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After Evil: A Politics of Human Rights
After Evil: A Politics of Human Rights
After Evil: A Politics of Human Rights
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After Evil: A Politics of Human Rights

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Mainstream human rights discourse speaks of such evils as the Holocaust, slavery, or apartheid in ways that put them solidly in the past. Its elaborate techniques of "transitional" justice encourage future generations to move forward, but the false assumption of closure enables those who are guilty to elude responsibility. This approach to history, common to late-twentieth-century humanitarianism, doesn't presuppose that evil ends only when justice begins. Rather, it assumes that a time before justice is the moment to put evil in the past.

Merging examples from literature and history, Robert Meister confronts the problem of closure and the resolution of historical injustice. He boldly challenges the empty moral logic of "never again" or the theoretical reduction of evil to a cycle of violence and counterviolence that is broken once evil is remembered for what it was. Meister calls out such methods for their deferral of justice and susceptibility to exploitation. Specifically, he spells out the moral logic "never again" in relation to Auschwitz and its evolution into a twenty-first-century doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect.

LanguageEnglish
Release dateJan 5, 2011
ISBN9780231520959
After Evil: A Politics of Human Rights

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    After Evil - Robert Meister

    AFTER EVIL

    Columbia Studies in Political Thought/Political History

    Columbia Studies in Political Thought/Political History

    Dick Howard, General Editor

    Columbia Studies in Political Thought/Political History is a series dedicated to exploring the possibilities for democratic initiative and the revitalization of politics in the wake of the exhaustion of twentieth-century ideological isms. By taking a historical approach to the politics of ideas about power, governance, and the just society, this series seeks to foster and illuminate new political spaces for human action and choice.

    Pierre Rosanvallon, Democracy Past and Future, edited by Samuel Moyn (2006)

    Claude Lefort, Complications: Communism and the Dilemmas of Democracy, translated by Julian Bourg (2007)

    Benjamin R. Barber, The Truth of Power: Intellectual Affairs in the Clinton White House (2008)

    Andrew Arato, Constitution Making Under Occupation: The Politics of Imposed Revolution in Iraq (2009)

    Dick Howard, The Primacy of the Political: A History of Political Thought from the Greeks to the French and American Revolution (2009)

    ROBERT MEISTER

    AFTER EVIL

    A POLITICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

    Columbia

    University

    Press

    New York

    Columbia University Press

    Publishers Since 1893

    New York Chichester, West Sussex

    cup.columbia.edu

    Copyright © 2011 Robert Meister

    All rights reserved

    E-ISBN 978-0-231-52095-9

    Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

    Meister, Robert, 1947–

    After evil: a politics of human rights / Robert Meister.

        p. cm. — (Columbia studies in political thought/political history)

    Includes bibliographical references and index.

    ISBN 978-0-231-15036-1 (cloth: alk. paper)

    1. Human rights. I. Title. II. Series.

    JC571.M385 2010

    323.012—dc22

    2010017186

    A Columbia University Press E-book.

    CUP would be pleased to hear about your reading experience with this e-book at cup-ebook@columbia.edu.

    References to Internet Web sites (URLs) were accurate at the time of writing. Neither the author nor Columbia University Press is responsible for URLs that may have expired or changed since the manuscript was prepared.

    CONTENTS

    Preface: My Task

    Introduction: Disavowing Evil

      1. The Ideology and Ethics of Human Rights

      2. Ways of Winning

      3. Living On

      4. The Dialectic of Race and Place

      5. Never Again

      6. Still the Jewish Question?

      7. Bystanders and Victims

      8. Adverse Possession

      9. States of Emergency

    10. Surviving Catastrophe

    Conclusion: Justice in Time

    Acknowledgments

    Notes

    References

    Index

    PREFACE | MY TASK

    Most long books are revised to create the illusion that they could have been conceived all at once. I want you, my reader, to be under no such illusion. In a broad sense, this book is the reflection of an entire lifetime—what I now think about what I have thought since the mid-twentieth century. It reflects, more narrowly, a series of realizations I had between 1989 and 2009—the interval between the fall of communism and the collapse of global capitalism, when a discourse of sentimental humanitarianism promised to supplant that of hard-edged political struggle. For me, these were also the years following the completion of my book on Karl Marx, whose work originated in doubts about an earlier postrevolutionary appropriation of human rights by states claiming global hegemony. I had planned my next book on the relevance of U.S. constitutional thought, especially on questions of civil war and reconstruction, to political transformations then occurring throughout the world. This book, a critique of the dark side of the particular version of human rights that followed from U.S. global dominance, has overtaken the earlier project.

    My successive realizations about what has been at stake in the changes of the past twenty years are a product of living and thinking through them. There is no way I could have come to these realizations all at once—and no way for me to give them a duly proportional emphasis as I revised every chapter. To help you follow what lies ahead I list here, at the outset, the realizations that I had so you can tie them together as you read.

    Political transitions are not just new beginnings; they are also what I call survivor stories that reflect a non-neutral judgment on the history that preceded them. In this respect, they are always about what the past will have been now that we have changed, and what it would have been had we changed sooner. Merely by occurring, political transitions thus instantiate a temporal reconstitution of the we.

    A central problem in such transitions is how to view ongoing beneficiaries of an injustice now regarded as past. Once that injustice has been renounced, do their continuing advantages perpetuate it? Or are those who so claim rightly criticized for dredging up a past over which at least a moral victory has been achieved?

    A further problem is that it would be good to be a beneficiary of the past—whether it was just or not—provided that one arrives on the scene as a newcomer, rather than as an exploiter, oppressor, or successor-in-interest to those who were. Birth here is the prototype of morally innocent succession—that in virtue of which the sins of one’s fathers should not be visited upon one. Correspondingly, rebirth is the paradigm of atonement—that in virtue of which an ongoing beneficiary should not be seen to perpetuate a past injustice he acknowledges and regrets.

    The modern theory of revolution (1789–1989) generally rejects the moral innocence of beneficiaries (and/or their potential for rebirth); it regards them as would-be perpetrators of social injustice unless they disgorge their unjust gains. Counterrevolutionaries react against this revolutionary identification of beneficiaries with perpetrators—they see the rise of revolutionary consciousness as itself morally damaging: insofar as it makes former victims capable of seizing power, it also makes them capable of inflicting even worse injustice than they suffered.

