Pandemonium: The Great Indian Banking Tragedy

Pandemonium

‘The Reserve Bank of India would like to assure the general public that Indian banking system is safe and stable.’

– RBI statement, 1 October 2019

Why did India’s central bank have to issue an unprecedented statement to that effect?

In Pandemonium: The Great Indian Banking Tragedy, Tamal Bandyopadhyay takes you in search for the answer. It is a compelling story on the rot in India’s banking system – how promoters easily swapped equity with debt as bank managements looked the other way to protect their balance sheets, until the RBI began waging a war against ballooning bad loans.

What really ails public sector banks, the backbone of India’s financial system? Is it the government ownership itself, or how this owner actually behaves? And just when many were rooting for privatisation as a way out, powerful bankers such as Chanda Kochhar and Rana Kapoor exposed the soft underbelly of seemingly more efficient and profitable private banks of India.

A timely and insider look at the dramatic forces reshaping banking in Asia’s third-largest economy, this book is a bird’s-eye view of Indian banking and also a fly-on-the-wall documentary. A must-read to understand contemporary India’s challenges and economic potential.

Praise for the Book

‘Tamal has a deep understanding and a broad perspective of the banking and financial sector. His curiosity, willingness to listen, attention to detail and ability to simplify complexity, while posing inconvenient questions, are unique strengths. These are reflected in this book.’

– UdayKotak, MD & CEO, Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd & President, CII

‘No other financial journalist-cum-author can read the pulse of the Indian banking system as Tamal can. A one-stop narrative of nuances and insights a reader is unlikely to get elsewhere. It’s a compelling read.’

– Deepak Parekh, Chairman, HDFC Ltd

‘Tamal writes with honesty, based on hard facts and with no holds barred. The volume will surely add to his reputation as an astute and insightful observer of, and honest commentator on, banking sector.

‘He has given us a financial sector policy thriller, difficult to put down once one starts the first chapter Who Killed Indian Banking? Successive chapters prove the point that investigative and analytical journalism can provide sharper insights than a whole host of heavy-duty essays.

‘Tamal’s real strength is his determination to dig deep, put lesser-known facts on decision making in the sector out in the public domain without being unduly normative or judgmental about the persons involved.’

– Rajiv Kumar, Vice Chairman, NITI Aayog

‘Our national economy has been under siege, aggravated by malfunctioning of the banking sector. This book offers valuable insights on its origin, spread and possible measures for a way out… They [the four distinguished former governors] spoke freely with Tamal because of his formidable reputation as a thoughtful, meticulous and fiercely independent columnist. In fact, these qualities shine throughout this book. I recommend this important book to professionals as well as the general public. It will benefit us all.’

– Vijay Kelkar, Chairman, India Development Foundation

‘The breadth of knowledge and attention to details shown by this veteran economic historian and journalist make fascinating reading for anybody interested in the Indian financial sector. Tamal’s superb storytelling makes the book so gripping that the reader is transported to the scene where the action is taking place. It’s an unbiased and candid account of the role played by the regulator, the investigating agencies, the business community, the bankers and the government. By the time one reaches the end of the book, it becomes clear why banking in India has been a tragedy.

‘My only complaint with the book is that it’s like binge-watching an engrossing TV series – I could not put it down until the end.’

– U.K. Sinha, Former Chairman, SEBI

‘Tamal has an exceptional record as an observer of Indian banking… The interviews with past governors of the Reserve Bank are revelatory because of their different perspectives. Recommended reading for anyone interested in the subject.’

– T.N. Ninan, Chairman, Business Standard Pvt Ltd

‘Tamal Bandyopadhyay’s magnum opus provides insights into the most important question in Indian policymaking today. With a fine understanding of banking, finance and economy and willingness to respect different perspectives, Tamal has woven a compelling tale of what has gone wrong with India’s banking system, starting from the 1990s. In telling this tale, he critically examines the role of governance, management, regulation and especially supervision of banks. In reforming these four pillars lies the solution to India’s most important policy problem and thereby the path to India becoming a $5 trillion economy.’

– Krishnamurthy Subramanian, Chief Economic Adviser, GoI

ROLI BOOKS

This digital edition published in 2021

First published in 2021 by

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Text © Tamal Bandyopadhyay, 2021

Foreword © Bibek Debroy, 2021

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This e-book is sold subject to the condition that it shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, resold, hired out, or otherwise circulated, without the publisher’s prior consent, in any form or cover other than that in which it is published.

To Tapan Jyoti, my elder brother, an inspiration for many in the small town where I grew up, and my sister-in-law Chhabi, for her love and affection. You know what you mean to me.

