pick-up on the remaining matters
arising form these conflicts, such as their effects on neighboring societies. However this soon
proved to be unsuccessful due to a number of reasons; in some regions, if there were any
organizations they were not accepted or were regarded to be partial and/or the existing and
8
UNDG,2002, “Country Studies: Republic of Congo”
UNDG 2002,“Country Studies: Afghanistan”
10
Roberts, Adam, 1993, “United Nations Divided World-The UN’s Role in International Relations” p. 87-91
11
Ibid
9
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accepted organizations proved to lack the capacity, expertise and/or resources to raise large
peace-keeping operations.12 This to some extent is still the case today.
Since the end of the Cold War both the demand and scope of the UN peace-keeping
operations had increased expanding form negotiation matters to disarmament of various
factions, the return of refugees, temporary administration, humanitarian relief assistance, and
the organization and supervision of elections.13
The solution was concluded to be increased and improved systematic contact and a more
cooperative course of action between the UN and its operational partners was called for.
1.2 The international community
The actors involved in post-conflict reconstruction activities are generally referred to as the
international community which consists of the many voices of governments, or as one voice
through the UN, its funds, programs and specialized agencies. In addition, the financial
institutions (IFI’s), and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) make up a large part of the
international community. All these actors are collaborating and interacting on a range of
different levels. However, their success in reconstruction is highly dependant on the quality of
their collaborations and interactions.
Since this paper is mainly concerned with the role of NGOs as operational UN partners, it is
nonetheless important to briefly mention the UN bodies important to reconstruction of wartorn states will be briefly introduced.
1.2.1 The United Nations
As the principal world body of peace and security, the role of the UN is to work with the
affected states to identify the key transition and development needs of the country, and help
the government coordinate necessary interventions as well as carry out the necessary
coordination and implementation of needed projects and activities. The UN does this by
interacting and cooperating with its operational partners.14
12
Ibid p. 87-91
Ibid p. 92
14
Interview, Richard Alderslade
13
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The Security Council is the main Peace and Security organ of the UN consisting of five
permanent member states and ten on a rotational two year mandate. The UN Charter gives the
Security Council primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security and
may intervene whenever peace is threatened. All member states are obliged to implement the
Security Council’s decisions. It has the power to impose economic sanctions or/and order an
arms embargo as measures of enforcing its decisions. However it will firstly try to find ways
of peaceful settlement of disputes or undertake mediation between the opposing parties. If
violence breaks out, the Security Council aims at securing a ceasefire by sending peacekeeping missions into the affected region with the aim of maintaining peace or keeping apart
opposing parties. If necessary, the Council may authorize the use of “all necessary means” to
make sure its decisions are followed.15
In terms of post-conflict states, the Security Council is responsible of ending the violence by
using its power to make decisions regarding the initiation of operations such as peace-keeping
operations and the establishment of Interim Administration bodies helping the countries
through their political and economical transitions. Special Representatives of the Secretary
General (SRSG), Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), Resident Coordinator (RC), and the UN
Country Team (UNCT), are all dependant on the Security Councils decisions.16
The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) within the UN Secretariat, under the
UN Charter is committed to assist the Member States and the Secretary-General in their
efforts to maintain international peace and security. In post-conflict settings the DPKO sets up
its own offices carrying out activities and projects to integrate UN efforts, governmental and
non-governmental bodies concerned with peace-keeping operations. DPKO also provides
guidance and support on military, police, mine action, and logistical and administrative issues
to UN political and peace-building missions, and leads states through a transition to stable
government.17
The UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) aims at promoting “higher standards of
living, full employment and economic and social progress; identifying solutions to
15
www.un.org
ibid
17
http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp
16
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international economic, social and health problems; facilitating international cultural and
educational problems; and encouraging universal respect for human rights and freedoms.”18
ECOSOC is the main UN coordinating body of economic and social activities concerning the
work of the UN funds, programs (specialized agencies) and its autonomously governed
specialized agencies, such as the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Often specialized agencies include the UN development
Programme (UNDP), UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), UN Population Fund (UNPFA), UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UN World Food Programme (WFP), and UN
Environment Programme (UNEP).19
In addition the ECOSOC, under the Art. 71 of the UN Charter, is given the responsibility of
granting consultative status to NGOs.20
ECOSOC does not have in-country teams but through its coordination of UN bodies,
specialized agencies and most importantly NGOs, its functions guide the field based partners
in their activities.21
The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) was established to serve as
a UN coordinating body responding to humanitarian emergencies, policy development and
humanitarian advocacy. It aims at improving the effectiveness of UN humanitarian in-country
operations through collaboration with other UN humanitarian agencies, funds and
programmes and NGOs.
The UN Development Program (UNDP) carries out development projects and a range of
activities concerning democratic governance, poverty reduction, crisis prevention and
recovery, and aiding countries to improve their population’s living standards. The UNDP is
involved in most developing countries and post-conflict states.
The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is mandated to lead and co-ordinate
international action to protect refugees and resolve refugee problems worldwide. Its primary
purpose is to safeguard the rights and well-being of refugees. It strives to ensure that everyone
18
NGLS, 2003, “Intergovernmental negotiations and decision making at the United Nations- A guide” p. 8
Ibid p.9
20
Ibid p.8 and 47
21
NGLS, 2003, “Intergovernmental negotiations and decision making at the United Nations- A guide”
19
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can exercise the right to seek asylum and find safe refuge in another State, with the option to
return home voluntarily, integrate locally or to resettle in a third country.22
UNIFEM is a UN fund focusing on developing women’s empowerment and gender equality.
It provides financial and technical assistance on reducing feminized poverty, ending violence
against women, reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS among women and girls, and achieving
gender equality in democratic governance in times of peace as well as war.23
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) conducts international
efforts to defeat hunger. FAO works with both developed and developing countries but
however focuses on developing rural areas. Within FAO states are able to meet and negotiate
agreements and debate policy. FAO is also a source of knowledge and information enabling
developing states and states in transition to modernize and improve their agriculture, forestry
and ensure good nutrition.24
1.2.2. UN specialized agencies
Specialized agencies are autonomous Organizations working with the United Nations and
each other through the coordinating machinery of the Economic and Social Council. The
programmes, funds and other departments of the United Nations report only to the General
Assembly.25
As set out in its Constitution, the World Health Organization’s objectives are “the attainment
by all peoples for the highest possible level of health”26, that is “health as a state of complete
physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity”27.
The World Bank is an international financial institution (IFI) and even though not a part of the
UN it is affiliated as a special agency of the UN system. The World Bank aims at eradicating
poverty and improve the living standards of people in the developing world thorough its
programmes and activities. It is a development Bank which provides loans, policy advice,
technical assistance and knowledge sharing services to low and middle income countries to
22
www.unhcr.ch
www.unifem.org
24
www.un.org
25
NGLS, 2003, “Intergovernmental negotiations and decision making at the United Nations- A guide” p.9
26
http:// www.who.int/overview/en/print.html
27
www.who.org
23
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reduce poverty. The Bank promotes growth to create jobs and to empower poor people to take
advantage of these opportunities.28
The International Monetary Fund was established to promote international monetary
cooperation, exchange stability, and orderly exchange arrangements. IMF carries out projects
aiming at promoting economic growth and employment. It also provides temporary financial
assistance to countries trying to help ease balance of payments adjustment.29
Nevertheless, the reconstruction tasks cannot be accomplished by the UN, its agencies, funds
and programmes alone, or solely by the Governments. New operational partners such as
NGOs and Civil Society actors are highly needed for improved performance and results.
1.2.3 The NGO community
By definition both Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and NGOs appear to be regarded as
being the same kind of organizations and as the definition below will show there is a very fine
line distinguishing one form the other.
A brief definition of CSOs, which also will be used through out the paper, describes Civil
Society Organization as “the associational activity of citizens (outside their families, friend
and workplaces) that is entered into voluntarily to advance their interests, ideas, ideals and
ideologies. It doesn’t include associational activity of people for profit-making purposes (the
private sector) or for governing (the sate or public sector)”.30 The NGOs could be placed
under the definition of CSOs as components of civil society, described as “organizations
formed to provide a benefit to the general public or the world at large either through the
provision of specific services or through advocacy. Most are membership organizations,
recruiting those who share the common interest; they are mostly considered philanthropic or
public organizations because their programmes reach well beyond their members.31
28
www.wb.org
Cf. also World Bank: Alcira Kreimer, etc: The World Bank’s Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction,
Washington, D.C. 1998 and World Bank: Paul Collier, etc: Breaking the Conflict Trap – Civil War and
Development Policy, A copublication of the World Bank and Oxford University Pres, 2003
29
www.imf.org
30
United Nations,2001, “The diversity of actors within the UN System”
31
ibid
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As will be discussed later on, there are numerous NGOs and CSOs present in post conflict
reconstruction. NGOs vary both in size, targeted areas of work and foundations. However
their aim is always the same- to alleviate suffering, improve living standards, represent and
make heard the voices of the people. In order to better understand how NGOs vary form one
another a few of them will be presented.
Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (OXFAM) is a confederation of twelve organizations
present in over one hundred countries aiming to find lasting solutions to poverty, suffering
and injustice. “Oxfam International seeks increased worldwide public understanding that
economic and social justice, are crucial to sustainable development. We strive to be a global
campaigning force promoting the awareness and motivation that comes with global
citizenship whilst seeking to shift public opinion in order to make equity the same priority as
economic growth.”32
Oxfam works both in emergency and relief situations as well as long term development
programmes found in reconstruction activities. The areas of concern are: education, debt and
aid, health, gender equality, conflict and natural disasters, and democracy and human rights.33
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) is a non-partisan international humanitarian aid
organization, independent from governments, that provides emergency medical assistance in
more than 80 countries. MSF works together with authorities such as the Ministry of Health to
provide assistance in those countries lacking health structures. MSF works in rehabilitation of
hospitals and dispensaries, vaccination programmes and water and sanitation projects and
provides training of local personnel. All this is done with the objective of rebuilding health
structures to acceptable levels.34
MSF also seeks to raise awareness of crisis situations by acting as witness. It also addresses
any violations of human rights and violations committed or sustained by political actors by
confronting the responsible actors themselves and by putting pressure on them through
mobilization of the international community, and by issuing information publicly. In order to
32
www.oxfam.org
ibid
34
msf.org
33
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prevent compromise or manipulation of MSF's relief activities, MSF maintains neutrality and
independence from individual governments.35
Quaker UN aims at abolishing war and promotes peaceful resolution of conflicts, human
rights, economic justice and good governance. QUNO works within the areas of conflict
prevention, relief and emergency aid, disarmament and peace-building, human right and
refugee issues and economic development. QUNO has consultative status with ECOSOC and
cooperates with a number of multilateral organisations, such as the World Trade Organisation,
International Labour Organisation, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund.36
The Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict is an NGO network that monitors and reports
on violations against the security and rights of children and adolescents in specific situations
of armed conflict. Watchlist uses this information to urge action by the UN Security Council,
other UN agencies and appropriate governments. Watchlist also provides capacitystrengthening support to local NGO partners in areas of conflict. The Watchlist is housed at
the Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children, a member of the network's
Steering Committee.37
World Vision is a Christian relief and development organization focusing on children and
communities by targeting critical needs such as clean water, reliable food supplies, basic
health care, education, and income-generating microeconomic development. The aim of
World Vision is to save lives and reduce suffering by tracking crises, pre-positioning
emergency supplies for immediate response, and remaining after the crisis to rebuild and
restore communities, by working with churches, governments, local organizations, and
international agencies.38
35
ibid
www.quno.org
37
www.womenscommission.org
38
www.worldvision.org
36
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2. POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION: WHERE DOES IT START?
The issues discussed in this paper concern post-conflict reconstruction in war-torn states. A
post-conflict state is one that is neither at peace nor in conflict. There exists a prevailing risk
of renewed violence which therefore calls for international intervention. Through its
reconstruction efforts, the international community’s aim is to prevent a relapse into conflict
and subsequently ensure sustainable peace. The international community seeks to bring wartorn societies back to “normalcy” and through reconstruction, aid them in establishing better
living standards for their populations. In order to achieve its goals, the reconstruction
activities carried out by the international community include the promoting of democracy
through the establishment and/or improvement of national institutions, good governance, and
of the judicial and economic systems.39
According to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict Final Report,
strategies for preventions are divided into two clusters:40
a. Operational prevention is short- term in nature and includes peace-making activities
and emergency and relief crisis.
b. Structural prevention refers to prevention prior to conflict or prevention of
reoccurrence of conflict. The latter includes the longer term activities such as peacekeeping and peace-building operations and reconstruction activities.
In the Agenda for Peace 1992, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, former UN Secretary-General states
that the first step to be taken is to identify at the earliest possible stage, the situations that
could produce conflict and through active diplomacy, try to remove the sources of danger
39
“The legacy of oppressive regimes, of violent and often protracted internal conflicts is inefficient economies,
neglected and often intentionally destroyed material and social, private and common capital. The need for
resources for successful reconstruction is enormous. Moreover, the problems of reconstruction are multiplied by
the fact that in most conflicts that have led to major humanitarian crises, the principal targets were civilians, and
the main, explicit objective of the warring parties was to destroy existing communities and social structures, to
create hatred and division that will make future peaceful interaction also impossible. This is one of the reasons
why the quality, the speed and the extent of humanitarian assistance and protection is so important during and
after the conflicts: in fact humanitarian action helps not only the actual or potential victims directly concerned
but it also brings in a dimension of humanity in tragic and vicious situations and can contribute to future moral
reconstruction.” Otto Hieronymi and Chiara Jasson: “Introduction”, The Economic and Social Consequences of
Humanitarian Crises, Refugee Survey Quarterly, 2003, op.cit.
