

Tech Pains: Characterizations of Lived Cybersecurity Experiences

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Abstract—The permeation of technology into every facet of life has profoundly shifted the nature and ramifications of cybersecurity incidents. As a consequence, a complete and refined characterization of these adverse events necessitates a sociotechnical approach that takes into account the subjective lived experiences of the victims. Although researchers have examined such experiences pertaining to specific types of incidents, a broad understanding of the harmful impact of cybersecurity incidents requires an investigation of how people characterize and cope with these adverse experiences in general. To that end, we conducted semi-structured interviews with 21 individuals who reported a variety of cybersecurity incidents, consequences, and coping mechanisms. We found that the experiences can be characterized along a *bounded to fuzzy* spectrum. As the majority of current cybersecurity efforts focus on relatively bounded incidents, we make the case that fuzzy incidents deserve similar attention because their harmful impacts are deeper and longer-lasting. Our insight can be applied to improve and personalize the delivery of cybersecurity interventions.

Index Terms—adverse technology experiences, security, cybersecurity incidents, privacy, lived experiences

1. Introduction

Cybersecurity has become an integral aspect of technology, affecting everyone regardless of their technical knowledge or efficacy. At its core, cybersecurity is about preventing harm to users as well as engendering a sense of trust that enables them to use technology safely. Yet, the ubiquity and volume of cybersecurity problems coupled with the tendency to gravitate toward easy-to-characterize and/or high profile attacks could potentially be crowding out investigations of harder-to-measure but no less harmful issues. We contend that a ground-up investigation of lived cybersecurity experiences is required to reveal gaps in the current understanding of the impact of cybersecurity incidents on people’s lives. Understanding how users conceptualize, suffer from, and cope with adverse cybersecurity events is the first step toward prioritizing research and development of effective countermeasures. To that end, we report on a broad investigation of adverse experiences with technology with cybersecurity as the focal point.

To surface a wide variety of harmful events, we adopted an open perspective not limited to preexisting definitions of cybersecurity incidents. Since the public’s knowledge of cybersecurity is far from complete or stan-

dardized, our approach enables an understanding of cybersecurity matters as they are experienced by end users rather than how they are defined by experts. Moreover, trust is an important component of cybersecurity; even if an event does not fit the traditional definition of a cybersecurity incident but lowers trust in technology, it should still be treated as important for the purposes of creating effective cybersecurity countermeasures.

Specifically, we tackled the following research questions:

- How are people’s characterizations of adverse experiences with technology connected to cybersecurity?
- What are the personal consequences of adverse cybersecurity experiences?
- How do individuals cope with these consequences?

We addressed the above questions via semi-structured interviews with 21 individuals. Based on the insight from these interviews, we show that *lived* experiences of cybersecurity are shaped by negative perceptions and adverse experiences with technology, *in general*. Importantly, we found that people connect cybersecurity to a diversity of issues along a spectrum with ends that we label as *bounded* and *fuzzy*. Bounded incidents are those for which users have reasonably clear conceptualizations and mitigation strategies, and fuzzy are those whose contours and solutions are amorphous or unclear. Our findings suggest that people find fuzzy issues more challenging and stressful. Yet, estimates of cybersecurity incident impacts, especially those cast in economic terms, do not typically include long-term individual consequences of fuzzy issues. Based on this investigation, we make the following contributions:

- **Broadening the scope.** We found that cybersecurity-relevant aspects are intertwined with a diverse set of incidents related to technology. Hence, an *ecological* treatment of the matters can help bring assessed damages of cybersecurity incidents in better alignment with their true long-term real-world impact.
- **Assessing the damage of cybersecurity incidents.** We propose assessing cybersecurity incidents by placing them along a spectrum ranging from *bounded* to *fuzzy*. We show that cybersecurity incidents on the fuzzy side are sources of fear and anxiety caused by ongoing or even unrealized-but-potential threats that impact user decision making and well-being.
- **Surfacing indirect and long-term impacts.** Our findings reveal various indirect and long-term impacts of adverse cybersecurity experiences, such as resignation, distrust, withdrawal, etc.

2. Related Work

One of the main goals of many cybersecurity efforts is reducing individual and collective harm. As such, it is necessary to define and measure harm so as to enable meaningful comparison and evaluation of cybersecurity strategies. We focused on harm as characterized by individual end users, rather than abstract collective definitions in technical terms, such as volume of an attack, number of malware infections, etc. From an individual perspective, an important additional consideration is to understand experiences not only as experts *define* them, but also as non-experts *experience* them. To that end, we develop a more accurate and useful understanding of lived cybersecurity experiences by building upon works that characterize harm from a technical standpoint and those that illuminate the mental models and approaches of non-experts.

Characterizing cybersecurity harms. The technically-focused research community has recently begun to take a harm-based view of cybersecurity evaluation [1], [2]. In such research, specific technical mechanisms, such as phishing and malware, are front and center [3]. Technical characterization of harms has covered support forum requests [4] and studied specific domains of abuse, such as typosquatting [5], affiliate marketing scams [6], [7], abuse and harassment in online discussions [8], video advertisement fraud [9], etc. More recently, researchers have explored the role of technology in intimate partner violence [10] revealing how seemingly legitimate apps can be repurposed for spying on partners [11] and deployed a consultation service that allows victims to detect and protect themselves from such incidents [12].

Investigations of specific technical properties of an incident must necessarily limit themselves to that one attack. In contrast, we cast a wide net that encompasses any adverse experience related to technology and allowed participants to select and discuss adverse experiences according to their own perspectives. Such a methodological approach avoids priming and guiding participants toward specific incidents, allowing us to obtain unbridled views of the adverse incidents they experienced *during* and *due to* their use of technology.

