r ,-,.. Unit 0 An Introduction to Thinking Crit.docx

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Unit 0: An Introduction to Thinking Critically
Module 1 - Logic and Critical Thinking
Readings: Solomon and Higgins, "A Little Logic"; Solomon and
Higgins, "Deductive Logic Valid
Argument Forms"; Solomon and Higgins, "Common Informal
Fallacies"
Unit 1: The Real and the Rational
Module 2 - Evidentialism
Reading: Clifford, "The Ethics of Belief'
Module 3- Classical Theistic Arguments
Readings: Anselm, "The Ontological Argument"; Thomas
Aquinas, "The Five Ways"; Rowe, "An
Examination of the Cosmological Argument"; Paley, "The
Watch and the Watchmaker"; Collins,
"A Scientific Argument for the Existence of God"
Module 4 - Problem of Evil
Readings: Mackie, "Evil and Omnipotence"; Plantinga, "The

Free Will Defense"; Hick, "Evil and
Soul-Making"; Rowe, "The Inductive Argument from Evil
Against the Existence of God"
Unit 2 - Experience and the Real
Module 5 - Pragmatism and Reformed Epistemology
Readings: Pascal, "The Wager"; James, "Will to Believe";
Bergmann, "Rational Religious Belief
without Arguments"
Module 6- Existentialism and Mysticism
Readings: Kierkegaard, "Truth is Subjectivity"; Selections of
Mystical Experiences, James,
"Mysticism"; Alston, "Perceiving God"
Unit 3 - Paths to the Real
Module 7 - Problem of Religious Diversity I
Readings: Dalai Lama, "Buddhism, Christianity, and the
Prospects for World Religion"; Hick,
"Religious Pluralism and Ultimate Reality"
Module 8 - Problem of Religious Diversity II
Readings: Plantinga, "A Defense of Religious Exclusivism";
Basinger, "Hick's Religious Pluralism
and 'Reformed Epistemology'-A Middle Ground"
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R Dean Davenport
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138 PART II• TRADITIONAL ARGUMENTS FOR THE
EXISTENCE OF GOD
II.A.1
The Ontological Argument
ST. ANSELM
St. Anselm (1 033-11 09), Abbot cif Bee and later Archbishop
cif Canterbury, is the originator cif one
of the most intriguing arguments ever devised by the human
mind, the ontological argument for the
existence of a supremely peifect being. After the short selection
from Anselm's Proslogion, there
From Motw/ogiou and Proslogion, with the replies ~{ C.1ut1i/o
ami Anselm, trans. with introduction and notes by Thomas
Williams.
(Indianapolis. IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1996.) © 1996
by Thon'las Williams. Used with penuission.

~··.
eST, ANSELM,•:TH·E QNJQLOGICAV.ARGUM.ENT 139
follows a briif selection from Gaunito 's reply,. In Behalfof the
Fool; and a cQUnterrespoi:lse
by Anselm: . .
[ST, ANSEL.M'S
PRESENTATION]
Therefore, Lord, you who grant understanding to
faith, grant that, insofar as you know it is useful for
me, I may understand tharyou eX:istas we believe you
exist, and that you are what we believe you to he.
Now we believe that you are something than which
nothing greater can he thought. So can it be that no
such nature exists, since ''The fool has saidinhisheart
'There isho God"' (P5alm 14;1; 53:1)? But when thi~
same fool hears me say "something than whfchcnoth-
ing greater can be thought," he surely understands
what he hears; and what he understands exiSts in his
understanding, 1 even ifhti·does not understand that it
exists [in tealityl For it is one thing for ari object to
exist in the understanding and quite another to under-
stand that the object exists [in reality]. When a painter;
for example thinks out in advance what he is going to
paint, he has it in his understandihg, but he does not
yet understand·that it exists;· since· he has not ·yet
painted it. But once he has painted·it, he both·has it
in his understanding and understands that it ex:ists

because he has now painted it. So even the fool
inust admit that something than which nothing
greater can be thought exists at least in his ull.derstand..:
ing~ since he' understands this when he hears it, and
whatever is understood exists in the ·understanding.
And surely that thari which a greater cannot be
thought c1nhot exist only in the understanding. For
ifitexists ·only in the understanding; 'it can be thought
to exist .in realitY as well, which is grdter. So if that
than which a greatercannotbe thought exists only iri
the understanding; then thatthan which a greater can"
not be thought is that than which a greater can be
thought. But that is dearly impossible. Therefore;
there is no doubtthatsomethirig th1mwhi€h a greater
cannot be • thought exists both· in the understanding
and in reality ....
This· [being] • exists so truly· that it cannot be thought
not to exist. For it is possible to think: that something
exists that cannot be :thought not to exist, and such a
being is greater than one thatcan be thought not to
exist: Therefore; ifthat than which a greater cannot
be thobght.can bethought not to: exist; then .that
than which a greater·cam1ot. be .thought is not that
than which a greater cannot he thought; and· this ·is a
contradiction. So that than which a. greater cannot
be thought exists so truly that it cannot be thought
not to exist.
And this is you, 0 Lord our God. You exist so
truly, 0 Lord my God, that you cannot be thought
not to e~d~t .. :And r~ghtly so,· (or •if ~ome @nd could
think something better than you, a creatur~ would
rise; above the c;reator and sit injudgmen,t upon
him; which is completely absurd. Jndeed, ev<;ry-

thing that exists; ex:cept for you alone, .c:an be
thought not. to exist. So yc)u alone among aU things
have existence mos.t truly, ;and therefore most
greatly. Whatever else. exists has existence less
truly, and therefore l~ss greatly. So .then why did
"the foolsay in his heart, 'There is. no God,'nwhen
it is so e;yident to tqe ratiqnal mind th;ttyouamong
all, beings exist most ,greatly? Whyjnde,ed, except
because he is stupid and a fool? ...
But how, has he said in his heart.what he could•not
think? Or. how, could he not· think what he said in
his heart; since to.say inone's heart is the same as to
think? But if he really-:-or rather;csince.he ·really.,.-'-
thought this, be€ause he said it in his heart,. and did
not say it in his heart, because .he could not think it,
there must be more than one way in which. some-
thing is "said in one'~ heart" or ''thought,~' In one
sense of the word, to think a thing is to think the
word that signifies that thing, But in •another sense,
it is to understand what exactly the thing is. God
can be thought,notto exist.in thefitstsense;butnot
at all in the second sense. No one who understands
what God is can think thatGod .does not ·exist,
although he may say these•wotds in his heart with
no signification at all, or with some peculiar signifi-
cation. For God is that than which a greater cannot
140 PART II • TRADITIONAl ARG l.JMENTS FOR'THB
EXISTENCE OF GOD
be thought. Whoever understands this ;properly,
understands that this being exists in such a way

, that he cannot, even in thought, tail to exist. So
whoever· understands~. that God; exists.in this way
cannot think·that he does not exist.
. Thanks be to you, my good Lord, thanks be
to you .. For what I once believed through:,your
grace; I now understand through your'·illumina-'
tion, so' that even if I .did·not wanLJo believe tha:t
you exist, I could not fail to understand'tliat· you
exist. ...
[GAUNILO''S CRITICISM]
"For example, there are those' who say thafsome-
where in the ocean iS an. island, whii:::h,'bebuse of
the difficulty-"'-otrather, impossibility..:.....:of finding
what dOes 'not exist, some call 'the' Lost . ISland'!
This: isliuid''(so the 'story goes) is more plentifully
endowed than even the IsleS:· ofthe Blessed with
an indescribable abundance of 'a}} sorts ·Of riches
and delights: And beduse"it has neither dwil.er
nor inhabitant, it is everywhere sl1pehor iri its abun~
dant riches to' all the otlier lands that htimari 'bein:gs
inhabit.
"Suppose someone tells me all this. The story is
easily told and• involves no difficulty,''and so··I
understand it. But ··if' this person went on to draw
a conclusion, and say,. 'You cannot any'longer
doubt that this iSland; more excellent than all others
on earth, truly exists somewhere in reality: For yot1
do not doubt that this· island exists in your under-
standing; and since it is.more excellent to exist not
merely in the understanding, but also in realitY,
this island must also exist· in reality, For ifit did
not, any land that exists in' reality would be greater

than it. 'And so this more excelk~nt thin,g that
you have understood would not in f~ct be more
excellent.'..,.If, I say, he should tty to convince me
by, this argument that I should no longer doubt
whether the island truly exists, either F•would
think he wasj6king, or I would not kilow whom
I· ought to think more foolish: myself,. if I grant
him his conclusion, or him, if he thinks he has
established the existence of that island with any
degree of certainty, without first. showmg that its
excellence exists in my understanding as a thing
that truly and un:dotihtedly~>exiSci and not in any
way like someth~g (alse or uncertain." ...
(S;J . .: ANSELM'S;REJ.QI NOER]
But, you ·say, this; is just the samG· as·if. someone
were .. to claim .. that it cannot· be doubted that.a
certain island in the ocean,. surpassing, all o.ther
lands in its fertility (whicildrom the difUqdty ~
onather, impossibUity-:-:af finding what •does not
exist, is ;called "the Lost .Island''), .tr.uly .exists in
rGality, because .someone, can easily understand it
when itis described to him in words.) say quite
qonfidently that if anyone can find .for me· some-,
tl}ing existing. either in reality or only in. thought
to which he can apply this. inferente in myargu.,
ment, besides that than which a.greater cannot bG
thought, I will find and give tQ ·him that Lost
ISland, never to be lost again. In fact, l}oweyer, it
has a4eady become , quite clear ·that that than
which;a greater. cannot bG thought cannot be
thought not to exist, since its existence is a matter
ofsuch certain truth. For otherwise it would not
exist at. all.

Finally, i£ someone says that he .thinks it does
not ·exiSt; I say that when. he thinks this, either he
is thinking something than which a greater. cannot
be thought,; or heis I1ot, If he is not, then he is not
thinking that it dqesnot.exi:;~; since.heis·notthinb
ing it at all. £utjfhe is, he is surely thinking some-
thing that cann()t. be thought not to e:l{ist. ·For if i~
could. be thought not to. exist, it .could be thought
t(.) have a begirming and art end; which is impossi,..
blec. Therefore;. SOI11eone. who is thinking. it, is
thinlqng something ~hat.cannot be thought .not to
exist,, ind of course someone who is thinking this
does not think that that very thing doe$ not. exist,
Otherwise he would be thinking something that
cannot be thought. Therefore, that than: which a
greater cannot be· thought' cannot be· thought not to
exist ....
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IMMANUEL KANT • A CRITIQUE OF THE ONTOLOGICAL
ARGUMENT 141
NOTE
1. The word here translated "understanding" is
"intellectus." The text would perhaps read better if!
translated it as "intellect," but this would obscure
the fact that it is from the same root as the verb

