United Nations Reform

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PART I

UNITED NATIONS REFORM: PROLOGUE

CHAPTER 1

An Agenda for United Nations Reform

Geoffrey Grenville-Wood

Great problems usually come to the United Nations because governments have been unable to think of anything else to do about them. The United Nations is a last-ditch, last resort affair, and it is not surprising that the organization should often be blamed for failing to solve problems that have already been found to be insoluble by governments.

U Thant, 1978¹

Even as it stands the UN system is considerably more effective than the impression given by many stringent criticisms, especially those emanating from its most powerful members. It is, if anything astonishing that this group of public-service international institutions, staffed from and governed by nearly every country in the world, have achieved so much of enduring value in the last forty-nine years. It would, however, be surprising if, after such a period of time, they were not in need of radical overhaul, the more so as their mandates and critical responsibilities are rapidly increasing in volume and complexity.

Erskine Childers and Brian Urquhart, 1994²

These are two views expressed by knowledgeable people a quarter-century apart. U Thant, after retirement showing the fatigue and frustration to be expected from someone who had tried to run the United Nations during some of its most difficult times. Childers and Urquhart exhibiting the commitment and hope of those who have lived through the darkest hours and who now see potential and possibility. Who is right? This book about reforming the United Nations will not provide the full answer. It will at least contribute to the discussion.

In truth, U Thant’s opinion reflects a stark and uncomfortable reality, as accurate today as it was then. Member States, especially the powerful, do not accept that the UN is anything more than just a minor instrument of foreign policy. An attitude which could be characterized as: if it serves our purpose to have the UN act, or if we can dump the problem in the UN’s lap, we will use the organization. There is as yet no firm commitment to the UN as the prime instrument for such states to conduct their foreign relations.

Thus, we see the UN constantly begging Member States to pay their dues; living a hand-to-mouth existence, while lacking the minimum funds to carry out the mandates demanded of it. At the same time, the organisation is under a constant barrage of criticism from many of the leading Member States for its bureaucratic mess, its financial chaos and its corruption and nepotism. The other truth is that the UN’s total regular operational budget, including all the specialized agencies and excluding peacekeeping and the international financial institutions (who do not like to think of themselves a part of the UN system, anyway) is US $ 6.384 billion per year. As Childers and Urquhart point out, this is equivalent to the amount US citizens spend on cut flowers and potted plants in a year.³

The whole UN system employs a total of 51,484 persons, including all professional, support and general service staff. The UN Secretariat proper, based in New York, Geneva and Vienna, and including at the regional commissions, comprising a total of about 9,100 persons. This is fewer than the City of Winnipeg which employs around 9,900.⁴ Yes, perhaps these are not the best people in the world, although many are. Most of the employees of the UN are highly talented and dedicated. I would guess that the proportion of vastly superior to deadwood probably exceeds that of Winnipeg or any other city or government department in Canada.

Lest there be any misunderstanding, there is also a great deal of truth in the quotation from Childers and Urquhart. The United Nations, after fifty years, has performed near miracles in many fields including health; but it is in need of major reform. The past fifty years have taught us that we need a better and more effective UN. The world, if it is to survive another fifty years, must reorganize its system of international and global governance. Perhaps we could call this requirement our Global Agenda for Change. Within this overarching Agenda, there are several components, each more daunting and challenging than the last, all interconnected, related and interdependent.

Sustainable Development and Agenda 21

Some of the changes needed have been outlined in a number of powerful documents emanating from the United Nations itself. For example, the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) approved its Agenda 21, a vast list of actions required of states, international organizations and citizens. What is most significant about Agenda 21, apart from its scope and reach, are the demands full and proper implementation of its recommendations will make of the international system. There is no historical precedent for the kind of global supervision of individual, private and public sector and nation state activity called for. There is also no precedent for the changes in day to day activity needed immediately. Thus, changes in the international system and the implementation of a truly global system of governance for the planet will be required to give real meaning to the concept of a shared environment and ecology, while still ensuring a decent life for the inhabitants of the planet.

