

I Do Not Know What You Visited Last Summer: Protecting users from stateful third-party web tracking with TrackingFree Browser


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Roadmap

- Introduction & Background
- System Design
- Evaluation
- Conclusion



Web Tracking is Prevalent and Serious

Prevalent

- More than 90% of Alexa Top 500 websites [Roesner, NSDI 2012].
- A web page usually has multiple tracking elements.

Web Tracking is Prevalent and Serious

NEWS The first U.S. case of MERS-CoV has been reported in Indiana, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention says.

updated 3:05 PM EDT, Fri May 2, 2014

CINTRENDS MH370 report · Ukraine · Attack thwarted · Aaron Hernandez · Amanda Knox · Midterm elections · Quentin Tarantino · World Photo Awards

Police: Teen planned school massacre



m/2014/05/02/justice/minnesota-attack-thwarted/index.html?hpt=hp_t1

A 17-year-old planned to kill his family, start a diversionary fire, set off bombs at a school, kill the resource officer and then shoot students, authorities in Waseca, Minnesota, said. FUL STORY


Cops tipped by

 How she helped stop school massacre '='
What should schools monitor'

Audience Science ChartBea DoubleClick DoubleClick DART Dynamic Logic WALMART'S LOV Facebook Connect UNLIMITE Google Adsense Learn Krux Digital Moat NetRatings SiteCensus Omniture (Adobe Analytics) LIVE TV Quigo AdSonar ScoreCard Research Be TRUSTe Notice

almart

Make CNN Your Homepage



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Web Tracking is Prevalent and Serious

Prevalent

- More than 90% of Alexa Top 500 websites [Roesner, NSDI 2012].
- A web page usually has multiple tracking elements.

Serious

 Not only browsing history, but also other sensitive information such as location, name and email, will be leaked out.

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• Potential for abuse is enormous.

No Effective Defense Approach

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- Disable third-party cookie
 - Many other storages to store user's identifier.
- Blacklist-based anti-tracking tools
 - Priori knowledge of tracking servers.
- Do-Not-Track header
 - No enforcement.

TrackingFree

Goals and Challenges


- Complete Anti-tracking Capability
- Backward Compatibility
- Affordable Performance


Referer : http://online.wsj.com/ Cookie : id = 12345

Referer : http://www.cnn.com/ Cookie : id = 24578


Core Idea : TrackingFree partitions client-side states into multiple isolation units so that the identifiers still exist but not unique any more!

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Regular Browser Architecture




Contents Allocation Mechanism


- Initial Contents Allocation
 - Handles those top frames that are navigated by users directly.
 - Based on registered domain name (e.g. google.com, sina.com.cn).
- Derivative Contents Allocation
 - Handles those frames that are generated due to the contents on other frames, which we call child frame.

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Derivative Contents Allocation

- Principal Switch
 - Cross-domain
 - User-triggered
- Principal Selection
 - Maintains an in-degree-bounded graph for principals.
 - The in-degree of the graph is set to two.





Evaluation

- Anti-tracking capability
 - Formal proof
 - Experiments with real world websites
- Compatibility
- Performance
 - Latency
 - Memory usage
 - Disk usage

Formal Proof

Methodology

• Use Alloy to formally analyze TrackingFree 's antitracking ability.

• Describe TrackingFree's behaviors on an existing Alloy web model [Akhawe et al. CSF 2010].

Results

• Formally verified that trackers can correlate TrackingFree user's activities up to three principals without site collaboration.

Anti-tracking Capability with Real World Websites

- Re-implemented an in-complete but accurate tracking token detection approach proposed on [Roesner et al. NSDI 2012].
- The approach is based on the observation that each tracking request must contain the user's globally unique identifier.

