Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 52 (2001), 683±700
Has Chaos Been Explained?
Jerey Koperski
ABSTRACT
In his recent book, Explaining Chaos, Peter Smith presents a new problem in the
foundations of chaos theory. Speci®cally, he argues that the standard ways of
justifying idealizations in mathematical models fail when it comes to the in®nite
intricacy found in strange attractors. I argue that Smith's analysis undermines much of
the explanatory power of chaos theory. A better approach is developed by drawing
analogies from the models found in continuum mechanics.
1 Introduction
2 The problem of in®nite structure
3 ODEs, eliminating ®ctions, and the exploitation of phase space
3.1 Discovery in qualitative dynamics
3.2 `De®ctionalizing' strange attractors
3.3 The special exploitation argument
4 Wilson, Truesdell, and continuum mechanics
4.1 Wilson
4.2 Truesdell
5 Conclusion
If a theory were not simpler than the phenomena it was designed to
model, it would serve no purpose.ÐCliord Truesdell
1 Introduction
To a remarkable extent, the answer to the title question is yes: Peter Smith
[1998] explains much about that part of nonlinear dynamics popularly known
as chaos theory. On the other hand, there is one important aspect of chaotic
models that he instead explains away. Real systems, he argues, cannot have
the central property posited within such models. Understanding this
mismatch between model and reality is one of Smith's chief concerns and is
also the focus of this article.
Smith's Explaining Chaos is a wide-ranging introduction to the philosophy
of chaos theory. Many of the topics discussed in other, nonphilosophical
surveys are included: phase spaces, ordinary dierential equations (ODEs),
& British Society for the Philosophy of Science 2001
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fractals and strange attractors, mathematical models and real-world
applications, and the (so-called) routes to chaos. More importantly for
philosophers, it also covers many of the areas that chaos has touched in the
philosophy of science: scienti®c explanations, determinism-randomnesscomplexity, predictions, approximate truth, and the de®nition of chaos.
The most interesting and original discussion considers the role that `in®nitely
structured models can have in representing a messy world and explaining
natural phenomena' ([1998], p. 165). Smith argues that chaotic models are, in
an important sense, more complex and intricate than the physical systems
being modeled. How then can one treat such a model realistically? Indeed,
how can such models be useful at all? Smith's answer to this challenge misses
the markÐperhaps the only `miss' evident in the book. In the remainder of
this article, I ®rst show why it seems that special justi®cation for the use of
chaotic models is needed, and then consider Smith's proposed solution.
Section 3 presents three problems with this solution. Section 4 oers a
dierent view of models containing surplus structure that follows the
approach used in continuum mechanics. In the end, I argue that philosophers
and scientists should have no qualms about treating chaotic models like any
other. The intricacy found in such models is not as peculiar as it might appear
and defending this view is not as dicult as Smith takes it to be.
2 The problem of in®nite structure
Smith's argument about the use of nonlinear models starts with a challenge
that he ®rst raised several years ago (Smith [1991]). Chaotic models, he
shows, contain intrinsic falsehoods. Such claims are no longer radical. Several
in-depth analyses of physical idealizations have been in print for some time
now.1 But unlike frictionless planes and ideal circuits, Smith argues that the
falsehood contained in chaotic models is the very thing that makes them so
interesting. Chaotic models misrepresent nature at their core, not merely at
the periphery.
Some distinctions are needed before pressing on. Recognizing that the
word `model', like `law' and `theory', is ambiguous, Smith introduces some
helpful categories. Dynamical systems are sets of real-world objects with
identi®able states that change over time. These also seem to include idealized
systems. Dynamical equations are the sets of equations governing dynamical
systems. Smith's chief concern is with mathematical models, the abstract
geometrical structures that capture the state and behavior of dynamical
systems. These include trajectories, attractors, and repellors in phase space.
1
See for example Nancy Cartwright ([1983]), William Wimsatt ([1987]), and Ronald Laymon
([1989]).
Has Chaos Been Explained?
685
Let us now put the claim that chaotic models misrepresent nature more
precisely: chaotic mathematical models contain properties that do not
correspond to anything in the dynamical systems being modeled. The heart of
this misrepresentation is the `in®nite intricacy' found in strange attractors,
speci®cally their fractal structure (Smith [1998], p. 39). Unlike coastlines and
ferns, strange attractors are true fractals in phase space. Material objects are
at best fractal-like: self-similarity within some range. For example, given the
molecular nature of matter, the fractal geometry of a mountainside cannot be
supported at all scales. Eventually the fractal must give way to discrete atoms.
