British Battleships 1919-1945

construction.

Introduction

Design

Although there were basic ideas regarding design that had been formulated in the light of war experience, it became necessary to re-evaluate the entire issue when preparing new ships, given the financial restrictions imposed after the war. Before and during the war types of ships were developed for certain basic roles, but it was found that they needed many additions and alterations if they were to be efficient in multiple roles. Many new types were built for special purposes (Renown class, etc.), but as British capital ships had to be all things and carry weapons of all types, it was seen as unnecessary to load a ship down with all sorts of fittings it really did not need. It was argued that if a ship had a main role the designer would have a clearer idea of what was required. The question arose as to whether the differing qualities and functions of the battleship and the battlecruiser could be combined in one ship as a compromise. It seemed that there was no reason why such a type should not be more efficient than the two specialist types – the heavily armoured slow ship and the lightly armoured fast ship. The devastating outcome at Jutland, where lightly armoured ships came into contact with the enemy fleet before the slower, heavily armoured ships, made the prospect of a fast, heavily armoured ship an appealing one.

After the war there was no shortage of personal opinions and the DNC’s Department was often bombarded with sketch designs from serving officers as well as from the private sector. One such sketch design came from Rear-Admiral Sir Richard Phillimore, KCMG, CB, MVO (President of the Post-War Questions Committee, 10 October 1919):

Is there any intention of radically altering the system on which our ships have hitherto been armoured and placing the bulk of the armour in a horizontal deck covering the ships’ vitals instead of on the side of the ship? If not, please state what reasons are considered to make this impossible as the main idea in capital ship construction or to make the placing of armour at 20 degrees to the normal preferable to placing it at 70 degrees. What conclusions were drawn by the DNC Department from the trials recently carried out on HMS Swiftsure and a target representing armoured protection of Hood abreast certain magazines? 10 × 16in; 16 × 5.5in; 4 × TT; 6,000 miles radius; speed 25 knots maximum; armour 6in horizontal; splinterproof control structures; no conning tower.

In the Admiralty corridors there was much talk of submersibles carrying large guns, super ships showing ridiculous features and, as always, the school of thought that was inclined to ‘scrap the lot!’. After many months of post-war debate it was concluded with great clarity that if the big gun was still to be the primary weapon (which it was) the ship should be designed accordingly. 1. Make battleships as strong as possible. 2. Do away with torpedo tubes in large ships (they were dangerous in case of direct hit). 3. Give priority to special-purpose ships – cruisers, destroyers, etc. The argument against having two different weapons of offence requiring different tactics and making life difficult for the operators was a sound one that was heeded during those post-war years. Torpedo attacks were better made from specialist vessels: torpedo-boat destroyers, submarines or torpedo-cruisers. Any weight saved by deleting this weapon from capital ships could be better used in protection qualities.

The influence of the Washington Treaty on design in the Royal Navy was profound, but Britain accepted the proposals, admitting that with regret she was no longer able to maintain the ‘two power standard’ she had enjoyed before the war. Since 1919 the Admiralty had been engaged in the wholesale scrapping of older vessels, but many were good ships that need not have been scrapped. The Washington Treaty only made matters worse; a letter in the German Gazette said it all: ‘The Washington Conference may prove to be a milestone in the next war.’

The outstanding feature of the Washington Treaty was that naval strength was still classed in terms of capital ships, in complete disregard of the strong opposition that maintained that the day of the battleship was past. The ever-forceful Sir Percy Scott wrote in March 1922: ‘Naval strength is no longer measured by the number of battleships a country has but by the number of aeroplane carriers and aeroplanes.’ Clearly, however, it had been proved that although the submarines and aircraft were an essential part of the modern fleet, they were certainly by no means a substitute and future designs were prepared accordingly. Although no official sketches of a hybrid battleship/carrier were prepared, many unofficial sketches were put forward and make interesting reading.

Official sketches drawn up during 1920/21 before the Washington Treaty took effect, show ships of massive proportions. The first few were merely developments of Hood, but later culminated in a completely new type (G3) with 18in guns. There was obviously a need for a fast battleship and a slower, heavier armoured battleship, and these early sketches reflected just that. The battlecruiser type had in fact evolved into a fast battleship and the battleship into a huge, well-armed, heavily armoured and capable warship. Most of the sketches sported 18in guns at the largest and 16in at the smallest. To reach final layouts by November 1921 (N3–G3) proved quite complex and the designs had moved through more than eighteen stages (full development of type is described in Raven and Roberts’ Battleships of World War Two). They came to nothing, however, and naval treaties were expedited to stop the very expensive, over the top, programme which no country could sustain financially. Some of the designs prepared for the G3 group and others that followed are shown in the Nelson class chapter, but there were also masses of designs produced in an endeavour to get round the Washington Treaty limitations and they seem to have been produced merely speculatively and to go on record for future use.