40
Dress, Toby, P., 2005, “Designing a peace-building infrastructure: Taking a system approach to the prevention
of deadly conflict”, NGLS p.13
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before the initiation of violence.41 However important, preventive action prior to conflict is
impeded by the difficulty of coming up with an exact forecast. Currently, a large number of
states are vulnerable to conflict however only a few fall into complete collapse or end up in
violent strife. In order to identify the states at risk of collapse, reliable tools of analysis for
precise predictions are needed. Since the UN lacks a well-funded and centralized body
focusing solely on collection of early warning information and analysis, it remains dependant
on external actors. As a consequence the UN’s resources are usually directed to areas
considered most vulnerable or to states that might have the largest impact on regional and/or
international stability at the expense of the ones considered less important but similarly
vulnerable.42
With respect to preventing reoccurrence of conflict, the UN needs on-ground operational
partners that work closely with the people and have the capacity to provide first-hand
information. Additionally, many more areas can be covered if the collaboration between the
UN and its operational partners is strengthened.43
If the momentum of conflict prevention is lost, the first step to be taken is initiating activities
aimed at resolving the issues that started the violence. This is achieved through coordinating
efforts of trying to reach an agreement by bringing together the hostile parties. These
activities constitute part of the peace-making operations which are the first laying a
foundation for future post-conflict activities. They are therefore very important attempts at
successful future reconstruction.44
It is argued that “the success or failure of post-conflict state-building endeavors depends to a
considerable degree on the quality and nature of the peace agreement upon which the new
order will be built.”45
Due to the urgency of ending the violence, the international community risks winding up with
hastened agreements which do not define if the aim at stopping the violence and its
41
Roberts, Adam, 1993, “United Nations divided world: The UN’s Role in International Relations” p. 473
Samuels, Kristi, 2003, “The future of UN state-building: Strategic and Operational Challenges and the Legacy
of Iraq”, International Peace Academy p.6
43
Dress, Toby, P., 2005, “Designing a peace-building infrastructure: Taking a system approach to the prevention
of deadly conflict”,
44
Voices from Africa, 1998, “Conflict, Peace and Reconstruction”, issue no. 8, NGLS
45
Samuels, Kristi, 2003 “The future of UN state-building: Strategic and Operational Challenges and the Legacy
of Iraq” p.7
42
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reoccurrence or building national democratic institutions. Most often, conflicts are ended
through different kinds of power-sharing establishments which have proved to impede future
reconstruction and state-building. One such example is the 1999 Lomé Agreement for Sierra
Leone which granted amnesty to one group of rebels and provided them with ministerial
posts. As time passed, the government was condemned as being illegitimate. Another example
is the case of Afghanistan witnessed large numbers of warlords regaining power over great
regions of the country.46
Peace-keeping operations are the second step to be taken in a post-conflict scene. Their aim is
to alleviate human suffering and create enabling conditions to building institutions for selfsustaining peace as well as preventing the reoccurrence of violence which as experience has
shown spills over into the region. Furthermore, peace-keeping operations aim to stabilize the
conflict situation after a cease-fire and to create an environment where the opposing parties
can shake hands and together seek to work and improve the situation of their country.47
Through peace-keeping operations, the peace however fragile it might be needs to be
maintained. Moreover, implementations of agreements between the opposing parties need to
be assisted. This step usually takes place after violence has been brought to a standstill which
enables the initiation of the international emergency and relief phase.
The activities carried out in the emergency and relief phase are short-term in nature. These
include emergency services such as providing food, clothing, clean water and sanitation
equipment to distressed populations; providing shelter establishment for homeless victims,
repairing salvageable structures, preventing, containing and treating life-threatening diseases;
and the demining of certain areas. The focus of these activities is not on the managing of
conflict but rather on saving lives.
As the nature of war has changed and the peace-keeping approaches have rapidly evolved, a
new concept was borne. Peace-building has come to be an essential part of the UN
interventions and is defined as: “action to identify and support structures which will tend to
strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict”.48
46
Samuels, Kristi, 2003, “The future of UN state-building: Strategic and Operational Challenges and the Legacy
of Iraq” p.7
47
Roberts, Adam, 1993, “United Nations divided world: The UN’s Role in International Relations” p. 480-486
48
Roberts, Adam, 1993, “United Nations divided world: The UN’s Role in International Relations” p. 375
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Peace-building aims at laying the foundation for future reconstruction and development by
focusing on reconciliation, respect for human rights, political inclusiveness, safe return of
refugees and IDP’s, reintegrating ex-combatants into society, and mobilizing resources for
reconstruction and economic recovery.49 Although sharing some similarities with the
reconstruction phase, peace-building should not be mistaken for humanitarian and
development activities. The role of peace-building is to add to such activities that reduce the
risk of relapsing into conflict and enabling reconstruction and reconciliation to take place. 50
If successful, the peace-making and the peace-keeping operations increase the opportunities
for post-conflict peace-building and reconstruction. However, in the aftermath of peacemaking activities, peace-keeping, peace-building and reconstruction need to take place
simultaneously and in a cooperative manner. In recent years, the international community has
acknowledged the need for a smooth transition between peace-keeping operations and the
peace-building and reconstruction activities. The belief that post-conflict intervention
activities were linear in nature has impeded many activities carried out by the international
community and brought to its attention the need for a transitional phase. This phase has come
to be recognized as vital for the prevention of reoccurring crisis and successful reconstruction.
2.1 The transitional phase
Post-conflict reconstruction projects and activities in war-torn societies are initiated after the
emergency and relief phase. Nevertheless, in some operational areas the two take place
simultaneously. In most cases the emergency and relief activities, if properly carried out, need
to take into account and plan for future implementation of reconstruction. On the other hand,
the reconstruction activities need to be pre-planned in order to pick up where emergency and
relief activities have left off or are ready to transform. The transition between the emergency
phase and reconstruction phase is therefore a very complex undertaking.
The transition phase in post-conflict states is defined as “the process and actions that create
the conditions for political, social and economic stability, and allow the process of securing
49
Aall Pamela, Miltenberger, Daniel, LT. Col., Weiss, Thomas, G., 2002, “Guide to IGOs, NGOs and the
Military in Peace and Relief Operations” p. 122-3
50
Voices from Africa, 1998, “Conflict, Peace and Reconstruction”, issue no. 8, NGLS p 28-29
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peace, justice and social equity to occur”.51 The primary goal of the transitional phase is to
improve country level national capacity and functioning in order to ensure that there is no
relapse to violence during the transitional period.52
The concept of transition was formally related to “natural disasters” and has subsequently
evolved changing to what today is known as the movement to consolidate peace and
government establishment. The planning of transitional efforts and activities carried out by
the humanitarian and developmental actors therefore need to be taking place jointly.53
Each transition situation is unique and most often triggered by a cease-fire agreement, peace
negotiations or peace agreements, a Security Council resolution or by a peace process often
led by active engagement of one or two UN Member States. There is no clear-cut definition of
where the transitional phase starts and where it ends. The transition periods are neither linear
nor unidirectional whereas their dynamics lack direct or uninterrupted process of progress
from conflict to peace and from relief to reconstruction and recovery. It is rather a process
where political, peacekeeping, humanitarian, and developmental facets are taking place
simultaneously. Development, cooperation and coordination between the international actors
are critical links for a successful transitional process.54
During transition, the humanitarian assistance operations are winding down while the
assistance aimed at long-term sustainable development has not begun or is just about to begin.
There is prevailing tension and a very real possibility that the matters could get worse before
they improve. The state is unstable and at high risk of relapse into violence and conflict. The
risk of relapse increases where the regional and global influences are at work or parties
remain dissatisfied.55
A period of transition is therefore inherently unstable and the causes that lead to instability in
the country concerned have most certainly not been resolved. Lack of an established peace
agreement, ongoing violence in the country and a missing functioning government to work
51
UNDG/ECHA, 2003 (March 4), “Briefing to ECHA”
ibid
53
Interview with Mark Bowden
54
UNDP, 2000 (27 Nov.), “Role of UNDP in crisis and post-conflict situations”
55
UNDG/ECHA, 2003, “Towards an Implementation Plan: Draft synthesis of issues, lessons learned and
preliminary recommendations”
52
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with as a reliable partner, are all examples of the most common causes that might impede the
achievement of stability.56
Given that each transition situation is unique, the issues arising need to be responded to in an
appropriate way. As a start, the most common issues arising in a transition situation in postconflict states need to be identified. 57
One of the main problems is that of coordination and cooperation amongst the parties
involved. On one level the humanitarian and the development actors need to cooperate to
ensure sustained transition, finding a balance between the scaling down of the humanitarian
aid and the scaling up of the development one.58
Another common problem appears to be the arrangements for the countries concerned, which
are often withdrawn too early or prolonged beyond the time needed. An important aspect to
be taken into account is the balance between aid and the rise of the government in the country
concerned. It is therefore imperative not to prolong international aid when the government
shows capacity of rising.59
On the other hand early withdraw of humanitarian agencies, funds and projects ensuring the
completion of transition could and most often does result in a regression of transition such as
relapse into violence and conflict.60
The issue of timing and sequencing in transition is usually ruled by availability of funds.
Most often a shift from humanitarian aid to sustainable development should be initiated but is
impeded generally due to lack of funding. The lack of funding in the relief-development
transition phase occurs because of the fact that most donors do not allow themselves to invest
in activities poorly clarified.61
56
Alderslade, Richard, Dr., 2003, “The Transitional Working Group and Framework Team: Issues”
UNDG/ECHA, 2003, “Towards an Implementation Plan: Draft synthesis of issues, lessons learned and
preliminary recommendations”
58
UNDG/ECHA, 2003, “Towards an Implementation Plan: Draft synthesis of issues, lessons learned and
preliminary recommendations”, p3
59
UNDG/ECHA, 2003, “Towards an Implementation Plan: Draft synthesis of issues, lessons learned and
preliminary recommendations”, p5
60
UNDP,2002,“Country Study: Angola”
61
Interview with Mark Bowden.
57
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As a result major donors involved in the transitional field of work do not recognize the
transition phase and therefore do not provide funds. Clarifying and identifying the transition
phase and the actions needed in this phase could solve this problem as well as the political
issues and integration of the planning process needs to be incorporated in the transitional
work. Issues arising in this area of funding are common at the end of the emergency phase
and at the initiation of development work. Donors tend to be more interested in funding the
emergency phase, which is short term, more evident and the results are more visible compared
to the ones in the transition phase. 62
2.1.2. Gaps within the transitional phase
The transition period habitually consists of a number of gaps which can be identified to take
place immediately after crises end and amplify as emergency assistance declines. These gaps
impede the long-term development activities which need to be implemented.63
The gaps are created “by an inability to transfer the momentum of crisis response to recovery,
rehabilitation and development activities”64 and have repeatedly emerged and hindered
recovery efforts to date. Even with appropriately planned and coordinated efforts, there are a
number of critical areas where gaps continuously arise in post-conflict transitional
situations.65 During the gaps, people and communities begin to recover spontaneously,
rebuilding, resettling, and often reproducing the conditions for relapse back into crisis.66
The following five gaps have been identified and described by the United Nations
Development Group (UNDG) a part of the UNDP: 67
1. The institutional gaps; These are characterized by extremely slow efforts to move
from relief activities to development activities, where the opportunities to undertake
relief, recovery, and development efforts in a coherent and simultaneous manner have
often not been noticed by the concerned organizations and agencies. Although the
62
Interview with Mark Bowden
UNDP, 2002, “Country Study: Congo”
64
UNDG “Bridging the Gap; A Report on the behalf of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Reference Group
on Post-Conflict Reintegration”
65
UNDP, 2000 (27 Nov.), “Role of UNDP in crisis and post-conflict situations”
66
UNDP,“Transition Recovery Programme: Turning Crisis into Opportunities for Development”
67
UNDG “Bridging the Gap; A Report on the behalf of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Reference Group
on Post-Conflict Reintegration”
63
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agencies and organizations are aware of their weaknesses (such as lack of common
and region specific vision, conflicting principles and mandates, lack of coordination,
institutional culture and unpredictable and inadequate funding), the disconnectedness
between their administrative procedures and continuing efforts to secure the attention
of donors make it difficult for them to change some of the failings of the system.
2. The political gaps: The bilateral donors determine their engagement in a country
where there is less existent political uncertainty or avoid the countries where the
outcome is uncertain and the limits of engagement are unclear. The programmes
dealing with core post-conflict issues are the ones suffering most often from lack of
funding due to delay or non-existing donor resources.
3. The authority vacuums; These are characterized by delayed post-conflict recovery
assistance due to the resistance from the national authorities in the concerned country
towards international representatives. An additional reason for delayed assistance
might also be the limited capacity of most government and civil service structures in
enforcing policies.
4. The synchrony gaps; These are characterized by a lack of synchrony between the
international community and national authorities and happen most often in situations
where the international community tries to implement programmes they feel are
necessary while the national authorities do not agree. These programmes often deal
with reconciliation, justice, and governance. The gap in such situations therefore also
rises from the lack of commitment of the national authorities in the affected
communities.
