Religious Freedom Under Scrutiny

Religious Freedom Under Scrutiny

PENNSYLVANIA STUDIES IN HUMAN RIGHTS

Bert B. Lockwood, Series Editor

A complete list of books in the series is available from the publisher.

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM UNDER SCRUTINY

Heiner Bielefeldt

and

Michael Wiener

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA PRESS

PHILADELPHIA

Copyright © 2020 University of Pennsylvania Press

All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations used for purposes of review or scholarly citation, none of this book may be reproduced in any form by any means without written permission from the publisher.

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University of Pennsylvania Press

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104-4112

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Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper

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A Cataloging-in-Publication record is available from the Library of Congress

ISBN 978-0-8122-5180-7

In memory of Asma Jahangir (1952–2018)

CONTENTS

Introduction

Chapter 1. Universalism Tainted with Particularisms

Chapter 2. Ambiguities of Freedom

Chapter 3. Equality in Diversity

Chapter 4. Awkward Bedfellows? Religious Freedom and Other Human Rights

Chapter 5. Shades and Modes of Secularisms

Chapter 6. Violations of Freedom of Religion or Belief

Chapter 7. Comparing International and Regional Case Law

Chapter 8. Preventing Violence Committed in the Name of Religion

Chapter 9. Custodian Against the Sacralization of Human Rights

Notes

Bibliography

Acknowledgments

Religious Freedom Under Scrutiny

INTRODUCTION

1. A Right Both Classical and Provocative

Freedom of religion or belief radiates the aura of a well-established human right, deeply entrenched in international human rights conventions and constitutional traditions across the continents.¹ At the United Nations (UN) level, the most important guarantees are Article 18 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which the UN General Assembly adopted in 1966. Based on Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), an instrument of the Council of Europe adopted in 1950, a rich regional jurisprudence on freedom of religion or belief has developed. Similar regional guarantees exist in the framework of the Organization of American States as well as within the African Union. Freedom of religion or belief has furthermore found recognition in numerous national constitutions. Some governments show a particularly strong commitment to the international promotion of this right. Parliamentarians from across the globe have established networks to support each other in the defense of freedom of religion or belief in their home countries;² and civil society organizations, both faith-based and secular, have established cooperation for a worldwide implementation of this human right.³ Moreover, while historians have debated the precise contribution of freedom of religion or belief (shorthand: religious freedom) for the genesis of human rights in early modernity,⁴ no one seriously doubts that its role was highly significant. Commentators appreciate its historical and contemporary function as a door opener for other human rights, in particular freedom of expression, freedom of peaceful assembly, and freedom of association. In short, freedom of religion or belief enjoys the reputation of a classical human right.

The adjective classical suggests that something has an elevated status beyond dispute and contestation. Appreciating freedom of religion or belief as a classical human right may thus convey the impression that there is no need for making serious intellectual investments in its support. However, this conclusion would be premature. As Manfred Nowak has observed, freedom of religion or belief is a particularly controversial right.⁵ Many governments show ambivalence when it comes to realizing the practical consequences of their formal recognition of religious freedom. Whereas some states reserve the enjoyment of this right to the followers of real religions (whatever that may mean), others narrowly limit religious practices, which are supposed to remain within the confines of a state-defined normalcy. In both cases, the state claims broad discretion in either permitting or prohibiting religious manifestations. Nationalist identity politics confines freedom of religion or belief to those religious communities that fit into the dominant national narrative, often at the expense of foreign sects or new religious movements. Governments that stage themselves as custodians of religious truth dilute the liberating thrust of freedom of religion or belief by mixing human rights language with a vague rhetoric of limited religious tolerance. Some progressive politicians in turn may invoke secularism, a concept that can carry very different meanings, in order to push religious manifestations back into a merely private sphere. Furthermore, some states have attempted in United Nations fora to twist freedom of religion or belief into an anti-liberal barrier against human rights advancements in the areas of intellectual freedom or gender emancipation.⁶

Freedom of religion or belief furthermore continues to spark political, legal, theological, and philosophical controversies, even heated ones. For critics from different political, ideological, and religious camps, this human right has disturbing features. The reasons for mixed feelings and ambivalent attitudes differ widely. While religious traditionalists may fear that guarantees of individual freedom could dissolve religious bonds and loyalties, secular-minded liberals in turn may wonder whether freedom of religion or belief would not function as a Trojan horse by readmitting religious obscurantism to public political culture. Some accuse the right to religious freedom of trivializing religion by turning it into a commodity and a matter of individual tastes and preferences. By contrast, others see the danger that freedom of religion or belief could undermine dearly won achievements of modern enlightenment. In short, it may well be true that freedom of religion or belief is a classical human right. Yet it is equally true that it harbors enormous provocative potential.