The United Nations provided the occasion, in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992, for the governments of the Member States and for thousands of representatives of the peoples of those states, through Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), to meet and identify the environment and development problems facing the planet. As can be expected, that huge effort only served to start a complex process leading to: measures which place environmental concerns at the centre of the development policies of all countries, to quote Maurice Williams, the President of the Society for International Development.⁵ The international system itself needs to embark on the same path. The international financial institutions, the private lenders and international institutions need to change approaches and standards and governments must have some form of accountability for the undertakings made and received at UNCED and after.

UNCED took place more than two years ago. It is now clear that the impetus for real change in national and international institutions, called for by the scope of the issues identified there, is largely lost. The poor state of the world economy has had the effect of weakening the resolve of governments and of sapping the creative energy of the policy-makers. Furthermore, it is apparent that the weak compromise institution created at UNCED, the Commission for Sustainable Development (CSD) will never have the capacity or the power to be the overseer for the implementation of Agenda 21.

In May 1994, the InterAction Council, a group made up of former heads of state and government, in a report which was the result of meetings involving a wide range of experts as well as several members of the Council itself, said the following regarding the CSD: The mandate of the CSD – covering virtually everything dealing with sustainable development – may turn out in practice to be a considerable bottleneck. Rather than speeding up, it may retard the adoption and implementation of meaningful measures.⁶

The Council went on to say: Consideration should also be given to whether there is really a need for CSD to report to other intergovernmental bodies, such as ECOSOC or the General Assembly, inducing a proliferation of meaningless debates. Would it not be sufficient for CSD to report directly to governments and to the Secretary-General, suggesting particular areas for attention or initiatives?⁷

In light of the lack of real authority around the CSD table, some of the ideas regarding institutional mechanisms, rejected at UNCED mainly because of the failure of governments to screw up the nerve to do something meaningful, have been resurrected. The InterAction Council said the following about the need for a stronger institution:

Given deficiencies resulting from its genesis, mandate, composition and operating modalities, doubts have arisen whether CSD will be able to become the desired, effective fora to discuss, coordinate and cope with the cluster of global issues of environmental degradation, poverty and overpopulation. The suggestion has been made that it would be desirable to have in this area a body as powerful and efficient as the Security Council is in its field. Such a body should be empowered to pass binding resolutions and to seek enforcement of decisions (although, to be sure, the Security Council itself is lacking this very power to impose policies on national governments).⁸

Another aspect of the Agenda 21 dilemma arises from the historic underpinnings of our system of international law. Common sense, we hope and sometimes even believe, will confirm that environmental concerns transcend national boundaries and therefore their solution must be addressed transnationally. Thus, it should be taken as a given that issues of national sovereignty should be made subservient to overriding environmental concerns. Not so – Professor Nicholas A. Robinson of the Centre for Environmental Legal Studies at Pace University School of Law and a noted international environmental legal scholar, in a paper delivered in advance of UNCED, set out the problem as follows:

Existing international law has not served to protect the environment: globally, this system has allowed the acute deterioration now experienced. There are reasons for this. Classic international law since Hugo Grotius focused on three key relations among nations:(l) that restitution be made when one state harms another; (2) that a state’s promises must be observed (pacta sunt servanda); and (3) that freedom of the seas be assured. Under the United Nations Charter, three further elements were embraced: (1) collective security; (2) the protection of human rights; and (3) the duty of international cooperation. While this framework has conferred enormous benefits on the community of nations, worldwide environmental trends highlight inadequacies. The system presupposes that nations can each take care of their own affairs, largely as independent ‘citizens’ or subjects under international law. Environmental problems, however, obliged nations to deal with matters over which each state has little to no control alone. No single state can be self-sufficient in its environmental well-being.

Mere treaties do not protect nature. International law rarely concerns itself, however, with the measures a state takes to observe a treaty until the breach harms another state, and by then the environment is injured too.⁹

At UNCED, the most heated debates took place around specific environmental or development issues. Delegates and NGOs alike were mesmerized by the potential of words. Words which marked either progress in the way the issue was described or which effectively protected the status quo. In fact, the real debate and the strong lobbying should have been on institutions and legal instruments. Subsequent events have shown that words on an Agenda have no meaning unless there are laws, in the form of treaties and agreements, and that there is in place an institution to oversee and enforce those laws.

