British Destroyers & Frigates: The Second World War & After

BRITISH

DESTROYERS

& FRIGATES

BRITISH

DESTROYERS

& FRIGATES

THE SECOND WORLD

WAR AND AFTER

NORMAN FRIEDMAN

SHIP PLANS BY A D BAKER III

With additional drawings by Alan Raven

Frontispiece

HMS Dunkirk the last of the unconverted 1943 ‘Battle’ class to remain in service.

All uncredited photographs from the collection of A D Baker III

Copyright © Norman Friedman 2006

Ship plans © A D Baker III

Additional drawings © Alan Raven

This edition published in Great Britain in 2008 by

Seaforth Publishing

Pen & Sword Books Ltd

47 Church Street

Barnsley S70 2AS

www.seaforthpublishing.com

Reprinted 2012

First published by Chatham Publishing in 2006

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN 987 1 84832 015 4

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without either prior permission in writing from the publisher or a licence permitting restricted copying. The right of Norman Friedman to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

Designed by Roger Daniels

Printed and bound in China by 1010 Printing International Ltd

Contents

To absent friends:

David Lyon and Antony Preston

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

The destroyer began with the torpedo, the first capital-ship killing weapon a small ship could carry. Just before the First World War the Royal Navy learned, for the first time in the world, how to wield its fleet’s destroyers both to defend against enemy torpedo attacks and to deliver attacks of its own. The great surprise of the First World War was that the fast heavily-armed ship designed to fight a torpedo war was at least as useful in many other roles, both with the fleet and outside it. Here a First World War ‘V&W’ class destroyer fires a torpedo. (Royal Naval Museum, Portsmouth)

This book tells the story of British destroyers and escorts (sloops, later frigates) from the slide towards the Second World War to the present. It therefore begins in the mid-1930s. A later volume will, it is hoped, carry the story back to the first destroyers and also to the first ships intended to screen the battle fleet against torpedo attack. Throughout the period covered by this book the Royal Navy was under terrible financial strain as it tried to contend with rapidly-changing technology and also with a rapidly-changing strategic situation. Often its approach was extremely creative, for example blending nominally different types of ships together so that an affordable force could cover the full range of roles. Examples include the ‘Tribal’ class destroyers, the ‘Hunt’ class destroyer/fast escorts, the abortive post-war cruiser/destroyer, and the Leander class frigates.

Throughout, Britain had to balance home or European defence against the defence of overseas interests, which included the Empire both formal and informal. The two roles were connected. The two Empires provided much of Britain’s economic muscle, and the raw materials needed to produce whatever would be used for home defence. Conversely, a Britain weak at home could not afford sufficient forces to protect distant possessions. Home and Empire were bound together by the sea lanes. Access to the resources of Empire certainly encouraged Winston Churchill to hold out against the Germans in 1940. Conversely Churchill saw the Battle of the Atlantic, the battle to retain access to overseas resources, as crucial. In peacetime the Royal Navy, as Britain’s only fully mobile force, was key to protecting the Empire against subversion and against local aggression.

After the Second World War the same sorts of threat surfaced in the form of regular Soviet forces in Europe threatening Britain while revolutionaries (and local armies) threatened the Commonwealth and the remaining informal Empire in the Middle and Far East. The latter threat was greater after 1945 than it had been before 1939. Against this rising threat Britain had much-reduced resources, about a quarter of national wealth having been expended to win the war. To some extent that was made up for by US support: in 1949 First Sea Lord had to admit that the Royal Navy alone could no longer protect British sea lanes.¹

In 1948 the British Government designated 1957 as the ‘year of maximum danger’, the target for fleet modernisation.² In what amounted to an inversion of the pre-war Ten Year Rule, it was accepted that the Soviets would probably fight, but that they would be restrained until 1957 both by wartime devastation and by a lack of nuclear weapons (assuming that they would not have their first atomic bomb until 1952). Given the 1957 horizon, the British could concentrate on developing new weapons and systems until the mid-1950s. The outbreak of war in Korea in 1950 (following the Soviet bomb test in 1949) was a terrifying surprise: it was taken throughout the West as a precursor of the Third World War. For Britain, preparation for such a war meant creating an army to help block a Soviet advance into Western Europe, and creating a fleet to fight a new version of the Battle of the Atlantic. The emphasis was on frigates and on minesweepers.

As their attempt to rearm failed, the British found themselves rethinking their strategy. They began to see nuclear war as unfightable; deterrence might preclude a Third World War. Soviet aggression would make itself felt in ‘warm’ rather than ‘hot’ wars in the Third World. For the Royal Navy, the shift became explicit as a result of the 1957 Defence Review.³ Examples of such ‘warm war’ involvement were the 1956 Suez attack, the 1961 Kuwait crisis, the 1964 confrontation with Indonesia, the Rhodesian blockade, the Falklands War of 1982, and the Armilla Patrol in the Gulf from 1980 onwards. Now attention was concentrated on amphibious and carrier-centred strike forces rather than on the convoy escorts of the first post-war decade. Initially the shift away from the ‘hot war’ mission promised considerable savings, as the number of frigates and destroyers could be cut drastically, and the reserve fleet pruned.

