When God Goes to Starbucks: A Guide to Everyday Apologetics

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Part I

SLOGANS RELATED TO

TRUTH AND REALITY

1

Why Not Just Look Out

for Yourself?

The human basis for morality is self-interest or egoism (from the Latin ego, I), according to Russian-born philosopher Ayn Rand, who popularized the idea of egoism.¹ This viewpoint has its own version of the Golden Rule: we should do unto others who will eventually/hopefully do the same to us. If I scratch someone’s back, eventually someone will scratch mine. In fact, each person has a moral duty to pursue her own self-interest exclusively. According to the egoist, I am the one who best knows what I need—much better than any other person. So self-interest comes before the interests of others. This is what the good life is all about—pursuing what I want.

This view fits quite nicely with today’s relativistic true for you, but not for me mentality. Relativists aren’t interested in finding truth but in preserving their own autonomy. This isn’t a logical argument against relativism, of course. I’m just trying to point out that the true(!) basis for relativism is ultimately rooted in its motivation rather than in any good reasons or persuasive arguments.

If self-interest is the basis for decision making and setting our priorities, we run into a host of problems.

First, this view often fails to distinguish between self-interest and selfishness. In the Disney movie Ice Age, Sid the Sloth—a really nice guy—is being discussed by two female sloths. Says one, He’s not much to look at, but it’s so hard to find a family man these days. The other replies, Tell me about it. All the sensitive ones get eaten.² The implication is this: if you want to survive, look out for yourself, not others. Rand’s discussion of this subject seems to suggest that self-sacrifice and self-preservation are opposed to each other. If I am deeply concerned about others, then I am less likely to preserve my own life.

Such thinking is confused. Taking care of oneself isn’t the same as selfishness. The Scriptures themselves assume that we already love ourselves; so we’re commanded, Love your neighbor as [you already love] yourself (Mark 12:31). A normal self-love means that we will, for example, feed and take care of our bodies. As Paul writes, No one ever hated his own flesh, but nourishes and cherishes it (Eph. 5:29). Self-love isn’t a goal to pursue (Paul warns Timothy to avoid those who are lovers of self in 2 Tim. 3:2, 5), but rather a fact to be acknowledged.³ The fact that we love ourselves is to guide us in our love for others: given our knowledge of how we want to be treated, this should serve as a model for how we treat others (Matt. 7:12).

Second, this view commits the naturalistic fallacy, illegitimately moving from is to ought. We all recognize that we can easily cater to our self-centered tendencies and our wants. Too often we are inclined to look out for our own well-being and disregard the welfare of others (Phil. 2:3–4). The problem with Rand’s view is that it makes an illegitimate jump from the way we are to the way we ought to be (known as the naturalistic fallacy). However, such a conclusion—moving from the descriptive to the prescriptive—doesn’t follow. Why accept Rand’s view? Why not affirm that we should resist our self-centeredness rather than give in to it? There is nothing logically compelling about making Rand’s recommended move.

Third, when we speak about how we ought to live, we are speaking of universally applicable ideals—but this flies in the face of egoism. It’s ironic that an egoist would announce far and wide that selfishness (or self-interest) is a virtue to be pursued. If we’re talking about ethics, then we’re talking about universal relevance—a stance all should embrace. But this works at cross-purposes for the egoist. Presumably, Ed the Egoist wants others to embrace this view as intellectually superior and to act on it, but this would mean that Ed is recommending that others cater to themselves rather than to Ed! As egoism becomes universalized and practiced, it actually undermines itself. It tells others to live for themselves rather than to live for me! This suggests that egoism is a deficient view. Why would egoists want their views universalized? Instead, they should keep quiet about them!

Fourth, we can never trust an ethical egoist. The ethical egoist can’t be trusted when offering moral advice to others, because it will ultimately be to his own advantage—not another’s—to follow it. After all, the egoist is always me-deep in conversation! Advocates of egoism only create a climate of suspicion around themselves. This, of course, renders egoism suspect; it turns out to be a very counterintuitive notion.

Fifth, the egoist’s desire to get what he wants turns out to be an empty or trivial concept—or worse. The egoist says that what he wants is the primary drive to all that he (or anyone else) does. People usually don’t betray their friends—even if doing so under severe pressure or possibly torture would give them considerable relief. They want to be loyal. If some cave in to pressure, it’s because they want relief more strongly than loyalty.