There is therefore an urgent requirement to reopen the discussions about the Earth Charter, the international treaty that would protect the sustainability of the planet in a meaningful and substantive way. Dr Parvez Hassan, a distinguished jurist from Pakistan and a leading international lawyer, put forward the case at The Hague in August 1991:

We … believe that the time has come when the international community must acknowledge and accept environmental rights and obligations in the same manner as it has acknowledged and accepted the international protection of human rights. A few decades ago, it seemed revolutionary to assert that human rights could be protected at the international level. Domestic Jurisdiction and sovereignty of states were then pleaded as iron curtains that barred international efforts to promote and protect the human rights of individuals across state boundaries. But the collective voice of the international community which first manifested itself in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations in 1948 brought about, overnight, a virtual global acceptance of the internationalization of human rights. I believe that, today, we stand on the threshold of an equally promising era: an era where the international community should move to accept and acknowledge the basic and fundamental rights and states to be free from environmental degradation.¹⁰

Thus Agenda 21 should be more than the list of actions required. More fundamental change at the institutional level is needed if we are to have meaningful results. The 50th Anniversary should provide a renewed impetus to examine the institution and the law that would make reality of the hopes and expectations that drove the UNCED process.

An Agenda for Peace

Shortly after UNCED, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali published An Agenda for Peace.¹¹ This report, which was commissioned by the Security Council at its historic summit meeting of 31 January 1992, dealt with three key aspects of the role of the United Nations in the context of collective security. These were Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping. Events since 1992 have made it even more obvious than it then was that the report only scratched the surface of the international security challenge facing the UN.

The demands made on UN peacekeeping and peacemaking capacities by the crises in Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda and Haiti show that there is a need for fundamental analysis of what precisely the UN ought to be expected to provide and on what basis should these demands be met. These issues are, in and of themselves, enough to keep reformers occupied well past the 50th Anniversary.

However, there are other equally pressing issues to address. The reform of the decision making process of the organization needs work. There are many ideas circulating about the membership, structure, powers and voting at the Security Council. The General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the other UN bodies and the agencies all need to be examined with a view to improving their operations and effectiveness.

The term Agenda For Peace referred only to those matters that related directly to the peacekeeping and peacemaking function as supervised by the Security Council. It is however important to broaden the concept of the Agenda For Peace terminology to include the whole issue of restructuring the United Nations system. The United Nations is the globe’s main engine for peace; renewal in all its aspects is in fact the Agenda for Peace.

Childers and Urquhart begin the process by identifying what could be called the nuts and bolts of the system; the machinery for decision making, finance and management, the staff and the relationship to NGOs.¹² The process for renewal does not necessarily include Charter reform, although perhaps it should. There is much to be done in the context of making the existing design, as set out in the Charter, more effective, more responsive and accountable.

The InterAction Council, in May 1994, identified one of the major shortcomings of the existing system which has to be addressed in this context. They said:

One of its major shortcomings is that it really does not operate as a system with common guidance, supervision or central direction. The main reason for this state of affairs is the system’s polycentric nature, which by itself is due to a decentralization of institutional competence on functional or technical grounds dating back in some instances more than 50 years. Thus, a plethora of more or less independent organizations pursues largely uncoordinated economic and social policies and programmes. In spite of an abundance of coordination devices, which remain largely in effect, the activities of the UN system lack coherence.¹³

The InterAction Council has identified one of the major difficulties with the UN system, a difficulty that has to be addressed immediately and decisively. This is not a matter for Charter reform, nor is it an issue that can be addressed by the Secretary-General alone. Member States are represented in more or less pivotal roles in all of the agencies. Governments deal, on a daily basis, with each of the agencies and continue to perpetuate the lack of coherence referred to. An international effort led by the Secretary-General and supported by the Member States and the non-governmental organizations must work towards bringing the United Nations system to order.

