Self-control is the ability to inhibit temptations and persist in one’s decisions about what to do. In this article, we review recent evidence that suggests implicit beliefs about the process of self-control influence how the process operates. While earlier work focused on the moderating influence of willpower beliefs on depletion effects, we survey new directions in the field that emphasize how beliefs about the nature of self-control, self-control strategies, and their effectiveness have effects on downstream regulation and judgment. These new (...) directions highlight the need to better understand the role of self-control beliefs in naturalistic decision-making. (shrink)

In this paper, following Rahel Jaeggi’s critique of forms of life, I contend that to identify genuine critical thinking we should start from an analysis of the normative nature of forms of life as the basic constituents of the social world. In this view, critical thinking can be seen as a critical behaviour. While genuine forms of life can recognize and consider the variety of concrete and diverse situations, on the contrary non-functioning forms of life’s critical rationality understands the norm (...) as applied from outside of the form of life. In this case the norm, erroneously understood as a neutral and universally applicable principle, such as economic rationality, is not able to consider the particularity of forms of life as goods in themselves. I defend the meaning that an education in critical thinking must have, as a genuine and functional rationality characterising human beings in a social world. -/- . (shrink)

This paper presents a paradox based on the following assumptions: that emotions are warranted when you are justified in thinking that the emotion is fitting, that there are warranted cases of past-directed fear, that fear is fitting in the face of its formal object: dangerousness, and that this formal object consists in a probability of damage or harm to something of value. The paper then discusses three likely solutions: (1) denying that past-directed fear can be warranted, (2) using an alternative (...) formulation of fear's formal object, and (3) giving up warrant as justified as fittingness. Finally, it provides a case for the third solution and presents a warrant-based approach to fittingness and the appropriateness of emotions in general. (shrink)

I argue that complete metaphysical grounds need not amount to metaphysically sufficient conditions for what they ground. I presented this at the Pacific APA in 2011. A version was R&Red somewhere but I never got around to Ring it, so it remains unpublished. It is cited every once in a while, so I'm uploading it here.

Paul Feyerabend, one of the most original and nonconformist epistemologists of the 20th century, is known for describing science as an essentially anarchic enterprise characterized by different, sometimes contradictory, methods, approaches and ways of reasoning. But it was through his reflections on art and myth that he developed an even more radical view: there are different forms of human thought, each characterized by a different rationality and reality, and science is only one of them. And in intellectual history there is (...) only change, but not progress. (shrink)

I frame my argument by way of Hayek's tendency to treat Hume and Smith as central articulations of the rule of law. The rest of the paper explores their defense of clientelism. First, I introduce Hume’s ideas on the utility of patronage in his essay, “Of the Independency of Parliament.” I argue that in Hume clientelism just is a feature of parliamentary business. It seems ineliminable. I then contextualize Hume’s account by comparing it to Montesquieu’s account of this system of (...) patronage in Book XIX, chapter 27 of The Spirit of the Laws. Montesquieu primarily treats it as a species of bad corruption. However, he also sees some benefits to it. I then turn to Smith and I show that he echoes Hume’s analysis of corruption in an easily ignored passage in Wealth of Nations. I then show that for Smith one argument in favor of a kind of federal parliamentary union between Great Brittain and her American colonies lies in its ability to facilitate and make more efficient the system of patronage by the Crown. While Smith’s account of these matters is quite Humean, one can discern in Smith a distinct cost-benefit argument for the acceptance of the necessity of a system of patronage in the service of the peaceful expansion and entrenchment of the rule of law in his proposal for parliamentary union. (shrink)

Philosophers and social scientists largely agree that fake news is not just necessarily untruthful, but necessarily insincere: it’s produced either with the intention to deceive or an indifference toward its truth. Against this, I argue insincerity is neither a necessary nor obviously typical feature of fake news. The main argument proceeds in two stages. The first, methodological step develops classification criteria for identifying instances of fake news. By attending to expressed theoretical and practical interests, I observe how our classification practices (...) turn on worries about fake news’s unique political-epistemic risks. From this, I argue (i) theories of fake news should capture independent mechanisms that realise these risks and (ii) the manifestation of them suffices for classifying a news story as fake news. The second step applies the classification criteria to bad science journalism. I argue the systematic epistemic faults in bad science journalism manifest the same political-epistemic risks we see in fake news, which suffices to justify classifying it as fake news. But since such faults aren’t plausibly attributed to its propagators being insincere, insincerity doesn’t function independently as a mechanism for realising fake news’s political-epistemic risks. Thus, I conclude, we should exclude insincerity from our accounts of the phenomenon. (shrink)

Bioethicists’ views diverge public opinion on various ethical issues, particularly in healthcare. For instance, bioethicists generally oppose payment for organs and advocate for preventing death at any age, whereas the public is more supportive of organ payment and prioritizing younger patients. I offer four arguments on how best to view this divergence. (a) Bioethicists’ specialized training, objectivity, and reliance on research often lead to views that differ from those of the public, which may be less informed and more influenced by (...) biases. (b) Further, divergence between expert and public opinion is a normal and sometimes necessary aspect of bioethics. Divergence can lead to more informed and progressive ethical practices. (c) While public input is valuable, achieving meaningful engagement is difficult due to varying values, risk perceptions, and socioeconomic circumstances. Effective bioethics would balance expert knowledge with public input, aiming for policies that are both scientifically sound and democratically legitimate. (d) Maintaining public trust in bioethics does not require full alignment with public opinion. Instead, bioethicists should focus on educating the public and incorporating informed public perspectives into their analysis and recommendations. (shrink)

This volume assembles 18 of Eckart Förster’s most important essays, written between 1987 and 2022, all of which touch upon the theme of limits of cognition. Among the issues tackled are Kant’s Opus Postumum, Goethe’s project of a scientia intuitiva or science of the intuitive understanding, the significance of §§76–77 of the third Critique for post-Kantianism, the case for Hölderlin’s authorship of the Oldest System-Programme of German Idealism, and Hegel’s early ideas on logic and phenomenology. In this review, I discuss (...) the volume focusing on three aspects. (i) I give a brief outline of its structure and goals; (ii) I investigate some of its highlights and central themes; and (iii) I place Förster’s picture of Kant and post-Kantianism within current scholarship and confront it with an alternative interpretive option: the view of Kant as concerned with non-contrastive limits of cognition and intelligibility. (shrink)

This paper proves normalisation theorems for intuitionist and classical negative free logic, without and with the $\invertediota$ operator for definite descriptions. Rules specific to free logic give rise to new kinds of maximal formulas additional to those familiar from standard intuitionist and classical logic. When $\invertediota$ is added it must be ensured that reduction procedures involving replacements of parameters by terms do not introduce new maximal formulas of higher degree than the ones removed. The problem is solved by a rule (...) that permits restricting these terms in the rules for $\forall$, $\exists$ and $\invertediota$ to parameters or constants. A restricted subformula property for deductions in systems without $\invertediota$ is considered. It is improved upon by an alternative formalisation of free logic building on an idea of Ja\'skowski's. In the classical system the rules for $\invertediota$ require treatment known from normalisation for classical logic with $\lor$ or $\exists$. The philosophical significance of the results is also indicated. (shrink)

Control is typically accepted as a necessary condition for moral responsibility. Thus, humans are morally responsible for their actions only if we can realise the right kind of control. Are there good reasons to think that humans can psychologically realise control? This paper is an attempt to address this question by establishing choice and agenthood as separate but interconnected aspects of control. I consider two challenges to the claim that humans can realise the kind of control required for moral responsibility. (...) First, an empirical challenge from cognitive neuroscience provides a familiar way to argue against the realisation of the choice aspect by human psychology. Second, a more formidable conceptual challenge to the aspect of agenthood presents us with scepticism about the kind of explanations that psychology can provide. The second challenge suggests that, in psychological accounts of choice, the agent disappears. Drawing on recent empirical models of cognitive control and philosophical accounts of agency, I conclude that the psychological explanation of choice is consistent with the aspect of agenthood being realised by human psychology. (shrink)

Knowledge-first theories of justification are theories of justification that give knowledge priority when it comes to explaining when and why someone has justification for an attitude or an action. The emphasis of this article is on knowledge-first theories of justification for belief. As it turns out, there are a number of ways of giving knowledge priority when theorizing about justification, and what follows is a survey of more than a dozen existing options that have emerged in the early 21st century (...) since the publication of Timothy Williamson’s *Knowledge and Its Limits*. This article traces several of the general theoretical motivations that have been offered for putting knowledge first in the theory of justification. This is followed by an examination of existing knowledge-first theories of justification and their standing objections. These objections are largely, but not exclusively, concerned with the extensional adequacy of knowledge-first theories of justification. There are doubtless more ways to give knowledge priority in the theory of justified belief than are covered here, but the survey is instructive because it highlights potential shortcomings that would-be knowledge-first theorists of justification may wish either to avoid or else to be prepared with a suitable error theory. This entry concludes with a reflection about the extent to which the short history of, arguably, failed attempts to secure an unproblematic knowledge-first account of justified belief has begun to resemble the older Gettier dialectic. (shrink)

