

# Perspective: A Principled Framework for Pliable and Secure Speculation in Operating Systems

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**Abstract**—Transient execution attacks present an unprecedented threat to computing systems. Protecting the operating system (OS) is exceptionally challenging because a *transient execution gadget* in the OS can potentially leak the *entire* memory.

In this work, we propose *Perspective*, a principled framework for building pliable and secure speculative execution defenses for the OS. *Perspective* offers a pliable interface that allows the OS to communicate its security requirements to hardware defenses, enabling tailored protection against transient execution attacks with little performance overhead. The design of *Perspective* is driven by a taxonomy of transient execution attacks in the OS kernel: (i) *active transient execution attacks*, where the attacker process exploits its own kernel thread to speculatively execute a transient execution gadget in the kernel, and (ii) *passive transient execution attacks*, where the attacker coerces the victim process’s kernel thread to execute a transient execution gadget. Based on the taxonomy, *Perspective* introduces Data Speculation Views (DSVs) and Instruction Speculation Views (ISVs), to mitigate active and passive attacks, respectively. DSVs define the ownership of kernel data by a given execution context and block any speculative access to data outside the DSV. ISVs define the set of kernel functions that can be speculatively executed by a given execution context. Any transmitter instructions—whose execution could leak secrets, such as load instructions—that belong to kernel functions outside the ISVs are blocked from speculative execution. ISVs open up new opportunities of (i) swiftly patching gadgets in the OS, (ii) reducing the surface of passive attacks, and (iii) speeding up the process of auditing transient execution gadgets in the OS.

We build *Perspective*’s software components in the Linux kernel and model the hardware components in *gem5*. We evaluate the security and performance of *Perspective* on a set of microbenchmarks and datacenter applications. *Perspective* has an execution overhead over an unprotected kernel of only 3.5% on microbenchmarks and only 1.2% on datacenter applications.

**Index Terms**—Operating Systems, Security, Speculative Execution, Virtualization

## I. INTRODUCTION

Transient execution attacks [58], [59], [68], [68], [85], [105], [120], [120], [126], [133], [138], [142], [144], [147],

[148] shattered the security isolation wall of modern processors. These attacks take advantage of *transient* instructions that may execute but not subsequently commit. An adversary can leverage *speculative execution gadgets* to leak sensitive data over microarchitectural covert channels [106], [154]. Such gadgets can leak any information within the address space in which they reside. Precariously, transient execution gadgets in the kernel can potentially leak *all* memory. This is because operating systems (OS), such as Linux, always map all physical frames [97] in the kernel address space for performance.

The unabating increase of the OS code base further exacerbates the threat of transient execution attacks. Manual code reviews by developers and security auditing become tremendously difficult, if not impossible. Case in point, the Linux kernel has reached 23 MLOC in 2023 [1]. Inevitably, this vast attack surface has led to a continuous stream of speculative execution CVEs [6], [7], [9]–[18], [20]–[23], [23]–[25], [32]–[40], [44].

A large body of work has focused on mitigating speculative execution vulnerabilities through software or hardware defense schemes. On the one hand, deployed software solutions are “spot mitigations” that provide limited coverage and often miss corner cases, requiring repeated efforts to resolve [6], [15], [17], [28], [42]. Furthermore, software approaches such as page table isolation [49], [55], [72], [79], [127], [152], Retpolines [139], LFENCEs [50], and even more heavyweight solutions such as core scheduling [101], cache flushing [102], and SLH [60] can have a significant impact on performance. For example, SLH shows a system call overhead of 65% on average [84]. Beyond performance, the deployment of software mitigations requires a lengthy procedure that involves kernel patches and even microcode updates. Given the requirement to manually add protection measures for identified gadgets [96], a principled way of mitigating transient execution attacks is needed.

On the other hand, several hardware solutions have been proposed [47], [61], [62], [71], [80], [83], [91], [95], [107],

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[109], [117], [123], [124], [136], [137], [146], [153], [155], [156], [159]. Predominantly, hardware defenses aim to be software transparent and backward compatible. However, without software information, hardware defenses are rigid, have to be always enabled, may miss corner cases, and may severely impact performance. Even some of the best-performing solutions [47], [155], [159] require intrusive changes in the core pipeline and especially in the cache hierarchy. Unfortunately, such solutions are often impractical for adoption due to the significant verification costs inherited by their intricate interactions with the microarchitecture.

#### A. This Paper: Pliable Secure OS Speculation

In this paper, we propose *Perspective*, a principled framework for building efficient, lightweight speculative execution defenses for the OS kernel. *Perspective* offers a pliable interface between software and hardware that allows the OS to communicate its security requirements to the underlying hardware protection mechanisms. This interface opens up a new design space of tailored protection—the hardware protection mechanism selectively protects vulnerable instructions based on the security goals and the landscape of transient execution vulnerabilities, minimizing unnecessary protection. As a result, the hardware protection mechanism can be as simple as blocking speculative execution of vulnerable instructions while still attaining a low execution overhead.

The design of *Perspective* is driven by a taxonomy of transient execution attacks in the OS kernel. In this taxonomy, we identify two attack scenarios in the kernel: (i) *active transient execution attacks*, where the attacker process exploits its own kernel thread to speculatively execute a transient execution gadget in the kernel and (ii) *passive transient execution attacks*, where the attacker coerces the victim process’s kernel thread to speculatively execute a kernel function containing transient execution gadgets. This taxonomy is agnostic to attack variants, such as Spectre v1 [85], Spectre v2 [85], Spectre RSB [87], [110], Retbleed [148], BHI [54], and others.

Based on our taxonomy, *Perspective* introduces two types of speculation views, Data Speculation Views (DSVs) and Instruction Speculation Views (ISVs), to mitigate active and passive attacks, respectively. A speculation view can be associated with an execution context, e.g., a process or a container.

The intuition of DSVs is that in an active attack, the attacker process exploits its kernel thread to speculatively access and leak the data *owned* by other victim processes or the kernel. Therefore, a DSV defines the set of data that a given execution context owns. Based on the DSV, the hardware mechanism can block any speculative access to data that are outside the DSV of the current execution context, as such access would violate data ownership. As a result, DSVs eliminate active attacks. In this paper, we propose one possible approach for associating the data to the execution context that allocates them.

However, DSVs do not mitigate passive attacks. This is because in passive attacks, the victim process’s kernel thread speculatively executes kernel functions containing transient execution gadgets to access and leak its own data, which

does not violate data ownership. Therefore, to thwart passive attacks, *Perspective* proposes the ISV interface. ISVs enable an execution context to define the set of kernel functions that are trusted by the context. Any transmitter instructions that belong to kernel functions outside the ISVs are blocked from speculative execution. In this paper, we propose several approaches to generate ISVs by marrying concepts from system call interposition [3], [5], [66], [76], [81], [94], [132].

The security benefits of ISVs are manyfold. First, ISVs provide an interface to swiftly mitigate unforeseen vulnerable kernel functions that contain transient execution gadgets. This benefit is vital given the continuous discovery of speculative execution vulnerabilities in kernel functions. Second, a victim program can exclude a large portion of kernel functions that are not used or infrequently used from its ISV. This use case is akin to kernel debloating [89], [90], reducing the victim’s surface of passive attacks. Finally, since ISVs provide the guarantee that kernel functions outside ISVs are blocked from speculative execution, one only needs to audit kernel functions within ISVs for transient execution gadgets. This approach speeds up the auditing process, as ISVs often include only a small fraction of the whole OS kernel functions. Moreover, any gadgets discovered during auditing can be excluded from ISVs, enhancing security.