Erskine Childers, in a speech at the University of London in January 1993, gave an excellent example. He said, while addressing a British audience, thus alluding to British examples:

Britain left Ghana with only 95 University graduates among 9 million citizens, a ratio to total population which, by the way, had it applied here would have meant that Britain in I960 would have had only 600 graduates for all needs. But in only 20 years the UN Development Programme, with UNESCO, trained over one million teachers, more than half in Africa. I know since I helped in this work. The British government withdrew from UNESCO in the very year when this enormous achievement could be announced.

Yet even as the million new teachers was reached and surpassed, the International Monetary Fund, supposedly a part of the system, was demanding that Third World governments dismiss tens of thousands of those very teachers, under its structural adjustment policies supported by the G-7 powers that control it. Whole portions, up to a third of the educational staffs so painstakingly built up by the rest of the system – and incidentally also with the G-7’s own bilateral aid – have been wiped out in the last decade. This is an example of no-sense contradictions in the system that simply must now be confronted.¹⁴

Therefore, reform is needed to deal with the chronic lack of coordination in the system. This would mean far more accountability of the agencies to some central authority residing within the office of the Secretary-General. Of course, that office is still clearly accountable to the members of the United Nations. The problem to date seems to have been that each of the agencies, although accountable to member governments, through their governing bodies, is not accountable to the UN system per se. In this way, the supervision by member governments is divided between many sectors within those governments and dispersed through a lack of central coordination within the system. The challenges the world faces in the second fifty years of the United Nations’ existence will not permit us the luxury of such practices and lack of accountability.

One major area that clearly needs reform is the office of the Secretary-General itself. It would seem that not enough attention has been paid to the role the Secretary-General is expected to play on the world scene. In the public’s mind, he is seen as the world’s foremost international civil servant. The office is the embodiment of the hopes of mankind for a peaceful and prosperous world. Unfortunately, the reality is that the office has no real independent authority and is severely circumscribed by budgetary and political considerations. In the new era this reality will have to change. At the same time, the office cannot be all things to all people and cannot be expected to perform all of the functions now required under the existing UN Charter.

Perhaps the first reform should be in the process for selection of the Secretary-General. No self-respecting organization would permit its executive head to be selected in such a highly inappropriate and Byzantine way. It cannot be denied that the office of the Secretary-General is a highly political one, and therefore the major powers in the United Nations will want to have a major say in the selection. However, such a selection should not take place merely upon the basis of whether certain individuals have the self-regard to put their names forward to their governments and others for consideration.

The United Nations has been lucky in its first fifty years in that the calibre of most of the persons who have held the high office has been of the highest order. There have been of course exceptions. In addition, one cannot help but wonder if there were not others available, from time to time, who could have been persuaded to accept the office had they been sought out and recruited. In fact a selection process based upon search and recruitment must be one of the first orders of business in the context of United Nations’ reform. In the final analysis, the real selection will be made by the Security Council. The hope is that the range of candidates put before the Security Council will in fact represent the best available candidates at any time.

Erskine Childers and Brian Urquhart prepared a report in 1990 on the issue of leadership and the United Nations. With reference to the selection of the Secretary-General they stated that the existing process was haphazard, increasingly parochial, and predominantly political. In their report they propose a different and improved process, as follows:

If the term of Secretary-General were to be limited to a seven-year single term, an improved process of appointment could be discussed by the General Assembly and the Security Council without any risks of possible embarrassment to the current Secretary-General.

The essential elements of an improved process are:

• serious consideration by governments of the necessary qualifications for the post, as indicated, among other things, by probable future demands on the UN;

• a single seven-year term;

• the cessation of the practice of individual campaigning for the Secretary-Generalship;

• agreed rules as to nominations and a timetable for the process;

• a well-organized search, in good time, for the best qualified candidates worldwide, thus taking the initiative away from self-perceived or nationally sponsored candidates;

• the inclusion of women candidates in the search in comparable numbers to men;

• a mechanism for the proper assembly of biographical material and for the assessment and checking of the qualifications, personal suitability, record, etc., of the candidates;

• high level consideration of candidates by governments, in consultation with parliamentary leaders and important non-governmental bodies, before a final decision.

