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    Sino-Indian War: Border Clash: October–November 1962
    Sino-Indian War: Border Clash: October–November 1962
    Sino-Indian War: Border Clash: October–November 1962
    Ebook205 pages3 hours

    Sino-Indian War: Border Clash: October–November 1962

    By Gerry van Tonder

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    For a hundred years, British and Chinese territorial claims in the Himalayas conflicted, with Indian historians claiming that the region was the fountainhead of Hindu civilization. In the halcyon days of the Raj, London saw Afghanistan and Tibet as buffers against Russian and Chinese imperialism. In 1913, an ephemeral agreement between Britain, Tibet and China was signed, recognizing the McMahon Line as the border of the disputed territory. China, however, failed to ratify the agreement, while India protested against a loss of historical land.After the Second World War, India became independent of Britain and Chinese Communists proclaimed a peoples republic. Despite cordial overtures from Indian Prime Minister Nehru, in late 1950 the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) invaded Tibet. In the ensuing twelve years, Indian diplomacy and Chinese cartographic aggression were punctuated by border incidents, particularly in 1953 when armed clashes precipitated a significant increase in the disposition of troops by both sides. In the spring of 1962, Indian forces flooded into the Ladakh region of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, to check the Chinese.In a spiralling game of brinkmanship, in September, ground forces were strategically deployed and redeployed. On 10 October, thirty-three Chinese died in a firefight near Dhola.Embittered by Moscows support of India against a sister communist state, and in a bid to clip Nehrus belligerent wings, on 20 October, the PLA launched a two-pronged attack against Indian positions.
    LanguageEnglish
    PublisherOpen Road Integrated Media
    Release dateJul 30, 2018
    ISBN9781526728388
    Sino-Indian War: Border Clash: October–November 1962
    Author

    Gerry van Tonder

    Born in Southern Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe, historian and author Gerry van Tonder came to Britain in 1999. Specializing in military history, Gerry has authored multiple books on Rhodesia and the co-authored definitive Rhodesia Regiment 1899–1981. Gerry presented a copy to the regiment’s former colonel-in-chief, Her Majesty the Queen.

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      Sino-Indian War - Gerry van Tonder

      India)

      INTRODUCTION

      In mid-1962, a flare-up in the Sino-Indian border dispute was sparked off by recent Indian forward movements into the disputed border area of Ladakh. Indian troops were reported to have occupied one outpost and were under orders to secure a larger one several miles farther out. Beijing strongly denunciated the Indian military moves, demanding an immediate withdrawal and stating that it would forcefully defend the positions it controlled. Indian premier Jawaharlal Nehru informed parliament that India would continue to protect the integrity of the Himalayan border area, and was preparing for the contingency of war with China to achieve this.

      The preservation of Indian territorial and political interests in the Himalayas had long been a fundamental aspect of Nehru’s policy of Indian sovereignty. As a loyal adherent to the passive teachings of Mahatma Gandhi, Nehru had originally sought cordial relations with Beijing, basing his policy on Panch Shila or the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. However, from 1954, there had been several Chinese incursions into Indian-claimed territory. In 1959, Beijing brutally quashed the Tibetan revolt, followed thereafter by increased efforts to bring the border states of Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal within its sphere of influence.

      Up until 1960, New Delhi had a tacit understanding that the mountainous northern border status quo would be maintained, but further Chinese encroachments in 1961 exacerbated what had essentially been a brittle situation. Now, Nehru and well-informed Indians started nurturing the belief that their interests could not be best served without a demonstrable determination to resort to force in their defence.

      Realistically, India most likely did not believe that it could make good its claims to all the territory in Ladakh, asserting that this was a real-estate legacy inherited from the British at independence. In fact, the Aksai Chin plateau area in eastern Ladakh was of far greater use and accessibility to China than to India, China having, in 1957, constructed a road across the disputed region connecting Tibet and Xinjiang. Of prime concern to Nehru, therefore, was the establishment of a show of military strength and a pattern of occupation designed to prevent further Chinese expansion to therefore leave New Delhi in a favourable negotiating position for a settlement of a whole tranche of border issues. This meant that efforts would have to be made to push back Chinese incursions which appeared to expand the limits of the disputed area.