When one considers the policy and strength of the Royal Navy during the Washington Treaty discussions, one concludes that there was little realization at that time that the proposals as finally agreed would seriously restrict the decisions of those who were responsible for the design and construction of major fighting units. In fact the limitations, although feasible on paper, were just not practicable. As Nelson and Rodney completed (1927) and with a construction gloom for many years during and after their construction, it was only natural that new designs should be proposed. Those that were, however, were a compromise still based on severe weight and size restrictions and the sketches show this most clearly. Unofficially the battleship/carrier (see sketch) idea was being debated and in theory and practice it was actually feasible, but unfortunately it was never seriously considered.

DESIGN FOR HMS HOOD Submitted by the President of Post-War Questions Committee, 1919

BATTLESHIP-CARRIER PROJECT

After debate, staff requirements in 1928 for new battleships showed an improved Nelson type, but a return to four twin turrets mounted fore and aft as was usual standard Admiralty practice before Nelson. Twelve 6in guns remained as secondary armament but were more widely spaced than in Nelson (40 feet centre of turrets as opposed to Nelsons 30 feet). The tertiary battery was eight 4.7in guns, and general fire control was a repeat of Nelson. To save weight the aft DCT was omitted and control was to be from ‘X’ turret. In the past the principal objections to the directing turret were: 1. The directing gun had to cease fire, since the loading operation interfered too much with the director layer. 2. A human link was introduced into the elevation and training transmission which introduced lag and errors into the system. Both these objections were largely discounted by modern methods of sighting turret guns and high-speed direct electrical transmission. The system was admittedly not so good as an independent director position, but was good enough for a rarely used alternative and certainly saved the use of personnel and officers.

Protection was similar to that of Nelsons, but the serious threat posed by diving APC shells vis-à-vis, for example, Nelsons shallow belt was now realized. Nelsons arrangement of side armour had its advantages, but it was considered that placing the belt inboard from the waterline could result in projectiles glancing down to explode inside the ship and possibly passing under the armoured belt (see drawings). Nelsons belt was severely criticized officially in 1927 and this fault was at last given serious consideration. The weakness, however, was never officially acknowledged. A meeting was held on 20 November 1928 to discuss Design 545-A+B and most items on the agenda were primarily agreed.

During those doldrum years it was necessary for Britain to watch foreign trends closely and strongly resist any commitment to single types (such as Deutschland and Dunkerque) being laid down. Certainly no group of ships was planned until it was certain that the design could match any foreign adversary Displacement and gun calibre were fixed; the two remaining factors being speed and armour. In this respect it was considered sound policy to give any new ships normal battleship speeds and good protective qualities rather than strain the design for a high speed which, it was thought, usually fell off with age. One particular point in all the designs forwarded was that the main armament strongly favoured the standard twin mountings as in the Queen Elizabeth and Royal Sovereign groups.

A meeting was called by the First Sea Lord on 10 January 1934 to discuss the question of size of future battleships in the light of the approaching 1935 Naval Conference. The following factors governed the situation: 1. A proposal made at Geneva by Britain to reduce the size of future battleships to 25,000 tons with 12in guns, or alternatively ships of 22,000 tons with 11in guns. 2. The proposal by Japan for a ship of 25,000 tons with 14in guns. 3. The American wish to preserve the present size of ship and gun, namely 35,000 tons and 16in guns. 4. The recent construction by the French of a battlecruiser of 26,000 tons and 13.5in guns (Dunkerque). 5. The expressed wish of the Germans to build a larger battleship than Deutschland.

With severe financial restrictions in force and an unwillingness to build a fleet of gigantic battleships when the treaties allowed new construction again, it was thought that the US Navy might be willing to agree, under gentle pressure that is, to a reduced size of capital ship – about 28,000 tons with 12in guns. They were to be built to stand up against 16in gun fire, attack from 2,000lb bombs and 750lb torpedoes. The Controller was asked to investigate designs of a ship carrying eight, nine or ten 12in guns with a speed of 23 knots. Sketch designs were prepared (see table) accordingly and after some debate suitable arrangements were agreed. Unfortunately, however, no other maritime power showed the slightest interest in conforming to such moderate dimensions.

The sketches for these ships were well laid out and some of the features deserve to be highlighted:

1.

Armour and protection. The belt armour was placed on the outside of the hull and not, as in Nelson and Rodney, slightly inboard. Experiments had shown that the vents provided in the upper portion of the bulges of Nelson and Rodney could be omitted without disadvantages. The outside position of the armour belt necessitated a different form of bulge from that in Nelson, but experiments showed that it was as effective as that in the latter ships.

2.

A lower and thinner belt was proposed to be placed below the main belt to meet the impact and explosion of long-range projectiles falling short as in number four round against the target Emperor of India and afford protection to the magazines against such plunging shellfire hitting below the main belt.

3.

Main armament. Very similar to that in the Queen Elizabeth and Royal Sovereign classes but better location arrangements were made.

4.

Secondary armament. In most cases this was protected in turrets but some provision was made for armouring the turrets and barbettes.

