Iran Yemen Posch FINAL

Iran’s relations with Yemen: Ideological and strategic aspects Walter Posch, LVAk Vienna Although Iran’s relations with Yemen go back centuries, they have never been part of a common historic narrative, strong enough to serve as basis for a political alliance. This holds true for Imperial Iran as well as for the Islamic Republic. Thus, the historic presence of the Zaidi sect of Shiaism in the Caspian provinces and the fact that Zaidism is the prevalent Shiite confession in Yemen was a well-known but without political relevance. See for instance Moḥammad Kāẓem Raḥmati, “Mirās̱-e farhangi-ye Zeydiyān-e Irān va enteqāl-e ān beh Yaman,” in: Tārikh-e Irān, 63/5 Winter 1388/2010, pp. 73-101. An exception can be made for the high Shiite clergy, the marja’iyya, in Iraq in the early 1921, when they recognized Fayṣal, son of Ḥusayn the sharif of Mecca as king of Iraq, who as a scion of the Bani Hāshim and therefore to the Prophet’s extended family as well as the family’s Zaydi origin was well known. Decades later, the same line of reasoning could be found in Richard Perle’s strategy paper “a clean break” prepared for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Richard Perle (et al), “A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm,” Washington DC 1996 < https://web.archive.org/web/20140125123844/http:/www.iasps.org/strat1.htm> Writing under the impression of Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship in Iraq (and perhaps the failed Shiite uprising in 1993?), Perle suggested that the King of Jordan could have some “ideas” regarding the Iraqi Shiites because he “hails from the Prophet’s family”. Yet the Iranians did not bestow too much importance on either position. At the begin of the 2000s in the wake of the US led intervention of Iraq, the political role of the Shiite confession in relation to Iranian strategic interests was discussed in several publications. François Thual’s 1995 book on Shiite geopolitics was one of the few to mention Yemen and the Zaidites as an element of what he understood to be Shiite strategy. François Thual, Géopolitique du chiisme, Paris 1995 (2. Auflage 2002) S. 101-105 ; Zhe’upulitik-e shiˁeh, übersetzt von Katayun Basser, Paris 1998, S. 111-116. His book was republished in 2002, a Persian translation followed in 2008. Back then, the Iranian embassy in France paid some attention to it. Yet the Iranian interest focussed on nominal Shiite groups like Turkey’s Alevites and similar heterodox branches of 12er Shiism, but not in Yemen. This changed with the outbreak of the war in Yemen. Even so, confessionalism would not dictate Iran’s course of action, geopolitics would. Iranian geostrategy With the revolution victorious, Iran faced the same dilemma as any post-revolutionary regime, namely, how to reconcile revolutionary fervour with strategic realism and the national interest. Iran’s Islamists developed a principle called “expedient interests for the regime” (maṣlaḥat-e neẓām) meaning that ideological bias must not destroy the overall system. In geostrategy Iran applies a simple 4x3 formula, namely the combination of four ideological postures with three geographic entities. For an in-depth analysis of the ideology-strategy nexus regarding Iran see Walter Posch, “Ideology and Strategy in the Middle East: The Case of Iran,” Survival, September 2017, pp. 69-96. These are: traditional Shiism where Iran plays the role of patron to all Shiites worldwide, traditional Iranian nationalism driven by the national interest; revolutionary political Islam in the sense of Khomeini, which the Iranians portray non sectarianism, but anyone else understands it as radical Shiite, and tiers-mondialisme i.e. the ideology of the 3rd World or the global South which originates in anti-colonial movements of the 1920s and was a cause célébré of the anti-imperialist Left in the 1970s and later. The Iranians apply the said four principles pragmatically – maybe opportunistically – to three geographic regions: Iran’s immediate neighbourhood, the Middle East, and the Global South. On occasions, it is hard to tell whether the Iranian nation states dons its ideology in order to promote strategic aims or whether the ideology draws on the