Attempts to Impeach Donald Trump: Declassified Government Documents, Investigation of Russian Election Interference & Legislative Procedures

Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Intelligence Council, White House

Attempts to Impeach Donald Trump

Declassified Government Documents, Investigation of Russian Election Interference & Legislative Procedures

Sharp Ink Publishing

2024

Contact: info@sharpinkbooks.com

ISBN 978-80-282-9635-3

Table of Contents

Impeachment: An Overview of Constitutional Provisions, Procedure, and Practice

Efforts to Impeach Donald Trump

Russian Interference in the 2016 United States Elections

Documents Related to Russian Interference:

Executive Order - Taking Additional Steps to Address the National Emergency With Respect to Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities

Russian Cyber Activity – The Grizzly Steppe Report

Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections

Joint Statement on Committee Inquiry into Russian Intelligence Activities

National Security Agency Report

Documents & Transcripts Related to Impeachment Attempt:

Dismissal of James Comey

James Comey FBI Farewell Letter

Representative Al Green Calls for Trump Impeachment

Jason Chaffetz Letter to FBI Over Comey Memo

Appointment of Special Counsel to Investigate Russian Interference With the 2016 Presidential Election and Related Matters

Comey Statement for the Record Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

Impeaching Donald John Trump, President of the United States, for High Crimes and Misdemeanors

Impeachment: An Overview of Constitutional Provisions, Procedure, and Practice

Table of Contents

Background

The Constitutional Framework

Judicial Decisions Related to Impeachment

Some Basic Research Tools to Assist in Impeachment Proceedings

A Brief History and Some Preliminary Issues Relating to Impeachment

Who Are civil Officers of the United States Under Article II, Sec. 4 of the Constitution?

What Kinds of Conduct May Give Rise to an Impeachment?

Conclusions and Other Observations

Background

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Authority to remove the President, Vice President, and federal civil officers by impeachment has been placed, by constitutional mandate, in the hands of the legislative branch of the United States government. Although rooted in the soil of English impeachment experience, the American impeachment system differs from its English forebear in some significant respects. Recorded incidents of English impeachments may begin as early as 1376, and one source would place the first in 1283.¹ A more fixed procedure appears to have begun in 1399, with the passage of the statute of I Henry IV, c. 14.² Whichever date one chooses, it is clear that the English practice took root well before the colonial beginnings of the United States. It ceased to be used in England at about the time that it became part of the American system of government. The last two impeachments in England appear to have been those of Warren Hastings in 1787 and of Lord Melville in 1805.³ The English system permitted any person to be impeached by the House of Commons for any crime or misdemeanor, whether the alleged offender was a peer or a commoner.⁴

Unlike the British system, which permitted penal sanctions to attach upon conviction of impeachment,⁵ the American system is designed to be remedial in function. Despite surface similarities to a criminal trial, the judgments which may be rendered upon conviction of an article of impeachment in the American system are limited to removal from office and disqualification from holding further offices of public trust. Thus, the American system seems more designed to protect the public interest than to punish the person impeached. Nevertheless, much of the procedure and practice involved in this country’s application of its impeachment process draws guidance and support from British precedents.⁶

¹ See Simpson, Jr., A., Federal Impeachments, 64 U. Pa. L. Rev. 651 (1916); Yankwich, L., Impeachment of Civil Officers Under the Federal Constitution, 26 Geo. L.J. 849 (1938), reproduced in H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93RD CONG., 1ST SESS., IMPEACHMENT, SELECTED MATERIALS 689 (Comm. Print, October 1973), and in H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 105THCONG., 2D SESS., IMPEACHMENT, SELECTED MATERIALS 1825 (Comm. Print, November 1998). Simpson, in his 1916 article, discussed the British history in considerable depth before moving into a discussion of some aspects of the Constitutional Convention’s consideration of impeachment as envisioned in what would become the American system.

² Simpson, Jr., A., Federal Impeachment, 64 U. PA. L. REV. 651 (1916).

³ Brief of Anthony Higgins and John M. Thurston, counsel for the respondent, Judge Charles Swayne, offered in the latter’s impeachment trial on February 22, 1905, reprinted in III HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES § 2009, at 322 (1907).

⁴ Yankwich, supra n. 14, at 690.

⁵ Conviction under the British impeachment system could result in punishment by imprisonment, fine or even death. Berger, R., Impeachment for ‘High Crimes and Misdemeanors,’ 44 SO. CAL. L. REV. 395 (1971), reprinted in H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93RDCONG., 1STSESS., IMPEACHMENT, SELECTED MATERIALS 617 (Comm. Print October 1973), and in H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 105THCONG., 2D SESS., IMPEACHMENT, SELECTED MATERIALS 1825 (Comm. Print November 1998).