From The Cone of Perception, volume one of my collected works, you will remember that one of the main topics in that work was V-Curvature, also called, "phenomenological velocity." In that work, although a solution to the v - curvature variable was provided as well as many graphs that yielded numerous jewels of spiral formulations in exquisite 3D color formations, that method by which the solution was found was not iterated. This chapter begins by showing how it is possible to (...) solve for something that ideally ought cancel out with itself and how, although commutation between square roots is valid, there may be room here for an alternate route of accessing a hidden dimension - that dimension we call V-Curvature, or, "Phenomenological Velocity." Herein is provided the pathway for solving for V-Curvature in terms of Csc, which can be translated into Sin and Cos functionality. Furthermore, the processing these equations through WolframAlpha yielded other insights into limits, roots, and series that logically follow. How did the solutions to the, "velocity," v - variable curvature in the Lorentz coefficient, "manifest," when the Lorentz coefficient ought cancel out with itself? The step - by - step solution below illustrates the algebraic process by which a specific solution for something that ought cancel out with itself can be found. The Sphere of Realization is a groundbreaking work of philosophical and mathematical theory. The first volume of this epic collection examines the concept of V-Curvature, or Phenomenological Velocity, using algebraic equations to explain how this phenomenon can be solved. This book goes on to explore the implications of these equations, such as limits, roots, series, and introspection into infinity, providing an alternate route for accessing a 'hidden dimension' that connects physical laws with abstract philosophical ideas. By utilizing this understanding, the author creates a platform for introspection into life and nature, and considers the philosophical implications of this perception, from the exploration of the infinity of angles to theions of time, velocity, the emergence of real numbers, and the meanings of eternity, forever, infinity, and never ending. This landmark work of mathematical exploration and philosophical discovery will challenge and expand our understanding of the universe, and invite us into a journey of introspection and understanding. An exploration of the esoteric terms therein, and the pathways they provide to access new modes of thought, will give the reader the ability to gain a greater insight into the intricacies of reality. The Sphere of Realization provides a unique and comprehensive approach to a difficult concept. Through a blend of philosophical and mathematical exploration, the author delves into the concept of V-Curvature, or Phenomenological Velocity to unlock the mysteries of "hidden dimensions" within our reality. These equations and theories allow the reader to explore angles, time, velocity, roots, series, and other related concepts. In so doing, the book offers an exciting journey into the esoteric. The author also provides insights into the emergence of real numbers from infinity, introducing concepts such as eternity, forever, and never ending in the process. A comprehensive discussion of the applicable equations and transformations, immune to the construct of time, serves as a powerful tool for unlocking a meaningful understanding of the universe. The Sphere of Realization is an opportunity to gain a deeper appreciation of the reality of our world. (shrink)

According to certain theories, acquiring knowledge of God does not necessarily depend on philosophical evidence, and a believer is not obligated to rely on philosophical arguments from natural theology to justify their religious convictions. However, it is undeniable that philosophical arguments supporting the existence of God and theodicies possess significant epistemic value. This raises the question: what is the epistemic significance of the intellectual products derived from natural theology if they are not essential for attaining knowledge of God? Drawing upon (...) the distinction between knowledge and understanding as separate epistemic goods, I argue that it is reasonable to assert that arguments for theism and theodicies contribute to religious understanding rather than directly providing knowledge of God. Finally, I enumerate several theoretical advantages that this proposal would offer to the field of religious epistemology. (shrink)

In philosophical work on the ethics of conversational exchange, much has been written regarding the speaker side—i.e., on the rights and duties we have as speakers. This paper explores the relatively neglected topic of the duties pertaining to listeners’ side of the exchange. Following W.K. Clifford, we argue that it’s fruitful to think of our epistemic resources as common property. Furthermore, listeners have a key role in maintaining and improving these resources, perhaps a more important role than speakers. We develop (...) this idea by drawing from Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber’s “interactionist” picture of reason, which suggests that reasoning is essentially dialogical and relies on the epistemic vigilance of listeners. The paper defends an imperfect, prima facie duty to listen, one that is sufficiently strong to place substantial demands on individuals, but not so overly demanding as to be implausible. (shrink)

Clinical microbiology serves as a partner to clinicians in the diagnosis and treatment of infectious diseases. Antibiotics are prescribed empirically before the availability of antimicrobial susceptibility testing data, especially when the patient's medical status could deteriorate by suspending the treatment. To investigate the impact of antimicrobial susceptibility testing on the management of outpatients with suspected bacterial infection in Libyan patients, a cross-sectional prospective study concluded on microbial microdroplet culture by including outpatients with suspected bacterial infection, who have done antimicrobial susceptibility (...) testing. Thus, 53 Libyan patients with urinary tract infections and 14 Libyan patients with skin infections were included in this study. Before the availability of antimicrobial susceptibility testing data, 25 patients were appropriately treated while 42 patients were inappropriately treated. After the availability of antimicrobial susceptibility testing data, the number of appropriately treated patients increased to 57 patients. Thus, antimicrobial susceptibility testing improved the management of 41 patients by discontinuing an unnecessary antibiotic in four patients, starting necessary antibiotic therapy in 18 patients, and changing to more appropriate antibiotic in 19 patients. However, the antimicrobial susceptibility testing has no impact on the management of 24 patients and has led to the worsening of the management of two patients. The effect of antimicrobial susceptibility testing of antibiotic de-escalation was assessed in 35 patients; however, antibiotic de-escalation occurred in six patients. Thus, data of antimicrobial susceptibility testing has improved the management of Libyan outpatients with bacterial infection but their role in antibiotic de-escalation was slight. (shrink)

Pharmacoeconomics (PE) is a relatively newly developed and fast-changing discipline [1]. PE plays a crucial role in healthcare decision-making by evaluating the costs and outcomes of different treatment options. In Libya, however, the implementation of PE evaluations faces various challenges that hinder its effective integration into healthcare systems. This communication analyses the current needs and prospects of PE by examining the challenges in its implementation, the benefits of integrating it into healthcare decision-making, and strategies to enhance its utilization in the (...) country's healthcare landscape. By exploring these different aspects, it is possible to gain a comprehensive understanding of Libya's status and potential advancements in PE. In Libya, the earliest records related to PE trace back to the late 19th century, specifically around 1835 during the Turkish colonization. During that time, various documents documented details such as drug prices, direct costs associated with specific diseases, expenditures on essential pharmaceuticals, and annual inventories of health and pharmaceutical institutions [2]. Over the past 80 years since modern Libya’s establishment after the colonial era, Libyan authorities have consistently published annual statistical reports. These reports cover expenditures on medicines, pharmaceuticals, and therapeutic materials, as well as the stock levels in healthcare facilities [3]. However, despite this data, there remains a significant lack of literature in PE, with a few exceptions that do not meet the standards expected of PE studies. (shrink)

