LEGAL PROFESSION

CAYETANO V MONSOD PARAS; September 3, 1991 NATURE Petition to review decision of Commission on Appointments FACTS - April 25, 1991 Atty. Christian Monsod was appointed by Pres. Aquino as Chairman of COMELEC - Rene Cayetano opposed such appointment as citizen and taxpayer because Monsod allegedly does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years - June 18, 1991 Monsod took his oath of office - Monsods credentials > member of Philippine Bar since 1960 > after bar, worked in law office of his father > 1963-1970 in World Bank Group as operations officer in Costa Rica and Panama involves getting acquainted with laws of membercountries, negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic and project work > 1970 in Meralco Group as CEO of investment bank > since 1986 rendered service to various companiesas legal and economic consultant or CEO > 1986-1987 secretary-general and national chairman of NAMFREL (election law) > co-chairman of Bishops Businessmens Conference for Human Development > 1990 - Davide Commission quasi-judicial body > 1986-1987 member of Constitutional Commission as Chairman on Accountability of Public Officers - AIX-C Sec1(1) - Commission on Elections chairman shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years - no jurisprudence on what constitutes the practice of law ISSUE WON Monsod is qualified as Chairman of COMELEC in fulfilling the requirement engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years HELD YES. Practice of Law means any activity, in or out of court which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. Monsod as lawyer-economist, lawyer-manager, lawyerentrepreneur, lawyer-negotiator, and lawyer-negotiator is proof he is engaged in practice of law for more than 1- years - Blacks Law Dictionary > Rendition of service requiring the knowledge and application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent > not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and giving all legal advice to clients - Land Title Abstract and Trust Co v Dworken > one who in representative capacity engages in business of advising clients as to their rights under law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court - UP Law Center > advocacy, counseling, public service - Alexander SyCip > appearance of lawyer in litigation is most publicly familiar role of lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer > more legal work is transacted in law offices that in the courtrooms > business counseling than trying cases; as planner, diagnostician, trial lawyer, surgeon - article on Business Star > emerging trends in corporate law SEPARATE OPINION NARVASA [concur] - concur only in the result PADILLA [dissent] - Practice refers to actual performance of application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it connotes active, habitual, repeated or customary action TF lawyer employed as business executive or corporate manager, other than head of Legal Department cannot be said to be in the practice of law - People v Villanueva > Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind - Commission on Appointments memorandum > practice of law requires habituality, compensation, application of law, legal principle, practice or procedure, and attorney-client relationship CRUZ [dissent] - sweeping definition of practice of law as to render the qualification practically toothless - there is hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or government regulation the businessman must know about and observe - performance of any acts in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law which tells us absolutely nothing GUTIERREZ [dissent] - practice is envisioned as active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal or extemporaneous - nothing in the bio-data even remotely indicates Monsod has given the law enough attention or a certain degree of commitment and participation - difficult if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what constitutes the practice of law - Monsod was asked if he ever prepared contracts for parties in realestate transaction; he answered very seldom - Monsod may have profited from his legal knowledge, the use of such is incidental and consists of isolated activities which do not fall under the denominations of practice of law SANTUYO V HIDALGO CORONA; January 17, 2005 NATURE Administrative case in SC for Serious Misconduct and Dishonesty FACTS

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- Petitioners Benjamin Santuyo and Editha Santuyo accused respondent Atty. Edwin Hidalgo of serious misconduct and dishonesty for breach of his lawyers oath and notarial law - In Dec 1991, couple purchased parcel of land covered by deed of sale - It was allegedly notarized by Hidalgo and entered in his notarial register - Six years later, couple had dispute with Danilo German over ownership of said land; German presented an affidavit executed by Hidalgo denying authenticity of his signature on deed of sale Petitioners' Claim - Hidalgo overlooked the fact that deed of sale contained ALL the legal formalities of a duly notarized document (including impression of his notarial dry seal) - Santuyos could not have forged the signature, not being learned in technicalities surrounding notarial act - They had no access to