China and the Ports of the Indian Ocean

Copyright 2022 Richard T. Griffiths

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Contents

List of Figures

List of Tables

Abbreviations

Preface

Introduction

Chapter 1: Security Concerns in the Indo-Pacific

Blanca Marabini San Martín

1.1 Chinese Investment Trends in the Indian Ocean

1.2 Chinese Naval Power in the Indo-Pacific

1.3 Other Naval Powers in the Indo-Pacific: Tensions with China and Naval Assets

1.4 The Likelihood of a Military Clash in the Indo-Pacific

Chapter 2: Trade, Shipping and Ports in the Indian Ocean

Richard T. Griffiths

2.1 Ports, Ships, and Cargoes

2.2 Port Performance

2.3 Port Improvement and Enlargement

2.4 Conclusion

Chapter 3: Chabahar: Convergence of Regional Geopolitics

Ryan Mitra

3.1 Capacity and Capability

3.2 Geopolitics

3.2.1 The Host State

3.2.2 The Investing State

3.3 Networks

Chapter 4: Gwadar Port and China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)

Gul-i-Hina Shahzad-van der Zwan

4.1 Gwadar Port: Pre-CPEC (2000-2013)

4.2 Gwadar Port: Post-CPEC (2013-2022)

4.3 Domestic Challenges and Competing Interests

4.4 Conclusion

Chapter 5: Karachi/Qasim

Richard T. Griffiths

5.1 Karachi Port

5.2 Port Qasim

5.3 Performance

5.4 Future Prospects

Chapter 6: Nhava Sheva and the Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust (JNPT)