In contrast, phase space is composed of mathematical points. Each point in
the space represents a possible state of the system and can be represented by
an n-tuple of real numbers. n corresponds to the dimension of the phase
space. Each point belongs to a trajectory (or `orbit') that represents a possible
evolution of the system. A phase space with state trajectories is called a phase
portrait. In dissipative systems, the phase portrait often contains attractors:
sets of points toward which neighboring trajectories ¯ow. Chaotic evolutions
are associated with strange attractors in which trajectories exponentially
diverge from their neighbors.2 Trajectories within the basin of attraction
wrap around the attractor as t ! 1, giving a strange attractor its unbounded
fractal geometry. Fine-structure is evident at all scales.
Smith's charge is that in®nitely intricate fractal structureÐunique to
chaotic attractors3Ðis not realistic. This becomes obvious, he argues, when
one considers the values of the physical magnitudes that are supposed to
correspond to states of the dynamical system. The points on a trajectory
governed by a strange attractor represent states that the model takes to be
physically possible. However, many of the values corresponding to these
points cannot be had by the dynamical system being modeled:
[M]acroscopic quantities of the type dealt with in paradigm chaotic
models [ : : : ] cannot have inde®nitely precise real number values. Hence
their time evolutions cannot really exemplify in®nitely intricate
trajectories wrapping round a fractal attractor (Smith [1998], p. 39).
In other words, we know from the underlying physics that the state
variables cannot take on certain values. But if the fractal structure of the
strange attractor is to be interpreted realistically, the variables must take on
such values.
Consider an example from an earlier paper (Smith [1991], p. 256). Let T be
the state variable for the temperature of a gas. Gases, as we know, are
molecular and T depends on the average kinetic energy of its constituent
2
3
See Abraham and Shaw ([1992], p. 121) for a helpful illustration of how this happens.
Although imprecise, I will use `strange', `chaotic', and `fractal' interchangeably when referring
to attractors. Strictly speaking, there are strange, non-chaotic attractors as well as chaotic
attractors that are not fractals.
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Jerey Koperski
molecules. In the kinds of dynamical equations that govern strange attractors
(coupled, nonlinear ODEs), T is represented by a real number. Smith shows,
however, that it is not physically possible for temperature to have an in®nitely
precise, real value. There can be no fact of the matter about whether the
temperature is, say, 29.000000018C or 29.000000028C. Consider TP, the
temperature at a point P. The best physical interpretation of TP is the average
kinetic energy of the gas molecules in an imaginary sphere centered at P. As
Smith points out, although the size of the sphere over which the average is
taken is ®nite, it need not have any particular size. Whatever radius happens
to be chosen is arbitrary; it could take an in®nite number of values within
some bounded range. Moreover, one must simply choose how to treat
molecules crossing the border of the sphere: as if they were captured within
the boundary, as if they were completely outside, or split the dierence in
some way. This arbitrariness supports the argument that there is no fact of
the matter about the precise value of TP.
A similar story can be told with respect to virtually any state variable used
in a chaotic model if quantum mechanical ¯uctuations are considered. As
others have claimed, there is no fact of the matter about the precise position,
momentum, energy, etc., of any system when one considers quantities on the
scale of Planck's constant (see for example Paul Teller [1979], p. 352).
Nonetheless, in order to accommodate fractal structure in the phase portrait,
chaotic models specify real-numbered values for each of these physical
magnitudes. In so doing, the models misrepresent the facts. As Smith puts it,
[I]n the typical case, the very thing that makes a dynamical model a
chaotic one (the unlimited intricacy in the behaviour of possible
trajectories) can not genuinely correspond to something in the time
evolutions of the modelled physical processesÐsince they can not exhibit
suciently intricate patterns at the coarse-grained macroscopic level
([1998], p. 41).
How then can one justify this nonphysical structure? Smith considers several
solutions to the problem before proposing his own. Their defects show that
interpreting chaotic mathematical models realistically is uniquely dicult.
One might start with the fact that using false properties is a common
practice in working science. Perhaps those properties associated with strange
attractors do not need a new, creative justi®cation. Fractals in dynamics
might be on a par with, say, charge densities in electrostatics. One could then
tailor the justi®cation used for idealizations in general to ®t the special cases
found in chaos.
Smith agrees that garden-variety idealizations pave the way for simpli®ed
mathematics and this simpli®cation is the key to justifying their use.
However, he points out that frictionless planes and massless pendulum rods
simplify by ignoring a property that exists in the real-world system.
Has Chaos Been Explained?