"intelligere," "to understand." Some of what
Anselm says makes a bit more sense if this fact is
constantly borne in mind.
From Kant's Critique~( Pure Reason, translated by J. M. 0.
Meiklejohn (New York: Colonial Press, 1900). Translation
revised by
Louis Pojman.
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11.8.'1
T.he Five: Ways
THOMAS AQUINAS .
T11e Dominican .friar. T11omas' Aquinas . ( r 22 5-127 4) is
considered by ·many to. be th~ greatest theo-
logian in W~tern reli.iion. The five ways tifshowing.'the
existence o/ God given 'In 'this. selection are .. ·
versions Of the cosmological a;_gument. The first way concerns
the fact that there is change(?' motion) and.
argues that there must be an Unmov:d Mover that originates all
change ?ut itself is. not m~ed. T11e
second way is from the idea of causation dna argues that there
tnust' lieafirst, unca~sed cause to ex,plai~
the exist~nce oj'all othercauses. T11ethird way is .from the
ideaq[conting~ncy: It argues thaf. 6eca~se

there aredependeYJt beings (e.g., humans), there must be an
indep~nilent or necessary being qtiwhoin the
dependent beings rely jodheir subsistence: The fourth way is
frmii e;;cellence, and itargties ·that because
there are degrees o/ excellehce,there must be a peifect
bei.iigftom whence all excellences come ;The final
··way is ftom the h-armony o/ things;· T1ure is a harmony o/
nature, which' calls for qn explanation. The
only 'suffidehi explamition is that. there is a divine de~gner'
who planned' this ham;ony.
147
ARTICLE 3:'D'OES G'Ob EXIST? B~t l.t seems that e~erythirig
that happen~ in the
, ~ :' ' ' ' ' ' ' - ' - - " . , -- -- - --' -- - - _. 1 - -' ' t - , •
If seems that God does not exist:
Objectiont:Ifone ofa pair of contraries
were infinite, it .would 'totally destroy the other
contrary. But by the name 'God' one means a cer:-
tain infinite good. Therefore, if God existed,. there
would be nothing eviL But there is evil in the
world. Therefore, God does not exist.
Objection 2: What ~an be accoQlplished with
fewer principles isnot done thro~gh more principles:
world could' have been accomplished .. through
other principles~ ~venif Godclidnot exist; for things
that are . natural are traced back to hature ·.as a princi-
ple, whereas thing.; that are purposeful are. traced
back to human reas~n· mwil! i1S a principle. There-
fore, there.is no. need.to .ciaiii:i.that God.·exists.

But contrary to .thls::Exodusl:14 says.urider
the perso~age of God, "I im Who ain."
I respond: There are five ways to 'proVe that
God exists. · ·
Printed with the pen11ission of the thnslator, Alfred). Freddoso:
This translation is being published by Saint Augustine's Preis'.
148 PARTII•TRADITIONALARGLIMENTSFOR THE
EXISTENCE OF GOD
The first and clearest way is that taken from
motion:
It is certain, and obvious to the senses, that in
this world some things are moved.
But everything that is moved is moved by
another. For nothing is moved except insofar as it
is in potentiality with respect to that actuality toward
which it is moved, whereas something effects
motion insofar as it is in actuality in a relevant
respect. After all, to effect motion is just to le~d
something from potentiality into actuality. But a
thing cannot be led from potentiality into actuality
except through some being that is in actuality in a
relevant respect; for example, something that is hot
in actuality----say, a fire-makes a piece ofwood, ·
which is hot in potentiality, to be hot in actuality,
and it thereby moves and alters the piece of :wood,
But it is impossible for something to be simulta-
neously in potentiality and in actuality with respect

to same thing; rather, it can be in potentiality and
in actuality only :with I:espec~ to differ;ent things: For
what is hot in actualityc:umot simultai}e(msly be hot
in potentiality; rather, ,it is dold i11 potentiality.
Therefore, .it is in1possible. 'that. soiil.ething should
be both moverand ~oved i11 th.e sam~ way'imd
with respect.to the sam~ thillg, or; in ~ther words,
that somet~ing, ~hould. n1ov~ itSeff; Til~!~fore, every-
thing that is moved nn1st pe moved by~another.
If, then, that by whishs~m~tliing is ITiove(is
itself lllO'[ed, then jt, too, must be moved by
another, and that oth~t:. by still another.l;>ut this ·
does not go on to infinity. For if it ·. d1d, then
there. would not be any first mover and, ;}S a result,
none of the others wduld effect IIl.otiop, eithe~. For
secondary movers effect modo~ only because they
being moved by a first mover,justas astick do~s
not effect. motion except because it is being moved
by a h,and. Therefore, ()ne has to arrive at some first
mover that is rw( being moved byanyfhing. And
this is what everyone t;tkes to be God. '
The' second way is based on the notion of an
efficient cause: ·· . .
· · · We find that among sensible· things there is .an
ordering of efficient causes, and yet we do ·not
find-nor is it possible to find-'-anything that is
an efficient cause of its ownsel£ .for if.something
were an efficient cause of itself, then it would be
prior to itself-which is impossible.
But it is impossible to go on to infinity among

efficient causes. For in every case of ordered effi-
cient causes, the first is a cause of the intermediate
and the intermediate is a cause of the last-and this
regardless of whether the intermediate is constituted
by many causes or by just one. But when a cause is
removed, its effect is removed. Therefore, if there
· w,ere no first among the efficient causes, then nei-
ther would there be a last or an intermediate. But if
the efficient causes went on to infinity, there would
not be a first efficient cause, and so there would not
be a last effect or any intermediate efficient causes,
either~W.hich is obviously false. Therefore, one
must posit some first efficient cause--which every-
, one calls God.
The third way is taken from the possible and
the necessary, and it goes like this:
Certain of the things we find in the world are
able t!) exist and able not to exist; for some things
are found to be generated and co~pted .and, as a
result, they areable tO (!XiSt .and able nOt tO exist.
. ' But it is impossible that everYthingshquld be like
this;fo~ that whichisable not tp exist is. such that at
some tiro~ It does~otexist. Therefore, if everything
is such that it is.;tb}e n()tto exist, then at some time
~othing .e~isted ih the world. But ifthi~ Vere true,
then nothingwould.exi~t.even t!Ow ... Fo~what does
not e~iSt:heg41sto exist only thrqugn soll].e~ing that
does exist; therefore! ifthere we.re no beiilgs, then it
was impossible that anything should have begun to
exist, an!f. so rr()thiJ:lg would .exist noV~Vhich is
obviously £alse. therefore, not all beings are. able to

exist [and able not to exist]; rather, it mt~st l;>e that
there is.s()mething necessaryinthe worla: ....•.. · ..
. Now every nece.ss:try.b~ing eitl~er has'a·cause of
its necessity from Ot}tslde ~ts.elfor it does.not: But it is
impossible to go on tt?, infinity among Ilecessary
b(!mgs that havea cau.se of their .. necessicy;in . the
same way, as was p~ovelrabo~e, that itis illlpossible
tp go on to infihity among efficient .causes. The~e-
fqre, one m~st posit something that. is nece~;try per se,
which does not have acause ofi~ necessity from out.:.
side itself but is instead a cause of necessity for the
o~her.[necessary] things. But tb.is everyone.callsGod.o
SAM t;J,EL CLARKE:• THE ARGUMENT
FRQM,(ON·TINGEN.CY 149
The fourth way is taken from the gradations that
are found in the world:
In the world some things are found to be more
and less good, more and less true, more and less noble,
etc. But more and less are predicated of diverse things
insofar as they approach in diverse ways that which is
maximal in a given respect. For instance, the hotter
something is, the closer it approaches that which is
maximally hot. Therefore, there is something that is
maximally true, maximally good, and maximally
noble, and, as a result, is a maximal being; for accord-
ing to the Philosopher in Metaphysics 2, things that are
maximally true are maximally beings.
But, as is claimed in the same book, that which
is maximal in a given genus is a cause of all the
things that belong to that genus; for instance, fire,

which is maximally hot, is a cause of all hot things.
Therefore, there is something that is a cause for all
beings of their esse, their goodness, and each of their
perfections-and this we call God.
The fifth way is taken from the governance of
things:
We see that some things lacking cognition,
viz., natural bodies, act for the sake of an end.
This is apparent from the fact that they always or
very frequently act in the same way in order to
Reprinted from A Discourse Conceming NatuMI Religion
(1705).
bring about that which is best, and from this it is
dear that it is not by chance, but by design, that
they attain the end.
But things lacking cognition tend toward an
end only if they are directed by something that
has cognition ~nd intelligence, in the way that an
arrow is directed by an archer. Therefore, there is
something intelligent by which all natural things are
ordered to an end-and this we call God.
Reply to objection 1: As Augustine says in
the Enchiridion, "Since God is maximally good,
He would not allow any evil to exist in His
works if He were not powerful enough and good
enough to draw good even from evil." Therefore,
it is part of God's infinite goodness that He should
permit evils and elicit goods from them.
Reply to objection 2: Since it is by the direc-

tion of a higher agent that nature acts for the sake of a
determinate end, those things that are done by nature
must also be traced back to God as a first cause. Simi-
larly, even things that are done by design must be
traced back to a higher cause and not to human reason
and will. For human reason and will are changeable
and subject to failure, but, as was shown above, all
things that can change and fail must be traced back
to a first principle that is unmoved and necessary per se.
150 PART II "TRADITIONA(ARGUMENTS FOR 'THE
EXISTENCE OF GOD
11.8.3
An Examination of the Cosmological Argument
WILLIAM ROWE
Briif biographical remarks about William Rowe appear bifore
selection I. B. 9. In the present selection,
taken from the second edition tif his Philosophy of Religion: An
Introduction (1993), Rowe
begins by distinguishing between apriori and a posteriori
arguments and setting the cosmological argument
From Rowe, l'hilosoplly of Religion, 2nd edition.© 1993
Wadsworth, a part ofCengage Learning, Inc.
Reproduced by pennission. www.cengage.com/pennissions
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WILLIAM ROWE • A.N EXAMINATION OF THE
COSMOL0(31CAL ARGUMENT 151
in historical perspective. Next, he divides the argument into two
parts: that which seeks. to prove the. •
existence of a self-existent being and thatwltich seeks to, prove
that this.self-e;xiStent being is the· God;of. .
theism. He introduces the principle of sufficient reason..,.,-
"There•mustbe an explanation (a)ojthe ·.·· ··
existence of any being and (b) of any positivejact whatever",..-
,andshows.itsrole in the cosmological·.;
argument. In the light ofthis principle, he .examines the
argument itseifand four objections to it.
STATING THE:AR;GUMENT
Argt!mel'lts for the existence of God are tonihionly
divided into a posteriori arguments and a prjori argu-
ments. An a posteriori argument depends on a prin-
ciple or premise that can be kn:own'C>nly by means
of our experience of the world. An a priori argu-
ment, on th~ other hand, purpo~s to rest on prin-
ciples all of "'hich can· be' knowit. independently of
our experience of the world, by just reflecting on
and understandirig them. Of the three· major argu-
ments for the eXistence ofGod-the Cosmological,
the Teleological, and the Ontological..:.._orily the
last 6fthese is entirely a priori. Intlie Cosn1ological
Al:gul:nent one startS from some simple fact about
the world, such as that it contains thirigs which
are caused to exist by other things. In the Teleolog-
ical Argument a somewhat more complicated. fuct
about the world :serves as a starting poirit, the
fad thanhe world exhibits order and •design. In
the Ontological':Argumerit, however, one· begiris