his notarial seal and notarial register, and they could not have made any imprint of his seal or signature. Respondents' Comments - He denied having notarized any deed of sale for disputed property. - He once worked as junior lawyer at Carpio General and Jacob Law Office; and admitted that he notarized several documents in that office. - As a matter of procedure, documents were scrutinized by senior lawyers, and only with their approval could notarization be done. - In some occasions, secretaries (by themselves) would affix dry seal of junior associates on documents relating to cases handled by the law firm. - He normally required parties to exhibit community tax certificates and to personally acknowledge documents before him as notary public. - He knew Editha, but only met Benjamin in Nov 1997 (Meeting was arranged by Editha so as to personally acknowledge another document) - His alleged signature on deed of sale was forged (strokes of a lady) - At time it was supposedly notarized, he was on vacation. ISSUES 1. WON the signature of respondent on the deed of sale was forged 2. WON respondent is guilty of negligence HELD 1. Yes. Ratio The alleged forged signature was different from Hidalgos signatures in other documents submitted during the investigation. Reasoning Santuyos did not state that they personally appeared before respondent. They were also not sure if he signed the document; only that his signature appeared on it. They had no personal knowledge as to who actually affixed the signature. 2. Yes. Ratio He was negligent for having wholly entrusted the preparation and other mechanics of the document for notarization to the office secretaries, including safekeeping of dry seal and making entries in notarial register. Reasoning Responsibility attached to a notary public is sensitive, and respondent should have been more discreet and cautious. Disposition Atty. Hidalgo is suspended from his commission as notary public for two (2) years for negligence in the performance of duties as notary public. SICAT V ARIOLA, JR. PER CURIAM; April 15, 2005 NATURE Administrative case in the Supreme Court. Violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility FACTS - In an affidavit-complaint, complainat Arturo Sicat, a Board Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Rizal, charged respondent Atty. Gregorio Ariola, the Municipal Administrator of Cainta, Rizal with violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility by committing fraud, deceit and falsehood in his dealings, particularly the notarization of a Special Power of Attorney(SPA) purportedly executed by one Juanito C. Benitez According to complainant, respondent made it appear that Benitez executed the said document on January 4, 2001 when in fact the latter had already died on October 25, 2000. - He alleged that prior to notarization, the Municipality of Cainta had entered into a contract with J.C. Benitez Architect and Technical Management, represented by Benitez, for the construction of low-cost houses(project worth=11M). For the services of the consultants, the Municipality of Cainta issued a check dated January 10, 2001 in the amount of 3.7M, payable to J.C. Benitez Architects and Technical Management and/or Cesar Goco. The check was received and cashed by the the latter by virtue of the SPA notarized by Ariola. Respondents' Comments - Respondent explained that as early as May 12, 2000, Benitez had already signed the SPA. He claimed that due to inadvertence, it was only on January 4, 2001 that he was able to notarize it. Nevertheless, the SPA notarized by him on January 4, 2001 was not at all necessary because Benitez had signed a similar SPA in favor of Goco sometime before his death, on May 12, 2000. Therefore, the SPA was cancelled the same day he notarized it. - Moreover, the suit should be dismissed for forum shopping since similar charges had been filed with the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. Which complaints were dismissed because the assailed act referred to violation of the IRR of the Commission on Audit. - The Court, in its resolution dated March 12, 2003, referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation. The IBP recommended that respondent's notarial commission be revoked and that he be suspended from the practice of law for one year. ISSUES WON acts of respondent amounted to a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. HELD Ratio The act was a serious breach of the sacred obligation imposed by the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which prohibits engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.. Reasoning The undisputed facts show that Benitez died on October 25, 2000. The notarial acknowledgment of respondent declared that Benitez appeared before him and acknowledged that the instrument was his clear and voluntary act. Clearly respondent lied and intentionally perpetuated an untruthful statement. - Neither will respondent's defense that the SPA in question was superfluous and unnecessary, and prejudiced no one, exonerate him of

