Movement Matters: How Embodied Cognition Informs Teaching and Learning

Introduction

Sheila L. Macrine and Jennifer M. B. Fugate

Movement makes reason lucid

—Hozier, 2019

Understanding the mind and how thinking occurs has been a challenge for philosophers, scientists, theorists, educators, and artists throughout history. Ideas about how we learn have been mainly theoretical and intuitive. With the current advances in neuroscience, however, many unanswered questions are being addressed. As a result, a paradigm shift is taking hold in human cognition, pointing to a new science-based understanding about the way we think and, ultimately, the way we learn. That shift includes a move away from traditional notions of the mind to an embodied model of human thinking and learning. Backed by scientific evidence from neuroimaging techniques, there is a growing movement to not only understand thinking as inseparably linked with the body and the environment, but also to reimagine the learning that follows. When thinking (i.e., cognition) is embodied, it is deeply dependent on features of the physical body of the learner. Said another way, a learner’s body plays a significant causal or physically constitutive role in cognitive processing (Wilson & Foglia, 2016). Therefore, the body (and the brain’s representation of that information) is key to understanding how thinking occurs (Kumar, 2018).

The French philosopher Merleau-Ponty (1962) posited that an embodied approach emphasizes an intercorporeality of the subjective, lived-body and that cognition cannot be understood without the body’s engagement with the world—a type of enfleshment of thought (see Gallagher & Varela, 2003; Leitan & Murray, 2014; Macrine, 2002; Marshall, 2008). For Merleau-Ponty, thinking is manifested, learned, and even relearned through bodily experiences (Bahler, 2016; Leitan & Chaffey, 2014). It is this philosophical theory of embodiment that eventually evolved into a testable theory in cognitive science called embodied cognition (Fincher-Kiefer, 2019). Embodied cognition scholars argue that the body is indeed essential in the production of cognition (Varela et al., 1991) and that cognitive processes are based on—or are at least moderated by—sensorimotor processes (Barsalou, 2016; Mahon & Caramazza, 2008; Zona et al., 2018). Put differently, our physical interaction with the world influences or—in some cases—even determines our cognition (Kemmerer et al., 2013; Shapiro, 2014). Indeed, previous researchers have theoretically recognized that cognition is not only embodied but also socially constructed (Piaget, 1977; Vygotsky, 1978), situated (Lave, 1988), and culturally dependent (O’Loughlin, 1995; Rogoff, 1990). In addition, others pointed to the need for embodied metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), concrete and hands-on experiences (Dewey, 1938; Montessori, 1912, 1973), such that the body is seen as the center of knowledge (James, 1890, p. 154). Further, Gibson (1979) argued that the person and the environment are mutually dependent on one another. Today, with advances in neuroscience, we have evidence confirming embodied views of cognition based on bodily and neural processes of perception, action, and emotion (Anderson, 2018; Aziz & Gomez-Djokic, 2016; Glenberg et al., 2013; Hauk et. al., 2004; James, 2010; Niedenthal, 2007; Niedenthal et al., 2010).

Although there are many flavors of embodied cognition, most recognize that thinking is grounded within the body and the environment, and that knowledge is simulated either directly or mediated by mental representations (for some examples, see Abrahamson & Lindgren, 2014; Barsalou, 1999, 2008; Clark, 2008; Gallagher as cited in Rowlands, 2010; Glenberg et al., 2005; Menary, 2010; Shapiro, 2011, 2014, 2019; Wilson, 2002). Recently, embodied cognition has expanded to incorporate the collective term 4E cognition, in which cognition is understood as not only "embodied, but embedded within a context, extended beyond the individual through enculturated practices, and enacted" as part of a dynamic system in which the body is self-producing and adaptive (see Hutto & Abrahamson, chapter 3 in this volume; Gallagher in Rowlands, 2010; Glenberg et al., 2005; Shapiro, 2014). So what does this mean for learning, and what are the implications for education?