resources of the Iranian nation state. The long Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) had a twofold effect on Iran’s revolutionary decision makers; first, they rather opportunistically perfected the combination of ideological fanaticism for domestic mobilisation with strategic realism following the needs of the battlefield. This went so far, that Iran would conclude arms deals even with Israel, whilst at the same time attacking it as a mere “Zionist entity”. Secondly the concept of the “resistance axis” (meḥvar-e moqāvemat) was developed. On the axis of resistance see Walter Posch, The Third World, Global Islam, and Pragmatism. The Making of Iranian Foreign Policy, (SWP Research Paper) Berlin April 2013, pp. 25-30. Originally, this idea was tactical in nature as it was born in the trenches: Iranian deep penetration units would cross the frontline and get into contact with the anti-Saddam Shiite Iraqi resistance. These actions were rather ideological in nature and served intelligence gathering more than military action. However, contacts built up back then would serve Iran well after the US toppled Iraq in 2003. After the Iran-Iraq war, the political language of said axis was adapted to formulate a broader strategic setting. Here again the Iranians combined an ideological framework for a contradictory political reality. With the war being over, Teheran viewed Iraq rather as a competitor than a threat but at the same time the Iranians wanted to keep their old anti-Saddam alliance functioning. This alliance included Syria, Iran’s primarily partner, but also Lebanese Hizbullah, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and HAMAS, far from cordial, all of them have complicated relations among each other. Iran managed the inherent tensions of this ramshackle and diverse alliance by reframing the “axis of resistance” as a strategic tool, a kind of tiers-mondialiste cum Islamist outlet directed against Israel whilst embracing the “Palestinian Cause”. This allows Shiite and Persian Iran to overcome its isolation in the Arab-Sunni world of which Palestine is part of. At the same time, the resistance axis, whilst outwardly anti-Israeli, unites the main anti-Saudi forces and thus strengthens Iran vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia. Iran and Saudi Arabia The competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia There are several useful studies on this topic, for instance Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, Iran-Saudi Arabia Relations and Regional Order, (Adelphi Paper 304) London 1996. is well known. A typical Iranian take of this relationship is the following: “For some time now the two countries oppose each other in regional strategic and geopolitical affairs. Until now, patience and restraint of the Islamic Republic of Iran was of the kind to prevent the region from gliding into destructive wars. [Saudi] Arabia and Iran oppose each other not only in Yemen but also on the issues of Iraq, Syria, Bahrayn, and in political fields such as the nuclear program, the economy, especially in the control of the oil price and its traditional role in OPEC.” ˁAli Jamāli, “Barrasi-ye ta’s̲ir-e jang-e ˁArabestān dar Yaman bar amniyat-e Jomhuri-ye Eslāmi-ye Irān,” Majalle-ye Siyāsat-e Defāˁi, 25.100 Autumn 1396/2018, pp. 153-196. This competition goes beyond aspects of identity such as the Sunni – Shia divide or the ethnic difference between Arabs and Persians. It runs even deeper than mere ideological competition between the revolutionary, republican Islamic Republic of Iran, and the monarchy of Saudi Arabia, although the ideological aspect became the central element and main axis of confrontation after Iran’s revolution in 1979. See for instance Saleh al-Mani’, “The ideological Dimension in Saudi-Iranian Relations,” in Jamal S. al-Suwaidi (ed.): Iran and the Gulf. A Search for Stability, (The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research) Abu Dhabi 1996, pp. 153-176, pp. 157, 158.. Even so, the heart of the matter is still classic competition among regional powers. Because even before the Islamic revolution, when Iran and Saudi Arabia were both in the Western camp, bilateral relations were extremely