A search group, to be established by the Security Council each time, should be representative of both its permanent and non-permanent members. It should be authorized to seek information and advice from any source, including the non-governmental sector and the international civil service. Its work should be carried out in the strictest confidentiality and well in advance of the date for a new appointment.¹⁵

It is also a matter of some concern to United Nations watchers that the office itself needs to become more focused and more closely identified with certain areas of the mandate of the organization. For example, it is highly questionable whether the office of the Secretary-General should be directly involved in actions authorized under Chapter VII of the Charter. Since it is always hoped that the Secretary-General of the United Nations will be available to provide good offices in the direction of resolving conflicts and attempting to avoid the use of arms, it seems appropriate that office should be removed from the day-to-day management of military operations, even if they are undertaken under the United Nations’ flag. It is thus recommended by some that the Chapter VII operations should be managed and organized by the Security Council which should have answerable to it a command structure reflecting the United Nations’ organization and system. This structure should be separate from the office of the Secretary-General which would thus be freed to act in a mediatory and conciliatory mode, as required.

Giandomenico Picco, a former United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for political affairs sets out the concept in some detail, referring to the difficulties the United Nations has endured since the heady days of 1990 and 1991:

The Cold War actually ended for the United Nations more than two years before the Berlin Wall came tumbling down. The catalyst was Mikhail Gorbachev, the last Soviet president, with his new attitude towards the world body, and the occasion was the Iran-Iraq war, perhaps the first non-East-West conflict. The five permanent members of the Security Council began a new way of working together in early 1987, and a year later the Secretary-General brokered the end of the Iran-Iraq war, perhaps the most remarkable in a series of UN successes between 1987 and 1991. Among those, El Salvador’s conflict was a civil war – whose resolution garnered a 1988 Nobel Peace Prize – and others had civil war characteristics. In addition, the United Nations helped broker the accords that led to the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, shepherded Namibia to independence, extracted the hostages from Lebanon, and fashioned the agreement for the subsequent settlement in Cambodia.

In all those cases, the office of the Secretary-General played a key role. Importantly, however, UN success was not secured by the use of force. The United Nations was engaged under the Secretary-General’s direction solely in negotiations and peacekeeping.¹⁶

Picco refers to the Gulf War in which the military role under Chapter VII was subcontracted out to the US led military coalition. He alludes to situations such as Somalia and Bosnia, and indicates that management by the Office of the Secretary-General of these situations has not been particularly successful because the tools available to the Secretary-General are those more related to Chapter VI peacekeeping ventures.

Picco concludes that the confused chain of command we have witnessed in the Balkans and elsewhere has resulted in a loss of credibility for the United Nations itself and in a lessening of the effectiveness of the effort. Lewis McKenzie has made similar comments.

Picco thus argues that the Office of the Secretary-General should not be endowed with any of the military financial and intelligence tools of a state. He is against transforming that institution into what he calls a pale imitation of a state. He claims that the institution of the Secretary-General is inherently inappropriate to manage the use of force and to involve itself in decisions on the use of force. In addition, this involvement compromises the institution of the office of the Secretary-General and the impartiality critical to its capacity as a negotiator. Picco relates a personal anecdote which highlights this distinction between the office of the Secretary-General and the Security Council, which represents more directly the Member States. Picco was of course the Secretary-General’s representative in the process of negotiating the release of the hostages held in Lebanon. He describes his experience as follows:

During the course of the Secretary-General’s operation that led to the release of 11 Western and 91 Lebanese hostages, the recovery of the remains of 2 Americans and the identification of the remains of 2 Israelis, I met several times as the UN negotiator with the hostage-takers under unorthodox circumstances. One of the first questions asked me was whether I was an emissary of the Secretary-General or the Security Council. I gave the right answer. Had I said ‘the Security Council’ as I was subsequently informed, I would have been killed. The question demonstrated quite an understanding of the United Nations organization and a perception of the Security Council as supposedly representing the vested interests of its Member States. In this instance, the Secretary-General’s office could do what the Security Council could not, just as the reverse was true in the war against Iraq.¹⁷