Our current educational delivery systems (i.e., teacher education, teaching pedagogy, curriculum, environmental design, and educational psychology) and approaches can be traced back to disembodied views of human thinking. Accordingly, perceptual, sensory, and motor systems were presumed to be irrelevant in understanding brain processes (Wilson, 2002; Woodward et al., 2009). As a result, thinking was considered to be limited by the bodily senses and had to be freed from the corporeal trappings of the physical world (Young & Whitty, 2010).

For example, behaviorist theory prioritized stimulus-response action, which basically removed the individual from the equation and focused solely on action and prescribed responses. This led to passive transmission models of learning in the 1940s and early 1950s. Even with the onset of the cognitive revolution, passive learning continued to dominate, although the ideas of stimulus-response were now thought to be mediated by the brain. By the mid-1950s, information-processing models of cognition began to take root, and cognitive processes were likened to software computations (see Turing, 1950; Miller, 2003). As a result, thinking was now viewed as a computation process, with perception seen as the input and action as the output.

These early computer metaphors of cognition have evolved into the present day’s computational models, yet few consider the person as central to the process. The goal of this kind of computational modeling is to infer the structural and functional properties of a cognitive process from the behavioral data thought to be generated by that process (Pitt et al., 2002). Yet these working models still mostly view thinking as amodal (symbolic) computations that lack connections to the individual’s body and sensory systems (Fodor, 1975, 1998), and they often fail to correspond to the semantic properties of mental states specific to human understanding.

While theories of embodied cognition continue to emerge, the American classroom has not kept pace. Teaching pedagogy and curriculum continue to view learning as abstracted and separate from the body. As a result, classroom teaching continues to rely on presenting and learning disembodied concepts, without the engagement of the sensory motor systems or understanding how the body influences internalization of these concepts (see Macrine & Fugate, 2020, for a recent review).

Alternatively, an embodied learning paradigm suggests that actions, emotions, sensations, and environment can influence what is learned. In addition to active bodily based learning, embodied learning can also be achieved through simulations, which are aided by the brain’s mirror neuron system (see Butera & Aziz-Zadeh, chapter 16 in this volume). As an example, observing the actions of a teacher results in the neural underpinnings of action observations and simulations (see Barsalou, 1999).

This Volume

The goal of this book, Movement Matters, is to explain/translate the latest empirical and clinical research on embodied cognition and to demonstrate how embodied teaching and learning principles naturally follow. That said, Movement Matters presents a space where neuroscience, psychology, cognitive science, and technology meet education to inform learning theory and to inspire an embodied approach to teaching the whole person. To accomplish this, we adopted and adapted an emerging approach called translational science research, historically found within the biomedical disciplines (McGaghie et al., 2012), to elucidate empirical and clinical findings for the public (NIH, 2020).

Such translational approaches have already been proven successful in the development of effective tools and interventions in the biomedical fields (NCATS, 2017). In other words, translational science (bench to bedside) is instrumental in closing the bio-medical research gap and is devoted to interpreting basic research findings to be used for tools, interventions, diagnoses, treatments, and prevention (Munro & Savel, 2016).

In 2013, Henry Roediger presciently wrote, In an ideal world, Cognitive and Educational Psychologists would have created a translational educational science that would be eagerly adopted by education, schools and educators who would want to improve education on the basis of the latest research findings (p. 1). He added that although such translational science has helped to disseminate new biomedical discoveries to broad audiences quickly, this has not been the situation in education despite more than a century of relevant psychological research (p. 1).

Evidenced-Based Practice

The call for research and evidence-based practice in education can be found in the No Child Left Behind Act of 2002, which mandated that scientifically based research be the norm for classroom instruction. Its updated replacement, the Every Student Succeeds Act of 2015, called for evidence-based interventions that are proven to be effective in leading to desired outcomes—namely, improving student achievement. Further, one of the nation’s foremost education researchers and policy analysts, Linda Darling-Hammond has stated that the rapid pace of our knowledge of human development and learning has impacted the emerging consensus about the science of learning and development and increased our opportunities to shape more effective educational practices (Darling-Hammond et al., 2020). Yet, she added, to take advantage of these advances requires integrating insights across multiple fields and connecting them to our knowledge of successful approaches.