competitive. For instance, Saudi Arabia refused to send representatives to the presumptuous festivities for the 2.500 years celebrations of Iran’s monarchy in 1972. Whilst Saudi Arabia and Iran avoided direct confrontation after the revolution, their competition was aggressive enough to affect the whole region. Tehran perceived the Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan in 1998 not only as defeat on behalf of a Pakistani-sponsored group in the neighbouring country, but also as a strategic victory for Riyadh. When in 2003 the US-led coalition toppled the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the suppressed Shiite-Arab majority came to power in Baghdad, many followers and supporters of the Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei ware among them and quickly staffed key ministries such as the Ministry of the Interior. Thus, Saudi Arabia saw the toppling of the Iraqi dictator two years after the toppling of the Taliban in Afghanistan not as elimination of a radical leader and an American success, but as a victory for Iran. In the following years Iran’s basic assumption for the region, namely the fall of all secular regimes by the ballot or the bullet came true. What the West erroneously dubbed as “Arab Spring”, Iran – equally erroneously – called an “Islamic Awakening” namely the brake-down of dysfunctional mostly secular highly militarized dictatorships. Therefore, the Iranians hoped for policy changes in their favour. Two policies would prevent this from happen. The first was one centred on Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood. Initially, Iran’s Islamists had good relations to the Muslim Brotherhood from the 1950s onwards and from the 1990s onwards, one of the brotherhood’s most important offshoots, HAMAS, was Teheran’s ally. Yet Tehran’s hopes were dashed, when Turkey and Qatar embraced the Muslim Brotherhood to the chagrin of Saudi Arabia, making Iran a much less appealing partner for the Brotherhood. The outbreak of the civil war in Syria further weakened Tehran’s standing with the Muslim Brotherhood due to Iran’s continuous support for the Assad regime. About the same time, Saudi Arabia successfully managed to frame Iran’s “axis of resistance” as a “Shiite crescent” further isolating Iran in the region. Finally, Riyadh gained the strategic initiative when it toppled the Muslim Brotherhood-led government of Egypt and paved the way for a staunch nationalist and secularist military based new government, thus cutting Turkey’s and Qatar’s roles in the Arab world to their natural size whilst Iran became more and more enmeshed in the quicksand of Syria. It is in this context of Iran losing and Saudi Arabia gaining the initiative, where the situation in Yemen necessitated more attention of both sides. Thomas Juneau Thomas Juneau, “How War in Yemen Transformed the Iran-Houthi Partnership,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 2021, p. 1-22. underscored the impact of Saudi Arabia’s military intervention in Yemen on the Houthis relationship with Iran. By 2015, his argument goes, “ties between Islamic Republic and the armed groups based in northwest Yemen were growing but limited. Yet by early 2021 the Houthis had become one of Iran’s most important partners in the constellation of no-state armed groups […]”. Juneau, art.cit., p. 1. According to the same author, there were limited contacts prior to 2004 although some Zaidi scholars studied in Qom in the 1980s and 1990s. Juneau, art.cit., p. 1. This assessment is correct as far as military and intelligence relations are concerned. However, whilst not being the defining element in Iranian strategic decision-making, the ideological factor still plays an important role and helps explain the relationship between the two entities. Thus, before we discern the geostrategic aspects of Iranian-Yemeni relations we have to assess the ideological side of it. The ideological dimension One reason for Iran’s initial reluctant behaviour was its – illusionary – hope for a greater role of Yemen’s 12er Shiites. Immediately after the revolution, Tehran expected the emergence of a homegrown 12er-Shiite community in Yemen. This was not a pure fantasy, because the revolution positively