
# Efficient Constructions of Bilinear Accumulators

Ioanna Karantaidou, Foteini Baldimtsi



# Set Membership



Bank, GMU, subscriptionbased service, etc

#### List of members as a Data structure


- Size of List: O(n)
- (at least one of) Additions/Deletions, lookups depends on n
- **Privacy** against list holder/membership verification in a privacy preserving way: Expensive!

## **Accumulator Setting**

MANAGER

Initialize & Create Acc.v





Accumulator Value: holds Set S


VERIFIER



Set S




## Positive Accumulator: adding User x



VERIFIER



## Positive Accumulator: proving membership



# Security Properties (membership)



Alice
•••

Set/List Verification=lookup Accumulator acc Verification algorithm:VerMem(w<sub>x</sub>)

Alice is a member  $\rightarrow$  verification

 $x \in acc \rightarrow \text{VerMem}(w_x)=1$ 

#### correctness



Bob is **not** a member  $x \notin$   $\rightarrow$  verification  $\times$  (or pro-**Soundness** 

 $x \notin acc \rightarrow VerMem(w_x)=0$ (or =1 with negligible prob.)

# 2 Types of Accumulators

#### RSA based accumulators [CL02, LLX07, BdM93]

- Accumulate odd prime numbers
- Factorization of group hidden
- Strong RSA assumption

#### Bilinear Pairing based accumulators [N05, CKS09, ATSM09, ZKP17]

- Accumulate integers
- Known order groups
- Witness, accumulator value belong in pairing friendly groups
- q-SDH assumption

#### **Choice depends on the application!**

# Common Issues with Known Accumulators

- Unnecessary accumulator updates that cause high communication costs
- Expensive non-membership operations
- Computational overhead due to extra properties

Can we do better if we take advantage of the presence of a trusted entity (manager)?

# Discussion on the secret key model

- Most known constructions have a trusted setup
- Anonymous Credentials, subscription-based services, etc

# Our Results


- 1. Positive Bilinear Accumulator with Optimal Communication Cost
- 2. Universal Bilinear Accumulator with Constant Non-Membership Witness Creation
- 3. ZK Accumulator with Constant Non-Membership Witness Creation and Update

#### **FIRST CONSTRUCTION**

Positive Bilinear Accumulator with Optimal Communication Cost

## **Positive Bilinear Accumulator**

$$Acc. v = g^{(x_1 + sk)\dots(x_n + sk)}$$



# Positive Bilinear Accumulator Verification

$$w_{\chi} = Acc. v^{(x+sk)^{-1}}$$
$$w_{\chi}^{(x+sk)} = Acc. v$$
Public parameters:  $g, g^{sk}$ ,  $(g^{sk})^2, (g^{sk})^3, ... \rightarrow w_{\chi}^{(x+sk)}$ 

$$Acc. v = g^{(x_1 + sk)...(x_n + sk)(x + sk)}$$

$$w_x = g^{(x_1 + sk)\dots(x_n + sk)}$$


Public parameters:  

$$g, g^{sk}$$
,  $(g^{sk})^2$ ,  $(g^{sk})^3$ , ...  $\rightarrow$   
 $g^x$ ,  $g^{sk}$ 

$$e(w_x, g^x g^{sk}) = e(Acc. v, g)$$
(VerMem)

## **Positive Bilinear Accumulator**

$$Acc. v = g^{(x_1 + sk)...(x_n + sk)(x + sk)}$$



## **Positive Bilinear Accumulator**

$$Acc. v = g^{(x_1+sk)...(x_n+sk)}$$

$$Add(x)$$

$$Acc. v = g^{(x_1+sk)...(x_n+sk)(x+sk)}$$

$$w_x = g^{(x_1+sk)...(x_n+sk)}$$




Minimum communication bound (on update messages) for positive accumulators= |d| (number of deletions)

User x

Camacho, Philippe, and Alejandro Hevia. "On the impossibility of batch update for cryptographic accumulators." *International Conference on Cryptology and Information Security in Latin America*. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2010.







Acc.
$$v = g^u$$

$$Add(x)$$
$$w_x = g^{u (x+sk)^{-1}}$$

upmsg

$$Acc. v = g^{u (x+sk)^{-1}}$$

Del(x)

Ac





- Communication efficient
- Dynamic (add,del)
- Positive (membership)

Correctness
w<sub>x</sub><sup>(x+sk)</sup> = Acc. v
holds and VerMem same
Soundness??