    Today’s globally dominant view of human rights is no longer addressed to victims who would become revolutionaries but, rather, to beneficiaries who do not identify with perpetrators. It encourages them to acknowledge past evil as what they would have opposed so that future evil will not have been a repetition of it. The effect of such confession and conversion is to make the moment of its occurrence—which is always the present—discontinuous with the now repudiated past.

    A beneficiary who bears witness to the innocence of past victims can thus conceive of himself as a would-have-been rescuer rather than a would-be perpetrator. The question for the human rights convert is always whether it is already too late to rescue, or still too soon. By agonizing over the question of his own potential guilt as a bystander, the witness to human suffering tries to save his soul without necessarily relinquishing his position of advantage.

    Insofar as today’s human rights consciousness is like a conversion experience, its moment of revealed truth is Auschwitz. Recognizing Auschwitz—preventing another one—is now an article of faith for secular humanitarians in much the way that Pauline Christianity gave universal meaning to the experience of Jewish suffering without assuming responsibility for it. In post-Holocaust debates about human rights, the violence that Israel uses to defend itself has become a laboratory for the violence that the world community (and especially the U.S.) would be obliged to use in protecting an Israel that could not defend itself. The post-Holocaust security of Israel thus stands as the constitutive exception on which twenty-first-century humanitarianism is based.

    The way that Israel’s Holocaust functions in how the West understands its humanitarian mission has changed during my lifetime. In the 1960s the question was whether one would have resisted Hitler before it was too late, and whether to resist one’s own government before it commits similar crimes in Southeast Asia. As my generation came to power, however, its central question was whether nations with the power to do so should have intervened to stop Hitler.¹ Today the question is whether the "world community" has a responsibility to protect potential victims of another Holocaust by creating another Israel which the world community would then have a special duty to defend.

    The twenty-first-century doctrine of humanitarian intervention—the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)—is a culmination of my generation’s globalized thinking. It proposes a new nomos of the Earth that would repudiate past violence (which always appears as something cyclical and uncontained) by endorsing exceptional violence—that of rescue and occupation.²

    Only when this book was nearly completed did I recognize that the evil in my title invokes the cyclical nature of violence (violence begetting violence) that humanitarian violence puts in its past. After evil thus corresponds to the Christian revelation described by René Girard that supersedes earlier religions based on human sacrifice by converting the surviving beneficiaries of such practices to belief in the universal innocence of past victims, as such.

    The revelation that we are already forgiven for the past evils we remember to confess is a consoling substitute for prophetic religions that do not let us off the hook in the present. This was the Qur’anic critique of the Judaeo-Christianity of Saint Paul; it is also a critique that strands of present-day Islamism make of today’s imperialism of the human. When I finally reached this conclusion, I realized that it had been stated prophetically by my late friend Norman O. Brown in lectures on Islam, delivered in 1981, as a response to the Iranian revolution.

    This last realization brought me back to my original concern in 1989 that a new universalism of human rights was becoming the self-consciousness of U.S. capitalist hegemony following the cold war’s end. If this is, as I argue, a successor to the counterrevolutionary project of the previous two centuries, we must ask whether it has also co-opted the revolutionary project. A prophetic answer could not be more urgent than it is now.

    As the product of these realizations, After Evil is about the unexpected twenty-first century that is now under way. It thus concerns what the twentieth century was and what it would have been if its lessons were finally learned. The new century, as the projected future of that past, was to be one of both ethics and prosperity. Its core imperative was to remember as much evil as we can so as not to repeat it. The presence of memory was not, however, merely a means of nonrepetition—it had also become a criterion. By the turn of the new century humanitarians had thus come to see evil itself as a cyclicity of violence and counterviolence that can be broken by remembering what it was. From this perspective past evil cannot be repeated unless it is forgotten—and what happens next will necessarily be different if, but only if, it reminds us that we have turned away from the past. To admit as much past evil as possible is thus, implicitly, to set oneself against evil in the future.

    This book shows the illusion of historical closure behind such a view—the idea that the opportunity for justice has been missed, and that compassion for past suffering is a moral state that justifies one’s continuing to benefit from past conditions that one now would have opposed. In the chapters that follow I stress the intertemporal aspect of justice as a struggle against the ongoing effects of bad history. I no longer assume, as I did when I began, that the end of evil and the beginning of justice must coincide—but I still believe that the two must be linked. Today’s version of humanitarian consciousness undermines this link to the extent that its prime directive (holding evil at bay) always justifies postponing justice—now is never the time. But if the past was evil, we would do better to conclude that justice must be something new. Such evil cannot be past until justice here and now becomes imperative.

    INTRODUCTION | DISAVOWING EVIL

    A New Century of Human Rights?

    This book questions a specific politics of human rights that represents itself as coming after evil, especially the evil of the twentieth century.¹ Unlike earlier versions of human rights that sought to hasten the advance of social equality,² today’s commitment to human rights often seeks to postpone large-scale redistribution. It is generally more defensive than utopian, standing for the avoidance of evil rather than a vision of the good.³ This is the version of human rights that entered the political mainstream as the twenty-first century began.

    The mainstreaming of human rights was a long time coming. During most of the twentieth century, appeals to human rights were considered idealistic—perhaps a suitable program for the victors of world wars but not a practical alternative to realpolitik. By the time the cold war ended, however, references to the twentieth century as a century of genocide had become commonplace,⁴ and its atrocities were condemned as uncontestable paradigms of evil that transcended cultural, religious, and ideological difference.⁵ The denunciation of physical atrocity as such became an essential element in the fin de siècle conception of what it means to be human, and the foundational premise of human rights advocacy.