This dissertation is about the relationship between Epistemology and other domains. In it I want to show that in an important sense, Epistemology is an autonomous domain. That is, epistemic vocabulary (e.g., “knowledge”, “justification”, “rationality”, “epistemic reason”, etc.) cannot be analyzed without remainder into non-epistemic vocabulary. Epistemic phenomena must be explained in terms of epistemic reasons and the form of assessment proprietary to them. Although epistemic vocabulary cannot be reduced to the vocabulary of other domains, Epistemology is nonetheless connected with (...) other domains in an important way. In this dissertation I focus on the connection between Epistemology and the Philosophy of Mind. I distinguish different forms cognitive self-monitoring can take and corresponding forms of cognitive autonomy. The kind of self-monitoring that receives the most attention involves simulating interpersonal argumentation. I argue that the capacity to self-monitor in this way grounds familiar epistemic standards (e.g., knowledge and justification) and explains how reasons get their grip on us. On the picture that emerges, Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind need to be done in tandem. Epistemology gives us the normative framework that is modeled by the self-monitoring system. The self-monitoring system, conversely, explains the kind of activity we engage in that makes that normative framework applicable to us. Epistemic reasons themselves are just episodes of this kind of activity. In Chapter 1 I argue that epistemic luck cannot be analyzed in non-epistemic terms. Here I generalize Jennifer Lackey’s criticism of Duncan Pritchard’s safety-based account of epistemic luck to all reductive theories. I argue that they will either be extensionally inadequate, or they will illicitly presuppose the vocabulary they are trying to reduce. The upshot is that epistemic luck can only be understood in terms of the epistemic assessment of reasons. By extension, we can’t give a reductive analysis of knowledge. This is not to say we cannot analyze knowledge, just that we can’t analyze away the epistemic vocabulary without remainder. In chapter 2 I explain the relation between epistemic luck, epistemic justification, and knowledge. I argue that previous work in the defeasible reasoning tradition, despite being on the right track, fell short of realizing its full potential. This is because the account of how these three things relate given by its proponents was insufficiently unified, which encouraged many epistemologists to abandon the defeasible reasoning tradition entirely. I argue that a unified and principled account of their relation is possible, and it allows for an elegant analysis of knowledge. In slogan form: good reasons are apparent to the knowing subject. In chapter 3 I extend the defeasible reasoning tradition to explain how knowledge is gradable. I show that this enables us to bring the debates about fake barns and knowledge from falsehoods to ecumenical resolutions, while also shedding light on a new kind of case. Furthermore, I explain how background assumptions are themselves defeasible and some of the epistemic significance of this fact. In chapter 4 I make the connection between Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind. I argue that the self-monitoring system of cognitively mature humans uses a model of the normative framework described in the previous chapters to regulate its own cognition. Here I build on that claim to develop an account of the role played by knowledge and justification in doxastic social coordination. I build on the claim that background assumptions are themselves defeasible to develop an account of the foundations of knowledge according to which they are social but not brutely sociological. In chapter 5 I discuss the relation between the epistemic states of cognitively mature humans, children, and non-human animals. I do this in a way meant to integrate an insight from virtue epistemology into the reasons-first picture developed here: positive epistemic standing is a state attributable to the subject. In chapter 6 I discuss the metaphysics of epistemic reasons. I claim that they are episodes of the activity of reasoning. In the preceding chapters, we get a sense of what that activity involves. Here I argue that the materials developed there put us in a position to understand what epistemic reasons are. This account incorporates the insights of rival positions while sidestepping familiar objections to them. The resulting picture is in line with the non-reductive approach to the epistemic developed so far. In fact, it goes further than other “reasons-first” approaches to Epistemology by claiming that reasons are not only basic within Epistemology, but they are also basic full-stop. One key consideration for my argument here is that reasons are, by their very nature, competitors. Although this point is generally acknowledged in the literature on reasons, its consequences for the metaphysics of reasons hasn’t been. Participants in the debate about the metaphysics of reasons typically try to identify reasons with something (e.g., facts or mental states) that are either not competitors, or only competitors insofar as they constitute, or bear on the epistemic assessment of, episodes of reasoning. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Nietzsche on Morality and the Affirmation of Life ed. by Daniel CameJames A. MollisonDaniel Came, ed., Nietzsche on Morality and the Affirmation of Life Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022. 220 pp. isbn: 978-0-198-72889-4. Hardback, $70.00Daniel Came's most recent edited collection features original essays from leading figures in the field. As most of its chapters are well-written and well-argued, it will interest Nietzsche scholars generally. It's difficult to narrow (...) the volume's intended audience much further than this, however. The source of this difficulty is not merely titular, though one wonders what aspects of Nietzsche's philosophy could not plausibly be yoked under the dual headings of "morality" and "life affirmation." Rather, the difficulty stems from a shortcoming of Nietzsche's. As Came puts the point in his introduction, "Nietzsche is greatly more forthcoming in his diagnosis of the life-denying nature of morality than he is about what should replace morality and in particular the type of life-affirming attitude which might then ensue" (7). The underdeveloped character of Nietzsche's positive [End Page 110] pronouncements about life affirmation leaves many questions unanswered, the most basic of which might be, "What exactly is it to affirm life?" (7). This collection admirably attempts to tackle such questions head-on by foregrounding Nietzsche's "practical-existential concern with the value of existence" (4)—even if, in resisting the temptation to delve ever deeper into the complexities of Nietzsche's critical enterprise, this approach risks leaving some specialist concerns aside.In light of the inchoate nature of Nietzsche's remedy for life denial, a volume taking life affirmation as its starting point can be forgiven if its contributions are somewhat scattered. Four chapters in this collection—authored by Gemes, Hassan, Huddleston, and Janaway—identify distinct obstacles to Nietzsche's project of life affirmation and explain how Nietzsche might overcome them. Three others—written by Came, Stern, and Kanterian—overlap in arguing that Nietzsche's notion of life affirmation is deeply confused at best and fatally flawed at worst. Two remaining chapters, by Reginster and Clark, are functionally close readings of GM. Below, I discuss the standout essays by Gemes, Came, Huddleston, and Stern, which straightforwardly interact with one another. I then comment on the volume's remaining essays.In his chapter, Gemes suggests that Nietzsche's concern with nihilism emerges after HH, whereas his earlier works express a Romantic preoccupation with cultural renewal. While Reginster analyzes nihilism as a cognitive state of disorientation or despair (The Affirmation of Life [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006]) and Pippin analyzes nihilism as a waning of erotic desire (Nietzsche, Psychology, and First Philosophy [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010]), Gemes contends that these forms of nihilism are downstream from a more fundamental condition of affective nihilism that becomes fully manifest with the advent of Christian morality. (Kaitlyn Creasy's work on affective nihilism goes unmentioned.) Gemes then rightly observes that nihilism does not merely subtend overt expressions of life denial, as Nietzsche also "characterizes the need to ask reflective questions about the value of existence as a pathological symptom" of nihilism (29, emphasis added; see also GS P:2; TI "Socrates" 2; TI "Morality" 5). This presents a problem for Nietzsche's life-affirming ambitions. For, even if the ancient Greeks and GM's nobles can accomplish "naïve affirmation," which is "more an affective state than a consciously avowed cognitive belief" (28–29), it is unclear whether we late moderns can do the same. Moreover, Nietzsche's [End Page 111] challenge of affirming the eternal recurrence (GS 341) seems to require the sort of reflective, cognitive assessment of life that Nietzsche diagnoses as nihilistic. I would have liked for Gemes to have examined Nietzsche's indictment of judgments about life in more detail, as this seems crucial for delimiting Nietzsche's project of life affirmation. In any case, Gemes concludes by suggesting that Z might strive to incite "deep poetic inspiration […] among those who [can] hear rightly" (35), thereby helping these select few overcome affective nihilism. This might be Nietzsche's best strategy for facilitating life affirmation.Came is less confident... (shrink)

Pensare in modo critico sull'aborto: Perché la maggior parte degli aborti non sono moralmente sbagliati; Perché tutti gli aborti dovrebbero essere legali: "Thinking Critically About Abortion" in Italian.

We give a Bayesian argument showing that, even if your total empirical evidence confirms that you have zillions of duplicate Boltzmann Brains, that evidence does not confirm that you are a Boltzmann Brain. We also try to explain what goes wrong with several of the sources of the temptation for thinking that such evidence does have skeptical implications.

The integration of postmodern thinking in the sciences, especially in biology, has been subject to harsh criticism. Contrary to Enlightenment ideals of objectivity and neutrality in the scientific method, the postmodern stance holds that truth is relative, not universal, and therefore progress is ambiguous. The effect of postmodern thought has ramifications that extend from the distrust of preexisting scientific conclusions to questions about the impact of progress in society. It also reflects skepticism about the scientific endeavor. Especially when postmodern ideas (...) are considered to have gained traction, the anti-postmodern critique has become harsher. At stake is whether postmodern notions are indeed irrelevant, and—even more important—whether they compromise scientific progress. The conditional significance of universals in biology and the role of historicity in the evolutionary process makes biology different from the other natural sciences and subjects it to the postmodern critique. This article argues that rather than being viewed as a science that seeks universals, biology should be viewed as a construct, more relevant to a technology, aiming to attain functionalities. Such recognition may fuel progress and assist biology in attaining its ultimate goal, which is to address the most intricate questions about the living world. (shrink)

Peirce’s pragmatic maxim is closely related to his conception of abduction. The acquisition of the actual effect required by the method of scientific reasoning expressed by Peirce’s maxim must be accomplished by resorting to abductive logic. Abductive logic starts from a surprising fact, derives a hypothetical explanation about that fact, and finally arrives at the possibility that the hypothesis is true. This is the process of abductive reasoning, as provided by Peirce, which is distinct from induction and deduction and generates (...) explanatory views. Peirce opposed a unified and unchangeable concept of causality. He used different interpretations of causality to illustrate the considerable differences in people’s understanding of cause and effect in different periods. The concept of pragmatism, as developed from the pragmatic maxim to abduction and then to scientific inference to the best explanation, is precisely what Peirce initially proposed, and inference to the best explanation is the starting point and the final result of the pragmatic maxim. (shrink)

This paper explores the notions of competitive and noncompetitive value and examines how they both affect meaning in life. The paper distinguishes, among other things, between engaging with competitive value and participating in a competition; between competitive value and comparative value; between competing with others and competing with oneself; and between subjective and objective aspects of both competitive and noncompetitive value. Since any competitive value is also comparative value, the paper criticizes Harry Frankfurt’s claim that comparative value is just a (...) ‘formal characteristic of the relationship between two items’, from which nothing follows about their value or desirability. The paper also argues that, overall, noncompetitive value has the advantage overcompetitive value in terms of attaining meaning in life. Reasons for this claim include that: competitive value relates less than noncompetitive value to what is meaningful in life; competitive value is harder to attain than noncompetitive value; competitive value depends more than noncompetitive value on luck and on what other people do; and competitive value is more likely to lead to stress, hypocrisy, and aggression. (shrink)

Developments in truthmaker semantics for the most part stay clear of the metaphysical issue of what sort of entities serve as the truthmakers and falsitymakers for sentences. It is assumed that perhaps facts or states of affairs (Fine, 2017a; Jago, 2020), with these taken sometimes as concrete particulars (Hawke, 2018) could serve for the job, but nonetheless that some such entities would do. In this paper I take a closer look at the issue of what entities could or could not (...) play the role of truthmakers and falsitymakers in standard truthmaker semantics (Fine, 2016, 2017a,b; Fine and Jago, 2019), based on desiderata imposed by metaphysical and semantic considerations. (shrink)

Whether we ought to trust the testimony of another person is often thought to primarily depend on features like their evidence, knowledge, or level of expertise. No doubt these are epistemically relevant features. However, a recent paper by Justin P. McBrayer (2024) convincingly argues that a testifier's interests may be more important than their expertise when it comes to how we should allocate our epistemic trust in them. Just think of the proverbial used car salesman. You should not trust what (...) he tells you, and realizing that he is an expert only seems to make things worse. In this reply, I consider McBrayer’s basic insight, constructively criticize his view, and tentatively explore further territory. (shrink)