We build *Perspective*’s software components in the Linux kernel and model the hardware components in *gem5*. We evaluate the security and performance of *Perspective* based on a set of microbenchmarks and datacenter applications. Compared to unmodified Linux running on unsafe hardware, *Perspective*’s DSVs *eliminate* active speculative execution attacks. Furthermore, ISVs reduce speculatively accessible functions by 95.1%. We then leverage the reduced search space provided by ISVs to speedup a state-of-the-art speculative execution scanner between  $1.14\text{--}2.23\times$  and  $1.57\times$  on average, and further block all identified gadgets. Finally, *Perspective* has an execution overhead over an unprotected kernel of 3.5% on microbenchmarks and 1.2% on datacenter applications.

We make the following contributions:

- A taxonomy of transient execution attacks and CVEs in the kernel that generalizes transient execution attacks into active and passive attacks. The taxonomy is agnostic to specific attack variants such as Spectre v1 and v2.
- *Perspective* introduces a principled framework for pliable and secure speculative execution in the kernel through two types of *speculation views*, data speculation views (DSVs) and instruction speculation views (ISVs), which protect against active and passive attacks, respectively.
- We present several design points on top of *Perspective*. These design points are based on tracking data ownership through allocation for DSVs and system call interposition for ISVs.
- A comprehensive security and performance evaluation of *Perspective* using microbenchmarks and datacenter applications.

## II. BACKGROUND

In this section, we provide a brief overview of transient execution attacks and operating system security.

### A. Transient Execution Attacks

Speculative execution is a fundamental performance optimization of high-performance processors. With speculative execution, some instructions may execute speculatively but do not commit due to pipeline squashes. We refer to the execution of instructions that do not commit as *transient execution*. Transient execution can leave sensitive information in microarchitectural states, such as caches, which can be recovered by attackers through microarchitectural covert channels [48], [106], [154]. This class of attacks is known as *transient execution attacks* [58], [85], [105]. In this paper, we focus on Spectre-type attacks [58] that exploit transient execution caused by various prediction mechanisms in the pipeline, such as control-flow misprediction or memory-dependency misprediction. Such attacks exploit fundamental performance optimizations, making them difficult to defend against.

**Spectre v1.** The most notable variant of Spectre-type attacks is Spectre v1 [85], which exploits conditional branch mispredictions. Listing 1 shows a Spectre v1 code snippet. The snippet takes an index variable `idx` as input, which is controlled by the user. The index is then tested against the size of `array1` to prevent out-of-bound accesses (Line 1). If the check passes, the code loads an element from `array1` (Line 2), which is in turn used as an index to access `array2` (Line 3).

```

1  if (idx < array1_size) { // mispredicted
2    u8 s = array1[idx]; // access
3    u8 y = array2[s*4096]; // transmit
4  }

```

Listing 1. Spectre v1 [85].

To carry out a Spectre v1 attack, the attacker first mis-trains the branch responsible for performing the bounds check (Line 1). Then, the attacker re-invokes the code snippet with an out-of-bound index. The mistrained branch is taken and transiently executes the out-of-bound memory access on Line 2, potentially reading a secret value and leaking it through a cache-based covert channel [154]. This attack process can be generalized into two steps: (i) transiently *access* the secret (Line 2); and (ii) *transmit* the secret through a covert channel (Line 3). We refer to a code snippet that performs a combination of these two steps as a *transient execution gadget*.

**Spectre v2 & Spectre RSB.** Speculative control-flow hijacking attacks, coerce the victim to transiently execute unintended code paths by exploiting indirect branch and return address prediction, potentially leading to unauthorized data accesses. For example, the attacker can poison a branch target buffer (BTB) entry of a victim indirect branch and point the jump target to a transient execution gadget. This variant is known as *Spectre v2* [85]. Similarly, in *Spectre RSB* [87], [110] the attacker poisons a return stack buffer (RSB) entry to speculatively hijack the control flow of a victim return.




Fig. 1. System call interposition overview.

### B. Operating System Security Isolation

In contemporary operating systems, such as Linux, virtual memory provides memory isolation between userspace processes and the kernel. To achieve high performance and avoid the high cost of context switches, the kernel is designed as a monolithic address space. A monolithic address space enables fast communication between different kernel components as memory can be directly accessed by any component without the heavy cost of context switching and inter-process communication. Furthermore, the kernel includes a direct map [97] area that maps all physical page frames in the system. Consequently, the kernel does not have to set up and tear down mappings when it needs to copy data to and from userspace and can easily obtain physical addresses.

**System Call Interposition.** System call interposition is a powerful security technique that reduces the number of systems calls available to userspace processes. Such techniques [2]–[4], [66], [116] have been widely adopted by internet browsers [78], cloud deployments including Amazon’s Firecracker [46], [52], Google’s gVisor [69], and container technologies [65], [88], [111], [130], [140]. When execution transitions into the kernel, a security monitor inspects the system call and decides if its execution should proceed. Figure 1 shows an overview of system call interposition. First, in step ①, the application binary is analyzed to create a deny/allow system call list. This can be performed either statically through binary analysis or dynamically with tracing. During deployment in step ②, the list defines the security contract between the userspace process and the kernel. Every time a process performs a system call, shown in step ③, the security monitor intercepts it. Based on the security contract, the monitor decides to block or allow it in step ④.

## III. THREAT MODEL

Perspective’s threat model considers environments where mutually distrusting parties share hardware resources, such as multi-tenant datacenters. We assume an unprivileged adversary who can trigger transient kernel execution and illegally access the victim’s secret data. For example, the attacker can carefully prime microarchitectural structures, craft system call arguments, and exfiltrate the secret through transient execution such as Spectre v1 [85], Spectre v2 [85], Spectre RSB [87], [110], Retbleed [148], BHI [54], and so on. The goal of Perspective is to block transient execution attacks in the OS kernel that enable information leakage between different userspace processes or between the kernel and the userspace. Additionally, we assume a strong adversary that can exploit any side channel. Perspective enforces the Spectre




Fig. 2. Example *active* transient execution attack in the OS. Input  $r1$  is controlled by the attacker.

threat model [153]. We do not consider attacks such as Meltdown [105] and MDS [141], as they are fixed in the newest processors. Non-transient side channels e.g., cache timing side-channels and attacks that leak non-speculatively accessed data are out of scope. Attacks such as Rowhammer [82], electromagnetic attack [128], and power side-channels [104] are out of scope.

#### IV. MOTIVATION & SCOPE

##### A. A Taxonomy of Transient Execution Attacks in the OS

Operating systems, including Linux, utilize a monolithic address space for high performance. For example, Linux uses a direct map [97] that maps all physical page frames in the system. However, from a security standpoint, a monolithic OS is more susceptible to transient execution attacks. This is because an attacker can circumvent protections, such as bounds checks, to speculatively access and leak all system memory from the OS address space. To better comprehend the risks, we present a taxonomy of transient execution attacks in the OS in two main scenarios. Note that this taxonomy is agnostic to variants of transient execution attacks, such as Spectre v1 [85], Spectre v2 [85], Spectre RSB [87], [110], Retbleed [148], BHI [54], and others.

**Active Transient Execution Attacks.** In an active transient execution attack, unauthorized memory accesses and subsequent disclosures are performed from the kernel thread of the attacker’s process. Consider the example of Figure 2. The upper half shows two userspace processes,  $Proc_a$  and  $Proc_v$ , representing the attacker and the victim. The goal of  $Proc_a$  is to steal private data owned by  $Proc_v$ , denoted by  $Secret_v$ . The lower half represents the monolithic kernel, which is divided into two parts: (i) the kernel code, containing a transient execution gadget located on the path of a system call, with  $r1$  being an argument of the system call; and (ii) the kernel data, encompassing the entire system memory, including  $Secret_v$  owned by  $Proc_v$ .