    By the turn of the twenty-first century, lifelong advocates of human rights were celebrating the emergence of a world community that defined itself as being against such atrocity, always and everywhere. This new, no longer controversial, version of human rights gradually ceased to address the perpetrators of atrocity; they had already placed themselves in the category of the inhuman as now defined. It would be aimed primarily at third parties—potential rescuers, whether governments or NGOs, who had in the past done nothing (or too little) because of indifference, realpolitik, and ethical relativism, and could now regard their humanitarian intervention as legitimated by the physical suffering already occurring on the ground. Such a shift in ruling ideology had been advocated by supporters of human rights since the Holocaust. Following the cold war, however, the arguments previously addressed to great powers were appropriated by them to legitimate their vision of a new world order embracing both capitalism and humanitarianism in much the way that, after the defeat of Napoleon, the Rights of Man became the foundation of a global order built on both imperialism and nationalism.

    The chapters that follow step outside the mainstream story of ascendant human rights, based on the universal meaning of Auschwitz, both to criticize it as a political ideology and to expound it (perhaps more fully than it has been) as a plausible ethical standpoint. These two projects go together. If large-scale physical cruelty is the ultimate evil, it would seem to follow that rescue provides sovereign power with a legitimation that comes ahead even of democracy. The priority of rescue over democracy explains the increasing receptivity of global superpowers to calls for humanitarian intervention: foreign military regimes seem ethically justified—something had to be done—regardless of the degree and character of their local political support. But the reality of rule by rescuers shows the darker, more Hobbesian side of human rights—the underlying politics of fear and insecurity on which global hegemony is now based. This book addresses the turn-of-the-century politics of human rights as both ideal and ideology by relating the wish for human rights to the fears and powers it invokes.

    No one who has lived in the twentieth century could seriously argue (nor do I) that international condemnation of human rights violators is a bad thing, and no one could deny that the struggle for human rights against authoritarian regimes is often progressive. My critique is specific to a Human Rights Discourse that became globally predominant after the fall of Communism in 1989, a moment of apparent closure to the discourse of global revolution and counterrevolution that followed from the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man. The distinction I draw between these two discourses is historical—and not primarily conceptual. Conceptually, it might have seemed in 1948—the year of both the Genocide Convention and the Universal Declaration—that freedom from crimes against humanity was an obvious extension of the Rights of Man. And some progressive political thinkers of the cold war era could plausibly argue that Auschwitz and the French Revolution were alternative foundations for the same human rights. I do not here dispute such conceptual claims. In the chapters that follow, I, rather, use Human Rights Discourse, capitalized as a proper name, to designate the transformation of Auschwitz-based reasoning into a new discourse of global power that claims to supersede the cruelties perpetrated by both revolutionaries and counterrevolutionaries during the previous two centuries.

    Before proceeding, however, I must acknowledge that the position of power from which human rights is now articulated is not merely that of a particular hegemonic enforcer, such as the U.S., but rather a world community. This, too, reflects the changed global situation at the end of the twentieth century. During the cold war no world community existed, and the fifty-year nuclear stalemate made it unacceptably risky for either global superpower to intervene in cases of large-scale human rights abuse condoned or committed by the other. This constraint was still present after the 1975 Helsinki Accords led to the proliferation of Helsinki groups throughout Eastern Europe that were watched by Human Rights Watch NGOs in the West.⁶ The fall of communism in 1989 eliminated the excuse that a humanitarian show of force could provoke nuclear countermeasures and also weakened the constraint on intervention. By the first Persian Gulf War in 1991, a self-described world community no longer doubted its power to prevail over evil. And after the 1994 Rwandan genocide, which outsiders could easily have interrupted,⁷ the advocates of human rights intervention shifted from questioning whether couldn’t implies shouldn’t to arguing that could implies should.

    The mainstream version of Human Rights Discourse now assumes that the world community should intervene when it can to prevent the repetition in the twenty-first century of the undeniable evils that it had failed to prevent in the twentieth.Then we needed to know more before trying to stop the genocides occurring before our eyes; we never knew enough until it was too late. But now visual evidence of genocide (bearing witness) is sufficient for human rights advocates to urge the world community to rescue first and investigate later. For an ethical intervener, such as the U.S., to be overly concerned today about its own potential role as an imperialist is, according to this view, at best an anachronism and at worst the same old craven excuse for doing nothing that allowed the horrors of the twentieth century to take place.⁹ The fin de siècle unacceptability of this excuse cries out in David Rieff’s 1995 call for U.S. intervention after the preventable genocide in Bosnia:

    To utter words like Never again, as Clinton did at the opening of the Holocaust Museum, was to take vacuity over the border into obscenity as long as the genocide in Bosnia was going on and Clinton was doing nothing to stop it. His words were literally meaningless. For if there was to be no intervention to stop a genocide that was taking place, then the phrase Never again meant nothing more than: Never again would Germans kill Jews in Europe in the 1940s. Clinton might as well have said, Never again the potato famine, or Never again the slaughter of the Albigensians.¹⁰

    The ethical imperative of post–cold war Human Rights Discourse is to get it right this time—to rescue the victims of a likely massacre before it is too late. The journalist Paul Berman presents this conclusion as the terminus of a journey traveled by the generation of 1968, his and mine, which grew up in the aftermath of the Holocaust believing that "the way to judge anyone’s moral character, including your own, was to pose a hypothetical question, . . . what would you have done . . . under the German occupation? . . . Would you have been a résistant? Or a collabo?"¹¹

    Our generation, according to Berman, made a mistake in applying its ethic of resistance to U.S. imperialism in Vietnam but got the ethic right in bringing about the downfall of Eastern European communism. The ultimate conclusion of the 68’ers moral journey (reached, Berman thinks, only by the best of us) is that, if resisting Hitler was an ethical imperative for those subjected to him, it would have been even better for states with sufficient power to have intervened while his atrocities could have been stopped. Elsewhere Berman elaborates this lesson as creating new possibility in the field of human rights and humanitarian action. He describes this view as follows:

    People with power . . . had a right to intervene in other societies . . . in spite of the sacred mandates of international law and the inviolability of borders. There was a right to intervene on humanitarian grounds, and to do so without borders. More than a right—there was .  .  . a moral duty to use power to rescue the vulnerable. A duty to use this power wherever people were in desperate need. A duty for wealthy and powerful countries not to stand by, fat and happy, while the rest of the world went to hell. Or to put this entire argument the other way, the supremely oppressed had a right to be rescued.¹²