Second scholasticism, ​analytical metaphysics, and Christian apologetics are the three topics characteristic of the lifelong efforts of the eminent Czech philosopher Stanislav Sousedík, who celebrated his 90th birthday in 2021. To honour this anniversary, a conference named accordingly was organized in Prague. The papers presented at this event — further elaborated by their authors and supplemented with Sousedík’s remarkable “Brief Autobiography” — constitute the gist of this book: a collective homage to Professor Sousedík and an attempt to promote and develop (...) his intellectual legacy. (shrink)

Notadamente, o Brasil não é um país de grande produção de leite ovino, todavia o país detém rebanhos leiteiros de grande porte e que produzem uma quantidade significativa de leite. Especialmente na região Sul e Nordeste do Brasil, a ovinocultura de leite cresce a cada ano. O leite ovino possui características diferenciais quanto ao bovino e caprino, em especial pela maior presença de sólidos totais, em particular pela maior presença de gordura quando comparado ao das outras espécies, aspecto esse que (...) confere 95% da produção de leite para a industrialização com a fabricação de queijos, portanto quando se fala em qualidade refere-se à sua capacidade de transformação em produtos lácteos de alta qualidade, altos rendimentos por litro de leite e produtos que assegurem sua inocuidade. Por mais baixa que seja a produção mundial de leite ovino, esse, por suas características, possui grande valor de mercado tanto na forma fluida como melhor ainda na forma beneficiada com a fabricação de queijos famosos e grande valor agregado de mercado. Dito isto, o sucesso da ovinocultura leiteira no país pode salutar com o conhecimento das características do leite bem como dos fatores que podem interferir na composição, quantidade e qualidade deste. Sendo assim, busca-se apresentar uma revisão sistemática das características químicas e sensoriais do leite ovino, bem como dos fatores que podem afetar sua qualidade e composição. (shrink)

This article analyzes how populism is conceptualized and studied in International Relations (IR) and argues that it should be seen as a political logic instead of a political ideology. It does so by demonstrating that ‘populist foreign policy’ looks radically different when analyzing the populist left, refuting the possibility of any distinctly ‘populist’ foreign policy positions. We argue that large parts of IR scholarship practice a form of concept-stretching that undermines the quality of analysis as well as the ability to (...) make meaningful policy recommendations. Using the empirical case studies of Bernie Sanders in the United States and Podemos in Spain, the article demonstrates that populism does not translate into any shared ideological positions but is a way of formulating and performing – in these cases – leftist politics through which political actors can interpellate and mobilize different societal groups and demands behind their political projects. In particular, the analysis debunks common assumptions about populism’s alleged effects on foreign policy and dangers to pluralist democracy and shows that “populism” neither necessarily opposes multilateralism, migration and global public good provision nor formulates an authoritarian claim to power. (shrink)

Some bioethicists argue that a doctor may frame treatment options in terms of effects on survival rather than on mortality in order to influence patients to choose the better option. The debate over such framing typically assumes that the survival and mortality frames convey the same numerical information. However, certain empirical findings contest this numerical equivalence assumption, demonstrating that framing effects may in fact be due to the two frames implying different information about the numerical bounds of survival and mortality (...) rates. In this paper, I use these findings to argue that framing is presumptively wrong because it violates the duty of proper disclosure. Along the way, I highlight morally relevant features affecting the permissibility of framing, tackle three objections and draw some general lessons for the ethics of nudging. (shrink)

Nhiều cơ sở giáo dục đại học Việt Nam đang tiến hành các chiến lược thu hút sinh viên quốc tế. Một nghiên cứu mới đây đã chỉ ra chiến lược nào trong số đó là hiệu quả hoặc không.

What role, if any, do ‘seemings’ play in philosophy? Clarifying the relevant type of philosophical inquiry will enable us to pinpoint what epistemic contributions ‘seemings’ could make thereto. It will also reveal what turns on the question—nothing less, I propose, than the very possibility of philosophy. However, the answer I develop appeals not to seemings, but rather to intuitions conceived as a particular type of presentation—a “consciousness of seizing upon” how the world is, as Husserl put it. After distinguishing presentations (...) from seemings, I prise apart two kinds of presentational phenomenology, eventually arguing that the ‘contentful’ sort is poised to do the needed epistemic work. (shrink)

Despite its prevalence today, the practice of purely performative resuscitation (PPR)—paradigmatically, the ‘slow code’—has attracted more critics in bioethics than defenders. The most common criticism of the slow code is that it’s fundamentally deceptive or harmful, while the most common justification offered is that it may benefit the patient’s loved ones, by symbolically honoring the patient or the care team’s relationship with the family. I argue that critics and defenders of the slow code each have a point. Advocates of the (...) slow code are right that not all PPR is wrongly deceptive or harmful to the patient or his family, and that the symbolic aspect of medicine is itself morally significant. But the critics are also correct: slow codes are prima facie wrong. I argue that pursuing a slow code amounts to treating the patient as a tool for others’ benefit—hence, treating him as an object—and that this instrumentalizing quality constitutes one core prima facie wrong of the practice. I also build a case for the idea that the slow code may not always be all-things-considered wrong, specifying certain limited conditions under which acts of PPR might ultimately be permissible. Thus, the symbolic dimension of medical treatment is indeed morally important, both in morally favorable and in morally problematic respects—namely, in its symbolic denial of the patient’s humanity. (shrink)

During the 2010s, a radical transformation took place in the Spanish philosophical landscape: most philosophy journals started releasing their papers for free under a creative commons licence. Thanks to open access publication, Spanish philosophy has a bigger audience today than never before. Drawing on the authors’ experience as editors of two of these journals, Theoria and Recerca, this paper discusses what made this transformation possible, its consequences for the assessment of the Spanish philosophical output and, finally, how to strengthen Spanish (...) philosophy journals to confront the forthcoming challenges in open access publishing. (shrink)

En este artículo sostengo que los tres filósofos/pedagogos cubanos del siglo XIX, Félix Varela y Morales, José de la Luz y Caballero y Enrique José Varona, fueron responsables de superar la enseñanza de la escolástica tardía en la Real y Pontificia Universidad de San Jerónimo de La Habana. Contra los filósofos y pedagogos escolásticos tardíos que preferían la lógica silogística y la autoridad de la tradición sobre la inducción, argumentaron a favor de esta última sobre la primera. Puesto que defendían (...) las ideas liberales y republicanas, también argumentaban en contra de aquellos que apelan a la autoridad de la tradición en lugar de a nuestras experiencias cotidianas. Su espíritu liberal desafió no sólo al régimen tiránico impuesto por España, sino a cualquier otro régimen cuya autoridad dependiera de la fuerza más que de la libre voluntad del pueblo a escoger sus gobernantes. (shrink)

We know a lot about what the world is like. We know less, it seems, about what we know about what the world is like. According to a common thought, it is easier for us to come to know about the state of the world than to come to know about the state of our own knowledge. What explains this gap? An attractively simple hypothesis is that our ignorance about what we know is explained by our ignorance about the world. (...) There are things we fail to know about what we know about the world because there are things we fail to know about the world. This hypothesis is often motivated by the idea that knowledge requires a margin‐for‐error. In this paper, I'll argue that this simple hypothesis is inadequate. Not all our ignorance of our knowledge can be explained by our ignorance about the world. In this sense, at least some of our ignorance about what we know is brute. (shrink)

The concept of the mind in philosophy encompasses a diverse range of theories and perspectives, examining its immaterial nature, unitary function, self-activity, self-consciousness, and persistence despite bodily changes. This paper explores the attributes of the mind, addressing classical materialism, dualism, and behaviorism, along with contemporary theories like functionalism and computational functionalism. Key philosophical debates include the mind-body problem, the subjectivity of mental states, and the epistemological and conceptual challenges in understanding other minds. Contrasting views from Aristotle, Descartes, Wittgenstein, and modern (...) philosophers like U.T. Place, Gilbert Ryle, and Hilary Putnam are analyzed. The paper also discusses the implications of these theories on our understanding of mental phenomena, consciousness, and the nature of human experience. (shrink)

Sometimes, realizing an ethically desirable outcome X will generate disutility for some whose very cooperation is necessary to realizing X, either in the form of material or social costs, or the abnegation of some of their values or personal principles. How does one gain their assent? Seeing one's way through such cases may hinge on one’s ability to make plausible first-pass predictions of how others will react to one’s interventions with them. In other words, one should know not simply the (...) warrant of one’s reasons in favor of X, but also how such reasons will be received when issued forth in one’s voice and from one's person. I call this me-knowledge— knowing the ‘me’ as seen from the perspective of a particular other. Drawing on classical Chinese sources, I argue that such knowledge is crucial to enhance one's efficacy in the world. (shrink)

A study was conducted regarding ways in which higher education institutions can improve ethics. Theoretical frameworks used included: Virtue ethics, deontological and environmental ethics theories. The total sampled written texts were 94. Non-probability sampling was used. The type that was used was online convenience sampling through web scraping. Philosophical assumption that guided this study was interpretivism and the approach was Qualitative. Case study was used as a design and content analysis as a method of data analysis. Some of the findings (...) of the study included but were not limited to the following: Higher education's ethical and professional standards are critical for retaining the trust of students, staff, and the larger society. Institutions that prioritise ethics and standards will be better positioned to carry out their goal and positively impact society. The study recommended the following to Higher education stakeholders: Create faculty-led ethics committees to evaluate and advise on ethical issues such as teaching, research, and academic freedom. Make certain that these committees are composed of a diverse spectrum of faculty members with ethics expertise; Create explicit rules and protocols for using AI, machine learning, and big data ethically in academic research and administrative processes. Address the issues of discrimination, privacy, and accountability in AI applications; and Involve alumni in ethics programs and projects to encourage them to support and contribute to ethical education and research. Create opportunities for alumni to advise students on how to develop ethical professions. (shrink)