siinply with a concept of'God ....
··Before we state ·the Cosmological Argument
itself, we shall consider some rather general points
ahouttheargument. I-Ii~torically, it can, betrac~d to
the writings of the Greek philosophers, Plato and
Aristotle, but the major developments in the argu-
merit took place i~ the thirteenth and in the ~igh-
teenth centuries. In the thirteenth century Aquinas
put forth five distinct arguments for the existence
of God, and of these, the first three are versions of
the Cosmological Argument.1 in the first of" these
he started from the. fu~:;t that there are things in the
world undergoing change and reasoned to the con-
clusion that there must be some. ultiniate cause of
change that .is itself unchanging. In the second he
started from the fact that there are things in the
world that clearly are caused to exist by oilier things
and reasoned to the conclusion .. that there must
he some ultimate cause of existence whose<own
existence is itselfuncaused. And in-. the thir,4 argu""
men the started from the fact that there are things in
the world which need not have: existed at all, thipgs
which do exist but which we can easily in1agine
might not; and reasoned to; the· conclqsion that
there must he some heirig that ·had to be ;"that exiSts
and could not have failed to exist. Now it might be
objected. that even .if Aquirias' arguments do:prove
beyond doubt the existence of an unchanging
changer, an uncaused 'cause, and a.: being: that
could .not have failed to• exist, the arguments fail
to prove the existence· of the· theistic·. God; For the
theistic -God, as we .saw, is supremely good,oomnip~
otent, omniscient, arid creator ofbut separate from
and independent of the world. How do we know,

for example, that the· unchanging changer isn't evil
or slightly ignorant? The answer to this<objection is
that ilie CosmologiCal Argument has two parts. In
the first part the .effort is to prove the. existence of a
special sort ofheirig,for•example, abeingthat could
not have failed to exist, or. a being that ·causes
change in .other things but is itself unchanging. In
the second part .. of the argument ,the effort is to
prove that the .special 1sort of being whose existence
has been established in ilie frrst part has, arid must
have; the·features-perfect goodness, omnipotence,
omniscience, and so on.,---which gu together ·to
make up the theistic idea of God .. What this
means, then,, is that Aquinas' three arguments· are
different versions of only the frrst part of the Cosc.
mological Argument; Indeed, in later sections ofhis
Summa Theological Aquinas undertakes to; show iliat
the unchanging .changer, the • tmcaused cause of
existence, and. the•.heing.cwhich had to exist are
one and the saine·being and thatthis single being
hasall·of the··attrihutes ofthe theistic God,
We noted above that a; second major develop-
ment in the Cosmological Argument took .place in
the eighteenth .century;• a· development reflected ill
the writirig5 of the Gem1an' philosopher, Gottfried
~-· I .
152 PART II•'T:RADITIONAL A·RGUMENTS n:>R THE
EX'ISTENCE· OF~"GOD
Leibniz (1646"-1716), and especiaUy in the whtings
of the English' theologian ·and;philosopher,·Samuel

Clarke (1675-1729). In 1704 Oarke gave a series of
lectures, later published imderthe title A Demonstra~ · •
tion cif the Being and Attributes ~fcGod. These lectures
constitute, perhaps, the most complete, forceful,
and<cogent presentation of the Cosmological Argu-
ment we possess. The· lectures:were. read.by the
m,ajor: skeptical philosopher of the centuiy; David
Hume (17l1-17J6),iand in his btilliant attack on
the attempt to justify religion in thei court of reason;
his Dialogues Concerning Natural Rel~ion, Hume
advanced several penetrating criticisms ofClarke's
arguments, criticisms which have persuaded many
philosophers in the modem period to reject the
Cosmological Argument. In ountudy of the c<;tr:gu-
mentwe shall concentrate. our. attention largely on
its ·eighteenth-century form and try to assess its
strengths • and. weaknesses. in the light .of the criti-'
cisms which Hurhe. and others····have advanced
against it.
The first part qf the eighteenth-"d:ntury form of
the Cosmological Argument seeks to .establish· the
existence • of a self:.-existent' being/ The. second part
of the argument attempts to ·pfove that the' self-
existent being is the .theistic God, ·that is; has •the
features which we have noted to ·be basic elements
in the. theistic idea of God. •.W e shall consider
mainly the first part of the argilment, fodt is against
the first part that. philosophers .froni Hume to
Russell have• advanced very important objections.
In stating the first part of the Cosmological
Argumentwe shall make use oftwoimportant con-'
cepts, the concept of a dependent being and ,the· con-
cept ofa self-existent being. By a dependentbeingwe
meal'l a being whose existence. is accountedfor by the

causal activity cif other things:' Recalling Anselm:s clivi::
sion into the three cases: "explained by another,"
''explained by nothing," and ''explained by itself,:'
ies dear that 'a dependent being .is a being whose
existenc'e •is explained 'by another. By a self-existent
being wdmean a being whose,existence is accounted for
by its own nature. This idea ... is an essential element
in the theistic concept of God. Again, in terms .of
Anselm1s three cas,es, a self-existent being is a being
whose cexistence is~explained by itself· Armed. with
these two• concepts; thee> concept of a dependent
being.•and the yoncept of a self"'existent being, we
can now state· the fitst part of the Cosmological
Argument.
T Every beirig (tliat' exists or ever dl:d'exist) is
either. a depend~nt, b~ing or. a ~elf -existent
being. · · · ·
2. Nqt every being can be a depenqe,nt being.
Therefore,
3. . Ih~re exists ,a self-exis~ent. being.
I)EDU(:TtV.E VAL.IDlTY
Before we loo~ critically at each of the premises of
this. argument, we sho.uld note .. that this argument
is, to. use an expt:ession frqm the logician;s yocabu-
lary, detiuctively vqlid. To find out V)'hether i!l1 argu"'
rnent is deductiyely .yalid, we 11eed only as~ the
question: If its premises were true, w,ould)ts co.n~
elusion: have to be true? If the answer is yes, the
argument .. i~ deductively valid., If.the;.answer. is nq,

the argument is deductively ipvalid:Notiq:itha,tthe
question ;of the va.lidity of an. a~:gument is. entirely
different fi:om. th.e. ql1estion ofw,hether: ,its premises
are in fact true. The follo'Yi.ng <J.J:gUment is made
up entirely of false statements, l:m~ it js deductively
valid.
1. Babe Ruth is the Presidentof'the Onited ·
' .
States.
The Presidentbf th;'Uriited States is from
Indiana,
Therefore,
3. Babe Ruth.is from Indi:ma. ·
;. ,_ - - -,
The argument is deductively valid because
even though its premises ar:e f;~:lse, if they were
trUe'its.conclusion would have to be true. Even
God, +Aquinas would say; cannot bring it ·about
that the .premises of this argument are true and
yet its conclusion is false ,for God's power extends
only to what is ·possible, and it is·. an absolute
impossibility ·.that Babe Ruth be. the~ President;
' '
f
WI LLIAM,ROWE • AN cEXAM I N'ATION OF THE

COSMOLOGICAlARG U MENT ~53
the President be from Indiana, and yet Babe Ruth
not be from Indiana.
,The Cosmological Argument (that is; its first
part) is a deductively valiq argument. [fits prernises
arec or were true~ its conclusion would. have. to be
true. It's dear from our example about Babe Ruth,
however, that the fact that an argumentc.is deduc-
tively valid is insufficient to establish cthe truth of its
conclusion .. What else is required? Clearly that we
know or have rational grounds' for believing that
the premises are true. If we know that the Cpsmo-
logical .i'rgument is deductively valid, and can
establish that its premises are true, we shall thereby
have proved that its conclusion: is true. Are, theti,
the premises of the Cosmological Argument true?
To this more difficult question we must now tt~m.
PSR AND THE fiRSfPREMISE
At first glance the first premise might appear to be
an obvious or even trivial truth: But it is neither
obviousnor;triviaL And if it appears to he obvi()US
or trivial, we must be confusing the igea of a
self~existent being with the idea of a being that is
not ~ dependent ·.being. Clearly,.· it is tr)Je. that
~ny • being. is either a dependent b~i'[lg (explain~d
bY other things) or it is UO! a dep(![ldent being
(not ~xplained by other things). But .. What our
premise says is that any being is either a depen'dent
being (explained by other things) or it is, a self-
existent ~eing. ·.(explained by itself). Consider
again Amehn's. tlifee cases.

a. explained by another
b. explained by nothing
c. explainedpyitself
What otir first prernise asserts is that each being that
exists (of ever did exist) is either ofsbrt a or of sort e;
It denies that any being is of sort b, And it is this
denial that makes the first premise both significant
and controversiaL.The obVious truth we must not
confuse it with is the truth. that;any being is either
of sort a or not of s9rt a. While this is true it is
neither very significant nor controversial.
Ea,rlier we saw that Anselm accep~ed. as a •basic
principle that whatever exists has an. explanation of
its existence. Since this basic. principle denies that
anytliing of sort b exists or everdid·exist,;ifs clear
thatAnselrri would,,believe the first premise .of our
Cosmological.Argument. •The eighteenth-century
proponents of the argument also ;were. convinced
of the truth of the. basic .principle ;we attributed to
Anselm ... And because they,,were convinced •of its
truth; they readily ·accepted. the first premise of
the· Cosmological Argument:· But :by the eighteenth
century, Anselm's basic principle had .been more
fully elaborated and had received a name, the Prin-
ciple if Sufficient Reason. Since this principle (PSR, as
we shall call it) plays such an important role in jus-
tifying the .premises· ()f the CosmologiCal Argument,
it will help us to consider it for a moment before
we continue our enquiry into the truth or talsity of
the premises of the Cosmological Argument.
The Principle ofSufficient Reason, as it was

expressed byboth Leibniz and Samuel Clarke, is a
very general principle and is·bes.t .understood as hav~
ing two parts. In its first part it.is simply a· restate~
ment of Anselm's principle.that there must be an
explanation of the existence· of any· being whatever.
Thus• if we come. upon a man· in a room;. PSR
implies that there must be an;•explanation iof.the
fuct that that particular man exists .. A moment's
reflection,. however; reveals.• that: there are· ;many
facts about the man other than the mere .fuct that
he exists. There is the fact thatthe .man in question
is· in the room he's in, rather than somewhere else,
the fuct. that he is in good. health, and the fact that
he is at .the moment thinking of Paris, .rather. than;
say, London. Now, the purpose·. of the second· part
ofPSR is to require:an·explanation ofthese fucts, as
well. We may state·PSR, therefore, as the pririciple
that there must be:atl explanation (a) of the existence of
a11y being, and (b) of any. positive fact whatever. We are
now in a position •to study the role this veryimpor"-
tant principle plays in the Cosmological Argument.
Since the proponent of the Cosmological
Argument accepts• PSR in both its·. parts, it· is clear
that he will appealto its first part; .PSRa; as justifi::.
cation for the fitst premise of the Cosmological
Argument. Of course;. we can and. should·enquire
154 PART II•'TRAPITIONAI!.'ARGUMENTS FOR THE"
EXISTENCE OF GOD'
into ;the deepyr question -of whether the proponent
of the' argull1ent is rationally> justified.· in· accepting