However, it was understood that NATO, which was concerned entirely with the ‘hot’ war, was a major element in the deterrence which had made the shift possible. A considerable British commitment to NATO remained, mainly in the form of substantial ground and air forces, which by the 1960s were increasingly expensive because the Soviet forces they faced were more and more capable. Meanwhile defence, including naval, resources declined.⁴ A crisis came in 1966: the new Labour government decided that it could not afford to replace the ageing carriers, the core of the ‘warm war’ capability. For a short time the Royal Navy argued that it still needed a very numerous fleet of escorts to handle global commitments, but the government soon announced withdrawal from East of Suez – from what was left, it seemed, of the Empires.⁵ NATO became the Royal Navy’s priority. The naval power-projection role was justified by the need to reinforce northern Norway in wartime. The last pre-Falklands defence review, in 1981, would have lopped off this capability as unaffordable, reducing the Royal Navy to an ASW force useful only in conjunction with other NATO navies. However, the Falklands War, in 1982, showed that the overseas role could not be avoided; flexible naval forces were essential insurance against strategic surprise. Even before the Falklands, the ‘Cod War’ with Iceland had demanded considerable naval forces to protect a vital British interest. Beginning in November 1975 three and later five frigates had to be kept constantly on patrol; ultimately twenty-one frigates were involved. With the end of the Cold War the strategic situation reversed itself, the overseas role now being dominant. This shift is visible in the decision to build the Type 45 destroyer to screen new carriers and to dispose of modern but specialised Type 23 frigates.

Close co-operation between the United States and Britain, at least on an informal level, seems to have survived the Second World War. The US Navy supplied equipment for British trials, and the British were kept well aware of the early postwar US naval building programme. More generally, knowledge of US building programmes seems to have had considerable influence on the Royal Navy. Co-operation in ASW and in intelligence seems to have been particularly close. Later there was crucial material assistance. During the very difficult early post-war period, the British seem to have assumed that, should the Third World War break out, the United States would once again be the arsenal of democracy. They therefore adopted US calibres (as in the 5in Medium Calibre Gun which figured in the abortive cruiser/destroyer) and gun barrels (the elements of guns which wear out most quickly), if not US gun mounts. The British bought US lightweight torpedoes for escorts and for their helicopters. Under the Mutual Defense Assistance Programme (MDAP) of the early 1950s the US Navy supplied some key equipment. Examples were the 3in/50 gun and the SPS-6 destroyer radar.

The Role of the Destroyer

The role of the destroyer, which was usually integral to the fleet, changed radically over the period this book covers. Perhaps the most important development after the First World War was that the fleet was likely to steam a considerable distance before engaging an enemy fleet, at least in the favoured case of the Far East. Thus destroyers would have both a main battle role and a screening role en route to battle, in the latter case against submarine, air and mine threats. None of these threats would apply during a battle, because enemy aviators and submariners would find it too difficult to distinguish friend from foe, and because it would be too easy for a fleet to accidentally run over a minefield laid for its own benefit.

For all navies, the destroyer mattered because she carried the ship-killing torpedo. Mass torpedo attacks could be worthwhile even if they were not pressed home. For example, the enemy fleet commander might feel compelled to turn, as at Jutland, to avoid their torpedoes. That torpedo attack saved the German fleet from destruction, although it made no hits. In the Battle of the Barents Sea in the Second World War, destroyers covering a convoy deterred German heavy units from attacking by threatening torpedo attacks. Similar tactics proved effective in the Mediterranean against Italian heavy units. Torpedoes were also used as intended: for example, in 1945 a British destroyer flotilla sank the large Japanese cruiser Haguro with a perfectly-executed torpedo attack.

The British hoped for more. Beginning about 1913 they sought to use their own destroyers both to break up enemy destroyer attacks and to attack the enemy battle fleet. There was a major problem. Battleships all had anti-destroyer guns. It was extremely difficult for gunners to distinguish friendly from enemy destroyers in the heat of battle. There was no equivalent to what we call IFF – Identification, Friend or Foe. Any destroyer which came close enough to be dangerous was fair game. The British solution was for the fleet commander to keep track of the destroyer force as it manoeuvred relative to the battle line, ie to maintain a tactical plot. To avoid overloading this manual plot, the British had to treat destroyer flotillas as units, each controlled by its own flagship: a flotilla leader. That is why the Royal Navy insisted, up until the end of the Second World War, on building such special flotilla leaders (a pre-war flotilla comprised a leader and two four-ship divisions or squadrons). The British knew that this was hardly universal practice. In 1936, for example, in a discussion of destroyer construction, a British officer remarked casually that only certain navies – the US and Japanese – would fight the way the British hoped to. Only they would use their destroyers against British destroyers, in a kind of dogfight preceding a fleet action.

British destroyers were conceived primarily for their fleet support role, operating in flotillas integrated with the fleet’s capital ships and cruisers. Ships from the Home and Mediterranean Fleets are shown at Gibraltar in the late 1930s for the annual combined exercise, the Home Fleet battleship and cruisers distinguishable by their dark grey paint. Destroyers show their pennant numbers and funnel bands indicating their flotillas. Note the Spanish Civil War recognition markings on cruisers’ B turrets. (Royal Naval Museum, Portsmouth)

Given the en route screening role, the Royal Navy began to install Asdic (sonar) on all new-construction destroyers in 1931. On 17 June 1932 the Admiralty ordered all destroyers fitted with Asdic. The number of destroyers assigned to a fleet was set by the number of battleships, ie by the length of the line of ships to be screened, using a vee formation (bent screen) extending far enough back that a submarine could not sneak around.⁶ Based on such reasoning, in 1919 the Admiralty decided that the two main fleets, Home and Mediterranean, would need a total of nine destroyer flotillas (a figure which could be cut back if the submarine threat were somehow eliminated).