The small battleship proposals having been dispensed with, the Admiralty returned to the main characteristics of the standard battleship which had been thoroughly worked out by November 1933. (For main dimensions see King George V class, 1937.) Designs on paper, although of great importance for theory and the historical record, do not in fact mean a great deal. It is comparatively simple to outline requirements in a sketch design, but to put these into practice, which means financial support and the solving of conflicting design requirements, is another matter. As can be seen from these notes designs took many directions and in fact the 1933 capital ship designs were very different from those planned during the 1920s when the Admiralty was looking ahead to the time when Great Britain could renew her battlefleet. The governing factor in designs although not straightforward are in fact easy to understand: 1. Financial considerations have priority. 2. Information about development abroad. 3. Fleet and staff requirements. 4. Balanced design (well armed, protected and good speed). 5. Unrestricted displacement.

Without a free hand on all these requirements no maritime power in the world could have built the ships that it needed at that time, and the result was that those ships that were built shortly before the Second World War were untried and, if the truth be told, generally left much to be desired.

Armour

With the cessation of hostilities in November 1918 some of the longest and most important debates concerning standards in capital ship design began. Looking back at certain disasters during the war it was considered at some length (since 1916) that views regarding protection were over-influenced by the losses of the battlecruisers at Jutland. Apart from those tragic losses the war in general had highlighted the fact that modern battleships’ (both British and German) armour had withstood gunfire very well. In fact even ships with pre-war standards of protection, which on paper did not have complete immunity from existing attack, still stood up very well to severe punishment and in most cases had made it back to port under their own steam.

It was considered that this capacity to take heavy punishment was the criterion of a good design, and all protection beyond the requirement of being able to withstand heavy hits was thought to amount to wasted weight. What the required protection ratio should be, however, varied a great deal from ship to ship. So far as armoured plating was concerned the Royal Navy entered the war believing that, at the fighting ranges favoured in 1914, 9in side armour and 4¼in turret roof plating was immune against 12in guns which the German battleships possessed in great numbers. In 1920, however, the Post-War Questions Committee dismissed these thicknesses, and although some favour was given to medium-range armour it was questionable whether the present-day thicknesses (13in in Queen Elizabeth and Royal Sovereign) would be impervious to the ever-increasing power of the latest APC shells being developed.

Because it had stood up so well to British shelling, the perception of German armour as being superior had been exaggerated, the truth being that the old British APC shells were incapable of penetrating the magazines and other vital areas of German heavy ships in a fit state for bursting, so not too much importance should be attached to the fact that the ships were able to return to harbour after having been hit. Defects in pre-1917 APC shells of 12in and greater calibres were: 1. They broke up on oblique impact having only been proved at normal; 2. The burster was too sensitive to be carried through a thick armour plate; 3. Some failed at proof The German ships never faced the APC shells that were developed after Jutland.

Luckily for British ships it was found that the German shells were not always up to much either; for example in 1915 an 11in shell hit the battlecruiser Lion at Dogger Bank and, although having pierced the armour plate, the shell was found lying on the crown of one of the turret magazines, the fuses having failed to detonate.

The latest ship at the end of the war was the mighty Hood but her protection had fuelled controversy from the outset, and it was proposed that a series of tests be held with a view to improving her if possible, and any other capital ship that followed. The Royal Navy was well aware of deficiencies in horizontal armour and as early as 1921 made the following statement: ‘We can lay down the important axiom that it must be made impossible for the enemy to destroy your ship by one fortunate hit, i.e., it must be impossible for him to ignite your store of explosives. Nothing else is of such vital importance as this. Hits which damage some of the engines and boiler rooms or turrets are of secondary importance. Accepting this principle it can probably be asserted that it is impossible to armour all the important parts of a ship completely against the gun you carry and which it must be presumed the enemy will also carry, but if your design and material are superior to the enemy’s you will take correspondingly less risk.’

The form of protection to date (1920) was based on the principle that armour fulfilled its requirements if it remained unholed after attack by shells, and to this end the plates were so designed that their resistance to being holed was measurable. The measurement of imperviousness to particular shells was called the ‘limit of resistance’ of the plate against the shell. The power of attack up to 1917 made it possible to armour capital ships sufficiently well to render them capable of resisting shell attack (in most cases) at the ranges then envisaged. The introduction of the new APC shell greatly modified the values of shell and armour and the subject of relative strength came under great scrutiny. It was found that if new construction was to be immune against heavy APC shells of 15in calibre and greater, maximum armour thickness would have to be applied. These findings, however, did not quite coincide with a quote from the DNC; ‘If such protection as will give, on paper, complete immunity against 18in attack be adopted, there are bound to be methods of defeating the ship and it is not difficult to picture a huge, superbly armoured vessel with its superstructure and control positions obliterated and its machinery personnel gassed, drifting at the mercy of the submarines or aircraft attending the enemy fleet. Such however is likely to be the fate of a ship in which offensive powers have been sacrificed to defence against a vessel in which superiority in offence has been the first consideration.’

After tests had shown just how good the APC shells were, the entire design of the Navy’s new ships was open to question, and the Construction Department was constantly engaged in design development. The new shells would govern new standards of protection because it was obvious that other maritime powers would soon (if they had not done so already) reach adequate levels of shell ability. Trials showed that a large proportion of any target was represented by the deck, and making a ship invulnerable to shell hits in this area was exceedingly difficult within the limitations of capital ship design. Various modifications were tried, but the general conclusion was that unless some new radical form of armour were developed it was impossible to improve arrangements in heavy ships other than by increasing armour thicknesses far beyond the present level (1920 = 3in average) which would involve unacceptable weight addition.

