The Campaign of Marengo, with Comments.
()
About this ebook
Herbert Sargent’s book follows Bonaparte’s first campaign as First Consul of the French Republic as he drives, organizes and masterminds his very own blitzkreig across the Alps. As a serving officer in the American Army, who saw active service in a number of the late 19th and early 20th Century campaigns of the United States, he is well qualified to pass his opinion on Napoleon’s brilliant campaign. It would be this campaign that would be the bedrock for the political machinations that would see Napoleon crowned as Emperor of the French some four years later.
A classic account of a campaign not much covered in Napoleonic literature.
Author – Herbert H. Sargent - (1858–1921)
Related to The Campaign of Marengo, with Comments.
Related ebooks
Napoleon’s Campaigns in Italy — 1796-1797 and 1800 Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsWellington & Napoleon: Clash of Arms Rating: 3 out of 5 stars3/5Napoleon's Polish Gamble: Eylau & Friedland 1807 Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5Masséna at Bay 1811: The Lines of Torres Vedras to Funtes de Oñoro Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsNapoleon As A General. Vol. II Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsFrench Revolutionary Generals Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsThe French army before Napoleon: lectures delivered before the University of Oxford in Michaelmas term, 1914 Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsOporto 1809 Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Sieges of Gerona 1808 / 1809 Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsWhat Kept The Tank From Being The Decisive Weapon Of World War One? Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsDix ans de souvenirs militaires de 1805 à 1815 Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsThe Battle of Quatre Bras 1815 Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Falklands War: From Defeat to Victory Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsHistory of The Campaign in France, in The Year 1814 Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsThe Great Ships: British Battleships in World War II Rating: 3 out of 5 stars3/5First Battle of Newbury Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsMalplaquet Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsWellington and the Siege of San Sebastian, 1813 Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsWaterloo Lectures: A Study Of The Campaign Of 1815 [Illustrated - 4th Edition] Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsSalamanca 1812 Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Jena to Eylau: The Disgrace and the Redemption of the Old-Prussian Army Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsSeven Years' Campaigning In The Peninsula And The Netherlands; From 1808 To 1815.—Vol. II Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5With Wellington's Hussars in the Peninsula and Waterloo: The Journal of Lieutenant George Woodberry, 18th Hussars Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsMémoires Militaires Du Général Baron Boulart Sur Les Guerres De La Republique Et La Empire. Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsThe Russian Officer Corps of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsThe Battle of Neuve Chapelle Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5The Fighting Pioneers: The Story of the 7th Battalion DLI Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsThe Road to Marston Moor Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratings
Wars & Military For You
Resistance: The Warsaw Ghetto Uprising Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5How to Hide an Empire: A History of the Greater United States Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Masters of the Air: America's Bomber Boys Who Fought the Air War Against Nazi Germany Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Art of War: The Definitive Interpretation of Sun Tzu's Classic Book of Strategy Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Sun Tzu's The Art of War: Bilingual Edition Complete Chinese and English Text Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Art of War Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Blitzed: Drugs in the Third Reich Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Faithful Spy: Dietrich Bonhoeffer and the Plot to Kill Hitler Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Killing the SS: The Hunt for the Worst War Criminals in History Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Rise of the Fourth Reich: The Secret Societies That Threaten to Take Over America Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5A Daily Creativity Journal Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Making of the Atomic Bomb Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5The Wager Disaster: Mayem, Mutiny and Murder in the South Seas Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Last Kingdom Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Happiest Man on Earth: The Beautiful Life of an Auschwitz Survivor Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5The God Delusion Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5God Is Not One: The Eight Rival Religions That Run the World--and Why Their Differences Matter Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Dr. Seuss Goes to War: The World War II Editorial Cartoons of Theodor Seuss Geisel Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5They Thought They Were Free: The Germans, 1933–45 Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The History of the Peloponnesian War: With linked Table of Contents Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Unit 731: Testimony Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Only Plane in the Sky: An Oral History of 9/11 Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5The Operator: Firing the Shots that Killed Osama bin Laden and My Years as a SEAL Team Warrior Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5
Related categories
Reviews for The Campaign of Marengo, with Comments.
0 ratings0 reviews
Book preview
The Campaign of Marengo, with Comments. - Herbert H. Sergeant
MARENGO.
CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTION.
{1}
After a war one ought not only to write the history of what has taken place, but also the history of what was intended.