687
Mathematical tractability is gained by abstracting away something that is
actual. In contrast, the problem with fractal attractors is that they have too
much detail. Chaotic mathematical models appear to posit `unlimited and
necessarily non-empirical ®ne structure' ([1998], p. 43), adding properties
rather than ignoring what is there. So the question remains, compared to the
lean underlying physics, how can an overly complex fractal model be a good
choice for the modeler?
Another approach is to ignore the idealizations and appeal directly to the
mathematics. After all, the ®rst great promise of chaos was its potential for
capturing unpredictable behaviorÐlike the onset of turbulenceÐwith a small
set of equations (such as [1], the well-known Lorenz equations). Smith agrees
that tractable dynamical equations can `specify in®nitely intricate solutions as
easily as they can specify e.g. nice elliptical solutions' ([1998], p. 43). Perhaps
the geometrical intricacy of a chaotic phase portrait is the price one pays for
analytical simplicity in the mathematics.
x_ s y x
y_ rx y xz
z_ bz xy
1
In Smith's view, this direct appeal to simplicity in the equations is
precluded by the qualitative approach to ODEs (see Arnold [1983] and
Devaney [1989]). Equations like (1), he argues, merely specify a bundle of
trajectories in phase space. It is the phase portrait, not the equations, that
represents the evolution of a real system. Modelers do not compare equations
to dynamical systems. They instead check the behavior of the system against
the properties of the phase portrait. Smith takes this to imply that the
semantic content of the models is primarily geometrical, not analytical. If
mathematical models are (at least approximately) true, then the geometrical
properties of the phase portrait are the truth-bearers, not the equations.
Hence, the desire for more tractable equations cannot justify the nonphysical
structure in a strange attractor. Something more is needed.
At this point, the stock answers have been exhausted and Smith proposes a
unique strategy. First, he rejects the inclination to think of fractals in terms of
`monstrous complexity'. Consider the Sierpinski Triangle (Figure 1).
Although this fractal contains self-similar structure at all scales, its complexity
becomes more manageable if one realizes how the ®gure is constructed.
Consider the ®rst four iterations of a simpli®ed Sierpinski triangle (Figure
2). The process begins by removing an inverted triangular section from the
middle. Three white triangles remain, each with a side half the length of the
original. The process is repeated for each of these three triangles, and so on to
in®nity. The end ®gure is a complex fractalÐthe product of countably in®nite
iterations. However, the operation used to produce it was quite simple.
688
Jerey Koperski
Fig. 1. Sierpinski Triangle
Here, then, is where Smith ®nds the needed simplicity in chaotic models.
Instead of focusing on the attractor itself in all its complexity, one should see
its structure as the result of simple stretching and folding operations on sheets
of phase portrait trajectories. The nonlinear ODEs associated with a given
chaotic phase portrait specify simple stretch-and-fold operations which in
turn leave an invariant fractal in their wake. Strictly speaking, this stretchingand-folding of sheets of trajectories is what the modeler is trying to capture:
[S]uppose we concentrate on modelling the way that the dynamics of
some phenomenon basically stretches apart and folds back trajectories
(trajectories, remember, of state-representing points in some suitable
phase space). We will no doubt precisify and simplify, but at this stage in
an entirely standard way [i.e., ODEs and real numbers will be used].
However, despite the simplicity here, a fractal may yet drop out as the
invariant attractor ([1998], p. 50).
It is not that in®nite structure is imposed in the modeling process, Smith
concludes; it `comes for free' via the iterations of stretching-and-folding
trajectories (henceforth, SFT). Still, in order to apply the model, one must
`de®ctionalize' the precise state values since, again, systems in reality cannot
support the in®nite precision found in real numbers. (On the other hand,
more `robust' properties that do not depend on precise initial conditionsÐ
Has Chaos Been Explained?
689
Fig. 2. Simpli®ed Sierpinski Triangle
e.g., period doubling as parameter values changeÐcan be interpreted
realistically as they stand.)
In other words, Smith believes that ODEs and real-valued state variables
are useful for encoding SFTs in a mathematical model. They are the best
tools available for specifying the behavior of orbits in the phase portrait,
which are the subjects of the model. Fractal attractors areÐborrowing a term
from Mary HesseÐ`negative analogies' between the model and the system
being modeled. Once the experimentalist applies the model and de®ctionalizes
such properties, they fall away as uninterpreted geometrical debris.
I agree that the notion of `imposing' an unlimited amount of structure on a
comparatively lean physical system is not the best way to account for the
presence of fractal attractors. Recall, however, that Smith rejects several
approaches to the problem because of their inability to account for this
imposition of complex structure. I argue in section 4 that if one rejects the
notion of imposing structure from the start, more natural ways of solving the
problem of in®nite structure present themselves. Before examining how this
might go, let us consider three shortcomings of Smith's proposed solution.
