Navies in the 21st Century

INTRODUCTION

Navies in the twenty-first century exhibit significant changes from their counterparts at the time of the Cold War’s end, now a quarter of a century ago. Many of the major fleets that dominated the world’s oceans – deprived of longstanding core roles virtually overnight – are now much smaller than they were then. They have, over the same period, been joined by a new cohort of emerging naval powers, many located in Asia. These new fleets have been financed by the shift in world trade towards the broader Asia-Pacific region and justified by rising regional tensions.

However, change extends much further than this. The evolution of the global political order away from a bipolar stand-off between NATO and the Warsaw Pact (and their respective allies) has been accompanied by a period of instability which has brought new and different missions to replace those lost. These often require different types of warship, as well as changed methods of operation. Technology, increasingly derived from civilian applications in a reversal of the historic direction of travel, has also proceeded apace. This is, perhaps, most evidenced by the accelerating use of unmanned and autonomous vehicles. However, it has also had important implications for such wide-ranging areas as command and control, propulsion, stealth and manning. Meanwhile social change has been reflected in a decisive shift away from conscription towards all-volunteer, professional services and in the growing numbers of women serving at sea.

The US Navy Los Angeles class submarine Pasadena (SSN-752) prepares to undock from the floating dock Arco (ARDM-5) as the Arleigh Burke class destroyer Stockdale (DDG-106) departs San Diego harbour in January 2016. Although Asian fleets are of growing importance, the US Navy remains the world’s largest and best-funded fleet by a considerable margin. (US Navy)

Since 2010, Seaforth World Naval Review has chronicled some of these changes on a yearly basis. However, the short timeframe inherent in this approach is not necessarily the best way to identify and assess trends that might take a decade or more to emerge. Navies in the 21st Century therefore attempts to take a longer-term and broader perspective in describing both why and how fleets have evolved in the post-Cold War age. In doing this, the hope is to complement the periodic analysis contained in the Seaforth World Naval Review series with a more comprehensive assessment of why things are the way they are now. At the same time, as relations between Russia and the West cool once more as a result of events in Ukraine and the Crimea, the book aims to explain to a broader readership the current importance, objectives, structures and capabilities of the world’s major fleets.

Navies in the 21st Century follows the methodology established by the annuals in calling on recognised experts to elaborate on these key themes. This introduction aims to set the financial context to post-Cold War naval developments and outline the major areas addressed in subsequent chapters.

THE FINANCIAL BACKGROUND

One of the biggest factors influencing naval force structures across the world is inevitably the amount of money governments allocate to spending on the military. A good starting point from which to analyse global world naval development is, therefore, to understand this financial backdrop.

Global Trends in Defence Spending: In spite of considerable discussion about the post-Cold War ‘peace dividend’, it is important to appreciate that the world, at the start of 2015, was actually spending a little more cash on the military than it did at the end of the Cold War. This is graphically illustrated by Diagram 1.1, provided courtesy of SIPRI.¹ Arguably, there are three main reasons for this:

The world – through the process of economic growth – is now considerably wealthier than it was twenty-five years ago. As such, although the percentage of the world’s annual economic output – as measured by gross domestic product (GDP) – allocated to defence has fallen from c.4.5 per cent in 1989 to c.2.3 per cent in 2014, this still means that more cash is available. In 2014, nearly US$1,800bn was spent on the military worldwide.

There has, indeed, been a ‘peace dividend’. However, this has largely been restricted to Europe and Russia. Elsewhere – particularly in Asia and the Middle East – continued regional tensions have meant that defence spending has remained a priority. Strong economic performance in many economically developing countries has also meant that they have been able to afford to spend more, both in absolute and relative terms. There has therefore been a shift in spending from Europe towards Asia. This is clearly demonstrated by Diagrams 1.2 and 1.3.

A big decline in United States’ defence spending in the decade after the Cold War was effectively reversed by the terrorist atrocities of 11 September 2001 and the onset of the ‘long war’ against terrorism. The huge expense of this war explains why the share of world military expenditure accounted for by the United States was little different at the end of 2014 than it was in 1989.