Richard T. Griffiths

6.1 The Indian Government and the ‘Major Ports’

6.2 Mumbai

6.3 Nhava Sheva

6.3.1 JNP Container Terminal

6.3.2 Nhava Sheva International Container Terminal

6.3.3 Shallow Berth

6.3.4 GTIPL Gateway Terminals India 2006 (APM)

6.3.5 Nhava Sheva India Gateway Terminals

6.3.6 Bharat Mumbai Container Terminal Phase 1

6.4 Performance

Chapter 7: Mundra and the Adani Ports

Richard T. Griffiths

7.1 Gautam Adani

7.2 Mundra

7.2.1 Dry and Liquid Bulk

7.2.2 Special Economic Zone

7.2.3 Container Terminals

7.3 Mundra Port Performance

7.4 Adani Ports Acquisitions

7.4.1 Dry Bulk Terminals

7.4.2 Hazira

7.4.3 Dhamra

7.4.4 Ennore (Kamarajar)

7.4.5 Kattupalli

7.5 Adani’s Shares in Indian Port Traffic, 2019

7.6 Future Developments

Chapter 8: The Hambantota Port and Sri Lanka’s Flirtation with China

Eyck Freymann

8.1 Ancient Maritime Ties

8.2 Strategic Promiscuity

8.3 Floating Hambantota

8.4 Announcing the Handover

8.5 Conclusions

Chapter 9: Colombo. South Asia’s Transshipment Hub

Richard T. Griffiths

9.1 Colombo Port

9.1.1 Queen Elizabeth Quay

9.1.2 Jaya Container Terminal

9.1.3 The Unity Container Terminal

9.1.4 Queen Elizabeth Quay/South Asia Gateway Terminal

9.2 Colombo Port Expansion (Colombo South Harbour)

9.2.1 Harbour Infrastructure Works

9.2.2 South (Colombo International Container) Terminal

9.2.3 East Container Terminal

9.2.4 West Container Terminal (WCT)

9.3 Competition

9.4 Colombo Port City

Chapter 10: Madras/Chennai Port

Richard T. Griffiths

10.1 Port Expansion

10.2 Port Performance

10.3 Port Competition

Chapter 11: Calcutta/Kolkata Port

Richard T. Griffiths

11.1 Kolkata Dock Complex

11.2 Haldia Port

11.3 The Search of a Deep-sea Site

11.3.1 Kulpi

11.3.2 Sagar Inland

11.3.3 Tajpur

11.4 Reflections

Chapter 12: Bangladesh, Bay of Bengal, and China’s Belt and Road Initiative

Moinul Islam

Chapter 13: Mongla Port

M Ziauddin Alamgir

13.1 Overview of Mongla Port

13.2 SWOT Analysis of Mongla Port

13.3 Impact of the MSR on Mongla Port

13.3.1 Challenges Militating against Mongla Port to be a Part of the MSR

13.3.2 Prospects of Mongla Port to be a Part of the MSR

13.3.3 Strategies to Mitigate Challenges Militating against Mongla Port to be a Part of the MSR

13.4 Conclusions

Chapter 14: Chittagong/Chattogram Port

Richard T. Griffiths

14.1 Port Development

14.2 Down River Expansion

Chapter 15: Sonadia and Matarbari. The Search for a Deep-Sea Port

Richard T. Griffiths

15.1 Sonadia

15.2 Matarbari Power Plants

15.3 Matarbari Deep-Sea Port

Chapter 16: Yangon and Thilawa

Richard T. Griffiths

16.1 Yangon Port

16.1.1 Asia World Port Management Terminals

16.1.2 Bo Aung Kyaw Terminal/The Myanmar Terminal (TMT)

16.1.3 Myanmar Industrial Port

16.1.4 Ahlone Industrial Port

16.0.5 Sule Pagoda Wharves

16.2 Thilawa

16.3 The Military Coup (February 2021)

Chapter 17: Sittwe, Kyaukphyu and Dawei. Myanmar’s Three Ports to Somewhere Else

Richard T. Griffiths and Merel van der Heijden

17.1 Sittwe Port

17.2 Kyaukphyu

17.3 Dawei

17.4 Conclusion

Chapter 18: The Malacca Dilemma

Elisenda Ventura Jariod

18.1 Geography anGeop-Politics

18.2 International Cooperation and Power Balance

18.3.1 China’s Energy Security

18.3 The BRI in the context of the Malacca Dilemma

18.4 The Polar Silk Road

18.5 Conclusions

Final Reflections

Land

Labour

Capital

Entrepreneurship

And the Chinese?

