

# Controlled Query Evaluation in Description Logics Through Instance Indistinguishability

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## Abstract

We study privacy-preserving query answering in Description Logics (DLs). Specifically, we consider the approach of controlled query evaluation (CQE) based on the notion of *instance indistinguishability*. We derive data complexity results for query answering over  $DL\text{-Lite}_{\mathcal{R}}$  ontologies, through a comparison with an alternative, existing confidentiality-preserving approach to CQE. Finally, we identify a semantically well-founded notion of approximated query answering for CQE, and prove that, for  $DL\text{-Lite}_{\mathcal{R}}$  ontologies, this form of CQE is tractable with respect to data complexity and is first-order rewritable, i.e., it is always reducible to the evaluation of a first-order query over the data instance.

## 1 Introduction

We consider controlled query evaluation (CQE), a declarative framework for privacy-preserving query answering investigated in the literature on knowledge representation and database theory [Sicherman *et al.*, 1983; Bonatti *et al.*, 1995; Biskup, 2000]. The basic idea of CQE is defining a *data protection policy* through logical statements. Consider for instance an organization that wants to keep confidential the fact that it has suppliers involved in both Project A and Project B. This can be expressed over the information schema of the organization through a denial assertion of the form

$$\forall x. \text{Supplier}(x) \wedge \text{ProjA}(x) \wedge \text{ProjB}(x) \rightarrow \perp$$

In CQE, two different main approaches can be identified. The first one [Biskup and Bonatti, 2004b; Biskup and Bonatti, 2004a; Biskup and Weibert, 2008; Benedikt *et al.*, 2018; Benedikt *et al.*, 2019; Studer and Werner, 2014] models privacy preservation through the notion of *indistinguishable data instances*. In this approach, a system for CQE enforces data privacy if, for every data instance  $I$ , there exists a data instance  $I'$  that does not violate the data protection policy and is indistinguishable from  $I$  for the user, i.e., for every user query  $q$ , the system provides the same answers to  $q$  over  $I$  and over  $I'$ . We call this approach (*instance*) *indistinguishability-based* (IB). In continuation of the previous example, in the presence of an instance  $\{\text{Supplier}(c), \text{ProjA}(c), \text{ProjB}(c)\}$ ,

an IB system should answer user queries as if the instance were, e.g.,  $\{\text{Supplier}(c), \text{ProjA}(c)\}$  (note that other instances not violating the policy can be considered as indistinguishable, e.g.,  $\{\text{Supplier}(c), \text{ProjB}(c)\}$ ).

The second approach [Bonatti and Sauro, 2013; Cuenca Grau *et al.*, 2013; Cuenca Grau *et al.*, 2015] models privacy preservation by considering the whole (possibly infinite) set of answers to queries that the system provides to the user. In this approach, a CQE system protects the data if, for every data instance  $I$ , the logical theory corresponding to the set of answers provided by the system to all queries over  $I$  does not entail any violation of the data protection policy. According to [Cuenca Grau *et al.*, 2015], we call this approach *confidentiality-preserving* (CP). In our ongoing example, a CP system would entail, e.g., the queries  $\text{Supplier}(c) \wedge \text{ProjA}(c)$  and  $\exists x. \text{Supplier}(x) \wedge \text{ProjB}(x)$ , but not also the query  $\text{Supplier}(c) \wedge \text{ProjB}(c)$  (notice that the choice is non-deterministic, and in our example the system could have decided to disclose that  $c$  participates in Project B and hide its participation in Project A).

In both approaches, the ultimate goal is to realize *optimal* CQE systems, i.e., systems maximizing the answers returned to user queries, still respecting the data protection policy. Traditionally, this aim has been pursued through the construction of a *single optimal censor*, i.e., a specific implementation of the adopted notion of privacy-preservation, either IB or CP. Since, however, in both approaches several optimal censors typically exist, this way of proceeding requires to make a choice on how to obfuscate data, which, in the absence of additional (preference) criteria, may result discretionary. To avoid this, query answering over all optimal censors has been recently studied (limited to the CP approach) [Cuenca Grau *et al.*, 2013; Lembo *et al.*, 2019].

Despite their similarities, the precise relationship between the IB and CP approaches is still not clear and has not been fully investigated yet. Also, query answering over all optimal IB censors has not been previously studied. Moreover, among the complexity results obtained and the techniques defined so far for CQE, we still miss the identification of cases that are promising towards its practical usage.

In this paper, we aim at filling some of the above mentioned gaps in the context of Description Logic (DL) ontologies.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Privacy-preserving query answering in DLs has been investi-

We focus on the approach to CQE based on instance indistinguishability (Section 3), and study its relationship with the CP approach (Section 4). Specifically, we prove that the IB approach to CQE in DLs corresponds to a particular instance of the CP approach to CQE [Lembo *et al.*, 2019]. Based on such a correspondence, for ontologies specified in the well-known DL  $DL-Lite_{\mathcal{R}}$  [Calvanese *et al.*, 2007], we are able to transfer some complexity results for query answering over all optimal sensors shown in [Lembo *et al.*, 2019] to the case of CQE under IB sensors (Section 5). Such results show that, even in the lightweight DL  $DL-Lite_{\mathcal{R}}$ , query answering in the IB approach is intractable with respect to data complexity, unless one relies on a single optimal sensor chosen non-deterministically in the lack of further meta-information about the domain of the dataset.

To overcome the above problems and provide a practical, semantically well-founded solution, we define a *quasi-optimal* notion of IB sensor, which corresponds to the best sound approximation of all the optimal IB sensors (Section 6). We then prove that, in the case of  $DL-Lite_{\mathcal{R}}$  ontologies, query answering based on the quasi-optimal IB sensor is tractable with respect to data complexity and is reducible to the evaluation of a first-order query over the data instance, i.e., it is *first-order rewritable*. We believe that this result has an important practical impact. Indeed, we have identified a setting in which privacy-preserving query answering formalized in a declarative logic-based framework as CQE, for a DL (i.e.,  $DL-Lite_{\mathcal{R}}$ ) specifically designed for data management, has the same data complexity as evaluating queries over a database (i.e.,  $AC^0$ ). This opens the possibility of defining algorithms for CQE of practical usage, amenable to implementation on top of traditional (relational) data management systems, as in Ontology-based Data Access [Xiao *et al.*, 2018].

For complete proofs of our results we refer the reader to an extended version of the present paper [Cima *et al.*, 2020].