As for mines, British practice was to equip many destroyers with the Two-Speed Destroyer Sweep (TSDS). That in turn required winches and fittings on the quarterdeck. TSDS was conceived as a search rather than a clearance sweep, ie a means of protecting the fleet (or at least detecting minefields) while on passage; hence its presence on board destroyers. It was expected to cut all unprotected moored mines, as well as a proportion of moored mines with anti-sweep devices; the percentage would increase with sweep speed and depth. Unlike all other sweeps, TSDS could be used at up to 25kts. However, at speeds above 12kts the swept swath was narrow. Doctrine called for four destroyers steaming and sweeping abreast of a column of battleships.⁷ Fitting TSDS was by no means equivalent to the US destroyer minesweeper conversion. It did not, for example, provide any means of sweeping non-contact mines, such as magnetic mines. An attempt early in the war to develop a destroyer magnetic sweep, which like TSDS could be installed as needed, appears not to have come to fruition.⁸ Note that a destroyer which could be fitted with TSDS normally was not rigged for sweeping and thus functioned as a standard destroyer. The main impact of the anti-submarine screening and TSDS requirements was to add equipment to a destroyer’s quarterdeck and thus to require a larger hull. Whether to provide for TSDS became an important wartime design issue.

The pre-war attempt to use destroyers to augment fleet antiaircraft firepower were less successful, partly because the British considered high-angle fire incompatible with the high muzzle velocity needed for good surface (anti-destroyer) shooting. This idea did have considerable impact on the designs of the ‘Tribal’, ‘J’ and ‘L’ classes. During the Second World War a solution was found in the dual-purpose main battery of the ‘Battle’ class.

The Admiralty’s ideal pre-war destroyer force included seven flotillas for duties outside the battle fleet, including local ASW defence. One key role was trade protection, often meaning convoy escort. Because they were armed with torpedoes, destroyers were a potent counter to individual heavy surface raiders (cruisers were never available in sufficient numbers). The surface raider problem was most prominent for convoys to Russia. Successful attacks (or even threats, in the case of the battleship Tirpitz against Convoy PQ 17) seem to have demonstrated to Stalin the potential of such ships, and this experience may explain his post-war fascination with large cruisers, most of which his successors cancelled.

During the First World War, destroyers provided the overwhelming majority of convoy escorts, because they were fast and numerous and had sufficient range. In November 1918 the Royal Navy operated 412 of them, largely against U-boats. Many were worn out by wartime usage, but even in 1930 the Royal Navy destroyer force considerably exceeded the sixteen flotillas (144 ships) deemed necessary. That year, however, the London Naval Treaty limited British destroyer tonnage. The Royal Navy needed some destroyer substitute for convoy warfare. It adopted what would now be called a high-low mix policy, the low (or less capable) end being the convoy sloop. Such ships were not limited by treaty: they had neither torpedoes nor destroyer speed (which was not needed for convoy work). Even at this low end, numbers did not approach what was needed, and the Second World War frigate programme produced numerous lower-end ships. The problem was partly one of geography. At the outset U-boats had to transit considerable distances before they could attack shipping. Minefields off the British East Coast and between Scotland and Norway could help confine them (the British attack on Norway in 1940 was partly intended to extend mining to the coastal Leads in Norwegian territorial waters, which the Germans were using). Once war broke out, however, U-boats appeared much farther afield than expected, and it became clear that convoys would have to be escorted to Halifax, to Gibraltar, to Sierra Leone, and to Jamaica – which added a requirement for another 100 escorts. The situation worsened enormously after the Germans gained bases on the Atlantic by conquering France and Norway in 1940, in effect multiplying the size of their force. Matters worsened when the Italians entered the war. Now shipping had to take the long route around the Cape, and that route became more important as a means of supplying the army protecting the Middle East, with its vital oil.

Destroyers were also valued for many duties outside the battle fleet. HMS Melbreak, a ‘Hunt’ class destroyer photographed in October 1942, symbolised that role. The small cross-shaped antennas on her yardarm are for the British Type 86M ship-to-ship and ship-to-airVHF voice radio.

The other key role was the fight for the narrow seas, particularly between Britain and the Continent. They included the approaches to the Port of London via the Channel. As the Second World War approached, this problem of securing coastal shipping became more and more important. It explains, for example, the anti-aircraft armament of late-1930s escorts. The ‘Hunt’ class was built largely to deal with this problem, their creators recalling the First World War struggle for the narrow seas, fought by surface striking forces based at places like Harwich. The Second World War echo of the North Sea battles was the lengthy battle in the Channel, often against German motor torpedo boats. British destroyers in the Mediterranean fought the offensive end of a similar battle. More generally, destroyers were valued because of their speed. Hence the development of destroyer minelayers, which were used in both World Wars.

With the end of the Second World War, classic fleet-on-fleet engagements seemed most unlikely. The new kind of fleet, built around a carrier, would still face the kinds of en route threats which had become prominent after the First World War. The destroyer’s screening role now dominated, her torpedo attack role surviving mainly because the Soviets began building large cruisers, like the Sverdlovs, which might attack convoys. Much later the surface attack role returned to some extent when the Soviets built major surface combatants with anti-ship missiles. Truly affordable low-end escorts became much more difficult to build with the advent of higher-performance submarines and therefore of new ASW sensors and weapons. It was no longer clear that sufficient numbers could be built. Would there ever be a role for a Third World War corvette? The perception that this was so changed British (and allied) naval strategy and in turn changed the requirements levied on frigates. Ultimately the distinction between destroyer and frigate changed. A Type 22 Batch III frigate is larger and more expensive than a Type 42 Batch III destroyer. The difference is that one is specialised in ASW and the other in area AAW. The frigate actually has much more anti-ship firepower than the destroyer, which in a way places it closer to a classical destroyer. The low end is no longer low. This melding may be traced back to 1960, when Leander class frigates were bought as fleet escorts instead of modernising Daring class destroyers.

By 1930, destroyer roles included many non-traditional ones, such as convoy escort. The London Naval Treaty signed that year drastically reduced the British destroyer fleet, just as the Royal Navy saw an increased need for shipping protection. It developed sloops as slow substitutes (ie not limited by treaty) for destroyers in that role. Their ultimate development was the Black Swan class, HMS Snipe is shown post-war.