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accountability. His assertion of falsehood in a public document contravened one of the most cherished tenets of the legal profession and potentially cast suspicion on the truthfulness of every notarial act. Disposition WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Gregorio E. Ariola, Jr., is found guilty of gross misconduct and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered in the records of respondent, and brought to the immediate attention of the Ombudsman. UI V BONIFACIO DE LEON; June 8, 2000 NATURE Administrative matter in the Supreme Court. Disbarment. FACTS Mrs. Ui filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Bonifacio on the ground of immorality, for allegedly carrying on an illicit relationship with her husband Mr. Ui. In the proceeding before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Bonifacio attached a photocopy of a marriage certificate that said that she and Mr. Ui got married in 1985, but according to the certificate of marriage obtained from the Hawaii State Department of Health, they were married in 1987. She claims that she entered the relationship with Mr. Ui in good faith and that her conduct cannot be considered as willful, flagrant, or shameless, nor can it suggest moral indifference. She fell in love with Mr. Ui whom she believed to be single, and, that upon her discovery of his true civil status, she parted ways with him. ISSUE WON Atty. Bonifacio conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to be barred from the practice of law HELD - No. The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the practice of the legal profession simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked, subject to the mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of legal ethics. One of the conditions prior to the admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral character. More importantly, possession of good character must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice. Otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. - A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, which has been defined as the conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community. Lawyers, as keepers of the public faith, are burdened with a higher degree of social responsibility and thus must handle their affairs with great caution. Atty. Bonifacio was imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with Mr. Ui, clothed as it was with what she believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. Immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society. Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be grossly immoral, that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree. - A member of the bar and an officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships but must also behave himself so as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. Atty. Bonifacios act of immediately distancing herself from Mr. Ui upon discovering his true civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference and proves that she fad no intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the legal profession. On the matter of the falsified certificate of marriage, it is contrary to human experience and highly improbable that she did not know the year of her marriage or that she failed to check that the information in the document which she attached to her Answer were correct. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the bar, free from misdeeds and acts of malpractice. FIGUEROA V BARRANCO, JR. ROMERO; July 31, 1997 FACTS - In 1971, Patricia Figueroa petitioned that Simeon Barranco, Jr. be denied admission to the legal profession. Barranco passed the 1970 bar exams on the fourth attempt. - Figueroa avers that she and Barranco had been sweethearts, that a child was born to them out of wedlock and that respondent did not fulfill his repeated promises to marry her. - Figueroa and Barranco were townmates in Janiuay, Iloilo and were steadies since 1953. Figueroa first acceded to sexual congress in 1960. A son, Rafael Barranco, was born on Dec 11, 1964. Barranco promised to marry Figueroa after he passes the bar exams. Their relationship continued, with more than 20 or 30 promises of marriage. Barranco gave only P10 for the child on Rafaels birthdays. In 1971, Figueroa learned Barranco married another woman. - From 1972 to 1988, several motions to dismiss and comments were filed. - On Sept 29, 1988, the Court resolved to dismiss the complaint for failure of complainant to prosecute the case for an unreasonable period of time and to allow Simeon Barranco, Jr. to take the lawyers oath. - Nov 17, 1988, the Court, in response to Figueroas opposition, resolved to cancel Barrancos scheduled oath-taking. - June 1, 1993, the Court referred the case to the IBP. On May 17, 1997, IBP recommended the dismissal of the case and that respondent be allowed to take the lawyers oath ISSUE WON the facts constitute gross immorality warranting the permanent exclusion of Barranco from the legal profession HELD No. To justify suspension or disbarment, the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless acts which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community. - Barrancos engaging in premarital sexual relations with Figueroa and promises to marry suggest a doubtful moral character on his part but it does not constitute grossly immoral conduct. - Barranco and Figueroa were sweethearts whose sexual relations were evidently consensual.