Picco identifies one issue which tips the balance in favor of a separation of duties:

Finally, there is the importance of morality as an anchor for the Secretary-General. Even if the institution of the Secretary-General could manage a Chapter VII use-of-force operation, it would then be the decision of his office to authorize intentional killing. This power is quite another matter than the tragic but unintended deaths that may accompany peacekeeping operations. In carrying out an offensive use of force, UN soldiers, identified aggressors, and civilians might all be casualties in unexpectedly high numbers. The authority to order killing, far from strengthening the institution of the Secretary-General, would render it no different in the eyes of suspicious combatants than major nation states and their alliances.¹⁸

It would seem that reform of the United Nations, and more particularly the Security Council, requires a little more thought in terms of what powers the Council should exercise and whether the Secretary-General is independent of the Security Council in some aspects or merely a servant of it, as appears to have been the case to date. The issue of how the Council is to be restructured, whether or not the veto should be maintained and whether other states should be added as permanent members could almost be considered secondary to this more fundamental analysis of what precisely is the role of the Security Council in relation to its management of the Office of the Secretary-General. Does the world organization not require a more independent Office, able to act to preserve the peace using non-violent means, and to use its good offices where combatants may very well include members of the Security Council? We are in a new world, the ideals of the drafters of the Charter are being achieved, in many instances. However, it is very possible that their concept no longer applies in relation to this very important aspect of the operation of the United Nations.

An Agenda for Development

On another front, also aching for major reform and initiative, is the area of development. In May 1994, the Secretary-General published a report on An Agenda For Development. A final version is expected soon. In some ways the issue of international development has been a source of great disappointment for many in the world community. There have been spectacular successes: parts of South-East Asia come to mind. But there are also abject failures: Africa springs immediately into view. In addition, there are spectacular failures within the success stories and there are minor successes within the abject failures. Erskine Childers in his University of London speech in 1993 set the focus as follows:

There are severe, potentially catastrophic economic inequities between the North and South which the G-7 powers have very largely ignored ever since the 1970s, which have not conveniently gone away, only become steadily worse. In I960 the richest one-fifth of the world’s population enjoyed thirty times the income of the poorest fifth; by 1989 the richest fifth was receiving sixty times the income of the poorest.

The ratio of 20:80, or worse, dominates our world today. As the 1990s opened, the twenty per cent Northern minority of human kind had 82.7% of world gross national product; 81.2% of world trade; 94.6% of all commercial lending; 80.6% of all domestic saving; 80.5% of all domestic investment, and 94% of all research and development. The 80% majority of humanity in the South get the 20% or less scraps from the tables of the affluent.

Among them, some 1.2 billion people now live in absolute poverty, on the very margins of survival itself and with more driven down into this condition every day, 40% more in the last twenty years. They include over 560 million rural women whose numbers in such misery are rising faster than men, with 75 million women the sole heads of rural households containing over 500 million children and older people.¹⁹

It is this truth that the UN must now reorganize and redouble its efforts to address. The Agenda For Development put forward by the Secretary-General, is only a beginning. There must be a major restructuring of the United Nations’ instruments for achieving development and there must be, as mentioned earlier, a fundamental restructuring of all the organizations so that they work in a coherent way together towards the same objective.

The South Centre, established in 1990 following the report of the South Commission, prepared a report in 1992 by the Working Group on Reform and the Future of the United Nations, that brought together many leading thinkers from developing countries. In relation to the institutions of the United Nations, the report had the following to say:

These multilateral financial institutions [Bretton Woods institutions] are designed to reflect international economic power relationships; in a highly unequal world, they are therefore constitutionally and effectively under the control of major industrialized nations of the North. Under these circumstances the current concern for democracy and democratic control – if it is to apply even to a limited extent to international organizations and relations – has consequences. The arguments for institutional specialization become invalid when one set of institutions is based on ‘the sovereign equality of nations’, and the basis for the other is economic power. For it is not true that there are no competing views or interpretations of economic and social reality; on the contrary these matters appear very different from the North and from the South.