In the example of Figure 2, similar to the generic Spectre v1 attack discussed in Section II-A,  $Proc_a$  first mistrains the branch responsible for performing the bounds check (Line 1 in Figure 2). This can be achieved by repeatedly making the system call with an  $r1$  value that passes the bounds check, thereby biasing the branch toward being taken. Subsequently,  $Proc_a$  initiates a system call with an out-of-bound  $r1$  value (1), enters the kernel space, and speculatively executes the transient execution gadget. Due to previous mistraining and the out-of-bound index  $r1$ , the gadget speculatively accesses




Fig. 3. Example *passive* transient execution attack in the OS.

$Secret_v$  (2), which is then transmitted to the attacker through a cache-based covert channel (3).

Since active attacks exploit the monolithic nature of kernel data, one of Perspective’s defense mechanisms, discussed in Section V, is to identify kernel data ownership by different contexts—e.g., different processes or containers. By blocking speculative memory accesses that violate ownership, Perspective effectively eradicates active transient execution attacks.

**Passive Transient Execution Attacks.** In a passive transient execution attack, the victim speculatively executes both *access* to the secret and *transmission* of the secret. This scenario is analogous to “cross-domain transient execution attacks” in Intel’s refined speculative execution terminology [75]. Since the speculative access to the secret is initiated by the victim, the access does not violate data ownership. Consequently, mechanisms that block speculative accesses violating data ownership are ineffective against passive attacks.

Figure 3 illustrates an example of passive attacks. The victim-issued system call executes Function 1 (1), which loads a reference of  $Secret_v$  to  $r1$ . Since function 1 does not access  $Secret_v$ , its execution does not leak the secret. However, when the victim returns from Function 1, the attacker can employ techniques such as Spectre v2 [85] and Spectre RSB [87], [110] to *hijack the victim’s speculative control flow* to any kernel function, such as Function 2, which contains a transient execution gadget (2). This step serves two purposes: first, it coerces the victim to speculatively execute a transient execution gadget; second, it creates a speculative type confusion [84], causing the value in  $r1$  prior to the hijacking, which is a memory reference to  $Secret_v$ , to be used out-of-context by the memory access in Function 2. Consequently, the hijacked execution speculatively accesses  $Secret_v$  (3) and transmits the secret through a covert channel (4).

Compared to active attacks, passive attacks are challenging to orchestrate, since the attacker has no control over the victim’s system calls and their arguments. As a result, passive attacks are generally assisted by hijacking the victim’s speculative control flow to a kernel function that contains transient execution gadgets [75], as exemplified by Step 2 in Figure 3.

Since passive attacks largely exploit the monolithic nature of kernel code, the second defense mechanism of Perspective, which will be discussed in Section V-C, is to limit the victim’s speculative control flow to a small subset of kernel functions and drastically reduce the attack surface for passive attacks.

TABLE I  
A COLLECTION OF SPECULATIVE EXECUTION-RELATED VULNERABILITIES TARGETING THE LINUX KERNEL.

	Attack Primitives	Insufficient Mitigation	CVEs and Academic Papers	Description	Origin of Vulnerability
1	Unauthorized speculative data access (Spectre v1)	n/a	[40]	Array index is not validated	Xilinx USB Driver
2		Misuse	[12]	Reintroduced Spectre vulnerabilities in backporting	ptrace
3		n/a	[22], [36]–[39]	Out-of-bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic	eBPF verifier
4		n/a	[23], [84]	Speculative type confusion [84]	eBPF verifier
5	Speculative control-flow hijacking (Spectre v2, Spectre RSB, and more)	Hardware	[26], [27], [29], [54]	Branch history injection [54]	Indirect calls and jumps
6		Software	[15]	LFENCE/JMP is insufficient on AMD	Indirect calls and jumps
7		Software	[30], [31], [149]	Retbleed [149]	Retpoline [139]
8		Misuse	[41]	Missing retpolines or IBPB	KVM
9		Misuse	[13], [17], [28], [43]	Improper use of hardware mitigations	Indirect calls and jumps

### B. Studying of Transient Execution Attacks in the Kernel

To gain a deeper understanding of the threats posed by transient execution attacks, we studied transient execution vulnerabilities in the Linux kernel. Our study focuses on two types of attack primitives that aim to (1) enable unauthorized speculative data access like Spectre v1; and (2) enable hijacking of the victim’s speculative control flow such as Spectre v2 [85], Spectre RSB [87], [110], Retbleed [148], BHI [54]. These attack primitives are the basic building blocks of *both* active and passive transient execution attacks in the kernel. Moreover, these primitives have not yet been fully mitigated or are attacks whose mitigations introduce overhead.

Table I summarizes our findings. The first column of Table I illustrates the impact of the vulnerability, falling into two main categories: (i) enabling unauthorized speculative data access (Spectre v1), or (ii) enabling speculative control-flow hijacking (Spectre v2 and Spectre RSB). The second column indicates whether the vulnerability results from insufficient mitigations. If so, it further specifies whether it is caused by insufficient hardware or software mitigations or misused mitigations. The third column lists the relevant CVEs and academic papers. Finally, the fourth and fifth columns provide the vulnerabilities’ descriptions and origins in the Linux kernel.

**Unauthorized speculative data access (Spectre v1).** Rows 1 to 4 list vulnerabilities that enable unauthorized speculative data access through Spectre v1-like attacks. From top to bottom, Row 1 represents CVE-2022-27223 [40], which identifies a transient execution gadget in the Xilinx USB peripheral driver with an unprotected index that allows transient outbound accesses. Due to the vast size of the Linux kernel, such vulnerabilities are often deeply buried within infrequently used modules, making it challenging to detect.

Then, Row 2 represents a vulnerability [12] that reintroduces Spectre vulnerabilities to `ptrace` when backporting Spectre mitigations to earlier Linux versions. This vulnerability highlights the possibility of accidentally creating transient execution gadgets in the Linux kernel.

Lastly, Rows 3 and 4 list a series of vulnerabilities in the eBPF program verifier. By exploiting these vulnerabilities, an attacker can inject transient execution gadgets into the Linux kernel by loading malicious eBPF programs, thereby achieving unauthorized speculative data access. This category of vulnerabilities is mitigated by fixing the verification logic

of the eBPF program and disallowing unprivileged users to load eBPF programs by default [135].

**Speculative control-flow hijacking (Spectre v2, Spectre RSB, and more).** Rows 5 to 9 list vulnerabilities that enable speculative control-flow hijacking through Spectre v2- or RSB-like attacks. These vulnerabilities are caused by inadequate mitigations. Row 5 shows the Branch History Injection (BHI) attack [54] that bypasses hardware mitigations [74], which replace software mitigations like Retpoline [139]. Rows 6 and 7 list vulnerabilities that originate from insufficient software mitigations. Row 6 shows a vulnerability caused by the false belief that inserting an `lfence` before indirect jumps can defend against Spectre v2 on AMD processors. However, there is a race condition where an `lfence` is ineffective. Row 7 represents the Retbleed attack [149] that targets Retpoline, the most widely used software defense against Spectre v2. Lastly, Rows 8 and 9 list a series of misuses of mitigations. These vulnerabilities arise because of the numerous hardware and software defenses against Spectre v2 on different CPUs that lead to confusion about which defense should be enabled.