    This doctrine, now widely known as the international community’s Responsibility to Protect¹³ likely victims of humanitarian disaster, frankly argues that the concept of a crime against humanity (first introduced at Nuremberg) supersedes the prior notion of a war crime—that unilaterally bombing the civilian population of another country, for example, is no longer a prima facie war crime when it is done to stop a crime against humanity occurring on the ground. There are, according to Berman, bombs that rescue.¹⁴

    My question in this book is not whether the international community should have (at least) interrupted Auschwitz or the Rwandan genocide by relatively costless aerial bombing when these atrocities became known;¹⁵ rather, I am concerned with the conception of ethics and politics that underlies Berman’s broader conclusion. According to this conception, bombing, like foreign occupation, can be a justifiable form of political intervention by third parties if, and only if, it is a response to gross ethical barbarities occurring locally.¹⁶ The ethical condemnation of atrocity, if not always the atrocity itself, must here precede intervention, which then becomes an act of rescue—ethical and not (at least initially) political.

    This view can be stated as a post-idealistic (sadder-but-wiser) version of liberal political thought that places the undeniable evil of the Holocaust at its center:

    The evil of genocide, as a universal ethical truth, takes priority over the contestable, culturally relative notions of good on which politics might otherwise rest.

    Avoidance of that evil must now replace the pursuit of good (fact must replace illusion) as the ethical foundation of a universal politics-based human rights.

    If committing genocide is undeniably evil, denying genocide helps to make that evil possible.

    The denial of genocide by third parties thus contributed to the evils of the twentieth century.

    After those evils, third parties can no longer make the excuse that rescuing victims (when possible) would involve choosing sides in a political struggle.

    Those who deny genocide put politics (the pursuit of goods) ahead of ethics (the repudiation of evil).

    The ethics of non-evil must now come before a concern for whatever politics may follow from a bystander’s act of rescue.

    The ethically centered approach to human rights that triumphed after the fall of communism in 1989 implicitly superseded the politically centered version of the Rights of Man that had been the focus of struggles for equality and liberty since the French Revolution of 1789.¹⁷ Third-party interveners in struggles inspired by the French Revolution tended to come in on the side of reaction, and thus against the Rights of Man. The new conception of human rights, however, sees the world community as the essential protector and foregrounds the position of the third-party intervener. The following presuppositions of the new discourse of human rights underscore its difference from the earlier view:

    Today’s human rights abuse is essentially local—typified by the atrocities that neighbors inflict upon neighbor and not, for example, by the global maldistribution of wealth.

    Today’s human rights enforcement is essentially global—a duty of third parties to intervene (across borders when necessary) to rescue neighbor from neighbor.

    Third-party rescue is fully justified by the human rights violations that neighboring combatants are inflicting, or have inflicted, on each other.

    The means used for human rights enforcement (which might include aerial bombardment, military invasion, or an embargo of essential goods and services) are exempt from being considered to be human rights violations in themselves.

    The Evil That Is Past

    My title, After Evil, refers not only to what follows the twentieth century but, more broadly, to the meaning of its pastness in the politics of the twenty-first—what the century of genocide will have been for those who live on. Those who participated in twentieth-century struggles imagined a future consensus on what evil was. This did not mean that all sides believed themselves to be on the side of good. It may be enough to believe that the other side thinks this and that its victory would leave one in a state of permanent disgrace. This is why revelations of atrocity may reinforce, rather than diminish, the intransigence of the side that commits them, and why ordinary individuals may fight desperately when they have some inkling of the brutalities that might eventually be disclosed. When one side envisions a future consensus on the meaning of evil, the other will often fight on to postpone that consensus.

    Evil is, of course, generally a term of contestation rather than consensus. When Milton’s Satan (The Enemy) says Evil, be thou my good, he inaugurates a war for the soul of mankind based on the meaning of the distinction between good and evil itself. If a struggle over the meaning of evil is the moral template for war, then consensus on the fact of evil is what it would mean for this war to end. The wars of the twentieth century ended with consensus on both the fact and evil of genocide.¹⁸ Denying that genocide happened (for example, Holocaust denial) became not merely factual disagreement about the past but a way to challenge, as Satan did, the prevailing ethical consensus on the meaning of good and evil, and thus put reconciliation to an end.

    As an effort to theorize the aftermath of the twentieth century, my project has turned out to be about the temporal dimension of human rights—the pasts they bring to closure, the futures they foreclose. Its argument is implicitly framed by other dates: the French Revolution of 1789 (with its Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen)¹⁹ and September 11, 2001—the equation of human rights with a war on terror. In the course of writing this book I have come to believe that the revolutionary conception of human rights that dominated the period between 1789 and 1989 has been supplanted by a counterrevolutionary conception of human rights that regards this two-hundred-year period as evil.

    This book has become a critique of a historically specific politics of human rights that was formed by the moral repudiation of Nazism after 1945 and became the dominant ideology of capitalist democracy after the collapse of communism in 1989. My starting point is that the present political character of Human Rights Discourse is distinct from the broader concept of human rights associated with 1789, which was the topic of debate and struggle between the revolutionary and counterrevolutionary movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.²⁰ That earlier conception, carried forward in the twentieth century welfare state and heavily represented in Eleanor Roosevelt’s 1948 conception of a Universal Declaration of human rights, is now almost gone.²¹ The post-1989 politics of human rights is not meant to be contested in the same political way as its predecessor—rather, it presents itself as an ethical transcendence of the politics of revolution and counterrevolution that together produced the horrors of the twentieth century—Nazism and communism. In the twenty-first century human rights is put forward as a cure for the mind-sets that made those now twinned evils intelligible to their proponents as moral goods. The new century was thus initially welcomed as coming after evil, a century in which the atrocities committed in the name of either revolution or counterrevolution are supposed to have become unthinkable and, if not, to justify the world community’s humanitarian intervention to stop them. Today the invocation of human rights is often part of a political project fundamentally at odds with the revolutionary struggles based on human rights: it is the war cry of a self-described international community led by the victors in the cold war.²²

    The present discourse of human rights, unlike the Declaration of the Rights of Man that proclaimed a global revolutionary divide, attempts to move once divided societies from a moral psychology of struggle to one of reconciliation. Some scholars see overall progress in this development;²³ others take a contrary view.²⁴ In either case, a fundamental difference exists between human rights as a slogan of popular resistance and today’s Human Rights movement, with its ostensibly less political focus on compassion for bodies in pain.