## 2 Preliminaries

We use standard notions of function-free first-order (FO) logic, and in particular we consider Description Logics (DLs), which are fragments of FO using only unary and binary predicates, called concepts and roles, respectively [Baader *et al.*, 2007]. We assume to have the pairwise disjoint countably infinite sets  $\Sigma_C, \Sigma_R, \Sigma_I$  and  $\Sigma_V$  for *atomic concepts*, *atomic roles*, *constants* (a.k.a. individuals), and *variables*, respectively. A DL ontology  $\mathcal{O} = \mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{A}$  is constituted by a TBox  $\mathcal{T}$  and an ABox  $\mathcal{A}$ , specifying intensional and extensional knowledge, respectively. The set of atomic concepts and roles occurring in  $\mathcal{O}$  is the *signature* of  $\mathcal{O}$ . The semantics of  $\mathcal{O}$  is given in terms of FO models over the signature of  $\mathcal{O}$ , in the standard way [Baader *et al.*, 2007]. In particular, we say that  $\mathcal{O}$  is *consistent* if it has at least one model, *inconsistent* otherwise.  $\mathcal{O}$  *entails* an FO sentence  $\phi$  specified over the signature of  $\mathcal{O}$ , denoted  $\mathcal{O} \models \phi$ , if  $\phi$  is true in every model of  $\mathcal{O}$ . In this paper, we consider ontologies expressed in  $DL-Lite_{\mathcal{R}}$ , the member of the  $DL-Lite$  family [Calvanese *et al.*, 2007] which underpins OWL 2 QL [Motik *et al.*, 2012],

gated also in settings different from CQE: see, e.g., [Cuenca Grau and Horrocks, 2008; Calvanese *et al.*, 2012; Tao *et al.*, 2014].

i.e., the OWL 2 profile specifically designed for efficient query answering. A TBox  $\mathcal{T}$  in  $DL-Lite_{\mathcal{R}}$  is a finite set of axioms of the form  $B_1 \sqsubseteq B_2$  (resp.,  $R_1 \sqsubseteq R_2$ ), denoting concept (resp., role) inclusion, and  $B_1 \sqsubseteq \neg B_2$  (resp.,  $R_1 \sqsubseteq \neg R_2$ ), denoting concept (resp., role) disjointness, where:  $R_1, R_2$  are of the form  $P$ , with  $P \in \Sigma_R$ , or its inverse  $P^-$ , and  $B_1, B_2$  are of the form  $A$ , with  $A \in \Sigma_C, \exists P$ , or  $\exists P^-$ , i.e., unqualified existential restrictions, which denote the set of objects occurring as first or second argument of  $P$ , respectively. An ABox  $\mathcal{A}$  is a finite set of *ground atoms*, i.e., assertions of the form  $A(a)$ ,  $P(a, b)$ , where  $A \in \Sigma_C, P \in \Sigma_R$ , and  $a, b \in \Sigma_I$ . As usual in query answering over DL ontologies, we focus on the language of conjunctive queries. A Boolean conjunctive query (BCQ)  $q$  is an FO sentence of the form  $\exists \vec{x}. \phi(\vec{x})$ , where  $\vec{x}$  are variables in  $\Sigma_V$ , and  $\phi(\vec{x})$  is a finite, non-empty conjunction of atoms of the form  $\alpha(\vec{t})$ , where  $\alpha \in \Sigma_C \cup \Sigma_R$ , and each term in  $\vec{t}$  is either a constant in  $\Sigma_I$  or a variable in  $\vec{x}$ . We denote by  $Eval(q, \mathcal{A})$  the evaluation of a query  $q$  over (the model isomorphic to) an ABox  $\mathcal{A}$ .

A *denial assertion* (or simply a denial) is an FO sentence of the form  $\forall \vec{x}. \phi(\vec{x}) \rightarrow \perp$ , such that  $\exists \vec{x}. \phi(\vec{x})$  is a BCQ. Given one such denial  $\delta$  and an ontology  $\mathcal{O}$ , we say that  $\mathcal{O} \cup \{\delta\}$  is consistent if  $\mathcal{O} \not\models \exists \vec{x}. \phi(\vec{x})$ , and is inconsistent otherwise.

In the following, with **FO**, **CQ**, and **GA** we denote the languages of function-free FO sentences, BCQs, and ground atoms, respectively, all specified over the alphabets  $\Sigma_C, \Sigma_R, \Sigma_I$ , and  $\Sigma_V$ . Given an ontology  $\mathcal{O}$  and a language  $\mathcal{L}$ , with  $\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{O})$  we refer to the subset of  $\mathcal{L}$  whose sentences are built over the signature of  $\mathcal{O}$  and the variables in  $\Sigma_V$ . For a TBox  $\mathcal{T}$  and a language  $\mathcal{L}$ , we denote by  $cl_{\mathcal{L}}^{\mathcal{T}}(\cdot)$  the function that, for an ABox  $\mathcal{A}$ , returns all the sentences  $\phi \in \mathcal{L}(\mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{A})$  such that  $\mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{A} \models \phi$ .

For the sake of presentation, we will limit our technical treatment to languages containing only closed formulas, but our results hold also for open formulas. In particular, the results on entailment of BCQs (see Sections 5 and 6) can be extended to arbitrary (i.e., non-Boolean) CQs in the standard way<sup>2</sup>. Our complexity results are for data complexity, i.e., are w.r.t. the size of the ABox only.

## 3 CQE through Instance Indistinguishability

A CQE framework consists of a TBox  $\mathcal{T}$  and a policy  $\mathcal{P}$  over  $\mathcal{T}$ , i.e., a finite set of denial assertions over the signature of  $\mathcal{T}$ . An ABox  $\mathcal{A}$  for  $\mathcal{T}$  is such that  $\mathcal{A}$  and  $\mathcal{T}$  have the same signature. In the following, when a TBox  $\mathcal{T}$  is given, we always assume that the coupled policy is specified over  $\mathcal{T}$ , that each considered ABox  $\mathcal{A}$  is for  $\mathcal{T}$ , and that, unless otherwise specified,  $\mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{A}$  and  $\mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{P}$  are consistent. A *sensor* is a function that taken an ABox for  $\mathcal{T}$  as input alters standard query answering over  $\mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{A}$  so that on the basis of the answers (even a possibly infinite set thereof) and the TBox, a user can never infer a BCQ  $\exists \vec{x}. \phi(\vec{x})$  such that  $\forall \vec{x}. \phi(\vec{x}) \rightarrow \perp$  belongs to  $\mathcal{P}$ .

We here propose a notion of sensor which is the natural application to our framework of the analogous definitions given in [Biskup and Bonatti, 2004b; Biskup and Weibert, 2008;

<sup>2</sup>We also notice that, since  $DL-Lite_{\mathcal{R}}$  is insensitive to the adoption of the *unique name assumption* (UNA) for CQ answering [Artalet *et al.*, 2009], our results hold both with and without UNA.

Benedikt *et al.*, 2018; Benedikt *et al.*, 2019]. The basic idea of this approach is that for every underlying instance (an ABox in our framework) and every query, a censor returns to the user the same answers it would return on another (possibly identical) instance that does not contain confidential data, so that she cannot understand which of the two instances she is querying. This is formalized as follows.

**Definition 1** [Indistinguishability-based censor] Let  $\mathcal{T}$  be a DL TBox and  $\mathcal{P}$  be a policy. An *indistinguishability-based (IB) censor* for  $\mathcal{T}$  and  $\mathcal{P}$  is a function  $\text{cens}(\cdot)$  that, for each ABox  $\mathcal{A}$ , returns a set  $\text{cens}(\mathcal{A}) \subseteq \text{cl}_{\text{CQ}}^{\mathcal{T}}(\mathcal{A})$  such that there exists an ABox  $\mathcal{A}'$  for which (i)  $\text{cens}(\mathcal{A}) = \text{cens}(\mathcal{A}')$  (in this case we say that  $\mathcal{A}$  and  $\mathcal{A}'$  are *indistinguishable* w.r.t.  $\text{cens}$ ) and (ii)  $\mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{P} \cup \mathcal{A}'$  is a consistent FO theory.