The British Royal Navy’s technologically advanced Type 45 air-defence destroyer Diamond escorting the Danish merchant ship Ark Futura in the course of Operation ‘Recsyr’, part of the UN-sponsored mission to destroy Syria’s chemical weapons, in 2014. The post-Cold War era has seen navies acquire new technology and adapt to a broad range of missions. (Crown Copyright 2014)

Although the impact of the world financial crisis that started in 2008 and a large government deficit have curtailed United States’ defence spending since the beginning of the current decade, it remains the world’s dominant military power by a considerable margin. The United States spends three times as much on its military as its nearest rival, China, and accounts for around a third of the world’s defence spending overall. It also remains by far the largest economy, being over two-thirds larger than China in nominal terms.² Moreover, the United States benefits from a network of alliances with many of the other world’s major powers, which share a common interest in a global trading economy that relies on a stable international order. In spite of perceived threats to American dominance in Asia and elsewhere, it is difficult to perceive the basic status quo changing materially in the short to medium term. Equally, the US Navy looks firmly anchored to its position as the world’s dominant naval force.

1.1: World military expenditure, 1988–2014

1.2: The share of world military expenditure of the 15 states with the highest expenditure in 1989 (SIPRI)

1.3: The share of world military expenditure of the 15 states with the highest expenditure in 2014 (base data courtesy of SIPRI)

1.4: DoN FY 1999 Budget Estimates Real Program Trends

1.5: DON FY 2016 Budget Estimates Real Program Trends

1.6: MAJOR FLEET STRENGTHS – 1990–2015¹

Notes

1 Numbers are based on official sources, where available, supplemented by news reports, published intelligence data and other ‘open’ as sources as appropriate. Given significant variations in available data, numbers should be regarded as indicative, particularly with respect to Russia, China and minor warship categories. There is also a degree of subjectivity with respect to warship classifications given varying national classifications and this can also lead to inconsistency.

2 1990 data refers to the Soviet Union, dissolved at the end of 1991. The precise status of the Soviet/Russian fleet at the end of 1990 is rather speculative, as many warships held in official reserve status never returned to operation.

3 FAC numbers relate to ships fitted with or for surface-to-surface missiles.

4 The lack of offshore patrol vessels for some countries reflects the existence of a separate coast guard for the performance of territorial constabulary roles. These can be significant forces.

Naval Expenditure & Force Structures: Of course, overall trends in and amounts allocated to military expenditure do not necessarily correlate to naval investment. A good case in point is Saudi Arabia, which currently has the fourth largest defence budget in the world but only a comparatively small navy due to the priority attached to land-based forces. Even when money is directed to the naval budget, this does not inevitably result in a more numerous or powerful fleet. The costs of new technology, ill-judged investment decisions and the need to provide adequate conditions of service and compensation to service personnel with growing expectations are just a few examples of factors that can eat away at naval funding.

Given its status as the world’s most powerful naval force, it is instructive to look at the development of the US Navy’s budget and force structure from the late 1980s with these perspectives in mind. Since then, it has shrunk from the near ‘600-ship fleet’ targeted during the Reagan presidency to somewhat less than 300 ships today. As defence expenditure remains close to 1980s levels, this decline inevitably warrants some explanation. The following factors seem relevant:

The Norwegian Fridtjof Nansen class frigate Thor Heyerdahl in company with other warships off the Norwegian Coast during exercise Joint Viking 2015, a training drill simulating defence of the northernmost province of Finnmark from Russian attack. Although Europe’s fleets have shrunk since the Cold War’s end, they remain an important part of a US network of alliances aimed at ensuring a stable world order. (Petter Brenni Gulbrandsen/Norwegian Armed Forces)

As demonstrated by Diagrams 1.4 to 1.5, US Department of the Navy spending has followed a broadly similar trajectory to overall US Department of Defense expenditure in the post-Cold War era. Real-term budgets initially fell by as much as forty per cent from the Cold War peak, reaching their nadir in the late 1990s. There was subsequently a ramp-up back to Cold War levels as the counter-terrorism war took hold, peaking in FY2010. Expenditure has subsequently declined again – but more moderately – as a result of the winding-down of operations in the Middle East and increased financial constraints.

The headline proportion of Department of Defense spending allocated to the US Navy – currently around thirty per cent of the total – has declined a little from the time of the Reagan naval build-up. However, its proportionate share was somewhat less during the peak years of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan given both were predominantly land campaigns. Moreover, the proportion of the naval budget allocated to the US Marine Corps grew from around ten per cent during the Cold War to peak at over twenty per cent between FY2007 and FY2009.

Efforts to improve conditions of service – including improved housing and medical allowances – have consumed funds that might otherwise have been used on front-line expenditure. This reflects a pattern of pressure from personnel costs experienced elsewhere in the world.

Much of the post 2001 build-up in defence spending took place under the leadership of Donald Rumsfeld, who served as Secretary for Defense from 2001 to 2006.3 One of Rumsfeld’s key objectives was to transform the military into a more effective post-Cold War force, leading to a greater focus on innovative systems and associated research and development. As a result, the shipbuilding account did not expand in line with wider naval budget. In addition, many of the new technologies came at a higher cost than ‘legacy’ systems and were also associated with delays.