. PSR.itself. But: we shall p'ut.this question aside•for
the moment. What we need to see. first is whether
he is correct in thinking •that if l?SR is true then
both·· of the premises of the Cosmological•Argu"
ment are true. And what we have· just seen 'is ,that
if only. the first part of PSR, that is, PSRa; is•.ttue,
the first premise of the Cosmological·Argument
will be true. But. what of .the second premise .,of
the argument? Forwhatn~asons does the proponent
think that it must be true?
THE S'E.COND PREMISE .
According to· the· second- premise; not every· being
that exists can be a dependent being, that is, can
have the explanation of its existence' in some
other being or beings. ·Presumably, the proponent
of the. argument thinks there is something funda-
mentally wrong with the idea that every being that
existsf is dependent, that each existing; being was
caused by some other beingo·whfch in tum was
caused by, some other being, and SO• on.' But just
what does he; think is wrong with ·it? To help us
in understanding his thinking, let~s:simplifY things
by supposing that there· exists only one. thing now,
At; a living•thing perhaps, •that was;brought into
existence by something else, A 2 , whiCh perished
shortly after it brought A 1 into existence. Suppose
further that A 2 wasbrm:ight into existence in similar
fashion some time agobyA3·, and A3 byA4, and so
forth back. into the past .. Each of these beings is a
dependent being, it owes' its existence to· the preced~
ing. thing in the series. Now jf nothing else ever
existed.ibut these beiligs, then what the second
premise says would not be true. ·for if every being
that exists or ever did exist is an A and was pro"'

duced by a; preceding A, then every.· being· that
exists or ever did exist would be dependent and,
accordingly; . premise> two of the Cosmological
Argument would be false. If the proponent of the
Cosmological Argument • is correct there must;
then., ·be ; something •wrong with t.he idea tha:t
every being that exists or did exist is· an A and
that they form a causal series:.A1 caused by A 2;
A 2 caused by A3 A3 caused by A 4, , .. A,; caused
by An~t~ How .does the proponent ofthe Cosmo..:.
logical· Argument propose to. show us that thew is
somethirig'vrong with• this view?
A.popular butmistaken idea1of how the pro-
ponent tries to show·that•somethingis"wrong with
the view, that every being might' be dependent, is
that he uses the following argument to reject it.
1. ·There must be afl;stbeingio start any cau~al
series.
2. If eyery ,l?eing were dependent there would,be
no first being t() start; the causal series ..
Therefore,
3. Not every being can be a dependent being.
Although this argument is. deductively valid,. and its
second premise is 'true, its first preniise overlooks
the distinct possibility that a causal series might be
infinite; with no first member at all .. Thusifwe go
back to our series o( A bein~, where . ~ach A is
depend~nt, having been produced by· the' preceding
A in the! ca~sal senes, it's dear that 'if the -series

existed. it wohld have·. ho first ~elliber, for ev'ery
in . the. series there . wollld be' a .• piece ding. A
Which produced it:· ad infinitum. Thefirst premise
of the arg~ment just ~ven. assumer that a . causal
series. must stop with a first member somewhere
in th~. distant past. But there seems to be no good
reason for' making tlut assumptiop ....•.. ··. •·••· · .. · ... ·•·.·.·
.. · .·
The eighteenth-century proponents of the
Cosmological Argument recognizedthatthe cahsal
series of dependent beings could be infinite, with-
out a first member to start the series. J'h,ey rejected
the idea that every being thatisor ever was is
dependent not because there. would. then ·.be no
first member to thee series of· dependent beings,
but because there would then be no· explanation
fot the, fact that there are and have . always, been
dependent beings. To, see their reasoning Jet's
return to our simplification of the supposition tha.t
the only ·things that exist .or ever did exist· care
dependent beings: hi our simplification· of that sup-
position onlyrone of-the dependent beings exists at
' I
~
I WILLIAM'ROWE •' AN EXAMINATION: OFTH
E'CiOSMOLOGICALcARGUMENT 155
a .time, each,one:perishing as it produces the next in
the series, Perhaps .the first thing to 'note ahoul: this

supposition is that there .is no individual A in the
causal series of dependent beings whose existencejs
unexplained'-,-A 1 is,explained by A 2, by A3, and
A, by An+ 1• So the first part o(PSR, PSRa, appears
to be satisfied. There is no particular ,being whose
existence lacks an explanation, What, then, 'is it
that lacks an explanation, if every particular A in
the causal series of dependent beings has an. expla,..
nation? It is the series>itself that lacks an explana.,.,
tion, or,·.as Tve chosen to express it, thCjact that
there are and have always been dependent beings.' For
suppose we ask why itjs that there are and have
always been As in existence. kwon't do to say that
As. bave· always been producing other As...,.,we
can't! explain why there have always been As by
saying there always have been As. Nor, on the
supposition that only As have ever existed, can
we explain the fact that there have always been
As by appealing to something other than an A-
for ·no such thing would have existed. Thus the
supposition that the only things that exist :or ever
existed are dependent things leaves us with a fact
for ,which there can be .no explariation;•namely,
the fact that there are and have, always been
dependent beings,
QUESTIONING THE
JUSTIFICA'TlON OF THE
SECOND PREMI.SE
Critics of the Cosmological Argument ha:ve raised
severalimportant objections against the claim that if
every being is dependent the series er collection of
those • beings would have no explanation. Our

understanding of the Cosmological Argument, as
well as of its strengths and weaknesses, ,'ill be deep.~
ened.:by a careful consideration ofthese criticisms.
The first criticism is that the proponent ofthe
Cosmological Argument makes the mistake of
treating the collection or series of dependent beings
as though it were jtself a dependent being, and,
therefory, requires ari explanation .of•its. existence:
But, so the objection goes, the collection, ofdepen"'
dent beings is not itself a dependent being any more
than a collection ?fstafl1ps is itself a stamp.
A second 'criticism i~ that the ·p~8ponent makes
the mistake of inferring .that·because eaGh member
of the· collection bf dependent beings has a cause,
the .collection itself must have. a cause,.<But,> as
Bertrand Russell. noted; such. reasoning• is, as falla~
cious as to infer. that ·the human• race (that is, the
collection ofhuman·beings)·must.have a mother
bec~use each member . of.the c:ollection (eaCh
human being) has amother.
A third criticism is that the proponent•pf the
argument fails to realize that for there .to· be ,an
explanation of a. collection:. of things is• nothing
more.thahJor.there to be an explanation of each
of the things making up the colleCtion. Since in
the .infinite collection (or series). of depeJident
beings, each .• being in the: collection· does have an
explanation~by virtue of having been caused. by
some preceding member. ·.of .the•. collection"""7the
explanation of . the collec:tion; •so the criticism
goes, has already been given: As David .Hume
remarked, "Did I show you the particular. causes

of each ihdividual in. a collection of tw-enty particles
of matter, I should think it very unreasonable;
shouldyou aftenvards askme, what wasthecausy
of the whole t~enty. This; is: sufficiently. explained
in explaining the cause ofthe parts. "2 .•
Finally, even if the proponent of the. Cosmo.,
logical Argument can .. satisfactorily answer ,these
objections, he. must fa~e one last objectioh to his
ingenious attempt to justify premise tWo of the
Cosmological. Argumenti• For .someone may agree
that if nothing exists. but an infinite .collection of
dependent beings,• the infinite collection will• have
no explanation' of its existence; ·and· still·refuse to
conclude from this that: there. is .something wrong
with the idea that every being is a dependent being.
Why, he might ask, should•we think that every-:-
thing has to have an explanation?, What's Wrong
with admitting that the fact that there are arid
have always been dependent beings is. a. brutejact, a
fact having no explanation whatever?. Why ;does
everything .have to have an explanatioir''anyway?
r-.,
!
156 PART II• TRADITIONAt ARGUMENTS F~R THE·
EX"ISTE:NCE OFcGOD'.
We must now see what £an be said•ip. response to
these se'veral objectionS:
·Responses to' Cfiticism

It is certainly ·a mistake. to think that a collection of
stamps is itself a stamp; and very likely a mistake to
think • that the collection of dependent· beings is
itself a dependent being: But the; mere fact that
the proponent. of the· argument thinks that there
must ·be an explanation· not .only· for: each member
of the collection of dependent beings but for the
collection itself is not sufficient grounds for con-
cluding that he must view the colle<::tion as itself a
dependent being. The collection of hui:han beings,
for example, is certainly not itself a human being.
Admittin'g· this, however, we might still seek an
explanation· of why there is a: collection nf human
beings;' of why there are such things as human
beings(atall. So the mere·fact that an:explanation
is demanded for the collection of dependent beings
is no proof that the person who demands the expla-
nation mustbe supposing that the: collection itself is
just another dependent being.·
The.csecond criticism attributes to the propo-
nent of the Cosmological Argumenfthe following
bit of reasoning.
{. Every wember of the coll~~~on'qfdependent
. beings has a cause or. explanatio.n.
Therefore, '
2. The collection of depend~nt b~ings has a cause
or explanation.
As we noted in setting forth this :criticism, argu~
ments ofthis sort are often unreliable.' It would be
a mistake to conclude that a collection of objects is
light in weight simply because each object in the

collection is light in weight,. for if there were many
objectS3·in•the:collection it might be quite heavy.
Onthe::otherhand;•ifwe know that each marble
weighs more than one ounce, we could infer val-
idly that the·collection of marbles weighs more than
an ounce. Fortunately, however, we don:t rteed to
decide whether the inference from 1 to 2 is valid or
invalid·:<W'e:need not decide this question because
the proponent of the Cosmological:Argumentneed
not use this inference .to establish that there must be
an explanation· of the collection ·. of dependent
beings; He need not use this ·inference because he
has in PSR a prirlcipfe from which it followsimmec.
diately that the collection ofdependerit beings •has' a
cause or explanation. For according to PSR, every
positive fact must have an ·explanation. If it is a fact
that there exists a collection of dependent beings
then, according to PSR, that fact too must have
an explanation. So it is PSR that the proponent
of the Cosmological Argument appeals to in con-
cluding that there .must be an explanation of the
collection of dependent beings; and not some dubi-'
ous inference from•the premise that each•member
of the collection. has an explanation. It seems, then,
that neither of the first two criticisms ·is strong
enough to·do any serious damage to the reasoning
used to support the second premise of the Cosmo-
logical Argi.lment.
The third objection contends that to explain the
eXistence ofa collection.ofl:hings is the same thing as
to explain the existeqce of each of its members. If we
consider. a collection of dependent. beings where
each being in the collection is explained by the pre-
ceding member ·which caused it, it's clear' that no

member of the collection will lack 'an explanation
of its existence. But, so the criticism goes, if we've
explained the existence of every member of a col-
lection, we've explained the existence of the collec-
tion-there's nothing left over to be explained. This
forceful criti<;:ism, ori~ally advanfed py David
Hume, has gained considerable support in the mod-
ern period. But the:critkism rests on an assumption
that the proponent of the Cosmological Argument
would not accept. The assumption is that to explain
the existence of a collection ofthings itis sufficientto
explain the existence. of every member in the collec-
tion. To see' what is wrongwith this assumption is to
understand. the basic issue iri ·the· reasoning by which
the prop'onent of the'Cosmological Argument seeks
to establish that not every being,can be a dependent
being,
In order for there to be an;explanation of the
existence of the collection of dependent, beings; it's
clear that the eighteenth-century proponents would
/
WILLIAM ROWE •AN ;EXAMINATION, OF
THE.CcOS.MOLOGICAL .ARGUM.ENT 1.57
require that the following two conditions be
satisfied:.
C1. 'fhere is an explanation of the ~xistence of~ach
of the. niemhers ·of the collection of depende11~
· beings. · ·.· . · ·