affected Yemen’s scattered 12er Shiites communities who would congregate and reorganise. It is fair to assume that most of them originated from other countries. However, in the years following the 1979 revolution Yemeni converts (shiˁeyān-e rahyāftegāni) from various confessions became the majority among the country’s 12-er Shiites. Centred around Māreb, they were in their majority intellectuals, physicians, professionals, clerics and academics. Yet the existence of such a small group of 12er Shiites in Yemen inspired by the Islamic Revolution, which raised some hopes among certain circles in Tehran, was strategically insignificant, because in demographic terms Yemen’s 12-er Shiites remain a quantité négligeable. Politically and culturally, they would be close to the Jarudiya, the very branch (ferqeh) of Zaidism, which is closest to the Twelver-Shiites. Ḥoseyn Aḥmadi-Sefidān and Moulud Saˁidi Aṭhar, “Barrasi-ye kaneshhā-ye siyāsi-ye goruhhā-ye shiˁi dar Yaman,“ Moṭāleˁāt-e siyāsi-ye jehān-e eslām, vol. 10.1, 1400/2021, pp. 107-128, here p. 112, 117, 118. For instance, just as the 12er Shias do, the Jarudiyya too rejects the legitimacy of the caliphs before Imam Ali. Whereas all other Zaidi branches – Sulaymaniyya, Jaririyya, Butriyya and Salihiyya – accept them and are therefore widely regarded as the Sunna’s fifth “madhhab”. Türel Yılmaz Şahin and Damla Kocatepe, “İran’ın Güvenlik Politikasında Yemen’in Rolü: Tarihsel ve Mezhepsel Bir Deǧerlendirme,“ KMU Sosyal ve Ekonomik Araştırmalar Dergisi, 24(42), 2022 pp. 45-61, here p. 49, 50. The Houthis belong to the Jarudiya, therefore, most Iranian authors would argue, their ideological closeness to the Islamic Republic was a foregone conclusion. However, the very point Iranian authors make is the alleged revolutionary nature of Iran’s jaafarite Shiite confession. Hence, so their reading of events goes, zaidite Yemeni scholars who would come to Qom to study would become politicised with a clear regional political edge as soon as they read the works of Khomeini. The most important Yemeni scholars to study in Qom was undoubtedly Seyyed Badr ad-Din Ḥuthi. Iranian authors insist he was heavily (shadidan) under the influence of Khomeini and other leaders of the Islamic revolution and their political thinking. Hence, according to some Iranian authors, Badr ad-Din Ḥuthi “stood up against Wahhabism under the inspiration (elhāmgiri) and thinking (tafakkor)” of the Iranian revolutionaries. Aḥmadi-Safidān and Saˁidi-Aṭhar, art.cit., p. 122. Seyyed Badr ad-Din was “a great and high rank marjaˁ” (marjaˁ-e bozorg va ˁāli-qadr) in his own right who published several books, including a 12-volume tafsir of the Quran. Aḥmadi-Safidān and Saˁidi-Aṭhar, art.cit., p. 122. However, there is no proof that Badr ad-Din Ḥuthi had converted to 12er Shiaism or that he promoted Khomeini’s views, as his son Ḥusain would in later years. Bernard Haykel, “The Huthi Movement’s religious and political ideology and its relationship to Zaidism,” in Abdullah Hamidaddin (ed): The Huthi Movement in Yemen. Ideology, Ambition and Security in the Arab Gulf, London New York 2022, pp. 17-25, here p. 20. After his death, his son Ḥusayn al-Ḥuthi would continue his political work. Ḥusayn’s most influential tool were his malazim “speeches” where he popularized the views of Khomeini and Khamenei. The Iranians also credit him for spreading djafarite views among the Zaydis in region of Saada. Aḥmadi-Safidān and Saˁidi-Aṭhar, art.cit., p. 123. Yet one must not overlook the fact that Ḥusayn al-Ḥuthi spent years in the 1990s in Sudan pursuing Islamic studies. Hence, he was exposed to many radical Islamist ideologies and trends most of them very different from his own Zaidi tradition. Among them were jihadist trends as promoted by Al-Qaida and similar groups but also the writings of Khomeini. Haykel, art.cit., p. 20, 21. According to another quasi-official view in Iran, the Islamic revolution would positively affect the mentality and identity of those who embrace it. This is the argument of Piruz Hāshempur and ˁAli Moḥammad Ḥaqiqi, “Rābeṭeh-ye enqelāb-e eslāmi-ye Irān va maḥvar-e moqāvemat dar hoviyat-bakhshi,” Pazhuheshhā-ye siyāsi.