    Human Rights Discourse is thus the name I give to the self-consciously ethical rejection of previous versions of the Rights of Man that were violently against the power of aristocracies, autocracies, and the like. Unlike previous conceptions of human rights that were a call to uprising and resistance, Human Rights Discourse operates today in the realm of intervention and rescue. It recasts the central dyads of revolutionary political thought—victim/perpetrator and victim/beneficiary—as nondivisive ethical relations among surviving witnesses to human cruelty. When it has its desired cultural effect, Human Rights Discourse is said to transform the attitudes that make it possible to engage in righteous struggle into those that make it possible to stop. The underlying hope of today’s Human Rights Discourse is that victims of past evil will not struggle against its ongoing beneficiaries after the evildoers are gone.

    Between Forgiveness and Vengeance?

    To victims still suffering, forgiveness or vengeance often present themselves as two competing conceptions of the moral imperative that would remain after evil has ceased and before justice comes. There is thus an implicit assumption that surviving victims, or those who speak in their name, either have a duty to take vengeance (that they are obliged to do so) or that they really ought to forgive, and could be deservedly criticized if they are so damaged that they cannot do so.²⁵ There is, however, an obvious ethical problem with vengeance: it leads to a cycle of future vengeance that must be broken for justice to commence. The ethical problem with forgiveness is that forgivers can be deservedly criticized for failing to remember—and remembrance implies, if not vengeance, at least an unwillingness to let go of the desire for vengeance even after one decides that it is better not to act on it.²⁶ It is ironic, but nevertheless true, that we must remember that we wanted vengeance in order to know that we have truly forgiven.

    This ethical tension between the imperatives to hold a grievance and to forgive is deeply evident in Hannah Arendt’s account of forgiveness as a new beginning—a beginning aware of itself as beginning again:

    Forgiving attempts the seemingly impossible, to undo what has been done, and . . . [make] a new beginning when beginnings seemed to have become no longer possible. . . . Forgiving is the only strictly human action that releases us and others from the chain and pattern of consequences that all action engenders; as such forgiving is the capacity for action, for beginning anew.²⁷

    Here Arendt shows that forgiveness is paradoxical—indeed, strictly impossible—and that its importance is in the light it sheds on the simultaneously backward-and forward-looking aspects of political action in the present. The paradox is that a self-conscious politics of justice is always a matter of both doing and undoing. In looking forward there is an imperative to do without remembering; yet we must remember in order to undo.

    Rather than work through Arendt’s paradox, the mainstream literature on transitional justice tries to take a middle ground between forgiving and forgetting. It typically advises posttraumatic regimes in which it is wrong to indulge in vengeance but equally wrong to forget the past. Its goal is to avoid both pitfalls by remembering what happened in ways that fall far short of undoing it. This is often described as a stance somewhere between vengeance and forgiveness.²⁸

    What does it mean to see forgiveness and vengeance as polar opposites between which one must stand? Forgiveness is a sovereign act—potentially an act of indifference, rather than compassion, that might be more humiliating than a punishment. From a sovereign standpoint, forgiveness is compatible with revenge—it might sometimes be the best revenge. The apparent need to choose between forgiveness and vengeance arises from the standpoint of former victims who are still unsure about whether they have won. For them successful vengeance could resolve this question by proving that victory was really theirs; but the thought that vengeance might fail, and perhaps even backfire, reinforces their anxiety that they may yet lose—not just politically but morally as well.

    A rhetoric that locates itself between vengeance and forgiveness would be a weapon of the weak that provides at least an illusion of victory over those whose power they still have reason to fear. By taking this standpoint, the former victim tries not to think about who really won and eschews the temptation to engage in a political analysis that might open the question of whether that evil has finally been defeated.²⁹ Today’s mainstream literature on transitional justice tends to assume that past victims never really win—their choice is whether to persist in struggle or to stop—and that stopping makes sense if they can declare a moral victory that seems to put oppression in the past.

    Before Justice Comes

    A recurring theme of this book is the inherently transitional character of Human Rights Discourse: it addresses a time between times, when evil has ended but before justice has begun.³⁰ There is, ex hypothesi, still time before a leap into justice and still a danger of relapse into the evil of the past. The question is whether it will always be too soon for justice until it is too late.

    The locus classicus for thinking about a time between is Saint Paul’s description of the Church in the time between the Resurrection and Christ’s return in Judgment. Paul assured the members of his movement that everything necessary for messianic justice had already occurred, even though a time still remained in which the world would seem to go on as before. In addressing those who lived in this time between the forgiveness of sin and the coming of justice, Paul’s task was to explain what it would mean to live as though everything had already changed because of Christ. Since the Crucifixion, Paul argued, everything necessary has already happened to bring about the forgiveness of past sin and reconcile mankind with God; since the Resurrection, nothing more will be necessary to establish God’s promise to save mankind from death. Now is a time to wait in faith that the deferral of justice is necessary to allow more time for the world to acknowledge that everything has changed.

    What kind of life is justified now? Paul’s answer is not to live as if we were still in the pre-messianic past when sin was unforgiveable and hatred of the sinner was virtue; neither is it to live as if we were in the messianic future when God’s justice has come and the sinner has already been punished. The former politicizes messianism; the latter aestheticizes it. Living in the now, for Paul, means living as not—not still in the past, not yet in the future—but in the time it takes for time to come to an end.³¹ According to Paul, the sins that we commit now, after having forsaken sin, will be different from our earlier transgressions of law that have been pardoned, and will be judged by a different standard. Sin will henceforward take the form of behaving as we would if the past were not over; it must be judged as a failure of faith—the faith that we are already forgiven and are now free to forgive accordingly because the time itself has changed.