**Example 1** Let us now formalize more precisely the scenario we have used for the examples in the introduction, by instantiating our CQE framework. The TBox signature consists of the atomic concepts Supplier, ProjA, and ProjB, denoting the set of suppliers of the company, suppliers involved in Project A and those involved in Project B, respectively, and contains the axioms  $\text{ProjA} \sqsubseteq \text{Supplier}$  and  $\text{ProjB} \sqsubseteq \text{Supplier}$ , stating that each individual instance of ProjA or ProjB is also instance of Supplier. Data protection is specified through the policy  $\mathcal{P} = \{\forall x. \text{ProjA}(x) \wedge \text{ProjB}(x) \rightarrow \perp\}$ . The following functions are IB censors for  $\mathcal{T}$  and  $\mathcal{P}$ :

- $\text{cens}_1$ : given an ABox  $\mathcal{A}$ ,  $\text{cens}_1(\mathcal{A})$  returns the set  $\text{cl}_{\text{CQ}}^{\mathcal{T}}(\mathcal{A}_{P_A})$  of BCQs, where  $\mathcal{A}_{P_A}$  is obtained from  $\mathcal{A}$  by removing the assertion  $\text{ProjA}(c)$ , for each individual  $c$  such that both  $\text{ProjA}(c)$  and  $\text{ProjB}(c)$  are in  $\mathcal{A}$  (note that for every ABox  $\mathcal{A}$ ,  $\mathcal{A}$  and  $\mathcal{A}_{P_A}$  are indistinguishable w.r.t.  $\text{cens}_1$ . Similarly in the following censors).
- $\text{cens}_2$ : given an ABox  $\mathcal{A}$ ,  $\text{cens}_2(\mathcal{A})$  returns the set  $\text{cl}_{\text{CQ}}^{\mathcal{T}}(\mathcal{A}_{P_B})$  of BCQs, where  $\mathcal{A}_{P_B}$  is obtained from  $\mathcal{A}$  by removing the assertion  $\text{ProjB}(c)$ , for each individual  $c$  such that both  $\text{ProjA}(c)$  and  $\text{ProjB}(c)$  are in  $\mathcal{A}$ .
- $\text{cens}_3$ : given an ABox  $\mathcal{A}$ ,  $\text{cens}_3(\mathcal{A})$  returns the set  $\text{cl}_{\text{CQ}}^{\mathcal{T}}(\mathcal{A}_{sup})$  of BCQs, where  $\mathcal{A}_{sup}$  is obtained from  $\mathcal{A}$  by adding the assertion  $\text{Supplier}(c)$  and removing  $\text{ProjA}(c)$  and  $\text{ProjB}(c)$ , for each individual  $c$  such that both  $\text{ProjA}(c)$  and  $\text{ProjB}(c)$  are in  $\mathcal{A}$ .  $\square$

It is easy to see that an IB censor always exists, but, as Example 1 shows, there may be many IB censors for  $\mathcal{T}$  and  $\mathcal{P}$ , and so it is reasonable to look for censors preserving as much information as possible. Formally, given two IB censors  $\text{cens}$  and  $\text{cens}'$  for  $\mathcal{T}$  and  $\mathcal{P}$ , we say that  $\text{cens}'$  is *more informative* than  $\text{cens}$  if: (i) for every ABox  $\mathcal{A}$ ,  $\text{cens}(\mathcal{A}) \subseteq \text{cens}'(\mathcal{A})$ , and (ii) there exists an ABox  $\mathcal{A}'$  such that  $\text{cens}(\mathcal{A}') \subset \text{cens}'(\mathcal{A}')$ . Optimal censors are then defined as follows.

**Definition 2** Let  $\mathcal{T}$  be a DL TBox and  $\mathcal{P}$  be a policy. An IB censor  $\text{cens}$  for  $\mathcal{T}$  and  $\mathcal{P}$  is *optimal* if there does not exist any other IB censor for  $\mathcal{T}$  and  $\mathcal{P}$  that is more informative than  $\text{cens}$ . The set of all the optimal IB censors for  $\mathcal{T}$  and  $\mathcal{P}$  is denoted with  $\text{OptIBCens}_{\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{P}}$ .

**Example 2** Among the censors of Example 1,  $\text{cens}_3 \notin \text{OptIBCens}_{\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{P}}$ , since both  $\text{cens}_1$  and  $\text{cens}_2$  are more informative than  $\text{cens}_3$ . It can be then verified that  $\text{cens}_1$  and  $\text{cens}_2$  are the only optimal IB censors for  $\mathcal{T}$  and  $\mathcal{P}$ .  $\square$

## 4 IB Censors vs. CP Censors

In [Cuenca Grau *et al.*, 2015], a different notion of censor, named *confidentiality-preserving (CP) censor*, has been proposed. Intuitively, a CP censor establishes which are the BCQs entailed by a TBox and a given ABox that can be disclosed without violating the policy. We report below the definition given in [Lembo *et al.*, 2019], which generalizes CP censors to any language  $\mathcal{L} \subseteq \text{FO}$ , called the censor language.

**Definition 3** [Confidentiality-preserving censor] Let  $\mathcal{T}$  be a DL TBox,  $\mathcal{P}$  be a policy, and  $\mathcal{L} \subseteq \text{FO}$  be a language. A *confidentiality-preserving (CP) censor* in  $\mathcal{L}$  for  $\mathcal{T}$  and  $\mathcal{P}$  is a function  $\text{cens}(\cdot)$  that, for each ABox  $\mathcal{A}$ , returns a set  $\text{cens}(\mathcal{A}) \subseteq \text{cl}_{\mathcal{L}}^{\mathcal{T}}(\mathcal{A})$  such that  $\mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{P} \cup \text{cens}(\mathcal{A})$  is a consistent FO theory.

The notion of more informative censor previously given for IB censors can be naturally extended to CP censors, and we can thus define optimal censors also in this case.

**Definition 4** Let  $\mathcal{T}$  be a DL TBox,  $\mathcal{P}$  be a policy, and  $\mathcal{L} \subseteq \text{FO}$  be a language. A CP censor  $\text{cens}$  in  $\mathcal{L}$  for  $\mathcal{T}$  and  $\mathcal{P}$  is *optimal* if there does not exist any other CP censor in  $\mathcal{L}$  for  $\mathcal{T}$  and  $\mathcal{P}$  that is more informative than  $\text{cens}$ . The set of all the optimal CP censors in  $\mathcal{L}$  for  $\mathcal{T}$  and  $\mathcal{P}$  is denoted with  $\mathcal{L}\text{-OptCPCens}_{\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{P}}$ .