It is impossible to deal with a single design feature, such as protection, in isolation. The designer has to consider the ship as a whole, all features depending upon one another. At that time (1920–21) speed was considered a most important factor in relation to other features of a ship, as it affected the other elements of the layout, with the exception of the armament. If machinery were reduced the length of the machinery space, the length of the armoured citadel, the amount of fuel, the amount of deck protection were also reduced, leading to, finally, a smaller hull with fewer fittings and less equipment. This was immediately apparent when the design of a battleship of say 22 or 23 knots was compared to that of a battlecruiser of say 30 knots and it was at once found impossible to give the same thickness of protection to the faster ship as to the slower. In HMS Hood it was found possible to provide the protection and even increase it over that of the Royal Sovereign class battleships while maintaining the same armament and giving the speed of 31 knots, plus a very heavy weight of underwater protection. This result, however, was only achieved by making a very big ship of great length and going to the extreme dimensions that the largest docks could accommodate, and it was here that British constructors came up against a difficult problem since the existing docks precluded ships of even a slightly larger size. Until larger docks were built (which they were not) the Admiralty would have to content itself with vessels of no greater dimensions than those of Hood.

Valiant 1919, anchored in Scapa Flow overlooking the German battleship Baden which would later be used for firing tests to help evaluate armour protection.

It had long been known that the deck protection of the latest giant battlecruiser Hood left a lot to be desired, and as she neared completion the Post-War Questions Committee called for a series of trials relating to her deck strength. It was decided to use the new APC shell, which was capable of carrying through and bursting about 40 feet beyond the first plate struck, to determine any critical weaknesses, the main question being, was she adequate against the Navy’s 15in APC shell? During the autumn of 1919 plates arranged to simulate Hood’s armour were tested. Test 1. Shell perforated and burst 40 feet behind 7in armour in the magazine. Test 2. With magazine roof thickened from lin to 2in. Shell perforated and burst 34 feet in rear of 7in armour. Roof plate blown to pieces. Test 3. (See page 27). Target: 2in HT plate, 3in HT plate and 2in HC plate (magazine roof). Projectile 15in APC (weighted). Angle of descent 32 degrees striking at 1,350 feet per second. Corresponding range 25,000 yards. A weighted shell was used and the 3in HT plating representing the main deck was wrecked, but the shell did not penetrate and glanced off. Thus the modification to the main deck (as seen in the drawing) gave fairly good protection to magazines from shells hitting the side armour.

At the conclusion of the trials it was seen that the weight available to protect Hood’s magazines was inadequate against plunging fire unless the ship were re-built with a new deck of thick homogeneous plate. Later, however, it was proposed that more trials be carried out on the Hood deck target, with the main deck being reinforced by 4¾in roof plate quality armour. No approval for this was sanctioned, however, and although the matter was not dropped, it was seen to be impossible to modify a ship that had been designed to 1916 standards.

Further tests were carried out against armour in the captured German battleship Baden in 1921 and HMS Superb in 1922 (see Nelson chapter), and these yielded an amazing amount of data for future use. It was concluded in 1921–2 that a main belt of 14in and decks of 7½–8in were necessary to keep out 16in and 18in APC shells at modern battle ranges and it was these thicknesses that were envisaged for the G3 design. By 1937, however, it had been decided that thicknesses would have to be greatly increased if they were to keep out modern bombs and shells, and the protection of the later King George V class (1936) was designed accordingly but within the limits of a maximum displacement of 35,000 tons.

MODEL TESTS FOR 1928 BATTLESHIP DESIGN

Some comfort was offered in a note by DNC Tennyson D’Eyncourt: ‘Looked at broadly it is considered that the action of the shell will not be quite so serious as the trials hitherto made would seem to indicate. The conditions of actual warfare do not in general test so severely the armour and protection of ships as do the trials specially made on the material. This is partly due to the angle incidence of the shell being frequently less than that taken, and partly to the fact that in addition to the vertical or deck armour which is erected for special trials, there is always the structure of the ship which adds very considerably to the protection afforded in practice and the chance of the shells hitting some of the very substantial structure of our capital ships is a very great one, and therefore the thickness of the protection given on paper is considerably augmented by the structure which is met with in the passage of the projectile.’

In general this applied to ships that served during the Second World War. It was to prove that shellfire was not the most important threat but aerial and underwater attack proved the most fatal of all. The new Prince of Wales’s 6in armoured deck was not pierced nor was her 14in or 15in belt, but she was most effectively sunk beyond the armour limitations. (For further tests against armour plates see Operation ‘Bronte’ in Nelson class chapter.)

Chemical Warfare

Gas and chemical warfare had shown their deadly possibilities for the first time during the Great War. The mustard and respiratory gases, that could burn, blind or choke men to death, were obviously seen to pose a major threat in any future conflict. Although never used at sea during the Great War, it had become possible to attack ships at sea with gas dropped from an aircraft, and the problem of anti-gas defence was much debated during the inter-war years.