The combined effect of these factors was an initial sharp fall in fleet numbers in the aftermath of the Cold War as old ships were retired and purchases of new vessels significantly reduced. This trend was slowed but not entirely halted by the renewed flow of moneys that followed the ‘9/11’ attacks because warship procurement was not accorded as high a priority as some other areas. In addition, the focus on new technology tended to make new ships more expensive, reducing the numbers that could be ordered. More positively, this problem has been recognised in recent years and efforts – such as a greater focus on established designs and incremental improvements – made to stabilise numbers. In addition, the significant efforts spent on technological R&D should help maintain the US Navy’s technical edge into the future. There is always a danger in trying to assess a fleet’s strength solely by numbers.

The Australian Anzac class frigate Warramunga and the PLAN’S Type 053H3 counterpart Luoyang exercising in the South China Sea in 2010. Whilst China is an important trading partner for nearly all Asian countries, her naval expansion is causing many cause for concern. (Royal Australian Navy)

POST-COLD WAR NAVAL DEVELOPMENTS

The ups and downs of the US Navy’s development are reflective of the constantly evolving and unpredictable post-Cold War era described more fully by Ian Speller in his opening strategic overview. He explains how the Western navies have steadily sought new roles to supplement or replace those missions that had become less relevant with the Cold War’s end. Significant emphasis has been placed on developing maritime expeditionary forces able to project power at distance, especially in the littoral, to tackle causes of instability ‘at source’. This is particularly relevant given the emergence of increased maritime terrorist and criminal activity in parts of the world, spurring US-led efforts to emphasise maritime cooperation to support the common good. However, the expansion of Asian navies – particularly that of China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) – has fostered the re-emergence of more traditional state-on-state rivalries that has produced a renewed focus on warfighting capabilities and driven the United States to refocus its forces towards Asia under the so-called ‘Pivot to the Pacific’. The recent return of Russia as a potential military threat certainly reinforces the wisdom of not entirely discounting the need for warships to fight each other at sea.

Philip Grove’s review of recent naval operations looks at the same trends from a different perspective. Public perceptions of navies during the Cold War were dominated by the importance of submarines, both in their roles as delivery systems for nuclear weapons and as a potential threat to vital sea lanes in the Atlantic. Whilst these perceptions were never entirely accurate, they tended to force many navies into something of a strategic straitjacket. The return of navies to involvement in a much wider range of operations, heralded by the British Royal Navy’s successful expeditionary deployment to the Falkland Islands in 1982 whilst the Cold War was still at its height, has brought greater freedom to demonstrate the flexibility inherent in naval power. It is interesting to note that both writers see the current roles and missions of navies as very much part of an historic continuum in spite of the considerable backdrop of change.

WORLD FLEETS TODAY

Things that have changed, however, are the size and structure of many of the world’s largest fleets. This is reflected in Table 1.6, which compares the strengths of the main global navies now with the position twenty-five years ago. The following key conclusions are suggested:

The major navies highlighted in the table are generally smaller in 2015 than they were in 1990. This reflects both financial considerations and, also, the use of technology to allow a smaller number of more sophisticated ships to do more. This trend towards declining fleets is much less marked in Asia than elsewhere in the world.

Within this general trend, there has been a marked shift away from lighter surface combatants such as smaller frigates and fast attack craft. This is also the case with respect to mine counter-measures vessels and – to a lesser extent – patrol submarines. In most of the leading Asian navies, this has been counterbalanced by increased numbers of ‘high end’ units, such as destroyers. This partly demonstrates the progress made by countries such as China and South Korea in refo-cusing their fleets towards ‘blue water’ roles. However, unlike some of the traditional Western blue water navies, local considerations still requires both these fleets to retain considerable numbers of smaller ships for offshore defence.

Nearly all navies have attempted to maintain or increase amphibious forces, whilst support shipping has also faired relatively well. This largely reflects the increased importance attached to long-distance expeditionary warfare described in the opening chapters.

Although the US Navy has shrunk considerably in size since 1990, the breadth and extent of its capabilities have no significant rival. China’s PLAN has certainly grown considerably in potency but nowhere near the extent to rival the potential threat posed by the Soviet Navy at the end of the Cold War. This is even more the case when consideration is given to the US Navy’s considerable technological superiority; a factor not evidenced by numbers alone.

1.7: TODD/LINDBERG CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM

Notes

Summarised from Navies and Shipbuilding Industries: The Strained Symbiosis (Westport, CT: Prager Publishers, 1996).