**Example 3** Consider  $\mathcal{T}$  and  $\mathcal{P}$  as defined in Example 1. An optimal CP censor  $\text{cens}_4$  in  $\text{CQ}$  for  $\mathcal{T}$  and  $\mathcal{P}$  is defined as follows: given an ABox  $\mathcal{A}$ ,  $\text{cens}_4(\mathcal{A})$  returns the set of BCQs obtained by removing from  $\text{cl}_{\text{CQ}}^{\mathcal{T}}(\mathcal{A})$  every query containing the atom  $\text{ProjA}(c)$ , for each individual  $c$  such that both  $\text{ProjA}(c)$  and  $\text{ProjB}(c)$  are in  $\mathcal{A}$ .

We soon notice that the CP censor  $\text{cens}_4$  is instead not an IB censor. Indeed, consider the ABox  $\mathcal{A} = \{\text{ProjA}(c), \text{ProjB}(c)\}$ . We have that  $\text{cens}_4(\mathcal{A}) = \{\phi \mid \phi \in \text{CQ} \text{ and } \mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{S} \models \phi\}$ , where  $\mathcal{S} = \{\exists x. \text{ProjA}(x), \text{ProjB}(c)\}$ . It is not hard to see that there exists no ABox  $\mathcal{A}'$  such that  $\mathcal{A}'$  and  $\mathcal{A}$  are indistinguishable w.r.t.  $\text{cens}_4$  and  $\mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{P} \cup \mathcal{A}'$  is consistent.  $\square$

Let  $\mathcal{A}$  be an ABox and  $\text{cens}$  be either an IB or a CP censor, the set  $\text{cens}(\mathcal{A})$  is called *theory of the censor*  $\text{cens}$  for  $\mathcal{A}$ .

The following theorem explains the relation between IB censors and CP censors.

**Theorem 1** Let  $\mathcal{T}$  be a DL TBox and  $\mathcal{P}$  be a policy. If  $\text{cens}$  is an IB censor for  $\mathcal{T}$  and  $\mathcal{P}$ , then it is a CP censor in  $\text{CQ}$  for  $\mathcal{T}$  and  $\mathcal{P}$ . The converse does not necessarily hold.

*Proof.* Let  $\text{cens}$  be an IB censor for  $\mathcal{T}$  and  $\mathcal{P}$ . Consider an arbitrary ABox  $\mathcal{A}$ . According to Definition 1, there exists an ABox  $\mathcal{A}'$  such that  $\text{cens}(\mathcal{A}) = \text{cens}(\mathcal{A}')$  and  $\mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{P} \cup \mathcal{A}'$  is consistent. Since by definition  $\text{cens}(\mathcal{A}')$  contains only sentences  $\phi \in \text{CQ}$  logically implied by  $\mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{A}'$  (i.e., BCQs  $\phi$  such that  $\phi \in \text{cl}_{\text{CQ}}^{\mathcal{T}}(\mathcal{A}')$ ) and  $\mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{P} \cup \mathcal{A}'$  is consistent, we have that  $\mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{P} \cup \text{cens}(\mathcal{A}')$  is consistent as well. Due to the equivalence  $\text{cens}(\mathcal{A}') = \text{cens}(\mathcal{A})$ , we derive that  $\mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{P} \cup \text{cens}(\mathcal{A})$  is consistent. To conclude the implication part observe that, by definition,  $\text{cens}(\mathcal{A}) \subseteq \text{cl}_{\text{CQ}}^{\mathcal{T}}(\mathcal{A})$ .

As for the converse, Example 3 shows that the CP censor  $\text{cens}_4$  in  $\text{CQ}$  for  $\mathcal{T}$  and  $\mathcal{P}$  is not an IB censor for  $\mathcal{T}$  and  $\mathcal{P}$ .  $\blacksquare$

We also notice that optimal IB sensors are *not* necessarily optimal CP sensors in **CQ**. Indeed, consider Examples 1 and 3. We have that  $\text{cens}_1 \in \text{OptIBCens}_{\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{P}}$  but, even if, as shown by Theorem 1, it is a CP sensor in **CQ** for  $\mathcal{T}$  and  $\mathcal{P}$ ,  $\text{cens}_1 \notin \text{CQ-OptCPCens}_{\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{P}}$  (it is easy to see that  $\text{cens}_4$  is more informative than  $\text{cens}_1$ ). We also know from Example 3 that the optimal CP sensor  $\text{cens}_4$  in **CQ** for  $\mathcal{T}$  and  $\mathcal{P}$  is not an IB sensor, and thus  $\text{cens}_4 \notin \text{OptIBCens}_{\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{P}}$ . However, from Theorem 1 it easily follows that if an optimal CP sensor in **CQ** for  $\mathcal{T}$  and  $\mathcal{P}$  is also an IB sensor then it is an optimal IB sensor for  $\mathcal{T}$  and  $\mathcal{P}$ , as stated below.

**Proposition 1** *Let  $\mathcal{T}$  be a DL TBox and  $\mathcal{P}$  be a policy. If  $\text{cens} \in \text{CQ-OptCPCens}_{\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{P}}$  and  $\text{cens}$  is an IB sensor for  $\mathcal{T}$  and  $\mathcal{P}$ , then  $\text{cens} \in \text{OptIBCens}_{\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{P}}$ . The converse does not necessarily hold.*

Actually, the relation between the two optimality notions of sensor depends on the sensor language adopted for the CP sensors. In particular, for **GA**, the set of the theories of the optimal IB sensors for a TBox  $\mathcal{T}$  and a policy  $\mathcal{P}$  coincides with the set of the deductive closures  $\text{cl}_{\text{CQ}}^{\mathcal{T}}(\cdot)$  of the theories of the optimal CP sensors in **GA** for  $\mathcal{T}$  and  $\mathcal{P}$ . This property is formalized by the following theorem, which is crucial to establish the complexity results of the next section.

**Theorem 2** *Let  $\mathcal{T}$  be a DL TBox and  $\mathcal{P}$  be a policy. Then,  $\text{ib\_cens} \in \text{OptIBCens}_{\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{P}}$  iff there exists a CP sensor  $\text{cp\_cens} \in \text{GA-OptCPCens}_{\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{P}}$  such that, for each ABox  $\mathcal{A}$ ,  $\text{cl}_{\text{CQ}}^{\mathcal{T}}(\text{cp\_cens}(\mathcal{A})) = \text{ib\_cens}(\mathcal{A})$ .*

*Proof (sketch).* ( $\Leftarrow$ ). Since  $\text{cp\_cens} \in \text{GA-OptCPCens}_{\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{P}}$ , it is easy to see that  $\text{cp\_cens}(\mathcal{A}) = \text{cl}_{\text{GA}}^{\mathcal{T}}(\mathcal{A})$  for each ABox  $\mathcal{A}$  such that  $\mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{P} \cup \mathcal{A}$  is consistent. Thus, for each ABox  $\mathcal{A}$ , since  $\mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{P} \cup \text{cp\_cens}(\mathcal{A})$  is consistent and  $\text{cl}_{\text{CQ}}^{\mathcal{T}}(\text{cp\_cens}(\mathcal{A})) = \text{ib\_cens}(\mathcal{A})$  holds by assumption, we derive that  $\text{ib\_cens}(\mathcal{A}) = \text{ib\_cens}(\text{cp\_cens}(\mathcal{A}))$ , i.e., all pairs of ABoxes  $\mathcal{A}$  and  $\text{cp\_cens}(\mathcal{A})$  are indistinguishable w.r.t.  $\text{ib\_cens}$ , and so  $\text{ib\_cens}$  is an IB sensor for  $\mathcal{T}$  and  $\mathcal{P}$ .