      Nehru stressed India’s imperative to actively maintain the nation’s claims to any of the disputed border areas, warning that a failure to do so would dangerously compromise the country’s security by calling into question the validity of the entire border demarcation inherited from their former colonial masters. Public awareness and opinion would be key to any future action. Nehru’s reputation as India’s founding premier was also at stake, and with the electorate watching on, the long-term military build-up for the defence of the northern border commenced.

      FIERCE FIGHTING IN TIBET

      Dalai Lama Reaches the Assam Plains

      Fierce fighting has broken out between Tibetan rebels and Chinese troops in the Chamdo area of East Tibet, The Times of India said yesterday.

      Chamdo is like an island protected by a Chinese garrison, said the paper quoting reliable sources from Gangtok, Sikkim. It was also reported from Gangtok that the Chinese are moving into Western Tibet in an all-out attempt to block escape-route passes leading to Nepal and Kashmir. Other reports said that twin-engined bombers are arriving at an airport 150 miles north of Lhasa and that planes resembling Soviet MiG 15s are flying in waves to reconnoitre all possible escape routes. The military airport at Lhasa, damaged by Tibetan rebels, has been repaired and is strongly guarded by contingents of the Chinese army, reports said.

      Khamba tribesmen were said to be running desperately short of supplies and ammunition.

      To Put it Down

      The Times of India quoted a high Chinese official in the border town of Kalimpong as saying that his Government had decided to put down the Tibetan rebellion once and for all. The Dalai Lama yesterday completed the most perilous stretch of his pony trek toward the Assam plains crossing the 14,500 ft. Se Las pass and descending into Sang Dzong, a Buddhist village 25 miles from Tawang monastery where he had been resting. Peking Radio reported yesterday that the Panchen Lama, installed by the Chinese in place of the Dalai Lama, has left Lhasa for Peking. He will attend the Chinese National Congress on April 17. Taipeh newspapers claimed yesterday that 200,000 tribesmen are fighting the Chinese Communists in the border area of Szechwan and Sikang provinces in China’s far west.

      Birmingham Daily Post, Friday, 10 April 1959

      For New Delhi, the timing of an escalation in border tensions was unusually fortuitous in terms of asserting its territorial claims as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was experiencing significant internal difficulties. Not only were Beijing’s relations with the Soviet Union strained, but Moscow had refused to support Beijing in their border dispute with India; in fact, Moscow was willing to provide non-aligned India with military hardware. Added to this, Nehru was confident that the West could be relied on to endorse Indian actions, and, should it become necessary, to provide direct support.

      The dispute with India was of equal importance to the PRC, who similarly maintained that India’s claims in the Himalayas were based on unilateral treaties forced upon an unwilling China in the days of the British Raj. For Beijing, control of the Aksai Chin was of fundamental importance to maintain a secure position in western Tibet. To back down in the face of Indian military determination would jeopardize this strategic objective and be detrimental to its standing as an independent communist state.

      The Tibetan uprising, which started in Lhasa in March 1959, followed by sporadic border clashes with India, did much to tarnish the image that Beijing was trying to nurture as a powerful but essentially benevolent leader in Asia. For the PRC, therefore, damage limitation was important, but not at the expense of negating its strategic interests. Beijing demonstrated significant levels of good-neighbourly cordiality in reaching border agreements with Burma in 1960 and Nepal in 1961, while continuing to seek negotiations with India. India, however, remained obstinately uncompromising in its responses to overtures from Beijing, leaving the Chinese in a seemingly no-win position with its diplomatic tactics.