Nonetheless, some Northern proposals for an institutional division of labour with respect to development-related functions assigned peace and social concerns to the UN, finance and macro-economic management to the IMF, development strategies to the World Bank and trade matters to GATT. If these proposals were to be accepted, the Northern vision of the world economy would be beyond effective challenge, intellectual pluralism would be threatened, and alternative views would have difficulty in attaining an institutional foot-hold for international visibility.²⁰

The report goes on to conclude that too much emphasis on the Bretton Woods institutions would reinforce the current imbalance that Erskine Childers referred to. It concedes that the institutions themselves were created in order to avoid the economic and political injustices and distortions which had been the cause of the great depression and the Second World War. However, they note that it is important today for these institutions to adhere more closely to their founding principles and purposes. The report concludes as follows:

On the other hand, if the North-based world view rooted in realpolitik is allowed to proceed unchallenged, the basic moral, ethical and political premises of the United Nations will all be undermined. It is therefore vital and urgent that advantage be taken of the current ‘window of opportunity’. A broad-based initiative must be initiated by the South aimed at protecting and promoting the basic principles of the UN; to that end it is necessary to insist upon a carefully considered process of change agreed through negotiation between different interests. Updating the mission and structure of the UN is a matter of concern for the whole of humankind. Changes in its mandate, functions and institutions must be determined in a democratic manner.²¹

Another aspect that is not receiving sufficient attention, but which United Nations reform should consider as a matter of priority, is the fact that financial behaviour at the international level is not subject to any international supervision. The InterAction Council spends some time in its report examining the relationship between new ad hoc arrangements, such as the G-7 and its various summit and ministerial meetings, the multilateral organizations, the Bretton Woods institutions and the United Nations per se.

The InterAction Council appears to throw up its hands in disgust and concludes as follows:

Neither the United Nations and its economic and social council (ECOSOC) nor the UN’s specialized agencies have ever played any significant role in economic policy making and it seems unlikely that they ever will. Governments direct their energies only to institutions where cooperation is likely to be most fruitful. The real problem is that the United Nations system was never able to cope with the multidisciplinary character of interdependence. The organization of the system along functional lines led to a situation where international cooperation was approached only from a sectoral perspective (which in turn would have the effect of strengthening sectoral lobbies nationally). Instead it should have tried to balance the various sectoral interests for the sake of global progress and cooperation. This would require a determined and sustained coordination exercised at the highest level, which cannot be resolved by the executive heads of the agencies meeting from time-to-time under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General. One of the irritations encountered in the past was that the various agencies were operating at cross-purposes, engaging as they did in normative activities and in issuing policy directives which were at variance. Sovereign governments had adopted in different sectoral forms, contradictory decisions of a global nature.²²

The InterAction Council recommends that a new representative reform commission should be set up with a view to preparing a package of proposals regarding reform of the UN system in this field, including a reduction in the number of organizations, the number of intergovernmental committees, the volume of paper reports and documents. Its despair and pessimism may be justified, but the scope of the problem and the challenge to the world organization cannot justify so minimalist an approach.

Erskine Childers’ 1993 speech cited an essay written by the University of Sussex professor, Hans Singer, underlines the scope of the real challenge facing the international community: The state has become too big for the small things and too small for the big things … The small things call for delegation downwards to the local level … The big things call for delegation upwards, for coordination between national policies, or for transnational institutions.²³

An Agenda for People

The United Nations reform process must also address what I have chosen to call An Agenda for People. This aspect deals with the democratization of international institutions, including the establishment of some form representative assembly and the establishment of minimum norms of international humanitarian law applicable to all Member States of the United Nations and therefore to all the peoples of the world.

The major blockage to real progress in this whole area is the concept of the sovereign state. In the context of a representative assembly, the states fear diminution of their powers. In relation to the minimum standards issue, states claim immunity from international opprobrium for practices that fall below the international norm.