We now prove its optimality by contradiction. Suppose there is an IB sensor  $\text{ib\_cens}'$  more informative than  $\text{ib\_cens}$ . So  $\text{ib\_cens}(\mathcal{A}') \subset \text{ib\_cens}'(\mathcal{A}') = \text{ib\_cens}'(\mathcal{A}'_i) \subseteq \text{cl}_{\text{CQ}}^{\mathcal{T}}(\mathcal{A}'_i)$ , where  $\mathcal{A}'$  is the ABox such that  $\text{ib\_cens}(\mathcal{A}') \subset \text{ib\_cens}'(\mathcal{A}')$  and  $\mathcal{A}'_i$  is the ABox such that  $\mathcal{A}'$  and  $\mathcal{A}'_i$  are indistinguishable w.r.t.  $\text{ib\_cens}'$  (one of such pairs  $\mathcal{A}', \mathcal{A}'_i$  must exist). But then, the function  $\text{cp\_cens}'$  such that  $\text{cp\_cens}'(\mathcal{A}) = \text{cp\_cens}(\mathcal{A})$  for each ABox  $\mathcal{A} \neq \mathcal{A}'$  and  $\text{cp\_cens}'(\mathcal{A}') = \text{cl}_{\text{GA}}^{\mathcal{T}}(\mathcal{A}'_i)$  can be shown to be a CP sensor in **GA** for  $\mathcal{T}$  and  $\mathcal{P}$  more informative than  $\text{cp\_cens}$ , which leads to a contradiction.

( $\Rightarrow$ ). Since  $\text{ib\_cens} \in \text{OptIBCens}_{\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{P}}$ , it can be shown that, for each ABox  $\mathcal{A}$ ,  $\text{ib\_cens}(\mathcal{A}) = \text{cl}_{\text{CQ}}^{\mathcal{T}}(\mathcal{A})$  if  $\mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{P} \cup \mathcal{A}$  is consistent, and  $\text{ib\_cens}(\mathcal{A}) = \text{cl}_{\text{CQ}}^{\mathcal{T}}(\mathcal{A}')$  otherwise, where  $\mathcal{A}'$  is the ABox such that  $\mathcal{A}$  and  $\mathcal{A}'$  are indistinguishable w.r.t.  $\text{ib\_cens}$ . Let  $\text{cp\_cens}$  be the function such that, for each ABox  $\mathcal{A}$ ,  $\text{cp\_cens}(\mathcal{A})$  returns all and only the ground atoms of  $\text{ib\_cens}(\mathcal{A})$ , i.e.,  $\text{cp\_cens}(\mathcal{A}) = \text{GA} \cap \text{ib\_cens}(\mathcal{A})$ . From the above considerations, it is not hard to derive that  $\text{cp\_cens}$  is a CP sensor in **GA** for  $\mathcal{T}$  and  $\mathcal{P}$  such that  $\text{cl}_{\text{CQ}}^{\mathcal{T}}(\text{cp\_cens}(\mathcal{A})) = \text{ib\_cens}(\mathcal{A})$  for each ABox  $\mathcal{A}$ . Moreover, it can be shown by contradiction that  $\text{cp\_cens} \in \text{GA-OptCPCens}_{\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{P}}$ . ■

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### Algorithm 1: OptGACensor

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**input:** a *DL-Lite<sub>R</sub>* TBox  $\mathcal{T}$ , a policy  $\mathcal{P}$ , an ABox  $\mathcal{A}$ ;  
**output:** an ABox;  
 1)  $\mathcal{A}_{\mathcal{T}} \leftarrow \text{cl}_{\text{GA}}^{\mathcal{T}}(\mathcal{A})$ ;  
 2)  $Th \leftarrow \emptyset$ ;  
 3) **while**  $\mathcal{A}_{\mathcal{T}}$  is not empty **do**:  
 4)   **let**  $\alpha$  be the lexicographically first assertion in  $\mathcal{A}_{\mathcal{T}}$ ;  
 5)    $\mathcal{A}_{\mathcal{T}} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_{\mathcal{T}} \setminus \{\alpha\}$ ;  
 6)   **if**  $\mathcal{T} \cup Th \cup \{\alpha\} \cup \mathcal{P}$  is consistent **then**  
 7)      $Th \leftarrow Th \cup \{\alpha\}$ ;  
 8) **return**  $Th$ ;

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## 5 Query Answering under Optimal IB Sensors

In this section we study query answering under IB sensors over *DL-Lite<sub>R</sub>* ontologies. In particular, we consider entailment of BCQs specified over the signature of the ontology.

A possible strategy for addressing this problem is to choose only one IB sensor among the optimal ones, and use it to alter the answers to user queries. In the absence of a criterion for determining which sensor is the best for our purposes, the choice of the optimal sensor is made in an arbitrary way (like in [Biskup and Bonatti, 2007; Cuenca Grau *et al.*, 2013]). Towards the realization of an optimal IB sensor, we first provide the algorithm **OptGACensor** (Algorithm 1), which implements a function that, for every *DL-Lite<sub>R</sub>* TBox  $\mathcal{T}$  and every policy  $\mathcal{P}$ , corresponds to an optimal CP sensor in **GA** for  $\mathcal{T}$  and  $\mathcal{P}$ . Then we explain how to use **OptGACensor** to establish BCQs entailment under an optimal IB sensor by exploiting Theorem 2. The algorithm first computes the set  $\mathcal{A}_{\mathcal{T}}$  of ground atoms entailed by  $\mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{A}$ . Then, it iteratively picks a ground atom  $\alpha$  from  $\mathcal{A}_{\mathcal{T}}$  following the lexicographic order, and adds  $\alpha$  to the ABox  $Th$  if  $\mathcal{T} \cup Th \cup \alpha$  does not violate the policy  $\mathcal{P}$ . The following theorem establishes the correctness and complexity of the algorithm.

**Theorem 3** *Let  $\mathcal{T}$  be a DL-Lite<sub>R</sub> TBox and  $\mathcal{P}$  be a policy. There exists a sensor  $\text{cens} \in \text{GA-OptCPCens}_{\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{P}}$  such that, for each ABox  $\mathcal{A}$ , **OptGACensor**( $\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{A}$ ) (i) returns  $\text{cens}(\mathcal{A})$  and (ii) runs in polynomial time in the size of  $\mathcal{A}$ .*

*Proof (sketch).* The proof of correctness is straightforward. Tractability in the size of  $\mathcal{A}$  follows from the fact that  $\text{cl}_{\text{GA}}^{\mathcal{T}}(\mathcal{A})$  can be computed in polynomial time, and the consistency check of step 6 can be done in  $\text{AC}^0$  in the size of  $\mathcal{A}$  [Lembo *et al.*, 2015]. ■

From Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 it follows that, to establish if a BCQ  $q$  is entailed by  $\mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{A}$  under an optimal IB sensor for  $\mathcal{T}$  and  $\mathcal{P}$ , it is sufficient to verify whether  $\mathcal{T} \cup \text{OptGACensor}(\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{A}) \models q$ , which can be done in polynomial time in the size of  $\mathcal{A}$ .