To face these challenges, we adapted a model of translational science (Rubio et al., 2010) called Translational Learning Sciences Research (Macrine & Fugate, 2021) specifically to address evidenced-based research on embodied cognition in an applied format for educators. We argue that this collection is the first to systematically gather, collate, translate, and disseminate the latest embodied research geared toward improved learning outcomes. It also shares some of the most significant breakthroughs and applications that recent embodied cognition research has made on the science of learning across content areas.

In this volume, we apply our model to educational, psychological, and neuroscience research to inform embodied teaching and learning pedagogy for the classroom. It has four major goals: (1) to translate and inform the reader on the latest research in embodied cognition; (2) to develop and create appropriate embodied curriculum and instruction to improve teaching and learning outcomes; (3) to create resources and tools to develop a better understanding of embodied teaching and learning; and (4) to eventually develop taxonomies to track implementation and outcomes, which will assess whether competencies are being met (adapted from Rubio et al., 2010).

To accomplish this, our contributors specifically review and report on the impact of sensorimotor activity in the academic content areas of language, STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics), applied technologies, and social and emotional competencies. Each of the contributors presents their embodied cognition research within these areas and translate their findings for classroom application. In doing so, we hope to encourage educators, educational psychologists, and others involved in schooling to adopt, apply, and develop their own embodied educational pathways. As a result, this book demonstrates how learning can be brought to new heights when the principles of embodied cognition are empirically applied to learning theory and teaching pedagogy. Finally, this collection helps us to understand what we know about how we learn and how this knowledge should inform the way we teach.

That said, embodied cognition represents one of the most important research programs in contemporary neuroscience and cognitive science. Movement Matters responds by translating the latest research on embodied cognition and critically examines its implications for classroom learning and teaching pedagogy. This book, written by a distinguished group of international scholars and emerging researchers, both charts embodied cognition’s conceptual and philosophical roots and interprets and translates the supporting empirical evidence into effective teaching and learning strategies. The aim of this volume is to begin to build interdisciplinary connections among the theoretical and applied advances in the field of embodied cognition with applications for education and the Learning Sciences. Mindful of the fact that this research cuts across multiple disciplines and is rapidly expanding, Movement Matters is both a timely and important collection for educators and scholars. It bridges the gap between research and curriculum-content silos of knowledge by bringing together experts from all content areas in one collection. The goal of this book, therefore, is to help educators better understand the current scholarship and research in the new Learning Sciences—specifically, embodied cognition and its extensions, the 4E’s of cognition (Gallagher as cited in Rowlands, 2010).

Organization

These are indeed exciting times for education, where our previous understanding of the importance of the body in learning was mostly theoretical (i.e., Montessori, 1973; Piaget, 1977; Rogoff, 1990; Vygotsky, 1978). Now behavioral and neural evidence from psychology, neuroscience, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence has empirically supported these assumptions. Consequently, all these fields have undergone paradigm shifts in their view of the way knowledge is acquired, produced, and represented.

Each chapter provides discussions within the content areas to reveal why embodied principles, approaches, and techniques facilitate learning and should therefore be integrated into the K-12 curriculum and beyond. Realizing the continuous interactions among the learner’s body, brain, mind, and environment provides a powerful mediating tool for the construction of an embodied learning curriculum, environmental design, and teaching pedagogy. Therefore, Movement Matters has much to offer educational practitioners, scholars, and researchers toward recognizing the untapped impact of embodied cognition as it can help students reach their full potential.

This book is organized into five major parts. The foreword, written by Lawrence Shapiro, Ph.D. (Philosophy, University of Wisconsin–Madison), explicates the foundations of the philosophy of mind and philosophy of psychology. He does this brilliantly through a compelling metaphorical description using The Matrix movie and its characters to unpack embodied cognition. Shapiro notes that psychologists and educators who have embraced embodied views of cognition now seek to understand how a student’s gestures might indicate something about their grasp of mathematical concepts and how a teacher’s gestures might in turn illuminate these concepts. He further argues that embodied cognition has inspired new and promising educational strategies (including many found in this book), which have already proven superior to the learning-by-recipe route.