There is inevitably significant interest in ranking the leading and, indeed, all navies in accordance with their size and capabilities in spite of the difficulties already referenced with respect to pure numerical comparisons. A number of academic systems exist to provide a more sophisticated basis for such an exercise. Notable examples include the ten-rank Todd/Lindberg classification system (see Table 1.7) and the similar nine rank approach adopted by Eric Grove and Michael Morris.⁴ Both ranking systems range from navies capable of global reach power projection – a ranking confined to the US Navy – at the top of the scale to token navies with very limited constabulary forces at the other. Whilst such standardised comparison systems have benefits of consistency – and would certainly accord all the navies in Table 1.6 with some form of power projection (or ‘blue water’) status – their practical application is fraught with difficulty. To cite just one example, to what extent should Brazil’s ranking be adjusted to take account of the fact that its sole aircraft carrier, São Paulo, has doubtful operational availability?

As such, no attempt is made to undertake such rankings in our reviews of the larger fleets. Instead, a range of contributors assess the factors influencing how each of the most significant fleets has developed over the past twenty-five years, as well as its current structure and priorities. Inevitably, this analysis is undertaken from a range of perspectives. Scott Truver, for example, looks at the US Navy’s progress through the lens of the most significant strategic documents it has promulgated since the end of the Cold War. Richard Beedall highlights how the British Royal Navy’s ambitious plans to transform to a more expeditionary posture has been constrained by political neglect. He also explains the current naval environment in the Middle East, where there is widespread reliance on external powers – such as the US Navy and Royal Navy – to provide maritime security. James Bosbotinis, meanwhile, examines both the benefits and difficulties the Soviet legacy brought to the reconstituted Russian Navy, as well as its current place in Russian military thinking.

Inevitably, there is considerable focus on the Asian navies. A quartet of contributors based in the region – Alastair Cooper, Jack McCaffrie, Chris Rahman and David Stevens – highlight the rise of China’s PLAN and its impact on the other major regional fleets. The PLAN’s expansion has also had ramifications in the Indian Ocean, as explained in Mrityunjoy Mazumdar’s regional review. However, China is only part of the story. For example, North Korean sabre-rattling has had a significant impact on both Republic of Korea Navy and Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force (JMSDF) force structures. Moreover, both Japan and South Korea suffer from a historic legacy that means relations between each other are not necessarily free of tension.

SHIPBUILDING & DESIGN

In addition to changes in fleet sizes and structures, there has also been considerable refinement to the way that warships have been built and designed. Naval architect Hartmut Ehlers, a former employee of the Blohm & Voss yard that originated the modular MEKO concept, takes us through some of the main technical trends. He explains how factors such as stealth, accommodation standards and modularisation have also contributed to the growth in size that is one of the more readily recognisable features of modern warships across the globe. He also explains how ongoing technological advances will shape the ships of tomorrow. Subsequent chapters look at different warship types, focusing on the more significant classes of the post-Cold War era. It is notable, in spite of the growth of shipbuilding away from its traditional European and North American hubs, how the vast majority of the more sophisticated warship designs currently originate from a relatively small number of established builders. Given the progress achieved in China and South Korea, this may change in the future.

A computer-generated image of the ‘Dreadnought 2050’ concept produced under the auspices of Startpoint, a new British maritime mission systems initiative in 2015. Although many of the concept’s design features are currently hypothetical, elements such as catamaran hulls, mission bays and tethered unmanned vehicles are already in use. (Startpoint)

TECHNOLOGY & MANNING

The book’s final chapters look at technology and manning. Norman Friedman provides a broad-ranging technological review, focusing on how the rapid rise in computing power typified by Moore’s Law has revolutionised naval warfare on, above and under the sea.⁵ As well as examining the technical details, he explains how this enhanced capability has been adapted to the new, often littoral-focused operating environment in which navies now find themselves. In many cases, technology derived from the civilian sector has been used to compensate for shrinking financial resources.

Norman Friedman makes the point that naval air power remains particularly relevant at a time when littoral operations are increasingly important, as it provides the only adequate means of engaging the fleeting but numerous targets that might be found in an environment such as Libya or Syria if nearby bases are not available. This is reflected in David Hobbs’ comprehensive description of current naval aviation capabilities. One particularly strong theme is the growing popularity of LHD-type ‘big deck’ amphibious carriers and other aviation-capable shipping as medium-sized navies come to appreciate the capabilities effective naval aviation provides. Another is the development of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in a broad range of maritime roles.