We note also that it is possible to implement different optimal IB sensors (actually, every optimal IB sensor) by modifying the order in which the ABox assertions from the set  $\text{cl}_{\text{GA}}^{\mathcal{T}}(\mathcal{A})$  are selected by the algorithm.

Depending on the application at hand, the approach of randomly choosing a sensor may not always be considered

appropriate [Cuenca Grau *et al.*, 2013]. For this reason, in [Lembo *et al.*, 2019] the authors suggest to use a form of skeptical entailment over (the theories of) all the optimal sensors, i.e., they propose a CQE framework in which a query has a positive answer if it is entailed by each optimal sensor. In the same spirit, we define the following decision problem.

**Definition 5** Let  $\mathcal{T}$  be a DL TBox,  $\mathcal{P}$  be a policy,  $\mathcal{A}$  be an ABox, and  $q$  be a BCQ.  $\text{IB-Entailment}(\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{A}, q)$  is the problem of deciding whether  $q \in \text{cens}(\mathcal{A})$  for every  $\text{cens}$  in  $\text{OptIBCens}_{\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{P}}$ .

By exploiting Theorem 2 and the results given in [Lembo *et al.*, 2019], we can provide the following theorem.

**Theorem 4** Let  $\mathcal{T}$  be a DL-Lite $_{\mathcal{R}}$  TBox,  $\mathcal{P}$  be a policy,  $\mathcal{A}$  be an ABox, and  $q$  be a BCQ. Then,  $\text{IB-Entailment}(\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{A}, q)$  is coNP-complete in data complexity.

*Proof.* The result immediately follows from Theorem 2 and from [Lembo *et al.*, 2019, Theorem 6], which states that deciding if  $\mathcal{T} \cup \text{cp\_cens}(\mathcal{A}) \models q$  for every  $\text{cp\_cens}$  in  $\text{GA-OptCPCens}_{\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{P}}$  is coNP-complete in data complexity. ■

## 6 Approximating Optimal IB Sensors

As stated in Theorem 4, IB-Entailment is in general intractable in data complexity. Towards a practical approach to CQE, in this section we consider a different entailment problem that approximates IB-Entailment, and we show that its data complexity is in  $\text{AC}^0$  (i.e., the same complexity of evaluating FO queries over a database). The approximation we propose consists in considering a non-necessarily optimal IB sensor whose theory, for every ABox, is as close as possible to the theories of all the optimal IB sensors.

**Definition 6** [AIB sensor and QIB sensor] Let  $\mathcal{T}$  be a DL TBox,  $\mathcal{P}$  be a policy, and  $\text{cens}$  be an IB sensor for  $\mathcal{T}$  and  $\mathcal{P}$ . We say that:

- (i)  $\text{cens}$  is an *approximation of the optimal IB sensors (AIB sensor)* for  $\mathcal{T}$  and  $\mathcal{P}$  if, for every  $\text{cens}' \in \text{OptIBCens}_{\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{P}}$  and for every ABox  $\mathcal{A}$ ,  $\text{cens}(\mathcal{A}) \subseteq \text{cens}'(\mathcal{A})$ ;
- (ii)  $\text{cens}$  is a *quasi-optimal IB sensor (QIB sensor)* for  $\mathcal{T}$  and  $\mathcal{P}$  if  $\text{cens}$  is an AIB sensor for  $\mathcal{T}$  and  $\mathcal{P}$  and there exists no AIB sensor  $\text{cens}'$  for  $\mathcal{T}$  and  $\mathcal{P}$  that is more informative than  $\text{cens}$ .

**Example 4** The IB sensor  $\text{cens}_3$  of Example 1 is a QIB sensor for  $\mathcal{T}$  and  $\mathcal{P}$  (but  $\text{cens}_3 \notin \text{OptIBCens}_{\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{P}}$ ). □

For QIB sensors the following notable property holds.

**Theorem 5** Let  $\mathcal{T}$  be a DL TBox and  $\mathcal{P}$  be a policy. A QIB sensor for  $\mathcal{T}$  and  $\mathcal{P}$  always exists and it is unique.

*Proof (sketch).* First, observe that the sensor  $\text{cens}_0$  such that  $\text{cens}_0(\mathcal{A}) = \emptyset$  for every ABox  $\mathcal{A}$ , satisfies condition (i) of Definition 6. So, either  $\text{cens}_0$  is a QIB sensor, or there exists a more informative AIB sensor. This implies the existence of a QIB sensor. Then, it is possible to show that if two distinct QIB sensors  $\text{cens}_a, \text{cens}_b$  exist (i.e., such that  $\text{cens}_a(\mathcal{A}) \neq \text{cens}_b(\mathcal{A})$  for at least one ABox  $\mathcal{A}$ ), it is possible

to construct another AIB sensor  $\text{cens}'_a$  that is more informative than  $\text{cens}_a$  (or, more informative than  $\text{cens}_b$ ), such that  $\text{cens}'_a(\mathcal{A}') = \text{cens}_a(\mathcal{A}')$  for all  $\mathcal{A}' \neq \mathcal{A}$ , and  $\text{cens}'_a(\mathcal{A}) = \text{cl}_{\text{CQ}}^{\mathcal{T}}(\mathcal{A}_1 \cup \mathcal{A}_2)$ , where  $\mathcal{A}_1$  and  $\mathcal{A}_2$  are two ABoxes indistinguishable with  $\mathcal{A}$  w.r.t.  $\text{cens}_a$  and  $\text{cens}_b$ , respectively. This leads to a contradiction. ■

Hereinafter, we denote with  $\text{qib\_cens}_{\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{P}}$  the QIB sensor for  $\mathcal{T}$  and  $\mathcal{P}$ . Entailment of BCQs over QIB sensors is then naturally defined as follows.

**Definition 7** Let  $\mathcal{T}$  be a DL TBox,  $\mathcal{P}$  be a policy,  $\mathcal{A}$  be an ABox, and  $q$  be a BCQ.  $\text{QIB-Entailment}(\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{A}, q)$  is the problem of deciding whether  $q \in \text{qib\_cens}_{\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{P}}(\mathcal{A})$ .

We now focus on the case of DL-Lite $_{\mathcal{R}}$  TBoxes and prove that, in this case, entailment of BCQs under QIB sensors is FO-rewritable. Formally, we say that QIB-entailment in a DL  $\mathcal{L}$  is FO-rewritable, if for every TBox  $\mathcal{T}$  expressed in  $\mathcal{L}$ , every policy  $\mathcal{P}$  and every BCQ  $q$ , one can effectively compute an FO query  $q_r$  such that for every ABox  $\mathcal{A}$ ,  $\text{QIB-Entailment}(\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{A}, q)$  is true iff  $\mathcal{A} \models q_r$ . We call  $q_r$  the *QIB-perfect reformulation* of  $q$  w.r.t.  $\mathcal{T}$  and  $\mathcal{P}$ .