2. Ambiguous Reactions

Freedom of religion or belief is not the only example of a classical human right with obvious provocative potential. We could say the same about freedom of expression or freedom of peaceful assembly, which likewise enjoy the reputation of old established rights and nonetheless continue to provoke and disturb. It is a general feature of human rights to challenge existing hegemonies by demanding equal rights of freedom for everyone. No wonder if human rights, in spite of their broad formal endorsement, trigger ambivalent reactions. However, in the case of freedom of religion or belief an additional source of provocation comes to the fore: religion. Within the human rights framework, freedom of religion or belief opens the space for the articulation of religious convictions, religious values, religious interests, religious identities, and religious needs. In other words, freedom of religion or belief functions as the entry-point for religion as a human rights issue.⁷

Religion both fascinates and polarizes. On the one hand, religious traditions contain an inexhaustible wealth of prophecies, promises, admonishments, narrations, parables, and metaphors. They shape personal identities and collective moralities, create profound bonds of loyalty, and have a lasting impact upon the cultural and historical makeup of countries and wider regions. On the other hand, religions can spark conflicts and divide societies. In past and present, they have justified discrimination, oppression, and violence.⁸ Ambivalent reactions to religion may also cast a shadow on the human right to freedom of religion or belief. In spite of its reputation as part of the established canon of liberal rights,⁹ freedom of religion or belief paradoxically does not receive unanimous applause among all liberals. Even within the human rights movement, practical commitment and skeptical reluctance frequently overlap.

Much of the existing reluctance seems to rest on the assumption that religions historically often stood in the way of modern emancipation. Whether and to which degree this assumption is fully justified requires further analysis. At any rate, the perception exists. In fact, even today religiously motivated opposition is one of the main obstacles to the realization of certain human rights claims, especially in the area of gender equality and sexual orientation, to mention the most obvious examples. Is this a mere coincidence, or do we have to assume a general antagonism between human rights and religions?¹⁰ If so, would this not undermine the legitimacy of freedom of religion or belief within the framework of human rights? Is freedom of religion or belief a human right that factually hinders the advancement of secular human rights agendas? This is not the only disquieting question in this context. Take the issue of universalism. Human rights epitomize a universalistic normative aspiration based on the acknowledgement of the equal dignity and equal rights of all human beings.¹¹ Can freedom of religion or belief be universalistic in this understanding? Does the title of this right not indicate a policy of privileging believers over non-believers? Moreover, human rights empower people by guaranteeing their freedom in various spheres of society, from family life to employment to the political arena. This empowerment function is essential to the understanding of human rights; it defines their raison d’être.¹² Rather than empowering individuals, however, religions have subjected people to divine authorities, thus ultimately disempowering them—or this may be the perception of many critics. Against this background, would a human right to religious freedom not come close to a contradiction in terms? Would it not be more plausible to associate human rights with humanism and the values of humanist enlightenment, for which people had to fight over generations, often against massive resistance from religious authorities? Maybe some of these questions rest on problematic historical and political assumptions. We therefore should be cautious and not jump to conclusions. What is prima facie clear, at any rate, is that freedom of religion or belief raises complicated questions, some of which even affect its very legitimacy as part of the canon of human rights.