5. The sustainability gaps; These are characterized by the national government’s inability
to maintain the recovery momentum due to the obligations created by the external
assistance. Another aspect of the sustainability gap is the difficulty in ensuring postconflict recovery due to the lack of formal government structures. 68
68
UNDG, “Bridging the Gap; A Report on the behalf of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Reference Group
on Post-Conflict Reintegration”
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2.2 The reconstruction phase
Reconstruction of war-torn societies requires careful planning. During this phase the history
and political culture of the state need to be taken into account. Required is also an
understanding of the impact international activities could have on the state’s power structures.
Once achieved, initiation and implementation methods can be determined thus paving way for
more successful reconstruction.69
Post-conflict reconstruction has two overall objectives: (1) to facilitate the transition to
sustainable peace after hostilities have ceased and (2) to support economic and social
development. 70
The recreation of the governmental framework is established by strengthening government
institutions, restoring law and order, and enabling the organizations of civil society to work
effectively. Also of great importance are reconstruction, maintenance and improvement of
physical and social infrastructure, key of which include transport, and communication. 71
Economic recovery depends on the success of this transition and on the rebuilding of the
domestic economy and restoration of access to external resources. These objectives involve
the creation of conditions for continuation of trade, savings, domestic and foreign investment;
and promote macroeconomic stabilization, rehabilitation of financial institutions, and the
restoration of appropriate legal and regulatory frameworks. 72
Of importance as well is the assistance provided to those populations affected by war through
reintegration of displaced populations, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants,
restoration of employment opportunities and support for vulnerable groups such as femaleheaded households. Other activities that are part of primary reconstruction tasks are the
support of land mine action programs, where relevant, including mine surveys and demining
69
Samuels, Kristi, 2003, “The future of UN state-building: Strategic and Operational Challenges and the Legacy
of Iraq”
70
Alderslade, Richard, Dr., 2003, “The Transitional Working Group and Framework Team: Issues”,
71
Alderslade, Richard, Dr., 2003, “The Transitional Working Group and Framework Team: Issues”,
72
Alderslade, Richard, Dr., 2003, “The Transitional Working Group and Framework Team: Issues”,
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of key infrastructure, as part of comprehensive development strategies for supporting a return
to normal life of populations living in mine-polluted areas.73
Reconstruction however does not refer solely to the reconstruction of "physical
infrastructure," nor does it necessarily signify a rebuilding of the social and economic
framework that existed before the onset of conflict. If conflict is protracted, it will affect and
transform a society and therefore a return to the situation prior the conflict may not be
possible or desirable.74 In many instances, these conflicts start because of the old regimes and
its ways of dealing with its citizens by not representing them and oppressing or forcing them
to a minimal standard of living. The primary objectives of reconstruction are a return to
normalcy and the creation of a new environment. This new environment created through the
establishment of the minimum of services, creation of work and school, the establishment and
maintenance of security, and the required creation of enabling conditions for a functioning
peacetime society. 75
The rebuilding of governments includes tasks such as establishing an independent judiciary,
respect and enforcement of property rights, institution building, and the law of contract. The
law of contract is one of the main tasks of reconstruction and falls into the economic and
social development dimension.76
Having come this far, it is important to introduce the three main areas of priority in
reconstruction of war-torn states need to be clarified. These are: reconstituting legitimacy of
the government, re-establishing security within the state and rebuilding effectiveness.
2.2.1. Reconstituting legitimacy of the government77
One of the main challenges facing the international community in reconstruction of war-torn
states is the creation of a legitimate government that includes and represents its whole
73
World Bank, 1999, “World Bank Group: Transitional Support Strategy for Kosovo”, Europe and Central Asia
Region, p 14
74
Cf. also Gilles Carbonnier “Undoing War Economies: A Prerequisite for Peace?” ; John Maresca: “The Role
of the Private Sector in Post-Conflict Reconstruction” ; and Otto Hieronymi and Chiara Jasson: “The
Consequences of Protracted Crises” in the The Economic and Social Consequences of Humanitarian Crises,
Refugee Survey Quarterly, op.cit.
75
Dr. Otto Hieronymi, In-class discussion
76
Dr. Hieronymi, In-class discussion
77
Brinkerhoff, Derick, W.,2005 Feb., “Rebuilding Governance in failed states and post-conflict societies”,
International Journal of Management, vol. 25, no. 1
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population. A state without a legitimate governing body that is not accepted by its citizens and
not including all parts of its population is doomed to the reoccurrence of violence and the
relapse into conflict. Considering the effects of these reoccurrences, the legitimacy of a state
needs to be reconstituted. The tasks involved include the expansion of participation and
inclusiveness of its population, reducing inequities, creating accountability, combating
corruption, holding regular elections, re-establishment of rule of law, promoting democracy
and rebuilding democratic institutions, and developing the civil society sector. While
undertaking these tasks, it is important to make results visible, providing people with hope
and a desire for continuation of reconstruction and improvement of their society.
2.2.2. Re-establishing security78
Enabling a society a return to “normalcy” can only be attained through the establishment of
security. Re-establishing security refers to the rebuilding or strengthening of systems in both
the economic and political sphere. It is carried out through a combination of reconstruction
activities, delivery of know-how, and the reformation or break up of the existing police forces,
private militias and military forces.79
Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) are the main tasks undertaken in this
area. DDR is closely linked with the reconstitution of legitimacy in terms of medium and long
term objectives of reconstruction such as; rebuilding and/or strengthening of judicial
institutions and police force, restart of economy and creation of employment opportunities.
Most often these states lack adequate systems of providing the civilian population the security
oversight that is needed for a return or establishment to normal pre-conflict economic and
political activity. Reestablishment of security also refers to peace-keeping operations of which
is linked to the humanitarian and emergency relief activities.
2.2.3. Rebuilding effectiveness80
Rebuilding the basic infrastructure destroyed by conflict and enabling the state to provide the
population its basic needs such as health, education, water and electricity, restarting the
economy, providing welfare, reducing poverty, and enabling socio-economic growth are the
78
Brinkerhoff, Derick, W.,2005 Feb., “Rebuilding Governance in failed states and post-conflict societies”,
International Journal of Management, vol. 25, no. 1
79
ibid
80
ibid
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main objectives of rebuilding state effectiveness. If not achieved, mass displacement of the
population, epidemics and humanitarian crises are the results.
These objectives can be attained through good governance which in these terms, involves the
provision of adequate and functioning municipal infrastructure such as restoration of schools,
health care systems and institutions, social safety nets, and transport. However, since the
governments in these states are weak or non-existent, the role of civil society and private
sector is increased.81
In terms of economic governance and activities, these states are likely to favor the elites
which translates into a deficiency of fiscal policy control thereby paving way for corruption. It
is therefore important to facilitate macro-economic and fiscal policy-making, the
implementation management of resources and the enabling of investment opportunities for the
population as a whole.82
As being the most carried out in post-conflict reconstruction, these three areas are interrelated
and overlap with one another. The reconstitution of legitimacy and rebuilding of effectiveness
could not be successful if security would not be restored. On the other hand, if the
government fails to provide its citizens their basic needs, especially in states suffering from
ethnic divisions, it will not be fully recognized and supported by its people. Finally, if
education and job opportunities would be established, people would be less likely to be
involved in acts of violence and therefore security would be easier to attain.
2.3. Issues in reconstruction
The following constitute the main areas of impediment to reconstruction efforts: 83
•
Inability of ensuring security as foundation for reconstruction, good governance and
economic growth.
•
Lack of effective coordination mechanisms among international actors
•
Lack of transparency in donor goals, most often resulting in political gamesmanship
and the reduction of coordination activities.
81
ibid
ibid
83
ibid
82
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•
Slow state capacity-building thereby hindering immediate and long-term delivery of
services, which in turn delays socio-economic growth. Delayed delivery of services by
the government might lead people to warlords and elites, creating a breeding ground
for corruption and regression of other reconstruction efforts.
•
Introduction of “shared and country-led decision-making”84 is a necessity but as
discussed has proven to be problematic.
•
Timing and sequencing of activities. “Exclusive or premature concentration on
democracy and election”85 risks destabilization of situations and renewal of conflict.
In terms of the economy, measures such as the liberalization of markets and
privatization, timing and sequencing need to be balanced and not carried out as
ideological imperatives.
•
Lack of sufficient attention directed to the linkage between reconstruction of
government legitimacy, effectiveness and security. This issue arises due to the division
of post-conflict reconstruction activities which have initially been seen as linear.
Major international actors focus on one of the areas while ignoring the others. The
military has been taking care of security issues only, while the reconstruction of state
effectiveness has been carried out by the development actors and their operational
partners such as UNDP, USAID, DFID, and development oriented NGOs.
Reconstruction of government legitimacy has in turn been undertaken by diplomatic
actors such as the UN Security Council and the US State Department.86
‘Quick-fix’ approaches or ‘one-size-fits-all’ solutions in form of agreements and legislative
acts, activities carried out at a premature time or delayed institution building, and ignoring
existing local capacity result in the dependency on external actors. Thus impedes the state
from full and independent recovery as well as from opportunities for governments to establish
their legitimacy.87
84
Ibid p.7
ibid p.7
86
Ibid p. 10
87
Ibid p 7
85
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The quality and nature of the peace-agreements established at the end of violence is very
important for flourishing reconstruction. If formulated carelessly, the agreements could
worsen the conditions within the state.88
Another challenge faced by the international community when restoring or re-building the
government in post-conflict societies lies in creating/rebuilding central level institutions or
sub-national/ local institutions. When a society is torn by conflict due to inequalities and
ethnic divisions, a de-centralized form of government would limit the central power by
relocating resources and control to different levels of government. This subsequently would
impede a ‘winner- takes-all’ situation form occurring thus preventing relapse into conflict.
Moreover, it would increase support for peace by integrating regions and/or minorities into
larger political affairs and decision-making.89
On the other hand, a de-centralized form of government risks enhancing divisions amongst
groups of people and the recreation of old systems. In some cases such as Afghanistan and
Sierra Leoné, the elites given local autonomy have been too powerful for the central
government to control. In Afghanistan the formal government in Kabul is supported by the
international community, however sub-national governance is conducted by warlords and
local commanders. Their power is diminishing the role and influence of the formal
government resulting in a regional division of governance.90
In Sierra Leoné where the Local Governance Act of 2004, aiming at increasing the local
representation, provided for locally elected councils and autonomous local decision-making.
The act was however used by the elites to maintain and increase their power.91
2.3.1. Elections: Issues and Importance
“Elections play a central role in democratization efforts…and this focus must remain strong;
but elections must also be part of a long-term undertaking that will lead to a strengthening of
national institutions and democratic processes. The real test of a democratization process is
88
Samuels, Kristi, 2003, “The future of UN state-building: Strategic and Operational Challenges and the Legacy
of Iraq” p. 5
89
Brinkerhoff, Derick, W.,2005 Feb., “Rebuilding Governance in failed states and post-conflict societies”,
International Journal of Management, vol. 25, no. 1
90
Ibid
91
Ibid p. 8
36
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not the organization of first elections, but whether those first elections are followed by others
in accordance with an agreed electoral timetable” 92
The implementation of elections, which is an essential part of post-conflict reconstruction,
brings about numerous issues both for the international actors and the situation within the
state. The main issue faced by the international community is the timing of elections. If
elections are held prematurely, in many instances, the reconstruction situation is worsened.