VON DER GOLTZ.
UPON Bonaparte's return from Egypt in October, 1799, he found England, Austria, and the small states dependent upon them waging war against France. The allies were united in an effort to crush the French Republic. They were sanguine of success. Against this formidable coalition France stood alone.
Before Bonaparte's return, a Russian army, commanded by Suwaroff, had also been fighting the French in Italy and Switzerland; but, having been defeated by Masséna, Suwaroff had retreated with the remnants of his army into the valley of the Danube, and thence had proceeded into Russia. The defeat of Suwaroff had caused the Russian Emperor, Paul the First, to believe that his army had not been properly supported by the Austrian armies. He therefore felt angry and bitter towards Austria. As soon as Bonaparte became aware of the state of the Emperor's mind he collected the Russian prisoners then in France, gave them new uniforms and new arms, and sent them back to their own country. These acts and others of a conciliatory nature pleased and flattered the Emperor Paul, and enabled Bonaparte, soon after his return, to detach Russia from the alliance.
Of the two great powers at war with France, England had been more active and more successful upon the sea; Austria, upon the land. In the battle of the Nile, Nelson had dealt the French navy a terrible blow, from the effects of which it never recovered. England was now mistress of the sea. Having her fleets in the Mediterranean and the Gulf of Genoa, she was prepared to assist Austria in her efforts to overthrow the French Republic.
During Bonaparte's absence in Egypt, Austria, aided by Russia, had pushed forward her armies to the boundaries of France. One large Austrian army{2} in western Germany was watching the crossings of the Rhine; another in northwestern Italy was fighting the French along the Apennines and Maritime Alps. From the theatre of operations made memorable by Bonaparte's victories in 1796-97, Austria had almost driven the French eagles. Bonaparte's battles of Montenotte, Lodi, Castiglione, Arcole, and Rivoli seemed to have been won in vain. Austria had all but reconquered Italy. Except along the narrow seaboard between the Apennines and the sea, no French soldiers were to be found upon Italian soil.
Such was the situation when, in November, 1799, Bonaparte became First Consul of France. At this time his acts certainly indicated a desire for peace. He wrote to the governments of England and Austria, deploring the futility of a continuation of the conflict, and suggesting that the war should cease. His overtures, however, were coldly rejected. He was forced to fight. Against this powerful coalition peace could be obtained only by victorious battle.
Industriously Bonaparte prepared for war. France was in a deplorable state. The treasury was empty; the soldiers were ill fed and ill clad; recruits and supplies were obtained with difficulty; civil war existed in certain parts of western France; and the armies of the Republic had met with defeat again and again. Over the French people this condition of affairs had cast a gloom which the magic of Bonaparte's name alone could dispel.
During the winter of 1799-1800 his energy and activity were apparent everywhere. His proclamations aroused the spirit and patriotism of the French people, and gave them confidence in their government, and hope of success under his leadership. He placed the finances upon a firm basis, crushed out the civil war, caused arms to be manufactured, and supplies to be collected; and from the levies that he ordered he organized sufficient forces to strengthen materially the French military power. Of the two French armies in the field, he sent re-enforcements to the Army of the Rhine, gave the command of it to General Moreau, and ordered General Masséna to take command of the Army of Italy, which, half-starved upon the rocks of Genoa, was struggling heroically against overwhelming odds. At this time, too, he began to collect, drill, and organize, in different parts of France, bodies of men who were destined to unite near Lake Geneva, and together with other troops in France already organized, were to form a third army, to be known as the Army of Reserve.
Before entering into the details of the campaign, it is necessary to describe the topography of the theatre of operations, to point out the situations of the opposing forces, and to explain the plans of the contending powers.
Bordering France on the east are Germany, Switzerland, and Italy. The Alps, covering Switzerland like a huge network, give to this country the appearance of an immense bastion, which, extending east, separates Germany from Italy. From Switzerland these mountains extend through and beyond the Tyrol. They separate the valley of the Danube from the valley of the Po. In Switzerland they are known as the Swiss Alps; in the Tyrol, as the Tyrolese Alps. On the north side of them are the States of Swabia, Bavaria, and Upper Austria; on the south side, Piedmont, Lombardy, and Venice.