What we can currently witness is that freedom of religion or belief has come under attack from different sides. The main obstacles to its full recognition and consistent implementation stem from political, cultural, and religious authoritarianism.¹³ In this regard, freedom of religion or belief is exactly on the same page as freedom of expression, freedom of peaceful assembly, and other human rights. It is important to bear this in mind. While some authoritarian governments stage themselves as custodians of religious truth claims, others defend religious hegemonies as part of a nationalistic narrative. Yet others fear that religious communities could become meeting points for dissidents; the governments’ usual response is tight control, intimidation, and infiltration. In addition to the ongoing problem of political and religious authoritarianism, however, freedom of religion or belief at times faces reluctance also from within the midst of liberal societies and liberal milieus. This is a very special experience in human rights work. Freedom of religion or belief is probably the only liberal right (if we may use this terminology here) that currently evokes mixed feelings among many (albeit certainly not all) liberals. Even within the human rights movement, people wonder what exactly the purpose of freedom of religion or belief should be. Is freedom of religion or belief an entitlement, which for whatever reasons made it into the historical canon of human rights, without fully matching the normative profile of universal rights to freedom and equality? This question is not merely of academic interest, because existing insecurity about the nature and content of freedom of religion or belief may hamper people’s commitment in this area. With a grain of salt, Mary Ann Glendon observes that the greatest challenge facing defenders of religious freedom today may well be the task of convincing people in a secular age that religious freedom is an important human right worth defending at home and abroad.¹⁴

3. Moses Mendelssohn and the Dialectic of Enlightenment

The complicated discursive configuration just sketched out is not entirely new. More than two centuries ago, Moses Mendelssohn (1729–1785), the father of the Jewish Enlightenment, faced resistance from different camps when striving for the liberation of the Jewish minority in Prussia and elsewhere. On the one hand, he had to tackle anti-Jewish prejudices, which throughout the centuries had prevented the Jews from getting access to many important societal positions. When fighting against hostility, discriminatory practices, and derogatory stereotypes, Mendelssohn saw himself in the same camp with many other philosophers of the Enlightenment, in particular his lifelong friend Gotthold Ephraim Lessing.¹⁵ On the other hand, Mendelssohn’s writings betray a concern that the Enlightenment itself could become the breeding ground for new forms of cultural hegemony. Many intellectuals of his day promoted the establishment of one natural religion or reasonable religion, which they hoped would in the long run replace the confusing variety of historical religions. This is what causes Mendelssohn’s concerns, because it would be the end of genuine diversity. I am afraid, he writes in a letter addressed to Immanuel Kant, that philosophy, too, has its fanatics who as aggressively persecute and even more purposefully proselytize than the fanatics of positive religion.¹⁶

Time and again, Mendelssohn uncovers problematic tendencies of homogenization within the Enlightenment, for example, a propensity among rationalistic intellectuals to extinguish all other lights in order to let full enlightenment undividedly stream from the light of reason.¹⁷ In his book Jerusalem (published in 1783) he critically addresses policies of cultural assimilation, against which he calls for an appreciation of the existing religious diversity: Brothers, if you care for true piety, let us not feign agreement where diversity is evidently the plan and purpose of Providence. None of us thinks and feels exactly like his fellow man; why then do we wish to deceive each other with delusive words? … Why should we make ourselves unrecognizable to each other in the most important concerns of our life by masquerading, since God has stamped everyone, not without reason, with his own facial features?¹⁸

Mendelssohn is one of the first philosophers to discover what later would be termed the dialectic of enlightenment.¹⁹ It is the danger that the liberating thrust of the Enlightenment could collapse into a force of assimilation, to the detriment of religious freedom and diversity. As a member of a religiously discriminated minority, Mendelssohn knows that this danger is not merely hypothetical. The Jews of his day suffer ongoing contempt not only from the side of traditional Christianity; some Enlightenment philosophers, too, equate Judaism to narrowmindedness, empty legalism, and anxious ritualism.²⁰ The charge of impenitence, an old anti-Jewish prejudice, finds an echo in David Hume’s spiteful remarks on the implacable narrow spirit of the Jews.²¹ Benedict de Spinoza blames the Jewish victims for their societal victimization when conjecturing that by cherishing their own religious rituals they brought the resentment of all men upon themselves.²² Even Kant is not free from anti-Jewish sentiments. In his Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Judaism represents the very opposite of the intellectually refined religiosity which Kant himself promotes; it stands for obscurantism and empty rituals. Kant’s criticism culminates in the verdict that Judaism as such, taken in its purity, entails absolutely no religious faith.²³