Not only do premature elections often take the focus away form other vital reconstruction
activities but previous leaders might reassume their power or use the election period for
personal gains in many cases intensifying the ethnic hatred and division.93
In this respect it is argued that elections should not be rushed but rather be put on hold
allowing the reformation and reconstruction of institutions to take place and establishing an
environment to prepare for them. This involves strengthening of institutions, re-enforcing
security, judicial systems, and the army. Without these steps completed the election process
risks to fail its purpose.94
On the other hand, postponing elections might lead to difficulties for the international
community. People in war-torn societies, especially if based on race, ethnicity or religion
more often than not rely heavily on international aid, tending to have high expectations of
overnight improvements concerning the legacy of their oppressive government. When these
improvements are delayed the people might loose faith and no longer cooperate.95 Another
issue resulting form postponement of elections is the local’s perception that the international
actors active in reconstruction activities, illegitimately hold the power.96
2.3.2. Implementation of the rule of law
One of the cornerstones of good governance is the rule of law. It is an essential part in the
efforts carried out by the international community to establish sustainable peace and
successful reconstruction. Through the implementation of the rule of law, the power of
92
Voices from Africa, 1998, “Conflict, Peace and Reconstruction”, issue no. 8, NGLS p. 34
Samuels, Kristi, 2003, “The future of UN state-building: Strategic and Operational Challenges and the Legacy
of Iraq” p.9
94
Ahmed, Salman, Jan/Feb 2005, “No size fits all: Lessons in Making peace and Rebuilding States”, Foreign
Affairs, Vol.84, no.1
95
Paris, Roland, 2004, ”At War’s End: Building peace after civil conflict”, Cambridge Press, Cambridge
96
Samuels, Kristi, 2003, “The future of UN state-building: Strategic and Operational Challenges and the Legacy
of Iraq”
93
37
S. Florea
governments is restrained thereby impeding state leaders to use their authority for personal
gains. It obliges the governments to conduct themselves in accordance with stipulated and
publicly known rules.97
In post-conflict societies, the rule of law provides for the protection of the rights of all
members of the society through rules that constrain the power of all parties involved in
conflict, holding them responsible for their actions. It also provides the means for non-violent
dispute resolution.98
The issues faced by the international community in this respect concerns the narrowly focused
attention on only a few legal institutions. In order to establish a legitimate government based
on good governance, the implementation of rule of law needs to be included in the
reconstruction of all institutions.99
Poor coordination of planning, resource distribution and unity of labor among the actors
carrying out the implementation of rule of law (i.e. DPKO, UNHCR, UNDP, their operational
partners and states) is another issue. In addition the lack of local experts and indigenous
involvement cooperating with the external experts while setting the rule of law agendas in the
concerned states contributes to less satisfactory results.100
97
Aall, Pamela, Crocker, Chester, A., Hampson, Fen, Osler, , 2001, “Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of
Managing International Conflict”, p 801-802
98
Ibid p. 801-802
99
Samuels, Kristi, 2003, “The future of UN state-building: Strategic and Operational Challenges and the Legacy
of Iraq” p 10-11
100
ibid
38
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3. NGOS IN POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION
NGOs are by and large seen as privately owned and financed organizations working outside
of their country. Most often than not NGOs form an organization based on tasks and activities
they consider are not sufficiently addressed by the public and/or the governmental efforts,
within the countries. NGOs and CSOs provide assistance in the international sphere and can
be categorized into four directives: humanitarian emergency relief, sustainable economic and
social development and reconstruction, spreading and monitoring of human rights, and
mediation/ negotiation and conflict resolution.101
Due to the increasing awareness of the importance of cooperation and coordination in this
field, NGOs and CSOs have come to recognize that all four directives overlap. NGOs
providing emergency relief need to take into account the following phase and the impact their
activities might have on the recipients’ ability to achieve future sustainable development.102
3.1 History
“I see a United Nations which recognizes that the NGO revolution- the new global people
power- is the best thing that has happened to our organization in a long time.” SecretaryGeneral Koffi Annan103
NGOs have been present for decades and are a new phenomenon in the humanitarian field.
Already in World War II NGOs such as Quaker UN were involved in humanitarian relief and
emergency work providing food and shelter to soldiers on the field.104
During the 70’s and 80’s the NGOs started to become increasingly respected by the
Secretariat and the Member States for their emerging ability to shape the global development
agenda and policy development. Furthermore during this period the NGOs and CSOs proved
themselves to be increasingly important operational partners in response to humanitarian
101
Aall, Pamela, Crocker, Chester, A., Hampson, Fen, Osler, , 2001, “Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of
Managing International Conflict”
102
Ibid p 638
103
NGLS, 2003, “Intergovernmental negotiations and decision making at the United Nations- A guide p. 48
104
Interview Quaker UN
39
S. Florea
crisis, leading to increased visibility and participation at briefings, meetings and dialogues
with the UN and governments.105
During the 90’s an explosion of new NGOs and CSOs took place in the involvement of all
UN activities, bringing together specialists from all key institutional constituencies such as
governments, special agendas, mass membership organizations, parliamentarians, the media
and others shaping the public opinion.106
3.2 The NGO-UN relationship
Presently the UN is undergoing a reform process. Part of that process is deciding the role of
NGOs and CSOs in the UN post-conflict reconstruction work as well as to which extent their
involvement in the UN activities will take place. This matter has been present for a long time
within the UN, particularly within the agencies involved in post-conflict states. 107
When carried out properly, the UN- NGO relationship “enhances the quality of decisionmaking, increases ownership of the decisions, improves accountability and transparency of
the process and enriches outcomes through a variety of views and experiences. But handled
badly- it can confuse choices, hamper the inter-governmental search for a common ground,
erode the privacy needed for sensitive discussions, over-crowd agendas and present
distractions at important meetings.”108
The NGO and CSO presence has increased radically over the past two decades and numerous
organizations are currently linked with many parts of the UN, working closely with the UN
humanitarian missions and development projects in the field of transitional post-conflict
states. “All of the UN funds, programs and specialized agencies now maintain formal
arrangements for interaction with NGOs.” 109
The ECOSOC is the main formal UN organ for consulting NGOs and undertakes the approval
process of accrediting NGOs consultative status. When accredited the consultative status the
NGOs are provided access to UN meetings. Depending on the form of accreditation NGOs
105
ibid
UNDG/ECHA, “Briefing to ECHA”
107
United Nations, “UN Reform Dossier: 1997-2002”
108
United Nations, 2003 (May), “UN System and Civil Society: An inventory and Analysis of Practices”, p. 2
109
United Nations, 2003 (February), “UN Secretary-General names Fernando Henrique Cardoso, former
President of Brazil, to lead high-level review of Un-civil Society relations”, p 2
106
40
S. Florea
may be granted access to UN facilities, documents, and formal sessions where they can
interact with government officials, secretariat staff. They may also be provided the
opportunity of bringing oral and written statements enabling them to influence the decisionmaking process and results of the meetings.110
NGOs need to meet certain requirements in order to be granted with consultative status. Their
activities need to be relevant to the ECOSOC, they must have democratic decision-making
mechanisms, must have been officially registered for at least two years, and their primary
source of funding must come from national affiliates, individual members or other NGOs.111
There are two forms of accreditation112:
•
Temporary/conference accreditation, which is given to NGOs for one or two certain
conferences and ends when the conference is over.
•
Consultative status/ongoing accreditation granting a regular presence at the UN.
NGOs can apply for this type of status with the ECOSOC, the UN agencies, funds,
programmes or autonomous specialized agencies. The consultative status is divided
into three categories:
1. General consultative status is given to large NGOs active in most ECOSOC
activities. They may attend all meetings, “speak before delegates, circulate
statements and place items on the agendas. Every four years, they must submit
quadrennial reports on their contributions to the work and goals of the UN.”113
2. Special consultative status is given to NGOs active in a few ECOSOC
activities. The difference between the general and special consultative status is
that the latter are not allowed to place items on agendas and their written
statements are limited.
3. Roster consultative status is granted to NGOs that might at times provide their
expertise in specific areas and they may also have consultative status with one
of the UN specialized agencies. They may attend meetings but not enjoy any of
the other privileges granted to the NGOs with general and special consultative
status.
110
NGLS, 2003, “Intergovernmental negotiations and decision making at the United Nations- A guide p. 52
Ibid p. 54
112
Ibid
113
Ibid p. 53
111
41
S. Florea
NGOs focusing on a specific subject may apply for some form of consultative status with one
of the UN funds, programs and autonomous specialized agencies. When joined with the funds
and programs, NGOs are able to take part in their meetings and may address the Executive
Boards but can not participate in the decision-making.114
“These relationships vary considerably, from the World Health Organization and the United
Nations Food and Agriculture organization, which cooperate closely with and consider NGOs
integral to their work on a variety of fronts, to the International Monetary Fund, which has no
formal system of relation with NGOs.” The UNDP has recently activated a UNDP civil
society committee, while the World Bank NGO Committee is now undergoing a review. The
WHO cooperates and consults with many NGOs at different levels and agrees to NGO
participation in their meetings.115
The Department of Public Information (DPI) has formal links with NGOs through which
NGOs attain access to the UN Meeting Rooms, documents, and buildings. The DPI provides
access to official UN documents and conducts a large information programme that includes a
monthly calendar of events, and a monthly mailing of UN information materials and a weekly
news letter.116
3.3 The strengths of NGOs
“NGOs exist primarily, if not solely, to provide relief from suffering and, in today’s world, to
try to bring about sustainable development, addressing the failures of governments and
society as a whole.” 117
The main strengths of NGOs are knowledge, expertise, networking capabilities, spirit,
creativity, commitment, and the many years of operation in post-conflict settings. These
strengths have been acquired by NGOs due to their close proximity with the grassroots and
most often their long presence in the same area.118
114
Ibid p. 54
United Nations, 2003 (May), “UN System and Civil Society: An inventory and Analysis of Practices”
116
NGLS, 2003, “Intergovernmental negotiations and decision making at the United Nations- A guide p. 56
117
The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, October 2001,”Comfortable with chaos: working with UNHCR and
the NGOs; reflections from the 1999 Kosovo refugee crisis
118
Interview with Mrs. Kanyoro
115
42
S. Florea
In addition and as a positive side effect, by working closely with the locals, NGOs provide
training and new ways of thinking. The locals involved in NGO activities are thought how to
manage on their own and become independent from external support.119
Moreover, International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) have worked to increase
the capacity of local NGOs and to show the importance of cooperation. Local NGOs through
right guidance and training can contribute significantly to improve the effectiveness of
democratic governance by increasing levels of civic participation. They can easier target
youth, women, and the disabled due to their knowledge of indigenous culture and
languages.120 An example of this is the Catholic Relief Services who have carried out projects
dealing with the management and capacity building of local NGOs hiring Macedonian staff to
provide training and technical assistance to various centres in the Serbian part Kosovo.121
Neutrality is an additional strength of NGOs. In post-conflicts states most often the root cause
of violence is oppression and discrimination based on religion, language and/or ethnicity. Due
to the lack of representation of all citizens, NGOs such as Medicins Sans Frontier, CARE and
the Red Cross are needed on the ground without taking sides.122
NGOs provide societies individual nurturing and encouragement as well as independence
through a bottom-up approach. By working with individuals at the grass-root level is one of
the NGOs main strengths.123 For these reasons NGOs tend often to be trusted by the people
and are familiar with their values, traditions and culture. This enables them to easier
understand the needs of the people and therefore easier target specific needs as well as the
root causes of problems.124 YWCA serves as a perfect example of this. The organization, as
many others such as World Vision and the Red Cross, use locals as the majority of staff for
their in-country offices. 125
NGOs do not suffer from the same bureaucratic illness as many other international
organizations. When on the field, NGOs are given the authority from the home-based head
119
120
121
Interview with Mrs. Kanyoro
Interview with Mrs. Kanyoro
http://www.interaction.org/kosovo/index.html
122
The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, October 2001 ”Comfortable with chaos: working with UNHCR and
the NGOs; reflections from the 1999 Kosovo refugee crisis htm
123
Ibid
124
Interview Tom Getman
125
Interview with Mrs. Kanyoro
43
S. Florea
quarters to make decisions enabling them to act more timely. Consequently, they can focus on
specific issues and solve them.126
NGOs have throughout time always been in favor of cooperation with other international
partners witch gives them the advantage of reaching out to a greater number of people and
informing them of the actual happenings on the field and headquarters. 127
The Christian Reformed World Relief Committee in Kosovo (CRWRC) started its activities
in Kosovo 1999 through the Alliance for the Rehabilitation of Kosovo (ARK), a partnership
of six specialized agencies including Bethany International Services, Dorcas Aid
International, International Aid, Partners for Christian Development, Reformed Church World
Service.128
At the end of its funding period, the alliance was taken over by a new NGO called Ruth. Ruth
was run by Kosovoars previously employed by the former ARK members. Its area of focus
includes health care, food security and agriculture, income generation, education, women's
issues, and community and institutional development and participation.129
Their networking capabilities have been developed over time due to the need of other
cooperating partners helping them to help others in need. “Most of the key NGOs are used to
working with the UN. Multi-national and multi-lingual organizations such as MSF, World
Vision and OXFAM are truly world-wide, with well established contacts, both between each
other and into governments and civil structures.”130
Many NGOs do not have the protection and security the UN provides for its staff. Thanks to
their burning desire to help NGO personnel risk their lives working in dangerous areas. In
126
127
128
129
Interview with Mrs. Kanyoro
Interview with Mrs. Kanyoro
http://www.interaction.org/kosovo/index.html
http://www.interaction.org/kosovo/index.html
130
Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, October 2001 ”Comfortable with chaos: working with UNHCR and
NGOs; reflections from the 1999 Kosovo refugee crisis
118
the
Laurence, Tim, Commodore, “Humanitarian Assistance and Peacekeeping: An Uneasy Alliance?”, Royal
United Services Institute for Defence Studies, Whitehall Papers Series, No. 48.
44
S. Florea
instances where the situations might seem hopeless they try to provide the highly needed help
to the people.131
NGOs have the capabilities to effectively mobilize public opinion through their close
relationship with the media. “Whatever the rights and wrongs of individual NGOs, they
together with the media, have become searchlights, illuminating and drawing attention to
particular causes and conflicts, and influencing both the participants and the outside world
community. Between them they are often the catalyst for a military deployment in the first
place”.132
As NGOs mainly survive on funds from their members and those interested in their area of
work they frequently struggle with their finances, especially if the NGOs are small in size.