-ye jehān-e eslām, 10.14 Winter 1399/2021, pp. 211-242. Like all revolutionaries hope for, this impact would result in a new revolutionary consciousness, consisting of the return to one’s own self or roots, support for the oppressed (maẓlumān), fight against Zionism, religious populism (mardomsālāri-ye dini), quest for justice, wish for independence, support for freedom movements, Islamic resistance, messianic expectation (mahdaviyat va enteẓār). Hāshempur and Ḥaqiqi, art.cit., p. 212. Furthermore, so the argument goes, the revolutionary mind-set would transform all Shiite communities in Arab countries form “forgotten Muslims” to politically cognisant and self-confident actors embracing a “revolutionary culture” (farhang-e enqelābi). Said “culture” is nothing but “Iran’s revolutionary soft power”, which is deeply rooted in religious Islamic convictions (eˁteqādāt). Hāshempur and Ḥaqiqi, art.cit., p. 221; Iran has a vast literature on “soft power” (eqtedār-e narm) and “soft war” (jang-e narm) all of which is derived from Joseph Nye and was translated into Arabic, in order to serve the needs of Lebanese Hizbullah and other sympathisers. For an adaption to the Yemeni context see Alexander Weissenburger, “The Soft War and the Past: The Huthi Movement’s Use of historical narratives as source of legitimacy,” Hamidaddin, op.cit., pp. 57-76. The “export” (ṣodur) of Iran’s revolutionary culture to Muslim, especially Shiite countries would automatically result in laying the base for an Islamic mentality and political ideology. Hāshempur and Ḥaqiqi, art.cit., p. 221. Ḥusayn al-Ḥuthi was the perfect example for this when he created the slogan “Allāhu Akbar, death to America, death to Israel, hate for the Jews, triumph for Islam”. Aḥmadi-Safidān and Saˁidi-Aṭhar, art.cit., p. 123: ; Hāshempur and Ḥaqiqi, art.cit., p. 230: Allāhu akbar, al-maut l-amrikā, al-maut l-Isrā’il al-laˁna ˁali-l-Yahud al-naṣr li-l-islām. According to Almahfali, this slogan was first heard on January 17, 2002 and is purely anti-Semitic. Mohammed Almahfali, “Transformation of Dominant political Themes from the founder to the current leader of the Huthi-Movement,” in: Hamidaddin, op.cit., pp. 37-55, here 43. In spite all similarities with the Iranian slogans, there is an important difference: the explicit curse of the Jews, which does not exist in Iranian revolutionary sloganeering because official Iran insists to be anti-Zionist, not anti-Semitic. Even so, the Iranians give themselves due credit for having bestowed the “core” (aṣl) of the slogan. Hāshempur and Ḥaqiqi, art.cit., p. 230. In the end, the Iranians make five points Iran’s Islamists had bestowed on the Yemeni Houthi movement: xenophobia (bigāne-satizi) meaning the rejection of Israel and the USA, Hāshempur and Ḥaqiqi, art.cit., p. 230. acceptance of Khomeinism, Hāshempur and Ḥaqiqi, art.cit., p. 231. political activism Hāshempur and Ḥaqiqi, art.cit., p. 233. organising cultural and social organisation in the spirit of the Islamic revolution, Hāshempur and Ḥaqiqi, art.cit., p. 234. revitalisation of Zaidism and spread of 12er Shiism. Finally, they make a pseudo-historic argument, when they put Iran on the origin on everything Shiite in Yemen: “The Iranians had played an undeniable role in bringing Islam to the people of Yemen and attracting them to the [12er] Shiite confession.” Hāshempur and Ḥaqiqi, art.cit., p. 236. In other words according to the Iranian’s view the Houthi’s embrace was inevitable, as it was historically determined. However, 12er Shiism was not a revolutionary ideology, it was on the contrary embracing patience and enduring suffering until the “promised day” (yavm-e maˁhud) of the appearance of the Mahdi. The politicization and revolutionization of Iranian Shiism would in all earnest start with the Khomeinist movement and its precursors and related currents. Other than Khomeini, Neˁmatopllāh Ṣāleḥi Najafābādi, a popular cleric familiarized traditional Shiism with revolutionary thinking in Iran, see Evan Siegel, “The politics of Shahid-e Jawid,” in: Rainer Brunner and Werner Ende (eds), The Twelver Shia in Modern Times, Religious Culture and Political History, Leiden – Boston – Cologne 2001, pp. 150-178. The Zaidis on the other hand look back to a long tradition of violent resistance