⁶ JEFFERSON’S MANUAL, published in CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON’S MANUAL AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES, ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS, H. Doc. No. 109-157, 109th Cong., 2d Sess. 314-331 (2007). This may also be found at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/hrm/browse_110.html, which, in turn, may be accessed through the website of the House Rules Committee under the heading House Rules Manual (GPO Access) at http://www.rules.house.gov/house_rules_precedents.htm.

The Constitutional Framework

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The somewhat skeletal constitutional framework for the impeachment process can be found in a number of provisions. These include the following:

Art. I, Sec. 2, Cl. 5:

The House of Representatives ... shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.

Art. I, Sec. 3, Cl. 6 and 7:

The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two-thirds of the Members present.

Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than toremoval from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.

Art. II, Sec. 2, Cl. 1:

The President ... shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.

Art. II, Sec. 4:

The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.

Art. III, Sec. 2, Cl. 3:

The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury.

A number of principles can be drawn from these provisions. Impeachment applies only to the President, the Vice President, and those other federal officials or employees who fall within the category of civil Officers of the United States. Impeachment will only lie where articles of impeachment are brought alleging that the individual to be impeached has engaged in conduct amounting to treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. The power to determine whether impeachment is appropriate in a given instance rests solely with the House of Representatives. The ultimate decisions both as to whether to impeach¹ and as to what articles of impeachment should be presented to the Senate for trial rest in the hands of the House.²

The Senate also has a unique role to play in the impeachment process. It alone has the authority and responsibility to try an impeachment brought by the House. The final decision as to whether to convict on any of the articles of impeachment is one that only the Senate can make. As to each article, a conviction must rest upon a two-thirds majority vote of the Senators present. In addition, should an individual be convicted on any of the articles, the Senate must determine the appropriate judgment: either removal from office alone, or, alternatively, removal and disqualification from holding further offices of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States. The precedents suggest that removal flows automatically from conviction on one or more articles of impeachment,³ but if the Senate chooses to impose an additional judgment disqualifying the individual convicted from holding future federal offices, a separate vote is necessary. A simple majority vote is required on such a judgment.⁴ The Constitution precludes the President from extending executive clemency to anyone to preclude their impeachment by the House of Representatives or trial by the Senate.⁵

Conviction on impeachment does not foreclose the possibility of criminal prosecution arising out of the same factual situation. The four most recent impeachments of federal judges after the conclusion of criminal proceedings against them, including that of Judge Kent, indicate that, at least as to federal judges, the impeachment need not precede criminal proceedings arising out of the same facts. Nor does an acquittal in the criminal proceedings preclude a subsequent impeachment.

While the constitutional provisions establish the basic framework for American impeachments, they do not begin to address all of the issues which may arise during the course of a given impeachment proceeding or to answer all of the procedural questions which might become pertinent to an inquiry of this sort. To fill this void, a number of resources are available.

¹ Historically, a number of circumstances are seen as having triggered or led to an impeachment investigation. See JEFFERSON’S MANUAL, supra, § 603 at 316. These have included charges made on the floor by a Member or Delegate; charges preferred by a memorial, usually referred to a committee for examination; a resolution dropped in the hopper by a Member and referred to a committee; a message from the President; charges transmitted from the legislature of a state or territory or from a grand jury; facts explored and reported by a House investigating committee; or a suggestion from the Judicial Conference of the United States, under 28 U.S.C. § 354(b), that the House may wish to consider whether impeachment of a particular federal judge would be appropriate. Prior to the expiration of the independent counsel provisions on June 30, 1999, an independent counsel, under 28 U.S.C. § 595(c), advised the House of Representatives of substantial and credible information which such independent counsel receive[d], in carrying out the independent counsel’s responsibilities ..., that may constitute grounds for an impeachment.

A resolution introduced by a Member and referred to a committee may take one of two general forms. It may be a resolution impeaching a specified person falling within the constitutionally prescribed category of President, Vice President, and all civil Officers of the United States. Such a resolution would usually be referred directly to the House Committee on the Judiciary. See, e.g., H.Res. 461 (impeaching Judge Harry Claiborne for high crimes and misdemeanors, first introduced June 3, 1986, and referred to the House Judiciary Committee; as later amended, this resolution was received in the House on August 6, 1986, from the Committee; it impeached Judge Claiborne for high crimes and misdemeanors and set forth articles of impeachment against him); H.Res. 625 (impeaching President Richard M. Nixon for high crimes and misdemeanors); H.Res. 638 (impeaching President Richard M. Nixon for high crimes and misdemeanors).