From the experience of a vulnerable and disdained minority, Mendelssohn formulates his strong plea for religious freedom. In particular, he calls for complete freedom from any coercion in matters of personal conviction: "Hence, neither church nor state has a right to subject men’s principles and convictions to any coercion whatsoever. Neither church nor state is authorized to connect privileges and rights, claims on persons and title to things, with principles and convictions, and to weaken through outside interference the influence of the power of truth upon the cognitive faculty. Not even the social contract could grant such a right to either state or church. For a contract concerning things which, by their very nature, are inalienable, is intrinsically invalid, and cancels itself."²⁴ Apart from ongoing political repression—for example, denials of residence permits, marriage restrictions, humiliating special taxes, and so forth—Mendelssohn also addresses possible new risks originating from some currents of Enlightenment philosophy. In particular, he warns against the aspiration that the one reasonable natural religion, which enlightened philosophers wish to promote, should provide the future bond of unity in society. At bottom, a union of faiths, should it ever come about, could have but the most unfortunate consequences for reason and liberty of conscience…. What would thereby be accomplished? Shall we say that all of you would think just alike concerning religious truths? Whoever has but the slightest conception of the nature of the human mind cannot allow himself to be persuaded of this.²⁵

More than two centuries after Moses Mendelssohn’s death, there are still good reasons for unpacking hidden or forgotten aspects of the dialectic of enlightenment, as manifested inter alia in ambiguous attitudes toward religious diversity in modern liberal society. While in theory diversity finds almost unanimous endorsement, attitudes can change quickly once religious positions and practices exceed what is considered normal in liberal circles. People with pronounced religious convictions often feel exposed to suspicion, since their way of life allegedly stands in conflict with certain liberal values or liberal lifestyles. Proposals to purge the public sphere of any visible signs and symbols of religiosity can count on certain popularity in larger parts of modern societies. This raises far-reaching questions about the self-understanding of liberalism. How accommodating is political liberalism? What is the relationship between the enlightened values of political liberalism and traditional religious values and convictions? What is the role of the state in this field? Does the state have a mandate to liberate religious communities internally, for instance, by enforcing standards of nondiscrimination within religious institutions, or should the state remain entirely neutral with regard to the existing religious diversity? The last question brings us to the issue of political secularism, which is another contentious theme. Can religious manifestations in the public sphere undermine the secular nature of the state, thus endangering an important achievement of the Enlightenment? Or can religious motives positively contribute to the understanding of an open, inclusive secularity of the state? Other questions concern the specific normative authority that human rights claim in managing diversity. Assuming that human rights provide the binding normative framework for fair coexistence under the conditions of diversity, do human rights seek to replace the normative authority traditionally ascribed to religion? Do they form a global civil religion, which supersedes the normative ethos of religious traditions, in parts or even in toto? If so, have human rights meanwhile become the object of new forms of idolatry, as Michael Ignatieff critically puts it?²⁶

4. The Indispensability of Religious Freedom

In spite of its reputation as a classical human right, freedom of religion or belief continues to evoke political controversies and ambivalent reactions, ranging from enthusiastic support to a certain unease or even open opposition. Obviously, the struggle for religious freedom is far from over. There is not only the challenge of its effective implementation, but its content, significance, meaning, and justification also deserve critical scrutiny. The purpose of the present book is to contribute to more conceptual clarity in this ongoing struggle. We can summarize our position in two closely interrelated hypotheses. Our first hypothesis is that freedom of religion or belief is a human right, which displays exactly the same normative structure that defines the human rights approach in general. The first sentence of Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights puts it in a nutshell when proclaiming: All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. Like any other human right, freedom of religion or belief, too, relates to all human beings, which means it epitomizes the aspirations of normative universalism. It furthermore aims to empower human beings in keeping with the normative principles of freedom and equality. By highlighting that freedom of religion or belief is fully in line with the inherent logic of the human rights approach we embark on a countercriticism to those objections which explicitly or implicitly deny the human rights nature of religious freedom. With our second hypothesis, we go a step further by claiming that freedom of religion or belief has an indispensable role to play within the framework of human rights. We argue that by ignoring or marginalizing freedom of religion or belief we would not just end up with a specific gap; such marginalization would ultimately weaken the plausibility, attractiveness, and legitimacy of the entire system of human rights. Without taking freedom of religion or belief seriously, human rights would not be able to do justice to the complex needs, yearnings, and vulnerabilities of human beings. Indeed, without freedom of religion or belief, human rights would cease to be fully humane.