against injustice and unjust rulers. Yılmaz-Şahin and Kocatepe, art.cit., p. 49. The difference lies in the concept of the mahdi and the emām which includes an imperative for supporting anyone who credibly fights injustice. The differences between the two confessions is well analysed through the concept of mahdi by Seyyedeh Fāṭemeh Ḥoseyni Mirṣafi and Seyyed ˁAbdollāh Dāneshi, “Bāzkhvāni-ye jāygāh-e mahdaviyat dar taḥaqqoq-e ḥokumat-e ˁadl az manẓar-e Zeydiyeh,” Faṣlnāmeh-ye ˁelmi-pazhuheshi-e enteẓār-e mouˁud, 71 Winter 1399/2021, pp. 51-68. The logical result of such a disposition is an imperative for uprisings. Hence, rather than understanding Iran as source and initiator of the Huthi’s political thinking, it may have well been the other way round; as Zaidis, Badr ad-Din Ḥuthi and his son Ḥusayn would have deliberately looked for a revolutionary tradition. Therefore, they would rather embrace the anti-imperialist ideology of Khomeinism, rather than 12-Shiite theology. It is also remarkable that Iran and Khomeini figured prominently in the speeches of Ḥuseyn, but are negligible in the discourse of his brother ˁAbdulmalik, who succeeded him when he was killed in 2004. This is in spite of Iran’s stronger involvement in Yemen affairs and its increasing military, political and economic aid for the Houthis. Almahfali, art.cit., pp.47-9. Iran and Yemen in the region Like anyone else, Iranian analysts too stress the important geostrategic position of Yemen as a gateway from the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea and the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf to the Horn of Africa. They are also well aware of the importance of the Bāb al-Mandāb waterway, for the Sumed pipeline and the Suez channel, as well as its importance for Saudi Arabia’s interests – the Saudis control several strategically important smaller islands belonging to Yemen, and according to the Iranians, would therefore never allow a successful Ḥuthi presence. Iran justifies its interest in the Bāb al-Mandāb with another aspect: the waterway’s importance for Israeli security and power projections. Jamāli, art.cit., pp. 165-168. Western analysts may disagree on this point; however, it is remarkable that Teheran needs to bring the Jewish state into the mix. Concerning Iran’s relations with Yemen, one can say the following: before the Islamic Revolution of 1979, imperial Iran eschewed close relations with both North and South Yemen. The only engagement in the region was with the Sultanate of Oman when in 1963 Iran help to suppress the Zhofar insurrection. After the revolution, the president of North Yemen ˁAli ˁAbdullāh Ṣāleḥ was the first to congratulate Khomeini. Yet with the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980, Ṣāleḥ would in accordance with GCC policy quickly side with Arab Iraq and even sent troops to support the Baathists. South Yemen too welcomed the new revolutionary regime in Tehran and both sides showed some goodwill gestures, especially since the South was neutral on Iran’s during the Iran-Iraq war. After the long war and the unification of the two Yemens, Tehran and San’a would sign some cultural and economic agreements but relations never really developed, mainly because Saleh valued the relations with Saudi Arabia and the GCC countries. Jamāli, art.cit., p. 173. When Iran embraced Yemen’s civil society protests from 2010 onwards relations with Saleh deteriorated. Furthermore, the important role of the Huthis and Ansarollah movement alerted Saudi Arabia, which understood their success as increasing Iranian influence. When Saleh’s successor Manṣur Hādi wanted to ameliorate relations with Iran, it met with fierce resistance of the GCC. Jamāli, art.cit., p. 174. This, in turn, caused Tehran to intensify its efforts regarding Yemen. Typically, for Iran it had to fit into a broader constitutional and analytical frame. According to article 10 of the Iranian constitution, which sketches out the principles of Tehran’s foreign policy, Iran has to observe three political and strategic aims: Increase and development of the economy, preservation of national security and territorial integrity Defending the Muslims and supporting liberation movements and