Creating Ships

For most of the period covered by this book British warship designs were produced by the Admiralty technical or materiel departments, led by the Department of Naval Construction, whose Director (DNC) signed each design (later, as noted below, Director General Ships, DCS, superseded DNC). The process was a spiral, DNC’s constructors producing a sketch to fulfil draft Staff Requirements (and to see whether they were practicable). Sometimes the staff did not realise the implications of its requirements (eg in ship size) until the sketch had been created. The requirements were then revised, and the process continued. Revision also took into account the views of other departments, such as those involved in ordnance.

The parties to this process were the seagoing fleet, the staff, and the Admiralty materiel departments. Generally the seagoing fleet demanded maximum performance, often (in the case of destroyers and frigates) in a minimum platform. Because the fleet had direct experience of recent designs, its views tended to reflect operating experience. Staff officers had recent seagoing experience, but they were more aware of new technical possibilities. They had to balance individual performance against numbers. DNC and the other technical departments presented technical realities which often went counter to what the fleet and the Staff thought could be achieved. There was thus an inevitable feeling that the designers could have done better. Particularly during the Second World War, British seagoing officers complained that foreign, especially US, de-signers seemed to be producing more heavily-armed ships than theirs, and DNC periodically found himself defending his products. For the staff, particularly after the Second World War as resources became tighter, the complaint was typically that ships were far too expensive, the suspicion being that private designers were doing better for foreign clients.

This triangle is neither unique nor new. For example, early in the twentieth century Royal Navy cruisers were often compared, to their disadvantage, with Elswick cruisers built for export. The defence was generally that the export ships lacked crucial but subtle qualities, such as magazine capacity, which usually did not appear in published data. Until the early 1950s the Thornycroft yard often offered its designs to the Royal Navy. The Royal Navy rejected many of them, accepting only what became the ‘Hunt’ Type IV (Brecon and Brissenden). The main ground for rejection was that Thornycroft did not understand modern weapon and sensor requirements; the builder tended to emphasise the features foreign buyers found most attractive, speed and armament per ton. In this book the only other private design bought for the Royal Navy was the Type 21 frigate.

However, by the late 1980s there was a pervasive perception within the British government that private defence contractors were more effective than their in-house (civil service) equivalents. By that time the Royal Navy had long abandoned attempts to develop its own weapons and electronic systems. DCS was the last hold-out of in-house development. Now the Royal Navy (like the US Navy) assigns the entire design task to a private contractor, such as BAE in the case of the Type 45 destroyer. The in-house organisation survives in a managerial role, monitoring the process. Maintaining separate monitoring and design agencies may be substantially less flexible than the previous DNC/DGS organisation. On the other hand, it can be argued that weapons and related systems are now so deeply enmeshed in a ship design that the classical constructors are not nearly as important as in the past; better to contract a ship to an integrated systems house. Yet without its in-house, hence disinterested, designers, the staff may no longer be able to understand the consequences of its choices, particularly at the critical earliest stages of a project. It will probably be unable to judge technical issues. A set of requirements for which no sketch has been made may have surprising consequences (such as huge size to maintain a stealthy shape) – which may be impossible to correct without major and expensive contract changes. To some extent the Royal Navy has tried to solve the problem by writing more flexible contracts and by forming joint teams of naval officers and contractors.

The Royal Navy thought of the Commonwealth navies as an integrated fleet. For example, Commonwealth and Royal Navy ships all shared a common series of pennant numbers. As war came to seem imminent, the Australians chose a design for emergency production. They considered and rejected the Black Swan and Kingfisher class sloops and the Halcyon class minesweepers. Instead, the design of a small sloop was developed by Australian naval constructors and submitted to their Navy Board (equivalent to the Admiralty) on 3 February 1939. It was smaller than a ‘Flower’ class corvette: 680 tons, 180ft on the waterline (186ft overall) × 31ft × 10ft, and was expected to make 15.5kts on the output of two triple-expansion engines, which could be built in railway workshops. Projected armament was two 4in guns, depth charges (with Asdic), and minesweeping equipment. Projected endurance was 2,850nm at 12kts. Although officially a minesweeper, the resulting Bathurst class was called a corvette by the RAN, and it often functioned as one. The first four were ordered in December 1939, followed by thirty-two more RAN ships. The Royal Navy ordered ten in January 1940, and then another ten; these ships were lent to the RAN during the war. Of these ships, thirteen served under British operational control, two beginning their war service in the Mediterranean. In addition, the Royal Indian Navy ordered four for construction in Australia (another three, ordered from Indian yards, were cancelled in March 1945). Wartime armament was a 4in gun forward and a 20mm gun or 12pdr aft; by the end of the war most had a single Bofors aft. HMAS Mildura is shown at Sydney. Completed in July 1941, she served as both an escort and a sweeper. (RAN via John Mortimer)

As the Royal Navy shrank in the 1970s, so did the naval staff and the Admiralty departmental structure. There seems no longer to be anything resembling the permanent structure which produced the Staff Requirements prominent in this book. Instead, ad hoc groups are formed. Their advantage – and disadvantage – is that they begin with a clean sheet of paper. Although members are aware of their own experience, they are unlikely to be aware of the many policy issues which had shaped previous ships. The problem is aggravated by the lengthening interval between ship designs. For both the Royal Navy and the US Navy, very long design periods are now tolerated. A constructor may work on very few separate designs throughout a career, hence gain very little experience to apply to subsequent ships. There seem to be more and more layers of review between initial concept and approval for construction. To a cynic, the purpose of the extra studies is to delay actually spending money on construction – ultimately at a high cost. The same cynic might suggest that delay was entirely acceptable during a Cold War when nuclear deterrence made war quite unlikely. With the end of the Cold War, the situation seems to have changed.