C2 . .There is ~n explanati9n of why .there.are any
qependent bein,gs.
According to the propon~nts of the Cosmological
Argument, if every being that exists or ever·did
eXistis a: dt~pendent~ being'-that is/if the whole
ofreality consists of nothing more than a collectiOn
of dependent beings-"-Cl will he satisfied;' but C2
will not be' satiSfied. Aild since C2 Won't be' satis-
fied, there will •be rio explanation of the collection
of dependent beings. The third. criticism; therefore,
says in effect that if Cl is satisfied, C2 will be satis-'
fied; and, since in a collection. ofdependent beings
each member will have an explanation in whatever
it was that produced it, Cl will be satisfied, So,
tliefefore, C2 will be satisfied and the collection
of dependent oeings will have an explanation.
''Although the issue is a complicated one, I think
it is possible t6 see that the third 'criticism rests ori
a mistake: the 1nistake of thinking' that 'if Cl is
satisfiea C2 must also be satisfied, Tile niistake is
a natural· one to make ·for it·is easy to 'ima'gine
Circumstances in which 'if Cl is satisfied C2 also
will be satisfied> Suppose; for example that the
whole of reality includes· not just a collection of
dependent beings but alsb a self ... existent being.
Supposefurther th~t instead" Of each dependent
being Having been produced By some other
dependenf be'ing, every dependent being was
produced by the self-existent being. Finally, let
us consider both the possibility that the :collection
ofdepeilderit beings is finite intime ~nd has a first
rnernber, and the possibility thatthe collection of
deperideht ;beings is infinite in past time, having

no first member. ·Using G for· the self.:existent
being, the first ,possibility may ;be diagramed as
follows:·
G, we shall. say,;·has always·existed and always wilL
We can· think of. d1 as so1he •presently .ex;isting
dependent being, d2, d3, arid so forth as dependent
beings that existed at some tirne;in :the past, arid d.;
as .the ·first ·dependent being to exist .. 1'he' second
possibility may be portrayed• as follows:'
On thi~ diagra~thereis riofirstfu~mber ofth~ col,
l~ction .. of dep1~ndent beings. EaTh membei:'. of tht;
infinite collection, however, is exP-l;rined. })y refer::
ence. t~ • the self-existent being G . which' J'r()duced
it. Now the inter~st~g pointabout bothth(!se
cases is that the explanation that has been provided
for themerrrbers ofthe <;ollection ofdependent
bein.gscarries 'With,it, at l~;,15t in p;trt, ,ari answer to
the ques6on of why th:reare any dependept beings
at all. In both cases we may explaiti why there are
depencleht. beings by po1ndng out th:~f there exisfs a
self-existent beillg that has been enga~ed in produc-
ingthem. So oncewe.have le'~ed."that theeJcistence
of each member of the collection ()fdependept
beings has. its existence explained by the fat that c
produced it, .;"'e have alreaqy feaw.~d· why there are
depepdentbeings. , .. · . , · . . . ·. · . · .....
Someone might object that we hav~n't really
learned,whythere a~ dependent beings until. w~
also learn why has been· .nroc:Iucingthern. But, ,of
coul'Se, "Ye could also saythatwe hayen't really
explained FheFexistence of .. ~ partictjlar dep?ndent
being,say,d3, until we als9 leaw not just tha((; pro;-
duced it. but why ~ produced.ft:The pointwe need

to grasp, hq~e~er, is that onc(! weadmitJpiit ~very
dependent being's existence is explained by G, we
must admit that the fact that there are dependent
beings has alsobt;en e~pJ~in.ed .. so it is not unnatural
that someone' should think that to explain the exis-
tence of the collection ofdependentbeings is nothi!lg
more than to explain· the'existerice or'itsmembers.
For, as we've seen, to e'h.'plain the collection's eXis,-
tence is to explain each ri1eii!ber' s .existenc~ and tp
explain why therea~e any dependent being$ at ~-
Ari:d, iri the exan1pks :we've, considered, in doing
~-' :
-
158 PART II• TRADITIONAl ARGUMENTS' FOR THE'
EXISTENCE OFGOD
die onei (eX:plaining' why each dependent being
exists) we!e already done the Other (explained why
there are any dependent beings .at all). We must n9w
see; however,•that on the supposition that the Vllhole
of reality consists .only ofa collection•.Ofdependent
beings, to give an explanation of each membefs.exis'-7
tence is not to provide an explanation of why there
are dependent beings;
In the examples we've considered, we have gone
outside of the collection of dependent bemgs in order
toexplain the n1embers' ~xiste~ce. B,utJf the only
beings thatexist o~ ever e~ted ~e depe!Jd~ntbeings
then each
1

d~pendent beillg · will b~ ·e:)Cplained by
some other dependent :Jeing, . ad infinitull1·. This
does. not mean that there fill be 's6II1e particular
depend~nt. b~ing,whose .e~istence is yriac,coumed
for. E~i.ch dependent being hasan explanationofits
existence; nWtely, in t?e dependent obing "'hi~li
pre~eded it andproduced it. So C1. is satisfied: there
is an explailation of the existence of eaci:J. member of
the. collection. of dependept. ~~iiigs. I~fning tp C2,
however, wefansee that 'it will not:Je.satisfied. We
cann()t explain' why the.re are' (or haveev~r be~n)
4ependent beings bx ~ppealing to. ali the m'embers
of the infinite.colle~tion,Q~dependent beir).gs. For if
the questi<}nto be :mswered is why there (()r have
ever been) any dependent beings' at all; we cannot
answer that questi<,m by H()ting diatthere aiways
have beendependept beings, each op.e' accoUnting
for the. existence of some otller i:i6peJ1dent being.
Thus on the ·stippos.itiqri th.ateverybeing is depen-
dent, itseerruthere Will be rio explana,~ion of why
there aredependent beings. C2 willnotbe satisfied.
Therefo~~. on the supposition. that ever¥ :Jeing is
dependent there will be no expian.ation of the'ex1s ...
tence oftplcollection of dependent b~ings. . .
THE TRUTH OFPSR
we .c9ine now to the final criticism ofthe reasoning.
supporting die second premise of the Cosmological
Argument, 1~cording to the, ~rhicisril, it is admitted
iliat. th~ suppqsitiol1. that every beirig is Oepen~ent
ilnpljesthat the~ewill be a brntefaetin the unive~,
a: £let, that is, for wliich diere can be rio explanation
whatever. For there will be no explanation of the

fact that~ dependent beings • exist and have always
been in existence. It is this brute fact that the pro-
ponents ofth(! argum~11t were describing wht;n.they
po~ted qut 'that if every.· being is. dependent, the
series or collection of d~pendent beings would.lack
an explallatio~ of its. existence .. The final criticism
askS what is wrong with admitting that die universe
contains such a brute, unintelligible fact: In· isking
this quest1on the critic challenges th.e: fundamental
principle, PSR, on Vhich the Cosmo~ogic;:al Jrgw-
I11~f1t re~ts·, For, as we?v:e seef1, the first premise ofthe
a,rgumen,t denies thi}tthere exists a being Vhose exis-
tence. has no e,xplanation. In support o(diis premise
the. propqnent appeals .. t() die first part of PSR .. The
second prelllise of the argument. ,claims that n()t
evt?ry being can be dep~ndent. In support of this
premi~ the. proponent appeals to ~e second part
of PSR, the part which states that there .must be an
explan,ation of any. positive fact whatever,
The proponent reasons that if every being were
a dependent being, then although the first part .of
PSR would. be satisfied~very ,being. woj.l}d have
an explar1ation~the second part W{)l,lld b.e yiolated;
there would be r10 explanation for.the pqsitiv:e fact
that there. are an,d. have. always . been d~pendent
beings .• For. Hrst, •· since . every being .. is supposed. to
be . dep.endent,. there would be. nothip.g. optside of
the collectiqn qf dependent .beings to explain the
collection's. existence. SecoQd, the .fact. that· each
membeJ; .. ()( the cqllection has an,.explanation in
sorp.e , other dependeQt being .is ir1sufficient to
explain whythere,are ang hav,e alw,~ys been depen~
dent. beings, And, fin¥ly, ,there is J:l,Othing ~bout
the collection ofdependentbeings that Vl0419sug~
gest that it is a self-existent .collection. Conse-

, - - - - - --- ~ - - - - - -·
quently, ife!ery being were dependent, the fact
that the.re are ar1d have always geen dependent
bein~;wol).ld. have .no explanation. But ~pis violates
the second part of PSR,, So the secpng premise of
the Cosmological Argument _must be . true: Not
every. being ca11 :be, a dependent being. This con-
clusion, however, is no better than the principle,
PSR, on which it rests. And it is the point of die
final criticism to question the truth of PSR. Why,
after all, shpuld we accept the idei} that every being
and every positive fact must have an explanation?
Why, in short, should we believe PSR? These are

(
/
WILLIAM ROWE • AN EXAMINATION OF THE
COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT 159
important questions, and any fmal judgment of the
Cosmological Argument depends on how they are
answered.
Most of the theologians and philosophers who
accept PSR have tried to defend it in either of two
ways. Some have held that PSR is (or can be) known
intuitively to be true. By this they mean that if we fully
understand and reflect on what is said by PSR we can

see that it must be true. Now, undoubtedly, there are
statements which are known intuitively to be true.
"Every triangle has exactly three angles" or "No
physical object can be in two different places in
space at one and the same time" are examples of
statements whose truth we can apprehend just by
understanding and reflecting on them. The difficulty
with the claim that PSR is intuitively true, however,
is that a number of very able philosophers fail to
apprehend its truth, and some even claim that the
principle is false. It is doubtful, therefore, that many
of us, if any, know intuitively that PSR is true.
The second way philosophers and theologians
who accept PSR have sought to defend it is by claim-
ing that although it is not known to be true, it is,
nevertheless, a presupposition of reason, a basic
assumption that rational people make, whether or
not they reflect sufficiently to become aware of the
assumption. It's probably true that there are some
assumptions we all make about our world, assump-
tions which are so basic that most of us are unaware
of them. And, I suppose, it might be true that PSR is
such an assumption. What bearing would this view of
PSR have on the Cosmological Argument? Perhaps
the main point to note is that even if PSR is a pre-
supposition we all share, the premises of the Cosmo-
logical Argument could still be false. For PSR itself
could still be false. The fact, if it is a fact, that all of
us presuppose that every existing being and every pos-
itive fact has an explanation does not imply that no
being exists, and no positive fact obtains, without an
explanation. Nature is not bound to satisfY our pre-
suppositions. As the American philosopher William
James once remarked in another connection, "In the

great boarding house of nature, the cakes and the
butter and the syrup seldom come out so even and
leave the plates so clear."
Our study of the first part of the Cosmological
Argument has led us to the fundamental principle
on which its premises rest, the Principle of Suffi-
cient Reason. Since we do not seem to know that
PSR is true, we cannot reasonably claim to know
that the premises of the Cosmological Argument
are true. They might be true. But unless we do
know them to be true they cannot establish for us
the conclusion that there exists a being that has the
explanation of its existence within its own nature. If
it were shown, however, that even though we do
not know that PSR is true we all, nevertheless,
presuppose PSR to be true, then, whether PSR is
true or not, to be consistent we should accept the
Cosmological Argument. For, as we've seen, its
premises imply its conclusion and its premises do
seem to follow from PSR. But no one has suc-
ceeded in showing that PSR is an assumption that
most or all of us share. So our final conclusion must
be that although the Cosmological Argument
might be a sound argument (valid with true pre-
mises), it does not provide us with good rational
grounds for believing that among these beings
that exist there is one whose existence is accounted
for by its own nature. Having come to this conclu-
sion, we may safely put aside the second part of the
argument. For even if it succeeded in showing that
a self-existent being would have the other attributes
of the theistic God, the Cosmological Argument
would still not provide us v...ith good rational
grounds for belief in God, having failed in its first
part to provide us with good rational grounds for

believing that there is a self-existent being.
NOTES
1. See St. Thomas Aquinas, Surnnza Theologica, Ila.
2, 3.
2. David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion,
Part IX, ed. H. D. Aiken (New York: Hafner
Publishing Company, 1948), pp. 59-60.
r
(
WltUAM,~AL'EY • THE,,WATCH 'AN,D.T.HEWATCHMAK£R
, U.C.1
WILLIAM PALEY
William Paley (1.7 43~ 1805), Archdeacon <?{Carlisle, was a
leading' evarigelical' apologist. , Hi,s most
important work is Natural Theology, or, Evidences of the
Existence: and 'Attributes oft he
Deity Collected from the Appearances ofNature (1802), the
.first chapter of which is: reprinted
here. Paley argues thatjust as we infer the existence of an
intelligent designef: to explain the presence of
From William Paley, Natural 711eology, or Evitletu:es of tlie
Exiswnce and Atrtibutes 4 the Deity Collecte,Jjrom
tlteAppe~rances oF
Nature (1802).