The concluding chapter looks at the important but often ignored subject of naval manning. History has proved that effectively trained personnel are vital for the maintenance of a capable navy. This remains true in this age of autonomous vehicles and of greater automation generally. Whilst the costs of personnel have resulted in a general reduction in the number of sailors, this has been counterbalanced by the end of conscription in many navies and much greater levels of overall professionalism. The increased emphasis on naval collaboration referenced in the opening chapters is also relevant here, as it has provided many smaller navies opportunities to broaden their knowledge and experience.

CONCLUSION

It is apparent that the world’s navies in the early years of the twenty-first century have faced a fast-evolving situation from a geopolitical, financial and technological perspective. As new uncertainties arise in the West’s relations with Russia and tensions in Asia continue, this backdrop is unlikely to change significantly. As such, any definitive conclusions as to the future direction of fleets around the world can only be speculative. However, from the editor’s perspective, the following areas are likely to warrant ongoing consideration in the years ahead:

The status of the US Navy as the world’s dominant naval power: The monopolistic position that the US Navy and its allies enjoyed with respect to sea power in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War is now clearly being eroded by the expansion of China and other fleets. Whilst it seems likely that the US Navy will remain the dominant naval power for the foreseeable future, the strategies it adopts to maintain this position will have a key impact on the extent of its leadership.

Continued tensions in Asia: There is currently no obvious solution to tensions in Asia, which will likely remain a key focal point from both a military and international relations perspective. Although China’s neighbours will inevitably balance the importance of their trading relations with the world’s second economy against their concerns over perceived Chinese expansionism, it seems probable that both formal and informal alliances to counter a worst-case scenario of actual conflict will continue to develop. North Korea’s likely actions will remain an area of uncertainty. Regional naval and other military expenditure will continue at a relatively high level.

Warfighting capabilities in warship design: There has been a marked tendency towards emphasising constabulary capabilities in a number of European warship designs, whilst even the US Navy’s littoral combat ships have – rather missing the point – been criticised for lack of offensive weaponry. This is in marked contrast to the situation in Asia.⁶ Looking forward, however, increased tension in Europe may see a greater emphasis on combat in local warships.

Technological Change: A number of technologies, for example railguns, laser weapons and unmanned carrier aircraft, are currently in their infancy. Many of these weapons are largely the preserve of the US Navy and present only in small numbers. The use of such systems seems likely to grow considerably looking forward.

Doubtless readers will have their own factors to add to this list.

A US NavyX-47B unmanned combat air vehicle demonstrator pictured alongside a manned FA-18FSuper Hornet strike fighter during trials onboard the carrier Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) in 2014. The development of UAVs in a broad range of maritime roles is an important current naval trend. (US Navy)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Just as for the US Navy’s hopes of achieving a secure maritime environment based on partnership between co-operating navies, such a wide-ranging book as Navies in the 21st Century could only have come about as a result of the collaboration of many people. Foremost amongst these must stand the distinguished group of international contributors, who have provided a diverse range of insights into navies today. I have personally learned much from their various chapters and am grateful for their support. I am indebted to Professor Geoffrey Till FKC for contributing his insightful foreword and guiding me towards contributors for particularly challenging parts of the book. My former fellow student and university flatmate, Professor David H. Dunn, now Head of the Department of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Birmingham, also provided considerable help in this regard. I must especially thank Rob Gardiner of Seaforth Publishing for agreeing to make this one-off supplement to the World Naval Review series a reality, as well as Steve Dent for his continuing patience and professionalism in translating the editor’s often ill-judged requirements into such an excellent and cohesive design. John Jordan’s series of line drawings, many specially produced or adapted for this book, speak for their own excellence but I have also to thank him for his practical advice in the early planning stages. Finally, the support of my wife Susan in continuing the time-consuming and thankless task of undertaking initial proof-reading is acknowledged with affection.

Comments and criticisms from readers are always appreciated; please direct them for my attention to info@seaforthpublishing.com

Conrad Waters

1 January 2016

Notes

1. Information in Diagrams 1.1 to 1.3 is derived from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Database at: http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database. The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database contains data on 172 countries over the period 1988-2014. The editor is grateful to Dr Sam Perlo-Freeman, Senior Researcher and Head of the SIPRI Project on Military Expenditure in its Arms and Military Expenditure Programme for his guidance with respect to the usage of comparative expenditure data.

2. These statements are made on the basis of nominal GDP and actual exchange rates. The United States’ comparative advantage would reduce – indeed China would be regarded as a larger economy – if purchasing power parity (PPP) adjustments were made to take account of the ‘real’ cost of living in various economies. PPP adjustments might be regarded as being of limited relevance when considering military expenditure given the fact much of the cost of technology and other expenses (e.g. fuel) are subject to external factors.