Contents

Foreword

Preface

Acknowledgements

Part I

THE CONUNDRUM

1. Who Killed Indian Banking?

2. The War Against NPAs

3. India’s Northern Rock Moment

4. Who will Rate the Rater?

Part II

THE HEART OF THE MATTER

5. What Ails the Public Sector Banks?

6. Whose Money is it Anyway?

7. Is Consolidation a Panacea?

Part III

EVERYTHING YOU WANT TO KNOW BUT ARE AFRAID TO ASK

8. The F Word in Indian Banking

9. Fear Psychosis

10. The Fallen Angels

Part IV

GOVERNORSPEAK

11. ‘It is an economic crisis’

C.R. Rangarajan

12. ‘The problem is how the owner behaves’

Y.V. Reddy

13. ‘PSBs have served a purpose… It is now time to move on’

D. Subbarao

14. ‘I do not see a sense of urgency or clear agenda in this government’

Raghuram Rajan

Part V

CRYSTAL GAZING

15. The Great Indian Asset Sale

16. Does the RBI Need New Clothes?

17. The Way Forward

Part VI

Charting the Ills

Epilogue: Postponing the Inevitable?

Appendix: The Stressed Sectors

List of Abbreviations

Glossary

Index

About the Author

Foreword

In the preface, Tamal Bandyopadhyay refers to Akira Kurosawa’s Rashomon, a metaphor for different, and often conflicting, versions of the same event.

For Indian banking, the metaphor is rather apt. Reams have been written on banking in India, not just research papers, but books too. C.D. Deshmukh, the first Indian to be appointed Reserve Bank of India (RBI) governor and later Union finance minister, did write his autobiography. Subsequent RBI governors also wrote books. Since Y.V. Reddy, it has become almost mandatory for ex-RBI governors (and a few ex-deputy governors) to author books focused on their RBI stints. At best, to use the same metaphor, it is the woodcutter’s story, not the commoner’s perspective. But I doubt Rashomon would have become such a great film without Kazuo Miyagawa as its cinematographer.

To chronicle what Tamal calls the great Indian banking tragedy, we need an external, objective and dispassionate observer as cinematographer. If you are inside the system, you may know everything about it, but you may have no sense about its place and function in the bigger picture. For years and years, Tamal has been, and still is, a widely read business journalist, across newspapers, especially on banking and finance. That brings an investigative flair and felicity in his use of language, aided no doubt by his specialisation in English literature. He is more than a columnist, having authored several books, mostly on banking.

In Lady Windermere’s Fan, Oscar Wilde had Dumby say, ‘In this world there are only two tragedies. One is not getting what one wants, and the other is getting it.’ (Later, this quote was redone by George Bernard Shaw in Man and Superman.) Why should there be a great tragedy in Indian banking? Across indicators – prevention of bank failures, number of banks (commercial, payments banks and small finance banks), bank branches and ATMs, deposits, bank credit, gross domestic product (GDP), banking standards, use of technology, digitisation, measures of financial inclusion – there have been improvements over time. Reforms, however defined, have much to do with competition and efficiency in factor markets (land, labour, capital).

Banking constitutes a critical strand of capital market reform. While privatisation of public sector banks (PSBs) is not yet on the agenda, there has been competition through private sector entry. Competition requires exit, as well as entry. The 2016 Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) has ensured an exit for errant promoters. There is a regulator for banks, though less starkly so for non-banking financial companies (NBFCs). Within that broad reform template, there is quite a bit the country has got.

However, in this five-part book (six, if you include the data charts), Tamal unveils the tragedy that lurks beneath.

Part I, titled ‘The Conundrum’, portrays symptoms of the malaise, familiar to most people. Non-performing assets (NPAs) mounted. With development finance institutions (DFIs) having died an unnatural death, banks started to lend in areas where they did not possess expertise. Bond markets did not develop deeply enough and infrastructure projects were financed via debt rather than equity. Compared with real sector growth, financial sector growth was disproportionately high. Add to that the NBFC problem. Hence, there are issues with (a) regulatory oversight; (b) governance oversight within banks; and (c) perverse behaviour of rating agencies. Cutting across all three, there is an information flow problem despite penetration of private sector banks, which have not always covered themselves with glory.

India’s banking landscape is still dominated by PSBs. Therefore, in unpeeling the malaise further, in Part II, Tamal zeroes in on PSBs. There have been committees galore, replete with recommendations. Implementation of recommendations, when attempted (read: consolidation and capitalisation), have concentrated on symptoms, not the disease. In the book’s diagnosis, and no one can possibly disagree, the core disease part of the DNA of PSBs has elements of (1) control over appointments; (2) multiple channels of control; (3) lack of independence of boards; (4) political interference; (5) perverse incentives and lack of accountability; and (6) conflict between social and commercial objectives. Though not listed in Part II, I would also mention the Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA) and vigilance enquiries.

But this, including the PCA, takes us on to Part III – questions that should be asked, but are rarely asked. In one of the richest parts of the book, Tamal takes us through frauds, and how they were worked. ‘The public sector bankers in India, including the retired, are an embarrassed and a much-harassed lot. The investigative agencies are hounding them for loans that have gone bad, and frauds. Are we replicating the Chinese banking system where many borrowers are dishonest, many bankers corrupt, risk assessment is poor and legal system weak, leading to large lumps of loans not being backed by genuine collateral? The investigative agencies are quick to file chargesheets and arrest bankers, but in how many cases have they been able to prove their charges? The focus seems to be more on the demonstrative effect. By subjecting them to public humiliation, unending investigation and tarring the entire banking community with the same brush, the Indian economy becomes the biggest loser. The tardy credit growth tells the story – the bankers are a harassed and a scared lot. They know if they do not lend, they will not be chargesheeted or arrested. And, no one loses his or her job for not lending. But if a loan turns bad, they may end up spending sleepless nights on a durrie at a barrack in Mumbai’s Arthur Road Jail.’