The defining characteristics of human rights—universalism, freedom, and equality—guide Chapters 1 to 3. To be able to make sense of freedom of religion or belief as a universal right, we have first to clarify in Chapter 1 that right holders are human beings, not religions or beliefs in themselves. Much of the criticism leveled against freedom of religion or belief misses the point by ignoring this important feature. Like other human rights, religious freedom empowers human beings. Consequently, it is only through the lens of human beings that religious issues come into the focus of human rights. Chapter 2 explores various philosophical, political, and legal aspects of human freedom. Pointing out that freedom of religion or belief is a human right to freedom may at first glance sound like a truism. Against the background of positions that wrongly ascribe anti-liberal features to freedom of religion or belief, however, the principle of freedom warrants systematic attention and clarification. In this context, we inter alia emphasize that freedom of religion or belief naturally also includes the freedom from religion. The subsequent Chapter 3 is dedicated to the principle of equality. We highlight that there is no general antagonism between equality and diversity, because in the context of human rights, equality itself can only make sense as a diversity-friendly principle. Measures designed to accommodate the special needs of certain religious minorities, for example, exemptions from generally applicable rules, require justification in the light of egalitarian principles.

After clarifying the nature of freedom of religion or belief as a human right, we tackle its relationship vis-à-vis other human rights as well as the relationship between religious freedom and the state. In Chapter 4, we explore possible tensions between freedom of religion or belief and other human rights. As two prominent test cases, we have selected freedom of expression, on the one hand, and gender-related liberation, on the other. Without ignoring complicated conflicts in these areas, we argue for a holistic understanding such that the various human rights norms can mutually complement and reinforce each other. Chapter 5 deals with different concepts of secularism and their impact on shaping the relationship between state and religions. From the specific standpoint of freedom of religion or belief, we conceptualize a nondoctrinal and inclusive understanding of state secularism. The guiding idea is that the secular state should provide an open space for the unfolding of religious (and nonreligious) diversity without discrimination.

While the main purpose of this book is to provide clarity and normative orientation in the face of conceptual controversies over freedom of religion or belief, two of its chapters are rather descriptive in nature. In Chapter 6, we provide a typological overview of violations of freedom of religion or belief, as they occur in different regions and under most different political, ideological, or religious auspices. Although that chapter is more empirical than the rest of the book, we have decided to insert it in the face of a tendency, often experienced in discussions on religious freedom, to mainly extrapolate from atrocities committed in the Middle East. However, human rights violations do not only relate to one region or one religion. It is our intention to sensitize readers to the multiplicity and complexity of violations of religious freedom, many of which remain under the radar of public attention. Chapter 7 briefly juxtaposes relevant juridical decisions taken at the international and regional levels on freedom of religion or belief. The focus is on the UN Human Rights Committee, which is the expert body in charge of monitoring the implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and comparing its jurisprudence on religious symbols in public life, religious education, and conscientious objection to military service with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. While the Strasbourg Court’s jurisprudence has evoked many political and academic comments, the case law of the Geneva expert bodies has attracted less attention. This has motivated us to give a succinct overview of the UN Human Rights Committee’s approach to handling individual cases of religious freedom, which in some important aspects goes further than the European Court of Human Rights.

The two final chapters resume the conceptual discussion—albeit from new angles. The thorny issue of violence perpetrated in the name of religion is the subject of Chapter 8. Our main interest in this context is to explore the role that freedom of religion or belief (as well as religious leaders and other faith-based actors) could play to help overcome the scourge of violent acts with religious underpinnings. One important contribution is the emphasis on human agency and thus human responsibility, by which freedom of religion or belief challenges various essentialist misrepresentations of the relationship between religion and violence. In the concluding Chapter 9, we come back to the question, raised already in the above introductory remarks, of how to understand the dynamic interplay between human rights and religious traditions. Our point is that by keeping the human rights framework open for the articulation of religious convictions, interests, yearnings, needs, and vulnerabilities, freedom of religion or belief serves as a reminder that human rights themselves do not constitute a religious or quasi-religious authority. It is not least by taking this critical role, that freedom of religion or belief serves as an indispensable component of human rights.

