Anarchism and Socialism

ANARCHISM AND SOCIALISM

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George Plechanoff

JOVIAN PRESS

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Copyright © 2016 by George Plechanoff

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE UTOPIAN SOCIALISTS

THE POINT OF VIEW OF SCIENTIFIC SOCIALISM

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE ANARCHIST DOCTRINE

PROUDHON

BAKOUNINE

BAKOUNINE—(CONCLUDED)

THE SMALLER FRY

THE SO-CALLED ANARCHIST TACTICS. THEIR MORALITY

THE BOURGEOISIE, ANARCHISM, AND SOCIALISM

THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE UTOPIAN SOCIALISTS

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THE FRENCH MATERIALISTS OF THE 18th century while waging relentless war against all the "infâmes whose yoke weighed upon the French of this period, by no means scorned the search after what they called perfect legislation," i.e., the best of all possible legislations, such legislation as should secure to human beings the greatest sum of happiness, and could be alike applicable to all existing societies, for the simple reason that it was perfect and therefore the most natural. Excursions into this domain of perfect legislation occupy no small place in the works of a d’Holbach and a Helvétius. On the other hand, the Socialists of the first half of our century threw themselves with immense zeal, with unequalled perseverance, into the search after the best of possible social organisations, after a perfect social organisation. This is a striking and notable characteristic which they have in common with the French Materialists of the last century, and it is this characteristic which especially demands our attention in the present work.

In order to solve the problem of a perfect social organisation, or what comes to the same thing, of the best of all possible legislation, we must eventually have some criterion by the help of which we may compare the various legislations one with the other. And the criterion must have a special attribute. In fact, there is no question of a legislation relatively the best, i.e., the best legislation under given conditions. No, indeed! We have to find a perfect legislation, a legislation whose perfection should have nothing relative about it, should be entirely independent of time and place, should be, in a word, absolute. We are therefore driven to make abstraction from history, since everything in history is relative, everything depends upon circumstance, time, and place. But abstraction made of the history of humanity, what is there left to guide us in our legislative investigations? Humanity is left us, man in general, human nature—of which history is but the manifestation. Here then we have our criterion definitely settled, a perfect legislation. The best of all possible legislation is that which best harmonises with human nature. It may be, of course, that even when we have such a criterion we may, for want of light or of logic, fail to solve this problem of the best legislation. Errare humanum est, but it seems incontrovertible that this problem can be solved, that we can, by taking our stand upon an exact knowledge of human nature, find a perfect legislation, a perfect organisation.

Such was, in the domain of social science, the point of view of the French Materialists. Man is a sentient and reasonable being, they said; he avoids painful sensations and seeks pleasurable ones. He has sufficient intelligence to recognise what is useful to him as well as what is harmful to him. Once you admit these axioms, and you can in your investigations into the best legislation, arrive, with the help of reflection and good intentions, at conclusions as well founded, as exact, as incontrovertible as those derived from a mathematical demonstration. Thus Condorcet undertook to construct deductively all precepts of healthy morality by starting from the truth that man is a sentient and reasonable being.

It is hardly necessary to say that in this Condorcet was mistaken. If the philosophers in this branch of their investigations arrived at conclusions of incontestable though very relative value, they unconsciously owed this to the fact that they constantly abandoned their abstract standpoint of human nature in general, and took up that of a more or less idealised nature of a man of the Third Estate. This man felt and reasoned, after a fashion very clearly defined by his social environment. It was his nature to believe firmly in bourgeois property, representative government, freedom of trade (laissez-faire, laissez passer! the nature of this man was always crying out), and so on. In reality, the French philosophers always kept in view the economic and political requirements of the Third Estate; this was their real criterion. But they applied it unconsciously, and only after much wandering in the field of abstraction did they arrive at it. Their conscious method always reduced itself to abstract considerations of human nature, and of the social and political institutions that best harmonise with this nature.

Their method was also that of the Socialists. A man of the 18th century, Morelly, to anticipate a mass of empty objections that would be endless, lays down as an incontrovertible principle that in morals nature is one, constant, invariable ... that its laws never change; and that everything that may be advanced as to the variety in the morals of savage and civilised peoples, by no means proves that nature varies; that at the outside it only shows that from certain accidental causes which are foreign to it, some nations have fallen away from the laws of nature; others have remained submissive to them, in some respects from mere habit; finally, others are subjected to them by certain reasoned-out laws that are not always in contradiction with nature; in a word, man may abandon the True, but the True can never be annihilated! [1] Fourier relies upon the analysis of the human passions; Robert Owen starts from certain considerations on the formation of human character; Saint Simon, despite his deep comprehension of the historical evolution of humanity, constantly returns to human nature in order to explain the laws of this evolution; the Saint-Simonians declared their philosophy was based upon a new conception of human nature. The Socialists of the various schools may quarrel as to the cause of their different conceptions of human nature; all, without a single exception, are convinced that social science has not and cannot have, any other basis than an adequate concept of this nature. In this they in no wise differ from the Materialists of the 18th century. Human nature is the one criterion they invariably apply in their criticism of existing society, and in their search after a social organisation as it should be, after a perfect legislation.

Morelly, Fourier, Saint Simon, Owen—we look upon all of them to-day as Utopian Socialists. Since we know the general point of view that is common to them all, we can determine exactly what the Utopian point of view is. This will be the more useful, seeing that the opponents of Socialism use the word Utopian without attaching to it any, even approximately, definite meaning.

The Utopian is one who, starting from an abstract principle, seeks for a perfect social organisation.

The abstract principle which served as starting point of the Utopians was that of human nature. Of course there have been Utopians who applied the principle indirectly through the intermediary of concepts derived from it. Thus, e.g., in seeking for perfect legislation, for an ideal organisation of society, one may start from the concept of the Rights of Man. But it is evident that in its ultimate analysis this concept derives from that of human nature.

It is equally evident that one may be a Utopian without being a Socialist. The bourgeois tendencies of the French Materialists of the last century are most noticeable in their investigations of a perfect legislation. But this in no wise destroys the Utopian character of these enquires. We have seen that the method of the Utopian Socialist does not in the least differ from that of d’Holbach or Helvétius, those champions of the revolutionary French bourgeoisie.

Nay, more. One may have the profoundest contempt for all music of the future, one may be convinced that the social world in which one has the good fortune to live is the best possible of all social worlds, and yet in spite of this one may look at the structure and life of the body social from the same point of view as that from which the Utopians regarded it.

This seems a paradox, and yet nothing could be more true. Take but one example.

In 1753 there appeared Morelly’s work, Les Isles Flottantes ou la Basiliade du célébre Pelpai, traduit de l’Indien. [2] Now, note the arguments with which a review, La Bibliothèque Impartiale, combated the communistic ideas of the author:—"One knows well enough that a distance separates the finest speculations of this kind and the possibility of their realisation. For in theory one takes imaginary men who lend themselves obediently to every arrangement, and who second with equal zeal the views of the legislator; but as soon as one attempts to put these things into practice one has to deal with men as they are, that is to say, submissive, lazy, or else in the