**Takeaways.** Despite the tremendous efforts of kernel developers and hardware vendors, numerous transient execution vulnerabilities continue to arise. In our study, we find that transient execution gadgets are often deeply buried within infrequently used code, hindering their detection. Furthermore, active kernel development can inadvertently reintroduce new vulnerabilities. Adding to the issue, the OS defenses against speculative control-flow hijacking often fall short due to insufficient or misuse of mitigations. As a result, an attacker can directly exploit, or coerce the victim to exploit, an unpatched transient execution gadget deep within the kernel. This enables the attacker to perform active or passive transient execution attacks to steal secrets. These observations emphasize the necessity of blocking speculative memory accesses that violate data ownership and limiting the set of functions that can be speculatively executed by a context to a small subset of all kernel functions.

## V. PERSPECTIVE DESIGN

Perspective introduces a principled framework for building pliable and secure speculative execution defenses for the OS. Perspective offers a pliable interface that allows the OS to




Fig. 4. An example of data speculation views (DSVs) and instruction speculation views (ISVs).

communicate its security requirements to underlying hardware protection mechanisms. At a high level, Perspective consists of two types of Speculation Views, Data Speculation Views (DSVs) and Instruction Speculation Views (ISVs), which aim to thwart active and passive transient execution attacks in the kernel as presented by our taxonomy of attacks in Section IV-A. Perspective’s design is rooted in this taxonomy, instead of attack variants, and hence it can mitigate all variants.

### A. The Perspective Framework

**Data Speculation Views (DSVs).** In active transient execution attacks, unauthorized memory accesses and subsequent disclosures are performed from the kernel thread of the attacker’s process to leak data *owned* by other victim processes or the kernel. The Perspective framework mitigates this class of attacks by isolating the kernel state based on ownership. Specifically, Perspective associates each process with a DSV. A DSV defines the set of data that a given execution context owns. Any speculative access to data outside the DSV is protected. For simplicity, we assume a simple but aggressive protection mechanism that *blocks* the speculative memory access until it becomes non-speculative. As the majority of accesses during kernel execution do not violate ownership, DSVs impose very low execution overhead even if the protection mechanism is as aggressive as blocking speculative accesses. In Section V-B, we discuss one potential DSV design by defining ownership based on memory allocations.

Figure 4 shows an example of DSVs. The userspace processes live on the upper side of the figure, while the monolithic kernel space contains the kernel code and data. The kernel code is represented as a function call graph, where each circle represents a kernel function. DSVs are depicted in Figure 4 as a gray pattern with a colored line that represents the owner process. For example, Figure 4 shows that during the execution of  $Proc_a$ , the speculative access of the function (C) is blocked as it tries to access data that belong to  $Proc_v$ ’s DSV. Similarly, a process is only allowed to transiently access data within its own DSV, e.g., the transient access from node (F).

**Instruction Speculation Views (ISV).** In passive transient execution attacks, both the *access* to and the *transmission* of the secret are speculatively carried out by the victim’s kernel thread. To thwart passive attacks, Perspective proposes the ISV interface that defines the set of kernel code that can be speculatively executed by a given execution context. To simplify the discussion, we assume that ISVs are defined at a

kernel-function granularity, however, in practice ISV protection is applied at the instruction granularity. Any transmitter instructions—whose execution could leak secrets, such as load instructions—that belong to kernel functions outside the ISVs are protected (e.g., blocked from speculative execution). The ISV becomes active when a process transitions from userspace into the kernel, e.g., due to a system call. Figure 4 illustrates the ISV of  $Proc_a$  using the call graph, where the kernel instructions that belong to the ISV are enclosed in the orange line. For example, consider the control-flow edge from node (A) to node (B). Because node (B) is outside the defined ISV, the program cannot speculatively execute transmitter instructions from node (B). Section V-C introduces multiple possible ways to generate an ISV for a given victim program.

The security benefits of ISVs are manifold. First, ISVs provide an interface to swiftly mitigate unforeseen vulnerable kernel functions that contain transient execution gadgets. This benefit is vital given the continuous discovery of transient execution vulnerabilities in kernel functions. Second, a victim program can exclude a large portion of kernel functions that are not used or infrequently used from its ISV. This use case is akin to kernel de-bloating [89], [90], reducing the victim’s surface of passive attacks. Finally, since ISVs provide the guarantee that kernel functions outside ISVs are blocked from speculative execution, one only needs to audit kernel functions within ISVs for transient execution gadgets. To this end, we augment with Perspective’s ISVs a state-of-the-art speculative execution gadget scanner [77] to dramatically reduce the scanner’s gadget search time and produce strict ISVs that block all identified gadgets. Note that an attacker can hijack the victim’s speculative control flow to the middle of a function that is within the ISV, Perspective builds on top of control flow integrity (CFI) techniques [86] to defend against these types of attacks.

**Outlook.** The interfaces of DSVs and ISVs open up a new design space of protection schemes against transient execution attacks. By changing the approaches of defining data ownership or generating ISVs, one can create various schemes tailored to their security requirements and performance goals. In the following sections, we present several design points for DSVs and ISVs.

### B. Defining Data Ownership for DSVs Through Allocations

The Perspective framework has many potential design points of DSVs by varying the definition of data ownership. We propose defining data ownership for DSVs based on the context of execution that the kernel operates on behalf of during memory allocation. Our insight is that allocations provide a strict security guarantee as they separate resources based on contexts. This approach simplifies Perspective’s integration with real-world operating systems as allocations are commonly tracked for resource control.

**Implicit and Explicit Memory Allocations.** To guide our design, we identify two main types of kernel allocations, *explicit* and *implicit* allocations. We define as explicit all




Fig. 5. Tracking explicit and implicit allocations.

the allocations where the kernel allocates resources explicitly requested by userspace, e.g., memory, sockets, or files. The upper part of Figure 5 shows an example of an explicit allocation. Arrows represent the transitions between userspace and the kernel. Time traverses vertically from top to bottom. In step ①, the userspace process executes the `mmap()` system call.<sup>1</sup> Then in step ②, the kernel allocates available pages on behalf of the process. During this time, Perspective assigns the allocated pages to the DSV of the process. Finally, in step ③ the kernel returns the virtual address (VA) to userspace. Similarly, in the case of a page fault, the allocated page will be associated to the DSV of the faulting process. In the case of `munmap()`, Perspective removes pages from the DSV.

Implicit allocations are usually allocated by the kernel on behalf of the process for bookkeeping and metadata management. An implicit allocation example is shown in the lower part of Figure 5. The userspace process executes in step ④ the `poll()` system call. Within the system call, the kernel may allocate memory, e.g., through `kmalloc()`, to store metadata about the file descriptors being polled. This is shown in step ⑤. Such allocations belong to the process, and hence Perspective protects them by adding them to the process DSV. Finally, in step ⑥, the return value of the number of file descriptors with events is returned to the userspace.

In practice, most implicit allocations are handled through slab allocations, e.g., through interfaces such as `kmalloc()` in Linux. The goal of the slab allocator is to maximize memory utilization and therefore tries to pack the allocations together [57], [100]. As a result, data belonging to mutually distrusting processes may get allocated even within the same cache line. For example, Linux slab allocations can be as small as 8 bytes [98], [99], much smaller than the contemporary cache line sizes of 64 bytes. However, this approach introduces a major challenge to security isolation. This is because Perspective would need to track data ownership at a granularity as small as 8 bytes, leading to high bookkeeping overhead. Perspective resolves implicit allocations by designing a secure slab allocator that isolates different execution contexts. We further discuss our implementation in Section VI-A.

### C. Generating ISVs with System Call Interposition

We leverage the principled security guarantees of ISVs provided by the Perspective framework to propose a methodology on how to realize ISVs. Our proposal marries concepts from system call interposition (Section II-B) used for application




Fig. 6. Perspective’s (a) static, and (b) dynamic construction of ISVs.

sandboxing with speculative execution. Specifically, Perspective introduces two techniques based on static and dynamic system call interposition to define personalized ISVs for each context.