The Admiralty set up a Chemical Warfare Committee which held its first meeting on 7 July 1920. One of the first battleships to undergo gas-attack tests was Ramillies (Royal Sovereign class) during the winter of 1920 but results showed that with her open bridge work and conning arrangements it was practically impossible to keep out poisonous fumes, and it would be an absolute nightmare if personnel faced such attack. More tests were carried out during the next few years – the most notable being in the aircraft carrier Courageous in 1922, but again, because of her numerous openings it was quickly realized that it would be extremely difficult to render many compartments gas tight. In August 1923 their Lordships received an article entitled ‘Protection of Capital Ships against Poison Gas’ which highlighted tests and trials in which the US Navy had been engaged. The article had three headings:

1.

Methods of producing a gas cloud

2.

Individual protection

3.

Collective protection

Methods of producing a gas cloud:

1.

A time-fused smoke float.

2.

Liquid gas sprayed on the surface of the water from aircraft out of gun range.

Individual protection:

The writer advocated the use of four different types of masks for the personnel:

DIVING SHELL TESTS, HOOD AND MALAYA

1.

Manual labour mask – container carried on the head so as not to impede the arms or body

2.

Diaphragm mask – for use of telephone operators etc

3.

Optical mask – for use of range-takers, gun-layers, etc

4.

A combination of b and c – for fire control officers

The British Admiralty favoured the use of a single mask for all ranks and ratings and provided that this universal type proved efficient (a new version was being developed at that time) the question of special masks for special duties would not arise. It was suggested that an optical mask be built in to range-finders and telescopes, one advantage being that the user would be better accustomed to action conditions than would obtain from intermittent use of a personal mask. Serious consideration would be given to this proposal should difficulties arise with the new version of the individual mask. Protective clothing against mustard gas was considered and it was suggested that special overalls be issued in wartime for action only.

On the forecastle of Barham, showing some of the crew undergoing chemical warfare practice and the use of gas masks, c. 1925.

Collective protection:

The writer dealt with this subject exhaustively, various suggestions being made as to how to prevent gas entering a ship. The opinion was that the whole ship below the upper deck should be made gas tight including turrets, ammunition passages, secondary batteries, etc., and even engine and boiler rooms. Briefly, compartments were termed either semi-closed or fully-closed. For the first, the idea was to make the compartment as gas tight as possible with regard to fighting efficiency and to prevent gas from entering by keeping the spaces under air pressure. To keep the air pressure up and at the same time filter the air, use of the ‘seco spray’ machine was suggested. With regard to the fully-closed compartments, the idea seems to have been for an agent for absorbing CO2 and to replenish the oxygen from tanks or cylinders in the compartment. There was emphasis on the need for collective protection everywhere to avoid the loss of efficiency resulting from the wearing of respirators by personnel. At the same time it was advocated that permanent gas masks be fitted as part of range-finders, gun-laying telescopes, etc., which should be used at all times, thus accepting a reduction in efficiency of the users of these instruments.

The Admiralty took the view that the writer had lost sight of the fact that a ship may be hit during an action and that in almost any compartment that was not well protected collective protection would disappear. It was also thought that the writer in his efforts to bring the gas menace to the notice of the US Navy had rather overstated the case. Such conditions as he postulated might be possible in the future, but not at the present time and the first requirement was to examine the means whereby gas could be got into a ship and only then determine practical methods of dealing with it.

In the Director of Naval Ordnance’s opinion, the correct line to take was:

1.

Stake everything on a good gas mask, and regard this for the time being as the primary and most effective defence.

2.

Carry out further research on methods of getting gas into a ship in order to ascertain just how great a danger the new threat might pose during a war.

3.

Investigate systematically the means of making some of the more important stations gas tight.

It was thought that any proposals to make the engine and boiler rooms gas tight were somewhat fantastic.

The spraying of gas from aircraft was considered worthy of investigation, not only from the point of view of possible use in a naval action, but also as means of defending beaches from hostile landings.

With regard to the proposals to provide anti-gas apparatus of different types to suit specific duties, Admiralty experience to date suggested that it was possible, but it was highly improbable that any definitive apparatus could be devised. It was realized that the chances of a ship’s personnel being gassed were probably greater in harbour than during any fleet action. It was therefore essential that each man be provided with personal anti-gas equipment in the first place; special types for specific duties could be considered when experience had been gained in the use of the new type of respirator being developed.

The emphasis on the need of protective clothing against mustard gas and the proposals to introduce an overall of protective material for use in action was sound in principle and indicated the lines on which issue should be made as soon as suitable material could be developed. It was understood that this was engaging the serious attention of the Chemical Warfare Committee.