Part I, Philosophical and Theoretical Background, discusses the mind/body dichotomy, the foundations of cognitive psychology, and computational models of mind (cognitivism). The authors in this section address the first step in our Translational Learning Sciences Research (Macrine & Fugate, 2021) model by tracing the history of thinking. These chapters highlight the promise of embodied cognition for education, in which the mind and body work together to aid cognition and ultimately learning.

Part II, Language, applies the principles of embodied cognition in the content areas of handwriting, vocabulary acquisition, language development and comprehension, and computerized reading. This section, based on the first and second steps in Translational Learning Sciences Research (Macrine & Fugate, 2021), introduces literacy-based research into tools and interventions to help us to understand that both physical and imagined manipulation leads to large gains in memory and comprehension.

Part III, STEM, contains four chapters dedicated to mathematics and sciences. Similar to the focus of part II, our model translates STEM-based research into tools and interventions that emphasize the importance of early finger counting and manipulatives, as well as the importance of hand and body gestures in understanding physical forces.

Part IV, Applied Technology, contains four chapters relating the principles of embodied cognition to learning technologies developed for various digital platforms, including kinesthetically active games using sensors and motion capture, as well as those for augmented and virtual reality. In a special chapter, some of these embodied educational techniques are adapted for use with individuals with special needs. These authors translate the latest systematic efforts to convert basic research knowledge into practical applications to enhance teaching and learning.

Part V, Social Cognition, Emotion, Mindfulness, explores how mirror neurons within the brain serve as the biological mechanism for social connectedness and emotion, as well as how individuals with disordered sensorimotor experiences might learn differently. Finally, it elucidates an understanding of how emotion is embodied, and how emotional and mindfulness interventions benefit classroom behavior and learning.

In the conclusion, we link back to the core message of the volume: the importance of embodied approaches to teaching and learning. We reflect on the clear signals from the research to provide insights that would not have been possible had this book not been researched and written and these findings not translated and developed. For example, we show how embodied approaches can change the way we teach and learn and how they can inform curriculum development, teacher education programs, education psychology courses and textbooks, and special education. Further, we discuss how this collection serves as a useful road map and source for future educators, researchers, and scholars as they make their own connections for teaching and learning. Finally, we discuss the importance of getting this vital information into the hands of teachers and learners, educational psychologists, and curriculum designers. We hope to encourage others to investigate and explore approaches and applications to embodied learning—and the science behind it.

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I PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

1 Embodied Cognition and Its Educational Significance

Sheila L. Macrine and Jennifer M. B. Fugate

Historically, the human mind was considered the sole source of knowing, thinking, and teaching, with the body considered both separate and inferior. Psychologically, cognition was seen as disembodiment (res cogitans sine corpore), in which the perceptual and motor systems were not considered relevant to understanding central cognitive processes (Wilson, 2002; Woodward et al., 2009). As such, classical views of cognition from psychology emphasized the storage and use of knowledge based upon mental representations (symbols), devoid of how the initial information was perceived through the body and the sensorimotor systems (Fodor, 1975, 1983; Newell & Simon, 1972; Pylyshyn, 2009; Tulving, 1983; for recent reviews, see Fugate et al., 2018; Macrine & Fugate, 2020), and separated from the brain’s modal systems for sensing, action, and affect (Smith & Medin, 1981). Philosophically, the body was seen as an impediment to the mind’s expansion and capabilities—an albatross levying a heavy drag on self-realization (Bordo, 1993; Macrine, 2002). This classical approach denied emotional and bodily reality altogether (Robinson & Pallasmaa, 2015), but the latest neuroscience evidence validates an embodied view of mind and its connection to the body.