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- Respondent, at the time of this decision, is already 62. Disposition Petition is dismissed. Simeon Barranco, Jr. is allowed to take his oath as a lawyer upon payment of proper fees. BARRIOS V MARTINEZ PER CURIAM; November 12, 2004 FACTS - Atty. Martinez was convicted of a violation of BP 22 - Complainant submitted Resolution dated March 13, 1996, and the Entry of judgment dated March 20, 1996 in an action for disbarment against Martinez - July 3, 1996 the Court required respondent to comment on said petition within 10 days from notice - February 17, 1997 a second resolution was issued requiring respondent to show cause why no disciplinary action should be imposed on him for failure to comply with the earlier Resolution and to submit Comment - July 7, 1997 the Court imposed a fine of P1000 for respondents failure to comply with previous resolution within 10 days - April 27, 1998 the Court fined the respondent an additional P2000 and required him to comply with the resolution under pain of imprisonment and arrest for a period of 5 days or until his compliance - February 3, 1999 the Court declared respondent Martinez guilty of Contempt under Rule 71, Sec 3(b) of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure and ordered his imprisonment until he complied with the aforesaid resolution - April 5, 1999 NBI reported that respondent was arrested in Tacloban City on March 26, 1999 but was subsequently released after having shown proof of compliance with the resolutions of February 17, 1997 and April 27, 1998 by remitting the amount of P2000 and submitting his overdue Comment: 1. He failed to respond to the Resolution dated February 17, 1997 as he was at that time undergoing medical treatment at Camp Ruperto Kangleon in Palo, Leyte 2. Complainant passed away sometime in June 1997 3. Said administrative complaint is an offshoot of a civil case which was decided in respondents favor. Respondent avers that as a result of his moving for the execution of judgment in his favor and the eviction of the family of complainant, the latter filed the present administrative case - September 11, 1997 Robert Visbal of the Provincial Prosecution Office of Tacloban City submitted a letter to the First Division Clerk of Court alleging that respondent Martinez also stood charged in another estafa case before the RTC of Tacloban City, as well as a civil case involving the victims of the Dona Paz tragedy in 1987 for which the RTC of Basey, Samar rendered a decision against him, his appeal thereto having been dismissed by the CA. - June 16, 1999 the Court referred the present case to the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation - The report of IBP stated: 1. Respondent filed a motion for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the complainant died and that dismissal is warranted because the case filed by him does not survive due to his demise as a matter of fact, it is extinguished upon his death. The IBP disagrees, pursuant to Section 1 Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, the SC or the IBP may initiate the proceedings when they perceive acts of lawyers which deserve sanctions or when their attention is called by any one and a probable cause exists that an act has been perpetrated by a lawyer which requires disciplinary sanctions. 2. Propensity to disregard orders of the SC, as shown by respondent, is an utter lack of good moral character 3. Respondents conviction of a crime of moral turpitude clearly shows his unfitness to protect the administration of justice and therefore justifies the imposition of sanctions against him 4. It is recommended that respondent be disbarred and his name stricken out from the Roll of Attorneys immediately - September 27, 2003 the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution adopting and approving the report and recommendation of its Investigating Commissioner - December 3, 2003 Atty. Martinez filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation - January 14, 2004 the Court required the complainant to file a comment within 10 days - February 16, 2004 complainants daughter sent a Manifestation and Motion alleging they have not been furnished with a copy of respondents Motion ISSUE WON the crime respondent was convicted of is one involving moral turpitude HELD Yes. Moral turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. It involves an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. - The argument of respondent that to disbar him now is tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of law is also untenable. The practice of law is a privilege. The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable; men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. - Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare, and for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministrations of persons unfit to practice them. - The court is also disinclined to take respondents old age and the fact that he served in the judiciary in various capacities in his favor. If at all, the respondent was held to a higher standard for it, for a judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence, and his conduct should be above reproach. - The Court based the determination of the penalty from previously decided cases, holding that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime of moral turpitude. Disposition Respondent was disbarred and his name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. PIMENTEL, HR V LLORENTE MENDOZA; August 29, 2000 (edel cruz)