The lengthening interval between separate designs reflects a reduction in the number of ships bought each year. One explanation is that ships themselves are growing considerably more expensive, due partly to the rising cost of their weapon systems. The same annual appropriation buys fewer. As the numbers fall, shipyards find themselves compelled to raise costs in order to pay their overheads. The only way to maintain even a shrunken force is to extend individual ship lifetime and so to increase the interval between classes. That is possible because, despite many claims to the contrary, weapons technology has largely stabilised after violent changes between 1940 and, say, 1965. That probably exemplifies the S-shaped curve which technology so often follows: very slow at first, then more and more rapid, and then slow again as the potential of a given technology is wrung out.

Until well after the Second World War, the Admiralty was largely independent of other British defence decision-making, the Cabinet often limiting itself largely to splitting overall resources between the services. The Admiralty felt only a limited need to explain its reasoning to outsiders. Ship requirements and designs were almost completely an internal matter, although there was sporadic interference from above (as is evident, for example, in wartime Minutes from Prime Minister Winston Churchill).

The civilian head of the Board of Admiralty was the First Lord, who was responsible to Parliament. The professional members were five Sea Lords plus the Vice and Assistant Chiefs of the Naval Staff. The First Sea Lord (roughly equivalent to the US Chief of Naval Operations) was also Chief of the Naval Staff (CNS). The Third Sea Lord was also Controller, responsible for naval materiel and the materiel departments (Fifth Sea Lord, however, was responsible for naval aircraft). Second Sea Lord was responsible for personnel, Fourth for dockyards and bases.

Unlike the contemporary US Navy, the Royal Navy did not form large units into which new technologies could be slotted, like the US Bureau of Ordnance. Instead, the Royal Navy added a Gunnery Department for fire control, when such devices first became important, retaining the earlier Department of Naval Ordnance, which provided guns. Torpedoes and Mines were, however, lumped together. The effect of this organic process was to create much more varied opinion at the level at which Staff Requirements and designs were debated, but it was also somewhat more cumbersome, and after the Second World War the different units were gradually amalgamated.

Perhaps the greatest lesson of the Battle of the Atlantic was how difficult it was to extemporise the large ASW fleet required. Yet ships simple enough to be mass-produced were not very useful in peacetime. One solution, adopted by the Royal Navy, was to convert existing destroyers into fast ASW frigates and then to place most of them in reserve, against the threat of a war considered quite possible from 1957 onwards. HMS Undine is shown in February 1954. As it happened, the advent of H-bombs made it much likelier that World War III could be averted by deterrence, and that the main threat would be limited war in the Third World. The reserve fleet was abandoned.

After 1948 the Royal Navy formally acknowledged that only within an alliance could it guarantee the security of Britain’s global sea lines of communication. That position was formalised in 1949 with the formation of NATO, and the Royal Navy now frequently operated in company with allied fleets. This photograph of Malta in the 1960s shows a mixed NATO fleet including a British Tiger class cruiser and Dutch, French and Italian cruisers and destroyers. Another feature of the post-war period was the blurring of the distinction between different categories of surface combatants, particularly after missiles provided destroyers with cruiser-level firepower, and armour ceased to be significant. One irony was that in the late 1970s the Royal Navy could plausibly argue that, with allied forces either depleted or tied up elsewhere (as in the Mediterranean), it would have to fight largely alone to guarantee access to the Eastern Atlantic and the Channel. (Royal Naval Museum, Portsmouth)

The most important material departments frequently appear in this book in the form of their directors: DNC (naval construction: DNC was Chief Constructor and Principal Professional Advisor to the Board); Engineer-in-Chief (E-in-C, the only department not denoted by the initial letter D); DEE (electrical engineering, not to be confused with radio and radar); DNO (naval ordnance); DGD (gunnery division: fire control, later gunnery and anti-air warfare, though still abbreviated DGD); DTM (torpedoes and mines); DAS (antisubmarine, often A/S, initially mainly concerned with Asdic); DSD (signals); DND (navigation and direction), DOD (Operations Division), DoD (dockyards). During the run-up to the Second World War DTM and DAS merged to become DTAS (Torpedoes and A/S) and later DTASW (adding weapons). During the war a new Department of Radio Warfare (DRW) was created. There was also, for a time a Department of Radio Equipment (DRE).

Until 1939 DNC and his department were located at the Admiralty in London, making it relatively simple for the Board and the Staff to interact with DNC and senior constructors. At the approach of war, the bulk of the organisation was evacuated a considerable distance to Bath, leaving DNC a small London section for urgent studies in response to Staff requests. This section was responsible for initial sketches made during the development of a Staff Requirement. With the entire organisation badly overloaded in the early 1950s, the London section was assigned detailed development of the third-rate ASW frigate (Type 17) and of its lineal successors, which became the Type 81 ‘Tribal’ class frigate. Rivalry between the London section and the main DNC organisation at Bath may have affected the development of the Leander class.⁹ Separate Sections at Bath were responsible for different types of ships.¹⁰ The post-war ‘County’ class missile destroyers were probably a unique case of carry-over from one section (5, developing missile ships) to another (7, for destroyers). The section organisation may have slowed the amalgamation of destroyers and frigates in the late 1950s.

DNC headed the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors (RCNC).¹¹ Their lengthy training included a period of sea time to give them a feeling for the fleet’s needs and for the realities of ships. Such men could not be trained rapidly in an emergency. Shortages of experienced constructors plagued the Royal Navy both during the run-up to the Second World War and during the Korean War mobilisation. In both cases overworked constructors made errors with serious design consequences. DNC both designed the ships and monitored their construction. Thus his department included superintendents at the yards and constructors at dockyards throughout the Empire and with the fleets. There was a separate Director of Dockyards (DoD, not to be confused with the Director of the Operations Division, DOD).