A study was conducted on ethical leadership in institutions of higher education. Objectives of the study were: (i). Illustrate theories of ethical leadership in higher education institutions; (ii) Determine importance of ethical leadership in higher education institutions; and (iii) Determine challenges facing ethical leadership in institutions of higher learning. The total number of written texts sampled was 32. The researcher employed non-probability sampling. The type employed was online convenience sampling using web scraping. The interpretivism philosophical assumption led this investigation, and (...) the qualitative approach was used. Case study was employed as a design and content analysis as a data analysis tool. The study found out that ethical leadership is essential in higher education institutions because it establishes a solid ethical foundation, fosters an environment of integrity, and contributes to the institutions' long-term success and viability. It acts as a model for all stakeholders, motivating them to follow ethical concepts and values in their academic pursuits and institutional responsibilities. The challenges of ethical leadership in higher education institutions range from fiscal limits to issues about diversity, governance, and technology. It is vital for higher education institutions to address these concerns in order to maintain their integrity and efficiency. Recommendations included but were not limited to the following: (i)Ethical leaders should model the behaviour they expect from their staff and students. Show integrity, honesty, and justice in your acts and decisions; (ii) Establish Clear Ethical Standards: Develop an ethical code or set of fundamental ideas for your educational community. Ensure that these expectations are communicated to all stakeholders, including staff, students, parents, and the general public;(iii). Encourage Open Communication: Create an environment in which faculty and students can express concerns and report unethical behaviour. Encourage transparency and active listening while responding to remarks; and (iv). Ethical Decision-Making Training: Provide leaders and personnel with ethical decision-making training and professional development opportunities. Use case studies and real-life occurrences to help in discussions about ethical quandaries. (shrink)

Review of 'History of Rationalities: Ways of Thinking from Vico to Hacking and Beyond' by Luca Sciortino Palgrave McMillan, Cham (Switzerland) 2023, pp. 351 € 84,94 .

ABSTRACT (ITA) Un’idea emerge, si sviluppa, guadagna consenso, muta, talvolta scompare per poi risorgere. Questo è anche stato il destino dell’idea di evoluzione, il cui lungo cammino viene ricostruito in questo saggio, dai Greci fino ai nostri giorni. A partire dal diciassettesimo secolo questa nozione assume sempre più rilevanza nello studio della natura. In ciascun pensatore l’idea di un’evoluzione delle specie viventi è stata accompagnata da una teoria volta a spiegare le cause e il meccanismo del mutamento. Questo saggio racconta (...) non soltanto la genesi e lo sviluppo dell’idea tout court che la natura in qualche modo si trasformi, ma anche la storia delle teorie che, assumendo come reale questa trasformazione, ne postulano una spiegazione. Particolare attenzione viene data ad alcuni aspetti spesso trascurati che hanno reso possibile il concetto di evoluzione del mondo vivente come la conosciamo adesso, di cui se ne mostra la rilevanza, già a partire dal pensiero greco. -/- ABSTRACT (ENG) An idea emerges, develops, gains consensus, evolves, sometimes disappears and then rises again. This was also the fate of the idea of evolution, whose long journey is reconstructed in this essay, from the Greeks to the present day. Since the seventeenth century, this idea has become more and more relevant in the study of nature. In each thinker the idea of an evolution of living species has been accompanied by a theory aimed at explaining the causes and the mechanism of change. This essay tells not only the genesis and development of the idea that nature somehow transforms itself, but also the history of the theories which, assuming this transformation as real, postulate an explanation. Particular emphasis is given to some often overlooked aspects that made possible the concept of evolution of the living world as we know it now, whose full relevance is shown, starting from Greek thought. Keywords: evolution, natural selection, Charles Darwin, history of ideas, history of science. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue for an often-neglected solution to the conceivability argument: the reconciliatory response. Its advocates state that, even if zombies are metaphysically possible, it does not follow that all versions of physicalism are false. To make the reconciliatory response, we must construct a theory that counts as a version of physicalism (because it makes higher-level facts count as physical) but also allows for the metaphysical possibility of zombies. Call any physicalist theory that can make the reconciliatory response (...) type-R physicalism. In this paper, I discuss one version of type-R physicalism: stochastic ground physicalism (SGP). First, I argue that type-R physicalism, construed as SGP, offers physicalists an attractive rationalist package that no other version of physicalism can provide. Second, I address two concerns that have been underexplored in the literature. First, the charge that SGP is incoherent because it fails to provide metaphysical explanations. Second, the charge that type-R physicalism is not a genuine form of physicalism because the supervenience of the phenomenal on the physical is a necessary condition for any formulation of physicalism. I argue that both concerns are ill-founded. (shrink)

The pace of technological change continues to outstrip the evolution of democratic institutions, creating an urgent need for innovative approaches to democratic reform. However, the experimentation bottleneck - characterized by slow speed, high costs, limited scalability, and ethical risks - has long hindered progress in democracy research. This paper proposes a novel solution: employing generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) to create synthetic data through the simulation of digital homunculi, GenAI-powered entities designed to mimic human behavior in social contexts. By enabling rapid, (...) low-risk experimentation with alternative institutional designs, this approach could significantly accelerate democratic innovation. I examine the potential of GenAI-assisted research to mitigate current limitations in democratic experimentation, including the ability to simulate large-scale societal interactions and test complex institutional mechanisms. While acknowledging potential risks such as algorithmic bias, reproducibility challenges, and AI alignment issues, I argue that the benefits of synthetic data are likely to outweigh their drawbacks if implemented with proper caution. To address existing challenges, I propose a range of technical, methodological, and institutional adaptations. The paper concludes with a call for interdisciplinary collaboration in the development and implementation of GenAI-assisted methods in democracy research, highlighting their potential to bridge the gap between democratic theory and practice in an era of rapid technological change. (shrink)

A critical analysis of the results of social surveys of philosophers of English-speaking (2009, 2020) and Russian-speaking (2015) groups, revealing major problems of modern world philosophy. First of all, these are the problems of adequate, relevant reflection of the objective, real, material world in the subjective human consciousness. Today it is important to understand: what kind of philosophy and why does a person need it? Is this a philosophy that splits human consciousness into a mosaic of fragments of various philosophical (...) speculative trends - empiricism, positivism, pragmatism, structuralism, monism, dualism, eclecticism, personalism, skepticism, agnosticism, existentialism, neo-Hegelianism, neo-Kantianism, Neotomism, etc.? Or is it a philosophy designed to combine “many things into one” and give humanity the most adequate, correct, scientific picture of the real world? Until now, world philosophy, like religious beliefs, does not unite, but divides humanity, hiding from it true, reliable, scientific knowledge behind a veil of empty concepts and categories. The world is material and unified, and human consciousness is split into parts. The new philosophy should correspond to the real world, providing people's consciousness not with pieces of a mosaic, but with a complete, logically justified and experimentally tested picture of the universe. (shrink)

Mấy ngày tuần qua, có nhiều ý kiến xung quanh chuyện đọc sách của Hoa hậu Kỳ Duyên. Nhiều chê bai, cũng có ý kiến bày tỏ sự thông cảm với lựa chọn cá nhân. Một số ý kiến cho rằng cần phải tăng cường truyền cảm hứng cho văn hóa đọc [1]. Tuy vậy, tình trạng văn hóa đọc suy giảm hoàn toàn không mới. Ngay cả ở những quốc gia có tầm ảnh hưởng và độ sâu văn hóa (...) rất đáng kính trọng như Pháp, đọc sách cũng đang bị suy giảm trong giới trẻ [2]. Sự cạnh tranh của các loại hình thông tin, thiết bị công nghệ và dịch chuyển từ "đọc sang xem" và "xem sang xem lướt" đã góp phần tạo nên sự xói mòn nền tảng đọc. Trên thực tế, từ phương diện sinh học, đọc tốn năng lượng, phải suy nghĩ và ngốn nhiều thời gian. Cân nhắc đánh đổi thói quen thụ hưởng lợi ích nhanh lấy lợi ích lâu dài trở thành khó khăn hơn ở thời đại này. So với thời kỳ khi mà sách là một trong số ít phương tiện thông tin mang lại nhiều lợi ích tinh thần, cân nhắc này rõ ràng thiệt thòi cho văn hóa đọc. Tuy vậy, cũng không cần quá bi quan, vì trong một số cộng đồng hướng tới phát triển nền tảng tri thức lâu bền, văn hóa đọc sẽ vẫn tiếp tục được duy trì, thậm chí phát triển. Hình ảnh tình cờ tôi thấy dưới đây là một ví dụ. (shrink)