Similarly to how system call interposition techniques define an allow list of system calls for an application, we identify potential entry functions to the kernel. Then, we use static or dynamic analysis to find the set of kernel functions used by these entry functions. These functions are trusted and form the basis of the ISV of the application.

Our approach avoids one of the common pitfalls of system call interposition. In particular, in conventional system call interposition enforcement, blocking a system call can have detrimental effects on applications as they may lead to irrecoverable errors and crashes. As a result, the system call allow list ends up being overly permissive to avoid usability problems. Instead, Perspective’s insight is that even if kernel functions are excluded from the ISV, execution can continue non-speculatively. As a result, Perspective’s ISVs can dramatically reduce the barrier for adoption.

**Static ISVs.** One approach to define ISVs is by statically analyzing the application binary. The first step is to identify the system calls that may be used by a given program. Next, Perspective statically analyzes the kernel binary to identify the set of functions that could be invoked during each system call. Then, it combines the set of system calls with the set of functions that could be invoked by each system call to form a static ISV at the granularity of functions for the application.

Figure 6(a) shows an example of generating ISV with static analysis. The kernel code is represented as a call graph composed of function nodes, where the node  $\textcircled{A}$  is the system call entry point. A call edge, shown as a solid line arrow, represents calling relations between functions. From the entry point  $\textcircled{A}$ , the static analysis recursively follows the call edge to traverse and record all kernel functions that might be called during the execution of the system call. These functions form the static ISV, which is marked as a gray cloud that engulfs a subset of function nodes.

As with any technique that relies on an accurate call graph, indirect jumps pose a major challenge because they are hard to reason with statically, making it hard to identify functions are *reachable* via only indirect jumps. Figure 6(a) shows reachable nodes connected with a dotted blue arrow. Such reachable nodes are not included in the static ISV. Therefore, any speculative indirect jumps to these reachable nodes are blocked from speculative execution even if these reachable nodes are safe to speculatively execute, incurring unnecessary overhead. Shown in Figure 6(a) with an orange dotted line, a

<sup>1</sup>We assume the `MAP_POPULATE` flag is set for simplicity.

transient transition from node (A) to (C) is allowed in the static ISV but not from (A) to (B), as the latter is a reachable node.

**Dynamic ISVs.** While static ISVs present a viable solution, to further reduce the attack surface of the kernel, Perspective introduces a dynamic technique to define ISVs. Specifically, Perspective leverages kernel-level process tracing to identify the set of actively used system calls and kernel function paths. Based on this information, Perspective generates a personalized dynamic ISV consisting of the kernel functions that are traced. Figure 6(b) shows the same high-level call graph but depicts a dynamic ISV that now includes a reduced set of nodes compared to the static ISV.

Compared to static ISVs, there are two benefits of using dynamic ISVs. First, dynamic ISVs can further reduce the attack surface over static ISVs by including only functions that are actually used by the application, not the functions that could be used. Second, dynamic ISVs generally offer better performance. This is because dynamic ISVs capture functions that are reachable via only indirect jumps, which otherwise would not be included in a static ISV. As shown in the example, in contrast to the static ISV, node (A) can transiently reach node (B), potentially improving performance. In addition, node (C) is now excluded from the ISV, improving security.

#### D. Discussion of ISVs

**Dynamically Reconfigurable ISVs.** An ISV provides an interface for *dynamically configurable security* at runtime. While an ISV is built offline and later provided to the OS at application startup, ISVs can become stricter later on. Specifically, during the runtime of the application, one can shrink the ISVs as certain system calls or function paths are no longer needed, reducing the attack surface. Furthermore, in a scenario where new vulnerabilities are found in kernel functions, the ISV can be adjusted to exclude affected functions, effectively mitigating new vulnerabilities without kernel patches and potentially expensive server downtime. Finally, it enables system administrators to install ISVs that could be applied to all or selected applications.

**Accelerating Security Auditing with ISVs.** Perspective’s ISVs unlock the potential to efficiently identify gadgets using security auditing techniques such as static analysis, taint tracking, and fuzzing [73], [77], [118]. This is because functions excluded from ISVs cannot speculatively execute, the auditing only needs to examine functions within ISVs, drastically reduce the search space. We demonstrate this point in Section VIII with Kasper [77], a state-of-the-art speculative execution gadget scanner that uses taint analysis and fuzzing. This approach significantly improves the overall gadget discovery rate, as we demonstrate in Section VIII.

**Enhancing ISVs with Auditing.** Perspective can leverage the accelerated security auditing to further enhance the security of ISVs. Specifically, after Perspective produces ISVs through system call interposition (Section V-C), it can use them to bound the search space of kernel auditing. Perspective

then uses the results of the ISV auditing to exclude all the vulnerable functions identified by the audit from the ISVs. We describe Perspective’s implementation in Section VI and present the results in Section VIII.

## VI. PERSPECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION

### A. Operating System Support

The design principles of Perspective are general and applicable to most operating systems. For our implementation prototype, we build Perspective on top of the Linux kernel and control groups (cgroups [103]) for resource tracking. However, alternative implementations based on processes are also simple to implement, allowing Perspective to be applicable to most commercial operating systems, including Mac OS X, FreeBSD, and Windows. Our implementation includes about 400 LOC of changes for DSV management and the secure slab allocator. We further modify the kernel (about 400 LOC) to expose speculation view metadata to the simulator. To generate ISVs on top of radare2 [119] we require about 150 LOC. Finally, our modifications to Kasper [77] are about 150 LOC. Next, we discuss the implementation of instruction and data speculation views of Perspective.

**Data speculation views with cgroups.** The primary requirement to support DSVs in the kernel is the ability to track the ownership of resources. In Perspective we use cgroups [103] to associate allocations with a DSV per container. For kernel threads, each of them belongs to distinct DSVs to improve isolation. The kernel buddy allocator (through `alloc_pages()`) obtains the cgroup ID of the current process context during allocations and associates the allocated physical frames to a DSV for the corresponding page in the direct map. As a result, Perspective associates each page in the direct map with appropriate DSVs fully protecting the direct map. This approach is sufficient for mapping a frame into the userspace (e.g., in the page fault handler) or using a frame solely in the kernel. When a physical frame is freed, Perspective disassociates it from its DSV.

**A Secure Slab Allocator.** As discussed in Section V, slab allocations are particularly challenging in current OS designs as they pack memory across mutually distrusting processes [98], [99]. To address this challenge Perspective introduces a secure slab allocator that isolates different contexts of execution at the granularity of pages. Specifically, for each slab serving a particular object size or type, Perspective maintains separate lists of physical pages to store objects for each cgroup, eliminating collocation.

**Resolving Unknown Allocations.** Perspective tracks resource ownership through the page and the slab allocator, but on rare occasions memory used by the kernel does not use these two primary interfaces. We classify such allocations as *unknown*. By default, unknown memory does not belong to a DSV, hence Perspective conservatively blocks speculation. We identify three main sources of unknown allocations. First, unknown allocations may originate from global variables defined in the kernel code. For example, some are structs of






Fig. 7. Perspective’s (a) ISV VA layout and (b) ISV hardware cache.

function pointers describing operations that can be performed on a file. When possible Perspective redesigns the allocation mechanisms to replicate such structs dynamically per process. Second, some allocations are per-cpu variables allocated at boot-time. Finally, the per-process kernel stack is allocated from `vmalloc` during fork. Perspective tracks it and adds it to the process DSV.