3 ODEs, eliminating ®ctions, and the exploitation of phase space
There are three reasons to be suspicious of Smith's account, one having to do
with the use of ODEs in contemporary dynamics, and the other two with its
implications.
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Jerey Koperski
3.1 Discovery in qualitative dynamics
Smith sees SFTs as the central feature of chaos. This is the fundamental
property he takes the modeler to be capturing; strange attractors are merely a
by-product. The importance of ODEs (such as [1]) lies strictly in their ability
to reproduce SFTs in their associated phase portraits.
One weakness in this view is that it misidenti®es the subject of research and
discovery in nonlinear dynamics. Consider for example the well-known case
of Edward Lorenz in the 1960s (Lorenz [1993], p. 130). In order to prove the
limitations of statistical weather forecasting using linear models, Lorenz used
a set of nonlinear ODEs with twelve variables to describe the `weather' in an
idealized dynamical system representing the atmosphere. His goal was to
produce simulated weather data that linear models could not replicate.
Lorenz discovered that his equations displayed sensitive dependence on initial
conditions (SDIC).4 He eventually simpli®ed the equations to get [1] and then
plotted the numerical values for the state variables. The ®gure produced was
a rudimentary form of the strange attractor now known as the Lorenz Mask.
The qualitative details of the attractor and its phase portrait, including SFTs,
were uncovered in subsequent research papers (see Kaplan and Yorke [1979]
and Williams [1979]).
The point is that SFTs were latecomers in the chain of discovery. As such,
it is dicult to see it as the subject of chaotic modeling, as the thing that
researchers are seeking to capture with equations. Dynamicists seldom start
with SFTs and then look for equations that can reproduce it. Instead, one
typically begins with a physical model of a real-world system that is amenable
to description by ODEs. The discovery of SFTs themselves, usually
associated with Stephen Smale's `horseshoe', bears this out. Smale was
conducting research on van der Pol's equation at the time (Diacu and Holmes
[1996], pp. 55±65). This equation was well known long before anyone came to
understand the complex structure of its phase portrait.
Nonlinear systems theorists typically do not try to model SFTs, nor are ODEs
used merely because they are the best vehicle available to capture geometrical
structures in phase space. It seems, therefore, that SFTs do not belong at center
stage either historically or as a rational reconstruction of dynamical modeling.
3.2 `De®ctionalizing' strange attractors
The next question is whether strange attractors can be explained away in the
prescribed manner. Smith's treatment bears a family resemblance to that of
4
Roughly, if a system displays SDIC, then its future state changes dramatically given an
arbitrarily small change in initial conditions. In terms of the system's phase portrait, SDIC
means that nearby trajectories diverge exponentially over time.
Has Chaos Been Explained?
691
Prigogine, who has long argued that state trajectories are idealizations that
the experimentalist must discard.5 But Prigogine is never mentioned. Smith
focuses on fractal attractors, not the foundations of phase space and
trajectories.
Can one take an anti-realist approach toward strange attractors? Yes, but
at a price. If strange attractors cannot be interpreted realisticallyÐif chaotic
aperiodicity is always a negative analogy to the dynamical systemÐthen
actual dynamical systems must be governed by something else. There are
three remaining categories of attractors in dissipative models, viz. point,
periodic, and quasiperiodic attractors. Let us consider these in order. Point
attractors describe systems that eventually come to rest, like a marble in a
cup. Next, periodic attractors (or limit cycles) are found in the phase portraits
of damped, driven, periodic systems such as a clock pendulum. Orbits in the
basin of attraction of a periodic attractor form closed curves as t ! 1.
Finally, trajectories on a quasiperiodic attractor densely cover the surface of
n-tori in phase space without closing. This aperiodic attractor is the most
complex of the three, but it is not a fractal (Tabor [1989], pp. 195±202).
What each of these attractors lacks is important. In none of the three cases
is there exponential separation of nearby trajectories and therefore no SDIC.
Many would argueÐand rightly so, I believeÐthat SDIC is the heart of
chaos theory. If neither strange attractors nor SDIC are real phenomena,
then chaos is essentially taken out of the explanatory resources of applied
dynamics. This would seem to be a steep price indeed. Nonetheless, in his
earlier paper Smith was willing to pay it:
[I]f locations along dimensions of the phase space are supposed to
represent physical quantities like (say) temperature and ¯uid velocity,
then it makes no physical sense to suppose that there is really in®nitely
sensitive dependence (or a corresponding real fractal structure) in nature
([1991], p. 266).