This quote says it all. There is the broad reform template and there can be no quarrels with that. However, as a critical ingredient in that reform template, we have the immediate problem described in Part III, not just one of the richest sections of the book, but also one of the most disturbing. Although the focus is PSBs, this part makes clear in its concluding chapter that the malaise also extends to private sector banks, which are hardly paragons of virtue.

RBI governors have had impeccable credentials, academic and otherwise. It is natural that they should have thought about the problem, though they need not always have articulated their views in public. In Part IV, we have the views of four respected ex-RBI governors – C. Rangarajan, Y.V. Reddy, D. Subbarao and Raghuram Rajan. The trouble with this part is that no public servant, former or current, will ever be candid in publicly stated views. So far, we have had a litany of woes, warts and blemishes of the tragedy, skilfully portrayed by the author.

Any reader is bound to ask – what next? How do we fix the system? If one is going to borrow an expression from Greek tragedies, there must not only be mimesis, but catharsis too. In fairness, it is not up to Tamal to suggest solutions. That is for the broader government – legislature, executive and judiciary – to work out. However, with the skill set that the author possesses, there must be ideas and these are stated in Part V – refinement of the IBC, and reform of the RBI and Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI).

‘There are too many questions. Is it a crisis? A game played by corporate India? It does not matter how we describe it – the fact is it spilled over to the real sector and created a crisis of confidence. What lies in the future? Should the DFIs come back? What should be the new landscape of banking: Co-existence of big banks and small banks? Should we have more banks or fewer banks? Will the bad banks and good banks continue to cohabit by the government’s indulgence? If all state-owned banks cannot be capitalised, the government must choose who should live and who should die. Can a few of them be privatised?’ These are meant to be regarded as rhetorical questions.

I have always been amused by the preamble to the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, which continues unamended: ‘And whereas in the present disorganisation of the monetary systems of the world it is not possible to determine what will be suitable as a permanent basis for the Indian monetary system; but whereas it is expedient to make temporary provision on the basis of the existing monetary system, and to leave the question of the monetary standard best suited to India to be considered when the international monetary position has become sufficiently clear and stable to make it possible to frame permanent measures.’ The RBI was thus constituted.

The preamble does not matter, though in some cases, courts have considered preambles before delivering judgments. In practice, an unamended preamble does not matter, not for the RBI. But for Tamal’s book, I think it is some kind of a metaphor. We need to find permanent solutions, not just temporary ones, to identify the catharsis in the tragedy that this book has described. We have come a long way since the days of bank nationalisation and bank failures.

Nonetheless, there is a tragedy in the works and this is a wonderful book to understand that. Indeed, in some parts, it reads like a mystery. All mysteries deserve to be solved.

– Bibek Debroy

31 July 2020

Preface

I am neither a banker nor an economist. As a journalist covering India’s financial ecosystem, I have tried to explain the great Indian banking conundrum: Why is the banking system serving the world’s second-largest population and Asia’s third-largest economy such a poster child for chaos and non-performance?

The subject is complex and the story is still unfolding, almost every day. So, how should one deal with such a broad canvas? The choices before me included a linear, time-bound narration with facts and figures, citing central bank notifications, key research reports, court judgments and reports of investigative agencies. Or, I could go the easier, columnist route and offer pearls of wisdom on how the Indian banking system ended up piling up so much of bad debt and what I thought were the ways of stemming the rot.

I did not follow either of those paths because I did not want to write a historical case study. Nor do I want to presume that you know all that has transpired, and are only interested in how this mess can be fixed. What I have attempted to do is chronicle an important story, much of which has not fully been told, through real people who are integral to India’s banking ecosystem. These are characters who, with very few exceptions, are known, and in some cases heard, but never really understood – at least, until now.

To explain how I went about unravelling the tale of what happened in India’s banking system, let me start with Akira Kurosawa’s 1950 classic, Rashomon, which opens with a woodcutter and a priest sheltering from a downpour under the Rashomon gate of the ancient Japanese city of Kyoto. When a commoner joins them, they both begin recounting a disturbing incident.

The woodcutter says he found the body of a murdered Samurai in the forest three days ago. The priest adds that he saw the Samurai and a woman travelling the same day that the murder took place. Both men are later summoned to testify in court, where they are joined by a captured bandit, who claims responsibility for the rape and murder.

The film goes on to narrate three separate yet intertwined stories – of the bandit, the murdered woman and the Samurai – told with the help of a medium. Each story lends a fresh prism to what transpired, adding rich new layers of truth and perspective to the plot.

In the similar way, this book attempts to capture the multi-layered banking landscape in India through the distinct yet interlaced eyes of central bankers, commercial bankers, economists, analysts, bond and foreign exchange dealers and, finally, bank customers.

They all have different stories to relate but these are all threads of the same narrative, which I have tried to weave together across 17 chapters grouped into five sections and a series of charts. Each chapter could be a book by itself.