Non-expert cybersecurity concerns. Various research efforts have been geared toward differentiating the traditional expert-centric views of cybersecurity from those of typical users. Ion et al. [13] explicitly compared expert and non-expert security practices, and multiple subsequent studies have focused on collecting a broad cross-section of user practices related to security and privacy concepts [14]–[16]. In addition, researchers have attempted to uncover mental models for specific security-relevant concepts such as flows of personal information on the Internet [17]. More narrowly focused cybersecurity studies have examined sub-populations of non-experts, such as older adults [18]. These efforts highlight the gaps between experts and non-experts on cybersecurity understanding and practices and call for greater attention to designing cybersecurity solutions to cater to non-experts.

Forget et al. [19] pointed to the gap between expected outcomes of cybersecurity interventions and the needs and difficulties of non-experts. Sharif et al. [20] uncovered that a major source of disparity between experts and non-

experts lies in the identification and characterization of a cyberattack. Efforts to gain a refined understanding of non-expert perspectives on these matters include studies that explore the nature and extent of the harms caused by specific threats, such as online harassment [21]. For instance, research has shown that non-experts may not fully understand or analyze the ramifications of their online actions, thus experiencing harms and regrets [22], [23]. Our research advances this area by investigating how people characterize the harm of adverse experiences with technology as a whole, instead of a narrow focus on specific incidents, attacks, or systems.

3. Method

To address our research objectives, we conducted semi-structured interviews with 21 individuals who had indicated one or more adverse cybersecurity experiences. To avoid priming, we framed the study without revealing our specific interest in cybersecurity. The following subsections provide details of our recruitment and study procedures along with the characteristics of our sample. All study materials and procedures were approved by our Indiana University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB).

Recruitment and Screening. We recruited participants during Spring and Summer 2019 via flyers posted across Bloomington, Indiana. In addition, we posted advertisements on online forums and mailing lists. The flyers and advertisements included a link to a screening questionnaire (see Appendix A). To ensure truthful responses, the questionnaire did not reveal the screening criteria. We limited participation to those 18 years of age or older who reported one or more adverse cybersecurity experiences from a list compiled based on the collective expertise of the authors. Further, we selected interviewees such that the sample would be as diverse as possible in terms of demographics, professions, technical expertise, etc.

Participants. Table 1 provides information regarding the 21 participants. As expected in a university town, the sample contained a large proportion (~60%) of undergraduate and graduate students. However, the participants cover a broad age range (21–78) and a diversity of fields and occupations. Nearly a quarter (5) were town residents not affiliated with the university. One-third of the participants were from minority ethnic backgrounds. The sample contained slightly more females than males (8 male, 12 female, and 1 non-binary).

Interview Protocol. Each interview lasted ~45–60 minutes. With consent, we audio-recorded the interviews for transcription and analysis. A graduate student conducted the first seven interviews as a course project (six in-person and one via online conferencing). These initial seven interviews broadly covered any negative experiences with technology to facilitate an open-ended early exploration. Based on the analysis of these initial interviews, we revised the interview protocol to sharpen the focus on adverse experiences with technology, their impact on people’s lives, and their connections to people’s backgrounds. The first seven interviews underscored that people’s characterizations of cybersecurity incidents cover a broad spectrum, and the corresponding personal experiences are deeply contextual. Therefore, in subsequent interviews, we encouraged participants to share stories of

TABLE 1. PARTICIPANT DEMOGRAPHICS

PID	Year of Birth	Gender	University Affiliation	Major/Department/Occupation	Ethnicity
4	1980	Female	Graduate student	Music	Asian, Hispanic, Caucasian
6	1997	Female	Undergraduate student	Biology	Caucasian
7	1992	Male	Graduate student	Informatics	Asian
8	1997	Non-binary	Undergraduate student	Psychology	Caucasian
10	1995	Male	Graduate student	Accounting	African American
12	1997	Female	Undergraduate student	Finance	Asian
16	1998	Female	Undergraduate student	Political Science	Caucasian
19	1995	Male	Undergraduate student	Liberal Studies	Hispanic
22	1959	Male	Unaffiliated	Business Owner	Caucasian
34	1961	Male	Unaffiliated	Retired	Caucasian
37	1956	Male	Unaffiliated	Retired	Caucasian
47	1997	Female	Undergraduate student	Sociology	Caucasian
57	1985	Male	Staff	University Division	Caucasian
58	1956	Female	Faculty	Public Health	Caucasian
59	1988	Male	Graduate student	Communication	Caucasian
65	1993	Female	Graduate student	Spanish and Portuguese	Hispanic
68	1988	Female	Graduate student	Education	Asian
69	1995	Female	Graduate student	Law	Caucasian
71	1962	Female	Unaffiliated	Retired	Caucasian
79	1990	Female	Alumni	Not Specified	Caucasian
88	1941	Female	Unaffiliated	Business Owner	Caucasian

specific incidents and followed up with questions focusing on behavior, short-term and long-term impacts, and connection to other aspects of their lives. The goal of asking participants to recall stories was to stimulate their reflection for comprehending their own experiences and enable them to engage actively in joint knowledge production. The subsequent 14 interviews using the revised protocol were conducted in-person by the first author. (See Appendix B for the revised interview protocol).

In the final stages of the interviews, we asked participants to read through the list of adverse cybersecurity experiences in the screening questionnaire to compare the aspects mentioned in the interviews with those provided by us. We continued collecting data until we reached saturation in terms of hearing mostly similar responses.

Analysis. We analyzed the interview transcripts using the MaxQDA qualitative analysis software. We followed an iterative inductive approach inspired by techniques from Grounded Theory [24] with initial open coding to extract key elements followed by selective coding to identify themes and patterns and organize them into a structure. The first author performed the bulk of the coding in an iterative manner with frequent communication and guidance from the last author. Our coding and analyses were driven by a focus on the *experiences* as described by participants rather than *operational details* ascribed to the systems or *specific concepts* defined by domain experts.