hostility towards Israel Stabilising Islamic societies according to Shiite principles. It goes without saying the Houthis and Ansarollah perfectly fulfilled all three points of Iran’s principled foreign policy. But in the end, it was Tehran’s assessment of regional developments that necessitated increased Iranian involvement in Yemen, namely reading the “Arab Spring” as an “Islamic Awakening” and understanding said awakening as the begin of the decrease of Western influence in the region. Adding to this Riyadh’s alleged support for radical Sunni groups like Al-Qaida, Tehran decided to risk confrontation with Saudi Arabia, it might have avoided under normal circumstances. Jamāli, art.cit., p. 174. Thus, relations with the Houthis almost automatically were elevated to the strategic level. This does not come really as a surprise, because Iran shares land and sea borders with fifteen countries but has no natural friends and allies, hence it cultivates relations with resistance movements throughout the region. Iran counts the following organisations and resistance groups among its friends: Shiite groups in Iraq, Bahrayn, Lebanon, Shiites and other enemies of the Taliban in Afghanistan, Zaidis in Yemen, Kurds of Iraq and the Palestinians. Jamāli, art.cit., p. 175. With the continuation of the conflict, Iran’s main assumption, the decrease of Western and pro-Western influence in the region and the rise of revolutionary, pro-Iranian populist Islamism, has turned out to be wrong. Thus, Tehran is stuck in Yemen for two reasons: first, the Iranians want to prove themselves as a regional power capable to extend its influence. Ideological aspects such as Iran’s support for the resistance front, Jamāli, art.cit., p. 185. the Islamic awakening, Jamāli, art.cit., p. 186. and the spread of revolutionary Islamist thinking, Jamāli, art.cit., p. 187. are merely supporting its strategic position. Hence, Saudi Arabia’s resistance is equally a strategic necessity. Taking this situation as a point of departure, Iranian scholars Moḥammad Reżā Ḥātami and ˁAlireżā Beygi, “Chashm-andāz-e jang-e Yaman va peyāmadhā-ye amniyati-ye ān barā-ye Jomhuri-ye Eslāmi-ye Irān,” Faṣlnāmeh-ye pazhuheshhā-ye beynolmelali, 38 Autumn 1399/2021, pp. 65-90. have inferred four possible scenarios: Continuation: The most likely scenario is the continuation of the current tragic affairs, because the parties involved were incapable to find common ground, let alone a viable peace plan. On the contrary, tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran are rather to increase and involved parties such as Ansarollah are not yet exhausted. Ḥātami and Beygi, art.cit., p. 79. Dialogue: This would be possible if the international community finally decides to solve the crisis via dialogue. There are several points worth considering because they should be resolved beforehand. For instance, a dialogue only makes sense for Tehran if the international community recognises Iran as “a country influencing Yemeni affairs”, thus legitimizing not only its presence but its strong involvement. It is not understandable why Saudi Arabia should consent to such a preposition, when the point of the whole war was to come back to the status quo ante. Ḥātami and Beygi, art.cit., p. 81. Dissolution: Yemen could again be divided into a Northern and a Southern state. Such a scenario becomes likely whence Saudi Arabia realizes it cannot achieve its objectives in any other way possible. Ḥātami and Beygi, art.cit., p. 83. Iran would see a Saudi monitored or instigated dissolution as a threat to its interests, because Tehran has to assume that Riyadh would control all strategically important geographic choke points and use this position against Iranian interests. Ḥātami and Beygi, art.cit., p. 84. Referendum: This is the most unlikely scenario of all, because it would necessitate serious political preparations and administrative groundwork. Besides, Iranians are convinced their followers would come out strongest in any referendum and Saudi Arabia would resist this. Ḥātami and Beygi, art.cit., p. 84, 85. Interestingly, Iranian scholars hardly ever ask, what Teheran’s reaction would be, if a referendum would yield other results than the expected ones. 13