    Echoing the rhetoric of Pauline Christianity, the fin de siècle discourse on human rights has instilled faith that times have changed in transitional societies such as South Africa, which have thus far been spared their Armageddons. In these societies, which seem in many ways unchanged, the sins that come after sinning often take the form of returning to (dredging up) the past and violating the faith that things are already different—or will be once everyone accepts the change that has occurred. A further point is that societies entering a new era of human rights become convinced that they have been given extra time to change. The new question is whether this extra time must be prolonged because it is still too soon for justice, or whether it must be compressed so as to give justice greater exigency before it is too late. Meanwhile, to be saved (as in Augustine) or ethical (as in Kant) consists of living in a virtual reality in which one acts as if others had good-will even though they do not. What then is the difference between faith and fiction, between human rights as a second chance and as a missed opportunity in which the appearance of change substitutes for the reality? Agamben writes about the ethical distinction between living as if and living as not:

    For Paul the redemption of what has been is the place of an exigency in the messianic. . . . The as not is by no means a fiction. . . . It has nothing to do with an ideal. . . . [T]hat which is not . . . is stronger than that which is. . . . [T]he messianic is the simultaneous abolition and realization of the as if . . . [T]he saved world coincides with the world that is irretrievably lost. . . . This means that he may not disguise the world’s being-without-god in any way . . . and cannot pretend to save the appearance of salvation. The messianic subject does not contemplate the world as though it were saved.³²

    For Agamben, the heightened exigency of a salvation that has yet to occur is thus as much a part of Paul’s messianism as putting evil in the past. Believing that there is still time, that it is not too late, has a different moral valence than believing that the moment for justice has been irretrievably missed, that it is postponed indefinitely, or that we have already been saved without deserving to be. For Paul, the time that remains is implicitly Godforsaken—God came and will return. This foreshortened time, a period of God’s absence, has special meaning according to Paul because now is the time we have to change the world. Paul’s messianism is not, primarily, the prophecy of an apocalypse but a way to live in the meantime. The messianic is not the end of time, but the time of the end.³³

    Many of the most serious disagreements in politics concern the meaning of this transitional time: though some will argue that the time has come for change—Never again—others will argue that the next occurrence of evil will be the last—the fire next time. Still others will say that what happened last time simply adds to what we already knew about past evil, which cannot be defended but which is so profound that redemption will require a miracle to change the human heart.

    It is not necessary, however, to take a messianic view of the need for change in a time without God. To believe that we are living after evil and before justice is the essence of what it means to live in a secular age. Secularity is always a secondary concept, defined by whatever element of the sacred is absent from it, and by how that element of sacredness would be conceived.³⁴ In a post-Christian culture, secular history is still the time St. Paul carved out between two messianic moments. It is thus not merely transitional time (which could not go on forever) but also a gift of more time that would not have existed if the end of evil and the establishment of justice had occurred at once, as perhaps they should have. In my view, present-day Human Rights Discourse is an intermessianic (and implicitly antimessianic) secular theology in which former victims, and those who may have inflicted or benefited from their suffering, await a final judgment that some hope and others fear will never come. This conception of the secular age as a time between messianic moments implies that now is never the time for justice.³⁵

    To call Human Rights Discourse a secular theology is not necessarily a criticism; if it is, I don’t know whether one would be criticizing that discourse for being secular (not theological enough) or for still being theological.³⁶ Secularization was, to begin with, a religious idea that originates within Judeo-Christian thought: it is what God does to himself when he creates the world and subsequently intervenes in its history. As a political idea, secularization arises out of the Roman separation of church and state. It occurs when the state usurps the legitimate spiritual function of the church, or when, perhaps surreptitiously, it relies on ideas that have already been delegitimated in their ecclesiastical form. Pauline Christianity gives believers extra time to confess and accept forgiveness for their sins before justice finally comes. Is Human Rights Discourse a secularization of this view?

    Nothing in my view hinges on whether a fixed boundary between religion and politics has been breached. I am inclined to be suspicious of any ideology, religious or political, that makes people wait for justice, but I accept the legitimacy of asking in the aftermath of evil whether it is still too soon to demand justice. Neither of these views is more religious or political than its opposite. Those who insist that now is the time for justice thereby imply that it is too late for retrospection and forgiveness. This might seem to surrender some of the higher ground that Pauline Christians often claim. But Paul himself acknowledged that a moment for final justice must come, and he had to explain why his congregations should nevertheless view the delay in Christ’s return as further evidence of God’s grace rather than as a betrayal of God’s promise. On the secular side, too, there are those who argue that it is always better to give people more time to change—a second chance—rather than risk their relapse into evil by demanding justice too urgently. There are also others who insist that we need to know what time it really is before saying that people should get a second chance.

    The moral rhetoric of the second chance (and not the new beginning) is what distinguishes the fin de siècle discourse of human rights from earlier revolutionary versions. Rather than hastening the end, today’s version of human rights buys more time for those who fear it may already be too late and provides hope that there is still an opportunity to avoid a final judgment on the past. This temporal logic is not unique to the field of human rights. Activists on global warming also argue that it is too late (the earth is past the tipping point) in order to persuade people to hope that it is not. We, the first-world beneficiaries of global warming, are promised in effect a second chance, not at ultimate success but at being judged differently for the policies we pursue from now on than we would be judged if global warming had happened before we understood the need for change.

    Carving out a time in which our sins are no longer a continuation of the past is characteristic of periods of transitional justice. Such periods are typically marked by an unstable equipoise between Redemption and Reconstruction. Redeemers believe that the present actions must no longer be judged as a continuation of a past evil that has been confessed. Reconstructionists counter that the time for change has accelerated and is already running out. Both sides presuppose that their debate occurs in a special kind of time—accelerated time, abbreviated time, slow time, supplementary time—which comes before the onset of the future but after the end of the now discredited past.³⁷

    The main tropes of metahistory—including revolution, reaction, redemption, reconciliation, return, and rebirth (as well as catastrophe, upheaval, transition, and emancipation)—are all originally theological, but not in the sense of being spiritual rather than secular. They are, rather, about the time of change, the rate at which time changes, and the time it takes to change. The chapters that follow are always, more or less explicitly, about the changing temporalities in which claims to justice are made and contested. What does it mean for a great evil, such as Nazism, U.S. slavery, South African apartheid, or Stalinism to be over and done with?