Extending south from western Switzerland to within about thirty miles of the sea, the French Alps form part of the boundary line between France and Italy; thence, turning east, they approach the Italian shore, and are here known as the Maritime Alps; still farther east, along the shores of the Gulf of Genoa, they are called the Apennines.
With the exception of a few passes, this great mountain chain, almost enclosing northern Italy, forms an insurmountable barrier to the soldier. Even over the passes, especially across the higher ranges, communication was, at the time of which we write, extremely dangerous. The snow and ice, the glaciers, avalanches, frequent storms, and steep declivities, made these mountain roads hazardous and difficult for the passage of armies. The principal passes in the Swiss Alps are the St. Gothard, the Simplon, and the Great St. Bernard; in the French Alps, the Little St. Bernard, and the Mont Cenis; in the Maritime Alps, the Col di Tenda and the Col di Ormea; and in the Apennines, the Col di Cadibona and the Bochetta.
Lying partly or entirely within this territory are three large rivers and their tributaries. They have their sources in or near the great chain of the Alps, and drain the tributary country. The Po rises in the French Alps, and flows east through northern Italy. The Danube rises in western Germany, and flows east through Bavaria and Austria. The Rhine rises in Switzerland, flows north into Lake Constance, thence, forming the outlet of the lake, flows west to Bâle, where it turns abruptly and flows north for the rest of its course.
Early in April, 1800, an Austrian army of one hundred and twenty thousand soldiers, commanded by Marshal Kray, guarded the right bank of the upper Rhine. The right wing extended beyond Strasburg; the left, well up into the Alps east of Switzerland; and the centre, forming the greater part of Kray's army, occupied the Black Forest in the angle of the Rhine made by its change of direction at Bâle. Kray's line of communication was along several roads down the Danube to the Austrian capital.
Facing the Austrian army, on the opposite side of the river, was the Army of the Rhine, commanded by Moreau. Including the French forces in Switzerland, it numbered one hundred and thirty thousand soldiers, and extended from the St. Gothard on the right to Strasburg on the left. It had for a base of operations the frontier fortresses of France, and Switzerland, which was occupied by the French.
The Austrian army in northwestern Italy consisted of one hundred and twenty thousand soldiers, and was commanded by General Melas. The greater part of it was in the vicinity of Genoa and along the Apennines and Maritime Alps. The remainder, occupying the fortresses and guarding the entrances to the passes of the Alps, was scattered throughout northwestern Italy. This army had its base of operations on the Mincio; and its line of communication was by several roads down the valley of the Po to its base, thence by two roads: one north through the Tyrol across the Brenner Pass into the valley of the Danube; the other northeast through Friuli across the Pontebba Pass to Vienna.
Opposed to the army of Melas was the Army of Italy. It consisted of forty thousand soldiers, of whom thirty-six thousand, commanded by Masséna, were holding the passes of the Apennines and Maritime Alps from Genoa to the Col di Tenda. The remainder, four thousand strong, commanded by General Thurreau, was guarding the Mont Cenis Pass in the French Alps. The line of communication of the Army of Italy to its base of operations on the Rhone was by the Genoa-Nice road.
A British fleet, commanded by Admiral Keith was in the Gulf. of Genoa; and a British corps twelve thousand strong, commanded by General Abercromby, was at Port Mahon in Minorca.
Such were the main features of the theatre of operations, and such were the positions and numbers of the opposing armies that were facing each other in Germany, France, Switzerland, and Italy, at the beginning of hostilities early in April, 1800. Against the Austrian armies, supported by the British navy, and a British corps which might at any time be thrown upon the coast of France, Bonaparte could not, with his two armies, expect to make much headway. His chances of success were small; the odds against him were too great. Unless he could increase his own forces, a French victory was doubtful. Thus it was that early in the winter he had seen the necessity of creating an army of reserve, which could be sent to re-enforce Moreau in Germany or Masséna in Italy as circumstances might require. But the Army of Reserve had not yet been assembled. The divisions composing it were still scattered throughout France. Their organization, however, was being rapidly pushed forward, with the intention that early in May they should unite near Lake Geneva and form an army of forty thousand soldiers.