Due to their limited budget NGOs rely significantly on volunteers. The large numbers of
volunteers involved in NGO activities is a significant strength of these organizations showing
the dedication and pure interest of their staff. This is the backbone of concrete results where
time has no meaning but only the results.133
In comparison to the UN, NGOs have the freedom of voicing their opinions and making
decisions without further implications. Every decision the UN makes goes through
governments. Governments act in their interest and therefore impede many decisions from
being made at the appropriate time or at all. The Kyoto Protocol and the US’ long-lasting
refusal to ratify it is one example. IN comparison, NGOs act in the interest of the people and
do not suffer from the same bureaucratic illness.134
The UN has to respect state sovereignty. The Secretary General cannot be partial but the
persistent voices of the NGOs have contributed to many changes. And yes, NGOs do make a
difference through their demonstrations and constant pressure for change. “The UN and
governments are like the big and strong elephants of Africa that fear nothing. However a
single bee flying into their ear constantly buzzing and irritating them can stir them up making
them act in ways they otherwise would not. The NGOs have a very similar effect on the
governments’ and UN’s behavior and agendas.”135
119
Interview with Mrs. Kanyoro
133
Interview Tom Getman
Interview Mrs. Kanyoro
135
Interview Mrs. Kanyoro
134
45
S. Florea
The involvement of NGOs has contributed to the conferences ability to reach consensus in
difficult policy areas. These actions led to a preparatory process by the UNCED (UN
Conference on Environment and Development Collection- Agenda 21), which was teaching
the activists how policy was made at both national and international levels. The outcome
showed the importance of NGOs as essential stakeholders for sustainable development.136
The most common and successful reconstruction activities undertaken by NGOs in war-torn
societies are: training of local NGO staff in countries, conducting demining operations;
provision of public services such as water, sanitation, shelter repair and construction;
encouragement of agricultural rehabilitation to achieve food security; managing health
clinics;137 demobilizations of soldiers; resettlement of refugees and IDPs (Internally Displaced
Persons), and other activities designed to promote reconciliation.138 At the beginning of the
conflict in Kosovo, the OXFAM team placed in Northern Macedonia, Southern Albania and
Kosovo comprised of experts in water and sanitation. These experts had previous experience
in such situations and knew what was required. WFP placed in the same setting moved and
distributed enormous quantities of food.139
NGOs and Civil Society actors have successfully dealt with priority areas of UN concern and
have also been active in directing international attention to issues such as poverty reduction
and human rights as well as convincing governments to give more serious attention to other
matters of concern. In this way, NGOs and Civil Society actors have increased public
understanding, sharpened policy-making and encouraged more concentrated international
efforts to deal with global issues. The NGOs and Civil Society actors have demonstrated with
time to have a collective power not only in influencing agendas to shift policy makers and
shape public opinion but also in setting them.140
136
United Nations, 2003 (May), “UN System and Civil Society: An inventory and Analysis of Practices” p. 6 and
(www.ciesin.org/datasets/unced/unced.html)
137
Interview with Mark Bowden
138
Ibid
139
The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, October 2001,”Comfortable with chaos: working with UNHCR and
the NGOs; reflections from the 1999 Kosovo refugee crisis
140
United Nations, 2003 (May), “UN System and Civil Society: An inventory and Analysis of Practices”
46
S. Florea
3.4. The weaknesses of NGOs
“I see a United Nations keenly aware that if the global agenda is to be properly addressed, a
partnership with civil society is not an option; it is a necessity.”141 Secretary-General, Koffi
Annan
As there are numerous positive aspects of the NGO involvement in the field of post-conflict
states in reconstruction there are also negative aspects. The issues and criticism, concerning
the NGO involvement in the UN activities are multi-faceted arising from both the UN and
governments. It is easy to take sides but the present world has changed and the most powerful
actors playing in the international arena- the governments by themselves or as one body- the
UN have come to the realization that today’s issues cannot be solved without collaboration
among all actors.
However what is required from the governments, the UN and donors is the recognition that as
they have weaknesses so do the NGOs. As they have been criticized over and over so have
NGOs. The same way the UN agencies are a blend of professional and amateurs, effective and
non-effective, efficient and inefficient, so are the NGOs. Most importantly however it is that
the strengths of NGOs are being recognized. New ways of improving each others operational
methods can only take place by interaction, and the identification of problems, weaknesses
and strengths.
The main issue in post-conflict reconstruction has been identified as coordination and
cooperation amongst the parties involved. This issue concerns NGOs as much as any other
actor active in this field. 142 With regards to the NGO activities, the need for coordination with
UN bodies to ensure sustained transition must be achieved.143 This process needs to take place
“within a single and integrated strategy that shifts the analytical perspective from symptoms
of the crisis to its underlying causes”144. The parties involved in post-conflict reconstruction
activities need to share a common vision of an “end state” and to have shared goals. This fact
141
NGLS, 2003, “Intergovernmental negotiations and decision making at the United Nations- A guide” p. 48
UNDG/ECHA, 2003, “Towards an Implementation Plan: Draft synthesis of issues, lessons learned and
preliminary recommendations”, p2
143
Ibid p3
144
Ibid
142
47
S. Florea
has through time and lessons learned proven to be imperative for successful post-conflict
response however it has not yet been achieved.145
Nevertheless, this is not the sole issue related to or faced by NGOs in reconstruction activities.
“Taken to extreme they can be self-indulgent, too focused on their particular human issue
and, living within a “rights-based” culture, they can be resentful of control, morally arrogant
and blind to the dark side of individual human nature; often their heart rules their head.”146
3.4.1. NGOs and governments
The fact that most governments in post-conflicts states if existent, are unstable and weak
results in a strengthened donor-NGO relationship. Most often this matter contributes to a
tense government-NGO relationship where governments feel threatened by NGOs and as a
result become hostile towards them by impeding the desire for cooperation between the
two.147
The NGO donors most often show reluctance in working with government counterparts148 due
to the fact that the majority of governments if existent do not show their own commitment in
reconstruction efforts, i.e. Angola spending most of the money it received on the military.149
Another reason for this cause is the lack of transparency leading to uncertainty of how and
where the funds are going to be used. This criticism, even if very often directed towards
NGOs, is highly applicable to the work of the UN.150
In addition, the demand of government accountability raised by NGOs is another question
elevating concerns among the governments. NGOs demand higher government accountability
while governments consider they are the legitimate representatives of society given that they
were elected. Governments also feel that the demands of the NGOs and Civil Society actors
are unrealistic and unreasonable and if attempted to by the UN, the results would imply
fundamental changes reaching beyond the UN Charter.151
145
ibid
The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, October 2001, ”Comfortable with chaos: working with UNHCR and
the NGOs; reflections from the 1999 Kosovo refugee crisis
147
Interview with Mark Bowden
148
Interview with Luigi Migliorini
149
ibid
150
Discussion with Richard Alderslade WHO
151
Interview Mrs Kanyoro
146
48
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Moreover, the growing numbers and diversity of NGOs raises concerns within Member States
and governments. The increasing number of NGOs has been regarded with fear and anger by
many. One forgotten aspect highly relevant to the criticism towards NGOs is the fact that
NGOs do not speak with one voice. Governments seem to believe that a few is enough but
each and every one of them deal with different areas. In comparison to the governments that
have their officials included in one body and the UN which is seen as one body consisting of
numerous departments, the NGOs are not one body with one voice. Each is a body of its
own.152
NGOs are meant to speak for the people and bring to the surface issues that are ignored or
forgotten. They voice critique against governments questioning their accountability and
putting a pressure on them to act in the interest of the people respecting human rights and the
environment. They have been crying out for the injustice of child labor, trafficking of persons
and equality of women amongst many other things. They hold to account the consciousness of
the governments and the UN and therefore the criticism of NGOs is quite large.153
3.4.2. NGOs and resource distribution
“Action in any sphere of international assistance has repercussions in the recipient’s society
going beyond those that were foreseen and intended by the NGO.”154 Evidence of this
statement can be found in various activities conducted by NGOs.
In some cases payment in form of tariffs or taxes has to be made by the NGOs to the military
groups within the countries in exchange for the permission of delivering humanitarian
assistance. These direct payments are criticized to contribute to the support of armies and
subsidize the conflict.155 As in many other instances these criticisms do not only apply to the
work of NGOs but also to the UN agencies. Secondly, the UN needs the consent of
governments to enter their territory.156 In urgent cases, NGO aid in the form of water, food,
medicine, clothing, etc is much needed and readily available while the UN aid may take some
time to arrive or not arrive at all when needed.
152
Ibid
Ibid
154
Aall, Pamela, Crocker, Chester, A., Hampson, Fen, Osler, , 2001, “Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of
Managing International Conflict”, p638
155
Aall, Pamela, Crocker, Chester, A., Hampson, Fen, Osler, , 2001, “Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of
Managing International Conflict” , Chap. 37
156
Discussion Richard Alderslade WHO
153
49
S. Florea
Furthermore, the resources brought into the countries by NGOs are sometimes stolen and are
at other times in the wrong hands. Whether the resources are used by the civilians or by
armies due to the lack of cooperation between NGOs and governments, the governing bodies
and army commanders are relieved from the burden of supporting the population and soldiers.
This then results in the freeing of internal resources for the war efforts.157 This criticism does
not only apply to NGOs but could happen to any UN convoy.
Moreover, by affecting the resource distribution, NGOs can aggravate the tensions in the
countries. This can be done by the employment of some but not others based on their
qualifications of what the NGOs might need. Development work targeted towards a certain
group even if a disadvantaged minority group subject to discrimination, can worsen
intergroup tensions. For example, some ethnic groups might be better skilled in agriculture
than others and without NGOs being aware, their employing of that particular group increases
tensions.158
Furthermore, NGOs can also have a negative impact on the development of the situations in
war-torn states through the media. By using pictures of war atrocities in order to raise funds
for their activities, they dehumanize one group of people in the minds of the public thereby
making the peace process more difficult. Nevertheless, these reports dealing with crimes
against humanity have also had positive effects. They have at numerous times pushed the
international community to act faster then they would have and therefore saved many lives.159
3.4.3. NGOs and funding
The fact that many NGOs work within a specific area of expertise and are usually small in
size allowing them to work faster without the obstacles of bureaucracy, attracts many donors.
However, the negative side lies in the high risk of dispersion, which NGOs often suffer from.
On the other hand, it is very difficult to put the government in charge with greater local
ownership of strategies in the post-conflict phases and at the same time find ways of holding
157
Aall, Pamela, Crocker, Chester, A., Hampson, Fen, Osler, , 2001, “Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of
Managing International Conflict”, p. 641
158
Ibid
159
Aall, Pamela, Crocker, Chester, A., Hampson, Fen, Osler, , 2001, “Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of
Managing International Conflict”, 641
50
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it accountable. One such example is Bosnia which ten years after the Dayton Peace
Agreement is still governed by the High Representative, essentially an imperial proconsul.160
Holding the government accountable is one of the main responsibilities of NGOs but if weak
they are not able to fulfill this function. The funding therefore generally goes through an
international organization such as a UN agency, department or programme, which has
credibility and is further sub-contracted to an NGO.161
The UN in-country operating agencies are concerned with both local and international NGOs
(INGOs). The local NGOs can mainly be used in medium and long-term projects, while they
have little experience and need coaching. Moreover, local NGOs are highly dependent and
fund-orientated therefore tending to distance their focus from their area of expertise to those
areas that are mostly funded (also described as waving on existing trends).162
This phenomenon can also be applied to the INGOs. The difference here is that INGOs have
experience in the field and are dynamic in their work. Another negative aspect of INGOs is
the fact that some tend to lean more towards a business and therefore enter the private sector.
With these regards, there are two phenomena of distortion that can be described:163
1. NGOs often wave on existing trends. The UN agencies complain about facing
difficulties in finding the right NGOs for the projects lying outside of the trends.164
This concern is true in some but not all cases. Nevertheless this fact does not have to
be seen as a weakness but merely as a vulnerability, since many NGOs face
difficulties receiving funds for their projects. On the other hand some NGOs are
government initiated aiming at receiving international financial support from such
institutions as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, called
GONGOs.165
160
Discussion with Richard Alderslade
Interview with Sofia Carrondo
162
Interview with Sofia Carrondo
163
Interview with Sofia Carrondo
164
ibid
165
Interview Mrs. Kanyoro
161
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2. NGOs who take on projects under a specific name while working on other activities
not included in the project.166 It is true that some do not fulfill their purpose but look
only for personal profit. These NGOs are usually established by one or two individuals
using “NGO-language” when formulating its documents and are called My Own NGO
(MONGOs). Their performance is poor and it does not follow up. The reason behind
lies mostly in the fact that they do not have staff holding them accountable for their
work. Thus very small NGOs are questionable.167
Nevertheless, there are also those NGOs that even if making profit, do their job. They do so
by training people, especially the youth by showing them how to set up businesses.168
Time has been regarded as a negative aspect of NGOs when carrying out their projects. They
have been criticized for not completing their work.169 This criticism is a generalization which
should be questioned. Businesses are known to criticize NGOs. However NGOs most often
than not do not have the resources Shell for example would have. If the NGOs are donor or
project focused and/or contracted then of course they cannot stay longer than was planned.
This is however not their error but the contractor’s.170
166
Interview with Sofia Carrondo
Interview Mrs. Kanyoro
168
Ibid
169
Interview David Atwood
170
Interview Mrs. Kanyoro
167
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4. CONCLUSION
The change in the nature of war and the increasing amount of conflicts has put a pressure on
the international community to find more efficient and if possible less time consuming
methods of resolving these issues.
The current conflicts are based on ethnicity, religion and linguistic differences. Belligerents
no longer target only combatants but whole groups of peoples and leave societies and regions
with destroyed infrastructure, no legitimate governments and extremely poor living standards.
The tools previously used by the international community are no longer adequate. As a result
the present tools used in post-conflict settings have developed from peace-making operations
and negotiations to peace-keeping and peace-building operations. These operations were
thought to take place one after the other but it has recently been recognized that in order to
achieve the set goals these operations need to take place simultaneously.