Notes on Contributors

LIST OF FIGURES

0.1. Unofficial Maps of the Belt and Road Initiative (2014)

0.2. The Real World of Ocean Shipping (February 2020)

1.1. The five theatres of operations of the PLA. 

2.1. Factors in Measuring Port Performance

3.1. Chabahar and Trade Routes from Afghanistan to India

3.2. Chabahar Port

4.1. Location of Pakistan’s Ports

4.2. Artist’s Impression of Gwadar’s Future

4.3. Gwadar Port

5.1. Karachi Port

5.2. Location of Karachi Port and Port Qasim

5.3. Port Qasim

5.4. Artist’s Impression of the Planned Karachi Comprehensive Development Zone

5.5. Artist’s Impression of the Karachi Port Expressway Project

6.1. Location of India’s ‘Major Ports’

6.2. Nhava Sheva Port

7.1. Mundra Port

7.2. Mundra South Port

7.3. Location of Adani Group Ports in India, 2021

8.1. Location of Sri Lanka’s Ports

8.2. Hambantota Port

9.1. Colombo Port and Colombo Port Expansion

9.2. Colombo Port

9.3. Colombo South Harbour

9.4. Artist’s Impression of Colombo International Financial City

10.1. Chennai Port

11.1. Kolkata Dock System

11.2. Haldia Port

11.3. Location of Kolkata, Haldia and three new sites

12.1. Location of the Bangladesh’s Main Port Projects

13.1. Mongla Port

13.2. Banknotes celebrating the Padma Bridge

14.1. Chattogram Port

14.2. Location of Chattogram Port and Port Expansion Sites

15.1. Sonadia Island Site

15.2. Matarbari Port Site

15.3. Artist’s Impression of Matarbari Port

16.1. Approaches to Yangon Port

16.2. Yangon Port

16.3. Thilawa Site

17.1. Location of Sittwe, Kyaukphyu, and Dawei and their hinterlands

17.2. Route from Sittwe to Aizawl

17.3. Route Kyaukphyu to Kunming

17.4. Route Dawei to Bangkok and beyond

18.1. Strategic Routes through the South China Sea

LIST OF TABLES

1.1. China’s Operational Missile Capabilities, 2020

1.2. Naval Asset distribution in the three PLAN fleets. 2020

1.3. Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Naval Forces 2020

1.4. Naval forces of key EU Member States present in the Indo-Pacific. Source: IISS, 2022

4.1. CPEC Gwadar Projects

5.1. Layout of Karachi Port

5.2. Layout of Port Qasim

6.1. Layout of Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust

7.1. Layout of Mundra’s Container Terminals

8.1. Chinese Infrastructure Loans in Hambantota District, 2007–2014

9.1. Improvements to Colombo Port

10.1. Layout of Chennai Port

13.1. Basic Structural and Technical Information of Mongla Port

13.2. Summary of SWOT Analysis

16.1. Layout of Yangon Port

ABBREVIATIONS

ADB Asia Development Bank

APL American President Lines (container shipping company)

APM A.P. Moller (port operator)

APSEZ Adani Ports and Special Economic Zone Ltd

ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations

AUKUS Australia-United Kingdom-USA (security partnership)

AWPM Asia World Port Management

BCIM-EC Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor

BIG-B Bay of Bengal Industrial Growth Belt

BJP Bharatiya Janata Party (India)

BLA Balochistan Liberation Army

BMCT Bharat Mumbai Container Terminal

BNP Bangladesh Nationalist Party

BOT Build-Operate-Transfer (infrastructure development agreement type)

BRI Belt and Road Initiative

CAR Central Asian Republics

CHEC China Harbour and Engineering Company

CICT Colombo International Container Terminal

CICT Chennai International Container Terminal

CITIC Group Formerly China International Trust Investment Corporation

CITPL Chennai International Terminals Pvt Ltd (port operator)

CMG China Merchants Group

CMPH China Merchants Ports Holdings

CMA-CGM Compagnie Maritime d’Affrètement and Compagnie Générale Maritime

Concor Container Corporation of India

COPHC China Overseas Port Holding Company

COSCO China Ocean Shipping CompanyCPA Chittagong Port Authority

CPC Communist Party of China

CPEC China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

CSC Sri Lanka Shipping Corporation

CSF Chinland Defense Force

DP-World Dubai Ports World

DSEZMC Dawei Special Economic Zone Management Committee

DWT Dead-weight tons

ECNEC Executive Committee of the National Economic Council

ECT East Container Terminal

EIA Energy Information Administration

EPZ Export Processing Zone

EU European Union

FDI Foreign direct investment

FSRU Floating Storage and Regasification Unit

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GTIPL Gateway Terminals India

Ha Hectare

HIPG Hambantota International Port Group

HIPS Hambantota International Port Services

IBTT International Bulk Terminal Thilawa

ICTSI International Container Terminal Services, Inc

IFC International Finance Corporation

IMF International Monetary Fund

IMO International Maritime Organization

INSTC International North–South Transport Corridor

IRCON Indian Railway Construction Ltd.

ISPS International Ship and Port Facility Security Code

ITD Company Italian-Thai Development Company

JCT Jaya Container Terminal

JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency

JNPCT Jawaharlal Nehru Port Container Terminal

JNPT Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust

KICT Karachi International Container Terminal

Km Kilometres

KMMTTP Kaladan Multi Modal Transit Transport Project

KoPT Kolkata Port Trust

KPT Karachi Port Trust

KRDA Kyaukphyu Rural Development Association

LDC Least Developed Country

LIBOR London interbank Offering RateLNG Liquefied natural gas

LOA Length Overall

LPG Liquefied Petroleum Gas

m Metres

MAS Myanmar Annawa Swan A Shin Group

MICT Mundra International Container Terminal

MIDPL Marine Infrastructure Developer Private Limited

MITT Myanmar International Terminals, Thilawa

MOU Memorandum of Understanding

MPA Mongla Port Authority

MPA Myanmar Port Authority

MSC Mediterranean Shipping Company

MSR Maritime Silk Road

mt Million tonnes

MTEUS Million twenty-foot equivalent units (standard containers)

mtpa Million tonnes per annum

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCT New Mooring Container Terminal