The first chapter, ‘Who Killed Indian Banks?’, tries to dispassionately examine how and why many public sector lenders are facing a mountain of bad assets that threatens to bury many of them.

The second chapter is about how the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) decided to tackle bad loans through an aggressive policy launched by then governor Raghuram Rajan, and continued even more zealously by his short-lived successor, Urjit Patel.

The third chapter deals with the crisis that gripped India’s non-banking financial companies (NBFCs) because of classic asset–liability mismatches, while the fourth chapter takes a close look at the role of rating agencies in the NBFC crisis.

These four chapters make up the first section of the book.

The second section focusses on public sector banks (PSBs), the mainstay of India’s banking system, across three chapters dealing with what ails them, the issues caused by endless capital infusions from the government, and the ultimate solution that the government has found – consolidation.

The third section of the book has three chapters dealing with the world of fraud, the fear psychosis that has gripped bankers because of hyperactive investigative agencies, and a look at two fallen angels: Chanda Kochhar, CEO of ICICI Bank Ltd and Rana Kapoor, founder and promoter of Yes Bank Ltd.

The fourth section is a critical insights-rich core of the book. It features candid interviews with not one but four past governors – C. Rangarajan, Y.V. Reddy, D. Subbarao and Raghuram Rajan – who, in theory and in practice, held immense power as independent custodians and regulators and with a few exceptions have rarely spoken publicly about this topic. They spoke with unusual candour on everything we wanted to know about what exactly transpired across Indian banking.

I got to know what went wrong, the how and why, and, critically, the possible way forward from four men – yes there has not yet been a woman governor of RBI in its 85 years – who know and care deeply about India and her future.

Two of the chapters in the fifth section deal with the changes to India’s insolvency law, the need for the RBI to reinvest in its own capabilities to regulate and oversee the banking system and maintain financial stability.

The last chapter in this section is on the challenging road that lies ahead for India’s banking system. Spread across 1.56 lakh branches, managed by 1.4 million employees, catering to over 1,000 million customers, a healthy banking sector is essential to drive India’s domestic and global aspirations.

The last section offers up a series of charts that tell the story of Indian banking and how it has evolved through the past few decades.

Finally, why do I name this book Pandemonium?

The literal meaning of pandemonium is a wild and noisy disorder or confusion; uproar – a situation in which a crowd of people act in a wild, uncontrolled, or violent way because they are afraid, excited, or confused. This is typically short-lived but the chaos in Indian banking is decades old.

John Milton coined this word in his poem Paradise Lost. Pandæmonium, as the capital of Hell is known in the epic poem, combines the Greek prefix pan-, meaning ‘all’ or ‘every’, with the Late Latin daemonium, meaning ‘little spirit’, ‘little angel’, or, as Christians interpreted it, ‘little daemon’, and later, ‘demon’. It roughly translates as ‘All Demons’ but can also be interpreted as ‘all-demon-place’.

In Hindu mythology, when the asuras defeated the devas in a battle and took over the universe, what followed was churning the ocean or samudra-manthan to get the nectar of immortality. That released the lethal poison known as ‘Halahala’. Shiva consumed the poison to protect the world. In the process, he got a blue hue in his throat – he became Nilkantha.

The Indian banking system has also been through the manthan. The RBI did the churning through its asset quality review (AQR), releasing the poison in the form of bad loans. The book chronicles the manthan and the search for a Shiva to consume the poison, protect the system and take it forward.

Dear reader, if you enjoyed this saga and have come away with a richer understanding of what happened and what might lie ahead, the credit goes to the countless people who spoke to me, narrating their personal and professional stories, explaining intricate nuances with patience and leading me through the journey that became this book. And, if you find the end result wanting, then the blame lies squarely with me.

Happy reading,

Tamal

Acknowledgements

This book, my sixth, is the outcome of painstaking research, analysis of reams of data and hundreds of hours of interviews on and off the record, in India and globally, with central bankers, commercial bankers, economists, treasury managers, research analysts, rating agency executives, lawyers and senior staff of investigative agencies, and many banking customers.

Let me start by thanking Bibek Debroy, chairman of the Prime Minister’s Economic Advisory Council. I asked him to write the foreword to a book that I had not yet written even a single word. He agreed instantly, which in itself was a big vote of confidence ahead of a daunting task.

I also thank Deepak Parekh, chairman, HDFC Ltd; Krishnamurthy Subramanian, chief economic adviser, Government of India; Rajiv Kumar, vice chairman, NITI Aayog; T.N. Ninan, chairman, Business Standard Pvt Ltd; Uday Kotak, MD and CEO, Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd; U.K. Sinha, former chairman, SEBI; and Vijay Kelkar, chairman, India Development Foundation, for their liberal endorsements of the book.

Four past governors of the RBI – C. Rangarajan, Y.V. Reddy, D. Subbarao and Raghuram Rajan – were equally forthcoming, making the book deeply insightful with their candid views on Indian banking. Each of them spent long hours with me, answering every question, however uncomfortable and pointed, and putting up with my initial lack of understanding on many of the nuances they lived with in their roles.

Six past RBI deputy governors – Anand Sinha, K.C. Chakrabarty, S.S. Mundra, R. Gandhi, H.R. Khan and N.S. Vishwanathan – and retired executive directors Sudarshan Sen, Meena Hemchandra and Uma Shankar helped me better understand the intricacies of many RBI policies.