3. Rumsfeld had previously also served as Secretary for Defense under President Ford from 1975 to 1977.

4. The Todd/Lindberg system was first set out in their Navies and Shipbuilding Industries: The Strained Symbiosis (Westport, CT: Prager Publishers, 1996). The Grove/Morris system is referenced by Geoffrey Till in Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2004).

5. Gordon E. Moore (b. 1929) was a co-founder of Fairchild Semiconductor and, later, Intel Corporation. In 1965 he observed the doubling of the number of components in each integrated circuit – essentially an indication of its power – every year and predicted this would last for at least a decade. In 1975, again looking forward, he revised this forecast to a doubling at least every two years. The period is often quoted as eighteen months due to a statement of a fellow Intel executive, David House, that computer performance would double every eighteen months around this time. The prediction has proved remarkably accurate over a sustained period but is now starting to decelerate.

6. The editor is minded of Toshi Yoshihara and James R Holmes’ analysis of the relative directions of European and Asian Seapower, ‘As one civilization vacates the oceans, another is crowding the seas and skies with ships and warplanes that bristle with offensively orientated weaponry’ in Red Star over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to US Maritime Strategy, (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press, 2013), p.3.

POST-COLD WAR NAVIES

It is now almost thirty years since the Cold War ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989), the reunification of Germany (1990), the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the break-up of the Soviet Union (1991). In the space of a few months the old certainties that had dominated strategic thought and practice for decades were swept away. In the years that followed navies had to adjust to a new environment where friends and enemies were less obvious and behaved less predictably than in the past, where established justifications for strategy and policy often did not match new national priorities, and where cherished roles appeared much less relevant than before. For many navies this occurred at a time when the end of the Cold War brought demands for a ‘peace dividend’ and reductions in expenditure on the armed forces. That the most immediate ‘dividend’ was not peace but rather a series of minor conflicts, regional wars and humanitarian crises brought additional challenges as navies adjusted to the shift away from old certainties. These changes had an impact on most navies and none more so than the most powerful and capable during the Cold War, the US Navy.

The US Navy aircraft carriers Constellation (CV-64) and Kitty Hawk (CV-63) operating together during the 2003 Invasion of Iraq. The build-up of the US Navy during the 1980s produced an offensively-orientated fleet with considerable power projection assets. Many of these proved to be sufficiently flexible to remain of use during the post-Cold War era. (US Navy)

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The United States emerged victorious from the Second World War with the largest and most powerful navy in the world. Its position of dominance was reinforced by the facts that the next largest navy belonged to a close ally (Britain) and the Soviet Union, transformed now from an ally to a potential adversary, had only very limited maritime forces and these focused mainly on coastal defence. For the first decade of the Cold War the United States thus enjoyed a period of what Samuel Huntington described as ‘monopolistic sea power’.¹ This gave the United States the chance to enjoy the fruits of global sea control without facing any peer rival, providing them with a major strategic advantage in a series of crises and limited conflicts. This position was never likely to persist unchallenged. After a slow start, the Soviet Union expanded its own navy and, by the 1960s, was beginning to develop blue-water capabilities able to contest United States’ dominance beyond Russian waters. Thus, within a decade of their humiliation at the hands of superior United States’ maritime power during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviets were able to challenge their rival at sea. Notably, during the 1973 Yom Kippur War the US Navy’s Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean found itself shadowed by the Soviet 5th Eskadra, with the latter gaining diplomatic leverage and political impact in a manner that was discomforting for the West.

By this time the Soviet Navy had surpassed the British as the second largest although it still lagged behind the US Navy in terms of size and capability, particularly in respect of the key United States’ offensive platform, their aircraft carriers. Soviet surface ships made regular and high-profile deployments far from home and bases were established in the Mediterranean (Syria) and South East Asia (Vietnam). The most serious challenge to the West was provided by the Soviets’ large submarine force and long-range bombers that threatened NATO’s vulnerable Atlantic sea lines of communication.