NFC National Finance Commission

NSICT Nhava Sheva International Container Terminal

NSIGT Nhava Sheva India Gateway Terminal

OBOR One Belt One Road

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

ONE Ocean Network Express

OOCL Orient Overseas Container Line

OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

OSR Overland Silk Road

PA Port Authority

PCI Pacific Consultant International

PIBT Pakistan International Bulk Terminal

PICT Pakistan International Container Terminal Ltd

PLA People’s Liberation Army

PLAN People’s Liberation Army, Navy

PML-N Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz

PMS Premier Mercantile Shipping

PMSC Private Maritime Security Company

PPC Port-Park-City (development model)

PPP public-private partnerships

PQA Port Mohammed bin Qasim Authority

PRC People’s Republic of China

PSA Port of Singapore Authority

PSDP Public Sector Development Program

PTI Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf

QEQ Queen Elizabeth Quay

QICT Qasim International Container Terminal

QUAD Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Australia, India, Japan, US)

RO-RO Roll-on, Roll-off

RSGT Red Sea Gateway Terminal

SAGT South Asia Gateway Terminal

SEZ Special Economic Zone

SLOC Sea Lanes of Communication

SLPA Sri Lanka Port Authority

SOE State-owned enterprise

SPM Single Point Mooring

SSBN Submarine-nuclear powered-ballistic

SSK Submarine-hunter killer

SSN Submarine-nuclear powered

SWOT Strengths-Weaknesses-Opportunities-Threats

TAMP Tariff Authority for Major Ports

TEUS Twenty-foot equivalent (standard container)

TIDCO Tamilnadu Industrial Development Corporation

TMIT Thilawa Multipurpose International Terminal

TMT The Myanmar Terminal (formerly Bo Aung Kyaw Terminal)

UAE United Arab Emirates

UK United Kingdom

UNCTAD United Nations Commission for Trade and Development

US/USA United States of America

USGS United States Geological Survey

WCT Western Container Terminal

WWF World Wildlife Fund

Tons. In all cases weights are expressed as metric tonnes (1000kgs). It the text, however, we have used ‘tons’ throughout.

$ US dollar. All currency measures are expressed in current US dollars, converted at the rate prevailing at the time.

PREFACE

This is a COVID-19 book. Conceived just as the pandemic erupted, the book’s authorship was decimated by sickness, worry and work-related stress. Some authors withdrew, others simply stopped corresponding. Substitutes disappeared at almost the same rate as they were found. As is a result, it is a shorter book than originally envisaged. Had everyone withdrawn at the same time I would simply have abandoned the whole project. But they didn’t. As each one withdrew, there was always the decision that the chapter was too important to miss but there was enough time to write it myself. And with each successive withdrawal, growing familiarity with the sources made it easier for me to undertake the next. This is why the editor of this book has also contributed over half of the chapters.

It remains for me, therefore, to thank all of the authors who, although beset by their own challenges, cheerfully respected (shifting) deadlines and accepted requests for revisions. I would like also to thank Merel van der Heijden for her help as research assistant and for her contribution to our joint chapter and to Blanca Marabini San Martin, who worked with the New Silk Roads project as a researcher and who also helped edit the final document. My thanks, too, to my friend and IIAS research fellow Gul-i-Hana Shahzad van der Zwan for her support and insights into the workings of China’s Belt and Road Initiative in the Pakistani context. Finally, I must thank all of my colleagues at the International Institute for Asian Studies for their support in this venture.

Richard T. Griffiths

Leiden, September 2022

INTRODUCTION

This book deals with two forces that are occurring simultaneously, that may or may not have implications for each other. The first one is the changing balance of economic power in the world, which inevitably means that some economies are expanding faster than others. This economic growth is accompanied by increased engagement with other countries, either to secure raw materials or to access new markets. They become more visible, they exercise more influence and they become more powerful. Since the Second World War this has happened in several regions of the World, in each case challenging the dominance of the United States. In the 1960s it was Germany, in the 1970s it was Japan, in the 1980s and 90s it was Southeast Asia and, since the 2000s it has been China and, most recently, the countries of the Indian Ocean. But only in the case of China has China’s ‘rise’ morphed into a ‘challenge’ and subsequently into a ‘threat’. As a result, every transaction which with any other country would pass for ‘normal’ becomes imbued with a strategic intent. If, at the same time, China is modernising and expanding its military and naval capabilities, the threat becomes more daunting.