The diculty with this view is that strange attractors and SDIC have
become indispensable. Researchers have known since the early 1980s that
long-term periodicity and quasiperiodicity cannot account for all of the
phenomena it was once thought. Experimentalists now routinely distinguish
chaotic from non-chaotic time series data using a variety of diagnostic tools.
For example, power spectrum analysis can often rule out periodic and
quasiperiodic attractors. Phase space reconstruction and the calculation of
Lyapunov exponents can con®rm the presence of a strange attractor
(Koperski [1998]). In short, researchers can no longer massage chaotic timeseries data into the categories of linear dynamics. If strange attractors and
SDIC are not real, then an entirely new account of dissipative chaos is needed.
5
Most recently in Prigogine ([1996], p. 105).
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Jerey Koperski
3.3 The special exploitation argument
Recall the close conceptual link between the in®nite structure problem and
the use of real numbers mentioned earlier (section 2). Smith argues that the
time evolutions of actual state variables `cannot really exemplify in®nitely
intricate trajectories wrapping round a fractal attractor' because the
properties associated with those variables (e.g., pressure) `cannot have
inde®nitely precise real number values'. So without real numbers, there can
be no fractal attractor.
In one sense, this is clearly true. Phase spaces that contain strange
attractors are typically (but not always) Euclidean, Rn manifolds. Remove the
Rn structure, and you remove the canvas on which strange attractors are
painted. But then again, this also takes away the canvas on which all
attractors are painted, chaotic or not. Point attractors and limit cycles are just
as much creatures of phase space as strange attractors. If there is something
wrong with real-valued state variables, the problem lies in the qualitative
approach to contemporary dynamics, not just chaos.
Smith himself realizes this and presses on to narrow his target. What
strange attractors have that others lack is ®ne structure all-the-way-down
(i.e., on all scales in phase space), a consequence of their fractal geometry.
More precisely, the attractor is topologically transitive. A map f: Rn ! Rn is
topologically transitive if for any pair of open sets A,B Rn there is a k such
that f (k)(A) \ B 6 1 (or, equivalently, for any two points in a dynamical
system, there is an orbit that comes arbitrarily close to both (Devaney [1989],
p. 49, [1992], p. 117). k represents forward iterations of the map. An
attracting set of phase space points is topologically transitive if there is a
trajectory in the basin of attraction that visits every region in the limit set, no
matter how small the region. Since strange attractors are topologically
transitive, a trajectory on the strange attractor explores every region of the
attracting set as t ! 1.
This, then, is a slightly more precise interpretation of ®ne structure at all
scales. Chaotic evolutions exploit phase space by way of topological
transitivity. Unfortunately, non-chaotic evolutions with the same property
seem to have been overlooked. Quasiperiodic attractors are also topologically
transitive. (This follows from the fact that trajectories on such attractors are
dense on the torus (Devaney [1992], p. 117).) It seems, therefore, that any
argument directed against the physical impossibility of chaotic ®ne structure
must apply equally to quasiperiodic ®ne structure.
In slightly dierent terms, what I have tried to show in subsection 3.3 is this.
Smith wants to prove that strange attractors cannot govern the behavior of
real-world systems. One way to do this is to attack its fractal cross-sections as
unrecognized ®ctions: nature cannot honor this ®ne structure all-the-way-
Has Chaos Been Explained?
693
down. Speci®cally, one could argue that there are no physical grounds for a
phase space fractal in which there is a trajectory cutting through every small
neighborhood on the attractor. However, once we replace labels like `®ne
structure' and `intricacy' with their more precise counterpart, topological
transitivity, we ®nd that quasiperiodic evolutions have it as well. In this regard
at least, chaos oers nothing new. Strange attractors do not exploit the Rn
structure of phase space to any greater degree than quasiperiodic attractors.
Once topological transitivity and quasiperiodicity are in the picture, it
appears that chaotic attractors have drawn undue attention. The Cantor setlike properties of a strange attractor and the densely wrapped tori of a
quasiperiodic attractor both have structure at all scales. Lacking a more
focused argument to the contrary, chaotic attractors appear to be no more
problematic than the quasiperiodic variety.6
So then, what has gone wrong? Smith calls for a `new perspective' after
having rejected the standard views on the use of idealizations. I argue that
those approaches were tossed aside too quickly. The best way to account for
fractal structure might not be a stock solution, but neither does it require
something completely novel.