Trong bối cảnh toàn cầu đang đối mặt với những thách thức ngày càng nghiêm trọng từ biến đổi khí hậu, tín chỉ carbon đã được xem như một giải pháp tài chính nhằm khuyến khích việc giảm phát thải khí nhà kính. Tuy nhiên, liệu giải pháp này có thực sự hiệu quả trong việc bảo vệ môi trường, hay chỉ đơn thuần là một cách để thương mại hóa thiên nhiên, mang lại lợi ích ngắn hạn nhưng tiềm (...) ẩn nhiều rủi ro lâu dài? (shrink)

The interest for versions of cosmological argument formulated in non-causal terms had increased in the last years. In this paper I shall argue that the cosmological argument of contingency is better understood in noncausal terms and I shall explore how the ontological dependence of the universe on God presupposed by this cosmological argument can be understood in terms of the identityessential account for ontological dependence championed by Kit Fine. First, I discuss the reasons for considering that the cosmological argument of (...) contingency is about constant or constitutive ontological (noncausal) dependence. Second, I present the essentialist account of ontological dependence by Kit Fine. Third, I examine the perplexities involving the ontological argument of contingency in the framework of identity-essential dependence. My conclusion is that, under the cosmological argument of contingency plus an identity-essential account of ontological dependence, all contingent things depend on God in a collective way, not an individual one. The collective essence of the totality of contingent things requires God, even although none of these things individually need to have God in their individual essences. (shrink)

In Appearance and Explanation, McCain and Moretti propose a novel internalist account of epistemic justification called phenomenal explanationism, which combines phenomenal conservatism and explanationism. I argue that the current version of phenomenal explanationism faces a dilemma: either it omits the awareness requirement but implies an implausible form of logical-mathematical omniscience, or it preserves the requirement but leads to a vicious regress. I suggest how phenomenal explanationism might be revised to avoid this dilemma.

The introduction to a special issue of Religious Studies on the theme of experimental philosophy of religion.

Validity is a well-defined notion. Premise circularity is not. Attempting to define premise circularity precisely generates a puzzle: a difficult-to-avoid correspondence between the definitions of ‘valid argument’ and ‘premise circular argument.’.

In this work, we attempt to define a notion of compositeness compatible with Quantum Field Theory. Considering the analytic properties of the S-matrix, we conclude that there is no satisfactory definition of compositeness compatible with Quantum Field Theory. Without this notion, one must claim that all bound states are equally fundamental, that is, one cannot rigorously claim that everyday objects are made of atoms or that atoms are made of protons and neutrons. I then show how an approximate notion of (...) compositeness may be recovered in the regime where the mass of a bound state is close to a multi-particle threshold. -/- Finally, we see that rejecting compositeness solves several of the "problems of everyday objects" encountered in an undergraduate metaphysics course. (shrink)

The unity thesis is the thesis that epistemic norms and zetetic norms comprise a unified normative domain. We argue against the unity thesis by presenting cases where the zetetic norms issue requirements to adopt doxastic attitudes (essential to the inquiry) which are forbidden by nearly platitudinous epistemic norms. After arguing that our cases are an improvement upon extant cases in the literature, we canvas a range of responses unity theorists might offer to resist our conclusion and argue that they either (...) do not dissolve the conflict between the epistemic and zetetic norms or introduce unmotivated restrictions on the space of permissible inquiries. (shrink)

This essay defends the claim that episodic remembering is a mental action by arguing that episodic remembering and sensory- or experience-like imagining are of a kind in a way relevant for agency. Episodic remembering is a type of imaginative project that involves the agential construction of imagistic-content and that aims at (veridically) representing particular events of the personal past. Neurally intact adults under normal conditions can token experiential memories of particular events from the personal past (merely) by intending or trying (...) to. An agent’s ability to actively remember depends not only on her being able to determine that some memory event occurs but on her ability to construct the relevant scene at will as well. I claim that the ability to guide construction with respect to imagistic-content is distinctive feature of a subset of active imagining. Episodic remembering is of a kind with that subset of active imagining by being a process of agential construction of imagistic-content, in this case, scene construction that aims at (veridically) representing the personal past. Agential scene construction in the context of remembering is the agent’s exploring her personal past as a highly circumscribed region of modal space. (shrink)

Pierson et al. (2024) conducted a survey of American bioethicists and compared their bioethical views to those of the general U.S. population. Recently, we also conducted a survey of researchers wo...

In this paper we motivate the ‘principles of trust’, chance-credence principles that are strictly stronger than the New Principle yet strictly weaker than the Principal Principle, and argue, by proving some limitative results, that the principles of trust conflict with Humean Supervenience.

Society is a composite of interacting people and groups. These groups play a significant role in maintaining social status, establishing group identity and social identity, and enforcing norms. As such, groups are essential for understanding human behavior. Nevertheless, the study of groups in everyday group life yields many diverse and sometimes contradicting theories of group behavior, and researchers tend to agree that we have yet to understand the emergence of groups out of aggregates of individuals. The current paper aims to (...) shed new light on the convoluted interrelation between groups and individuals by focusing on individuals’ social identities and group categorization. It does so by exploring the dynamic nature of the self and its implications on identity and group membership, and introducing a framework recognizing the fluidity of groups and group categorization. Incorporating historical insights with contemporary theories, this paper argues for a flexible understanding of group dynamics that surpasses rigid in-group and out-group classifications, proposing instead that group affiliations exist along a continuum that reflects the ever-changing social landscape. (shrink)

This paper introduces and evaluates a possible truthmaking argument for a robust conception of aboutness commitment. According to the argument, the pure aboutness-based account of truthmaking and the thesis of Truthmaker Commitment entails that a truthbearer is ontologically committed to what it is about in an appropriate sense of “aboutness”. However, this argument encounters challenges, notably an inherent explanatory circularity within the robust conception of aboutness commitment, and a radical inconsistency between its two premises in terms of their underlying motivations. (...) To address these issues, this paper proposes a more moderate conception of aboutness commitment, drawing inspiration from B. Smith’s mixed aboutness-based account of truthmaking. According to this moderate proposal, the representationalist notion of intended aboutness, or the anti-representationalist notion of general aboutness, constrains, but does not determine, the notion of ontological commitment, which in turn contributes to a stronger notion of genuine or satisfied aboutness. This modified moderate conception not only sidesteps the explanatory circularity, but also aligns more closely with the objective of providing a fundamental ontology. Therefore, it is recommended as a fitting approach to engaging in the relation between aboutness and ontological commitment. (shrink)

The paper tries to spell out a connection between deductive logic and rationality, against Harman's arguments that there is no such connection, and also against the thought that any such connection would preclude rational change in logic. One might not need to connect logic to rationality if one could view logic as the science of what preserves truth by a certain kind of necessity (or by necessity plus logical form); but the paper points out a serious obstacle to any such (...) view. (shrink)

The Spiritual Forms in Nicolai Hartmann’s critical ontology. For a critical-genetic interpretation of The Problem of Spiritual Being. The Author critically discusses the theoretical assumptions underlying Nicolai Hartmann’s 1933 The Problem of Spiritual Being. The Author deals with the main categorial problems involved in the Hartmannian discussion about the spiritual being, also looking at his previous production. In particular, the Author analyzes the position of the ontic level of spiritual being with respect to the previous three real ontic levels (inorganic, (...) organic, psychological) and the mutual relationship between the three fundamental forms of spiritual being identified by Hartmann (personal, objective, objectified). The Author believes that the 1933 volume has been poorly considered in its direct links with the overall project of critical ontology. (shrink)

This paper investigates the lived experience of alienation as a form of mental strife or pathology as it is connected to the digitalization of modern life. To do so, I deploy the concept of affordances from ecological psychology, phenomenology, and embodied cognition. I propose an affordance-based model for understanding digitalized alienation. First, I argue that the lived sense of alienation is best understood as a fracturing of the affordance space, where possibilities for action are lived as disconnected from one another (...) and therefore from one’s personal development and search for meaning. Using this model, I show how the process of digitalization can lead to a lived sense of alienation for modern subjects. On this model, digitalization is alienating insofar as it fractures the affordance space into disconnected fields that invite determinate, separate, and repeatable tasks—swiping, clicking, scrolling, etc.—rather than offering opportunities for the development of new cognitive and bodily skills that are mutually informing and enriching across different affordance fields. (shrink)

Many theists believe both (1) that Heaven will be infinitely or maximally good for its residents and (2) that most humans will, eventually, reside in Heaven. Further, most theists believe (3) that human procreation is often all-things-considered morally permissible. I defend three novel arguments for the impermissibility of procreation predicated on the possibility of heavenly overpopulation. First, we shouldn’t be rude to hosts by bringing more people to a party than were invited, which we do if we continue to procreate. (...) Second, justice requires that the goods of Heaven be supremely good for those for whom heavenly existence is (even partially) compensatory, but if Heaven has a fixed and finite number of goods, each successful act (or enough acts) of procreation lowers the expected goodness for those persons and threatens to undermine justice. Third, we should choose the course of action with the least-worst outcome, and it would be worse to overpopulate Heaven than underpopulate it. (shrink)

In his lecture “Philosophy and the Unheard,” Cavell invites us to observe a pervasive analogy between Schoenberg’s idea of the twelve-tone row and Wittgenstein’s idea of grammar, which is supposed to encapsulate an expansive, sweeping philosophical program—Cavell’s own. For Cavell, the analogy evinces not only the kind of reading of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigation, which is attuned to Wittgenstein’s seemingly paradoxical amalgamation of embrace and resistance in regarding to the conditions of modernity, but also a kind of philosophy of music, which (...) is illuminated by musical procedure. In this essay I probe into Cavell’s analogy, which, I contend, rests on Cavell’s interpretation (contra Von Wright) of Spengler’s influence on Wittgenstein. I argue that Cavell delineated the analogy in a way which does not consider a deeply felt gradation in Wittgenstein’s philosophical attitude toward modern music. This ultimately renders Schoenberg’s composition with twelve-tone incommensurate with Wittgenstein’s Spenglerian scheme of musical decline. I also argue that “Schoenbergian unheard” is not analogous to its purported Wittgensteinian counterpart. While the former inheres in comprehensibility—namely, correct, conscious application of the kind of contrived rules that would ensure coherence—the latter inheres in transparency, namely, a familiar physiognomy, which is internally related to the preconditions as well as the lived, embodied realities of musical intelligibility. From Wittgenstein’s perspective, the Schoenbergian idea of the row with its unforeseen yet pervasive consequences turns out to be tantamount to an idea of grammar for music for the meaning-blind. I conclude that in this “tale of two unheards,” Cavell invariably remains on the side of Wittgenstein. Philosophy, as it mattered most to him, has no business with music for the meaning-blind. (shrink)

Cho and Martinez-Martin provide a wide-ranging analysis of what they label “digital simulacra”—which are in essence data-driven AI-based simulation models such as digital twins or models used for i...