Classical Views of Cognition

Since the time of Aristotle (384–322 B.C.), the body and mind were seen as separate and hierarchical in nature. Specifically, Aristotle believed that the mind ruled over the body, and reason over the emotions (Barnes, 1995). As a result, one had to discipline and dominate the body and emotions in order to free the rational mind. These assumptions informed René Descartes’s (1596–1650) notions of the dichotomous nature of the mind/body separation (Ryle, 1949). He contended that the mind must be cleared, and the foundation of knowledge laid (preconceived universal truths), an idea known as foundationalism. Metaphorically, the idea was like an architect demolishing and clearing the land before building a house. In his First Meditation, Descartes posited that trusting perception alone (i.e., the senses to explain experience) was limiting because the senses can be deceived (Descartes, 1637/1998). For example, Descartes argued that far-away objects appeared to be quite small even though they were not actually so, and therefore our bodily senses were not reliable. Descartes insisted that the mind must be absent of any biological or social influences that might contaminate or taint true knowledge or reason. Cartesian theory held that the mind determined physical acts, and therefore volitional acts of the body must be caused by volitional acts of the mind.

Gilbert Ryle (1900–1976), the British philosopher, challenged Cartesian dualism when he suggested that sensations, thoughts, and feelings do not belong to a mental world distinct from the physical world. In fact, he called this the myth the ghost in the machine (Ryle, 1949). Building on this, Ryle theorized that the body and mind do cooperate, but only accidentally, with each retaining full autonomy from one another. In other words, all mental and physical activity occurs simultaneously but still separately.

Although a greatly scaled-down history, the legacy of Descartes’s dualistic theory of knowledge continues to shape modern views of knowing and learning. Foundationalism, the basis for Western epistemology, philosophy, and the sciences, still dominates educational thought. So how do we move beyond classical views of cognition to embodied cognition and an embodied approach to teaching and learning?

Education as a Result of the Classical View of Cognition

Historically, Western philosophy conceptualized the body as an instrument to be directed and a possible source of disruption to be controlled by our rational faculties (Lennon, 2019). These types of grand narratives have attempted to explain our social reality in its entirety. As a result, the mind and body separation informed the foundation of Western thinking about how knowledge is acquired and how learning occurs. In the case of psychological and educational theories, these narratives have ranged from behaviorism and stimulus-response thinking to blank slate processing, information processing, computational processing, and recently to artificial intelligence (more on this later). None of these views saw the body (or senses) as instrumental to cognition. In addition, these approaches paid little attention to the roles of learning in the affective domain. Both the teachers’ and the students’ bodies, as well as the social contexts in which learning occurs, were seen as irrelevant to the teaching-learning event (Macrine, 2002).

Constructivism emerged as an alternative, and it rescued the learner from the behaviorists’ role of receiver of knowledge. However, constructivism still posited that knowledge was a product of the individual’s mind and fashioned its mental schemas to correspond with reality or social influences. Emphasizing cognition through critical thinking left the focus of learning as purely an intellectual activity (Brookfield, 1985; see Ollis, 2012, for a review). Here, knowledge was still seen as individual in nature and based on the technical interests of the rational individual seeking control over life and the environment (Lave & Wenger, 1991). The implication for learning was that it is basically a private, individualistic matter.

The resultant constructivist pedagogical approaches took students out of the complex and dynamic life of everyday activities to sit them down in front of workbooks, skills, and drills (Newman et al., 1989). This model neglected the situated body and continued to rely on a noncontextualized, disembodied curriculum that inevitably resembled its predecessors. In fact, Matthews (1992) critiqued constructivism as the well-known metaphor a wolf in sheep’s clothing—or to change metaphors, like the empiricists’ wine served up in new wineskins. Ernst von Glasersfeld (1987, 1995), the father of radical constructivism, wrote that it is difficult to make the case for constructivism because its arguments almost always get tangled up within the old epistemological web from which constructivism desperately tried to free itself.