The second force lies at that interface between growth and exchange, that need for fuel, raw materials and markets. To reach these trading partners requires increased the means to trade – trucks and trains, roads and rails on land, and ships and ports at sea. More trade means more capacity to trade, and that entails more investment in infrastructure. If, as is indeed the case, most of that trade is conducted by sea, this demand for infrastructure becomes apparent in the need for larger and more developed ports. This has happened in China. Twenty years ago, China has two ports that ranked among the top ten in the world (Shanghai and Ningbo); today it has seven. It is also starting to happen in Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Myanmar, sometimes supported by government funds, sometimes by private enterprise and sometimes with foreign capital and expertise. Almost inevitably, when that foreign interest is China, the intention is always suspect.

Hence the title of the book:

China and the Ports of the Indian Ocean

The choice of title is always difficult. The effect of placing China first is to imply that it is the main factor in the dynamic of Indian Ocean Port development. This would certainly coincide with the dominant geo-political, geo-strategic discourse, a discourse that also carries the expectation that China is the only independent force in the equation, negating the motivations and capacities of other actors. It also has the effect that, by placing China centrally in the framing of the question, it will inevitably become the main part of the answer. We could equally have reversed the title, or even have omitted the China altogether (but, dear reader, would you now be reading these words). This would have focussed the attention on the multiple actors and agencies involved in helping, and as often, hindering the much-needed improvements in port capacities and efficiency. As a foreign financier/builder/operator, China would have appeared among all the other nations vying for a role in the ports of the region.

In 1945, Kavalam Madhava Panikkar wrote in his book on the importance of the Indian Ocean to India’s development, ‘He who rules the sea will shortly rule the land also’. He asserted that unless the Indian Ocean were free and its shores protected, nothing for India was possible - no development, no commerce, and no stability. ‘The Indian Ocean must therefore remain truly Indian’. Thirty-five years later, reflecting on the impact of growing Soviet naval power on global geo-strategy, the Italian journalist, Guido Gerosa, echoed this sentiment, writing ‘Whoever controls the Indian Ocean controls Asia. The ocean is the key to the seven seas’. Since then, if anything, the centrality of the Indian Ocean to world development has only increased. The journey of much oil and gas begins through its waters and the vessels serving the growing trade between the industrial giants of Europe and East Asia plough through its waves. By the early 1990s, the Soviet naval threat had receded and the tranquillity of the Indian Ocean seemed guaranteed by a string of US naval bases and the presence of the Fifth Fleet. That sense of security began to evaporate at the start of the present century, with the increased presence of Chinese investments in the area, especially in Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The idea emerged that port investments in these countries represented a deliberate Chinese strategy to create a ‘string of pearls’ of potential Chinese naval bases and to strengthen diplomatic ties. The concept of a string of pearls gained quite a cult following in the ensuing years, even if only to temper expectations of its probable realisation. At the same time, the centrality of the Indian Ocean for the safety of China’s trade routes also began to loom large in India’s own security discourse.

Since the introduction of economic reforms in 1989, the rise of China has been a familiar feature of economic or political discourse. Year-on-year double digit growth rates propelled the country through the size rankings until it has become the second largest economy in the world; second only to the United States. To help secure raw materials for the burgeoning economy, China intensified its economic interests in the African continent, with substantial investments in extractive industries and the extension of credits to improve the transport infrastructure. Meanwhile, foreign direct investment (FDI) flowed into the country and transformed its manufacturing sector into (to use a 19th century analogy) a ‘factory of the world’. This was reflected in huge balance of payments surpluses and growing reserves of foreign exchange. In 1999, the country’s leaders urged Chinese businesses to ‘go out’ and look for opportunities to invest abroad, to secure markets and obtain access to new technologies and practices. Finally, in 2013, the recently elected president, Xi Jinping, made two speeches, in Kazakhstan and Indonesia, in which he enlisted the spirit of the ancient Silk Road. He offered the nations of Central Asia and ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) respectively the chance to share in China’s prosperity by increasing their mutual interdependence and by benefitting from Chinese loans and investments in improving their infrastructure. It was not until almost eighteen months later that the details of the scale and scope of the ‘Belt and Road’ initiative (BRI) became clear – the belts representing overland trade routes and development corridors, and the road representing a Maritime Silk Road (MSR). In this interval, the Chinese news agency Xinhua published two unofficial maps purporting to show the cities already connected with the BRI (Figure 0.1). Since they were first published these maps have appeared, sometimes in modified form, in countless publications and on countless websites. In later use, the overland part of the map has often been changed to show either BRI development corridors or the main transcontinental railway lines. More often than not, however, the lower part, reflecting the MSR is left unchanged.