After the Second World War the different categories of surface combatants began to merge. Big destroyers like HMS Diana, shown on 18 September 1954, came close to being small cruisers, although they lacked the self-supporting features of such ships. Later large destroyers, the ‘Counties’ and HMS Bristol, were sometimes called cruisers, although they lacked important cruiser features including protection. (A&J Pavia via John Mortimer)

Many departments had their own laboratories and schools, the latter often responsible for development work. Examples included the DNC test tank at Haslar, HMS Excellent for DGD, HMS Vernon for DTM, and HMS Osprey for DND. Asdics were developed by the A/S Experimental Establishment at Fairlie. British naval radars and post-war command systems were developed by the Admiralty Signals Establishment, ASE. Overall, the experimental establishments expanded considerably in wartime, one of the most important being the Underwater Experimental Establishment, UNDEX, which figures in this book in decisions on the Daring class hull structure, and which conducted many early post-war tests of ships to destruction. Note that DNO relied on industry for gun mounting designs; Vickers seems to have had a monopoly.

Some of the Departments represented branches of the service; officers chose their specialities, attended special schools, and carried those specialities forward through their careers. The branches competed but apparently did not exchange much information. It is inherent in such a system that claims by any one branch are accepted by the others. Before the Second World War the two major weapons specialities were gunnery and torpedoes (ASW was an outgrowth of the torpedo branch). A gunner was Director of Plans and a torpedo expert was Director of Tactics. Thus Director of Plans was unlikely to know much about underwater warfare. This organisational accident may explain why pre-war British officers so overrated the effectiveness of Asdic and ASW tactics.¹²

The Naval Staff began as a war planning and intelligence organisation, hence the natural forum to decide what sort of materiel the navy needed. First Sea Lord was both operational head of the Royal Navy and Chief of the Naval Staff (CNS), with a Deputy (later Vice) Chief (DCNS or VCNS) under him. In the wartime and early post-war organisation, VCNS was responsible for policy. Under him were the Naval Intelligence Department and the Directorate of Plans (Operations). At the next level down the Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff (ACNS), under Controller, supervised the Tactical Division (director, DTD) later the Tactical and Staff Duties Division (director, DTSD), which prepared and circulated draft Staff Requirements. In theory, writing a Staff Requirement was the first step in a design, although in practice sketch designs might be developed informally in advance of actual staff requirements. Typically Controller asked for a draft Staff Requirement for circulation for comment among the Staff Divisions. Controller and the Sea Lords (ultimately First Sea Lord) adjudicated disputes among them. Requirements were also sent to DNC so that a draft sketch design could be produced as a test of feasibility. During and after the war ACNS was also in charge of operational research (Directorate of Operational Research, DOR), and other ACNS positions, such as ACNS(T) for trade protection (mainly the Battle of the Atlantic), were created during the war. ACNS(W), for weapons, was responsible for Staff Requirements.

At the other end of the scale, frigates grew in sophistication to the point where they were fleet escorts operating with destroyers. Ultimately the main distinction was that destroyers offered area air defence, whereas frigates offered superior ASW capability; ships of both categories were of about the same size, and frigates were sometimes considerably more expensive than destroyers. HMS Rhyl, shown in 1982, was built just as this shift was occurring. The dark patch at her bow was probably due to heat generated by her diesel generators. She is shown as modernised, with Seacat and a helicopter deck aft, and with a towed (variable-depth) sonar at her stern.

Discussion of design proposals by the full Board became difficult during the war. In 1942 a Future Building Committee (FBC) chaired by ACNS(W) was formed. Considering both the overall shape of the fleet and particular ship choices, it was important for wartime destroyer development. The FBC may have been formed largely in response to various disasters in 1940 and 1941 at the hands of Axis aircraft. Although it lapsed at the end of the war, the idea of a co-ordinating committee outside the Board was attractive. The Ship Design Policy Committee (SDPC) was formed in 1947 as, in effect, a filter between design studies and the Board: it had to endorse a proposed design before it could be presented to the Board.¹³ It seems to have been considered unwieldy; in 1959 a new Ship Characteristics Committee (SCC) was formed. The post-war successor to the FBC was the Fleet Requirements Committee, formed in the late 1950s.

After the war the ultimate size and shape of the fleet was very much a Cabinet-level issue and the subject of Defence Reviews. Until about 1956 such reviews might be led by a Minister of Defence, but he had little or no staff supporting him, hence had to accept Service views. In October 1955 Prime Minister Anthony Eden was surprised to learn that defence plans called for spending an unaffordable £2 billion in 1959. In response he expanded the role of the previously powerless Ministry of Defence to ensure that the composition and balance of each service corresponded to overall Cabinet policy, ie that spending was reined in. Its civilian chief would have power over the service heads. A separate Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee would be created. In tandem with these changes Eden ordered a Long Term Defence Review. It was completed late in 1956, coinciding with the débâcle at Suez which seemed to illustrate the bankruptcy of current policy. The review announced drastic cuts in keeping with the largely unannounced but seismic change in British national strategy towards nuclear deterrence and a capability to fight only limited wars. At much the same time similar financial pressure created the modern US Defense Department. In both cases the determining factor was probably the exploding cost of new technology.