US proposals followed generally the lines along which the Admiralty was proceeding. The air purifier, the air filter and the use of compressed air for overcoming small leaks were all at this time under consideration for use in HM ships. The loss of efficiency resulting from closing-in might be as great as, or greater than that resulting from the wearing of gas masks, especially at times of low visibility, a condition that would frequently prevail during a gas attack. For items such as turrets, secondary batteries etc., it was considered that in view of the great practical difficulties in making such spaces even reasonably gas tight, the policy to rely on in respect of these spaces was that of individual protection. It was clear that the main questions regarding collective protection that confronted the US Navy were the same as those with which the Admiralty was faced. In conclusion the Board considered that progress in protecting the personnel of ships against gas should be made along the following lines:

To stake everything at this time on a good gas mask and to regard this as the primary and most effective defence. The Board suggested that the sooner the fleet was completely equipped and had gained sufficient experience in the use of the personal gas mask, the better. Orders were given to carry out research and experiments to ascertain how to get gas into a ship, and to investigate the means of making the more important stations gas tight. The investigations which were then in progress were considered to be on sound and practical lines, but would probably require modification or amplification in the light of experience gained.

Strict procedural training was carried out during the 1920s, the outcome seems to have been that individual safety was favoured, rather than trying to make large areas gas tight. Nelson and Rodney (and King George V class 1937) were fitted with limited gas filter arrangements in their large superstructures, which would at least ensure that most of the bridge personnel would be protected from serious harm, but that seems to have been as far as it went in the days of battleships.

The Arrival of Aircraft

During the Great War The Times newspaper was always noted for its lively reviews on military matters and this of course continued into peace time. In December 1920, however, a series of letters regarding capital ships and the extent of their usefulness sparked off a debate in which practically everyone who was anyone in naval circles joined. The controversy quickly spread to official circles and became the great discussion of the period.

A first article had appeared on 29 November 1920 under the title ‘The Navy – A Question for the Nation’ and although it is too long to recapitulate here, suffice to say that it pointed out that, as a consequence of the enormous construction programme being undertaken by the USA and Japan, the British Battle Fleet would soon be relegated to third place rather than her usual prime position. It asked ‘are battleships really the capital ships for the future or are submersibles and aircraft really the new weapons to conquer all?’

At the end of the war even Sir John (Jackie) Fisher himself stated: ‘The greatest possible speed with the biggest practicable gun was, up to the time of aircraft, the acme of sea fighting. Now there is only one word – submersibles.’ One of the most prominent naval officers of the day, the gunnery expert Sir Percy Scott, was quick to reply to the letter to add weight to the doom of the battleship and in fact had, as far back as 1914, been saying that submarines had entirely revolutionized naval warfare. Many famous names were seen on letters which flooded into the columns of The Times. Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge, Sir Herbert King Hall, Lord Sydenham, Admiral W. H. Henderson and Admiral R. H. Bacon to name a few. The most formidable antagonist to the battleship was of course Sir Percy Scott who then came up with an article ‘What Use is a Battleship?’ (13 December 1920), and to this there were literally dozens of answers, of which he took no notice whatsoever. Sir Percy’s article read:

Sir – Will you help me in my ignorance? I cannot get an answer to my question ‘What is the use of a battleship?’ She must be of some use or the United States and Japan would not be building battleships. A lot of naval officers have written to me but they only tell me what she is not useful for, they will not answer my question. Is her use a secret that only a few know and will not disclose? Will it be disclosed by the Committee of Imperial Defence who are going to tell what the weapons of the new navy are to be? Admiral Hall, a young and vigorous officer, who had wide experience during the war, will not enlighten my ignorance; he is only telling the public what the battleship is not useful for. What is the good of that? Before we spend 109 millions on battleships and another 100 millions in making safe harbours for them, we ought to know what use they are. Now, Sir, do try and enlighten my ignorance. Ask Lord Sydenham or someone else who knows all about naval affairs.

As can be imagined the political cacophony that followed was unprecedented, but one of the best replies came from someone who signed himself simply as ‘naval officer’: (15 December) ‘Sir, – In reply to Sir Percy Scott, on the lines of the well-known nursery rhyme I would say the capital ship is: The ship that sinks the enemy’s capital ship, that protects the cruisers that sink the cruisers which protect destroyers, that sink the submarines that attack the merchant ships that bring the food that feeds the people who build the ships that transport the army that defends the house that Jack built – the British Empire.’

The columns of The Times were ablaze for more than ten weeks, but after that the editor decided to end the debate as it seemed to be going nowhere. In fact it had got out of hand. There was certainly no easy answer to be had by the written word – practical tests, trials and lengthy experiments were needed to give any degree of truth to the question of how much use was the present-day battleship in the light of four years’ wartime experience.

Ships had been set aside after the war, there being no shortage of surplus vessels. The Admiralty at first put forward a few of the pre-dreadnoughts to see how they would stand up against modern technology (Swiftsure and Agamemnon), but ultimately experience was needed in the dreadnought type and as a result Monarch (Orion class) was used from 1923 to 1925; Centurion (King George V class) became Remote Control Target Ship (1927–37) and Emperor of India and Marlborough (Iron Duke class) were used extensively as test ships against shells and explosives of all types.

Monarch after shell tests and in a mutilated condition. Her funnel has collapsed, the bridgework is wrecked and the forecastle deck has a large hole in it.

Probably the most experimental battleship during the 1920s was Monarch. She was used extensively for tests to see how armour strength in British battleships would stand up against light, medium and heavy shells (see British Battleships of World War One). She was also used in gas and chemical attacks, and later for special tests to see how machinery in the Royal Navy’s capital ships would take a knock to its vitals.