    Human Rights Discourse of the late twentieth century puts all such questions into a single metahistorical narrative that culminates in Human Rights Discourse itself. In this narrative, a moral consensus on evil is both necessary and sufficient to put it in the past; once this happens, resuming old political struggles can be repudiated as a potentially catastrophic effort to go backward. My initial response is that believing that the past was evil does not require one to believe that the evil is past. The problem, I argue, is when and whether a time for justice has come. But to make this argument I must take the reader on a considerable journey.

    The Chapters Ahead

    Our journey begins with the idea of launching a revolution against a form of social organization that fits to varying degrees the metaphor of a giant labor camp—such as a plantation, a mine, a factory, or even a prison. Variants of the labor camp may differ in their degree of centralization and homogeneity—and also in the type of mobility available to its subjects through, for example, escape, migration, and contractual consent. Using labor as a central metaphor—and not, for example, captivity, or poverty—focuses attention on the aspect of production and thereby opens the question of who benefits and how benefits accumulate. These questions about beneficiaries and their cumulative gains distinguish a revolution against a labor-camp system itself from mere overthrow of those who run it. To react against revolution—thus defined (to be counterrevolutionary)—is to resist the moral equation of beneficiaries of injustice, with its direct perpetrators, and thus to preserve accumulated gains resulting from the system as a whole. Today’s Human Rights Discourse contributes to the counterrevolutionary project of reassuring structural beneficiaries by focusing on violent crimes committed against the bodies of victims. Chapter 1 concludes that in Human Rights Discourse victims, thus defined, get to claim a moral victory when, and insofar as, the beneficiaries get to keep their gains.

    Chapters 2 and 3 develop my argument in the context of two historical versions of the labor-camp model: South African apartheid and U.S. slavery. Both chapters focus on the conceptual process through which beneficiaries of both systems come to reidentify themselves as common survivors by bearing witness to the horrors of a past they now disavow. In the course of comparing South Africa and the United States (for example, on questions of closure versus permanent recovery), I consider what it means for an ongoing beneficiary to put injustice in the past by embracing the standpoint of a compassionate witness to it. If the beneficiary comes to see himself as, essentially, a successor to a now defunct regime, based on victimization, would it not be altogether good to be that beneficiary? Isn’t this how European colonists, imbued by classical studies, viewed their unfortunate period of overlap with preexisting cultures, which could be honored and commemorated after they were gone?

    Chapter 4 recommences my genealogy of Human Rights Discourse by adding questions arising from the critique of colonialism to those arising from the critique of capitalism. Just as capitalism raises questions of interpersonal justice between victim and beneficiary, colonialism raises questions of intertemporal justice about the relation of settler and native: Who came first? Who will survive? And what is the relation of geographical space, cultural continuity, and biological extermination to the meaning of such survival? Colonies often functioned as labor camps within global capitalism, but colonialism itself had rationales that did not assume that the native and settler had a mutual need for the other’s co-presence and ultimate survival. In addition to plantations, mines, and factories, it thus developed reservations (U.S.), reserves (British), and eventually concentration camps, which appear first in colonized Africa and eventually in twentieth-century Europe. The main purpose of such concentrations was to reduce the space occupied by expendable populations: to waste them rather than use them—and eventually to eliminate them. Mid-twentieth century death camps used such violent methods of mass extermination that the whole idea of ethnic removal (cleansing) is now associated with the threat of genocide.

    Chapter 5 finds the core of Human Rights Discourse in the claim that death camps, exemplified by Auschwitz, are paradigmatically evil. One aspect of this paradigm is that the question of beneficiaries (nearly) drops out; a related aspect is that genocide, as such, becomes the ethical kernel of any critique of labor camps, reservations, and unjust regimes in general—what is ultimately wrong (once identified) is their noncommitment to the biological survival of subject populations. Human Rights Discourse adapts this argument (no more death camps) after the cold war to allow the international community to intervene in former colonies for the purpose of rescuing human bodies without purporting to recolonize such failed states.³⁸ The global Responsibility to Protect doctrine rests on a new paradigm, the refugee camp, which exists to save lives rather than to use or waste them and is therefore ethically distinguishable from both a labor camp and a colonial reservation. This ethical difference is large but not infinite. The inhabitants of refugee camps are rarely killed or exploited but are still disempowered, and they rarely benefit beyond having been saved. What matters in fin de siècle humanitarianism is simply to save them, and thus to be against their suffering and death. Here we reach the crux of the twenty-first-century conception of human rights, namely, that there is nothing worse than cruelty and that cruelty toward physical (animal) bodies is the worst of all. If the Holocaust now reveals genocide to be an absolute, and infinite, evil, then the only universal ethics after evil would be to put human rights, as a "Responsibility to Protect," ahead of any claim to justice (which will always be less absolute than the Holocaust). The chapter concludes by discussing the philosophical characteristics and limitations of this view, which authorizes third-party witnesses (and would-be rescuers) to claim ethical priority over militant believers in a new truth.

    Chapter 6 explores the substantive centrality of the Holocaust to Human Rights Discourse as it emerged in the twentieth century. I treat this body of thought as a, perhaps, secular example of the Jewish Question originally asked and answered by St. Paul: Why are there still Jews now that Christ has given Jewish suffering a universal meaning? The first modern version of this question arose in the nineteenth century when the secular citizenship that Jews once sought in Christian states was extended to everyone and became the universal paradigm of citizenship as such. In similar fashion, the late-twentieth-century paradigm of universal human rights (such as the right of refugees to be saved) was self-consciously developed to prevent what happened to Jews in the Holocaust from happening again, to anyone. But now that Jewish history has once more been universalized, why do Jews still think that they are the only Jews? In confronting this question, I consider how the Holocaust has made the murdered Jew the paradigmatic human rights victim and modern Israel’s survival the constitutive exception on which Human Rights Discourse is based. The parallel I draw between this discourse and Paul’s Judeo-Christianity concludes with a discussion of militant Islamism as its political-theological outside. Here I focus on the analogy between Crucifixion denial and Holocaust denial and whether giving universal value to past (Jewish) suffering brings the need for prophecy to an end.