In January 1957 it was announced that all proposals from the individual services would go through the Ministry of Defence. The Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee became Chief of Staff to the Ministry of Defence, or Chief of the Defence Staff (the first was former First Sea Lord Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten). Now a Minister of Defence, answerable to the Cabinet, could bypass the service chiefs altogether in allocating resources. By 1962 new projects had to be endorsed first by the Defence Research Policy Committee (or Defence Research Committee), and then by the Operational Requirements Committee, both staffed from all the services in hopes of making them more objective. They were then passed to a separate Weapons Production Committee before being submitted to the Cabinet Defence Committee for final approval. A project began as a Staff Target which evolved into a Staff Requirement and was approved as an Operational Requirement. The first ship project subject to such review was the Type 82 (Bristol) guided missile destroyer.

As the home market for destroyers and frigates contracted, British firms became more dependent on exports. Perhaps the most successful deal of all was the sale of six frigates to Brazil. They were loosely related to Type 21, with much the same weapon system. The first two, Niteroi and Defensora, are seen in the Channel en route to Brazil. (Vosper Thornycroft)

As in the United States in the 1960s, the key to controlling the services was operations analysis, comparing different forces which seemed to be directed at similar goals, conducted at the Ministry rather than at the service level. By the late 1960s the services had largely been shorn of their own operational research organisations, so they had little means of resisting MoD analyses on their own terms. In the navy’s case the new kind of analysis had particularly bad consequences. The contributions of various platforms and forces could be compared only in discrete, well-defined roles. That is very useful when weapons or forces are designed to deal with a single scenario, such as an armoured force to deal with a Soviet attack on the Central Front; it is far less useful for general-purpose forces whose great strength is in their flexibility. Furthermore, this type of analysis is essentially static: it does not take account of an enemy’s reactions to what friendly forces do. However, much of what navies do with their mobility is exactly that: they change the enemy’s perceptions and even the terms of the problem. That is why navies exercise great influence even though they may rarely fight. For example, in the 1970s it was common in the United States to divide up the fleet into special-purpose arms, distinguishing sea control from power-projection forces, and to evaluate each on its own terms. The US Maritime Strategy of the 1980s, a classical large-navy concept (applicable to the Royal Navy as to the US Navy) aimed to seize sea control by using forces usually designated for power projection. It may be that the effect of sea power often can be appreciated only in a dynamic war game, in which the enemy’s behaviour changes over time. This is why, during the 1980s, the US Navy invested so heavily in its wargaming facilities.

The Ministry of Defence Operational Analysis Establishment (DOAE), began a major study of maritime warfare in 1973. The Ministry of Defence was under intense pressure to cut naval spending, both because of British economic problems and because it was considered vital to spend more on the Central Front in Germany. DOAE studies apparently helped justify the sort of cuts which were wanted. Forces were evaluated in a narrowly-defined NATO war. Naval roles such as pre-hostilities marking and trailing and attacks on Soviet surface combatants at the outbreak of war were listed. On these terms the surface force was compared with submarines and with land-based aircraft. Inevitably there were gross simplifications. Aircraft generally seemed to be a better and more economical choice. They offered great mobility; once they had attacked, they could quickly return to base, reload and attack again. At least in theory, their airborne radars could detect even relatively small targets at long range. It was not in DOAE’s remit to point out that the aircraft were tied to British bases, or that weather might well prohibit their use. By 1974 DOAE was recommending aircraft for surface strike missions, pointing out the limitations of the Exocet then being deployed. It appears that DOAE analysis justified killing the big Type 43 destroyer and then justified the 1981 naval cuts (the relevant papers have not yet been released). For the researcher, the shift towards centralised authority and the DOAE is evident in the decline of Admiralty policy papers in The National Archive (formerly the Public Record Office) in favour of Ministry of Defence papers, often produced by the Royal Navy.

The Treasury became more and more involved in the details of British naval forces. As the agency responsible for controlling spending (since it has to raise the funds), the Treasury in effect functioned as a balance wheel to the services. Beginning in the late 1960s, Treasury documents show considerable scepticism about new naval programmes. The Royal Navy found that the explanations it produced were often used as a basis for further protests. That was particularly evident in the case of the Type 22 frigate, whose mission changed quite radically without any formal statement of what was happening.

Through and beyond the 1970s the Admiralty and its staff were severely cut and the Staff Divisions amalgamated. DTSD became as Director of Tactics and Staff Duties, and much later DTWP (Tactics, Weapons, and Policy). Ultimately he became Director of Operational Requirements (Navy), DOR(N), sometimes styled DNOR. There were periodic reorganisations. In 1954 TASW became the Department of Undersea Warfare (DUW). There was considerable amalgamation in the late 1950s as the Admiralty tried to avoid drastic cuts in front-line forces due to a severe budget squeeze. In 1984 CNS, with ACNS below him, directed four major divisions: DNW (Naval Warfare), DNOT (Operations and Training), DNSD (Naval Staff Duties), and a Secretarial division.

Probably the most striking change was the creation of super-departments. In February 1956 the Nihill Committee was created to consider reorganisation of design, taking into account complaints from sea that US ships had better layouts and used lighter and more compact equipment. On the recommendation of its 1958 report, the DNC, E-in-C (as DME, Director of Mechanical Engineering), DEE, DNE (Naval Equipment), and a new DNP (naval production) departments were all combined in a new Director General, Ships organisation in new buildings at Foxhill in Bath. DNC left Whitehall for Bath. DNO, DGD and DUW (among others) merged under a new Director General Weapons (Naval), DGW(N). The same reorganisation created the Ship Characteristics Committee and established a five-year term of office for Controller. About two decades later the ship organisation moved to Abbey Wood in Bristol. As noted, DCS is now a monitoring rather than a design organisation. At least for the moment, the Type 23 frigate seems to have been the swan-song of the Royal Navy’s own warship designers.