User x

Proof overview:


- R (public parameters) runs an adversary A (public parameters)
- A submits lists of to-be-added, to-be-deleted elements  $L_A$ ,  $L_D$
- R simulates updates and witnesses
- A breaks acc soundness
- R breaks q-SDH assumption

q-SDH: Given (p, G,  $G_T$ , e, g),  $\{g^{sk}\}^i$ , i = 0, ..., q there is negligible probability of finding  $g^{\frac{1}{sk+x}}$  for  $x \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ 


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- R simulates updates and witnesses
- A breaks acc soundness
- R breaks q-SDH assumption

#### Adaptive soundness not achieved



Baldimtsi, Foteini, et al. "Accumulators with applications to anonymity-preserving revocation." 2017 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P). IEEE, 2017.



	Positive					
	Camenisch et al 09	Nguyen 05	this work (NA- sound)	this work (A- sound)		
Add	1	1	1	1		
Del	1	1	1	1		
MemWitCreate	1	1	1	1		
NonMemWitCreate	-	-	-	-		
MemWitUpOnAdd	1	1	0	0		
MemWitUpOnDel	1	1	1	1		
NonMemWitUpOnAd d	-	-	-	-		
NonMemWitUpOnDe I	-	-	-	-		
VerMem	1	1	1	1		
VerNonMem	-	-	-	-		
Manager storage	1	1	1	1		
Parameters	2q	q	q	q		
Com. cost	a + d	a + d	d	d		
Efficient ZKPs	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	✓	✓		
Adaptively-sound	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$		✓		

• Jan Camenisch, Markulf Kohlweiss, and Claudio Soriente. An accumulator based on bilinear maps and efficient revocation for anonymous credentials. In PKC 2009

• Lan Nguyen. Accumulators from bilinear pairings and applications. In CT-RSA 2005.

#### **SECOND CONSTRUCTION**

Universal Bilinear Accumulator with Constant Non-Membership Witness Creation

# Additional Properties (non-membership:NM)



Charlie Alice Set/List NM verification=lookup Accumulator acc NM verification algorithm: VerNonMem(w<sub>x</sub>)

Bob is **not** a member  $\rightarrow$  NM verification

 $x \notin acc \rightarrow \text{VerNonMem}(\overline{w_x})=1$ 



•••	
Alice	

Alice is a member  $\rightarrow$  NM verification 2

 $x \in acc \rightarrow VerNonMem(\overline{w_x})=0$ (or =1 with negligible prob.)



correctness

# Generic Universal Modular Construction motivation: Non membership for y

Bilinear **ATSM09**, S={ $x_i$ },  $x_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ 

 $\prod_{i=1}^{|S|} (x_i + sk) = c(sk)(y + sk) + d$ Users (public parameters):  $S = \{x_i\}$ , polynomial division Manager (sk):  $\prod_{i=1}^{|S|} (x_i + sk) \in \mathbb{Z}$ , used as exponent RSA **LLX07**, S={ $y_i$ },  $y_i$  primes

a  $(\prod_{i=1}^{|S|} y_i) + b \ y = 1$ Users (public parameters)/Manager (sk):  $\prod_{i=1}^{|S|} y_i \in \mathbb{Z}$ , Euclidean algorithm


# Generic Universal Modular Construction motivation: Non membership for y

Bilinear **ATSM09**, S={ $x_i$ },  $x_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ RSA **LLX07**, S= $\{y_i\}$ ,  $y_i$  primes  $\prod_{i=1}^{\infty} (x_i + sk) = c(sk)(y)$  $\prod_{i=1}^{|S|} y_i + b \ y = 1$ non-membership cost: |S| blic parameters)/Manager Users (public paran (sk):  $S=\{x_i\}$ , polynomial  $I_{i=1} \mathcal{Y}_{i} \in \mathbb{Z}$ , Euclidean algorithm Manager (sk).  $\prod_{i=1}^{|S|} (x_i + sk) \in \mathbb{Z}$ , used as exponent