4 Wilson, Truesdell, and continuum mechanics
Given that modern chaos theory has only been around for thirty years or so,
it is surprising to ®nd similar issues in the more mature realm of continuum
mechanics. Still, this is where we ®nd the clearest cases of nonphysical surplus
structure in idealized dynamical systems. Seeing how the problem is resolved
in continuum models will suggest a strategy for chaotic models. This
approach is motivated by the work of philosopher of science Mark Wilson,
and Cliord Truesdell, the dean of twentieth-century rational mechanics.
4.1 Wilson
Wilson seems to have something akin to Smith's de®ctionalizing of physically
impossible states in mind when he writes, `[I]f left solely to its own devices, the
heat equation accepts mathematical solutions that we discard as ``unphysical'' precisely because these solutions deposit implausible boundary
conditions upon their frontier' ([1991], pp. 567±8). Although the heat
equation is (at least approximately) true, insight from the actual physics
involved is required in order to apply it to dynamical systems. The equation
6
Elsewhere, Smith suggests that all models in classical macrophysics idealize in much the same
way ([1998, 71). All such mathematical models, therefore, are at best approximately true.
However, if this is intended to be the ultimate answer to the problem, then it is not clear why
such a novel interpretation of fractal ®ne structure was needed in Chapter 2.
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Jerey Koperski
permits solutions that, although perfectly good from a mathematical point of
view, must be rejected because the underlying physics disallows them.
Let us consider a simple example that Wilson uses to make his point. In
introductory continuum mechanics, the end-points of a violin string are
considered ®xed. This idealization simpli®es the equations involved. We
know, however, that real violin strings cannot have ®xed endpoints. If that
were the case, no energy would be transferred to the body of the violin and
therefore no sound would be produced. Strictly speaking, the equations
`predict' that the violin will not produce any music. However, this artefact of
the ®xed-point idealization is easily spotted and dismissed.
A brief word about the terms used here is in order. An idealization is a
simplifying assumption made before one constructs a dynamical equation or
mathematical model. For instance, when engineers decide to ignore the
friction in a newly designed component, they do so because friction is
negligible for the application at hand. The engineer has idealized away the
damping force and so the associated mathematics is simpli®edÐlikewise in
considering the planets to be point masses, transmission lines to be noiseless,
and all the rest. Artefacts, in contrast, are the false properties or relations that
can result from idealizations. An artefact is not an abstraction built into the
model; it is a (possible) consequence of simplifying assumptions. Artefacts are
often benign. No one is confused when the Census Bureau refers to the 2.14
children in the average American home. At times, however, it is dicult to
separate the artefacts from genuine physical properties, or in Hesse's terms,
to ®gure out whether the neutral analogies are in fact positive or negative.
This is especially so in the mathematical sciences where uncovering the
physical signi®cance of certain terms is often nontrivial.
One way of interpreting Smith's conclusion is this: the fractal structure of a
strange attractor is a nonphysical, artefactual result of using real-valued state
variables and a Euclidean phase space. (This is very much the line of Smith's
early thought on the problem [1991].) In this light, his concerns take on a
familiar form. Most mathematical models contain idealizations. Some of
these produce artefacts. The artefact might require a change in the model or it
might simply be ignored. In the case of the violin, we choose the latter
knowing that energy must be transferred from the strings to the body of the
instrument. Similarly, the argument goes, one should not interpret the
structure of a strange attractor realistically. Doing so can only lead to
con¯icts with known facts about the underlying physics.
The analogy between violin and attractor breaks down, however. Although
the ®xed end-point boundary condition is false, it allows for solutions that get
the dominant behavior of the string correct. The simpli®ed equation closely
approximates the dynamics of real violin strings. For a more accurate model,
a more realistic version of the ®xed-string boundary is needed. (Speci®cally,
Has Chaos Been Explained?
695
the boundary conditions will be moved into the body of the violin in order to
capture the vibration of the end-points.) Of course, the move toward greater
realism entails greater mathematical complexity. The new, less idealized
equation will also be less tractable.
In contrast, if Smith is correct, then strange attractors are already too
complex. The path to greater realism lies in taking these overly precise models
and making them less so. Hence, it does not appear that the problem of
in®nite structure ®ts under Wilson's more general approach toward dealing
with artefacts.
Wilson's contribution to the subject does not end here. More importantly,
his account suggests a straightforward approach to idealized surplus
structure. First, one must consider a slightly dierent set of questions. Why
do dynamicists use real-numbered state variables? Why consider the mass in
the violin string a continuum rather than as molecular? Why impose arti®cial
boundary conditions when no strict boundary exists in nature? The answer to
each of these questions is clear: because we want to be able to use dierential
equations. The power of the mathematics drives all branches of dynamics.7
Truesdell and Muncaster have a similar view:
However discrete may be nature itself, the mathematics of a very
numerous discrete system remains even today beyond anyone's capacity.