Similarly, three former chairmen of SBI – Rajnish Kumar, Arundhati Bhattacharya and Pratip Chaudhuri – offered me rich insights into how a major lender functions, especially in times of difficulty.

I am also thankful to V.G. Kannan, former CEO of Indian Banks’ Association; veteran bankers A.K. Khandelwal, Birendra Kumar, P.H. Ravikumar, R.K. Bansal and G. Padmanabhan, non-executive chairman of Bank of India.

Vishnu Vaidyanathan, a corporate banking professional with a multinational bank, was of immense help in my research on a wide range of subjects.

My former colleague Somnath Dasgupta, a veteran journalist and editor, was the first reader for many of the draft chapters. He corrected many mistakes and gave me ideas on how to improve the narration. Nabeel Mohideen, a friend and colleague for more than three decades, has always been a sounding board. And, Devangshu Datta, whose interests range from markets to chess, bridge, sex and religion, asked many questions and gave me ideas to make the text smarter.

My first boss in Mint and a friend for the past 14 years, Raju Narisetti, has always been one call away for any help I seek. Thank you.

I relied on research reports by Ashish Gupta of Credit Suisse, Vishal Goyal of UBS and Renny Thomas, senior partner, McKinsey & Company, as well as publications from Nomura, Macquarie, CRISIL, ICRA, Liases Foras, Jeffries, and have liberally quoted from the columns of Bloomberg columnist Andy Mukherjee.

I have also delved into many of my own ‘Banker’s Trust’ columns that appeared in Mint from early 2007 until late 2018, and, since then, in Business Standard. I thank both newspapers, as well as the Indian Express, the Economic Times, Money Control, Moneylife, Outlook Business, the Times of India, BBC, Press Trust of India, Reuters and Bloomberg for some of the reporting that filled gaps in my writing for the book.

One chapter of this book is based on a series of articles I had written for Mint, along with Achintan Bhattacharya, former director of National Institute of Bank Management.

I have also quoted from a news story by Varun Sood that was posted on LinkedIn.

For helping source information and transcribe a few interviews, my thanks go to Pruvasha Sinha, an associate in equity sales with an investment bank; Sanchit Agarwal, an investment analyst with Windrose Capital; and my former colleague Ravindra Sonavane.

Kapil Kapoor of Roli Books came up with the idea of telling India’s banking story and Pramod Kapoor, founder of the publishing house, was of great support along the way. I also thank Neelam Narula and the team at Roli Books for their sincere efforts.

If I have inadvertently missed out on mentioning any name, my sincere apology and there are many who spoke to me on background that I am grateful for but can’t name here. You know who you are and how much you have helped me.

My son Sujan, studying in the US, religiously called every night (morning for him) to check on the progress of the book, while wife Rita took care of all household chores, especially during the Covid-19 lockdown in Mumbai, so I could spend as much time as I needed to complete the project. My love and gratitude to both of them.

Finally, Gogal, as always, was my constant companion until the wee hours, patiently lying at my feet, with an occasional disapproving yawn, when I stayed up beyond 3 am working away on the chapters.

Thank you

PART I

THE CONUNDRUM

In October 2019, India’s Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman spoke about the Indian economy at Columbia University. After she listed the Narendra Modi government’s achievements, she took questions. Somebody cited former Reserve Bank of India (RBI) governor Raghuram Rajan’s comment that the first Modi government had not done well because it was ‘extremely centralised’.

Sitharaman riposted that the government-owned banks had their worst phase when Rajan was the RBI governor and Manmohan Singh the prime minister.

‘What ails our banks today? Where has it been inherited from?’ she asked.

Attempting to answer that question leads us into the first part of this book. Multiple factors contributed to the piling up of the mountain of bad loans. These negative factors were interwoven into the fabric of Indian banking in such a way that it is hard to identify a single main culprit:

Was it the surge in bank credit during the golden growth era of 2006–08?

Was it the 1990s decision to bury development finance institutions?

Was it the shallow corporate bond market?

Was it the RBI’s ultra-loose monetary policy after the 2008 financial crisis?

Were banks to blame for being innovative in concealing non-performing assets (NPAs) or bad loans?

Was it the so-called ‘policy paralysis’ in the latter stages of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) regime that ended in 2014?

Rajan went to war against the piling up of NPAs and his successor Urjit Patel intensified the battle to recognise bad assets. But the contagion also spread as the non-banking financial companies (NBFCs) were engulfed by NPAs, after the 2016 demonetisation.

While the system was flush with money, the banks had turned cautious because they were already burdened with NPAs. The NBFCs rushed to fill the void but they committed the cardinal sin of borrowing short and lending long.

The collapse of Infrastructure Leasing & Financial Services Ltd (IL&FS) in July 2018 started a forest fire that spread quickly, singeing many in the financial sector. The government was eventually forced to take drastic action. We discuss alternative firefighting methods which could have been tried.

Finally, in this section, I dissect the role of rating agencies. Were some raters compromised, or was it just plain inefficiency or incompetence?