Nevertheless, and despite the very real threat that these posed to transatlantic shipping, by the late 1970s it was recognised that in any conflict the Soviet Navy’s major concern would be defensive, and would focus in particular on protecting so-called ‘bastions’ in the Barents Sea, Arctic Ocean and the Sea of Okhotsk where their strategic nuclear missile submarines (SSBNs) could be protected from attack. This provided an opportunity that, by threatening the bastions, the Soviets could be forced to divert additional assets to their defence, reducing the forces that would be available to attack Allied shipping elsewhere. This approach lay at the heart of the new US Maritime Strategy that evolved during the early 1980s and was published in unclassified form in 1986.² That strategy articulated a rather Mahanian focus on seizing the initiative in the war at sea through offensive action in the battle for sea control; carrying the fight to the enemy in order to defeat and destroy their forces at the time and place of America’s choosing, rather than fighting a defensive battle on the Soviets’ terms. In this way they could secure friendly use of the sea and enable the reinforcement and support of America’s allies in Europe, Japan and elsewhere. They could also use Western maritime superiority to deter the Soviets from taking aggressive military action, using Warsaw Pact vulnerability in the maritime domain to compensate for their numerical superiority on land in central Europe. The strategy reflected the bellicosity of the Reagan administration’s approach to the Soviet Union and was accompanied by a major naval build-up aimed at the creation of a ‘600-ship Navy’.³

NATO warships from Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and Denmark exercise together in June 2005. The end of the Cold War brought about a new environment where friends and enemies were less obvious and behaved less predictably than in the past. (Royal Australian Navy)

Thus, the US Navy approached the end of the Cold War with an offensive mission dominated by a desire to engage and defeat the main enemy in their own backyard. With a fleet that included fifteen aircraft carriers, forty-four battleships and cruisers, sixty-eight destroyers and sixty-five major amphibious vessels, it remained by far the most powerful.⁴ The end of the Cold War and the precipitate decline of the Soviet fleet removed at a stroke the existing rationale for this navy and it was clear that the admirals would need to find a new role if they were to justify their share of a reduced budget. That the end of the Cold War would not usher in a period of prolonged peace was soon demonstrated by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the subsequent war in the Persian Gulf in 1991. The US Navy was fully involved in the response to the invasion and in the defeat of Iraqi forces, but inevitably it played a supporting role in what was primarily an air and land campaign.

THE US NAVY’S SHIFT TO THE LITTORAL

With the Soviets gone the United States no longer faced a peer rival able to challenge global sea control, but it was clear that there would still be conflicts and crises that would likely involve the United States in some form or another. The US Navy responded to this new era in a series of ‘capstone’ policy documents that articulated a shift in emphasis away from ‘blue water’ operations towards a focus on responding to the challenge of what the US Marine Corps described as ‘chaos in the littorals’. The first of these documents, entitled The Way Ahead, was published in April 1991, shortly after the conclusion of the Gulf conflict. This was followed in 1992 by … From the Sea, in 1994 by Forward From the Sea, and in 1997 by Anytime, Anywhere: A Navy for the 21st Century.⁵

Despite some notable differences in emphasis between these documents they all shared a common focus on a littoral approach and on the kind of capabilities that would enable the navy to influence events on land from the sea in a context where regional crises could occur in unexpected places. Blue-water concerns were never entirely forgotten, and received enhanced prominence in Forward From the Sea, but the US Navy had clearly repositioned itself from being one designed primarily to fight for control of the sea against a major peer rival to a force able to exploit its near-monopolistic control in order to influence events ashore in a broad range of contingencies. US Navy interest was matched by that of the US Marine Corps whose concept for Operational Maneuver from the Sea, published in 1996, articulated a way for amphibious forces to be employed to decisive effect in the post-Cold War era.⁶

US Marines embarked on the amphibious assault ship Tarawa (LHA-1) undertaking landing exercises in the Persian Gulf in February 2003, shortly before the invasion of Iraq. The aftermath of the Cold War saw the US Navy increasingly preoccupied with being able to exploit its monopolistic control of the sea to influence events ashore. (US Navy)

The need to project power ashore was evident in a series of crises including Operations ‘Deny Flight’ (1994) and ‘Deliberate Force’ (1995) in Bosnia, where US Navy and US Marine Corps aircraft and sea-launched cruise missiles made an important impact. This was also the case with respect to Operation ‘Allied Force’ in Kosovo (1999), where sea-launched missiles and carrier aviation made another significant contribution to success ashore. Sea-based missiles and aircraft also contributed to the constant sorties and occasional strikes in the Persian Gulf that marked the interval between the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. In all three cases the US Navy also undertook embargo operations in support of international sanctions. The growing range of sea-based strikes was illustrated in 1998 when seventy-five sea-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles were fired at targets in Sudan and land-locked Afghanistan in retaliation for the terrorist attacks on United States’ embassies in East Africa in August that year. That the US Navy could also fulfil more traditional forward presence and deterrence missions was illustrated during the Taiwan Straits crisis in 1996 when two US Navy carriers were deployed to the straits in response to provocative Chinese missile tests; a rather traditional employment of naval forces to demonstrate United States’ capacity and resolve to protect its friends from potential aggression.