To analyze the large, we replace it by the in®nite, because the properties
of the in®nite are simpler and easier to manage. The mathematics of large
systems is the in®nitesimal calculus, the analysis of functions which are
de®ned on in®nite sets and whose values range over in®nite sets. We need
to dierentiate and integrate functions. Otherwise we are hamstrung if we
wish to deal eectively, precisely, with more than a few dozen objects
able to interact with each other. Thus, somehow, we must introduce the
continuum (Truesdell and Muncaster [1980], pp. xvi±xvii).
Although this passage is about continuum mechanics and partial dierential
equations, the same line of thought applies to nonlinear dynamics and ODEs.
In this case, the move from the discrete to the in®nite occurs in ignoring tiny,
discontinuous jumps in the state variables. Given the microphysics involved,
precise values for classical quantities might change discontinuously. Nevertheless, for well-behaved equations to describe their evolution, the state
variables must take on real values and their change of state must be
(piecewise) smooth.
All this suggests that focusing on strange attractors, fractal structure,
trajectories, and the rest is misguided. These geometrical entities are useful
only insofar as they provide qualitative insight into the governing equations.
7
In fact, Wilson ([1991]) describes several ways mathematicians deal with idealized initial and
boundary conditions. The direct appeal to mathematical convenience is, as Wilson says,
`sometimes warranted', but in other cases a more involved story must be told.
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The properties of the phase portraitÐchaotic and otherwiseÐare completely
determined by the equations associated with that space. If one uses an
unwarranted idealization in order to set up the ODEs, then that is where the
argument needs to be directed. State variables in chaotic models might take
on physically impossible values. Nonetheless, the root of the problem has
nothing to do with strange attractors. If there is a fundamental mismatch
between the interpretation of a phase portrait and the real-world system, the
blame must lie in the dierential equations whose solutions are represented in
that space. Smith, I believe, is taking aim at the wrong target. His concerns
point not to chaos proper, but rather to ODEs and their standard
idealizations.
Smith clearly does not intend a broad skeptical attack on dierential
equations. Can a more focused, cogent version of the argument be made? In
my view, no. It is extremely dicult to argue for a narrow anti-realism about
strange attractors that does not encompass a great deal in modern dynamics.8
Let us now consider a second, related perspective on nonphysical surplus
structure.
4.2 Truesdell
Recall once more the way Smith proposed the problem of in®nite structure.
Unlike textbook physical models such as the ideal pendulum, chaotic models
appear to add an in®nite amount of surplus structure that does not exist in
reality: `there is too much detail rather than too little; they are opulent rather
than impoverished' ([1998], p. 42). There is therefore a disanalogy between
the fractal structure in a strange attractor and run-of-the-mill idealizations in
dynamics.
Chaotic models are not the ®rst to seemingly impose surplus structure on
reality. Consider this example from Tim Poston and Ian Stewart:
[Fluid mechanics] supposes that the velocity of the ¯uid at each point x
can be given by a vector v(x), usually varying smoothly with x. Strictly,
this is nonsense. On a small enough scale we would see molecules
bouncing o each other with highly varying velocities, and empty spaces
between them where no velocity could be assigned (Poston and Stewart
[1978], p. 217).
In other words, the models used in ¯uid mechanics seem to assert a fact-ofthe-matter regarding ¯uid velocity where there is none. For such models to be
correct, real ¯uids would have to form a continuum at all scales. Of course,
8
Smith is, at times, on the verge of just such a conclusion. Ocially, all macroscopic dynamical
models are approximately true, rather than true simpliciter ([1998], p. 71). It is not clear,
however, how this squares with the uniquely chaotic problem of in®nite structure.
Has Chaos Been Explained?
697
the molecular nature of matter is inconsistent with such facts. How, then, is
the imposition of this surplus content justi®ed?
The short answer is: it isn't. One need not take the models as adding
surplus structure to the relatively lean physics of molecular ¯uids. Instead, as
Truesdell vigorously argues, the truth lies in the opposite direction. Rather
than imposing a false microstructure on the world, continuum models like
those in ¯uid mechanics ignore the small-scale facts:
Widespread is the misconception that those who formulate continuum
theories believe matter `really is' continuous, denying the existence of
molecules. That is not so. Continuum physics presumes nothing
regarding the structure of matter. It con®nes itself to relations among
gross phenomena, neglecting the structure of the material on smaller
scales (Truesdell [1984], p. 54).