5. Background of the Two Authors

Toward the end of this introduction, we would like to add a few words about ourselves. We understand ourselves as human rights practitioners with a special, albeit not an exclusive, interest in freedom of religion or belief. One of us (Michael Wiener) has been working within the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights since 2006.²⁷ In this function, he supported the mandate of the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief for more than five years, after having written his doctoral thesis on legal issues of that very mandate.²⁸ The other author (Heiner Bielefeldt) served as UN Special Rapporteur from 2010 to 2016 and he has been a member of the Panel of Experts of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) on Freedom of Religion or Belief since 2016. The experiences we gained—partially together—in the support of freedom of religion or belief have shaped our outlook on this right, which we always locate within the holistic understanding of human rights. Our activities were not limited to writing reports and participating in discussions within the relevant international and regional fora; we also undertook fact-finding missions in different parts of the world, many of which were eye-opening experiences of great intensity. Incidentally, we should not hide the fact that we both happen to come from Germany, which explains occasional references to German concepts and cases. While we have been working across different academic areas, our main disciplines are philosophy (Heiner Bielefeldt) and law (Michael Wiener).

In our work within the United Nations context, we met with human rights defenders from different parts of the world, from diverse religious or nonreligious backgrounds, and from different societal and educational milieus. Not all of them had an academic training. While this book is obviously an academic project, we are convinced that human rights work does not presuppose an academic education. Human rights flourish owing to their inherent persuasiveness—or they are doomed to collapse. Their fundamental principles—human dignity, freedom, and equality—have a compelling persuasiveness and are easy to understand. This is also true for freedom of religion or belief, which for many people, albeit not for everyone, enjoys an intuitive plausibility. Like many other important issues in human life, however, complications arise once we aspire to a more precise understanding and to a consistent articulation of contents, conditions, and limitations.

We have decided to dedicate this book to the memory of Asma Jahangir (1952–2018) and to donate our royalties to the Asma Jahangir Foundation²⁹ for its work on legal aid in Pakistan. One of the coauthors worked with Asma Jahangir for four years during her mandate and the other coauthor was her immediate successor as Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief. Throughout her life, Asma Jahangir struggled for religious freedom, both at the international and national levels. She consistently advocated for a holistic understanding of human rights, always taking into account the rights of members belonging to minorities, women’s rights, and freedom of expression. With her vision and principled approach, she clarified concepts of religious freedom and managed to defuse related controversies, for example in the context of religious symbols and the debate on defamation of religions. She stressed the importance of perseverance by stating: There is always hope in the fight for human rights. There are always possibilities to gain terrain in the protection of victims. There is always ground to turn a negative situation into a positive one.³⁰

CHAPTER 1

Universalism Tainted with Particularisms

1. A Controversial Claim

In the twenty-first century, human rights can no longer base their authority on self-evident truths or transhistorically imagined natural rights. Historicity, contextuality, and critical hermeneutics have become keywords in the unfinished business of deconstructing previously unquestioned validity claims in morality and law, including in the field of human rights. One idea has been in the center of much criticism: the claim to universal validity, across political, cultural, religious, and other boundaries. This is a very high aspiration, indeed. In the eyes of critics, the claim to universality may actually aim too high to be sustainable even in theory, let alone in practice. However, it is exactly this aspiration that defines the human rights approach in general, as summed up in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which in its first article famously proclaims that All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. Likewise, the preamble of the UDHR professes recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family. Most of the following articles start with the word everyone thus corroborating the claim of universal applicability. In the case of prohibitions (of torture, slavery, etc.) the language of everyone shifts to a no less universalistic no one.

A year before the adoption of the UDHR, the American Anthropological Association published a statement in which the authors expressed concerns that the proclamation of a universal normative standard would impoverish cultural diversity.¹ In a study for UNESCO, anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss pointed to the particular cultural and historical contexts that shaped the idea of human rights.² Assuming that these rights first emerged in the West, he doubted the usefulness of promoting standards deemed to be applicable to all of humanity, across cultural and historical divides. Those early documents of human rights criticism have meanwhile assumed an iconic status. Among the many critics are Adamantia Pollis and Peter Schwab who entitled one of their articles Human Rights: A Western Construct with Limited Applicability.³ Criticism of human rights comes from different political corners, from the right as well as the left, but it can also remain more or less apolitical. Conservative skeptics have objected that by glossing over irredeemable cultural divides, the promotion of universal rights might inadvertently increase the risks of a clash of civilizations.⁴ Left-wing scholars engaged in postcolonial studies have pointed to suspicious continuities between contemporary human rights promotion and earlier forms of a European mission civilisatrice.⁵ Others base their skepticism on the irrefutable observation that universalistic standards did not emerge in a cultural vacuum.