By 1999, ten years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the US Navy had contracted significantly, from almost 600 (actually 566) ships and submarines in commission to ‘just’ 317. The four old battleships were retired and the navy cut the number of carriers in commission from fifteen to twelve. Particularly heavy cuts were experienced by those forces whose primary rationale related to Cold War missions. Thus, the number of strategic missile submarines was halved from thirty-six to eighteen boats over the course of the decade, nuclear-powered attack submarine numbers were similarly cut from ninety-six to fifty-seven and conventional attack submarines were phased out entirely. The number of frigates, intended primarily for anti-submarine work, was cut by nearly two-thirds, from 100 to just thirty-seven. It should be noted that over the same time period the number of amphibious ships was reduced from sixty-five to forty-one hulls, although the replacement of older ships with newer, more capable vessels mitigated the loss in expeditionary capability. As Amund Lundesgaard has noted, the increase in the number of mine countermeasure vessels, from five to sixteen, reflected the new emphasis on littoral warfare.⁷

The Littoral Combat Ships Fort Worth (LCS-3) – foreground – and Freedom (LCS-1) pass each other off the coast of San Diego. The US Navy’s increased interest in littoral operations following the end of the Cold War eventually spawned the Littoral Combat Ship concept. (Lockheed Martin)

MEETING NEW CHALLENGES

One of the features of thinking about security at this time was the growing recognition that concepts based solely on traditional military concerns were no longer sufficient. This impacted on perceptions of security at sea as much as it did the land. It had always been the case that the smuggling by sea of arms, narcotics or people could present a security challenge and that the sea could be used as a medium for attack by terrorists and other sub-state groups. However, these problems appeared particularly acute in the 1990s and 2000s as concerns about a ‘new’ brand of religiously-motivated terrorism and fears of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) combined to reinforce established concerns. At the same time there was growing recognition that the security of an increasingly globalised world economy depended on the safe and timely arrival of cargoes that travelled by sea and that could be disrupted at sea or ashore by criminal activity, politically-motivated violence or simply by poor maritime practice. This served to elevate to a new importance maritime security operations (those operations designed to counter terrorism and other forms of illegal activity at sea).

Cynics might argue that Western navies began to emphasise such things because their previous key roles, related to deterrence and warfighting, appeared much less relevant now that they had no conventional adversary to measure themselves against. Whatever the case, that security could be challenged in a variety of unconventional ways was readily apparent even before events such as the attack by al Qaeda on the US Navy destroyer Cole in 2000 and the terrorist attacks on targets in Washington and New York on 11 September 2001. These had an important impact on United States’ foreign policy, contributing to large-scale military intervention in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) which led, ultimately, to enduring and costly campaigns that achieved rather equivocal results. The US Navy and Marines were heavily involved in both, with strikes conducted by sea-based cruise missiles and carrier aviation and also the landing of troops and supplies from the sea.

The Pentagon burns after the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001. Thirty-three sailors and nine other US Navy employees or contractors were amongst the 125 killed at this location. The ‘9/11’ attacks had a significant impact on United States’ foreign policy and hence US Navy operations. (US Navy)

While the use of the sea to land United States (and Coalition) forces in Iraq appears unremarkable, the fact that maritime forces could play such a major role in military operations in Afghanistan is noteworthy given the landlocked nature of that state. Despite this, the US Navy supported operations there with the creation of an Expeditionary Strike Force (ESF) consisting of four carrier battle groups and two amphibious ready groups. The ESF contributed strikes deep into Afghanistan and also undertook maritime interdiction operations to intercept cargo intended for the Taliban regime (via Pakistan or Iran). Perhaps most surprising, in November 2001 Marines from the 15th and 26th Marine Expeditionary Units were projected into Afghanistan from amphibious ships in the Arabian Gulf 450 miles away. Joining US Army Special Forces already in theatre, these were the first conventional US ground forces in that country.⁸ The success of this operation provided some vindication for the recent preoccupation of the US Navy and Marine Corps with power projection from the sea.

Experience in Afghanistan, and from 2003 also in Iraq, provided a salutary reminder of the costs (human and material) associated with any attempt to maintain large ground forces on foreign soil against the wishes of at least a portion of the local people. Within this context the US Navy and Marines were able to emphasise the value of expeditionary forces which could be kept sea based, available to intervene if need be but capable of being forward deployed without a footprint ashore and without infringing the sovereignty of any third parties. By sea basing forces in this manner the US might also be able to maintain a presence in regions where even friendly states might be reluctant to provide permanent bases that could become the focus for political dissent or terrorist activity. The basic idea was far from new, but sea basing in the twenty-first century could be enabled by a range of techniques and