**Generating instruction speculation views.** To generate ISVs, we have designed a static and dynamic analysis framework. Specifically, for static ISVs we identify system call paths used by a given binary by extending Radare2 [119], a state-of-the-art binary analysis tool. Second, we identify the function path for a given system call. Our framework combines the two to statically define ISVs at the instruction granularity per program. For dynamic analysis, we rely on the tracing subsystem of Linux to dynamically identify the system calls and their function paths in the kernel on a per-process and container basis. The result is a dynamic ISV profile.

**Improving Kernel Auditing.** Perspective can significantly improve the performance of kernel auditing by drastically reducing the search space only within ISVs. There are various techniques to identify gadgets using static analysis, taint tracking, and fuzzing [73], [77], [118]. We select Kasper [77] for our implementation, a state-of-the-art speculative execution gadget scanner that uses taint analysis and fuzzing. Specifically, we improve Kasper’s kernel auditing performance by modifying Kasper and the underlying kernel fuzzer Syzkaller [70] to bound their search space within the ISVs. The result is a drastically reduced search space (Section VIII).

**Enhancing ISVs with Auditing.** Perspective can further leverage the results of kernel auditing to generate even stricter ISVs. Specifically, after Perspective generates ISVs and Kasper performs its gadget analysis, we leverage the results of the analysis to exclude all identified vulnerable functions from the ISV, further enhancing their security. While the kernel analysis is bound by the capabilities of the underlying toolchain, Kasper and Syzkaller for our implementation, Perspective’s approach can be leveraged for other analysis techniques as well [73], [112], [118]. We present the security enhanced ISVs in Section VIII.

### B. Architectural Extensions

The goal of the hardware design of Perspective is to expose the speculation view metadata to the hardware and efficiently control speculation.

**Exposing ISVs to Hardware.** Perspective’s ISVs are at the granularity of instructions, enabling Perspective to block the speculative execution of any instruction that does not belong to the ISV irrespective of its type. To expose ISVs to hardware, we propose a simple design that associates a page of code in the kernel with an ISV page through a fixed virtual address offset, enabling fast ISV access. The offset is defined by the OS at process creation time. An ISV page holds an entry for each instruction at the same offset as in the code page. Each entry is a single bit that identifies whether that instruction belongs to the ISV. With this design Perspective only needs to populate ISV pages on demand based on usage when a first access to an ISV page is performed. Figure 7(a) shows the virtual address space and how the code pages are mapped to the ISV pages through the offset. Furthermore, Perspective maintains a hardware structure near the processor pipeline, called the ISV cache, that stores ISV entries. Figure 7(b) shows the ISV cache. The ISV cache is indexed by the instruction VA. On a hit, a response is returned to the pipeline to identify if Perspective needs to block speculative execution. In an ISV cache miss, the speculative execution of the instruction is blocked, and the instruction VA combined with the offset is sent to the TLB to locate the physical address of the ISV page. As we will see in the evaluation, due to the small amount of code accessed by applications during kernel execution, the ISV cache achieves a very high hit rate of 99%. To avoid ISV cache flushes on context switches, we tag entries with the address space identifier (ASID) similar to other tagged structures. Similar implementations have been proposed in prior work [134], [160] for other purposes.

**Exposing DSVs to Hardware.** Our goal is to minimize hardware changes in existing processors. To this end, Perspective implements DSV based on virtual ranges on a per-context basis inspired by upcoming secure processor extensions such as Intel’s TDX [19]. Specifically, Perspective introduces a data structure called the Data Specation View Metadata Table (DSVMT), which is similar to TDX, and it is accessed in parallel to the TLB. Perspective leverages the DSVMT during kernel execution to identify DSV metadata. The DSVMT is organized as a three-level tree structure supporting the three contemporary page sizes (4KB, 2MB, 1GB). The leaf entry corresponds to 4KB pages. Each entry defines if a given page belongs in the DSV, and hence the DSVMT entries are only a single bit. Perspective further maintains a small DSVMT hardware cache located close to the processor pipeline that is checked on access. On a miss, instead of waiting for a refill, Perspective conservatively blocks speculation. Because DSVMT entries are very small, Perspective enjoys very high hit rates close to 99% as shown in Section IX-B. We believe that a realistic adoption path is for Perspective to extend secure architecture extensions such as TDX. We opted against storing the DSV information in page tables because that would require intrusive changes in how the kernel currently uses page tables for the direct map, adding significant complexity to managing page tables and context switching.

TABLE II  
FULL-SYSTEM SIMULATION PARAMETERS.

Parameter	Value
Architecture	2 out-of-order x86 cores at 2.0 GHz
Core	8-issue, out-of-order, 62 Load Queue entries, 32 Store Queue entries, 192 ROB entries, L-TAGE branch predictor, 4096 BTB entries, 16 RAS entries
Private L1-I Cache	32 KB, 64 B line, 4-way, 2 cycle Round Trip (RT) latency, 1 hardware prefetcher
Private L1-D Cache	32 KB, 64 B line, 8-way, 2 cycle RT latency, 1 hardware prefetcher
Shared L2 Cache	Slice: 2 MB, 64 B line, 16-way, 8 cycles RT latency
Coherence	Directory-based MESI protocol
DRAM	50 ns RT latency after L2
ISV Cache	128 entries, 32 sets, 4-way; 57 bits / entry
DSV Cache	128 entries, 32 sets, 4-way; 53 bits / entry
OS Kernel	Linux v5.4.49

**Controlling Speculation.** To control speculation, in Perspective the hardware adds a fence ahead of the instruction based on DSV and ISV. In this way, an attacker cannot observe side effects from speculative execution. A fenced instruction is allowed to proceed when it reaches the Visibility Point [153]: at the head of the ROB or when no older instructions can squash it. On DSV and ISV misses, instructions are blocked, and request is sent to the cache hierarchy after the instruction reaches its VP. On a hit, DSV and ISV LRU bits are not updated until the instruction reaches its VP.

## VII. METHODOLOGY

**Full-system Simulation.** We model an out-of-order processor shown in Table II using cycle-level simulation with gem5 [56]. We evaluate the following defense schemes: (i) UNSAFE is the baseline architecture, which is not protected against transient execution attacks; (ii) FENCE is a hardware-only defense that delays all speculative loads until all prior branches are resolved; (iii) PERSPECTIVE-STATIC is the FENCE scheme augmented with the proposed Perspective hardware, running our modified Linux kernel. PERSPECTIVE-STATIC utilizes static ISVs; (iv) PERSPECTIVE is the same as PERSPECTIVE-STATIC, except it uses dynamic ISVs. (v) PERSPECTIVE++ extends PERSPECTIVE with stricter, ISV++, as discussed in Section VIII.

**Benchmarks and Applications.** We evaluate the performance of Perspective on LEBench [122], a microbenchmark suite for Linux, as well as four datacenter applications, Redis [93], httpd [8] (Apache web server), nginx [121], and memcached [67]. Each workload runs within a container and Perspective leverages cgroups as discussed in Section VI. For LEBench, we run the ROI for each microbenchmark, and use the evaluation methodology of the original work [122]. For datacenter applications, the client and the server communicate over the loopback interface, which is less likely to bottleneck applications on I/O and represents the worst case for Perspective. We run httpd and nginx for 40K requests using ab [51]. We run Redis for 20K requests using redis-benchmark [92] and average over all individual tests. We run memcached for 160K requests using memslap [161]. We measure the percentage of time that applications spend in the OS during our experiments by tracking userspace/kernel time in the simulator: 50% for

TABLE III  
ATTACK SURFACE REDUCTION WITH PERSPECTIVE.