4. Findings

Our broad investigation of lived cybersecurity experiences revealed a complex picture of attribution, resolution, and coping strategies influenced by age and technical efficacy, connecting “cybersecurity” to a diverse variety of adverse experiences with technology.

4.1. Diversity of Cybersecurity Incidents

Table 2 shows the major cybersecurity incidents reported by each participant. Notably, each reported multiple

incidents, with *every* participant affected by malicious software or actors and nearly every participant encountering phishing or spam. On the other hand, blackmail was reported by only two participants. When narrating their experiences, all participants expressed negative emotions, such as frustration, anger, anxiety, annoyance, etc. Such an orientation sometimes translated to cybersecurity being connected to seemingly unrelated adverse aspects of using technology, such as addiction to devices, services, or apps.

We found that the growing volume and variety of cybersecurity incidents leads to frustration as well as a sense of inevitability or resignation. This reveals a crucial complementary dimension to prior reports of users’ feelings of resignation due to the abundance of cybersecurity-related advice, guidelines, and requirements [25], [26]. Ten out of 21 participants believed that adverse experiences are unavoidable in the current technological environment; P69 described such problems as a part of life: “*I feel like it’s just kind of part of life, like bullying’s always been a part of high school. But now since we have Facebook and stuff, it’s just going to happen online. [...] I’m kind of in the space where I grew up most of my life with a lot of technology [...] it’s just part of life, so it feels normal that sometimes my credit card is going to be stolen or I know that I got viruses on my computer.*”

Resignation can dissuade people from attempting to diagnose and fix the issues they face. Some, however, choose to rely on experts, as indicated by P4: “*Maybe I haven’t learned the lessons of the last 5 or 10 years. But experts in that field have maybe learned those lessons so that I could go to those sources of information [...] maybe I can go through a checklist of things that I can do better [...] just because I am not an expert. But I know that other people are experts and care about this issue [...] So to me it seems logical that there’s a lot of effort put into [solving the problems].*”

Alternatively, people rely on technology to address such issues on their behalf. People further expect the technological solutions to be simple, comprehensible, and useful, as noted by P47: “*If it’s not easy to use then it’s*

TABLE 2. CYBERSECURITY INCIDENTS REPORTED BY EACH PARTICIPANT

ID	Phishing/ Spam	Viruses/Malware/ Hacking	Scam/Ransom/ Blackmail	Unauthorized use of bank accounts/cards	Unpleasant encounters on social media	Online tracking/ Collection of personal information	Stalking
4	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	
6	✓	✓				✓	
7	✓	✓				✓	
8	✓	✓					
10	✓	✓				✓	
12	✓	✓	✓				
16	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓
19	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	
22	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓
34	✓	✓	✓				
37	✓	✓		✓		✓	
47	✓	✓		✓		✓	
57	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	
58	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	
59	✓	✓		✓			
65		✓			✓		
68	✓	✓			✓		
69	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	
71	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		
79	✓	✓		✓			
88	✓	✓		✓		✓	
TOTAL	20	21	3	11	10	13	2

potentially not helpful. If you can't figure out how to use it, how is it going to help you?" To this end, eight of the interviewees believed that appropriate training would be beneficial or mentioned having benefited from training, echoing the findings of prior studies on the positive effects of training (e.g., for avoiding phishing [27]). Additionally, when asked how she dealt with the worries and anxiety created by these experiences, P79 responded: "I think just learning more about technology and different things like spam filters and how phishing schemes and hacking work. The IT people in our company did a little presentation about that just so we would all be aware. I just make sure that I go to those and I'm engaged, just trying to learn more, so I can feel more comfortable, like accessing different things on the Internet."

Participant responses indicated that their characterizations of cybersecurity incidents fell along a spectrum anchored at one end by incidents that we characterize as *Bounded* and at the other end by those we term as *Fuzzy*.

4.2. Bounded Incidents

Bounded incidents have well-defined boundaries such that they can be circumscribed and limited to specific periods, systems, devices, events, etc. Matters such as malicious software, phishing, hacking were often experienced and characterized in these terms. Moreover, a clear solution to the problem is often available. Although these types of incidents are the ones most commonly covered by the media and cybersecurity research, we discovered that participants found them comparatively less stressful. All participants reported finding a solution when faced with a relatively bounded incident. For instance, remediation options can be found in online forums dedicated to helping users recover from malware infections [4].

More than half of the participants reported bounded incidents involving unauthorized access to their bank accounts and/or credit cards. Interestingly, the vast majority (9 out of 10) solved the issues through the respective finan-

cial institutions. Their losses ranged from small amounts to hundreds of dollars, causing anxiety and negative emotions. As P71 reported: "Somebody got hold of my ATM card and spent \$500 on a dating site. So that's why I'm a little panicky now. [...] I was married at the time, so why would I go to a dating site?" Notably, the participants could not provide clear or conclusive explanations regarding the origins of the unauthorized access.

Typically, participants did not incur financial costs for addressing bounded incidents because free solutions or software were adequate for resolving the issue. Only three participants needed to purchase software to clean their infected devices. However, we identified more extreme remediation approaches as five participants purchased a new device instead of fixing an infection. Yet, they treated the purchase as a routine device upgrade rather than the cost of a cybersecurity incident. Only P88 reported financial burden and emotional frustration due to a large amount of money spent to fix a bounded incident. This was counter to our expectations, as we anticipated a larger number of participants expressing strong negative emotions regarding monetary expenses incurred to handle cybersecurity incidents. This may be attributed to the aforementioned view on the *unavoidable* nature of such incidents, and users' becoming more resigned to such costs.