On the French side, Bonaparte, at the head of the French Republic, had for the first time full control of all military operations. Hitherto, great as had been his achievements in Italy and in Egypt, he had acted as a subordinate, merely directing the operations of his own army; but now his military genius was to have full play.
On the Austrian side, the Aulic Council, consisting of twenty-one members, directed all military operations. This council, which held its sessions at Vienna, not only made the plans of campaign, but also issued detailed orders to the Austrian commanders, and furnished them information regarding Bonaparte's plans and manoeuvres.
At this time the ablest soldier in Austria was the Archduke Charles. Already he had greatly distinguished himself in several campaigns. He reasoned that, inasmuch as Austria, England, and Russia had failed to crush the French Republic in 1799, before Bonaparte's return to France, the allies stood little hope of success after Russia had withdrawn from one side, and Bonaparte had been added to the other. He therefore advised his government to accept Bonaparte's offer of peace. To the Aulic Council he also gave valuable advice upon the military situation. But no attention was paid to his suggestions. In fact, before the campaign opened, the Archduke was relieved of his command in the army, and sent into Bohemia in a kind of honorable exile.
The plan of campaign adopted by the allies was that the Austrian army under Kray in Germany should remain on the defensive, holding Moreau in check if possible, while the Austrian army under Melas in Italy attacked the Army of Italy along the Apennines and Maritime Alps. By this means, the allies expected that the Austrian forces in Italy, so superior in numbers to the French, would be able with the help of the British fleet to blockade Genoa, and to drive the Army of Italy across the Var into southern France. This movement being accomplished, the purpose was that Melas, supported by the British navy and Abercromby's corps, should invade France, and attack and capture Toulon. Furthermore, the allies hoped, by adopting this plan, to receive some support from the Royalists in the south of France. If this operation succeeded, it was expected that Moreau would detach a sufficient force from the Army of the Rhine to march on Toulon for the purpose of driving back the allies: whereupon Kray could attack the Army of the Rhine, thus weakened, with much hope of success; that, in fact, he could take the offensive, force the crossings of the Rhine, and invade France.
In this calculation no plans were made to attack the French forces in the great stronghold of Switzerland. If, however, the allies succeeded in their designs, Kray and Melas could unite their armies in France, thus cut the communications of the French forces in Switzerland, and smother them, as it were, between the two great Austrian armies.
In view of the facts that the allies were flushed with their recent victories, were superior to their adversary in numbers, and also held the mastery of the sea, they expected great results in the coming campaign. With so many advantages on their side, their plans seemed both reasonable and accomplishable; but they reckoned without the genius of Bonaparte.
On the other side, Bonaparte had two plans, both of which it will be well to examine, that the reader may grasp the breadth of Bonaparte's intellect in originating strategic conceptions. Both plans were based upon the fact that the great stronghold of Switzerland, extending like a huge wedge between the Austrian army in Germany and that in Italy, was occupied by the French. This natural fortress, almost impregnable, could be used as a base of operations from which to attack either Kray in Germany or Melas in Italy.
The first plan conceived by Bonaparte was to leave Masséna in Italy on the defensive to hold Melas in check, then to unite the Army of Reserve with Moreau's army, cross the Rhine in force between Schaffhausen and Lake Constance, and attack that part of Kray's army occupying the Black Forest in the angle of the Rhine between Lake Constance and Strasburg. By an attack in this direction, Bonaparte calculated that he could defeat Kray, drive him north, sever his communications with Vienna, and either destroy or capture his army. If successful in this operation, he could descend the Danube and seize the Emperor's capital; then by taking possession of the Tyrol and the Carnic Alps, he could occupy the Brenner and Pontebba passes, which operation would sever the communications of Melas in Italy and cut him off from Vienna. With Kray's army captured or destroyed, with the French holding the only passes by which the Austrians in Italy could retreat, and with Bonaparte in possession of the Austrian capital, the campaign must end; the Austrian Emperor would be compelled to make peace. This plan had many advantages. It would, if successful, be far-reaching in its results; it would not only destroy Kray, but would paralyze the operations of Melas; it would, to use Bonaparte's expressive words, reconquer Italy at Vienna.
Though this plan promised great results it was not carried out. A rivalry between Moreau and Bonaparte was the principal cause. The former, being jealous of the latter,