The problem here is fourfold:

• The term want becomes unhelpful. When anyone acts, the egoist tells us that this action was in response to the strongest desire someone had—when one really wanted. The term want then comes to mean whatever supports egoism. No matter what potential counterexample one gives, the egoist appeals to some stronger want lurking in the background. This, however, leads to another problem.

• What I decide to do is nothing I have control over, because all my choices and actions are necessarily determined by my strongest desire. But why should I assume this? In fact, wouldn’t one’s holding a belief in egoism be determined by his own deepest desires rather than freely or rationally choosing it? This kind of an approach simply assumes that egoism is right rather than offering any good arguments for it.⁴

• People may want all kinds of things that are self-destructive. Alcoholics want more alcohol; drug addicts want to continue their habit; pedophiles want to engage in illicit sex. But surely simply wanting something is not justification for egoism.

• What if people want to live lives of self-sacrifice and devotion to others? Persons like Mother Teresa and William Wilberforce are examples of people wanting to help others. Why should the egoist dispute such other-centered dedication as wrongheaded? The egoist’s view seems arbitrary this way: Why should I opt for my own good as opposed to society’s good? It seems that the egoist can give no real reasons for why his view is to be preferred.

Sixth, even if egoists lay claim to self-interest rather than selfishness, we’re left with the problem of arbitrariness—why only this virtue and no others? Some philosophers make the distinction between being selfish and being an egoist. To be selfish means we show no concern for others. An egoist, on the other hand, may show concern for others, but this is driven by her own feelings of pity, not the condition of the poor or unfortunate. For example, the seventeenth-century British philosopher Thomas Hobbes claimed that he gave to beggars because of his own sense of pity. He didn’t want to walk away feeling guilty.⁵

Even so, it seems that self-interest is only part of the moral picture. Why think that this alone would be the only moral virtue? While a person may legitimately consider his own concerns as an object to pursue (within limits), this need not be the only one.

So we can see that the egoist is on to something—even if he is misguided. Indeed, our lives are often helped by boundaries we create for ourselves—to get the necessary rest, for instance; in doing so, however, we’ll be better able to serve other people. If we’re cranky without our sleep, we should make sleep a priority. It benefits us as well as those around us. There is more to the moral world than our own self-interest.

Seventh, the pursuit of power or self-interest isn’t an end in itself; it is a means to something else. But how is that goal to be determined? Perhaps the best example of egoism in the field of philosophy is Friedrich Nietzsche’s emphasis on the will to power. He despised Christianity, which, he claimed, sprang from a doormat theology. For Nietzsche, the pursuit of power mattered. We’re left wondering, however, why this is the supreme value. And isn’t pursuing power a means to something else rather than an end in itself? Power is just an arbitrary value.

Eighth, even if I may end up getting some benefit from a charitable act (e.g., someone recognizes my service), it doesn’t follow that this was my motive for acting charitably. The egoist says that we all inescapably act from self-centered motives—even apparently self-sacrificing persons like Mother Teresa, who, according to this line of thinking, was seeking a reward in the afterlife and avoiding punishment.

However, when human creatures show love for God and others, this doesn’t mean such actions are motivated by nothing more than punishment-avoidance and reward-mindedness. The sheer enjoyment of God’s presence—the greatest good of humans—and his approval of us are reward enough. C. S. Lewis offers a delightful picture:

Money is not the natural reward of love; that is why we call a man mercenary if he marries a woman for the sake of her money. But marriage is the proper reward for a real lover, and he is not mercenary for desiring it. . . . Those who have attained everlasting life in the vision of God know very well that it is no mere bribe, but the very consummation of their earthly discipleship.⁶

Ninth, there will inevitably be a conflict of interests (or egos). What happens if my interests clash with another’s? How do we adjudicate between conflicting personal agendas? What happens when an ethical egoist becomes a powerful dictator? At this point, the egoist doesn’t want to have his viewpoint embraced by another (despotic) egoist.

Tenth, any obligation to self-interest is merely a matter of convenience for the egoist. Since the egoist’s moral rules are really ones of convenience or expediency, the duty to self-interest will only exist as long as it is convenient. When it isn’t convenient (e.g., when an egoistic dictator is pursuing his own self-interest), the oppressed egoist can’t appeal to higher moral principles without inconsistency.