Alternatively, it may be a resolution requesting an inquiry into whether impeachment would be appropriate with regard to a particular individual falling within the constitutional category of officials who may be impeached. Such a resolution, sometimes called an inquiry of impeachment to distinguish it from an impeachment resolution of the type described above, would usually be referred to the House Committee on Rules, which would then generally refer it to the House Committee on the Judiciary. See, e.g., H.Res. 304 (directing the House Committee on the Judiciary to undertake an inquiry into whether grounds exist to impeach President William Jefferson Clinton, to report its findings, and, if the Committee so determines, a resolution of impeachment; referred to House Committee on Rules November 5, 1997); H.Res. 627 (directing the Committee on the Judiciary to investigate whether there are grounds for impeachment of Richard M. Nixon, referred to the House Committee on Rules, and then to the House Judiciary Committee); H.Res. 627 (directing the Committee on the Judiciary to inquire into and investigate whether grounds exist for the impeachment of Richard M. Nixon); H.Res. 636 (seeking an inquiry into whether grounds exist for impeachment of President Richard M. Nixon). See the discussion in 3 DESCHLER’S PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OFREPRESENTATIVES, H. Doc. 94-661, ch. 14 § 5.10-5.11, at 482-84 and § 15, at 621-26 (1974) (DESCHLER’S). DESCHLER’S may be accessed through the House Rules Committee website, http://www.rules.house.gov/house_rules_precedents.htm. This, in turn, provides a link to http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/precedents/deschler.html.

On February 6, 1974, the House passed H.Res. 803, authoriz[ing] and direct[ing] the Committee on the Judiciary to investigate fully and completely whether sufficient grounds exist for the House of Representatives to exercise its constitutional power to impeach Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States of America. The Committee submitted H.Rept. No. 93-1305 to the House of Representatives on August 20, 1974. It included text of a resolution impeaching President Nixon and setting forth articles of impeachment against him, which was printed at 120 Cong. Rec. 29219, 29220 (August 20, 1974). However, because of the resignation of President Nixon, the House never voted on the resolution.

² Precedents differ as to whether the House will choose to initiate an impeachment investigation regarding allegations of misconduct occurring prior to the federal officer’s commencing his current tenure of office. For example, in 1912, in response to H.Res. 511 (62nd Congress), the President transmitted to the House Judiciary Committee information related to an investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice of charges of improper conduct by Judge Robert W. Archbald, which had been brought to the President’s attention by the Commissioner of the Interstate Commerce Commission. After its investigation, the House Judiciary Committee reported out a resolution impeaching Judge Archbald both for misconduct while he was in his then current position as a U.S. circuit court judge designated as a judge of the U.S. Commerce Court, and for misconduct in his previous position as a U.S. district judge. The House agreed to the resolution. Judge Archbald was tried in the Senate, convicted, removed from office, and disqualified from further federal offices.

In 1826, the House, without division, referred to a select committee the request by Vice President John C. Calhoun that the House investigate allegations against him relating to his past official conduct when he was Secretary of War. Similarly, in 1872, at the request of Vice President Schuyler Colfax, the House, pursuant to a resolution, appointed a special committee to investigate charges that Colfax, while Speaker of the House, had accepted a bribe to influence Members of the House. In 1873, the testimony received by the special committee was referred to the House Judiciary Committee to determine whether the testimony warranted articles of impeachment of any federal office not a Member of the House, or made proper further investigation of the case.

In contrast, in the 93rd Congress, when Vice President Spiro Agnew requested that an impeachment investigation be undertaken into charges that he may have committed impeachable offenses related to his conduct as a Governor of Maryland before commencing his tenure as Vice President, neither the Speaker nor the House took action on the substance of his request.

³ This question was explored in the Senate impeachment trial of Judge Halsted Ritter, after he was convicted on the seventh article of impeachment brought against him. A colloquy arose after Senator Ashurst sent an order of judgment to the desk providing that Judge Ritter be removed from office. Based upon the language of Article II, Section 4 of the United States Constitution, the President Pro Tempore concluded that removal was automatic upon conviction in a Senate trial on one or more articles of impeachment. No vote was needed to remove the person convicted from office. 80 CONG. REC. 5607 (April 17, 1936).

⁴ See, e.g., vote to disqualify Judge Robert W. Archbald, 39 yeas, 35 nays, 49 CONG. REC. 1447-1448 (January 13, 1913); VI CANNON’S § 512.

⁵ U.S. CONST., art. II, sec. 2, cl. 1.

Judicial Decisions Related to Impeachment

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While no court has challenged the authority of the Senate to try impeachments, there are decisions regarding questions raised by the impeachment trials and convictions of Judges Walter L. Nixon, Jr., and Judge Alcee Hastings.¹ Compare Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993), affirming, 938 F.2d