We prove FO-rewritability of entailment of BCQs under QIB sensors in DL-Lite $_{\mathcal{R}}$  by exploiting a correspondence between this problem and entailment of BCQs under IAR-semantics for DL ontologies, which is indeed FO-rewritable for DL-Lite $_{\mathcal{R}, \text{den}}$ , i.e., DL-Lite $_{\mathcal{R}}$  enriched with denial assertions [Lembo *et al.*, 2015]. We recall that the IAR-semantics is an inconsistency-tolerant semantics that allows for meaningful entailment also when the ABox contradicts the TBox of an ontology (for instance, when  $\mathcal{A} = \{A(d), B(d), C(d)\}$  and  $\mathcal{T} = \{A \sqsubseteq \neg B\}$ ). The IAR-semantics is based on the notion of *ABox repair* ( $A$ -repair), which is a maximal subset of the ABox that is consistent with the TBox (in our example there are two  $A$ -repairs,  $\mathcal{R}_1 = \{A(d), C(d)\}$  and  $\mathcal{R}_2 = \{B(d), C(d)\}$ ). Then, entailment under IAR-semantics is defined as follows: let  $\mathcal{T}$  be a DL-Lite $_{\mathcal{R}, \text{den}}$  TBox,  $\mathcal{A}$  be an ABox, and  $q$  be a BCQ,  $\text{IAR-Entailment}(\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{A}, q)$  is the problem of verifying whether  $\mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{R}_{\text{iar}} \models q$ , where  $\mathcal{R}_{\text{iar}}$  is the intersection of all  $A$ -repairs of  $\mathcal{O} = \mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{A}$ , called the *IAR-repair* of  $\mathcal{O}$  (in our example,  $\mathcal{R}_{\text{iar}} = \{C(d)\}$ ).

To establish the relationship between QIB-entailment and IAR-entailment, we give the notion of secret, which in our framework is the counterpart of minimal inconsistent set in inconsistency-tolerant query answering [Lembo *et al.*, 2015].

Let  $\mathcal{T}$  be a TBox, let  $\mathcal{P}$  be a policy, and let  $\mathcal{A}$  be an ABox. We say that a set of ABox assertions  $\mathcal{S} \subseteq \text{cl}_{\text{GA}}^{\mathcal{T}}(\mathcal{A})$  is a *secret* in  $\mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{P} \cup \mathcal{A}$ , if  $\mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{P} \cup \mathcal{S}$  is inconsistent and for each assertion  $\sigma \in \mathcal{S}$  we have that  $\mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{P} \cup \mathcal{S} \setminus \{\sigma\}$  is consistent. We denote by  $\text{secrets}(\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{A})$  the set of all the secrets in  $\mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{P} \cup \mathcal{A}$ .

We now provide the following key property.

**Lemma 1** Let  $\mathcal{T}$  be a DL TBox,  $\mathcal{P}$  be a policy,  $\mathcal{A}$  be an ABox, and  $q$  be a BCQ.  $\text{QIB-Entailment}(\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{A}, q)$  is true iff there exists an ABox  $\mathcal{A}' \subseteq \text{cl}_{\text{GA}}^{\mathcal{T}}(\mathcal{A})$  such that (i)  $\mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{A}' \models q$ , and (ii)  $\mathcal{A}' \cap \mathcal{S} = \emptyset$ , for each secret  $\mathcal{S} \in \text{secrets}(\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{A})$ .

*Proof (sketch).* ( $\Leftarrow$ ). It is not difficult to show that given an ABox assertion  $\alpha \in \text{cl}_{\text{GA}}^{\mathcal{T}}(\mathcal{A})$ , there exists an optimal IB sensor  $\text{cens} \in \text{OptIBCens}_{\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{P}}$  such that  $\alpha \notin \text{cens}(\mathcal{A})$  only if there exists a secret  $\mathcal{S}$  in  $\text{secrets}(\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{A})$  such that  $\alpha \in \mathcal{S}$ .

Now, from the above property, conditions (i) and (ii) we have that  $\mathcal{A}' \subseteq \text{cens}(\mathcal{A})$  for every  $\text{cens} \in \text{OptIBCens}_{\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{P}}$ . This means that  $\mathcal{A}' \subseteq \text{qib\_cens}_{\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{P}}(\mathcal{A})$ . Moreover, since  $\mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{A}' \models q$ , we have that  $\mathcal{T} \cup \text{qib\_cens}_{\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{P}}(\mathcal{A}) \models q$ .

( $\Rightarrow$ ). It is not hard to see that there exists an ABox  $\mathcal{A}'$  satisfying condition (i) ( $\mathcal{A}'$  is the ABox indistinguishable from  $\mathcal{A}$  w.r.t.  $\text{qib\_cens}$ ). As for condition (ii), suppose that there exists an ABox assertion  $\alpha \in \mathcal{A}'$  and a secret  $S \in \text{secrets}(\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{A})$  such that  $\alpha \in S$ . From Definition 6, we have that  $\alpha \in \text{cens}'(\mathcal{A})$  for every  $\text{cens}' \in \text{OptIBCens}_{\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{P}}$ . Since  $S \setminus \{\alpha\}$  is consistent with  $\mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{P}$ , it is possible to define an optimal IB censor whose theory contains  $S \setminus \{\alpha\}$ , which is a contradiction. ■

The following theorem establishes the relationship between QIB-entailment and IAR-entailment.

**Theorem 6** *Let  $\mathcal{T}$  be a DL-Lite $_{\mathcal{R}}$  TBox, let  $\mathcal{P}$  be a policy, let  $\mathcal{A}$  be an ABox, and let  $q$  be a BCQ. QIB-Entailment( $\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{A}, q$ ) is true iff IAR-Entailment( $\mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{P}, \text{cl}_{\text{GA}}^{\mathcal{T}}(\mathcal{A}), q$ ) is true.*

*Proof.* Since  $\mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{A}$  is consistent, then the secrets in  $\mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{P} \cup \text{cl}_{\text{GA}}^{\mathcal{T}}(\mathcal{A})$  coincide with the minimal subsets of  $\text{cl}_{\text{GA}}^{\mathcal{T}}(\mathcal{A})$  that are inconsistent with  $\mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{P}$ . Therefore, the IAR-Repair  $\mathcal{R}$  of  $\langle \mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{P}, \text{cl}_{\text{GA}}^{\mathcal{T}}(\mathcal{A}) \rangle$  is the set of ground atoms from  $\text{cl}_{\text{GA}}^{\mathcal{T}}(\mathcal{A})$  that do not belong to any secret in  $\mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{P} \cup \text{cl}_{\text{GA}}^{\mathcal{T}}(\mathcal{A})$ . Thus, from Lemma 1 the thesis follows. ■

Theorem 6 actually states that, to solve QIB-entailment, we can resort to the query rewriting techniques used to establish IAR-entailment given in [Lembo *et al.*, 2015], provided that we compute  $\text{cl}_{\text{GA}}^{\mathcal{T}}(\mathcal{A})$ . We recall that query entailment under IAR-semantics in a DL  $\mathcal{L}$  is FO-rewritable if for every TBox  $\mathcal{T}$  expressed in  $\mathcal{L}$  and every BCQ  $q$ , one can effectively compute an FO query  $q_r$  such that for every ABox  $\mathcal{A}$ , IAR-Entailment( $\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{A}, q$ ) is true iff  $\mathcal{A} \models q_r$ . The query  $q_r$  is called the *IAR-perfect reformulation* of  $q$  w.r.t.  $\mathcal{T}$ .