The section winds up with a brief outline on how the maladies could be treated.

1

Who Killed Indian Banking?

PART 1

Scene: The Jerome L. Greene Hall at Columbia University.

Date: Tuesday, 15 October 2019.

Dramatis Personae: India’s Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman Professor Arvind Panagariya, moderator.

A hundred-odd students of the School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA).

Many well-known economists, finance professionals and fund managers.

The Deepak and Neera Raj Center on Indian Economic Policies at Columbia University is a relatively young institution. But it has turned the hosting of Indian finance ministers into a tradition. At its inauguration in October 2015, the keynote address was delivered by the late Arun Jaitley, who was then the finance minister. Jaitley spoke at this venue again in October 2017.

This is Sitharaman’s first visit. She read out a speech on ‘Indian Economy: Prospects and Challenges’, after announcing that she looked forward to a free-wheeling audience interaction.

Professor Panagariya served as the first vice chairman of the Government of India think-tank, NITI Aayog, from January 2015 to August 2017 before he returned to his tenured position at Columbia. (The ex-officio chairman of NITI is the prime minister.)

The audience also included Panagariya’s thesis adviser, Jagdish Bhagwati, the renowned professor of economics, law and international relations, at Columbia University. Sitharaman confessed Bhagwati’s presence made her ‘a bit nervous’.

In her 24-minute prepared speech, she claimed that India’s vision of becoming a $5 trillion economy by 2024–25 was ‘challenging but realisable’. She also touched upon other measures taken by the Indian government such as a commitment to fiscal consolidation, a new insolvency law, injection of capital into government-owned banks, consolidation of the banking sector, liquidity support to non-banking financial companies, corporate tax cuts, etc.

Panagariya moderated the interactive session that followed.

The first three questions were on a possible cut in personal income tax, the effects of the November 2016 demonetisation and the case for doing it again (amidst audience laughter) and the ease of doing business.

Sitharaman responded confidently.

Then a gentleman read out this question: ‘Ma’am, so, there is no doubt that the Indian economy has done better since the NDA (Bharatiya Janata Party-led National Democratic Alliance) came to power in 2014. But you obviously had to face your fair share of criticism globally. I recently came across a lecture delivered by Dr. Raghuram Rajan at Brown University and one of the points he mentioned was why didn’t Modi-1 do better on the Indian economy. [This is] Because the government is extremely centralised and the leadership does not appear to have a consistent, articulated vision on how to achieve economic growth. What would be your view on this?’

Sitharaman took her time: ‘It has several layers of observations. Let me put it that way and I would want you to give me the benefit of reading it over again so that I can jot it down and I give you a pointed reply. Would you please do that again?’

The gentleman: ‘Should I read it out again?’

Sitharaman’s answer: ‘Yeah. Read it out again.’

The gentleman: ‘Sure. Because the government is extremely centralised and the leadership does not appear to have a consistent, articulated vision on how to achieve economic growth.’

Sitharaman paused, and looked disturbed. Then she smiled and said: ‘I am taking a minute to respond because I do respect Raghuram Rajan as a great scholar, who chose to be in the central bank in India at a time when the Indian economy was all buoyant, yet I cannot but mention it now that the banks in India… and you are all aware only a few days ago the Economist has written about the state of Indian banks. Yet, to link with the statement, it was in his time that loans were given just based on phone calls from crony leaders and public sector banks (PSBs) in India till today are depending on government’s equity infusion to get out of that mire.

‘Dr. Manmohan Singh was the prime minister and I am sure Dr. Raghuram Rajan will agree that Dr. Manmohan Singh would have had a consistent, articulated vision for India. (Audience laughs.)

‘With due respect, I am not making fun of anybody, but I certainly want to put this forward for a comment which has come like this.

‘I have no reason to doubt that Dr. Raghuram Rajan feels every word of what he is saying and I am here today giving him his due respect, but also placing the fact before you that Indian public sector banks did not have a worst (sic) phase than when the combination of Dr. Manmohan Singh and Dr. Raghuram Rajan as prime minister and the governor of Reserve Bank had.

‘At that time, none of us knew about it. There was an asset quality review which Dr. Raghuram Rajan did, which I am very happy about – very grateful that he did it. But I am sorry. Can all of us put together also think of what ails our banks today? Where has it been inherited from?

‘So, it’s very well… Dr. Bhagwati is here, Dr. Panagariya is here, I am sure there are many more economists among us who can take a view of what prevails today; of what prevailed 50 years ago.

‘But I would also want answers for the time when Dr. Raghuram Rajan was in the governor’s post speaking about the Indian banks – for which today, to give a lifeline is the primary duty of the finance minister of India. And the lifeline, kind of an emergency, has not come overnight.

‘So, if there is a feeling that there has been a centralised leadership now, I like to say that a very democratised leadership led to a whole lot of corruption… Very democratised leadership. The prime minister, after all, is the first among equals in any Cabinet. We have after all inherited the Westminster [model]. Haven’t we?

‘You need to have a country as diverse as India with an effective leadership. A rather too democratic leadership – which probably will have the approval of quite a lot of liberals – I am afraid, left behind such a nasty stink of corruption which we are cleaning up even today.