In the Sermon on the Mount, Christ teaches that God will only forgive [aphiemi] us if we forgive [aphiemi] others; however, it’s hard to understand why God would only forgive us conditionally and yet expect us to forgive unconditionally. I argue that understanding aphiemi as not counting a person’s sin against their relative moral standing makes sense of Christ's teaching.

Sacrificial dilemmas such as the trolley problem play an important role in experimental philosophy (x-phi). But it is increasingly argued that, since we are not likely to encounter runaway trolleys in our daily life, the usefulness of such thought experiments for understanding moral judgments in more ecologically valid contexts may be limited. However, similar sacrificial dilemmas are experienced in real life by animal research decision makers. As part of their job, they must make decisions about the suffering, and often the (...) death, of many non-human animals. For this reason, a context-specific investigation of so-called “3R dilemmas” (i.e., dilemmas where there is a conflict between the principles of replacement, reduction, and refinement of the use of animals in research) is essential to improve the situation of both non-human animals and human stakeholders. An approach well suited for such investigation is experimental philosophical bioethics (“bioxphi”), which draws on methods similar to x-phi to probe more realistic, practical scenarios with an eye to informing normative debates and ethical policy. In this article, we argue for a need to investigate 3R dilemmas among professional decision-makers using the tools of bioxphi. In a first step, we define 3R dilemmas and discuss previous investigations of professionals’ attitudes in such cases. In a second step, we show how bioxphi is a promising method to investigate the whys and hows of professional decision-making in 3R dilemmas. In a last step, we provide a bioxphi template for 3R dilemmas, give recommendations on its use, explore the normative relevance of data collected by such means, and discuss important limitations. (shrink)

“For it is not impossible that a nation should have many leaders who convene, unite, and reach a consensus; they can thus govern and administer justice… Then also, why cannot they have terms of office…? When the turn of other magistrates comes to replace them, they will investigate the abuses of trust committed by earlier [magistrates]; Those found guilty will pay for their crimes… Finally, why cannot their powers be limited and determined by laws or norms?” These lines of Don (...) Isaac Abravanel’s Commentary on 1 Sam 8 earned him fame in 20th century scholarship as “the first early modern Jewish republican thinker.” Yet, the history of the modern rediscovery of Abravanel’s political thought is relatively unknown, and more so, its philosophical and political meaning. My paper will try to elucidate an important part of this history, while emphasizing its value for an understanding of the criticism of the Wissenschaft des Judentums between the two World Wars. (shrink)

This paper aims to shed new light on major features of the early Zionist construction of a Jewish political space. Revisiting two early debates of Martin Buber (1878-1965) with Max Nordau (1849-1923) and Hermann Cohen (1842-1918), the article points at the limitation of the Zionist political construction for a later articulation of the Jewish and Palestinian complexity in a shared or divided land. Herzl’s understanding of Zionism as a strictly political and economic apparatus brought to an historical and ideological debate (...) at the fifth Zionist Congress in 1901 between the young Buber and the faithful associate of Herzl, Nordau. Against Nordau’s prioritization of the productivization of Jews, Buber developed in his famous speech on “Jewish Art” the necessity of a cultural and spiritual elevation of Jews. In 1916, in the middle of WWI, Buber’s cultural notion of Jewish national regeneration in Eretz Israel sets the backdrop for another debate and clash, this time with the German Jewish philosopher Hermann Cohen. (shrink)

In this article, I analyze Charles Crittenden’s account of fictional objects in his Unreality: The Metaphysics of Fictional Objects (1991). I argue that Crittenden’s sketchy ontology of fictional objects does not support his weak eliminativism. Going along the lines of Amie Thomasson (1999), I stress that the problem of fictional objects is a strictly ontological problem, which requires an ontological solution. A solution to the problem of fictional objects (or ficta) that accommodates “practice” (ordinary language and literary practices) is of (...) course to be praised, but not when it is foregrounded at the expense of “ontology.” I argue for Roman Ingarden as a champion of ontology and practice, whose way of dealing with ficta fares better than Crittenden’s on both the ontological and practical sides. In short, ficta should be approached as something over and above mere grammaticalia (grammatical objects) namely as “purely intentional” objects that are formally incomplete, and which readers complete by resorting to practices of language and literary criticism. (shrink)

Background: Food fortification refers to the process of adding nutrients to foods during their production. It is a cost-effective strategy with well-documented health, economic, and social benefits. Food fortification practices in school meal programs need guidance and legal support from various national policies. Aim: This study aims to analyze how various national policies—such as those related to school feeding, nutrition, health, food safety, agriculture, and the private sector—associate with the implementation of in-school food fortification among countries with school meals programs. (...) Methods: The Bayesian Mindsponge Framework, combining the reasoning strengths of Mindsponge Theory and inference advantages of Bayesian analysis, was employed on a dataset of 126 government representatives who manage large-scale school meal programs in 126 different countries. Results: Findings showed that food safety policy and agriculture policy were positively and significantly associated with the in-school food fortification practices, while school feeding policy and private sector policy had ambiguous relationships with these practices. Nutrition policy and health policy had a significant negative association with food fortification practices among countries implementing school meal programs. Conclusions: Findings underscore the strong position of food safety policy and agriculture policy in guiding food fortification practices in school meal programs. There is a need to re-assess the implemented nutrition policy and health policy due to their significant negative associations with these practices. Enhancing and strengthening the school feeding policy and private sector policy may increase their potencies in giving positive impacts on in-school food fortification practices. (shrink)

Das Positionspapier adressiert Probleme und Schwierigkeiten, die sich aus dem elektronischen Publizieren und den derzeitigen bibliometrischen Bewertungsverfahren wissenschaftlicher Expertise ergeben. Hierzu zählen u.a. der ‚Markt‘ der Informationen (Stichwort: Verlagsoligopole), das Wissenschaftler:innen-Tracking und die Metrisierung der Wissenschaft. -/- Es richtet sich insbesondere an Vertreter:innen die akademischen Philosophie als Fachdisziplin. Das Papier enthält Empfehlungen dazu, wie die identifizierten Problempunkte innerhalb der Disziplin lösungsorientiert angegangen werden können. Folgende Punkte werden zur Diskussion gestellt: -/- - Diamond-Open-Access im Bereich des elektronischen Publizierens: Infrastruktur in die (...) Hände der wissenschaftlichen Community - Peer Review: Begutachtung nach Kriterien der Wissenschaftlichkeit - Bewerbungsverfahren: Nutzung von Visualisierungen statt Metriken - Promotionsphase: Trennung der Rollen von Betreuung und Begutachtung - Datenhoheit: Unterbindung des Wissenschaftler-Trackings -/- Die Empfehlungen zielen auf eine unmittelbare Stärkung der Autonomie des Wissenschaftsbetriebs. (shrink)

In recent years, research on modeling the human mind has been progressing rapidly in Japan, which has provided a framework for programming the mind in the current development of artificial intelligence. Despite the skepticism about this subject, it is possible to model the mind according to the same pattern as long as people feel the same way when placed in the same situations and if they can understand the feelings of others when placed in specific situations. In addition, as people (...) tend to understand other’s emotions by applying some model of the mind, the existence of such a model for understanding people’s emotions is not surprising. Therefore, this book introduces the main ideas of the model of the mind, indicating that the human mind is inevitably equipped with various emotions. In other words, this model yields several qualitatively different impulses defined as human emotions. Currently, the field of research that analyzes this model of the mind is called the “economics of emotions,” which is expected to become a unified theory applied across the humanities and social sciences. There is no human mind left that cannot be modeled by the economics of emotions as this concept focuses on the human mind as a whole. In this regard, this book (published in 2022 in Japan) touches on the key points discussed in the economics of emotions. While this book aims to present an overall picture to readers intending to study the economics of emotions, it will also help them organize the overall contents, whose English translation will be published in 2024. (shrink)