Figure 0.1. Unofficial Maps of the Belt and Road Initiative (2014)

There are several objections to the use of these maps, but let us focus on two. The first issue is that several of the cities placed on the map do not have any Chinese port interests, whether construction, finance, or operation. Jakarta is the start of a Chinese financed and Chinese built high-speed rail project connecting it to Bandung. Similarly, Mombasa is the starting point of a Chinese funded conventional rail link with Nairobi. Kolkata was the anchor for a proposed development corridor linking the city to Kunming (passing through Bangladesh and Myanmar) that collapsed when India lost interest. The second objection is that the lines joining the ports are utterly meaningless. It is highly unlikely that any shipping line would have a journey following the routes indicated by the lines on the map and improbable that Mombasa to Piraeus (Greece) or Mombasa to Kolkata would ever have more than incidental traffic. The effect of the lower part of the map, however, is to reinforce an image of a pervasive and enveloping Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean, rather like a ‘string of pearls’. The screenshot shown in Figure 0.2, captured on the eve of the COVID-19 pandemic, shows the real time location of cargo ships (dark) and tankers (light). There are many more at off-shore anchorages or in the ports themselves. The map reflects the complexity of ocean shipping and it demonstrates the senselessness of drawing lines on the seas. On the other hand, it does show the centrality of the Indian Ocean. Virtually 40% of world sea-borne merchandise trade passes through its waters.

Figure 0.2. The Real World of Ocean Shipping (February 2020)

This volume explores the ports of the Indian Ocean and the dynamics behind their development, including the influence of China. It concentrates on five countries – from west to east, they are Pakistan, India, Sri-Lanka, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. They are home to over 1.8 billion people, more than 23% of the world’s population. Before the onset of the pandemic, India, Bangladesh, and Myanmar had been among the fastest growing economies in the world, with annual average growth rates between 2010 and 2019 of over 6%. This economic growth has propelled these countries onto world markets, although for many the trade dependence (expressed relative to gross domestic product in 2019) remains low. In each case, the overwhelming majority of that trade was conducted by sea. This means that the economic development and prosperity of each country hinges on its ability to expand the capacity and increase the efficiency of its ports. Inefficient and overburdened ports can be the source of delays, imposing extra costs on the economy and undermining its competitiveness. The challenge for the ports of the Indian Ocean, of course, is to maintain the progress in the face of increasing demand. This requires both the physical space to allow expansion, and investment in new equipment and facilities. The funding for those investments may come from government grants, reinvested profits from port authorities and share and bond issues to the public, and private direct investment (often on the basis of a long-term lease) and foreign loans (both commercial and concessionary). The last two of these sources – direct investment and loans - may well involve foreign countries, including China.

There are many actors involved in the maritime development of the Indian Ocean nations. In comparison with others, is China’s role large or small? Are its effects beneficial or pernicious? Are its intentions benign or aggressive? In its dealings with other countries, are Chinese actors more or less powerful than others? In preparing this volume, we adopted no a-priori position in this debate. The authors were left completely free to choose their stance. This is reflected in the different chapters.

The first chapter accepts that there is a ‘string of pearls’ logic to China’s participation in port development and even accepts that commercial ports are capable of being configured for naval purposes. However, instead of stopping the analysis at that point, as do most of the geo-political publications, it provides a detailed account of China’s naval build-up and capacities in various operational theatres. The build-up is indeed large and fast, but the naval forces at the country’s command not as impressive as the potential forces aligned against it in the event of a conflict. The conclusion is that China’s potential presence in the Indian Ocean might seem threatening, it does not actually constitute an immediate threat.

The second chapter starts by exploring the nature of international maritime trade. It shows that most maritime trade by volume involves the trade of homogeneous ‘bulk’ commodities – dry such as minerals or coal and liquid/gaseous commodities such as oil or LNG (liquefied natural gas). The largest category by value, however, are manufactured goods which nowadays are carried in containers. Ports face a double challenge in the forms of the growing volumes of all cargo flows, and the growing size of the vessels that carry them. The failure to cope adequately with either of these challenges will lead to congestion at ports and delays in deliveries.