      In a high-stakes game of posturing, Indian activity in Ladakh also hardened the PRC’s determination to defend its position. In a missive to New Delhi, dated 30 April 1962, Beijing stated that its troops had been ordered to resume border patrols in the Ladakh area, something it had claimed it had ceased two years ago. It was unequivocal in its threat to resume patrolling along the entire shared frontier. On 3 May, the PRC and Pakistan jointly announced their agreement to negotiate a provisional delimitation of the frontier between Xinjiang and Pakistan, an undertaking that included Pakistani-occupied Kashmir, a move guaranteed to further exacerbate Sino-Indian as well as Indo-Pakistani relations.

      Accessibility to the Sino-Indian border region, highly problematic in the hostile, mountainous wilderness of the Himalayas, made extensive or sustained military operations extremely difficult for both antagonists. Throughout the year, particularly in winter, the maintenance of even small military outposts, many at an elevation of over 16,000 feet, was a logistical nightmare for both sides. Albeit that the PRC had significantly longer supply lines, it did generally enjoy easier ground access to the disputed area than did India. In more recent years, the Chinese had also improved their propensity for redeploying troops from one place to another by developing a route parallel to much of the border for use by military transport. However, border approaches from the Indian side, over much rougher terrain, were for the most part restricted to rudimentary trails that met the border at right angles. Especially in the Aksai Chin, Indian supplies had to navigate several high passes. As a consequence, both sides depended heavily on pack animals for supply. The Indians also used airdrop delivery where and when possible.

      At the time, major Indian troop concentrations along the border were found in three widely separated areas: the Ladakh region of Kashmir, Sikkim and the North East Frontier Agency, or NEFA. India had thirteen infantry brigades in Kashmir, but eleven were deployed westward to defend and police the ceasefire line with Pakistan.

      Indian forces in Ladakh, operating in company-sized units or less, were supplied as far as Leh via an overland route which was passable most of the year, but aircraft and pack animals were required to supplement motor transport. The sole, understrength infantry division and several local rifle battalions located in NEFA had to be supplied in the same manner. However, India’s road infrastructure was more capable of supporting the reinforced brigade group in Sikkim.

      Potala Palace, Lhasa, former residence of the Dalai Lama. (Photo Luca Galuzzi)

      There were about 110,000 Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops in Tibet, around twice the number deployed there before the 1959 uprising. Of this number, it was estimated at the time that around 40,000 troops were stationed in eastern Tibet, 48,000 in and around the Tibetan capital Lhasa and about 20,000 along the border with Nepal. In addition, there were also an estimated 34,000 troops in Xinjiang Province, mostly in the north and east. Indian intelligence estimated a presence of 2,800 in the Aksai Chin area of Ladakh, supported by a further 7,000 reserves within 180 miles.

      The PLA had two main access roads at their disposal: Yarkand–Gartok and Galmo–Lhasa. The latter was the main supply route for the military units in Tibet. The Chinese were also constructing east–west roads within Tibet and connecting roads to Nepal.

      Domestic economic instability curtailed the PRC’s resupply and reinforcement capabilities in the Indian border area, with the maintenance of sustainable troop levels in Tibet severely stretching its logistic capabilities. Beijing was therefore hamstrung in its abilities to meaningfully augment troop deployment in Tibet to any sizeable extent: it had neither the motor transport nor the fuel and oil. A lack of developed air facilities in the area and the extreme length of Chinese supply lines limited Beijing’s air capability, particularly for combat operations.

      Despite the important national interests and pride involved that vigorously injected both India and China with patriotic fervour, there were major factors that caused both sides to exercise caution lest the tempo of their quarrel escalated out of control.

      The Indians were not confident that they had the resources to cope with the vast Chinese military power should significant escalation take place. On the other hand, the Chinese were fully aware that their dispute with India had generated widespread criticism within the communist bloc, making them reluctant to heighten the conflict, especially in Ladakh where they had already occupied the contested territory. Added to this, the very nature of the theatre involved meant that the logistical support of even relatively small military operations would place unsustainable

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