The emergency/relief, transitional and reconstruction phase consists of a combination of postconflict operations and are not linear in nature. In order to avoid inefficiency, loss of funds
and time, these phases need to be recognized as interrelated. The actors involved are forced to
find new ways of strengthening their relationships and only by joint efforts based on
cooperation can the expected results materialize.
The international community aims not only at bringing war-torn societies back to their normal
state prior to the conflict but also to establishing a society with functioning democratic
institutions based on the rule of law and respect for human rights.
The reconstruction phase has been acknowledged to start somewhere in the transition from the
relief and emergency period. The transition phase is most often triggered by a cease-fire
agreement, peace negotiations or by a peace process led by the international community. In
this period the humanitarian assistance operations are winding down while the reconstruction
efforts have begun or are about to take place. Societies in transition periods are neither at
peace nor in conflict. Thus the state is weekend and at high risk of relapse into conflict and
violence. For this reason the arrangements in the state made by the international actors need to
be sequenced in order to provide a ground for the local government to continue on its own.
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The main identified issues faced by the actors working in this area deal with the coordination
and cooperation of agencies, organizations and their activities and projects as well as that of
the donors. Agencies do not always work in the exact same direction at the same time
therefore a need for a common shared vision of the “end-state” has proven to be vital for a
successful post-conflict response. The transitional phase and reconstruction activities need
further clarification in order to be recognized by the donors.
Through the experiences gained and lessons learned, the UN has come to recognize the
importance played by NGOs and CSOs in reconstruction of war-ton societies. The NGO
community has through time increased in numbers and is presently active in most areas of
international fieldwork. Their presence as well as the respect it has received by the UN
Secretariat and the Member States started to increase two decades ago. They have through this
period of time demonstrated their abilities to influence agendas and shape public opinion as
well as to be essential stakeholders for sustainable development.
As a result, reform processes within the UN concerning the involvement and methods of
cooperation with the NGO community are taking place. The importance of NGOs within the
UN system is not necessarily reflected by the UN’s desire to cooperate with them but rather
the changing world and the demand that comes along with it. The UN is increasingly
recognizing the important role NGOs play as operational partners especially in the field. Their
strengths of being close to people, having their trust and receiving first-hand information
about what is needed on the field is of importance if not essential for the UN bodies involved
in reconstruction. Moreover their expertise, creativity, spirit and ability of making individual
decisions, if necessary, are aspects that the UN bodies due to their heavily bureaucratic
system lack.
So what is the role of NGOs in post-conflict reconstruction? They represent, as described
through their strengths and clearly declared in the UN Secretary- General Koffi Annan’s
statements, “…the new global people power”. Their role is to represent the people and in the
best way, to protect them from oppression, discrimination, and try to help them help
themselves to improve their lives.
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5. RECOMMENDATIONS
With regards to the improvement of the work taking place in the transition and reconstruction
phase, the first step should be taken by NGOs in an effort to organize themselves. NGOs
should establish a system similar to the one of the UN where the organizations would be
categorized and establishing different departments depending on their area of expertise and
regional focus. Each department should then develop an INGO and local NGO section. This
system would in aid the improvement of cooperation and coordination among the NGOs as
well as improve their efficiency, accountability and transparency.
A department should be established to work with the ECOSOC and DPI focusing on the
improvement of cooperation between NGOs and the UN. The UN agencies and NGO partners
should then initiate common approaches under this coordinating body which should be
undertaken by the UN and in comparison to previous attempts, the efforts should continue and
results should not be expected to materialize over night.
This could be achieved primarily through a strengthened relationship between the UN and
NGOs both at the headquarters and in the field. Secondly, the INGOs in partnership with local
NGOs should be given the responsibility to bring awareness to the locals due to the trust they
are given by local communities, their creativity, spirit and capability of making fast decisions.
Nevertheless the UN should try to find ways of not imposing its bureaucratic system on the
NGOs in the field. If this happens, the NGOs would be as time inefficient as the UN can be at
times, which would take away one of the main strengths of the NGOs.
Using local initiatives and community participation, inter-agency collaboration enables one to
successfully implement projects at any stage of the transition period in a society. For
successful achievements of projects and activities the local structure and needs, the power in
the communities and individuals should be taken into account. Moreover better rationalizing
of the use of the resources through bottom first approach should be established.
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ANNEX:
COUNTRY STUDY- KOSOVO
57
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Balkan region has suffered for more than a decade of disintegration due to its conflicts in
former Yugoslavia. As a result a number of areas formerly part of Yugoslavia have
established own autonomy such as Croatia, Bosnia- Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Slovenia.
What is left of former Yugoslavia is now called Serbia and Montenegro including the
Province of Kosovo.
Since the end of 1990’s Kosovo is trying to gain own independence and undergoes a time of
ethno-religious tension between the Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs. Currently the
territory of Kosovo is a de facto UN protectorate and the present international community is
carrying out a number of peace-keeping and peace-building operations, and reconstruction
activities.
Through my stay in Kosovo I have had the opportunity to learn about the political,
economical and social issues and also gained first hand knowledge on the obstacles faced by
the UN agencies and NGO community in their efforts of reconstruction. My visit in the
Province of Kosovo and Belgrade has been one of the main reasons for choosing this area as a
country study.
2. BACKGROUND
Basically Serbia is presently experiencing two transitions: one post-conflict after the internal
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990’s, and the second after the Dayton Peace
Agreements of 1995. The latter is a more conventional transition towards liberal democracy
and free markets, with an ultimate aim of EU membership and will not be discussed in this
project.
In early 1990’s, the socio-economic situation in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(SFRY) began to deteriorate. It was traditionally based on industry, mining and agricultural
activities. The difficult transition from being a Communist state in 1991 and moving towards
democracy was followed by a disintegration of the FRY culminating in a war in Bosnia and
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Herzegovina. The climax of the situation was reached at the end of the1990, with the 1999
Kosovo crisis and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention.171
After the democratic changes in Serbia in October 2000, authorities of the Montenegrin and
Serbian republics started to renegotiate their relationship and resulted in transforming the
former centralized federation into a loose union of the republics- now called “Serbia and
Montenegro”. The union of Serbia and Montenegro has a combined population of 10.6
million, where Serbia is the larger republic with around 95 percent of population.172
The current Serbian government, democratically elected and internationally recognized, was
established on the 25th January 2001. It inherited a country weakened by war- a bankrupt
state, devastated economy, limited civil confidence and a suspicious international community.
Despite the government’s program of economic reforms, the unemployment rate almost
doubled bringing significant decrease in official incomes and growth of the ‘grey’ or
‘informal’ economy.173
A new Constitutional Charter and associated Implementation Law were ratified in January
2003. Under the new Charter, the two republics have a joint Presidency, Parliament, and a
Council of Ministers however the economic, fiscal, monetary and customs policies operate
separately.174 The new Constitutional Charter stipulates that after a three-year period a
referendum will be called to determine whether the two republics will remain together.
Neither of the documents addressed the status of Kosovo, which until 1999 was a province of
Serbia. In 1999, following the NATO intervention and signing of a peace accord, the UN
Security Council passed Resolution 1244i, placing Kosovo under the interim administration of
the UN Mission in Kosovoii.175
Kosovo is a small province with a population of 2 million, before the recent conflict. It is
placed in the southern part of Serbia bordering with Albania and Former Yugoslav Republic
Of Macedonia (FYROM). Until 1990 Kosovo was an autonomous region in the Socialist
171
Vujnovic, Melita, Dr., 2003 (September), “Country strategic health needs report and priorities for WHO
collaboration 2004-2010: Serbia and Montenegro”
172
World Bank, 1999, “World Bank Group: Transitional Support Strategy for Kosovo”
173
Vujnovic, Melita, Dr., 2003 (September), “Country strategic health needs report and priorities for WHO
collaboration 2004-2010: Serbia and Montenegro”
174
Ibid
175
World Bank, 1999, “World Bank Group: Transitional Support Strategy for Kosovo”
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Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), with predominantly ethnic Albanian population.
Under SFRY’s 1974 constitution, Kosovo had its own judiciary, police, and education and
health policies, however following the constitutional changes in the 1990’s its autonomy was
significantly restricted. Serbia took over the control over the Kosovar police and economic
policies and ethnic Serbs replaced ethnic Albanians in many public sector jobs, resulting in an
establishment of Kosovo Albanian parallel network of services and institutions.176 The
outcome resulted in an armed revolt of the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army) towards the
Serbian government, which started in 1997-1998.177
2.1. The Kosovo conflict
The conflict in Kosovo started in 1997-1998 with the armed revolt of the KLA who pledged
to protect the Albanian people and win independence for Kosovo. The acts of the KLA were
results of long-term frustration towards the oppressive Serbian government and were triggered
by the Serbian assault of the non-violent student demonstration in August 1997 in Pristina.
The Serbian security forces responded to the revolt in a brutal and violent way, attacking
Kosovo Albanian villages, looting the houses, driving out the Kosovo Albanians, and as time
passed and the situation worsened killing and executing the Kosovo Albanians. Within
months from its conception the KLA had grown in numbers and was in control of some
territory in Kosovo forcing the Serbian security forces to withdraw. However the KLA was
technologically inferior to the Serbian forces, disorganized and weak. Their acts came to serve
as an excuse for the Serbian authorities to continue with their expulsion and assassination of
Kosovo Albanians.178
The Serbian leader, Slobodan Milosevic, used the already protracted disturbances and
instabilities between the Serbs and Kosovo Albanians as tools securing his personal political
position. For him, the dispute was not only about Kosovo but also about the growth of his
own personal power and authority over Yugoslavia. Up until January 1999 the conflict was
reported by the Serbian authorities to the international community as being under control but
was however internationalized after media reported human rights violations in form of
executions of forty-five Kosovo Albanians in the small town of Racak. This incident came to
bring the international community to the realization that serious involvement in searching for
176
ibid
Mertus, Julie, A., 1999, “Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started War”
178
Power, Samantha, 2002, “A problem from hell- America and the Age of Genocide”, Basic Books, NY p. 445
177
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a diplomatic solution was not enough and enforcement of diplomacy by military threat was
imperative if diplomacy was to succeed.179
Since the 1999 crisis, a provisional government has been elected in the UN Administrative
Province of Kosovo however the area is still under the UN Resolution 1244.180
Presently Kosovo is undergoing a transition from relief to reconstruction and development.
The emergency phase in Kosovo appears to have ended in the late 2001-early 2002, when the
transition towards sustainable development and livelihood to the Kosovars started. The
conflict was stopped by the NATO intervention 1999 and is presently being held under their
supervision, thus Kosovo is neither at peace but nor in conflict.
There are numerous issues faced by the actors involved in the post-conflict Kosovo in further
development. The main issue is the lack of a final resolution on the political status of Kosovo.
Due to the existing tension between the two ethnic groups in the area, the international
community involved in this field is not prepared to make any major decisions involving the
political status of Kosovo. A decision made by the international authorities might result in
offending either the Serbian population or the Kosovoar population, aggravating the situation.
Therefore the main decisions are being put on hold and the international actors are waiting for
the matter to be decided.181 Currently, first talks on the future status of Kosovo are taking
place, however the ethnic parties have not found a common ground on which an agreement
could be reached. 182
3. RECONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENTS IN KOSOVO
The main aim in every post-conflict reconstruction setting, including the Province of Kosovo
is to: restart and/or further develop public administrations to serve as solid grounds for future
functioning democratic institutions, to rebuild infrastructure, and develop functioning, open
and transparent market economies. All these objectives make part of the three main areas of
priority in post-conflict reconstruction mentioned above. These are reconstituting legitimacy
of the government, re-establishing security within the state and rebuilding effectiveness.
179
Schnabel, Albrecht, 2000, “Kosovo and the challenges of Humanitarian Intervention”, UN University Press,
NY p.35
180
Interview with Luigi Migliorini
181
Interview with Conor Lyons
182
Financial Times October 15 2003
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3.1. Reconstituting legitimacy of a governing body
One of the main challenges facing the international community in reconstruction of war-torn
states is the creation of a legitimate government that includes and represents its whole
population.