    Chapter 7 calls into question the fundamental mechanism of moral change on which a post-Auschwitz culture of human rights purports to rely—the conversion from bystander to witness. Here the compassionate witness projects onto the actual victim feelings of unfulfillment that he already satisfies. How? Because the witness provides narrative fulfillment to the victim’s story by putting it in his own remembered past. But the witness’s real moral identification is not, I argue, with an actual victim but with a hypothetical other bystander who would have been an opponent by bearing witness in time. The chapter concludes with the question of whether beneficiaries ought to feel guilty about whether they would have been perpetrators rather than just lucky to be beneficiaries. The lucky are, by definition, those who benefit undeservedly but without doing anything wrong.

    Chapter 8 returns to the position of beneficiaries and takes up a question previously set aside: Is it conceptually impossible (or just too hard) to account for the past history in structuring future benefit flows? Shifting to the register of law, I argue that we already use property rules to trace revenue flows retroactively and redirect them in the future and that, under the law of remedies, property can be created (or inferred) to account for past injustice. A constructive trust, for example, is an equitable remedy for unjust enrichment. This device treats unjustly acquired wealth as though it had been held in trust for victims, allowing them (and their successors in interest) access to revenue streams similar to those that would flow from ordinary (nonremedial) property rights. Once present beneficiaries of past injustice are regarded as constructive trustees, it does not matter whether they are personally guilty or not. A further point is that property rights (the effect of the past on the present) include embedded options (puts and calls) that could be separately priced and included in the corpus of such a constructive trust. This mode of valuation has recently been used to bring about a massive redistribution of global wealth based on property rights that have nothing to do with remedial justice. Although any use of such methods is, and should be, contestable, it is clear that barriers to using them for purposes of social reparation are not primarily conceptual. They are political and psychological barriers, reinforced by the comfort Human Rights Discourse gives to beneficiaries.

    Chapter 9 considers the questions of why and whether perpetrators should be prosecuted. My focus here is Nuremberg, which stands as an exception to my general critique of recent humanitarian thought. I still disagree, however, with the now common interpretation of Nuremberg: that it advanced a transition from a culture of impunity to the rule of law by prosecuting only a few leading Nazis and (implicitly) giving amnesty to the rest. Today experts on transitional justice often favor declaring such amnesties explicitly, and in advance, so that there will not be a backlash if a few human rights trials need to be held. The real audience for such trials, they contend, is conformists in the old regime who now can think that they would have been opponents had they known what was really going on. What about the next emergency? As cultural conformists they can, henceforward, articulate the regret they will feel when the full facts are eventually known, while taking comfort from the fact that such knowledge will always come too late for them to be found blameworthy. I argue, against this view, that the central point of Nuremberg was to hold individuals responsible when it matters. The accused at Nuremberg were specifically not allowed the defense of a good faith belief that, following the Reichstag Fire, Jews and Communists really did pose a threat to the newly elected Nazi government. Contemporaneous statements alleging such a danger were, rather, part of the prosecution’s case that defendants were collectively liable for conspiring to maximize Nazi power. When the Tribunal found sufficient evidence to hold defendants individually liable for their crimes, it did not go back and say that the constitutional emergency declared after the Reichstag was even partially exculpatory with respect to violating the international laws on which defendants were tried. The Bush administration understood and feared the possibility of Nuremberg-based prosecutions when it gave its officials what Nazi defendants lacked—legal opinion letters stating that the 9/11 emergency was a full defense. This way around Nuremberg has been rightly rejected by the Obama administration, which has reverted to the cultural argument that going forward with human rights trials would be unnecessary and divisive once change has come. To the extent that this view prevails, a self-declared culture of human rights would become yet another culture of impunity.

    Chapter 10 considers the implications of this entire book for the work camp, death camp, and refugee camp as the basis of a late-twentieth-century dialectic of the human. My underlying notion of humanitarianism as a counterreligion, rejecting the cruelty of whatever religion came before, here takes the foreground. I thus directly take up the moral psychology of conversion as both the expression and repression of the wish to kill a god who would demand human death. The underlying paradox, I argue, is that counterreligions treat the cruelty of human sacrifice as both a paradigm of injustice and as a reason to transcend justice itself with compassion (love) for the sacrificial victim. Claims of justice are thus neither originary nor self-sufficient—they always come after some form of human sacrifice (after evil). And they are often vague about what they reject in human sacrifice. Is it the use of human life that occurs in the work camp? Or the useless expenditure of human life that happens in the death camp? Or the waiting (to be saved/freed) that exists in the refugee camp? The question of whether something could redeem past human sacrifice, or justify collective self-sacrifice, pervades my concern throughout this book with issues such as revolution vs. compassion, exploitation vs. succession, St. Paul vs. Muhammad, messianism vs. the prophetic tradition—and the special roles projected onto Jews in each of these debates.

    I conclude that such debates are still about justice, after all, but that justice itself is an intertemporal problem (the supersession of one time by another) and not simply an interpersonal problem. Both aspects of justice appear, I contend, in the recent clash between secular humanism (a variant of Judeo-Christian messianism) and resurgent forms of prophetic religion including, but not limited to, late-twentieth-century Islamism. The central issue (which has always arisen within, and not between, world civilizations) is whether there is, finally, nothing worse than age-old human cruelty—returning to past evil—or whether something new has happened (or will have happened) that changes everything. My title, After Evil, evokes a time that comes before justice when justice may seem less urgent; this book is my attempt to keep its urgency alive.

    1

    THE IDEOLOGY AND ETHICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

    The End of Human Rights

    What did it mean for the victors of the cold war to describe its end as a victory for human rights? In their institutional outcomes we can see obvious similarities between the third-wave democratizations of the late twentieth century and an earlier age of democratic revolution.¹ But there was also an obvious distinction: the third wave of democratizations had mostly occurred without revolutionary violence. Was it a final victory or a final defeat for human rights that they were now disentangled from the inevitable cruelties of revolutionary struggle?

    Many historians of human rights regard it as a world-historical achievement to extract the humanitarian kernel or empathy for all who suffer from the political hell of revolutionary struggle in which some suffering is welcome as a means of change.² This view marks a rarely acknowledged shift in the meaning of human rights activism. Today the revolutionary is no longer the standard paradigm of a

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