#### Can we replace non-membership with constant-runtime membership?? Yes, with a trusted manager


# Can we make sure that $ACC_1$ and $ACC_2$ are disjoint?


The accumulator manager always signs the most up to date value of the accumulator






 $ACC_1. \operatorname{Gen}(1^{\lambda}, \emptyset)$  $ACC_2. \operatorname{Gen}(1^{\lambda}, \mathbb{D})$ 







- Gen $(1^{\lambda})$ :
  - 1.  $ACC_1.Gen(1^{\lambda}, \emptyset)$
  - 2.  $ACC_2.Gen(1^{\lambda}, D)$  with the same random coins for parameters, where D is the accumulator's domain
- Add(x):
  - 1.  $ACC_1.Add(x)$
  - 2.  $w_x = \mathsf{ACC}_1$ .MemWitCreate(x)
  - 3.  $ACC_2.Del(x)$
- Del(x):
  - 1.  $ACC_2$ .Add(x)
  - 2.  $\overline{w_x} = \mathsf{ACC}_2$ .MemWitCreate(x)
  - 3.  $ACC_1.Del(x)$
- MemWitUpOnAdd/Del(y):
  - 1.  $ACC_1$ .MemWitUpOnAdd/Del(y)
- NonMemWitUpOnAdd/Del (y):
  - $1. \ \mathsf{ACC}_2.\mathrm{MemWitUpOnAdd/Del}(y)$
- VerMem(x):
  - 1.  $ACC_1.VerMem(x)$
- VerNonMem(x):
  - 1.  $ACC_2.VerMem(x)$

Fig. 3. Generic Construction for Universal Dynamic accumulator

#### Note on Efficiency

#### Concretes:

- Generation (run once) linear to Domain size
- Add/Del of double cost

Asymptotics: All operations constant, independent of accumulated set S

# Generic Universal Modular Construction-Soundness

**Theorem:** A combination of accumulators  $ACC_1$ ,  $ACC_2$  is a universal dynamic adaptively-sound accumulator if  $ACC_1$ ,  $ACC_2$  are positive dynamic adaptively-sound accumulators of domain D and one is holding  $S \subset D$  and the other one  $\overline{S} \subset D$  and public updates are not permitted.

# Generic Universal Modular Construction Soundness

**Theorem:** A combination of accumulators  $ACC_1$ ,  $ACC_2$  is a universal dynamic adaptively-sound accumulator if  $ACC_1$ ,  $ACC_2$  are positive dynamic adaptively-sound accumulators of domain D and one is holding  $S \subset D$  and the other one  $\overline{S} \subset D$  and public updates are not permitted.

#### INTUITION:

Information obtained by 2 accumulators with the same instantiation could be obtained by different states of 1 accumulator

# Generic Universal Modular Construction Soundness

**Theorem:** A combination of accumulators  $ACC_1$ ,  $ACC_2$  is a universal dynamic adaptively-sound accumulator if  $ACC_1$ ,  $ACC_2$  are positive dynamic adaptively-sound accumulators of domain D and one is holding  $S \subset D$  of  $S \subset D$  and public updates are not permitted

PROOF: R has access to Add/Del oracle. A breaks ACC=(ACC<sub>1</sub>, ACC<sub>2</sub>) soundness. R breaks ACC<sub>1</sub> (positive) soundness


# **Efficiency Results**

	Positive			Universal	
	Camenisch et al 09	Nguyen 05	this work (A- sound)	Au et al 09	This work- Instantiation with Nguyen 05
Add	1	1	1	1	1
Del	1	1	1	1	1
MemWitCreate	1	1	1	1	1
NonMemWitCreate	-	-	-	S	1
MemWitUpOnAdd	1	1	0	1	1
MemWitUpOnDel	1	1	1	1	1
NonMemWitUpOnAdd	-	-	-	1	1
NonMemWitUpOnDel	-	-	-	1	1
VerMem	1	1	1	1	1
VerNonMem	-	-	-	1	1
Manager storage	1	1	1	S	1
Parameters	2q	q	q	q	q?
Com. cost	a + d	a + d	d	a + d	a + d
Efficient ZKPs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Adaptively-sound	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	✓	✓	$\checkmark$

#### **THIRD CONSTRUCTION**


#### ZK Accumulator with

Constant Non-Membership Witness Creation and Update





Esha Ghosh , Olga Ohrimenko , Dimitrios Papadopoulos , Roberto Tamassia and Nikos Triandopoulos "Zero-Knowledge Accumulators and Set Operations" *IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive* 2015 (2015): 404.