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NATURE Administrative Matter. Disbarment FACTS - Senator Aquilino Pimentel filed this disbarment case against Attys. Antonio Llorente (election officer of COMELEC and chairman of the Board) and Ligaya Salayon (ex officio vice- chairman) for gross misconduct, serious breach of trust and violation of the lawyers oath in connection with the discharge of their duties as members of the Pasig City Board of Canvassers in the May 8, 1995 elections. - Pimentel alleges that respondents: Respondents tampered with the votes he received Statement of votes show that other candidates were credited with votes which were above the number of votes they actually received and his votes were reduced (dagdag-bawas =p) In 101 precints, Enriles votes were in excess of the total number of voters who actually voted therein The votes from 22 precints were twice recorded in 18 statements of votes. - PIMENTEL: The respondents committed a serious breach of public trust and of their lawyers oath by signing the statements of votes (SoVs) despite their knowledge that some of the entries were false. - RESPONDENTS: The errors pointed out by complainant could be attributed to honest mistake, oversight and /or fatigue. - IBP recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit. - Pimentel also filed criminal charges against the two before the COMELEC which dismissed said charges for insufficiency of evidence. - The SC, upon Pimentels petition for certiorari, directed the COMELEC to file appropriate charges against respondents. ISSUE 1. WON a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under Rule 139 B, section 12 C (within 15 day period) since the petition was filed late 2. WON the respondents are guilty of misconduct HELD 1. NO Reasoning - In Halimao v. Villanueva: Although Rule 139-B, sec 12(c) makes no mention of a motion for reconsideration, nothing in its text or in its history suggests that such motion is prohibited. - It appears that the petition was filed on time because a copy of the resolution personally served on the Office of the Bar Confidant of the SC was received. It is the burden of the respondent to show that the complainant filed the petition was filed beyond the 15-day period for filing it. - Even if Pimentel received the IBP resolution in question was filed 2 days late, the delay may be overlooked. - Disbarment proceedings are undertaken solely for public welfare. The sole question for determination is whether a member of the bar is fit to be allowed the privileges as such or not. - The complainant or the person who called the attention of the Court to the attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and generally has no interest, in the outcome except as all citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. For this reason, laws dealing with double jeopardy or prescription or with procedure like verification of pleadings and prejudicial questions have no application to disbarment proceedings. 2. YES Reasoning - In disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar, only clearly preponderance of evidence is required to establish liability. - SC: What is involved here is not just a case of mathematical error in the tabulation of votes per precinct as reflected in the election returns and the subsequent entry of erroneous figures in or two statements of votes but a systematic scheme to pad the votes of certain senatorial candidates at the expense of the petitioner in complete disregard of the tabulation in the election returns. - Despite the fact that these discrepancies were apparent on the face of these documents and that the variation involves substantial number of votes, respondents nevertheless certified the SoVs as true and correct. This constitutes misconduct. - Only the respondents had access to the SoVs and the CoC and thus had the opportunity to compare them and detect the discrepancies therein so it is irrelevant that the canvassing was open to the public and observed by numerous individuals. - A lawyer who holds a government position may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct in the discharged of his duties as a government official. However, if the misconduct also constitutes a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility or the lawyers oath or is of such character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or shows moral delinquency on his part, such individual may be disciplined as a member of the bar for such misconduct. - By certifying as true and correct the SoVs in question, the respondents committed a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code, which stipulates that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. By lawyers express provision of Canon 6, this is made applicable to lawyers in the government service. In addition, they likewise violated their oath of office as to do no falsehood. - As lawyers in the government service, respondents were under greater obligation to observe the basic tenet of the profession (to behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and