‘So, very well, I respect his views but if I am given the opportunity – now that you have given me an opportunity – I like to give my view with due respects to Dr. Raghuram Rajan and his knowledge.’

The moment she stopped, many hands were raised (for asking questions) and the audience started clapping.

The moderator, Panagariya, said: ‘Well, you know, the next time you go to hear Dr. Raghuram Rajan, you have got your question.’

That eased the tension. Everyone, including a visibly relaxing Sitharaman, laughed.

Who Killed Indian Banking?

A fortnight later, (31 October), the TV Channel CNBC did exactly what Panagariya suggested: It asked Rajan about Sitharaman’s comment. He replied: ‘I had eight months in the previous [UPA-II] government and I had 26 months under this [NDA] government. So much of my term [as RBI governor] was under this government.’

Rajan added, ‘Let me not get into a political back and forth. The reality is, there is a clean up which we started, which is underway, which needs to be completed fast. The recapitalisation has to be done, but it also has to be done in the non-bank financial sector which is seizing up. And, you need to clean up, and get the financial system going again if you want stronger growth.

‘There are people who say Why did we do the clean up, we could have gone on? (But) we simply couldn’t have gone on because banks were stopping lending because their balance sheets were getting clogged with non-performing loans. So, you had to force recognition and recapitalisation to set them back on track,’ he added.

That job was, he said, ‘half-finished right now’ and ‘it has to be finished.’

Two years after he stepped down as RBI governor in 2016, Rajan prepared a 17-page note on bad loans in September 2018. This was at the request of Dr. Murli Manohar Joshi, a member of India’s Parliament and chairman of its Estimates Committee.

Through eight sections and seven charts, the note explains how bad loans were created, how the RBI tackled it, whether it could have been done differently and how to prevent a recurrence.

According to Rajan and others who track banking, the genesis of bad loans started in 2006–08. At that time, growth was strong and many infrastructure projects had been completed on time without cost overruns. So, the banks extrapolated past growth and performance and assumed this happy state of affairs would continue.

This led to a classic case of irrational exuberance, as the global financial crisis took hold and growth slowed down. Rajan, in this note, refers to a conversation with one promoter who said he was being wooed by bankers who were waving cheque books and asking him to quote the amount he wanted.

The Golden Era

India’s golden era of growth was between financial years 2005–06 and 2007–08 (April 2005 to March 2008 – India follows an April–March financial year), before the onset of the so-called Subprime crisis.

The gross domestic product (GDP) of the Indian economy grew at 9.5 per cent in 2005–06, 9.6 per cent in 2006–07 and 9.3 per cent in 2007–08, under the old national income accounts methodology. The average inflation (the yardstick for inflation calculation was the wholesale price index in those days) in 2006 was 4.42 per cent; in 2007, 6.59 per cent; and 2008, 4.74 per cent. The fiscal deficit, which was 3.96 per cent of GDP in 2006, dropped to 3.32 per cent in 2007 and further to 2.54 per cent in 2008.

The cocktail of high economic growth, even higher credit growth, low inflation and a reduced fiscal deficit led to risk-taking by corporations and banks. Bank credit grew at breakneck pace. Non-food credit – that is, commercial loans from banks – rose by 32.35 per cent year-on-year in 2006, 26.07 per cent in 2007 and 21.14 per cent in 2008. Economists say that bank credit should ideally grow at no more than three times the GDP growth rate. But in 2006, it clearly crossed that threshold.

In September 2008, the collapse of US investment bank, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., triggered a global financial crisis. Institutions all over the world with exposure to dodgy US mortgages suffered losses, or went bust.

The Reddy Regime

The RBI’s 21st governor, Y.V. Reddy, is widely credited for protecting India’s banking system from the impact of the global financial crisis. Reddy completed a five-year term in office on 5 September 2008, just over a week before Lehman went down.

In an interview with this author (Chapter 12), Reddy defends the high credit growth during his tenure, claiming it was not a bubble. An increase in household financial savings and a reduction in the government’s revenue deficit created the ideal situation for genuine growth, he says.

But of course, there were elements of a bubble, particularly in sectors like housing and infrastructure. Reddy sensed the impending storm and he successfully ring-fenced Indian banks from global turmoil, through a policy of monetary and regulatory tightening.

As the crisis loomed, Reddy raised the risk weight on banks’ exposure to commercial real estate, housing loans to individuals against mortgage of properties, consumer credit and capital market exposures.

Banks are required to keep capital in hand to be able to absorb the impact of potential bad loans. If a higher risk-weight is assigned to a given class of loans, the bank must set aside more capital for giving such loans. Hence, higher risk weights lead to higher cost of money for banks and higher interest rates for the borrowers. This discourages excessive lending and borrowing.

In central banking parlance, this is a ‘counter-cyclical’ measure. The RBI also hiked provisions for ‘standard assets’ (loans where interest and principal are repaid on time) progressively from 2005, and it clamped down on banks borrowing from other banks.

The banking sector’s gross bad loans were 3.3 per cent of the overall loan portfolio in 2006. This declined to 2.5 per cent in 2007 and 2.25 per cent in 2008. After provisions, net bad loans dipped to 1.2 per cent in 2006, and further reduced to 1 per cent in 2007 and 2008. However, this did not last. By 2018, gross bad loans had risen to 11.2 per cent, and net bad loans had risen to 6 per cent in 2018.