#### Goal:

• Adv can learn only the latest query answers

#### How:

• Randomness in the exponent



### Application: ZK Accumulatorthe need for randomness

- 1. First element's witness is g (generator is public information)
- 2. A guess about S can be verified with public information
- 3. A witness can be updated with public information (still valid?)

Public parameters:  $g, g^{sk}$ ,  $(g^{sk})^2, (g^{sk})^3, ...$ 


 $S = \{x_1, x_2\}$ 

acc.  $v = g^{(x_1+sk)(x_2+sk)} = g^{x_1x_2+(x_1+x_2)sk+sk^2} = g^{x_1x_2}(g^{sk})^{x_1+x_2}(g^{sk})^2$ 


## Application: ZK Accumulatorthe need for randomness

MANAGER





Add(x)



r ??
S ??
Verification
works!

### Application: ZK Accumulator-Non-membership usually

Bilinear **ATSM09**, S={ $x_i$ },  $x_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ 

 $\prod_{i=1}^{|S|} (x_i + sk) = c(sk)(y + sk) + d$ Users (public parameters):  $S = \{x_i\}$ , polynomial division Manager (sk):  $\prod_{i=1}^{|S|} (x_i + sk) \in \mathbb{Z}$ , used as exponent  $g^u$ 

$$u = \prod_{i=1}^{|S|} (x_i + sk) = c(sk)(y + sk) + d, \qquad d \neq 0$$

 $g^{ru}$ 

Non-membership verification requires r

### Application: ZK Accumulator-Non-membership by Ghosh et al

 $S \cap \{x\} \neq \emptyset$ 

$$q_{1}[sk] \prod_{i=1}^{|S|} (x_{i}+sk) + q_{2}[sk] (y+sk) = 1$$
  
$$\overline{w_{y}} = (W_{1}, W_{2}) = (g^{(q_{1}[sk]+\gamma(y+sk))} r^{-1}, g^{q_{2}[sk]-\gamma \prod_{i=1}^{|S|} (x_{i}+sk)})$$
  
$$e(W_{1}, Acc. v) e(W_{2}, g^{x} g^{sk}) = e(g, g)$$

Remove accumulator randomness

### Application: ZK Accumulator-Non-membership by Ghosh et al

 $S \cap \{x\} \neq \emptyset$ 

$$q_{1}[sk] \prod_{i=1}^{|S|} (x_{i}+sk) + q_{2}[sk] (y+sk) = 1$$
  
$$\overline{w_{y}} = (W_{1}, W_{2}) = (g^{(q_{1}[sk] + (y+sk))} r^{-1}, g^{q_{2}[sk] - (y+sk)})$$

Add query/witness specific randomness

 $e(W_1, Acc. v)e(W_2, g^x g^{sk}) = e(g, g)$ 

## Application: ZK Accumulator-Non-membership by Ghosh et al

(+) r not needed for verification
 (-) no witness update algorithm
 Update → NonMemWitCreate: O(|S|)

$$-\prod_{i=1}^{|S|} (x_i + sk)$$

Add query/witness specific randomness

 $e(W_1, Acc. v)e(W_2, g^x g^{sk}) = e(g, g)$ 

### Application: ZK Accumulator-Modular Construction

(+) r not needed for verific
 (-) no witness update algo
 Update → NonMemWitCreate

 $e(W_1, Acc. v)e(W_2, g^x g^{sk}) = e(g,$ 

#### Solution:

instantiate our generic modular universal construction with ZK accumulators with membership operations **Result:** Non-membership witness creation, Nonmembership witness update: O(1)

# Summary

In the secret key model:

- 1. We can hit optimal communication cost (*Positive Bilinear Accumulator with Optimal Communication Cost*)
- 2. We can have constant non-membership (Universal Bilinear Accumulator with Constant Non-Membership Witness Creation)
- 3. We can have constant ZK (*ZK Accumulator with Constant Non-Membership Witness Creation and Update*)

# Available on ePrint soon