honor) because a public office is a public trust. Disposition Respondents participation in the irregularities reflects on the legal profession. This merits a suspension but since this is their first transgression, a fine is sufficient. Fine of 10,000 Php for each for misconduct. CORDOVA V CORDOVA PER CURIAM; November 29, 1989 (giulia pineda) NATURE Administrative case in the SC for Immorality of a member of the Bar FACTS - Savacion Delizo Cordova sent an unsworn letter-complaint to then CJ Teehankee charging her husband Atty. Laurence Cordova with immorality and acts unbecoming of a member of the Bar. The complaint was forwarded to the IBP, Commission on Bar Discipline for investigation, report and investigation. - The Commission required the complainant to submit a verified complain to which she complied and submitted on Sept 27, 1988 a

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revised and verified version of her long and detailed complaint against her husband. - On Dec 16, she was required to submit before the Commission her evidence ex parte. She requested for the rescheduling several times. The hearings never took place as she failed to appear. - The respondent never moved to set aside the order of default, even though notices were sent to him. - In a telegraphic message dated Apr 6, the complainant informed the commission that she and her husband have already reconciled. - In an order dated Apr 17, 1989, the Commission required the parties to appear before it for the confirmation and explanation of the telegraphic message and to file formal motion to dismiss the complaint. Neither responded and nothing was heard from either party since then. The findings of the IBP Board of Governors: - Complainant and respondent Cordova were married on 6 June 1976 and out of this marriage, two (2) children were born. - In 1985, respondent Cordova left his family as well as his job as Branch Clerk of RTC of Cabarroguis, Quirino Province, and went to Mangagoy, Bislig, Surigao del Sur with one Fely G. Holgado. - Fely G. Holgado was herself married and left her own husband and children to stay with respondent. Respondent Cordova and Fely G. Holgado lived together in Bislig as husband and wife, with respondent Cordova introducing Fely to the public as his wife, using the name Fely Cordova. - Respondent Cordova gave Fely Holgado funds with which to establish a sari-sari store in the public market at Bislig, while failing to support his legitimate family. - On 6 April 1986, respondent Cordova and his complainant wife had an apparent reconciliation. Respondent promised that he would separate from Fely Holgado and brought his legitimate family to Bislig - Respondent would, however, frequently come home from beerhouses or cabarets, drunk, and continued to neglect the support of his legitimate family. - In February 1987, complainant found, upon returning from a trip to Manila that respondent Cordova was no longer living with her children in their conjugal home; that respondent Cordova was living with another mistress, Luisita Magallanes, and had taken his younger daughter along with him - Respondent and his new mistress hid Melanie from the complainants, compelling complainant to go to court and to take back her daughter by habeas corpus. The RTC of Bislig, gave her custody of their children. - Notwithstanding respondent's promise to reform, he continued to live with Luisita Magallanes as her husband and continued to fail to give support to his legitimate family. ISSUE WON the recent reconciliation of the Cordovas and the failure of the complainant to pursue the case have dismissed the case. HELD The most recent reconciliation between complainant and respondent, assuming the same to be real, does not excuse and wipe away the misconduct and immoral behavior of the respondent earn carried out in public, and necessarily adversely reflecting upon him as a member of the Bar and upon the Philippine Bar itself. Ratio - An applicant for admission to membership in the bar is required to show that he possessed of good moral character. That requirement is not exhausted and dispensed with upon admission to membership of the bar. - The lack of moral character that we here refer to as essential is not limited to good moral character relating to the discharge of the duties and responsibilities of an attorney at law. The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community. Disposition WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law indefinitely and until further orders from this Court. The Court will consider lifting his suspension when respondent Cordova submits proof satisfactory to the Commission and this Court that he has and continues to provide for the support of his legitimate family and that he has given up the immoral course of conduct that he has clung to. SORIANO V DIZON PER CURIAM; January 25, 2006 (romy ramirez) NATURE Administrative case for disbarment FACTS - Respondent, Atty. Manuel Dizon, was convicted by final judgment by the RTC of Baguio City for frustrated murder. He applied and was granted probation by the said court based on several conditions which included among others the satisfaction of the civil liabilities imposed in favor of the offended party, Roberto Soriano, the taxi driver who was rendered paralyzed on the left side of the body as a