Death of DFIs

Although the irrational exuberance of 2006–08 may have led to risk-taking, there were other factors contributing to the malaise in banking. One of these was a policy decision taken way back in the 1990s, which, in turn, reversed a policy decision taken just after Independence.

A special class of lenders called development finance institutions (DFIs) were created just after Independence. The DFIs were promoted, owned, and assisted by the government to offer long-term project financing, particularly for infrastructure. Banks were meant to focus on short-term loans such as the working capital needs of commercial borrowers.

The logic was that banks borrow their funds through short-term loans – savings accounts can be closed anytime and even fixed deposits mature in a few years. However, infrastructure projects need long-term capital since projects have longer gestation periods.

The DFIs were meant to service such long-term needs. This was possible so long as they had access to low-cost, long-tenure financing. For decades, they had access to the low-cost National Industrial Credit Long Term Operations Fund, which was created out of the profits of the RBI. (The RBI generates profits through the so-called seigniorage on every bank note it prints since the cost of printing is less than the face-value beside buying and selling bonds in the open market and deploying foreign exchange reserves, among others.) The DFIs also raised cheap money through bonds, backed by government guarantees.

The first DFI was the Industrial Finance Corporation of India Ltd (IFCI), set up in 1948, under an Act of Parliament, to meet medium- and long-term financial needs. The Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India Ltd (ICICI) followed in 1955 and the Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI) was created in 1964 as a wholly-owned subsidiary of the RBI.

In the 1990s, policy changed and the DFIs started being phased out. It was assumed that long-term capital needs could also be serviced by scheduled commercial banks and the bond market.

The DFIs had to die because the windows for cheap money closed as reforms gathered pace after liberalisation in 1991. DFIs found themselves raising money through short-duration, high-cost financing and creating longer-maturity assets. This asset–liability mismatch was unsustainable.

Many believe that the death of the DFIs led to or contributed largely to a bad loan crisis in the 1990s. The peak of that wave of bad loans came in 1994 when 19.07 per cent of banking assets turned into gross bad loans, and 13.71 per cent turned into net bad loans after provisioning.

Nobody cares to look at IFCI today. It is now a listed penny stock which can be called a non-deposit-taking, non-banking financial company (NBFC) with a weak balance sheet.

Another DFI, IDBI struggled with increasing asset–liability mismatches before it became a ‘full-service universal bank’. This required complicated legal manoeuvres.

First, the Industrial Development Bank (Transfer of Undertaking and Repeal) Act 2003 gave it the status of a company. Then the RBI turned it into a scheduled bank in September 2004. IDBI’s own banking arm, which had been set up in 1994, was merged into the parent institution. This ‘infanticide’ was committed in 2005 to complete the transformation from DFI into bank.

A Government of India review in 2002 said, ‘Financial sector reforms, involving interest rate deregulation, increased competition from banks, and lack of concessional funds have rendered the business models of DFIs unsustainable.’

Nobody sheds tears for the DFIs but banks, which used to focus on working capital loans, struggled to learn the art of project lending. Even two decades down the line, they continue to stumble in this area. A deep corporate bond market might have made a difference, but such a market does not exist.

Project Dreams

The third large DFI, ICICI became a universal bank in 2002 by merging with its child, ICICI Bank Ltd. That banking arm was born in 1994 when the RBI granted licences to ten new banks.

The ICICI merger was quite dramatic. On 5 October 2000, ICICI’s managing director (MD) and chief executive officer (CEO), K.V. Kamath and his core team of Nachiket Mor, Chanda Kochhar and P.H. Ravikumar, along with ICICI Bank’s MD and CEO, H.N. Sinor, unveiled a road map to universal banking. The presentation was made to three RBI deputy governors – Reddy, S.P. Talwar and Jagdish Kapoor – at the 18th floor of the RBI’s headquarters on Mint Road, Mumbai.

Code-named ‘Project Dreams’, this was basically a reverse merger, where the smaller banking arm would take over the larger DFI. In about 20 minutes, Kamath’s team displayed 22 slides describing the path of migrating the DFI into a universal bank in most minute details.

Till 2013, ICICI Bank was among the biggest infrastructure lenders. But it then started to focus on retail and unsecured lending. In 2019, ICICI Bank would finally shut down its project financing division to reduce its exposure to long-term assets, especially in infrastructure.

Shallow Corporate Bond Market

‘There is no liquidity!’ A banker who started his career on the trading floor, and retired as the boss of a large PSB, once told me that in his 36-year career, he had never heard any other description of the corporate bond market.

This statement best sums up the problems. The lack of depth is one reason why long-term financing is high risk. Bonds are secured instruments, which allow funds to be raised for the long term, or even forever (in the case of perpetual bonds). If a bond-holder wishes to exit, she can sell the instrument in the secondary market. Hence, a bank which uses short-term financing, or a mutual fund facing redemption demands, can also pick up long-duration bonds without fears of asset–liability mismatch.

This of course, depends on a liquid secondary bond market where instruments are easily traded.