While security experts often classify cybersecurity incidents based on operational characteristics, we found that the same kind of incident can vary in terms of its crispness, thus leading to a variation in "boundedness." For instance, P34 recounted an incident where a pop-up alerted him that his machine was infected with a virus, and he was asked to call a phone number to resolve the issue. This type of scam, referred to as a technical support scam [28], typically aims to deceive users into providing remote access to their machines. In this case, P34 stated that the scammer already had access to his machine but simply gave up after he refused to pay: "So I call the number. I come to find out it was a scam to get money. This guy actually had access to my laptop. He was going

through there and doing all this stuff. [...] He can even disable my laptop so that I couldn't do anything on it. I said I ain't gonna pay you \$99. I just refused, and all of a sudden, my laptop started working again. They were just trying to give me the scare to get me to pay \$99 [...] I was wondering how he was able to manipulate my computer." While the participant ultimately suffered no monetary loss, others may have paid and/or experienced disruption, resulting in the same kind of incident differing in boundedness across users and situations.

Bounded incidents can cause substantial damage. However, the silver lining is that users are often aware that an attack is taking place, which is a necessary precondition for resolving the problem. Even if a victim does not fully understand the technological mechanism, the stress caused by the attack is relatively muted, and the harms related to it are primarily lost time and money. Interestingly, those who reported the loss of a device as an adverse experience (except P16) were much more worried about the possibility of the data falling in the wrong hands and leading to the leakage of private information than about the considerable personal inconvenience or monetary costs.

4.3. Fuzzy Incidents

In contrast to bounded incidents, several reported incidents were amorphous, where operational detail and boundaries were ambiguous, fluid, unclear, or unknown. We consider such experiences as *fuzzy incidents*, which typically include tracking of online activities, privacy violations, and unpleasant online encounters in general. These issues often do not have clear-cut solutions as the issue or the problem itself is often not clear-cut to begin with.

Participants reported considerable difficulties and stress in dealing with fuzzy incidents, indicating uncertainty, insecurity, and confusion. When people felt unable to understand and solve an issue, they resorted to denial or avoidance as coping strategies. In this regard, participants engaged in a wide range of practices. On the one hand, P22 ignored the issue as an unavoidable aspect of online activities: "I'm not the best person in dealing with insults and harassment [...] One of the most effective ways that I have found to deal with people who want to make your life difficult is just to ignore them." Similarly, P79 chose passive acceptance, justifying it by pointing to a lack of agency: "My biggest negative thing is some kind of ignorance, not knowing a lot about many different viruses. [...] I think I just haven't done enough research to know if there are license agreements or terms [...] if the antivirus software runs out at a certain time, do I have to renew it? Going back to ignorance and me not doing enough back end research, I just don't know how that works. I guess ignorance is bliss in some ways." On the opposite end, P65 was driven to complete withdrawal: "I don't post on Twitter or Facebook, and I deleted everything that I thought was kind of iffy. Yeah, so I don't post anything, that's why there's no cyberbullying." Similarly, P71 did not want to "play the game" and deleted her Instagram account and used a pseudonym on Facebook.

Nonetheless, not participating may not be as feasible for younger participants, given the more ubiquitous use of social media among younger individuals [29]. Further, cyberbullying incidents can have severe repercussions, as

highlighted by P19: "I know a kid in my high school who attempted suicide because of cyberbullying [...] Someone kept reaching out to him on Facebook, like attacking all his posts, messaging mean stuff. [...] It was kind of crazy. They created fake accounts to message him." Indeed, studies have linked the use of social networking sites to depression in younger populations [30]–[32], and users frequently encounter cyberbullying, meanness, and harassment on these platforms [33]–[35].

Online tracking [36] was among the most common fuzzy incidents reported by the participants, leading to concerns about how sensitive data about their activities was collected and used by various entities. For instance, six participants were bothered by social media advertisements being based on their Web search history even though they did not comprehend or grasp the complexities of the ad ecosystem. The annoyance reported by our participants regarding the collection of their information for advertising echoes findings of prior studies on advertising that cover targeting based on sensitive traits (e.g., substance abuse, race, etc.) or other potentially sensitive user information [37]–[40]. Redmiles et al. [41] have similarly reported that confusion about targeted ads creates the feeling of being watched. Some participants expressed their worries as a larger concern about personal information becoming profitable for businesses without consent (P19, P58, P68) and available for governmental surveillance (P58, P69).

The abundance of information explicitly shared online by users (e.g., in social networks [42]) or discovered through other means [43] can lead to stalking, online and/or in the physical world [44]. For instance, P22 talked about an individual who tracked down his workplace and showed up to confront him over a denied rental application; the harassment briefly continued over email. P22 outlined the additional security-related precautions he took to protect his online accounts, recounting the use of "a code generator that helps protect the account from being hacked" and "really long passwords" that are frequently changed and stored in a fingerprint-protected note on his smartphone.

In another case, P16 recounted a traumatizing online stalking experience that lasted several years and significantly affected her online behavior. Specifically, a person located overseas followed her mother's blog when she was a kid and systematically started contacting her and following her online accounts: "When I was 16, he somehow found my Facebook without my full name being on my mom's blog. [...] He sent me a happy birthday message. [...] We blocked him on Facebook. Then on my 18th birthday [...] he messaged me again." The participant continued mentioning the different services where the stalker located and messaged her, even when she used distinct handles. This experience resulted in her making all accounts private and being suspicious of all incoming messages which had a negative effect on her overall experience and resulted in the rejection of connection requests from actual friends: "So I have to change all my handles for Instagram and Snapchat and Twitter, and now I'm set to private so no one can see my posts or follow me or message me without me approving it. That's really frustrating. [...] I have to be so careful what I post, and I don't post any pictures of my house or anything

unless I'm inside. I don't put any full name on my posts." These experiences highlight the shortcomings of current countermeasures to defend against such incidents.

4.4. Generation Gap

We found that participants' reactions and actions to adverse experiences were impacted by age and technical efficacy (which are correlated characteristics [45]). Specifically, we found notable differences between the experiences of those born before 1980 and those born later. The latter group came of age as the personal computer and Internet were gaining traction and reaching ubiquitous adoption and is referred to as "digital natives" [46].