According to agent-centered virtue ethics, acting well is not a matter of conforming to agent-independent moral standards, like acting so as to respect humanity or maximize utility. Instead, virtuous agents determine what is called for in their circumstances through good practical reason. This is an attractive view, but it requires a plausible account of how good practical reason works. To that end, some theorists invoke the skill model of virtue, according to which virtue involves essentially the same kind of practical (...) reason as ordinary skills. I contend, however, that ordinary skills provide a plausible and informative model of good practical reason only insofar as they are assessed by agent-independent standards. And so virtue, likewise, must be assessed primarily by agent-independent moral standards, if the skill model is to serve its purpose. I consider how agent-centered virtue ethics might avert this dilemma. But I ultimately suggest proceeding a different way. (shrink)

In the Aristotelian tradition, the psychological difference between virtue and continence is commonly understood in terms of inner harmony versus inner conflict. Virtuous agents experience inner harmony between feeling and action because they do not care to do other than what their circumstances call for, whereas continent agents feel conflicted about doing what is called for because of competing concerns. Critics of this view argue, however, that when the circumstances require sacrificing something of genuine value, virtuous agents can indeed feel (...) conflicted about acting well. But if this is so, what differentiates virtuous from merely continent agency? This essay argues that the traditional distinction conflates two aspects of virtue as well as two species of continence. And distinguishing between them provides resources for making sense of the complex relationship between inner conflict and good moral agency. (shrink)

Recommender systems are artificial intelligence technologies, deployed by online platforms, that model our individual preferences and direct our attention to content we’re likely to engage with. As the digital world has become increasingly saturated with information, we’ve become ever more reliant on these tools to efficiently allocate our attention. And our reliance on algorithmic recommendation may, in turn, reshape us as moral agents. While recommender systems could in principle enhance our moral agency by enabling us to cut through the information (...) saturation of the internet and focus on things that matter, as they’re currently designed and implemented they’re apt to interfere with our ability to attend appropriately to morally relevant factors. In order to analyze the distinctive moral problems algorithmic recommendation poses, we develop a framework for the ethics of attention and an account of judicious attention allocation as a moral skill. We then discuss empirical evidence suggesting that attentional moral skill can be thwarted and undermined in various ways by algorithmic recommendation and related affordances of online platforms, as well as economic and technical considerations that support this concern. Finally, we consider how emerging technologies might overcome the problems we identify. (shrink)

The rise of social media has created a new platform for communication and interaction, but it has also facilitated the spread of harmful behaviors such as cyberbullying. Detecting and mitigating cyberbullying on social media platforms is a critical challenge that requires advanced technological solutions. This paper presents a novel approach to cyberbullying detection using a combination of supervised machine learning (ML) and natural language processing (NLP) techniques, enhanced by optimization algorithms. The proposed system is designed to identify and classify cyberbullying (...) behavior in real-time, analyzing textual data from social media posts to detect harmful content. The model is trained on a large dataset of labeled instances of bullying and non-bullying content, using supervised ML algorithms such as Support Vector Machines (SVM), Decision Trees, and Random Forest. NLP techniques, including sentiment analysis, keyword extraction, and text vectorization, are employed to preprocess and transform the data into a format suitable for machine learning. To optimize the performance of the detection model, techniques such as Grid Search, Genetic Algorithms, and Particle Swarm Optimization are used to fine-tune hyperparameters, resulting in improved accuracy and reduced false positives. The system's effectiveness is validated through experiments conducted on various social media platforms, demonstrating its potential to detect cyberbullying with high precision. Future work will focus on enhancing the model's adaptability to emerging slang and evolving language patterns in social media. Key words: Cyberbullying Detection, Social Media, Supervised Machine Learning, Natural Language Processing (NLP), Optimization Techniques. (shrink)

The rise of social media has created a new platform for communication and interaction, but it has also facilitated the spread of harmful behaviors such as cyberbullying. Detecting and mitigating cyberbullying on social media platforms is a critical challenge that requires advanced technological solutions. This paper presents a novel approach to cyberbullying detection using a combination of supervised machine learning (ML) and natural language processing (NLP) techniques, enhanced by optimization algorithms. The proposed system is designed to identify and classify cyberbullying (...) behavior in real-time, analyzing textual data from social media posts to detect harmful content. The model is trained on a large dataset of labeled instances of bullying and non-bullying content, using supervised ML algorithms such as Support Vector Machines (SVM), Decision Trees, and Random Forest. NLP techniques, including sentiment analysis, keyword extraction, and text vectorization, are employed to preprocess and transform the data into a format suitable for machine learning. T. (shrink)

The rise of social media has created a new platform for communication and interaction, but it has also facilitated the spread of harmful behaviors such as cyberbullying. Detecting and mitigating cyberbullying on social media platforms is a critical challenge that requires advanced technological solutions. This paper presents a novel approach to cyberbullying detection using a combination of supervised machine learning (ML) and natural language processing (NLP) techniques, enhanced by optimization algorithms. The proposed system is designed to identify and classify cyberbullying (...) behavior in real-time, analyzing textual data from social media posts to detect harmful content. The model is trained on a large dataset of labeled instances of bullying and non-bullying content, using supervised ML algorithms such as Support Vector Machines (SVM), Decision Trees, and Random Forest. NLP techniques, including sentiment analysis, keyword extraction, and text vectorization, are employed to preprocess and transform the data into a format suitable for machine learning. To optimize the performance of the detection model, techniques such as Grid Search, Genetic Algorithms, and Particle Swarm Optimization are used to fine-tune hyperparameters, resulting in improved accuracy and reduced false positives. The system's effectiveness is validated through experiments conducted on various social media platforms, demonstrating its potential to detect cyberbullying with high precision. Future work will focus on enhancing the model's adaptability to emerging slang and evolving language patterns in social media. (shrink)

Analitica rețelelor sociale este arta și știința de a extrage informații valoroase ascunse din cantități mari de date semi-structurate și structurate de rețele sociale. Algoritmii bazați pe analitica rețelelor sociale, procesarea limbajului natural, procesarea complexă a evenimentelor și tehnicile de extragere a datelor sunt utilizate în mod obișnuit de software-ul de analitica social media, folosind diverse instrumente specifice. În poziționarea unui program de analitica rețelelor sociale ca parte a practicii de business intelligence a unei organizații sau intelligence pentru un serviciu (...) de informații, BI poate fi conceptualizată atât ca proces, cât și ca produs. (shrink)

This articles explores the mereological foundation of truthmaker semantics. Building upon Kit Fine’s abstract theory of part in [16], we engage in an exploration of the mereological assumptions that determine the construction of truthmaker semantics. Our approach yields semantics for a diverse range of logics, including substructural logics such as the associative Lambek calculus, as well as the logics of analytic containment. Furthermore, we elucidate the philosophical implications that arise from this pioneering approach.

The KK thesis says (roughly) that if S knows that P, then S knows that S knows that P. Though controversial, KK may be able to neatly explain an otherwise puzzling datum: namely, that assertions of the form “P, but I don’t know if I know that P” are infelicitous. If KK is true, those assertions are unknowable, and hence guaranteed to violate a knowledge norm on assertion. For many, the fact that KK (if true) can so explain that datum (...) is a strong consideration in its favor. This paper undermines that argument for KK. It first goes on the offensive, arguing that the more plausible “weak KK” gives a worse explanation of the datum. It then proposes an explanation which does not rely on any version of KK, but rather a "believe that you know" norm on assertion. Together, these moves undermine the linguistic argument for KK, and so significantly weaken the case for KK. (shrink)

In his late lectures, Foucault developed the ancient Greek concept of parrhesia, a courage to speak the truth in the face of danger. While not entirely uncritical of the notion, Foucault seemed to find something of an ideal in the political and aesthetic ideal of franc-parler, of speaking freely and courageously. Simultaneously, the post-1968 political valorized the ideal of parrhesia, or “speaking truth to power”: parrhesia seemed inherently progressive, the sole preserve of the left. But a cursory inspection of the (...) annals of Nazism and fascism shows that these movements also aligned themselves with parrhesiastical modes of expression. The fragmented, disparate strands of today’s neo-fascist revival, too, are closely imbricated with the notion of speaking valiantly in the face of supposed orthodoxies: in many ways, the preeminent parrhesiasts today are found on the neo-fascist side. This points to an essential weakness in the concept of parrhesia, particularly in terms of its value and valence as a strategy for the political left. Perhaps it matters less how we speak—being caught up in language games—than what policies and programs we enact. Žižek’s plea for a renewed dogmatic orthodoxy and Chesterton’s criticism of heresy offer ways out of the parrhesiastical trap. (shrink)

As online learning becomes more prevalent, colleges and universities have increasingly turned to remote proctoring services that claim to detect and deter student cheating during exams. However, many students have begun to voice concerns about the discomfort and anxiety these services can cause. This chapter aims to illuminate the existential and phenomenological nuances present in student testimony by reevaluating the proctor's gaze as an objectifying and alienating force. Specifically, I argue that the anxiety students describe is a response to feeling (...) seen. In most cases, remote proctoring involves the surveillance of student behavior by a stranger or artificial intelligence, and the empirical literature suggests that students are often falsely penalized for innocuous or unintentional "disruptions" during their exams. Thus, rather than be "caught up" in the exam process (and invisible to oneself), students are forced to attend to their bodily comportment and engage in a self-reflective awareness of their behavior as a body for-others. In the most extreme cases, the proctor's gaze is not only a distraction for students; it is also alienating such that students no longer feel free to appraise the character of their own actions but must instead see themselves through the eyes of the proctor. (shrink)