While psychology has been more open to progressive notions such as constructivism, social constructivism, and radical constructivism, many of these models still bare the same computational cognitive orientations. Schools, whether they are conscious of it or not, still work hard to separate the mind from the body (Macrine, 2002): Cartesian dualism is still pervasive throughout school settings. The teacher is seen as a talking head—a disembodied and disempowered conduit for core curriculum. These disembodied threats come in the form of rote memorization, mindless drills, and skills in preparation for standardized testing. Even now, the ramifications of our epistemological heritage continue to have quite an effect on how we conceptualize knowing, learning, and teaching.

Philosophical and Psychological Influences on Embodied Cognition

In contrast to the classical views of cognition, the famous philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty understood the importance of not just knowing why but how we gain knowledge (1962; see also O’Neill, 1974). Merleau-Ponty’s (1962) notion of knowledge emphasized I am my body. Against Cartesian dualism, Merleau-Ponty’s existential phenomenology maintained that thinking was a fully embodied event: people perceive the world first and foremost through their bodies. He argued that cognition cannot be understood without the body’s engagement with the world (see also Leitan & Murray, 2014; Marshall, 2008; Merleau-Ponty & Fisher, 1965). Lather (1991) insisted that we foreground the relation between the knower and known, teacher and taught, from an embodied perspective.

In the field of psychology, John Dewey (from works between 1925–1953), echoing William James (1892), suggested that higher-order cognitive functions are adaptations generated by interactions with the world. Both James and Dewey rejected the rational psychology drawn from Cartesian dualism. Later, James Gibson’s ecological theory (1979) married both phenomenological (i.e., the subjective experience) and naturalistic perspectives. Gibson argued that perception was direct and the environment meaningful (see Leitan & Chaffey, 2014, for a review). Consequently, Gibson suggested that there was no mind between perception and action, and that action was based in the body, supported through evolution and the environment. Gibson called these affordances, the idea that opportunities for action are provided by a particular object or environment.

Most recently is the added idea that the brain’s role is to predict incoming stimuli to exert action. Continuing these ideas, developments in robotics (see Brooks, 1991) and dynamic system theory (see Beer, 1998; Thelan & Smith, 1994) treat cognition as arising from interactions with the world. In one of the most widespread notions of the mind, Andy Clark (2013) has posited a bidirectional, iterative relationship between sensorimotor input and conceptual knowledge, such that the brain is constantly predicting what sensory and bodily information is being encountered and then using stored knowledge via feedback to refine these predictions (for a similar view, see Barrett, 2017, discussed in detail in Fugate & Wilson-Mendenhall, chapter 18 in this volume). In fact, some robotics researchers have argued that true artificial intelligence can only be achieved when robots are able to connect sensory and motor skills through a body (see Brooks, 1991; Pfeifer, 2001, 2006).

Theories of Embodied Cognition

Our current understanding of human thinking and cognition rejects Cartesian dualism in favor of embodied cognition, which grounds cognition in sensory and motor activity. As a result, cognitive psychology has undergone a theoretical shift to acknowledge that sensorimotor processing is fundamental to understanding information (Smith & Sheya, 2010).

Embodied cognition suggests that the physical body plays a significant causal role, or a physically constitutive role, in cognitive processing (see Wilson & Foglia, 2015). Some of the core principles of embodied cognition are derived from the early ideas of developmental and educational psychologists (e.g., Dewey, 1938, 1989; Kolb, 1984; Piaget, 1952, 1968; Montessori, 1969; Rogoff, 1990; Vygotsky, 1978). Early work on action-on-thinking can also be seen in sociocultural psychology (e.g., Vygotsky, 1978), activity theory (e.g., Gal’perin, 1992; Leontiev, 1978), and apprenticeship in thinking (e.g., Rogoff, 1990) and by a variety of perspectives of learning, activity, and knowledge appropriation (e.g., Brown et al., 1989; Lave & Wenger, 1991; Robbins & Aydede, 2009; Rogoff, 1990; Wilson & Foglia, 2015).