Acknowledgements

First and foremost I would like to thank my wife Rhea, who so often and so lovingly encouraged and assisted me in this lengthy project. For my birthday very early in our marriage she bought me Edgar March’s British Destroyers, which first awed me and then made me realise how much more was to be learned and said. I particularly thank Rhea for helping me find a way to photograph Ship’s Covers at the National Maritime Museum and thus to assemble key material for the early chapters of this book. The late David Lyon, king of the Museum’s Draught Room, introduced me to the Covers, and shared his enormous knowledge of, and enthusiasm for, British torpedo craft. The late David R Topliss, of the Brass Foundry station of the Museum, introduced me to the constructors’ notebooks, which have proved so valuable a source. My good friend A D Baker III largely illustrated this book, read an earlier draft, and provided much excellent advice. His drawings are based partly on originals held by the National Maritime Museum at the Brass Foundry. D K Brown illuminated the logic of British ship design, as seen from the inside. I am grateful to both the late J David Brown and Captain Chris Page RN, successive heads of the Royal Navy Historical Branch. Their staffs were also extremely kind to me. I am particularly grateful to Jock Gardner and to Malcolm Llewellyn-Jones. Dr David Stevens and Josef Straczek of the Royal Australian Navy Historical Branch were also very helpful. I am also very grateful to my friends the late Antony Preston, Alan Raven, Dr Eric Grove, John Mortimer, David Andrews RCNC, and Chuck Haberlein of the US Naval Historical Center. I would like to thank the staffs of the Brass Foundry, past and present, of the Public Record Office (now part of The National Archives), and of the US Navy Operational Archives, on all of whom I depended heavily. I am grateful to the staffs of the libraries of the Imperial War Museum and of the Science Museum. Special thanks go to the Freedom of Information staff of The National Archive and also to the Defence Logistics Organisation Frigate Integrated Project Team, for the latter’s response to a Freedom of Information request. Although I benefited from much help, I alone am responsible for the views in this book and for any errors it contains.

FOOTNOTES: Notebooks are the constructor’s notebooks held by the Brass Foundry station of the National Maritime Museum. ADM, PREM and T225 references are to files at the Public Record Office of The National Archives (TNA).

¹ ADM 205/83. The three ‘pillars’ of British strategy were the defence of the United Kingdom itself, of sea communications, and of the Middle East. Hence the need for a balanced fleet, rather than one specialising in ASW or in mine countermeasures, the two chief elements of trade protection. In May 1949 the First Sea Lord wrote that the affordable ‘Restricted Revised’ fleet could be cut back from the wartime fleet proposed the previous September (reductions including eight FADE and forty-eight frigates) ‘by relying on the American Navy for … half the Naval Forces required for the control of the sea communications in the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean, and for all the forces required for the control of sea communications in the South Atlantic and Pacific’. In the same file ACNS wrote that ‘It is politically impossible for this country, whose very life depends on secure sea communications, to [surrender] some part of its essential sea security … wholly to the safe keeping of another power, however friendly. [That] would mean accepting complete domination of our policy in peace and war by another country’.

² In 1934 the year 1939 was designated the year of maximum danger, presumably as a way of dramatising the reversal of the earlier Ten Year Rule. The 1939 date did not, it appears, become a formal target for rearmament in the way that the 1957 date was treated.

³ ADM 167/144. A review of naval policy, as part of the Chiefs of Staff Radical Review, began in 1954. Its Steering Committee consisted of Controller, VCNS, the Secretary of the Board and a representative of the Second Sea Lord (responsible for personnel). A December 1954 revision of the initial June 1954 naval policy paper argued that both sides would probably avoid risking uncontrollable escalation because all-out war was increasingly unfightable. Also, the Soviets believed that the West was doomed, and thus that their main task was to deter a Western attack against themselves. Cold War tensions would most likely be released in local (Third World) wars. As reflected in internal studies completed in 1955–6, contemporary US Navy long-range planners reached very similar conclusions. The first version of the Admiralty paper argued that in the H-bomb era a reserve fleet could survive only by being dispersed to commercial ports too minor to be nuclear targets. The necessary additional manpower was not available; the reserve fleet would have to be cut. ADM 167/150 includes a June 1957 study of naval measures applicable only to Global War, hence probably to be cut.

⁴ Keith Speed, who was Navy Minister in the early Thatcher Government, explained that about 1980 inflation in defence goods was running about 5 per cent above other forms of inflation, so that a pledge within NATO to increase spending by 3 per cent a year above inflation actually bought less each year. Speed, Sea Change (Ashgrove Press, Bath: 1982), p 86.

⁵ Withdrawal from Aden was announced in February 1966 as one consequence of the Defence Review that eliminated the British carriers (Aden was evacuated in November 1967). In July 1967 withdrawal from Singapore and Malaysia was announced. However, the British would retain capability in the region. Under continuing economic pressure the British government announced in January 1968 that it would withdraw completely from East of Suez, and that the carriers would be retired in 1972 rather than in 1975, as originally planned. Bahrain, the last British naval base in the Gulf, was closed on 15 July 1971. The Singapore naval base was handed over to the Singapore government on 1 November 1971. A residual British/Australian/New Zealand presence ended in 1974. Without the need to protect the route to the East, the Mediterranean was no longer a vital area. Withdrawal from Malta (by 31 March 1979) was announced in the 1975 Defence White Paper, and on 1 April 1976 the British ended their continuous naval presence in the Mediterranean.

⁶ George Franklin, Britain’s Anti-Submarine Capability 1919–1939 (Frank Cass, London: 2003), p 138, shows a screen used in a 1933 fleet exercise. The Royal Navy also tried circular screens.

⁷ In a crosstide of more than one knot the third and later ships would probably be endangered.

⁸ ML 139/40 of 25 February 1940, in the ‘J’ Class Cover, approves in principle fitting a destroyer LL (magnetic) sweep, already well into development, to units of