Anti-tracking Capability with Real World Web Sites

Tracking Host	Prevalence (# Domains)	Tracking Token(s)	
b.scorecardresearch.com	133	UIDR	
ad.doubleclick.net	117	id,gads	
ib.adnxs.com	75	anj	
p.twitter.com	70	utma	
cm.g.doubleclick.net	56	id	
ad.yieldmanager.com	52	bx	
bs.serving-sys.com	40	A4	
cdn.api.twitter.com	40	utmz	
secure-us.imrworldwide.com	38	IMRID	
adfarm.mediaplex.com	31	svid	
Top 10 Tracking Hosts			

Anti-tracking Capability with Real World Web Sites

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ad.doubleclick.net	117	id,gads
ib.adnxs.com	75	anj
p.twitter.com	70	utma

• TrackingFree eliminated all of them.

bs.serving-sys.com	40	A4	
cdn.api.twitter.com	40	utmz	
secure-us.imrworldwide.com	38	IMRID	
adfarm.mediaplex.com	31	svid	
Top 10 Tracking Hosts			


Compatibility

• Manually tested TrackingFree's compatibility on 69 third-party services from Alexa Top 50 websites.

Name	Example	# Succeeded Instance	# Total Instance
Cross-site online payment	Purchase on Ebay and make payment on Paypal	1	1
Cross-site content sharing	Share Youtube video to Facebook account	32	32
Signle sign-on	Using Facebook account to login Yahoo	35	36
Overall Results		68	69
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Performance

Source	Overhead
Latency	~3%-~20%
Memory	~25MB/principal
Disk	~0.6MB/principal



Conclusion

- We designed and implemented TrackingFree browser which completely protects users from third-party web tracking by isolating web contents.
- We theoretically and experimentally proved TrackingFree's anti-tracking capability.
- TrackingFree is backward compatible with existing websites.



Thanks & Questions?

http://list.cs.northwestern.edu/WebSecurity



Out-of-scope threats

- Within-site Tracking
- Tracking by exploiting browser vulnerabilities
- Stateless tracking

Preference Configuration Manager

- User preference can be abused to store tracking identifier. (e.g. strict transport security)
- Completely isolating user preference affects user preference.
- Our solution:
 - Isolate user preference.
 - Apply user-initiated changes to all of the principals.
 - Monitor GUI message to determine user-initiated preference change.

Related Work


Browser	Isolation Mechanism	Contents Allocation Mechanism	Anti-tracking Capability
IE8	In-memory Isolation	Tab based	No
Chromium	In-memory Isolation	Top-frame based	No
Gazelle	In-memory Isolation	SOP based	No
OP	In-memory Isolation	Web Page based	No
AppIsolation	Technique-specific Storage	User Configuration based	Not complete
Tahoma	Virtual Machine	User Configuration based	Not complete
Stainless	Technique-specific Storage	User Configuration based	Not complete
Fluid, MultiFirefox	Profile	User Configuration based	Not complete
TrackingFree	Profile	Indegree-bounded Principal Graph based	Complete

Principal Switch


- Two intuitive yet extreme policies:
 - Not privacy-preserving (no switch)
 - Unnecessary overhead (switch all the time)
- Our solution: switch principal only if the following two conditions are met:
 - Cross-site
 - User-triggered

Principal Switch

Same principal




Different principal



- Two intuitive yet extreme policies:
 - Break compatibility (always create new principal)
 - Break anti-tracking capacity (create at most one principal for each domain)


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
Principal Communication


- Explicit communication is widely used, but break the isolation mechanism.
- Our solution: we restrict the use of explicit communication as follows:
 - Third-party elements in one principle can not explicitly communicate with other principals.
 - First-party elements can only explicitly communicate with the first-party elements placed in its neighbor principals





Principal Communication


- Implicit Communication
 - History sharing (e.g. history, bookmarks)
 - User preference sharing
 - Communication through navigation URL parameters











Performance

Latency Overhead Source	Cost(ms)
Principal Construction	322.36
Extra IPC	349.06
Render/JS Engine Instrumentation	139.21

Overall Overhead: ~3% - ~20%

Memory/Disk Overhead

Memory Overhead on 12 Web Pages (~25MB/Principal)

Memory	Chromium	TrackingFree	Increase
1 Principal	477.1(MB)	505 (MB)	27.9(MB)
4 Principals	623.6(MB)	702.8(MB)	79.2(MB)
12 Principals	434.6 (MB)	642.5(MB)	297.9(MB)

Disk Overhead on 12 Web Pages (~0.6MB/Principal)

Memory	Chromium	TrackingFree	Increase
1 Principal	21.3(MB)	21.8(MB)	0.5(MB)
4 Principals	22.5(MB)	25.9MB)	3.4 (MB)
12 Principals	23.7(MB)	29.4(MB)	5.7 (MB)