~'
I
181
I
-J
182 PART'II • TRADITIONAL ARGUMENTS FORTH E:
EXISTENCE OF GOD
a subtle and complex artifact like a watch, so too we must infer
the existence c.if an intelligent Grand
Designer to explain the existence c.if the works c.if nature,
which are far more subtle, complex, and
cleverly contrived than any human artifact.
STATEMENT OF THE
ARGUMENT
In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against
a stone, and were asked how the stone came to be
there, I might possibly answer, that, for anything I
knew to the contrary, it had lain there for ever; nor
would it, perhaps, be very easy to show the absurdity
of this answer. But suppose I found a watch upon
the ground, and it should be inquired how the
watch happened to be in that place, I should hardly
think of the answer which I had given-that, for
anything I knew, the watch might have always
been there. Yet why should not this answer serve
for the watch as well as for the stone? Why is it
not as admissible in the second case as in the first?

For this reason, and for no other; viz., that, when we
come to inspect the watch, we perceive (what we
could not discover in the stone) that its several parts
are framed and put together for a purpose, e.g. that
they are so formed and adjusted as to produce
motion, and that motion so regulated as to point
out the hour of the day; that, if the different parts
had been differently shaped from what they are, if a
different size from what they are, or placed after ariy ·
other manner, or in any other order than that in
which they are placed, either no motion at all
would have been carried on in the machine, or
none which would have answered the use that is
now served by it. To r~ck6Ji:Up a few ofthe plainest
of these parts, and of their offices, all tending to one
result:-We see a cylindrical box containing a: coiled
elastic spring, which, by its endeavor to relax itself,
turns round the box. We next observe a flexible
chain (artificially wrought for the sake of flexure)
communicating the acti()n of the spring from the
box to the fusee. We then find a series of wheels,
the teeth of which•catch in; and apply to, each other,
conducting the motion from· the fusee to the bal-
ance, and from the balance to the pointer, and, at
the same time, by the size and shape of those wheels,
so regulating that motion as to temlinate in causing
an index, by an equable and measured progression,
to pass over a given space in a given time. We take
notice that the wheels are made of brass, in order to
keep them from rust; the springs of steel, no other
metal being so elastic; that over the face of the watch
there is placed a glass, a material employed in no
other part of the work, but in the room of which,
if there had been any other than a transparent sub-
stance, the hour could not be seen without opening

the case. This mechanism being observed, (it requires
indeed an exanlination of the instrument, and per-
haps some previous knowledge of the subject, to
perceive and understand it; but being once, as we
have said, observed and understood,) the inference,
we think, is inevitable, that the watch must have had
a maker; that there must have existed, at some time,
and at some place or other, an artificer or artificers
who formed it for the purpose which we find it
actually to answer; who comprehended its construc-
tion, and designed its use.
I. Nor would it, I apprehend, weaken the con-
clusion, that we had never seen a watch made; that
we had never known an artist capable of making
orie; that we were altogether incapable of executing
. such a piece of workmanship ourselves, or of under-
standing in what manner it was performed; all this
being no more than what is true of some exquisite
remains of ancient art, of s~me lost and to the gen-
erality of m'aclcihd, ·of the'lno~e curious productions
of modem manufacture. Does one man in a million
know how oval frames are turned? Ignorance of this
kind exalts our opinion of the unseen and unknown
artist's skill, ifhe be unseen and unknown, but raises
no doubt in our minds of the existence and agency
of such an artist, at 'some fom1er 'time,· and in some
place or other. Nor: can I perceive that it varies at all
the inference, whether. the question arise concerning
a human agent, or concerning an agent of a different
species, or an agent possessing, in some respect, a
different nature.
·~
i

:i..
WIL.tiAM f'AL'EY'fTHE.WATCH AND:THE
WATCHMAI<::ER 183
II. Neither, secondly, would it invalidate :0ur
conclusion, that the ·.Watch 'sometimes went
wrong, or that it seldom: went exactly hghLThe
purpose of the machinery, the :design, and the
designer, mightcbe evident, and, in the ·case sup-
posed; . would be evident; in whatever· way we
accounted for the irregularity of·the movement,
or whether we could account for 'it or not. It is
not necessary that a machine be perfect, in order
to show with what design it was made; still less
necessary, where the only question is, whether it
were made with any design at all.
III. Nor, thirdly, would it bring any uncer-
tainty into the argument, if there were a few parts
of the watch, concerning which we could not dis-
cover, or had not yet discovered, in what manner
they conduced to the general effect; or even some
parts, concerning which we could not. ascertain
whether they conduced to that effect in any man-
ner whatever. For, as to the first branch of the case,
if by the loss, or disorder, or decay of the parts in
question, the movement of the watch were found
in fact to be stopped, or disturbed, or retarded, no
doubt would remain in our minds as to the utility
or intention of these parts, although we should be
unable to investigate the manner according to
which, or the connection by which, the ultimate

.effect depended upon their action or assistance;
and the more complex is the machine, the more
likely is this obscurity to arise. Then, as to the sec-
ond thing supposed, namely, that there were parts
which might be spared without prejudice to the
movement of the watch, and that he had proved
this by experiment, these superfluous parts, even if
we were completely assured that they were such,
would not vacate the reasoningwhich we had insti-
tuted concerning other parts. The indication of
contrivance remained, with respect to them, nearly
as it was before.
IV. Nor, fourthly, would any man in his senses
think the existence of the watch, with its various
machinery, accounted for, by being told that it was
one out of possible combinations of material forms;
that whatever he had found in the place where
he found the watch, must have contained some
internal configuration or other; and ,that this
configuration ihight be the structufe.riow exhib-
ited, viz., of the works o(1 watch, as well as a
different structure:
y.Nor, fifthly, wouldit yield his inquiry IlJ,Or,e,
safisfactiol1,.to •. be'answerea, that,there.· eristed in
tnfngs a prin21pl7 of order,. whi~~ h~d:diip~~ed
the parts of the .·~atch into th~ir.prese'nt .. form ~nd
situati<m,. never .• knew a Vatch madeliy tlle,
principl~ df order;. nor can he evell: form to himself
an idea of what is meant by a principle of order,
distinct from the intelligence of the watchmaker.
VI. Sixthly, he would be surprised to hear that
the mechanism of the watch was no proof of

contrivance, only a motive to induce the mind to
think so.
vn. And not less surprised to be informed, that
the watch in his hand was nothing more than the
result of the laws of metallic nature. It is a perversion
of language to assign any law as the efficient, oper-
ative cause of anything. A law presupposes an agent;
for it is only the mode according to which an agent
proceeds; it implies a power; for it is the order
according to which that power acts. Without this
agent, without this power, which are both distinct
from itself, the law does nothing, is nothing. The
expression, "the law of metallic nature," may sound
strange and harsh to a philosophic ear; but it seems
quite as justifiable as some others which are more
familiar to him such as "the law of vegetable
nature," "the law of animal nature," or, indeed, as
"the law of nature" in general, when assigned as the
cause of phenomena in exclusion of agency and
power, or when it is substituted into the place of
these.
VIII. Neither, lastly, would our observer be
driven out of his conclusion, or from his confi-
dence in its truth, by being told that he knew
nothing at all about the matter. He knows enough
for his argument: he knows the utility of the end:
he knows the subserviency and adaptation of
the means to the end. These points being
known, his ignorance of other points, his doubts
concerning other points, affect not the certainty of
his reasoning. The consciousness of knowing little
need not beget a distrust of that which he does
know ....

184 PART "11 • TRADITIONAl ARGOMENTS FOR THE
EXISTENCE Of GOD
,APPLICATION OF THE
'ARGUMENT,
~very ,i,ndication ~f contrivance, . ~very manifesta-
tion of d~sign,' which existed 'in'tl1e' watch exish
in',the Zyor,ks of nattir~; ~ith the'differeh~e ~n
t}ie s~de of ~atu.re, ofbeing great~rand inore,! and
that i}1. a. 'degree which exceeds. all tomputatio~. I
mean that' the i::()titrivances
1of n~ture S!,Upass the
contrivanceS'.>of ait,. in the complexity,· subtilty,
and curiosity ofthe mechanism; and still more, if
poSsible,. do they·go beyond them in number and
variety; yet in a' multitude of cases, are not less evi~
dently ·mecHanical;: not less evidently ccontrivances,
not less evidently accommodated to .their end;' or
suited to .their office, than,are the most perfect •pro"-
ductions•of human ingenuity>'
From David Hume, Dialogue Concemit~g Natiot1a/ Religiofl
(1779) London: Longman ·c.;ieen, 1878.

.

202 PART II•TRAOITIONAL ARGUMENTS FOR THE
EXISTENCE OF GOD
11.(.4
A Scientific Argument for the
Existence of God
ROBIN COLLINS
Robin Collins (1961- ) is professor of philosophy at Messiah
College, and he has written several
articles on the argument from design. The article included here
presents a simplified version (if an
argument that he has developed in much more technical detail
elsewhere. He begins by noting that ltfo
would have been impossible had certain laws of nature an.d
fundamental physical constants (such as the
gravitational constant) been even slightly d!fferent. He then
argues that since this apparent 'fine-
tuning" of the laws and constants is significantly more probable
on the assumption that the universe
was designed to be hospitable for ltfo than on the assumption
that it was not designed at all, such
apparent fine-tuning counts as evidence in favor if the existence
if a designer.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Evidence of Fine-Tuning
Suppose we went on a mission to Mars, and found
a domed structure in which everything was set up
just right for life to exist. The temperature, for
example, was set around 70° F and the humidity
was at 50 percent; moreover, there was an oxygen

recycling system, an energy gathering system, and a
whole system for the production of food. Put sim-
ply, the domed structure appeared to be a fully
functioning biosphere. What cqnclusion would
we draw from finding this structure? Would we
draw the conclusion that it just happened to form
by chance? Certainly not. Instead, we would unan-
imously conclude that it was designed by some
intelligent being. Why would we draw this conclu-
sion? Because an intelligent designer appears to be
the only plausible explanation for the existence
of the structure. That is, the only alternative
explanation we can think of-that the structure
was formed by some natural process~eems
extremely unlikely. Of course, it is possible that,
for example, through some volcanic eruption vari-
ous metals and other compounds could have
formed, and then separated out in just the right
way to produce the "biosphere," but such a sce-
nario strikes us as extraordinarily unlikely, thus
making this alternative explanation unbelievable.
The universe is analogous to such a "biosphere,"
according to recent fmdings in physics. Almost
everything about the basic structure of the
universe-for example, the fundamental laws and
parameters of physics and the initial distribution of
matter and energy-is balanced on a razor's edge for
life to occur. As the eminent Princeton physicist
Freeman Dyson notes, "There are many . . . lucky
accidents in physics. Without such accidents, water
could not exist as liquid, chains of carbon atoms
could not form complex organic molecules, and
From Reasot1 for rile Hope Within, Michael J. Murray, ed., ©

1999, Wm. B. Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, MI. Used with
pennission.

