A question of consciousness
This new discussion of the nature and origin of consciousness might be completely wrong, says Charles Foster, but it’s still a brilliant and essential book
Sentience
The Invention of Consciousness
Nicholas Humphrey
Oxford University Press 2022
Hb, 256pp, £16.99, ISBN 9780198858539
Two questions dominate modern debate about consciousness. What is consciousness for? And how could consciousness have evolved out of unconscious matter?
In this bold, brilliant, honest and ultimately unconvincing book, theoretical psychologist Nicholas Humphrey identifies and addresses both questions. His directness and philosophical sophistication are unusual in the crowded and noisy neuroscientific marketplace.
Humphrey’s audacity isn’t in doubt. He thinks he has answers to both questions.
He begins by defining his terms. Central to his argument is his distinction between what he calls “cognitive consciousness” and “phenomenal consciousness”. When he refers to “consciousness” generally he means having knowledge of what is in your own mind. Your conscious mental states are those of which you are the subject and to which you have access by way of introspection. The subject (you) remains constant over time. That makes self-narrative possible or perhaps inevitable.
He sees this general consciousness (which he dubs “cognitive”) as facilitating the unity of self and creating a “mind-wide forum” for planning and decision-making: “Anything that is becomes shareable with whatever else is.” But, he asks, how do sensations with phenomenal qualities fit in? Our sensations have a qualitative dimension. “Redness” for instance, means something to me. That makes sensations different from, for instance, thoughts, beliefs and wishes. Phenomenal experience is the root of “phenomenal consciousness”. Humphrey posits that one might have cognitive consciousness without phenomenal consciousness – for instance in the case of “blindsight”, where the visual cortex has been removed but yet (without any sensation at all of vision) the subject is able reliably to indicate the position