On 1 August 1923 she was anchored in eleven fathoms of water and a charge of 2,081 pounds of TNT was hung from a boom fitted 40 feet below the waterline and 7 feet 6 inches from the side superstructure. Her machinery had been prepared in accordance with Admiralty instructions and steam was raised in numbers A1, A2, A3, A5, B1, B2, B4 and B5 boilers. Auxiliary steam pipes were at working pressure throughout the ship. Oil fuel tanks in use were in ‘A’ Boiler Room (keel to second longitudinal port) and ‘B’ Boiler Room (second to fourth longitudinal port). Because of bad weather the test was postponed until 4 August when the charge was ignited at 09.06. After the explosion the vessel was boarded and the following notes were compiled:

At the moment of explosion boiler pressure was evidenced by the lifting of safety valves immediately prior to the charge being fired. After the explosion, as far as could be seen from outside the ship, the machinery was continuing to run satisfactorily, the pilot light on the aft superstructure showed that the dynamo engine was functioning and the funnel discharge appeared normal. As soon as personnel were allowed on board and prior to permission being given for the Engine Room staff to open up compartments and go below, listening at the various ventilating trunks, seemed to show that normal running of the auxiliary engines was continuing. Soon after they returned on board they observed that the funnel discharge from ‘A’ Boiler Room was diminishing and, suspecting loss of suction of the oil fuel pump because the ship was listing about 11 degrees, shut off the oil fuel pump and oil filter discharges of ‘A’ Boiler Room. The boilers in ‘B’, as far as could be ascertained, continued to function satisfactorily. At about 09.40 the hydraulic pumping engine ceased to work and a thick vapour from burning oil fuel was rising from the port after fan intake to ‘B’ Boiler Room, the dynamo engine had stopped and steam was issuing to a considerable extent from the centre Engine Room ventilating trunk into the after superstructure. Because of the risk of fire in ‘B’ Boiler Room the oil fuel was shut off at 10.00. At 10.10 the centre Engine Room was entered but the steam vapour was too dense to locate the cause. As the air cleared it was seen that the starboard main condenser inboard door was split and sea water was spurting freely through the fissure. All sea connections were shut as quickly as possible, but it was found that the bilge had already flooded to a depth of just over three feet. All sea valves were still working freely.

After Centurion, Monarch was the battleship most used for experimental purposes. Her test results furnished much needed information towards capital ship construction. Shown here shortly before being shelled, she is listing to starboard to expose her armour strake. Note the white bands around the hull (range taking aids). 1925.

The steam pressure in ‘A’ Boiler Room had remained at 10psi, fans were still running, main feed pumps still moving and all water gauge glasses intact; a few boilers were short of water but A1 boiler was leaking badly at the starboard and blowdown valve. All floor plates were displaced, but ladders and gratings were still in place and slight leaks had occurred here and there. The oil fuel had caught fire in the drip pans of A5 boiler, but this burnt out shortly after the entry of the examination party. ‘B’ Boiler Room pressure was the same as that in ‘A’ and the only damage here was confined to a few leaks on the main steam expansion gland; a small oil fire was in progress in the front of B5 boiler but this was easily extinguished. ‘C’ Boiler Room appeared to have suffered more from shock than either ‘A’ or ‘B’, nearly all the glass fronts of the gauges being shattered, floor plates dislodged and much dust shaken down. The boilers themselves, however, did not appear to have suffered. Most of the auxiliary machinery in the area remained intact except for a few fractures to some of the sea water pumps, but on the whole there was no discernible damage.

All engines in use during the test were tried by hand and still moved freely and appeared undamaged.

The damage as a whole was minimal, the only failure being a reduction in water pressure. It was considered that all auxiliary machinery in those compartments not destroyed or flooded at the moment of explosion, could still have been kept in use had immediate access been allowed. With regard to the main propelling machinery, the leakage from the starboard main condenser cover would possibly have been diminished by pads and shores to such an extent as to allow the use of the starboard engines with main circulator bilge suctions in operation. Had the turbines been in running condition it was considered the lift would have been much diminished so that if the blading had fouled the resulting damage would have been slight and the turbines would have remained usable. It was submitted that if any further trials of a similar nature were carried out it would be an advantage to fit gauges and equipment on the upper deck so that it would be easy to see what was going on down below.

This trial was just one of the hundreds carefully carried out by the Royal Navy to try to ascertain how capital ships would fare when damaged. While these and many other extremely valuable tests were taking place during the period of the ‘What use is a Battleship?’ debate (although published in 1920 it certainly never lost its appeal for the general press), tests were being carried out in the USA on an old German war prize, the battleship Ostfriesland, by the USAAF (United States Army Air Force). The debate over the ship became a fiasco after the pilot ‘Billy’ Mitchell (Brigadier General William Mitchell) claimed after he had bombed the ship that the day of the battleship was truly past. The saga was long, but briefly what happened was this:

Mitchell had set his sights on what he saw as magniloquent Admirals and Sea Lords on both sides of the Atlantic, and after attacking all of them verbally in articles appearing in journals, periodicals and newspapers, went on to test his theories in a practical manner. After knocking the old coastal defence battleship Indiana to bits, he made moves to get Ostfriesland allocated as a sitting target to be destroyed by aircraft. Trials started on 20 July 1921 when the ship was attacked with 230lb bombs, but of 33 bombs dropped only eight hits were scored on the main deck and did little damage. Later, 600lb and 1,000lb bombs were used but none seemed to affect the water integrity of the old battleship. Next day, however, six more 1,000lb bombs were dropped, but only two made contact. One caused no damage whatsoever, but the other was a near miss on the port side which caused the hull to cave in from the ‘water hammer’ effect – it opened her up to the sea and she began to sink. Disappearing beneath the waves in about forty minutes, it looked like a victory for the arrogant Mitchell and the anti-battleship brigade. In fact the test had proved little so far as the British Admiralty was concerned – a matter of an old, unmanned, sitting target sunk as a result of constant bombing. Would not a crew aboard have saved her by isolating the area of damage? Would she not have been a more difficult target if under way and yet more difficult if firing at the attacking aircraft? The Admiralty, although taking note of the ‘interesting’ trial, concerned itself with more methodical tests which would furnish them with sound information regarding the real strength of modern battleships. Even the committee set up in the USA had registered its verdict: ‘It cannot be said that the battleship has become superfluous because of the possibility of bombing attacks by aircraft. The battleship represents the highest and ultimate fighting strength of the fleet.’

In 1923 more debates took place in the House of Lords regarding the capabilities of capital ships to defend themselves against attacking aircraft, and it was asked whether the wings of sea power had been clipped? It was pointed out as usual that new naval weapons had been developed (namely submarines and aircraft) which greatly weakened the offence in modern sea power. Forces could not, as before, be carried across the seas. A weak power without a navy could, in theory, challenge the strongest sea power simply by having a strong minefield, an adequate aircraft and a handful of submarines.

Even the great Admiral Von Scheer, who commanded the German High Seas Fleet, a staunch believer in battleships, was forced to concede that by the time the Great War ended the submarine had proved its worth and could, in theory, hold off a fleet of capital ships. It was a known fact that had there been a fleet of submersibles present in the Dardanelles in 1915 it would have been almost impossible for any surface ship to approach the beaches for bombardment, as was so often accomplished during that campaign. What more could be said to prophesy and haste the demise and ultimate doom of the world’s battleships?

It is obvious that there was more than a degree of truth in the arguments of the anti-battleship lobby, but during the decade from 1920 to 1930 there was more to the affair than just questions of what use were battleships, or what if they were faced with a fleet of submarines, or indeed could they defend themselves against a squadron of high-level bombing aircraft? The entire subject of defence had to be addressed, and the Admiralty was only too aware that some of the questions were almost impossible to answer. The main question of course was what would replace battleships if they were all deleted from the world’s battlefleets? Submarines and aircraft carriers at that time were not yet developed to their full potential – there was still much to be done in that area. Moreover there was still a need of a strong, fast, heavily armed type of warship which was and would always be needed to protect smaller ships – especially merchant vessels which could not be looked after by submarines or indeed aircraft at that time. Although the Second World War proved to be the final frontier for the big battleship, the type never lost favour with many of the world’s navies and it continued to serve until well after the conflict.

Today (2011) battleships as a species are extinct but it does seem that even with all the modern technology – missiles, aircraft and submarines – the ‘big gun’ still has a place in any war. There was much speculation when during the 1991 Gulf War a Silkworm missile was heading for the battleship Missouri, and an uninformed press release declared: ‘She would have been completely wrecked. Her fate would have been sealed.’ Alarming statements and riveting reading, but in fact these statements were made by people who obviously did not know the facts. Of course it would be foolish to say that the ship would not have suffered superficial damage, but it is very doubtful that she would have been sunk. Like all battleships, she was designed to take (and deliver) a tremendous pounding – and that is why the battleships survived the barrage of opinion during the inter-war years and why they have not been completely erased from the US Navy. The Wisconsin was decommissioned in 1991 and in 1996 was moved to the Norfolk Navy Yard. In 2006, along with the Iowa, she was struck off the Naval Vessel Register and they were to become museum ships.

However, the US Congress was deeply unhappy about the loss of heavy naval gunfire support, and passed a Defence Act that requires the battleships to be kept and maintained in a state of readiness should they be needed again, and further measures have been implemented to ensure that Wisconsin at least could be quickly returned to active duty in an emergency. It is possible then that the history of the battleship is not completely over.

Aircraft in Battleships

After countless trials from 1920 to 1930, there was general agreement by the early 1930s that aircraft had a definite role within the fleet at sea, and many of the older battleships were given hangars and catapults during their modernization. There was a strong lobby of official opinion, however, that held that such aircraft should be confined to aircraft carriers. The late 1920s witnessed many debates on the subject and the Commander-in-Chief, Directors of War, Staff Colleges and Tactical School, Director of Naval Ordnance and the Air Ministry featured prominently in the discussions. In about 1933–4 the general opinion was that fighters were the best defence against attacking aircraft – a view which often changed from month to month. What was fully agreed was that the expansion of the Fleet Air