

Meltdown and Spectre Attacks

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- H.1. When we read from a memory address multiple times, the second access is usually faster than the first access, what is the reason?
- H.2. Regarding the Flush+Reload technique used in the book, why do we use an array of size 256×4096 , why not use an array of size 256?
- H.3. How do we use CPU cache as a side channel to send out a number 89?
- H.4. We have defined an array of size 1024 (bytes). If the CPU cache size is 128 bytes (i.e., when memory address x is accessed, the memory from x to $x+127$ will be cached by the CPU). Please describe how many distinct values we can send out using this array and the Flush+Reload technique.
- H.5. A secret number is stored at the kernel address `0xf102000`. The following user-level program tries to access and print out this number. What is going to happen?

```
#include <stdio.h>
int main()
{
    char *kernel_data_addr = (char*)0xf102000;    ①
    char kernel_data = *kernel_data_addr;        ②
    printf("I have reached here.\n");           ③
    return 0;
}
```

- H.6. A secret number is stored at the kernel address `0xf102000`. You are trying to print it out. Please use plain English to describe how you can do this.
- H.7. To improve the success rate of the Meltdown attack, it is better that the targeted kernel memory has already been cached by CPU. Why?
- H.8. If CPU does not do out-of-order execution, can we still launch the Meltdown attack? What is the downside?
- H.9. KAISER can be used to defeat the Meltdown attack. Its main idea is to not map kernel memory in the user space. Explain why this idea works.
- H.10. In the Spectre attack, why do we need to train the CPU?
- H.11. If CPU does not do out-of-order execution, can we still launch the Spectre attack?
- H.12. In the Spectre attack scenario, the protected memory and the attacker program are in the same process, why can't attackers directly access the protected memory?
- H.13. When we run the `SpectreAttack.c` program listed in the book, why do we always see `array[0*4096 + DELTA]` in the cache?

- H.14. Your program runs in a sandbox, and it is allowed to access the first 100 elements of a protected buffer; the access has to go through the following sandbox API. The address of the buffer is at `0xbfff0200`. There is a secret number stored at `0xbfff0100`, but your program cannot access it due to the sandbox protection. Can you get this secret number? If so, please describe how.

```
int low = 0;
int high = 100;
int restrictedAccess(int x)
{
    if (x > low && x < high) {
        return buffer[x];
    } else {
        return 0;
    }
}
```