Regardless of the final resolution of Kosovo’s political status the efforts to develop local
democratic institutions and processes have had to continue. In January 2000, through the
formation of a Joint Structure of Interim Administration (JIAS) composed by 20 departments
lead by one local and one international co-head serving on a Council of Ministers whose
mission was to establish and implement socio-economic policies for Kosovo, the first steps
towards more democratic systems of governance were taken. A Constitutional Framework for
Interim Self-Government has been sanctioned in May 2001 aiming to establish Provisional
Institutions of self-Government (PISG).183
3.1.2. Elections and Power Sharing
The interim municipal councils set up in 1999, immediately after the conflict were replaced in
2000 by assemblies selected through democratically held municipal elections. Under the
UNMIK these municipalities have the authorization over economic development, budget
approval, health, education and a number of other social services. Only three out of thirty
municipalities were not successful. These municipalities were consisting of a Serb majority
that boycotted the election process.184
The issues faced in the development of such municipalities arose in those with equal
representation of the two different ethnic parties or a large mix of the different existing
minorities in Kosovo. The progress within these municipalities was delayed due to
discussions between the ethnic groups related to the procedural nature rather than
development related issues facing the communities. Other issues have concerned the lack of
experience and know-how and narrow party interests.185
183
UNDP, 2002, “Human Development Report”
ibid
185
ibid
184
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In addition, many municipalities “recruit candidates for what are defined as civil servant
positions based on political considerations”186. This is opposing the principles set up by the
international standards where municipal servants are not to be appointed on a party
association but on professional criteria.187
The first democratic elections for members of a new Kosovo Legislative Assembly were held
in November 2001 and selection of a President were supposed to take place a month later but
were delayed due to minor reoccurrences of violence throughout the Province. In early 2002
the new President was elected as well as the appointment of a new Government. Since then,
gradual transfer of power from the international administration to the Kosovoars has been
taking place. Presently the international government acts as advisor to the local government,
however some competencies and responsibilities are still reserved for the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) appointed to oversee UNMIK activities. The
total transfer of power to the central government will however take place only once the
international mission in Kosovo is completed and the status of Kosovo has been resolved.188
The Resource Centre in Prizren (NRC Prizren) serves as a perfect example of NGO
engagement in this area. The NRC Prizren is a local Kosovoar NGO. In 2002 the NRC
Prizren along with eight other NGOs implemented a project called the "Monitoring the work
of the elected officials to ensure transparency and their accountability to the electorate". The
main objective of this project was to enhance democracy. This task was carried out through a
number of activities namely monitoring Municipal Assembly meetings as well as the work of
the municipal departments and directorates; providing information to elected officials on
issues of concern for the local community; organising public debates with elected officials;
and verifying that the meetings were advertised and sufficiently attended by citizens.189
Additionally, the NRC Prizren provides support to other NGOs, citizens and community
groups. It aims to expand their operational and organisational capacities, through promotion
of greater participation of the public and training of managerial capacity. It serves as a
186
ibid
ibid
188
UNDP, 2002, “Human Development Report” p. 34-35
189
http://www.netdd.org/pz/en/activities/monitoring.htm
187
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meeting point where networking and sharing of experiences between NGOs is enabled. It also
empowers links between NGOs and local government, donors and the business community.190
In regards to tensions between the different ethnic groups a large number of NGOs have
carried out projects focusing on reconciliation targeting youth, children and parents. The
Catholic Relief Services (CRS) carried out a Parent-School Partnership program bringing
communities together to identify and find solutions to their needs. This program focused on
children, education and schools.191
The NRC Prizren is involved in several other projects i.e. “Painting for Peace and Tolerance”,
a six-month multiethnic project involving Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo Serb, Ashkali and Roma
children. The project aims at promoting reconciliation amongst younger generations. The
project also resulted in the identification of new local NGOs as implementing partners.192
3.1.3. Development of the Civil Society
Strengthening the civil society sector is one of the most important component of a democratic
system and therefore very important in reconstruction. In post- conflict states the governments
are usually weak or non-existent. In these situations the role of civil society is greatly
increased.193
During the period of 1989-1998 Kosovo had around seventy active NGOs out of which five
were INGOs. They were initially formed focusing on human rights issues but slowly came to
expand to other areas. Since the1999 crisis the number of NGOs has increased presently
reaching above a thousand and is still growing.194
The World Vision for example is presently carrying out projects mainly dealing with the
promotion of peace by establishing relations with local communities and their leaders. They
have been present in Kosovo since 2000 and founded the Council for Peace and Tolerance
(CPT) consisting of nineteen voluntary members representing the Orthodox, Catholic and
Muslim religions. Their aim is to “collectively promote and build values of trust, security and
190
http://www.netdd.org/pz/en/background/background.htm
http://www.interaction.org/kosovo/index.html
192
http://www.netdd.org/fk-kp/en/index.htm
193
ibid
194
UNDP, 2002, “Human Development Report”
191
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enhanced quality of life for all citizens”195 by organizing civic education seminars and multiethnic children’s outreaches, establishing links of communication between the different
groups. The CTP has through its work established relations with UNMIK and a number of
other organizations such as NATO, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE), and local and international organizations.196
The local NGO named NRC Prizren, mentioned above, was established in association with
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) but became independent in
2000. It is in charge of a project named “Strengthening Civil Society”. The main objectives of
this project are “to strengthen Civil Society in Gjakovë/Ðakovica municipality by generating
and supporting local NGOs and coordinating their leadership”. The activities involved in this
project deal with provision of information and training support for local NGOs, and
strengthening the cooperation of NGOs with local authorities.197
Concern Worldwide in Kosovo completed its reconstruction of schools program in mid 2001
and has since laid greater emphasis on human rights and minority issues. Parallel to these
activities it has conducted capacity building activities with local NGOs.198
3.2. Re-establishing security
As mentioned earlier, re-establishing security refers to the rebuilding or strengthening of
systems in both the economic and political sphere. It is carried out through a combination of
reconstruction activities and DDR.199
In Kosovo the judicial system prior to the 1999 conflict was not based on the principles of the
rule of law and lacked a constitutional basis capable of holding offenders responsible for their
actions. Some of the ethnic groups in Kosovo were not protected by a fair judicial system.
The reconstruction of a legal system in Kosovo needed not only to be re-established but also
reformed in order to protect human rights.
195
A World Vision Journal of Human Development, First Quarter 2005, “ Preventing Violent Conflict- can
humanity move beyond band-aid solutions?” p. 21
196
A World Vision Journal of Human Development, First Quarter 2005, “Preventing Violent Conflict- can
humanity move beyond band-aid solutions?”
197
http://www.netdd.org/gj-dj/en/activities/strengthening.htm
198
http://www.interaction.org/kosovo/index.html
199
Brinkerhoff, Derick, W.,2005 Feb., “Rebuilding Governance in failed states and post-conflict societies”,
International Journal of Management, vol. 25, no. 1
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The development and functioning of Kosovo’s judicial system is currently under the authority
and responsibility of the SRSG. The same structures existent prior to the 1999 conflict was
restored including a Supreme Court, District, Municipal, and Minor Offence Courts as well as
implementation of disciplinary- corrective institutions.200
The international community has faced difficulties in terms of establishment of parallel
Kosovoar Serb judicial systems as a result of their resistant to take the necessary oaths before
the representatives of the international administration. However the international community
is in support of full and equal integration of judges and other judicial personnel.201
The appointment of international judges and prosecutors has taken place aiming at the training
and strengthening the professionalism of the locals, to further the efficiency and independence
of the system and support the implementation of the rule of law.202
The civilian oversight of security in the Province of Kosovo is undertaken by the NATO
troops called Kosovo Force (KFOR). After the 1999 crisis the KLA was demobilized and
transformed into the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) given the responsibility of civilian
emergencies.203 The overall civilian protection is however the responsibility of the
international civilian police force called the CIVPOL. Due to the initial issues faced by
CIVPOL, such as language barriers and little knowledge about the laws in Kosovo, a local
police force called the Kosovo Police Force (KPS) was set up.
The KPS was and still is under training by the CIVPOL in all kinds of areas, starting from
directing traffic to crime related issues. In regards to the KPC, many locals gave the
impression of not being very found of them, saying that even though they have changed name
it is still the same persons with the same opinions that are at work. I guess the agreement
signed between the SRSG, NATO and KLA transforming them into KPC was the
international community’s way of initiating a sense of security among the different ethnic
groups as well as integrating a large number of ex-combatants into society.204
200
UNDP, 2002, “Human Development Report” p.38
ibid
202
Ibid p. 39
203
ibid
204
UNDP, 2002, “Human Development Report”p. 40
201
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Due to such issues as lack of proper representation and security of minorities, NGOs like the
International Catholic Migration Mission in Kosovo (ICMC) initiate programs dealing with
areas of focus they believe to be overseen or not sufficiently attended. The ICMC has been
active in the Province since 1999 aiming to assist the most vulnerable returnees, provide
advocacy, protection monitoring, and re-integration assistance. Through their teams of
caseworkers and advocacy advocates the ICMC has worked together with the UNHCR in the
monitoring of minority security and protection issues.
3.2.1. Reconstruction of homes and job generation
Reconstruction of homes and generation of job opportunities are very important parts of
reconstruction and cornerstone of re-establishing security and DDR. In order to accomplish
successful reintegration of ex-combatants, refugees, minorities and IDPs, homes and work
places need to be made available.205
Kosovo suffers of high unemployment rates among its youth and/or females. Due to the slow
privatization impeded primarily by a resolution of Kosovo’s final status but also the outdated
production system, under investment and lack of foreign investment.
In regards to homes, some of the large international and regional organizations namely the
UNMIK, World Bank, European Union in partnership with donor governments (i.e. US, Japan
and Norway) and NGOs have been responsible for this task.
United Methodist Committee On Relief in Kosovo (UMCOR) has been active in the Province
since 1999. It has assisted Kosovoar refugees in the neighbouring countries through
emergency relief. UMCOR has since made a transition to longer-term development and
peace-building objectives presently managing areas of shelter, food security and agriculture,
and social and community development.206
Stabilization Through Income Generation is one of UMCOR’s projects initiated in 2001
focusing on provision of credit, training, and information resources to micro and small
entrepreneurs. “The project aims to identify gaps in the economy and target them with small
credits and grants. One of the primary objectives of this initiative is to work with UMCOR's
205
206
UNDP, 2002, “Human Development Report”
http://www.interaction.org/kosovo/index.html
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ongoing conflict resolution and peace-building projects to create cross-ethnic economic
linkages to all communities in Kosovo”.207
Kosovo Enterprise Program (KEP) is a project carried out by the IMCM in Kosovo. It focuses
primarily on women, providing induction training and micro-loans to low income and small
business entrepreneurs aiding them to start up their businesses.208
3.3. Rebuilding effectiveness
In order to rebuild effectiveness of the government, rebuilding the institutional and physical
infrastructure providing for the basic needs of the people is necessary. Restart of national
economy, health, education and transportation are all parts of this area.
“The common ambition of the people of Kosovo, UNMIK and the international community,
goes beyond the return of Kosovo where it was in the beginning of 1989 or even 1998. Our
ambition is to put Kosovo on the track of sustainable economic and social development which
offers the people of Kosovo a future in Europe as citizens of Europe.”209
The economy in Kosovo is more or less sustained by the international community but progress
is visible in many areas. For instance the banking system was non-existent in the initial postconflict stages. Since then the international community has managed to rebuild and activate
seven licensed banks, an inter-banking system of payments and a twenty-four hours banking
service with automatic teller machines.210
Health and education has undergone tremendous changes. For example Kosovo, even prior to
the conflict lacked any kind of mental health care system. Prior and during my stay in Kosovo
the WHO in partnership with donor governments, international organizations, local and
international NGOs had already laid the ground for such system.
MSF has been active in the Province of Kosovo for more than a decade. Presently MSF is
conducting its projects in Mitrovica, Skenderaj/Srbica and Vushtrri/Vushtrr municipalities.
207
http://www.interaction.org/kosovo/index.html
http://www.interaction.org/kosovo/index.html
209
UNDP, 2002, “Human Development Report”p. 73
210
UNDP, 2002, “Human Development Report” and interview with Conor Lyons
208
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These activities include mobile clinics, mental health, equipment and support, reconstruction
and rehabilitation of medical structures, well cleaning and water sanitation for schools.211
It has also been involved in different project concerning the IDPs in Serbia and Montenegro
and their return to the province of Kosovo. In 2003 the MSF was carrying out a project
aiming at the improvement of IDPs’ situation. This was done through the provision of psychosocial support and small-scale rehabilitation.212
In regards to the activities conducted in Mitrovica, the MSF has been working in both parts of
the divided municipality. Even though concerned about the withdrawal of several
international organizations due to attacks on humanitarian staff, the MSF decided to remain
active in the area. The organization runs mobile clinics and mental health activities in North
Mitrovica while supporting the municipality’s hospital.213
“An important component of Kosovo’s efforts to develop a strong economy involves its
infrastructure, including energy, transportation and telecommunication systems.”214
The International Rescue Committee (IRC) as well as Mercy Corps International have been
active in Kosovo since early 1990’s. The IRC have been engaged in assisting community and
local institutions in rebuilding the Kosovoar infrastructure. The Mercy Corps International has
been following an Integrated Rural Development Strategy based on civil society, agricultural
and economic development, and transitional social services initiatives.215
Besides the, and imperative for successful reconstruction of the health, education and
economy sectors, the telecommunication, transportation and energy infrastructure needs to be
strengthened and improved. Activities in these areas are carried out and even progress is
visible, however much more needs to be done.
211
http://www.msf.org/msfinternational/invoke.cfm?component=article&objectid=751B7B22-B3D6-11D4B1FA0060084A6370&method=full_html
212
http://www.msf.org/msfinternational/invoke.cfm?component=article&objectid=7AB00326-F177-4FC28CA0E0DDC2A17B5E&method=full_html
213
http://www.msf.org/msfinternational/invoke.cfm?component=article&objectid=751B7B22-B3D6-11D4B1FA0060084A6370&method=full_html
214
UNDP, 2002, “Human Development Report”p. 79
215
http://www.interaction.org/kosovo/index.html
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3.4. Issues in reconstruction
As experienced in post- conflict reconstruction of states, Kosovo is not an exception in
regards to lack of cooperation and coordination amongst the actors involved in the field. Due
to lack of an existing functioning body or mechanism, cooperation appears to be stronger
when established at personal levels as opposing to institutional levels.216
Why is coordination and cooperation important? Coordination and cooperation is a necessity
for successful post-conflict reconstruction. “It maximises the utilisation of resources and helps
all players involved to better achieve their goals”217.