While fuzzy incidents were greatly stressful for both generations, bounded incidents were less troublesome for the younger generation. The disparity stems largely from differences in technical knowledge and efficacy. For instance, prior work has found a correlation between efficacy and security-related behavior pertaining to phishing [47]. Younger participants tried to find solutions by turning to various online resources, such as forums, technical support pages, etc. In contrast, older participants tended to rely on offline resources, such as volunteers in public libraries, technology support events in community gatherings, etc. Even so, three of the older participants had limited knowledge of offline public resources for dealing with technology challenges. Since age is correlated with technical efficacy and capabilities, our findings corroborate prior results showing that the ability to obtain security-related advice depends on a user's skill level [15].

Younger participants were much more likely to experience a loss of productivity due to incidents that led to a temporary or permanent loss of their device(s). Compared to older participants, younger participants tended to approach cybersecurity matters with a somewhat cavalier and passive attitude, as reflected by the frequent occurrence of expressions like *"there is nothing to be done."* In contrast, older participants reported active protective steps such as being mindful when sharing information (P58, P88), turning trackers off (P88), and minimizing the use of *"unnecessary"* services. As P34 stated: *"I still don't [pay bills online]. I still like to do that the old-fashioned way. [...] I was born in the 60s. You pay your bills in person, that way you know they're paid. I've bought stuff on Amazon, but I've never paid bills on the Internet."*

P58 highlighted privacy concerns regarding data collection because it can facilitate mass surveillance and enable radical policing based on tracking people: *"I think it's good that Google offers a way where you can look at what data they have on you, what data they're collecting. Right now, my phone is tracking my location. I don't want you tracking my location. [...] They're doing the facial recognition thing in China, and they're going to do it at major airports in the United States."* This is a valid concern as prior research has demonstrated real-time tracking attacks not affected by the location privacy countermeasures deployed in popular services [48]. Moreover, location information enables the inference of other sensitive information [23], [49] including social ties [50]. P58 knew of privacy-invasive practices by foreign and local governments, reflecting the public's increasing awareness and concern regarding government-driven data collection.

Correspondingly, younger participants expressed smaller emotional reactions to adverse experiences, casting them as an unavoidable aspect of using modern technology and the Internet: *"If somebody bad wants to access it, there are leaks and hacks that happen all the time. I might as well take advantage of the convenience of doing all the online stuff because it's not going to change."* Older participants took these experiences less lightly and exhibited greater anxiety and confusion, corroborating prior reports on the challenges and confusion that older adults face when using technology [51], [52].

Importantly, the two generations differ in regards to the long-term impacts of cybersecurity incidents. Long-term considerations for the younger generation are typically about making relevant adjustments to their practices, such as avoiding certain topics on social media. In contrast, older individuals are likely to lose confidence in their ability to use technology in general. Older people typically need to expend significant effort in learning to use technology, and even small setbacks accumulate and lead to long-term loss of confidence. Yet, older participants reported that resources to learn about the use of technology, which are needed for overcoming the loss of confidence and dealing with cybersecurity incidents, are often unsuitable for older adults, who typically need them the most. As a result, older people are likely to suffer greater disruption to their lives from cybersecurity incidents and may even be specifically targeted by malicious actors. For example, P71 narrated a story about a ransomware attack experienced by her father: *"He was in his 80s when this [ransomware attack] happened. He was not really tech-savvy, but he would use the computer for his little business. He called me [...] he said, 'you know, somebody wants money to give me my computer back.' I said, 'Don't give them any money.' He was on the phone with these people for six hours, and I think he ended up giving away \$200 before he called me."*

However, digital natives are not necessarily well-prepared and knowledgeable [53]. Although no young respondent reported difficulties in learning about technology, P79, an account manager whose work involves intensive use of digital communication tools, reported worries and fears owing to a lack of knowledge of risks and dangers of the online environment. She was concerned that her knowledge and preparation would not be enough to avoid harmful cybersecurity incidents: *"There's always a kind of fear that [hacking] could happen. At my work, there were things that we got kind of trained on by our IT team, making sure to watch out for suspicious links or emails from people who weren't us or emails from people impersonating someone else. [...] I think just kind of the fear of phishing scams or not knowing if links are acceptable to click on or if attachments are going to have a virus in them. [...] So far, for the most part, I have avoided any major crises, but I am always worried that I could easily click on something or open something that might have a virus I don't know about."*

5. Discussion

It should come as no surprise that the participants viewed the cybersecurity aspects of technology in a negative light. These matters were a source of stress and anx-

ity and often found to be opaque in terms of attribution and operation. The differences based on age, which is often a proxy for differences in technical efficacy, were along the lines noted in the literature (e.g., [18]).

Our contribution surfaces the details of the disconnect between users' lived experiences and experts' impact assessments. One of the highlights of our findings is the recognition that people seem to lump a diversity of issues under the single umbrella of "cybersecurity-related matters" that fall along a bounded-fuzzy spectrum. It should be emphasized that bounded and fuzzy are not binary categorizations based on specifics of the technology, but intended to anchor two ends of a spectrum. For instance, depending on the situation or the user, a virus infection could be a bounded incident resolved quickly with a virus scan or a fuzzy one that leads to a loss of personal data and subsequent identity theft. For example, one participant reported a virus that enabled a hacker to take control of his machine and demand ransom. Whether an incident is bounded or fuzzy is based not on the technological detail (i.e., viruses) but the *experience* of the user. Similarly, cyberbullying could turn out to be more bounded than fuzzy. Our point is that understanding where an incident may fall along the spectrum can facilitate a more accurate and nuanced assessment of end-user impact.