There are some fairly hefty problems with the mind-set of looking out for number one. The other-centered life that the other-centered triune God calls us to is not only far more attractive, but to live this way is in keeping with how God designed us. God has made us to relate to him and to one another—to love God and to love our neighbor as ourselves (Mark 12:28-33; Luke 9:57-62). Ultimately, we flourish when living by the Jesus Creed.⁷ God’s commands have our best interests in mind—they are for your good (Deut. 10:13; cf. 8:16; 30:9). We harm ourselves when we try to create our own reality. This egoistic pursuit actually flies in the face of reality.

Summary

• Some egoists distinguish between self-centeredness (which they reject) and self-interest (which may involve others).

• Egoism wrongly moves from is (that we tend to be self-concerned) to ought (that we ought to live this way). This is called the naturalistic fallacy.

• Why would we ever trust the advice of an egoist since we know that it is always directed toward his own interests?

• When we speak about how we ought to live, we are referring to universally applicable ideals. But this is opposed to the self-interested goal of the egoist.

• The egoist’s desire to get what he wants is empty and trivial.

• Why pursue self-interest as opposed to being other-centered in our orientation? Why prefer self over others? Why stop with the self? Why this virtue and no others?

• To pursue self-interest or power can’t be an ultimate goal, but is rather a means to something else. How then do we determine what that goal is?

• What happens when two or more personal agendas or egos conflict with one another (e.g., in a dictator)?

• The egoist’s duty to self is merely a matter of convenience, not principle.

• Even if I may end up receiving some benefit from a charitable act (e.g., someone recognizes my service), this doesn’t mean that this was my motive (or primary motive) for acting charitably.

• How do we handle any conflict of interest or egos?

Further Reading

Frankena, William K. Ethics. 2nd ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973. Chapter 2.

Graham, Gordon. Eight Theories of Ethics. London: Routledge, 2004. Chapter 3.

Lewis, C. S. The Weight of Glory. In The Weight of Glory and Other Addresses. New York: Macmillan, 1965.

McKnight, Scot. The Jesus Creed: Loving God, Loving Others. Brewster, MA: Paraclete Press, 2004.

2

Do What You Want—

Just as Long as You

Don’t Hurt Anyone

Jack Kevorkian, known as Dr. Death and author of Prescription Medicide: The Goodness of Planned Death, has been responsible for euthanizing or assisting in the suicides of more than a hundred people. The standard Hippocratic Oath invoked by doctors across the ages includes the promise: I will neither give a deadly drug to anybody if asked for it, nor will I make the suggestion to this effect. . . . In purity and holiness I will guard my life and my art. That is, the doctor must be committed not to killing even when the patient asks him to.

In July 1996 at the National Press Club, Kevorkian was asked about his philosophical beliefs. He replied, Yeah, it’s quite simple: Absolute personal autonomy. I’m an absolute autonomist. Do and say whatever you want to do and say at any time you want to do or say it, as long as you do not harm or threaten anybody else’s person or property. This statement was greeted by hearty applause.¹

This statement of personal autonomy is quite commonly heard in our society that stresses rugged individualism. What are we to make of this philosophy of the absolute autonomist? And what about that qualifier, just as long as you don’t hurt anyone?

First, it’s an irony in our society that people will deny moral standards or assert absolute autonomy but then slip other (universal) standards in the back door when no one seems to be looking. We commonly hear people make sweeping relativistic claims, but then they’ll tack on an absolute, inviolable standard at the end:

• "People can do what they want—just as long as they don’t hurt anyone."

• "You can do whatever you want—as long as it’s between two consenting adults."

• "You can do whatever you want—as long as it’s in the privacy of your own home."

• "People can believe and do whatever they want; they should just be tolerant of others’ views."

• "You can do what you want; just don’t violate another person’s rights."

In essence, they’re saying, You don’t have any limits whatsoever—well, except for this or that. Let the autonomist fish or cut bait: why can’t people just do what they want—period? Why should they have any regard for others at all? Why should privacy be respected? Why not be intolerant? The absolute autonomy of someone like Kevorkian is seriously compromised by the qualification as long as you do not harm or threaten anybody else’s person or property. Ironically, Kevorkian has fatally harmed other persons!