Hockey and Allen-Collinson (2009) wrote that phenomenologically we know the world through the body, just as that body produces the world for us (p. 117). From this perspective, experiences are always embodied and relational, and the body plays a central role in shaping our experience of the world (van Amsterdam et al., 2017). Therefore, thinking extends throughout the body and is scaffolded upon a material and social world (for corresponding views, see Bahler, 2016; Clark, 1998; Damasio, 1994; Gallagher, 2005; Gopnik, 2009; Rowlands, 2010; Sheets-Johnstone, 2011; Shapiro, 2014; Yancy et al., 2014).

Barsalou’s (1999) perceptual symbols systems (PSS) was one of the first explicit, psychological theories of embodied cognition. Specifically, Barsalou stated that knowledge is reenacted (i.e., simulated) through the perceptual and sensory systems it engages (e.g., auditory, visual, motor, and somatosensory). According to PSS theory, thinking about an action evokes the same visual stimuli, motor movement, and tactile sensations that occur during the act itself (Barsalou, 2003, 2008). The experience is captured by the sensory and perceptual systems and can be later used to re-create (through simulation) the experience without the actual stimulus (i.e., when just thinking about the knowledge).

Although there are a number of theories of embodied cognition, they are all united in their emphasis on the body functioning as a constituent of the mind, rather than secondary to it (see Leitan & Chaffey, 2014, p. 3; Shapiro, 2007). Two common themes emerge across such embodied theories. First, the body and the world (environment) are integral to form, integrate, and retrieve knowledge, and knowledge is grounded or situated in the interactions between the individual and the environment. In some versions, grounding represents how mental representations are understood and learned (e.g., Barsalou, 2008; Glenberg & Gallese, 2012; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). In some cases, language is thought to be the tool that binds together individual, heterogenous instances underlying abstract concepts because direct simulation would be harder than for concrete concepts (Borghi & Binkofski, 2014; Mazzuca et al., 2017; also see Fugate & Wilson-Mendenhall, chapter 18 in this volume). In other cases, metaphors are thought to ground abstract concepts (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). In other versions, there is no grounding necessary because there are no mental representations; rather, the individual’s interaction with the environment is the unit of knowledge (e.g., Hutto, 2005). Second, knowledge is simulated (Barsalou, 1999, 2008; Gallese, 2009), such that thinking and recalling information is re-experiencing the bodily states at the time of encoding and does not represent amodal (symbolic) concepts. Although the contents of simulation are in the past, simulations occur in the present and can therefore be affected by current constraints as well.

Recently, embodied cognition has extended its reach into 4E cognition, in which cognition is not only embodied, but embedded, extended, and enacted (see Gallagher as cited in Rowlands, 2010). Specifically, embedded refers to the fact that our bodies are situated in the environment, and our bodily capacities are geared toward current concerns and goals (i.e., affordances; see also Pouw et al., 2014). Extended refers to the fact that the boundaries of mind are engaged in enculturated practices, routines, societal norms, and the like. Finally, enacted refers to the fact that the body is self-producing and adaptive, with its own identity as it draws from the physical environment on which it depends. The body is a continually changing structure that determines its own actions on itself and its world. These assumptions bear resemblance to embedded cognition (Pouw et al., 2014), which suggests that perceptual and interactive richness embed a person’s cognitive activity in the environment.

Today, researchers in various research areas such as developmental psychology (Thelen & Smith, 1994), biology (Maturana & Varela, 1987), language (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), neuroscience (Chiel & Beer, 1997; Kiefer & Trumpp, 2012; Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998), and philosophy (Clark, 1998, 1999; Varela et al., 1991) are rethinking and incorporating the role of the body in their disciplines. For instance, studies using functional magnetic resonance imaging show that motor portions of the brain re-create physical experiences when we read, see, or hear of them (Bergen, 2012). While it is understood that movement and action help to shape our perception and learning in early life, they also continue to impact the way we experience the world throughout development and into adulthood (Kontra et al., 2012).

Embodied Learning: Shifting Educational Models

As a result, embodied cognition holds promise for understanding the role of action and experience in learning contexts, as well as using action to scaffold learning in more formal educational settings later in development (Kontra et al., 2012). Derived from these principles,