The first port studied is the port of Chabahar in Iran. At the moment, the port is being developed by India in an attempt to obtain access to Afghanistan and Central Asia, which it cannot easily do through Pakistan because of the diplomatic tension between the two countries. It is also 170 kms from the Chinese supported and constructed port in Gwadar, Pakistan and if often portrayed as its geo-strategic rival. The chapter denies any dual-use intention or capacity for Chabahar and describes its future commercial potential, as long as the USA acquiesces in the current situation.

Chapter Four turns the attention to Gwadar, itself – a small fishing port exulted in the official literature to the status of ‘crown jewel’ of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The port is the intended anchor of a transport corridor providing Kashgar, in Xinjiang, with easier access to the sea. The chapter eschews any naval or strategic purpose in the project. However, despite the economic imperative, progress has been slow, due to unrest in the region and tensions with the central government. Nonetheless, within a comprehensive development scheme, and with Chinese investment, the author is optimistic over the port’s future.

This optimism over Gwadar’s future is not shared by Chapter Five, which examines the development of the ‘twin’ ports of Karachi and Port Qasim, which together take up 95% of Pakistan’s international trade. Despite their limitations of both ports, recent CPEC plans to expand the area near Karachi Port into a coastal development zone, with extra container berths, together with the publication of a World Bank study promoting a new bridge to relieve traffic congestion around the port, suggest that they are not ready to surrender traffic to Gwadar.

Chapter Six starts by examining the Indian government’s role in control over the country’s ‘major ports’ that, up until thirty years ago, were responsible for most of the country’s international maritime trade. The largest of these is the Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust (JNPT) founded in the 1980s as an overflow port for Mumbai. It has recently become the first ‘major port’ to have hived off all its terminals to private port operators. All this success, however, has failed to prevent it losing its top spot as India’s largest container port to Mundra, a privately owned and operated port nearly 1,000 kms to the north.

The development of Mundra, the flag-ship port of the Adani group, is the focus of Chapter Seven. From a single jetty and a large plot of land, thirty years ago, the port of Mundra has expanded until it became India’s single largest container port. Moreover, with port acquisitions elsewhere in the country, the Adani group accounted for well over one third of India’s entire container throughput. Furthermore, Adani has long been developing port and coal-mine interest in Australia and has recently taken a 70% holding in the Israeli port of Haifa. The contrast with the for long over-regulated JNPT could not be starker.

With Chapters Eight and Nine, the focus of the volume moves to Sri Lanka. Chapter Eight begins by tracing the country’s political development, especially after the end of the civil war, before moving to consider the development of the Chinese funded and operated port of Hambantota. The chapter quickly disposes of Hambantota’s role as ‘poster-child’ for the common accusation that Chinese infrastructure aid is a form of ‘debt entrapment’ and emphasises instead the role of local actors in the critical decision-making. Long seen as something of a white elephant, the port has emerged as a transshipment hub for motor vehicles. Chapter Nine concentrates on the development of the port of Colombo, which has grown into the largest port in the region, thanks to a prescient decision to accommodate container traffic. It owes its size to its role as a transshipment hub, with over 60% of its cargo destined for India and the Middle East. Its ability to maintain that position depends on its capacity for further growth which, in its turn, depends on managing competing interests within the port. China is engaged in building the latest addition to the port, and India’s Adani group has an option to build the following extension, as India tries to re-establish its influence in the country.

Chapters Ten and Eleven examine ports on the east coast of India. The port of Chennai (formerly Madras) is dealt with in Chapter Ten. Its growth has been hampered by the fact that it is hemmed in by the city, and that it has failed in its efforts to expand into a new basin on reclaimed land further along the shore-line. The enforced loss of polluting bulk traffic (coal and fertiliser) to the nearby port of Ennore, allowed it to expand its container throughput but even that is now being challenged by new nearby container terminals being built and operated by the well-funded and ambitious Adani Group. Chapter Eleven is devoted to the Koltata Port Trust (KoPT), which controls Kolkata and its 1967