result of his being shot by the defendant. - The defendant despite the condition that he pay the civil liabilities imposed on him as a condition for the probation, appealed said civil liability to the Court of Appeals. - From the records of the trial court, it appears that defendant was drunk at the time of the incident and that the case arose out of the apparent resentment of the defendant from having been overtaken by the victim who was then driving a taxi. From the testimony of a witness, it further appears that the taxi driver was merely defending himself and that defendant was the aggressor during said incident. - Upon the complaint for the disbarment filed by Soriano against Dizon, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines rendered its report and recommendation which was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors. The Commssion recommended the disbarment of the defendant for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude and for exhibiting an obvious lack of good moral character. ISSUES 1. WON Dizons crime of frustrated murder involves moral turpitude and that his guilt warrants disbarment HELD Ratio - The totality of the facts of the case unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral turpitude. Given that membership in the legal profession demands a high degree of good moral character not only as a condition to admission but also a continuing requirement for the practice of law, the

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defendant has shown in all his actuations that he lacks the fitness to remain in the law profession. Reasoning - Not all cases involving homicide involves moral turpitude. The question as to what may be a crime involving moral turpitude would depend on the individual facts surrounding the case and the surrounding circumstances. - In the case at bar, it was shown that Dizon was the aggressor as he pursued and shot complainant when the latter least expected it. The actuations of the victim in this case can be considered as reasonable actions clearly intended to fend off the attack of Dizon. - The defendants use of an unlicensed firearm and his ref usal to satisfy his civil liability to the victim is a serious transgression of Canon 1 of the code of Professional Responsibility. - Defendant has continuously display his dishonest and duplicitous behavior by first seeking to arrive at an out of court settlement with the family and when the same failed, making it appear that it was the family would sought a conference with him. He also lied to the court by claiming that he incident was the result of the mauling he got at the hands of the victim and two other persons. This story was belied by the physical evidence as testified to by no less than three doctors. Disposition Manuel Dizon is disbarred and his name is stricken from the roll of attorneys. CASTILLO VDA. DE MIJARES V VILLALUZ REGALADO; June 19, 1997 (cha mendoza) NATURE Petition for the disbarment on the grounds of grossly immoral and grave misconduct FACTS -Complainant is the presiding judge of Branch 108 of the RTC of Pasay City while respondent is a consultant at the Presidential Anti Crime Commission, and a retired justice of the Court of Appeals -Complainant was widowed by the presumption of death of her 1st husband, upon a decree of presumption of death after 16-year absence -Complainant and respondent met sometime in 1977when respondent was the presiding judge of the Criminal Circuit Court in Pasig for the murder case involving the death of the complainants son. Since then, the respondent became a close family friend. -On January 7, 1994, the complainant and the respondent got married in a civil wedding, with all the essential and formal requisites present. -On the afternoon of their wedding day, the respondent fetched the complainant from her house in QC to stay in the respondents condo unit. There was a phone call and when the complainant answered, a woman was on the other end of the line offending the complainant with insulting remarks. The complainant confronted the respondent about the caller and the confrontation ended up in a heated exchange of words, to the point where the respondent said to the complainant, Ayaw ko nang ganyan! Ang gusto ko sa babae, 'yong sumusunod sa bawa't gusto ko'. Get that marriage contract and have it burned." With that, the complainant left the respondent and after that, they never contacted each other again. -Several months after, in a bible study session, the complainant learned from Manila RTC Judge Ramon Makasiar, a member of the bible group, that he (Judge Makasiar) solemnized the marriage between the respondent and a certain Lydia Geraldez. After hearing that, on June 6, 1995 the complainant filed the instant Complaint for Disbarment against him (Exh. "A"). -On August 7, 1995, when complainant discovered that the respondent falsified his marriage contract (Exh C.) dated May 10, 1994 by stating that he is single, the complainant executed against respondent her "Supplemental Complaint Affidavit for Falsification" (Exhs. "D" and "D1"). The complainant also presented the Marriage Contract between her and respondent (Exh. "B"), the Order declaring her first husband, Primitivo Mijares, presumptively dead (Exh. "E"); and Affidavit of Judge Myrna Lim Verano, who solemnized the marriage between