To establish FO-rewritability of QIB-entailment in DL-Lite $_{\mathcal{R}}$ , however, we still need to address the above mentioned computation of  $\text{cl}_{\text{GA}}^{\mathcal{T}}(\mathcal{A})$ , and turn it into an additional query reformulation step. To this aim, we can exploit the fact that, for a DL-Lite $_{\mathcal{R}, \text{den}}$  ontology  $\mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{A}$ , an FO query  $q$  evaluates to true over  $\text{cl}_{\text{GA}}^{\mathcal{T}}(\mathcal{A})$  iff  $q'$  evaluates to true over  $\mathcal{A}$ , where  $q'$  is obtained by suitably rewriting each atom of  $q$  according to the positive inclusions of  $\mathcal{T}$ . Intuitively, in this way we cast into the query all the possible causes of the facts that are contained in the closure of the ABox w.r.t. the TBox (similarly to what is done in query rewriting algorithms for DL-Lite [Calvanese *et al.*, 2007]).

To compute such a query  $q'$ , we use the function  $\text{atomRewr}(q, \mathcal{T})$ , which substitutes each atom  $\alpha$  of  $q$  with the formula  $\phi(\alpha)$  defined as follows (where  $A, B$  are atomic concepts and  $R, S$  are atomic roles):

$$\phi(A(t)) = \bigvee_{\mathcal{T} \models B \sqsubseteq A} B(t) \vee \bigvee_{\mathcal{T} \models \exists R \sqsubseteq A} (\exists x. R(t, x)) \vee \bigvee_{\mathcal{T} \models \exists R \text{--} \sqsubseteq A} (\exists x. R(x, t))$$

$$\phi(R(t_1, t_2)) = \bigvee_{\mathcal{T} \models S \sqsubseteq R} S(t_1, t_2) \vee \bigvee_{\mathcal{T} \models S \text{--} \sqsubseteq R} S(t_2, t_1).$$

The following lemma, whose proof can be immediately obtained from the definitions of  $\text{cl}_{\text{GA}}^{\mathcal{T}}(\cdot)$  and  $\text{atomRewr}(\cdot, \cdot)$ , states the property we are looking for.

**Lemma 2** *Let  $\mathcal{T}$  be a DL-Lite $_{\mathcal{R}, \text{den}}$  TBox,  $\mathcal{A}$  be an ABox, and  $q$  be an FO sentence. Then  $\text{Eval}(q, \text{cl}_{\text{GA}}^{\mathcal{T}}(\mathcal{A})) = \text{Eval}(\text{atomRewr}(q, \mathcal{T}), \mathcal{A})$ .*

We are now able to establish FO-rewritability of QIB-entailment.

**Theorem 7** *Let  $\mathcal{T}$  be a DL-Lite $_{\mathcal{R}}$  TBox,  $\mathcal{P}$  be a policy,  $q$  be a BCQ, and  $q_r$  be an FO sentence that is a IAR-perfect reformulation of  $q$  w.r.t. the DL-Lite $_{\mathcal{R}, \text{den}}$  TBox  $\mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{P}$ . Then, the FO sentence  $\text{atomRewr}(q_r, \mathcal{T})$  is a QIB-perfect reformulation of  $q$  w.r.t.  $\mathcal{T}$  and  $\mathcal{P}$ .*

*Proof.* Let the FO sentence  $q_r$  be an IAR-perfect reformulation of  $q$  w.r.t. the DL-Lite $_{\mathcal{R}, \text{den}}$  TBox  $\mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{P}$ . Then, for every ABox  $\mathcal{A}$ , IAR-Entailment( $\mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{P}, \text{cl}_{\text{GA}}^{\mathcal{T}}(\mathcal{A}), q$ ) is true iff  $\text{Eval}(q_r, \text{cl}_{\text{GA}}^{\mathcal{T}}(\mathcal{A}))$  is true. Now, from Lemma 2, it follows that, for every ABox  $\mathcal{A}$ ,  $\text{Eval}(q_r, \text{cl}_{\text{GA}}^{\mathcal{T}}(\mathcal{A})) = \text{Eval}(\text{atomRewr}(q_r, \mathcal{T}), \mathcal{A})$ . Since by Theorem 6, for every ABox  $\mathcal{A}$  such that  $\mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{A}$  is consistent, IAR-Entailment( $\mathcal{T} \cup \mathcal{P}, \text{cl}_{\text{GA}}^{\mathcal{T}}(\mathcal{A}), q$ ) is true iff QIB-Entailment( $\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{A}, q$ ) is true, it follows that the FO sentence  $\text{atomRewr}(q_r, \mathcal{T})$  is a QIB-perfect reformulation of  $q$  w.r.t.  $\mathcal{T}$  and  $\mathcal{P}$ . ■

Since IAR-entailment is actually FO rewritable, as shown in [Lembo *et al.*, 2015], the above theorem proves the FO rewritability of QIB-entailment for DL-Lite $_{\mathcal{R}}$  TBoxes. Moreover, the above theorem identifies a technique for obtaining the QIB-perfect reformulation of a CQ, based on a simple combination of the IAR-perfect reformulation algorithm of [Lembo *et al.*, 2015] and the  $\text{atomRewr}$  reformulation defined above. Therefore:

**Corollary 1** *Let  $\mathcal{T}$  be a DL-Lite $_{\mathcal{R}}$  TBox,  $\mathcal{P}$  be a policy,  $\mathcal{A}$  be an ABox, and  $q$  be a BCQ. The problem QIB-Entailment( $\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{A}, q$ ) is in AC<sup>0</sup> in data complexity.*

## 7 Conclusions

In this paper, we have studied the approach to CQE based on instance indistinguishability and identified a semantically well-founded notion of CQE that enjoys first-order rewritability in the case of DL-Lite $_{\mathcal{R}}$  ontologies. We believe that this result opens the way towards practical implementations of CQE engines for DL ontologies and Ontology-based Data Access. We are currently working to achieve this goal.

Another important future direction is a deeper study of the user model. Our framework inherits from its predecessors a relatively simple model, which assumes that the user knows (at most) the TBox and all the query answers returned by the system, and considers only the *deductive* abilities of the user over such knowledge. This user model might need to be enriched to capture more realistic data protection scenarios.

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