I ROBIN COLLINS <• A SCJENTIFIC
ARGUMENTFO,RTH.E:·EXISTENCE,OF GOD 203
hydrogen atoms could not' forr:h breakable bridges
between .molecules" 1~in short,dife as we know ,it
would be.impossible. ·
·Scientists; <:all this· .. extraordinary . balancing' :of
the·paranieters .of physics and. the initial conditions
of the universe the "fme-tuning of the cosmos." It
has been extensively discussed by philosophers,
theologians> and scientists; especially: since .. the
early 1970s,. with hundreds ofarticles and dozens
of books written on the topic; Today, it is widely
regarded as offering by far· the most persuasive cur•
rent argument for the existence ofGod: For•exam.,..
ple, theoretical physicist and popular science writer
Paul Davies-whose early writings were not partic-
ularly sympathetic to theism-claims that with
regard to basic structure of the universe, "the
impression of design is overWheli:ning:"2 Similarly,
in response to. the}ife-pemlittin,~ fine-;tuning of the
nuclear resonances responsible· for the oxygen and
carbon synthesis in sta~. the fam()~S astrophysicist
Sir Fred Hoyle de'dares that · ·
r a6 'not believe that any . scientists Vho

~f(aillined the evidence would fail to draw
the inf~rence that, the law~of nudearphysics
hav~ be~n deliberately.design~d with regard
t? .. th~. consequences ,they produce inside
srars:Ifthis is.so, thenmy apparently .
random ql!ir;ks haye become pirt of a deep-
lai1 sch~JJ1e, If not then .ye a~,bkck again at
a monstrous sequence of acddents.3
A few examples. ofthis fine-tuning •are listed· beloWJ
1. Ifthe'initial explosiori of the big ban,g hafdif:
fer~d in strength by as little as one part 'ih'l 060,
. theuniverse would have either quickly col-
laps~d back on itself, or expand~d .too rapidly for
stars to form. In' either case,life would be . . ·
imp~ssible. (As John Jefferson Oavis po~ts qut,
ail accuracy of one part in 1060 can be compared
to firing a bull~t at a one-inch target on the
other side o( th~ observable univ~rse, twenty
bilhon light years away,and hl.tting the target/
2. Calculations. indicate. that: i[th~ strong n~clear
force, the force that binds protons and neutrons
togetheLi11 an atom; h4d been st~onger or .
· · weaker by as little as five percent,; :life would :be
impossible,5 · · · , •
3. Calculatihns By 'Brandon Cartt+ show' that' if
. gr<ivity had been stronger orwe~kei by' one.
· part in "10~0, then 'life-"sU:stamirig staidike the
surr. could not exist. 'This· wotild most' likelY
niakeSlJ:fe in1possible.6 · · ... •

4. Ifthe·fi~U:tro~ wefe not'aboutr:oofHmesth~
mass of'the prot<m, all protons 'Nould have
decayed into neutronsor 'all neutrons' woU:~d'
hare. d~tayed ~n.t6' protons,. a~d thus life wouid
not b'e· possible. 7 . ·. · · ·
5. If the elect~()magnetic force were slighfly
stronger or weaker, life would he impossible,
for a variety of different reasons. 8
Imaginatively, one could think of each instance of
fine-"tuning as a radio dial: uriless' all the dials are set
exactly ~ight, life would be ilnp6ssibk 'Or, one
cotild think of the initial conditions of the universe
and the furidainellthl· parameters of physics as a dart
boatdthat fills the whole galaxy,'ai1d the conditions
necessary for life to ~exist as a 'siTJill orie-f66t-wide
ta.fg({ unless the dart hits'the target; life would be
impossible: The tad that the dials ·ar~'J>erfectly set:
or. 'that the datt has hit the target, strongly suggests
that sonieotie set the dials or aimed the dart'fot it
seerri~' enormbusly itllprobable'that suth a ·~oinci..:
derice could have happened'by 'chance. ·
Although indiVidual·calculations of fine::.tu:nirig
are only' approxiiilate and could be in error, the tict
that the universe ·'·is 'fine~tuned ··for· life is ilniost
beyond question ·hec~use. ohhe l~rge · number of
independent instances of; apparent.· fme'-tU:ning. As
philosopher Johh Leslie has pointed out, "Clues
heaped upon dues catFconstitll.t~ weightf evidence
despite doubts about eacli element in ;the pile.''9
What is' controversial/ liowever, is the degtee to
which the fine-tuning proVides evidence for the exis-
tence of God. As.t11P!:eS§tV.e.as the argument from

fine~tuning seems to be, atheists have raised several
significant objections to it. c8nsequeritly, thosevho
are aware of these objeCtions, "ot ·have thought of
them·. on their . own, often~ will·· fmd . the argument
unconvincing. This is' n6t orily true of atheists; but
204 PART II•TRADITIONAlARGUMENH' FOR
THETXISHNCE OF GOD
alsd ,many theists .. I have known~ for. instance,',both a
committed Christian Hollywood filrrimaker; and a
conunitted Christian biochemist . who remained
' " " ,. ' ' '. . ' f . . ~ ' ' ' • ' • ·' ' . • .
unconvinced because of certain. atheist objections to
the ;J.rgurnent. Th.is,is unfortunate, partiqllarly since
the. firleHup.!ng argurner1t is probably tl}e, n~ost pow-
erfUl current argument for the existence qfGod. My
g()al. in this. ~htpter, therefc:~r~, to n1ake the fine,..
turung ar~ment . <1$, str9i':g )~ .. p9ssible; This will
involve developing the 'argttllient in as objective
;tQd rigor()US a way as I can,,an~ tl!en answering the
major atheist obj~ctions to. it. Be(ore launching into
this, hovyever, I will need to ~ake a preliminary
distinctiorL
A Preliminary Distinction
To develop the fine-tuning argument rig()rot;tsly, it
is useful· to distinguish between what I shall call tile
atheistic.. single-universe hypoth~;sis and .• the • (ltheistic
many-uf!iverses hypothesis. Accordin,gto the. atheistic
single-upivel'Se hypothesis, ,there i~ only ~me uni-

vel'Se, ;;tll.d it is ultimately an inexplicable,. "brute"
fact th;;tt the. univel'Se exists, and.is.fine-tuned. Many
atheists, ho:wever, advocate another.hypothesis,one
which a~tempts to explain; how the ~eemingly
improb,a~le fine-tuning of the univel:'Se .. c;ould ,be
the I'esultof chance. )Ye will, call t~~ hypothesis
the atheistic many-worlds hypothesiS,, or !~e. atheistic
many-tmiverses hypothesi~:. Aq:ordjng to •this hypoth-
esi~, there exists. what could; be im~ginatively
thought ofas a "univel'Se generator" that produces
a very large or infinite number of .univel'Ses, with
e,ach univel'Se having a randomly selected set of ini-
tial condi~ons and . values for .. th~ . pararnetel'S of
physics. Bec;ause this generatqr produ,ces .so many
univel'Ses, just by 1=hance it will eventually produce
qne ~~;tt is fine-tuned for,intell,igent life to occur(
Plim of the Chapter
:ijelow, we w,ill use. this distinctip:Q between the
~t,heistic single,-l1~!vel'Se. hypothesi~ and the atheistic
many..-un.iverlies.hyp,qthesis to present; t:wO separate
argu111~n~ for theism based pn th~ fine~ tuning: one
which argues that the fine-tuning provides strong
reaSons to).prefet theism. oveFthe atheistic<single-
univel'Se hypothesis< and one which argues that
we should prefer theism over the atheistid many-
universes. hypothesis, We will develop the argu-
ment againstthe atheistic single-universe hypothesis
in section·II below;.referring to it as the core argil-
ment. Then we will ·answer objections to this core
argument in section III, and fmally develop the
argument for preferring theism . to . the' atheistic
many-universes. hypothesise in section IV. An
app·endix is also included that further elaborates

and justifies one . of the key premises of :the core
argument presented in section II.
II. CORE ARGUMENT
RlGOR.OUSLV FORMULATED
Gen~ral Principle of Reasoning_ 'used .
The Principle Explained We will fornmlate the
fine-tuning argument against the':athei~tic single-
univel'Se hypothesis in terms of what I Will call
the prime principle of conjinn~tion. The prime pi;inci-
ple of' confirmation is a generdl principle reason-
ing which tells us ~hen some obse'rvati'on co lints as
evidence. in favor of one hypothe.sis bver arwther.
Simply put,' the principle says that whenever 1.1/e. are con-
sidering two competing hypotheses, ati observation counts
as evidence in Javor oj the hypothesis i:nder 'Which the
observation has the .highest probability (or is the. least
improbable). (Or, put slightly differen.tly, the princi-
ple says that whenever 'we . ·;re considering two
competing hypotheses, H 1 and H 2, aiiobset:Vation,
0, counts as evidence in fa~or of H 1 over if 0 is
more probable urider H 1 than· it is .. urider. H2.)
Moreover, the degree to Vhich the ~vidence counts
in favor of one' hypothesis o~er another' is propor-
tional to the degree to ~hich the dbservadon is
more probable under t!'te o11e hypothesiS than the
other:10 'Por example,' the. fine:..tuning much,
much more probable under theisrh 'than under the
atheistic single-uni.Jerse ·hypothesis, so it· counts a's
strong . evfdence for theism over this atheistic
hypothesis. In· the· b:ext major subsection; we will

.
/
ROBIN COHINS •-A SCIENTIFIC ARGUMENT: FOR-THE
EXISiH NCE OrGOD 205
present a -more fonnaLand ··elaborated rendition of
the :fme-;:turring argument in. terms of tlie prime
prinCiple .. First; however;lefs look-at a cbuple of
illustrations ofthe principle and therr.present. sowe
support for it.
Additi.onal Illustrations .of the Principle For our
first illustration,· suppose that .I weni hiking in the
mountains, and found underneath a certa.in .. cliff a
group: of rocks arranged in a· formation thaCdearly
forinedi the patterri ,''Welcome to the mountains;
Robin Collins," One hypothesis is.that, by chance,
the rocks just happened to •be arranged in that
pattern--'-ultimately, perhaps, because ofcertain ini-
tiaLconditions .ofthe universe. Suppose the only
viable alternative. hypothesis is that my brother,
who· ·was in the mountains before, me, arranged
the rocks in this way .. Most of us wouH,immedi..,.
ately take the arrangements. of rocks .. to_ be ·strong
evidence in favor of the "brother'' hypothesis: over
the "chance" hypothesis. Why? Because it strikes us
as extremely improbable that the rocks would be
arranged that way by chauce; but no~ improbable at
all that my brother would place th:n1, in that con-
figuration. Thu~~ by the prime prinCiple of confir-
mation we would conclude that the arrangement of

rocks strohgly ·. ~upports. the '"brother'' hypdthesis
over the chance'hypothesis;
Or consider· another case', thaf of' finding· the
defendant's fingerprints on the; murder Weapon.
Normally, we would take such a finding as strong
evidenc~ ;that the .. defendant was guilty. Why?
Because we judge.that it. would be unlikely for
these fingerprints to- be on the murder weapon if
the defendant was. innocent,: but not unlikely if the
defendant. was guilty. That is, we-would go through
the same sort of reasoning as in the above case.
Support for ,the Principle Several t~ings can be
said in favor of the prime principle· of confirmation:
First; many· phildsophers think. that this . principle
can be derived from what is known as the probability
calculus, .the s.et ofmathe.matical rules that. are typi-'
cally assumed to govern. probability. Second, there
does not appear to be any case of recognizably good
reasoning that violates this principle. Finally, the
principle. appears to have .a·wide range .ofrapplita'--
bility,, unqergirding much of our reasoning in sci"'
ertce"tand everyday Jife,. ,as the examples above
illustrate;· Indeed,· some have· even, claimed that a
slightly more .generahVersion of· this J>ririciple
undergirds all scientifi(;. reasoning. Because of all
these reasons in favor of the principle, we .. can be
very confident in it.
Further DeveiQpmellt of Argument
Tb fi.ttthet develop core Veri>ibrl :of'the firte-
tuning 1 aq~~meh t, We ~ill· S:u'nunaii.ze; the argument
by explicitly listing it~ ' two premises · and 'its