There have been other attempts to categorize cybersecurity issues. For example, Kim et al. [54] created a taxonomy of technology-centric matters, such as spam emails, malware, and phishing, and non-technology-centric matters, such as scams, cyberbullying, and misinformation. In contrast to such classifications based on technical detail or specific concepts defined by cybersecurity experts, our spectrum is grounded in the *experiences* as described by *end users*. We call for incident characterization, prioritization, and response to be adjusted appropriately based on the placement of an incident along the bounded-fuzzy spectrum. Our findings suggest that attention should be given to the *personal characterizations* of an incident. We argue that such an approach is instrumental for surfacing the true costs borne by end users and can yield a more accurate judgment of the real-world impact of an incident.

Typically, most research efforts and media stories on cybersecurity focus on a single issue (e.g., malware) or a discrete event (e.g., data breach). While such a focus is important – in fact, participant characterizations of bounded incidents were similar to such a focused orientation – it deals with issues that people find less stressful and easily addressable. Part of this is most likely a result of greater exposure and experience with these issues over the years as their prevalence and reporting has continually grown. Our findings suggest that further gains in user education for practicing better "cybersecurity hygiene" would require increased attention to fuzzy incidents, which tend to involve greater social and behavioral considerations and require a *sociotechnical* approach for resolution.

Further, dealing with the interconnectedness and long-term impacts of cybersecurity incidents described by the participants requires an *ecological* orientation that situates cybersecurity matters within specific contexts of the users' lives. As our findings show, the impact of the same issue can vary noticeably across individuals depending on factors such as age, occupation, technical efficacy, financial means, etc. Moreover, the impact may involve indirect

and long-term effects such as loss of self-confidence, technology avoidance, etc. However, users currently do not have easily understandable and *personalized* metrics that help them gauge the potential impact of various cybersecurity issues, especially for fuzzy incidents. For instance, nudges to encourage secure practices and/or discourage potentially harmful actions can be presented as potential savings or losses in terms of time, money, effort, etc., respectively, wherein the values of these metrics are personalized to the individual user.

In the cybersecurity discourse, incidents are a common unit of analysis, applied at the societal and/or the individual level. Consequently, characterizations of an incident drive prioritization and resource allocation for appropriate response and, in turn, measurements of its impact. Therefore, it is important that the impact of an incident be understood appropriately. Most estimates of impact typically cover only a specific event (e.g., a spear phishing attack) and are reported in the aggregate over a large population. Further, the estimates are generally framed in terms of loss of money or time. While time and money metrics are certainly useful, our findings suggest that they are not adequate. Additionally, the short-term focus of these metrics ignores indirect and long-term effects, thus likely underestimating the overall impact of an incident by a significant amount. Moreover, the judgments are derived by cybersecurity domain experts, typically without input from end users. Our findings can bridge this important gap. In that vein, the bounded-fuzzy spectrum reflects how *end users* view these matters. For users, the emotional and cognitive impact [55] of fuzzy incidents is far more salient compared to bounded incidents that result in short-term pain or are ignored altogether.

The resignation and passive acceptance reported by some participants is a cause for alarm, especially since such attitudes were expressed by the younger generation. In this regard, greater exposure to technology seems to be a double-edged sword; it increases technical efficacy and comfort at the same time creating long-term "security fatigue" [25] due to constant exposure to adverse incidents. The inability to deal with these problems may also be due to a lack of adequate user agency, leading to a sense of inevitability and resignation. P69 said: "*I think I'm on the very end of the millennials [...] was born in 95. So I can understand the anxieties. It's just that I don't feel very anxious about it. I know there are always different ways that people hurt other people [online]. It's just our reality.*" Boosting user agency by educating and incentivizing users to take more active steps regarding cybersecurity matters will require multidisciplinary solutions covering technology as well as public policy. Our findings suggest that the younger generation may benefit the most from such efforts. P57, a young male who is relatively mindful and active in coping with cybersecurity issues, suggested: "*I think it's more reactive as opposed to proactive. We do things to minimize the risk as much as possible, but I think some of it is just inevitable. So we just watch closely and make sure that nothing bad is going on.*"

Our findings suggest that the approach to cybersecurity guidance needs significant improvement when it comes to those who are not digital natives. Many of these individuals have needed to spend time and effort in learning the basics of technology; needing to learn about cybersecurity

on top creates a significant challenge. As P71 reported: “My dad used to open every single email that ever came to him, because he didn’t know better. [...] He was very trusting. [...] He thought that they were trying to help him fix it.” Based on our findings and prior studies, we suggest that cybersecurity training and solutions be customized based on age and technical efficacy.

The practices of our participants indicate that technology is viewed as a means to an end, thus resulting in relatively less attention to specific devices and technologies and more to the tasks and the data. Devices may be seen as expendable, as evidenced by those who upgraded the device as a solution to fixing a malware infection. P59 suggested this choice was encouraged and enhanced by product design: “It [infection] might seem like an incentive to buy a new device rather than fixing the current product. [...] I know that Apple products are designed pretty intentionally not to be open to the user in the same way that other computer products are [...] it’s almost impossible to repair sometimes without specialized tools. [...] Oftentimes, it’s cheaper to just buy a new phone [...] depending on what’s going wrong.” Interestingly, device purchases are opportune moments for prompting changes in security behavior [56].

Surprisingly, data loss was rarely mentioned as a cybersecurity incident, perhaps because of the increasing use of cloud services for storage and backup. This may explain why only 4% of ransomware victims reported paying the ransom [57]. On a positive note, fluid device switching makes it possible to create convenient solutions for bounded issues limited to a specific device. Still, accessing data and services via multiple devices creates interdependencies and increases the attack surface. Yet, typical cybersecurity solutions operate with a single-device per user assumption and may overlook the larger attack surface.