Many of the issues in the Kosovo post-conflict reconstruction arise from the lack of
coordination and cooperation. In order to make the two possible; information sharing and
transparency of the various organizations agenda are needed. In regards to the NGOs in
Kosovo, many have been hesitant to share information because they see each other and
sometimes also the UN agencies as competitors for the available donor funds.
Another issue related to coordination in Kosovo is that the NGOs do not have a place within
the structure of the UNMIK’s international coordination efforts. These efforts are organized
under UNMIK’s four pillars; humanitarian, economic, institution building and governance,
and civil administration action. Due to the large numbers and great diversity of cultures and
agendas within the NGO community, coordination proves to be a difficult task. This could be
solved through unified NGO efforts aiming to organize and coordinate themselves.218
Presently the development phase in Kosovo is suffering of funding fatigue. This issue as
many others is linked to the lack of cooperation and coordination amongst the actors involved
in the field. There has been enormous funding in the emergency phase, which has not been
used in an optimal way.219 Many of the activities in the immediate post-conflict period in
Kosovo were dealing with institution building and should have been taking place in the
present transition period rather than during the emergency phase. Thus presently there is a
216
Interview with Sofia Carrondo
ibid
218
http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?ID=1039
219
Interview with Sofia Carrondo
217
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lack of funding for the activities, which currently are imperative while in the past where not
applicable and therefore unsuccessful.220
3.4.1. Gaps within the transitional phase in Kosovo
As mentioned the gaps in the transition from emergency and relief to reconstruction start after
crisis end and widens as emergency assistance declines. Going back to the fact that the funds
were misplaced already from the first phase after the crisis ended, and as the emergency phase
is over, the gaps have widened, resulting in lack of funding for present needed projects.221 All
the previously-mentioned gaps can be found and identified as follows:222
1. The institutional gaps: The UNMIK has the transitional authority to run Kosovo
through the establishment of own institutions differing from the ones set up in the rest
of Serbia leading to confusion and difficulties in decision-making and acting at an
appropriate time, results in the slowing down of efforts to move from relief to
reconstruction and development. Perfect examples of institutional gaps are the
municipal operation UNMIK established including the issuing of own passports and
the Kosovoar vehicle registration, both only recognized in Kosovo resulting in
movement restriction.
2. The political gaps: The final resolution of the political status of Kosovo, which is the
main problem faced by all actors involved in the situation due to conflicting interests,
defines this type of gap. The political status of Kosovo cannot be decided by the
international community due to various reasons as above mentioned.
3. The authority vacuums: Although the UNMIK has been given the authority from the
UN, the local authority in Kosovo is vague and weak and therefore limited in its
capacities to affect the established policies. In spite of the international presence the
law and order in the present Kosovo is weak.
220
Interview with Sofia Carrondo
Interview with Sofia Carrondo
222
Interview with Sofia Carrondo and Conor Lyons
221
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4. The synchrony gaps: This type of gap is linked to the political gap and is also
identified by the disagreement and dissatisfaction by both ethnic parties in regards to
the final political status of the Serbian province of Kosovo.
5. The sustainability gaps: Unsustainable economy is the basis of this gap. Presently the
international community is sustaining Kosovo’s economy. Without their presence
Kosovo would at this point in time collapse.223
223
Interview with Conor Lyons
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4. NGOs IN KOSOVO
Since the ending of the crisis, the number of NGOs in Kosovo has increased from 65 local
NGOs and 5 INGOs to nearly 2500 local NGOs and 500 INGOs.224 They are spread
throughout Kosovo’s territory focusing on human rights and humanitarian aid, psychologicalsocial aid, education, economic aid, citizen education, and political lobbying, targeting both
youth, women, the disabled, ethnic groups and business community.225
The Humanitarian Community Information Center (HCIC) was set up aiming at provision of
information and coordination of tasks and activities of international organizations, INGOs and
NGO working in the field. 226Due to the speed of increasing NGOs and INGOs in Kosovo, the
goal was not achieved. Lack of coordination amongst the actors involved led to further
complications in the planning of both the emergency and the reconstruction phase.227
The UN agencies and INGOs active in the field have worked to increase the capacity of
Kosovar NGOs. Their importance as operational bodies is recognized by the UN agencies.
Additional work is however needed to show Kosovar officials the importance in cooperating
with NGOs.228
The UNMIK is positively disposed to local NGOs but there are no established procedures for
provisions of grants.229In these regards, the NGOs in Kosovo have experienced issues of
inclusion into the UN. They express that the information exchanged in the field has often been
one-sided. While they have been able to provide the UN agencies with essential information
from the locals, the UN agencies have not pursued the expected strengthening of
cooperation.230
224
Interview with Conor Lyons
UNDP, 2002, “Human Development Report”
226
www.reliefweb.int/hcic
227
Interview with Gerry McWeeny
228
ibid
229
2000 NGO Sustainability Index USAID
225
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The UN agencies faced various difficulties in their work with the local NGOs and INGOs due
to a gap between the levels of organization of a smaller number experienced NGOs, active in
the area before the war, and a large number of NGOs that have formed since.231
Firstly local NGOs have little experience and need coaching and can therefore be used in
medium and long-term projects. Secondly, while the INGOs have dedication, experience in
the field and are dynamic in their work they can be prone to wave too much on existing
trends. This fact might result in difficulties in finding INGOs appropriate for the projects
lying outside of the trends. Thirdly, some NGOs tend to lean more towards a business and
therefore enter the private sector.232
Two phenomena of distortion to be identified in these regards:
1. NGOs who are highly donor funding dependent resulting in turning their focus away from
their areas of specialty towards the mostly funded activities.
2. NGOs who take on projects under a specific name while working on other activities not
included in the project.233
While the experienced and established NGOs have developed clear missions and strategic
plans, and permanent, high quality staff, the majority of newly established NGOs are more
likely to design their initiatives in response to donor priorities. Moreover, they are likely to be
forced to hire staff on a temporary basis to fulfil the needs of particular projects because of
their small budgets and donor dependency.234
Having said this, major donors prefer to fund projects proposed by international
organizations. Although the thinking behind the donors rather working with NGOs might be
politically correct since the strengthening of the civil society in Kosovo is highly needed,
231
2000 NGO Sustainability Index USAID
232
Interview with Sofia Carrondo
232
Interview with Sofia Carrondo
Barnes, Catherine, 2004, “GPPAC Discussion Paper: UN-CSO Interaction in Conflict-Affected
Communities”, http://www.gppac.org/documents/GPPAC/Research/UN-CS_interaction/Regional_experiencespaperCB_29Sept04.doc
232
234
2000 NGO Sustainability Index USAID
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NGOs are less capable of resisting the mainstreaming trends. Therefore the funding is
generally going through an international organization such as an UN agency, department or
programme, which has the UN credibility and is further sub-contracted to an NGO.235
Moreover, the level of technical advancement within the NGO sector has improved
dramatically since the end of the war. The more established NGOs have concrete technical
bases, while those in smaller cities and in rural areas do not have access to even the most
basic equipment.236
Attempts have been made by several international organizations to establish an infrastructure
supporting the NGO sector development. The main issues have dealt with lack of access to
space for meetings, office equipment and libraries. Nevertheless, the local NGOs have been
successful in establishing information sharing structures and promotion of cooperation within
the sector but also with the government and private sector. Strong coalitions have been
established especially among NGOs active in the women rights field and those involved in
election monitoring.237
4.1. Service provision
Over the past decade the Kosovoar civil society has had to provide health services, education,
protection of human rights and other public services due to the lack of government support.
The post-conflict influx of international organizations has however disempowered the role of
local NGOs in the Province. This has been raising concern about the future provision of such
services once the international community leaves the area.238
However, even if the local NGOs cannot fully meet the community needs in terms of
production of goods and services they serve as an important source of information regarding
community needs to the international organizations.239
Due to lack of contact between the local NGOs and their government prior to the war the
NGO sector has acquired the habit of opposing the government rather than lobbying it for the
implementation of certain policies. Having said that, they have little experience in advocacy
235
Interview with Sofia Carrondo
2000 NGO Sustainability Index USAID
237
2000 NGO Sustainability Index USAID
238
2000 NGO Sustainability Index USAID
239
2000 NGO Sustainability Index USAID
236
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and need to develop capacity to fully participate in decision making especially as the
government structures evolve.240 Nevertheless, the INGOs and local NGOs contribute
significantly to improve the effectiveness of democratic governance by increasing levels of
civic participation.241
The UNMIK and OSCE as well as INGOs have contributed to their training by maintaining
good communication with the local NGOs as well as by consulting with them on different
policy issues. “Local NGOs were also actively involved in reviewing and commenting on
UNMIK’s NGO regulation and the content and nature of reporting for public benefits.”242
240
2000 NGO Sustainability Index USAID
Interview Gerry McWeeny
242
2000 NGO Sustainability Index USAID
241
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5. Conclusion
Numerous conflicts and internal strives have been taking place in the Balkans over the past
decade, forcing the region to undergo significant changes and along with them so has the
international community. Most recently the Former Republic of Yugoslavia is known as
Serbia and Montenegro with the Province of Kosovo under the administration of UNMIK.
After the 1999 crisis Kosovo has been taken significant steps towards sustainable democracy
and livelihood for the local people. This has been accomplished by and large through
successful reconstruction efforts. These include development of local democratic institutions
based on the rule of law and respect for human rights as well as bringing greater awareness of
the importance of a strengthened civil society to the locals and government officials.
Secondly, reconstruction of judicial systems and effective police force, generation of job
opportunities and homes have been initiated. Through these efforts security is being reestablished to serve as a basis of reintegration of refugees, IDPs and ex-combatants. Lastly,
state effectiveness is being improved through the reconstruction of infrastructure, health and
education systems and institutions serving as basis for meeting the people’s needs and restart
of economy.
Even if largely successful, the reconstruction phase has not progressed without impediments.
The main issues faced in by the international community are firstly, the lack of final
resolution of Kosovo’s status. The UNMIK is still the main governing body and full power to
the democratically elected government will be transferred only when the status is finalized.
Secondly lack of coordination between the international actors and a weak relationship
between the UN and NGOs.
The implementation of a coordinating body of reconstruction activities has been established,
however not been highly successful. Other issues linked to the poor coordination of activities
are remaining tensions between the ethnic parties, lack of foreign investment, and funding
fatigue. Lack of funding is the result of narrowly planned activities.
Since the ending of the crisis, the amount of NGOs in Kosovo has increased from 65 local
NGOs and 5 INGOs to nearly 2500 local NGOs and 500 INGOs. Frustration has been
experienced both by the UN and NGOs when attempting to cooperate. Improvements need to
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be made in order to accomplish the goals set for Kosovo and the local institutions and
government officials need to be made aware of the significant contribution NGOs can deliver.
The importance of NGOs as operational partners is nevertheless increasingly recognized by
the rest of the international community. They are spread throughout Kosovo’s territory
focusing on human rights, and humanitarian aid, psychological-social aid, education,
economic aid, citizen education, and political lobbying, targeting both youth, women, the
disabled, ethnic groups and business community.
In these regards, the NGO work carried out in Kosovo is of essential importance to the
reconstruction of post- conflict environments. They are active in all areas of reconstruction.
Moreover their close proximity to the grassroots is of major importance. The major
international organizations even if large in size and budget would have not been able to cover
the areas dealt with by the NGOs, especially not at the grassroots level.
Even though mistakes have been made the reconstruction in Kosovo is progressing and
regardless of its final status the efforts to establish sustainable peace and development will
continue. This period therefore identifies further learning and maturing of the actors playing
in the international arena of war-torn states. The current issues arising in reconstruction are
yet to be solved but nonetheless improving. The mistakes made in the past seem to serve
today as a base for future improvement.
i
Under the UN Security Council Resolution 1244, Kosovo remains a province of Serbia, but is to have
‘substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration’ while the ‘sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
FRY’ continue to be recognized. It also provides that UNMIK is to be replaced over time with democratic selfgoverning local institutions.
ii
The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was established by the UN resolution 1244 as a transitional
administration. The powers vested in UNMIK- and its head, the Special Representative of the Secretary General
(SRSG)- include ‘all legislative and executive authority… including the administration of the judiciary’.
UNMIK has four “pillars” or areas of accountability: (i) humanitarian issues; (ii) civil administration; (iii)
democracy building and elections; and (iv) reconstruction recovery and economic development.
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Websites of interest:
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Interviewed persons:
NGO SECTION/DESA
Michelle Federoff
Daniel Perez
OCHA
Mark Bowden (Senior Coordinator of UNDG)
QUAKER UN
David Atwood- Director Representative Disarmament and Peace
UNDP KOSOVO
Sofia Carrondo- Deputy Resident Representative
Conor Lyons- Coordinator of the UN Volunteer Programme
WHO PRISTINA
Dr. Serap Sener- Head of Office
Ardita Tahirukaj- Health promoting Schools Adviser
Gerry McWeeney- Healthy Environment Programme Manager
WHO BELGRADE
Luigi Migliorini M.D.- Head of Office, WHO Belgrade
Dr. Melita Vujnovic- Liaison Officer, WHO Belgrade
WHO NEW YORK
Richard Alderslade- Senior External Relations Officer, Health Policy
WORLD VISION
Tom Getman
WORLD YWCA
Mrs Musimbi Kanyoro- General Secretary
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