conclus1ol1: '
• Premise 1 .. The existence of the fine..,tuning is
not improbable under theism.
• Premise 2. The existence· of the fine..: tuning is
very impri>bable l.lndet the atheistic single-
universe hypothesis.
• Conclusion: 'Fr6m. pien{ises (l). and. (2) anH th~.
prime principle of confirmation,, itfoii<)ws that
the fine-tuningdataprovide'st~ortg evidence to
favor the design hypothesis over the atheistic
single-universe hypothesis.
At this point, we should paQse to note t:wo featt._u::es
of this argument:·· First, the argument-does not say
that the. flne-tQning. evidence proves :that the uni~
verse was designed, or. ex en that it is likely t;hat the
uniyerse was designed. In. order to justifY tpese sorts
of claims, .we would have to look .at tQ.e full range
of evidence both for. and against the design hypoth~
esis, sowething .we .are not. doing in .this chapter.
Rather, the argqment merely .concludes -that the
fine-tuning strongly supports theism over the atheistic
single-universe hypothesis,
In this . way; the ·•· evidence of the' fine-:-ttming
argument is mw::h Jike fiQ.gerpJ'ints found on. the
gun:.although they .. can ,proviqe· strong e.vid,ence
that the defendant coiilihitted the murder, .ope
could not copclude. merely frox:n them .alqne that
the defeqdant is guilty; one would also have to.look
at all the other e.vidence offered. Perhaps, for
instance, ten .·reliabl('! witnesses claimed to see the

~-
1
i
I
~
206 PART II•TRADIHONAl:. ARGUMENTS FOR
THE:EXISHNCEcOF GOD'
defendant at a party at the • time ofthe shooting.· In
this case, the fingerprints would still count as signif-
icant evidence of guilt,' but·this evidence would be
counterbalanced bythe testimony ofthe witnesses.
Similarly the evidence of fine-tuning strongly sup"
ports theism over the atheistic single-"universe
hypothesis; though iL does not itself show that,
everything considered, theism is the most plausible
explanation of the world. Nonetheless, as I argue in
the conclusion of this chapter, the evidence of fine-
tuning provides a :J:iuich stronger and more objec-
tive argument for theism (over the atheistic singl~;-
universe hyp'Othesis) .than the strongest atheisti~
argumentcloes against theism. . , · , ..
The ~econd feature of the argument we should
note is that, given the truth of the prime principle cif
confirmation,. the conclusion of the argument follows
from the premises. Specifically, .jf the premises of
the argument. are true, then we_ are guaranteed
that the conclusion is. true: that is,. the ~rguiilent is
what philosophers call valid. Thus, insofar as we can
sho)V that the pre~ises of the, argu!Jlent are true, we_
~ili have shown that the conClusion is true. Our

next t~sk, therefore, is to atte~pt t~ show th~t the
premises are tru~, or at 'least, that ~e have s~rong
reasons to believ~ them.
Support ·for. the. Premises
Support for Premise (1) Preniisei(T) is ea5y to sup-'
port and fairly uncontroversial. One major : argu-
ment in support of it ·can be simply stated · as
follows: since God is an all good bt.?ing; and it is good
for intelligent, conscious beings to exist, it is not surprising
or improbable that God would create a world that- could
support ·intelligent life. Thus, the fine~tuning is not
improbable under theism, as premise (1) asserts.
Support for Premise (2) Upon looking at the data,
many people find it very obvious that the fine-
tuning is. highly improbable under the atheistic
single-universe hypothesis. And•' it is c easy to see
why when we think of the fine..:tuning in terms
of the •analogies offered earlier. •In the dart board
analogy,•for example; 'the initial conditions of the
universe and the fundamental parameters of physics
ar~ thought •of as a dart board that fills the whole
galaxy, and the conditions necessary for life to exist
as• a small one-foot-wide• target; Accordingly,.from
this. analogy• it 'seems· obvious that it rwould be
highly• improbable ·for the fine-tiuiingno occur
under the atheistic single-universe . hypothesis,___
that is, for the dart to hit the target by chance.
Typically; advocates of. the fine~tiihing ·argu"'
ment are satisfied•with resting the justification of
premise (2); .or something like it; on this sort ofanal-
ogy; Many atheists and .theists;,.however, question
the legitimacy of this sort of'ahalogy;· and thus find

the argument unconvincing. For these people; ;the
appendixto this chapteroffers a rigorous and objec.:.
tive justification of premise (2) using standard prin-;
ciples of probabilistic reasohing, Aniong other things,
in the process of rigorously justifying premise (2), we
effectively answer the• common objection to the
fine-tuning argument that because the uhiverse is a
unique, unrepeatable event, we cannot meaningfully
assign a probability to its. being fine-tuned.
Ill. SOME OBJECTIONS
: ' - i. ~
TO CORE VERS.ION
As powerful as the c~~e versi;n ~fthe fue,-tuhing
argument is, . several major objection~ have been
raised to it, by both atheists :md .theists. In this sec-
tion, ,we will. consider these obje_ctions in tum.
Objection 1: Mote 'Fundamental
law Objection
One criticism of the· fine..::tuning argument· is that;· as
far as we know, there could be a more fundamental
law under ·which, the parameters of physics must
have the values they do. Thus, given such a law,
it •is notimprobable that the knowncparameters of
physics fall within the life-permitting range.
Besides being• entirely speculative, the problem
with postulating such a law: is· that it· simply moves
the ·improbability of the fine'-tuning up one ·.level,
tothat of the postulated physical law itself. Unoer
this hypothesis, what is improbable is that of all the

conceivable fundamental physical laws 'there could

ROBIN COLLINS •:A SCIE·NTIFIC
ARGUMENJ.FORTH.E.EXlSJE.NCE•OF GOD 207
be, the universe .just happens to have the. one. that
constrains. the. cparameters of physics in a·.; life~
permitting way, ·Thus; trying to explain the fine:..
tuning by postulating this sort •offundamentallaw is
like trying to.explain why the pattern ofrocks below
a cliff spelL7~Wekome to the mountains, .Robin
Collins'' by postulating,that an. earthquake occurred
and that all the rocks on the diff face were arranged
in just ~he right. configuration. to tall· into the· pattern
in qilestion .. Clearly this explanation merely transfers
the improbability up oneJevel; sihce now it seems
enomiously improbable that ,of all the possible con-
figurations the rocks could be in oil the cliffface, they
are in the one which results in the pattern •::w elcome
to the mountains, Robin Collins."
A similar sort of response can be given to the
claim that the fine-'tUning is not. improbable
because .it:might he logically necessary for the para-
meters of physics to have life"'pertnitting .. •values;
That is,· according to this .. claim;:the: parameters of
physics must have life-permitting values in the same
way 2 + Z must equal 4, or the interior angles of a

triangle. nmst add •UP to 180 degrees in Euclidian
geometry. Like the. 7'more ftmdamentallaw'' •pro~
posal above, however; this postulate simply transfers
the improbability up one level: of all the lav.'S and
parameters of physics that conceivably could have
been logically nscess;uy, itseemshighh' improbable
that it woUld be' those that are life-permitting.11
Objection 2: Other Forms of
Lif~ Olljettion
Another objection people commonly raise to the
fine.:.tuning a:rgufu.ent is that as: tar"aS we know;
other forms oflife could exist even if the parameters
ofphysicnvere different. So; itis'clairned, the fine.:.
tuning· •argument ends up presupposing that all
fonhs ofintelligeritlife musthe like tis. The answer
to this objection is that most cases of fine-tuning do
hot ···niake this · ptesuppositioll. Consider, for
instance, the case of the fine.:..tulling ()f the strong
nuclear force,: Jfit we're Slightly smaller, h() atoms
could exist other than hydrogeri. ·Contrary to what
one might see on Star Trek;an.ind:~lligent life-form
cannot becomposedmerely ofhydrcigen gas: there
is simply.cl'wt enough' stable complexjty, So,dn'gen~
eial the.:fine"'tuning argument merely, presupposes
that· intelligent ·.·life requires some, degree .oLstable;
reproducible organized complexity': This iScertainly
a very reasonable a~sun.1ptiol1.
' -_' ,_; _,-_;;_, ',
•Objection. 3: Anthropic PrinCiple ·

' obj~ctiori
Acco.rding to. the we;aLversion of the so-called
anthropic principle, if the l~ws of nat!Jre were; not
fine-tuned, we would not be here to corhmt;pt on
the fuct. Some have argued, therefore, that the fme-
tulJ.irig is'not really i;npiobable (irsuprisirig at all' under
atheism, but simply follows from the fuct 1 thaC we
exist. Th~.; response .to tgis. ol;ljt:ction is to simply
restate the argument in te~ of.our e,xistt!I1Ce: our
existt;nce as eml?oQ.ied, intelligent beings is ex:tremely
unlikely under the atheistic single-univ~rse hypothe-
sis (since our existence r~quires fme-tuning), but not
improbable under theiSill: The11,•We sirpply ;:J.Rply the
prime principle 9f confirmation to dra}v tht: conclu-
sion thatol{r ,exjstf!!Ce strongly confinns th~ism over
the atheistic single:;:-upiv~rse hypothe~is,
To further illustrate this response, consid~r the
followi~g "flring squad~' ;malogy. As John .Leslie
points out,. if fifty sharpshooters all miss me, the
response ''if'they had riot rnissedtmel .wouldn't
be here tb ·consider the tact" ·is' 'not adequate:
Instead, I wouldri~turally conclude that then! was
some reason why·theyall missed;suth as that they
never really intended to kill me. :Wh{would r con..:
dude this? Because my continued existence would
be· very improbable' undet the hypothesis th~t•they
missed me by chance, but not' improbable". under
the . hypotfiesis. that there wa.s some reason 'why
they missed me. Thus, bf the prime ·principle c:f
confirmation,·.···· tri.y . continued eXistence strongly
confirrhs the latter hypothesis. 12 ·
·objection 4: The HWho Designed

God?" ObjectiC)ri.
Perhaps the inost common objection that atheists
raise to th'e argument from design, of which .the
208 PARJU.•JRADITIONAI!.ARGUM·EN'TS FOR THE
EXISTENCE OF GOD
fine,..tuning argument .is on'e instance, is thafpostu...:
lating the existence. of God qoesnot solve· the prob"'
. lem ·of design, but 'merely;ttansfet'S it up one level;
Atheist George S!Uith; for example;>claiills that
If the universe is wo'Ad.~rl"~lly designed:
surely God is even more wonderfully
desigiied. 'He rimst, therefore, 1iiM~1iliad a
designer even m()re yv:qn~erful than He is.
If God did not require a designer, then
. there is no reason why such a: relatively leSs
wonderful• thing as the 'universe needed
one:B·
Or, as philosopher J.. J. C. Smart state~ the
qbjection:
If we postUlate God in addition t<f the
created universe we increase· the:·
· coniplexiry of outhypothesis; We have all
the complexity of the ;universe" "itself; and
we have in addition die at least equal
C()mplexit)r ofGod: (The desighefofari

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