Second, upon scrutiny, such slogans end up self-destructing. In a purely autonomous world, why insist on standards at all? Why be concerned about others at all? Let’s revisit these slogans for a moment:

• "People can do what they want—just as long as they don’t hurt anyone." But what’s wrong with hurting another person if you can get away with it? Why think that humans have value in themselves—especially if we’ve naturalistically evolved from valueless processes? And aren’t there certain things that are wrong and harmful even if private (e.g., pornography)?

• "You can do whatever you want—as long as it’s between two consenting adults." What if the two consenting adults engage in sadomasochistic acts? Aren’t such actions deviant?

And why limit the discussion to adults? What’s ultimately wrong with lowering the age of sexual consent, as the North American Man/Boy Love Association desires?

• "You can do whatever you want—as long as it’s in the privacy of your own home." Again, why should absolute autonomists insist on privacy as opposed to doing whatever one wants in public—including shouting, Fire! in a crowded theater or Bomb! on a transatlantic flight? And is child abuse or wife-beating okay since it’s done in the privacy of one’s home?

• "People can believe and do whatever they want; they should just be tolerant of others’ views." If the relativist believes that her views are true for her but not necessarily for others, then why should she insist on laying this standard of tolerance on everyone—relativist or not? Where does that standard come from? What if a person doesn’t want to be tolerant

(whatever that means)?

• "You can do what you want; just don’t violate another person’s rights. Why respect anyone’s rights? Where do rights even come from in a godless world? How can the relativist believe we can do what we want but, out of the other side of her mouth, insist that others’ rights ought to be respected? Isn’t it ironic (and contradictory) that our society both freely accepts the true for you but not for me relativism as well as insists on watching out for people’s inviolable rights"? If relativism is justified, humans don’t have rights that ought to be respected. If humans have genuine rights, then relativism is false.

Third, one can do a number of things without hurting others, but they would still be wrong and should still be avoided. We’re familiar with date rape drugs (GHB, rohypnol, and ketamine) and what they are intended for. Let’s apply this slogan of doing what you want without hurting others: Let’s say that a young man wants to do what he wants to an unsuspecting woman at a party. He places such a drug in her drink. . . and you can guess the rest. Suppose he takes certain precautions so that there are no consequences to his violating her. He does all of this without hurting her—or even without her knowing what has taken place. Hasn’t the young man then been able to do what he wants without harming the woman?

We still recognize that this act is intolerable. While the man may not have technically hurt the woman physically or even psychologically, he took terrible advantage of her by raping her while she was under the influence of the drug. We know that certain things are wrong even if they don’t injure another. Another example might be mocking mental hospital patients whose minds are no longer connected to reality, leaving them incapable of making sense of the hateful things being said of them. Such actions don’t hurt the patients—these acts actually damage the soul of the mocker—but engaging in them is still wrong.

Furthermore, what if a teenager wants to commit suicide, exercising his own autonomy? We wouldn’t say that this is a good or noble thing, would we? If autonomy is what ultimately matters and one determines that life isn’t worth living, then why not let the teenager commit suicide? Isn’t that his right? Philosopher John Stuart Mill noted a similar problem—having the right to enslave oneself: The principle of freedom cannot require that [one] should be free not to be free. It is not freedom, to be allowed to alienate his freedom.² That is, my placing absolute power in the hands of a slaveholder undermines my human dignity. This isn’t true freedom. Such questions of suicide or self-slavery expose the inadequacy of this autonomous philosophy of life.

Fourth, while human freedom and choices are important, they must be considered in the context of broader issues, such as community, life’s being a gift, and the existence of moral standards. Ironically, Kevorkian’s philosophy of absolute autonomy is undermined by his qualifier (as long as you do not harm or threaten anybody else’s person). Despite his individualism, he’s assuming (a) that we are part of a larger community, and (b) that we should take commitments to this community seriously. Absolute (personal) autonomy assumes I don’t need to regard others and I don’t have moral duties to others; a better term to use would be personal responsibility, which suggests that human choices are meaningful in the context of a broader community of loyalties and moral commitments.

Another reason to reject absolute autonomy is that our lives are a gift from God; they are not a right. It’s