Strictly speaking, there can be no mismatch between facts in the macroscopic
model and facts in the microscopic world. For there to be a mismatch,
continuum models would have to imply something about the structure of
matter. However, nothing is presumed and nothing is implied. Engineers
using continuum mechanics are not concerned with the makeup of the
material in their models. If pressed, the engineer will surely concur that the air
¯owing over a wing is composed mostly of nitrogen molecules; nonetheless,
the equations governing that air¯ow ignore this ®ne structure. For the
application at hand, the microstructure simply does not matter. The
microscopic components underdetermine the properties of the macroscopic
material, but the utility of continuum models in no way hinges on our ability
to resolve this underdetermination. At bottom there might just as well be
Newtonian corpuscles, Boscovichian point masses, or Leibnizian monads, so
long as they behave in large numbers like a continuous ¯uid.
This, then, is why no justi®cation is needed for the surplus material in
continuum models. Far from imposing an in®nite amount of structure where
there is none, the correct view is that the small-scale structure is ignored.
Returning now to chaos, recall that the question Smith is out to answer is
how models positing `unlimited and necessarily non-empirical ®ne structure'
can ever be a good choice for the modeler. Although this seems reasonable, I
believe that the best response is to refuse the assumptions behind this loaded
question. If at the onset we resist the urge to see the problem as positing or
projecting nonphysical structure, then a solution that Smith initially rejects
turns out to be close to the mark.
Consider the temperature example once more (section 2). Smith argues that
the fractal structure of a strange attractor forces TP into taking nonphysical
values. If there is no fact of the matter regarding TP insofar as it maps to
precise, real numbers, then there is an obvious mismatch between the world
and the model. How then do we account for this? Following Truesdell, one
698
Jerey Koperski
ought not to infer anything as to what TP qua state variable corresponds to at
the molecular level. Again, atoms, point masses, or monads, it does not
matter, so long as macroscopically detectable changes in TP are continuous
rather than discrete. Crudely put, if TP ¯ows rather than jumps from one
value to another, then real numbers are appropriate. Points and trajectories
in an Rn phase space follow close behind. The fundamental decision for the
modeler is whether changes in TP at a certain scale can be described in a
phase space. It does not matter that at some level nature fails to sanction the
use of real numbers. The question is whether TP behaves that way at the scale
the modeler is interested in. Of course, there is nothing special about TP. The
same goes for any physical trait.
Furthermore, the possible values of the state variablesÐrepresented by the
phase space pointsÐare not in¯uenced by whether the model is chaotic or
not. No matter how the system evolvesÐperiodically, quasiperiodically, or
chaoticallyÐthe range of physically possible states remains the same. The
dynamics cannot add or impose anything. Therefore, fractal attractors do not
force the model into nonphysical values. Whether a given state is physically
possible or not is ®xed within the phase space without regard to the system's
evolution. Trajectories on a strange attractor can only move through state
points that are `already there'. If phase space models take on impossible
values, the blame must lie with the equations that govern that space and the
idealizations used to set it up.
5 Conclusion
We should note once more that Smith's own approach does not imply that
chaotic models impose nonphysical structure. However, he uses this notion in
his critique of several common strategies for dealing with idealizations and
artefacts. Only then does he give his novel account of fractal attractors as an
epiphenomenon of the modeling process. In response, I have argued for two
things.
First, although Smith rejects global skepticism toward dynamical models,
it is dicult to say what is wrong with chaotic models without having that
criticism spill over into the rest of dynamics. In particular, since quasiperiodic
attractors share many of the characteristics of strange attractors, if the latter
variety is problematic, so are their non-chaotic cousins. Second, Smith's
solution to these problems is more creative than need be. If at the onset we
resist seeing fractal structure as adding a complex, nonphysical property to
phase space models, then the standard accounts of idealizations that Smith
rejects are viable. As we have seen, the argument that fractals are not like
frictionless planesÐsince only the latter suppress an existing propertyÐis
Has Chaos Been Explained?
699
misleading. Truesdell in particular helps identify where and why macroscopic
models ignore small-scale phenomena.
In the end, there is not much new under the sun presented by chaos theory.
Smith agrees with this perspective throughout Explaining Chaos, except when
it comes to strange attractors. I suggest the same attitude be taken there as
well.
Acknowledgements
A version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the British
Society for the Philosophy of Science, July 6, 2000. Thanks to R. Batterman,
M. Wilson, and D. Raman for helpful comments on a distant ancestor of
this paper. Thanks also to P. Smith for access to several preprints and an
unpublished series of lectures.
Department of Philosophy
Saginaw Valley State University
7400 Bay Road
University Center, MI 48710, USA
koperski@svsu.edu
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