Config	LEBench	httpd	nginx	memcached	redis
ISV-S	92%	91%	90%	91%	90%
ISV	96%	94%	94%	96%	95%

httpd, 65% for nginx, 65% for memcached, and 53% for Redis.

## VIII. SECURITY EVALUATION

As discussed in Section IV, speculative execution attacks in the kernel can be categorized into active and passive attacks. This taxonomy is agnostic to a specific attack variant, as any variant such as Spectre v1, v2, BHI, Retbleed and others, can be exploited to perform either active or passive attacks. Since Perspective’s design is rooted in this taxonomy, not attack variants, it can mitigate all variants.

### A. Active Attacks Security Analysis

Active attacks are the most potent scenario as they are initiated directly by the attacker’s kernel thread and are relatively simple to perform. Perspective completely eliminates active attacks. This is because Perspective’s DSVs provide a strong security guarantee that an attacker cannot speculatively access kernel memory that has been allocated to other contexts. As a result, *any* speculative execution attack variant is blocked from performing active attacks. We leverage the identified CVEs in Table I to launch Proof-of-Concept (PoC) active attacks. Perspective’s DSVs effectively mitigates all active attacks.

### B. Passive Attacks Security Analysis

In passive attacks the victim process’s kernel thread speculatively executes kernel functions containing transient execution gadgets to access and leak its own data. To this end, ISVs enable an execution context to define the set of kernel functions that are trusted by the context. Any transmitter instructions—whose execution could leak secrets, such as load instructions—that belong to kernel functions outside the ISVs are blocked from speculative execution.

**Attack Surface Reduction.** To assess the passive attack surface reduction of Perspective, we measure the surface as the number of functions that can be speculatively executed in the Linux kernel. Table III reports the relative reduction in the attack surface after applying ISVs to different applications. Perspective’s personalized ISVs reduce the attack surface by at least 90.9% across all evaluated benchmarks and applications. Using static ISVs (*ISV-S*), Perspective reduces the number of functions that can be speculatively executed to only an average of 9% to that of Linux. With dynamic ISVs (*ISV*), this number is further reduced to an average of just 4.9% of Linux. This is because dynamic ISVs eliminate functions that static analysis unnecessarily includes. As a result, passive transient execution attacks of any variant are blocked within 95.1% of the kernel functions. In summary, these results highlight the significant reduction in the attack surface achieved by Perspective through personalized ISVs with system call interposition.

TABLE IV  
PERSPECTIVE’S MDS/PORT/CACHE GADGET REDUCTION.

Benchmark	ISV-S	ISV	ISV++
LEBench	87% / 87% / 83%	93% / 93% / 93%	100% / 100% / 100%
httpd	84% / 84% / 78%	91% / 92% / 92%	100% / 100% / 100%
nginx	84% / 83% / 78%	91% / 91% / 91%	100% / 100% / 100%
memcached	84% / 84% / 78%	92% / 92% / 92%	100% / 100% / 100%
redis	83% / 83% / 78%	91% / 91% / 91%	100% / 100% / 100%

**Search Space and Transient Execution Gadgets.** Perspective’s ISVs reduce the number of speculative accessible functions to 5% of the entire kernel, hence, the gadget search space is reduced from 28K functions in Linux down to only 1.4K. To better understand the potential security gains of this reduction, we leverage Kasper [77], a state-of-the-art transient execution gadget scanner that uses taint analysis and fuzzing via Syzkaller [70]. Specifically, we (a) quantify the potential transient execution gadgets that Perspective’s ISVs eliminate, (b) leverage the reduced search space of ISVs to speed up the gadget search process, and (c) utilize the results of the analysis to produce even stricter ISVs.

First, based on the results obtained from the authors of Kasper, we calculate the number of gadgets that are blocked from transient execution attacks with Perspective’s ISVs. Kasper [77] identifies 1533 potential speculative execution gadgets in the whole Linux kernel. It identifies 805 micro-architectural buffers (MDS), 509 port contention (Port), and 219 cache-based covert channels (Cache) potential gadgets. Perspective blocks all transiently accessible gadgets excluded from the ISVs which account for 78% with static ISVs (*ISV-S*) and more than 91% with dynamic ISVs (*ISV*). Although our threat model (Section III) does not include MDS attacks, as they are fixed in current processors, Perspective’s ISVs still provide significant reduction. Overall, the results demonstrate the ability of Perspective to drastically reduce the attack surface of the Linux kernel by reducing the accessible gadgets.

Next, we leverage the security guarantee that kernel functions outside ISVs are blocked from speculative execution to limit Kasper’s gadget scanning to only the kernel functions that are within ISVs. Figure 8 shows the results. Perspective speeds up Kasper’s gadget discovery rate (gadgets/hour) by  $1.57\times$  on average. We see that the speedups are even more profound in applications such as nginx reaching  $2.23\times$ . In summary, we have shown that Perspective is able to speed up existing kernel analysis techniques and potentially open up new possibilities for other solutions that are currently not considered possible or tractable for large OS code bases.

We further leverage the analysis of Kasper augmented with Perspective to produce even stricter dynamic ISVs as described in Section V-C and Section VI-A. Specifically, we use the analysis of Kasper to remove all identified vulnerable functions from the ISVs. The resulting ISVs (*ISV++*) block all identified gadgets as shown in Table IV.

Finally, we evaluate ISV protection with practical attacks by launching Proof-of-Concept (PoC) passive attacks using transient execution gadgets in CVEs of Table I. Because the transient execution gadgets in those CVEs are excluded from




Fig. 8. Speedup of Kasper’s gadget discovery rate (gadgets/hour).

the ISVs, the attacker cannot coerce the victim to speculatively execute them, blocking passive attacks.

## IX. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

### A. Performance Results

**LEBench.** Figure 9 shows the latency of LEBench tests on all schemes, including FENCE, PERSPECTIVE-STATIC, PERSPECTIVE, PERSPECTIVE++, normalized to UNSAFE. Among all the evaluated schemes, FENCE has the highest average execution overhead of 47.5%. In system calls such as `select` and `poll`, the overhead of FENCE can be as high as 228.3%. This is because the execution spins in the kernel repeatedly, paying the cost of mitigations. On the other hand, PERSPECTIVE-STATIC, PERSPECTIVE, and PERSPECTIVE++ exhibit very little execution overhead in most cases, with an average overhead of 4.1%, 3.6%, and 3.5% respectively. Perspective schemes only experience moderate overhead in `big-fork` and `page-fault`, where most of the overhead originates from DSVs as new allocations are created. Overall, Perspective shows little overhead in LEBench.

**Datacenter Applications.** Figure 10 shows the throughput of datacenter applications in requests per second normalized to UNSAFE. The UNSAFE baseline throughput is 11.5K, 18K, 55K, and 40.7K RPS for httpd, nginx, memcached, and redis respectively. The results show that FENCE can induce significant slowdowns, with an average overhead on throughput of 5.7%. The key-value stores, memcached and Redis, suffer the most due to the high cost of frequent blocking of memory accesses. PERSPECTIVE-STATIC, PERSPECTIVE, and PERSPECTIVE++ achieve nearly the same performance as UNSAFE, with an average overhead on throughput of 1.3%, 1.2%, and 1.2% respectively. In the case of httpd, PERSPECTIVE-STATIC performs a bit worse than PERSPECTIVE with dynamic ISVs, due to an increased number of indirect jumps whose targets cannot be statically analyzed and included in static ISVs, as we discuss in Section IX-B.