6. Implications

Perhaps the most direct implication of this work for security practitioners and researchers is that user characterizations of cybersecurity can be useful for communication related to security issues. For instance, when performing mediation and triage, it is important that the label assigned by the expert is aligned with the attribution of the attack by the victim. Our findings related to bounded events suggest that we can explicitly map certain attacks to specific concepts understood by non-experts. At the same time, there is a large diversity of incidents considered adverse cybersecurity experiences that are much more difficult to attribute to a specific event. A first step toward a more meaningful understanding of these adverse experiences could be placing them on the bounded-fuzzy spectrum which can, in turn, help quantify their impact on their victims and aid triage and response.

On the bounded side, it appears that objective harms like device access, time, or money are the main losses. In contrast, quantifying the negative impact of fuzzy incidents is a much more challenging task because the harm is ill-defined, difficult to describe, and ongoing. While privacy loss has been quantified monetarily within specific contexts [58], the losses connected to these broader feelings of harm are more difficult to measure since they

are related largely to psychosocial impacts. Nonetheless, recent research has found that systems labeling abusive online actions as “harassment” can provide validation and support to affected users [59].

Resignation in the face of security threats has long been recognized as a problem. The intensity of the feeling of a lack of agency mentioned by our participants further highlights this issue. Without the motivation for adoption, even the most usable defenses cannot succeed. To that end, targeting improvement in user empowerment and efficacy appears to be increasingly important for enhancing cybersecurity hygiene for individuals as well as collectives.

One of the more insidious implications of our work is that concerns related to fuzzy incidents undermine the overall trust in technology itself, leading to withdrawal from technology use (e.g., not paying bills online). Even though the security attributes and implications of online banking and cyberstalking are quite different, user conceptualizations of “online safety” (an increasingly salient everyday concern) are attached to the sense of safety in any Internet-mediated activity. It is possible that addressing fuzzy concerns like privacy or toxic online discourse may have positive impacts on cybersecurity practices as users build trust in the medium as a whole.

Our analysis revealed that perceptions and assessments of harm from adverse experiences can vary significantly across individuals. As such, cybersecurity training and interventions can benefit from understanding a user’s personal perception and ordering of harms. This would enable prioritization and delivery of cybersecurity-relevant actions tailored to the user’s experience and needs.

7. Limitations

A few limitations must be taken into account when considering generalizability. As with any qualitative study, our findings are derived from a small sample with a large proportion of students, albeit from a diversity of fields of study. Further, we have disproportionately fewer individuals in the older age groups. It should be noted that we deliberately sampled those who had experienced adverse incidents with technology. Therefore, the extent to which such incidents are experienced by the general population requires further scrutiny. For instance, a follow-up quantitative study via an online questionnaire could help verify broader applicability and uncover cultural variations. The findings may be impacted by self-selection and self-reporting. The limitations of self-reporting could be overcome by additional research that employs complementary techniques such as computational analyses of online support forums and system usage logs.

8. Conclusion

We address three separate, yet complimentary, dimensions: peoples characterizations of adverse cybersecurity experiences, their perceptions of the severity of the ensuing harms, and their coping strategies in future interactions with technology. Our work suggests that classifying cybersecurity incidents along a bounded-fuzzy spectrum can be useful for gauging their harmful impact and determining appropriate mitigation strategies, especially for

non-experts. To that end, our findings make the case for *personalized* cybersecurity metrics and mitigations that incorporate individual differences in the nature and severity of the experienced harm. Considering user trust and comprehension in system design and cybersecurity communication is crucial for avoiding adverse cybersecurity experiences being treated as an unavoidable *fait accompli* of technology use. Otherwise, we risk non-experts being exposed to increasing harm in a technology-saturated world.

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Appendix A. Screening Questionnaire

Thank you for your interest in participating in our Study on Adverse Experiences with Technology.

Please fill out this brief 3-minute questionnaire about yourself and your experiences with technology. We will use your answers to determine if you are eligible to participate in the study.

If you qualify for participation, we will contact you via e-mail for a 45-60 minute interview session conducted on campus at Indiana University Bloomington. As a token of our appreciation for your participation in the interview, you will receive \$10 cash or cash equivalent, such as an Amazon gift certificate.

If you do not qualify, your responses will be discarded safely.

- What is your Year of Birth?
- What is your gender?
 - Male
 - Female
 - Something else. Please specify:
 - Prefer not to answer
- What is your occupation?
- What is your ethnic background? (*Select all that apply.*)
 - African American
 - Asian
 - Hispanic
 - Native American
 - White (Caucasian)
 - Something else. Please specify:
- Are you a resident of Bloomington, Indiana?
 - Yes
 - No
- Are you affiliated with Indiana University Bloomington?
 - Yes
 - No
- [If affiliated with Indiana University Bloomington] What is your affiliation with Indiana University Bloomington? (*Select all that apply.*)
 - Undergraduate Student
 - Graduate Student
 - Faculty
 - Staff
 - Retired
 - Something else. Please specify:
- [If affiliated with Indiana University Bloomington] What department or school are you affiliated with?
- [If Student] What is your major/field of study?
- On an average day, how much time do you spend actively on Internet-connected devices, such as a computer, phone, tablet, etc.?
 - None
 - Less than 1 hour
 - 1-2 hours
 - 3-4 hours
 - 5-7 hours
 - 8 or more hours
- Which of the following devices do you use? (*Select all that apply.*)
 - Tablet
 - Smartwatch
 - Smartphone
 - Digital camera
 - Desktop
 - Voice assistant (e.g., Amazon Echo)
 - Fitness tracker (e.g., Fitbit)
 - Gaming console (e.g., Playstation, Xbox, Wii, etc.)
 - Laptop
 - Other. Please specify:

- Which operating system do you use for your laptop? (If you use multiple laptops, select the operating system for the laptop you consider as your primary laptop.)
 - Microsoft Windows
 - MacOS
 - Linux
 - Chrome OS
 - I don't know
 - Something else. Please specify:
- Which operating system do you use for your desktop? (If you use multiple desktops, select the operating system for the desktop you consider as your primary desktop.)
 - Microsoft Windows
 - MacOS
 - Linux
 - Chrome OS
 - I don't know
 - Something else. Please specify:
- Which operating system do you use for your mobile phone? (If you use multiple mobile phones, select the operating system for the mobile phone you consider as your primary mobile phone.)
 - Android OS (Google)
 - iOS (Apple)
 - Something else. Please specify:
- Which of the following tasks have you ever done? (*Select all that apply.*)
 - Created a Web site
 - Updated the operating system on a smartphone, laptop, or desktop
 - Installed anti-virus software
 - Used the command line to display hidden files in a directory
 - Synced your to do list with your calendar
 - Identified the host server from a web address
 - Backed up your files
 - Set up a server
 - Turned on/off auto loading of images in e-mail
 - Sent an encrypted e-mail
 - Created an e-mail signature
 - Turned off location sharing on a mobile device
 - Created a computer program and/or a phone app
 - Changed the default settings on software or apps
 - Completed an online voice call or video call
 - Set up two-factor authentication
 - Paid bills online
- Which of the following have you ever experienced? (*Select all that apply.*)
 - Hacked device or online account
 - Phishing
 - Bugs in software or apps
 - Identity Theft
 - Stalking
 - Leak of sensitive personal information
 - Cyberbullying
 - Viruses or other unwanted/malicious programs (such as spyware, adware, etc.)
 - Unauthorized access to your bank account
 - Theft/unauthorized use of your credit or debit card
 - Demand for ransom to restore access to device or data
 - Something else. Please specify:
- What did you do in response to the adverse experience(s)? (*Select all that apply.*)
 - Repaired device using advice from an online forum
 - Notified the financial institution
 - Purchased security software
 - Obtained a loaner device
 - Purchased a new device
 - Notified the credit card company
 - Took device to a repair shop
 - Repaired device with anti-virus/anti-malware software

- Nothing
- Something else. Please specify:
- What were the consequences of the adverse experience(s)? (*Select all that apply.*)
 - Loss of productivity
 - Violation of privacy
 - Loss of funds from a bank or credit card account
 - Cost of replacing a device
 - Damage to credit profile
 - Time without a device (while it was being repaired)
 - Loss of confidence in the use of technology
 - Reduced ease of use of a device
 - Reduced sense of security
 - Loss of data (e.g., documents, pictures, etc.)
 - Cost of purchasing security software
 - Cost of repairing the device
 - Loss of employment
 - Embarrassment
 - Time spent learning to repair a device
 - Something else. Please specify:
- Are you able to attend an in-person interview at a location on the campus of Indiana University Bloomington?
 - Yes
 - No
 - Maybe
- If you cannot attend in person, which of the following could work?
 - Audio/video conference (e.g., Zoom, Skype)
 - Telephone
 - Other. Please specify:
- If you qualify for the study, which email address should we use to contact you for scheduling an interview?

Appendix B.

Semi-structured Interview Protocol

B.1. Initial Briefing

This research focuses on adverse experiences with digital technologies. It can include any situations where you felt unpleasant, unsatisfied, worried and concerned while using digital technologies.

By doing the interviews, we hope to know more about how people characterize experiences of adverse incidents when they use digital devices and services and how they perceive, understand, and respond to those experiences.

B.2. Background Information

B.2.1. Introduction.

- Tell me a bit about yourself.
- What is your occupation? If you are a student in college or graduate school, what is your major?
- If you don't mind, when were you born?

B.2.2. Technology Habits.

- What digital devices and services do you use regularly? For what purposes?

B.3. Adverse Experiences

B.3.1. General.

- You mentioned in the questionnaire that you have had adverse experience using these devices/services. What specific incidents caused the adverse experience? [If the participant cannot remember, go through the list of adverse experiences mentioned by the participant in the screening questionnaire.]

B.3.2. Specific.

- Could you tell me about a particularly prominent incident? What were the exact details? Let's start with (key elements) such as the device/service you were using.
 - [Follow-up: Detection] How did you detect the incident?
 - [Follow-up: Reaction] How did the incident make you feel when you detected it? What was your reaction to the incident?
 - [Follow-up: Solution] Did you solve the issue?
 - 1) (If not) How is it going now? Are you still facing the issue? How does it make you feel? What has it cost you?
 - 2) (If yes) How did you solve the issue? How did you figure out the solution? What specific tools or resources did you use?
 - a) Did it cost you anything (if so, what or how much)? How did it make you feel?
 - b) Did you try any other solutions before you finally solved the problem? If so, what were they? What were the key elements?
- Did you have any other adverse experiences? If yes, please tell me about them one by one. [Follow the same questions as above for each incident.] [If needed, prompt the participant using the following examples of adverse experiences: *Hacked device or online account, Phishing, Bugs in software or apps, Identity Theft, Stalking, Leak of sensitive personal information, Cyberbullying, Viruses or other unwanted/malicious programs (such as spyware, adware, etc.), Unauthorized access to your bank account, Theft/unauthorized use of your credit or debit card, Demand for ransom to restore access to device or data.*]

B.4. Influences

B.4.1. Initial.

- Did the experiences you described above have any influence on you? [If no, skip this category.] [If yes, continue.]

B.4.2. Short term.

- What were the influences in the short term?

B.4.3. Long term.

- What were the influences in the long term?

B.5. Lessons Learned

- What did you learn from these incidents and solution-seeking experiences? [Follow-up, if needed:] For example, did these experiences affect your habits or preferences regarding using the involved devices or services? Did they alter your views of digital technologies in general? Did they influence your social or professional relationships?

B.6. Wrap-up

- Is there anything else you find important that we did not cover? Do you have any questions?

Thank you very much for sharing your experiences. Your responses were very helpful. If you have any questions later, please feel free to contact the researchers.