**Comparing to Spot Software Mitigations.** We further compare to software mitigations (KPTI [72] and Retpoline [139]) in Linux, which are spot mitigations only for Meltdown and Spectre-v2. They show an average overhead of 14.5% in LEBench and 5% on datacenter applications. Without KPTI, the performance overhead of spot mitigations is 6.6% and 1.2% for micro and macro benchmarks respectively. Perspective provides better security than spot software mitigations and only shows an overhead of 3.5% and 1.2% respectively.

**Comparing to Hardware Mitigations.** To provide a better understanding of Perspective, we further compare it to




Fig. 9. LEBench suite’s normalized latency to an unsafe baseline under different schemes.




Fig. 10. Requests per second normalized to an unsafe baseline.

two state-of-the-art hardware-only schemes: Delay-on-Miss (DOM) [124] and Speculative Taint Tracking (STT) [156]. They represent two design points in the spectrum between hardware complexity and performance, with DOM being simpler and slower, and STT more complex and faster.

Compared to the unsafe baseline, DOM shows an average overhead of 23.1%, while STT shows an average overhead of 3.7% in the microbenchmarks. The overhead profile of both DOM and STT is similar to FENCE, where several benchmarks like those based on select, poll, and epoll show overheads of 204% for DOM and 26.4% for STT. On the other hand, Perspective shows an average overhead of 3.5% on microbenchmarks. Overall, in microbenchmarks, Perspective is significantly faster than DOM and slightly faster than STT. In terms of macrobenchmarks, all three configurations show good performance, achieving normalized throughput of 98.3%, 99.6%, and 98.8% for DOM, STT, and Perspective respectively. Overall, all three configurations show marginal overhead in practice.

In terms of complexity, STT requires complex taint tracking additions to the processor pipeline, making its adoption difficult in practice. On the other hand, DOM requires simpler modifications, however its performance overhead can be significant. Perspective represents a balanced design with minimal hardware changes compared to DOM and STT while achieving low overhead. We believe that Perspective achieves its goal of attaining high performance while enabling software to take control of transient execution in the kernel.

### B. Sensitivity Analysis

**Breakdown of Speculation Views.** Table VI shows the percentage of fenced instructions that were caused by Perspective’s DSVs and static, dynamic ISVs, and ISV++. Such fences would represent false positives due Perspective’s implementation since we are focusing on benign workloads. Both LEBench and applications exhibit similar profiles. The results show that on average, the *ISV-Static* accounts for 20% of the total number of fenced instructions, while the DSV accounts

for 80%. In *ISV-Dynamic*, the ISV percentage decreases to 18%. This is because dynamic ISVs may capture reachable functions that static ISVs cannot. The fence rate is on average 9 and 37 fences per kilo instructions for ISVs and DSVs, respectively. *ISV++* exhibits similar characteristics.

**Unknown Allocations.** As discussed in Section VI-A, some allocations beyond those handled by the page and slab allocators may be classified as *unknown*. Accessing memory from unknown allocations can cause stalls in the processor pipeline. We quantify their impact by selectively disabling blocking of unknown accesses. On average, unknown allocations in the kernel’s direct map are responsible for 1.5% of Perspective’s overhead on LEBench and marginal overhead on applications. We believe that additional engineering efforts can further reduce this overhead.

**Hardware Structures.** Perspective introduces the ISV and DSV caches. Both caches are organized as 128-entry 4-way set associative caches and provide very high hit rates close to 99% for both microbenchmarks and applications. The reason is that a small cache can hold the relatively small working set of instructions and data in the kernel. Table V show the characteristics of Perspective’s hardware structures: area, access time, energy, and leakage power. The data correspond to 22nm and is obtained with CACTI [53]. Although the access time to Perspective structures is a fraction of a cycle, to be conservative we account for 2 cycles.

TABLE V  
HARDWARE STRUCTURE CHARACTERIZATION.

Configuration	Area	Access Time	Dyn. Energy	Leak. Power
DSV Cache	0.0024 mm <sup>2</sup>	114 ps	1.21 pj	0.78 mW
ISV Cache	0.0025 mm <sup>2</sup>	115 ps	1.29 pj	0.79 mW

**Memory Fragmentation.** Perspective utilizes separate physical pages to store objects for different *cgroups*. This approach provides strong isolation, but it can lead to increased memory fragmentation. We use *slabtop* to track the memory utilization ratio, defined as the size of active objects divided by the total size of objects. On average, Perspective’s secure slab allocator incurs a minimal memory usage overhead of 0.91%.

## X. RELATED WORK

Numerous hardware-only defense mechanisms have been proposed [47], [61], [62], [71], [80], [83], [95], [107], [109], [123], [124], [136], [137], [146], [153], [155], [156], [159] to defend against transient execution attacks. While hardware

TABLE VI

PERCENTAGE OF FENCED INSTRUCTIONS DUE TO ISV AND DSV.

Config	LEBench	httplib	nginx	memcached	redis
ISV-S/DSV	27% / 73%	20% / 80%	15% / 85%	13% / 87%	23% / 77%
ISV/DSV	22% / 78%	12% / 88%	16% / 84%	15% / 85%	23% / 77%
ISV++/DSV	22% / 78%	13% / 87%	16% / 84%	15% / 85%	23% / 77%

defenses offer great software transparency, they lack the necessary information to determine which data and execution paths require protection. Consequently, they either conservatively protect *all* speculative instructions that could leak information [124], [146], [153], or conservatively infer what data is not confidential [61], [156], resulting in high execution overhead or complex hardware.

Prior work on system call interposition [2], [3], [5], [66], [76], [81], [94], [132] has focused solely on application sandboxing to protect the kernel against traditional attacks such as buffer overflows. Similarly, a body of work has focused on architectural support for memory-based protection [63], [125], [131], [145], [150], [151]. These works focus on traditional attacks rather than transient execution attacks.

Kernel mitigations have primarily focused on page table isolation to mitigate unauthorized data accesses. KPTI separates userspace and kernel page tables in order to mitigate Meltdown-style attacks. Other software-only approaches [49], [55], [79], [127], [152] also rely on page tables to block speculation through page faults. However, these approaches require context switches, leading to substantial overhead. Furthermore, when access to unmapped data is required, the kernel needs to switch to the complete mappings, voiding isolation [55].

Control flow integrity (CFI) [45], [64], [108], [113]–[115], [129], [143], [157], [158] is a powerful technique that can reduce the attack surface of the kernel. CFI prevents attackers from diverting the victim’s control flow to attacker-chosen logic. Recent works, such as SpecCFI [86], leverage CFI to restrict speculative execution, increasing the bar for attacks. Such techniques are orthogonal to Perspective. First, Perspective introduces DSVs to protect data accesses, which is not the goal of SpecCFI, CET [129], and CFI in general. Second, SpecCFI and CET would mark all kernel functions as legal, and hence speculation would be able to reach any function irrespective of the userspace process making the system call. This leaves a large attack surface vulnerable. ISVs provide tailored protection to applications, as an attacker cannot hijack the control flow to speculatively execute a function outside the ISVs. We demonstrate this point in Section VIII.B as Perspective drastically reduces the attack surface of the kernel.

## XI. CONCLUSION

This paper presents *Perspective*, a principled framework for secure speculation in the operating system. Perspective introduces Data Speculation Views (DSVs) and Instruction Speculation Views (ISVs) to mitigate active and passive attacks, respectively. DSVs define the ownership of kernel data by a given execution context. ISVs define the set of kernel functions that can be speculatively executed by a given execution context. Perspective’s ISVs open up the opportuni-

ties of (i) swiftly patching gadgets in kernel functions, (ii) reducing the surface of passive attacks, and (iii) speeding up the kernel auditing process. Our evaluation showed that Perspective achieves significant security improvements with minimal performance overhead.

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