her (complainant) and respondent (Exhs. "F" and "F-1"). Respondents claim The respondent claimed that he only voluntarily signed the Marriage Contract bet. Him and the complainant in an effort to help the complainant in the administrative case for immorality filed against her by her legal researcher in 1993 and that their marriage was just a sham marriage -Also, he claims that when he got married to the complainant, his first marriage with Librada Pea was still subsisting because the decision declaring its annulment had not yet become final and executory (required publication not yet done), as certified by Mrs. Nelia B. Rosario, Acting Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 37 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Exh. "4"). ISSUE WON the respondent is guilty of gross immorality and grave misconduct? HELD YES, respondent is undeniably guilty of deceit and grossly immoral conduct. Ratio The nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that he shall be a person of good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent for admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law Reasoning The respondent made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. A former Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court, and, thereafter, a Justice of the Court of Appeals is surely conversant with the legal maxim that a wrong cannot be righted by another wrong, if granted that he was just helping the complainant in the administrative case filed against her. -The respondent gave his voluntary consent to the marriage, and with all the legal requisites for the marriage present, he should have known that his marriage with the complainant was valid. -the respondent stated under oath that his marriage with Librada Pea had been annulled by a decree of annulment, when he (respondent) took Lydia Geraldez as his wife by third marriage, and therefore, he is precluded, by the principle of estoppel, from claiming that when he took herein complainant as his wife by second marriage, his first marriage with Librada Pea was subsisting and unannulled. Disposition WHEREFORE, finding herein respondent, former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz, GUILTY of immoral conduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years effective upon notice hereof, with the specific WARNING that a more severe penalty shall be imposed should he commit the same or a similar offense hereafter. SO ORDERED.

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ESTRADA V SANDIGANBAYAN PER CURIAM; November 25, 2003 (boots tirol) NATURE RESOLUTION of the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court FACTS -Joseph Estrada, through Atty Alan Paguia, filed a Petition for Certiorari under the Rules of Court against Sandiganbayan, which prayed 1. That Chief Justice Davide and the rest of the members of the Honorable Court disqualify themselves from hearing and deciding the petition; 2. That the assailed resolutions of the Sandiganbayan be vacated and set aside; and 3.That Criminal Cases No. 26558, No. 26565 and No. 26905 pending before the Sandiganbayan be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. -Atty Paguia, speaking for Estrada, asserted that the inhibition of the members of the SC from hearing the petition is called for under Rule 5.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct prohibiting justices or judges from participating in any partisan political activity which proscription, according to him, the justices have violated by attending the EDSA 2 Rally and by authorizing the assumption of Vice-President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to the Presidency in violation of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contended that the justices have thereby prejudged a case that would assail the legality of the act taken by President Arroyo. The subsequent decision of the Court in Estrada v. Arroyo is, according to petitioner, a patent mockery of justice and due process. -The SC dismissed the petition for lack of merit (Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of discretion) and the SC warned Atty Paguia of his conduct -- his attacks on the Court and making public statements on the case (violating Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility). He was given 10 days SHOW CAUSE why he should not be sanctioned for conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of the Court. - On 10 October 2003, Atty. Paguia submitted his compliance with the show-cause order. In a three-page pleading, Atty. Paguia, in an obstinate display of defiance, repeated his earlier claim of political partisanship against the members of the Court (for discussion on political partisanship please see original case), and continued to make public statements about Estradas case. ISSUES WON Atty Paguia should be suspended from the practice of law HELD YES. -Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that the lawyer should observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers and, indeed, should insist on similar conduct by others. In liberally imputing sinister and devious motives and questioning the impartiality, integrity, and authority of the members of the Court, Atty. Paguia has only succeeded in seeking to impede, obstruct and pervert the dispensation of justice. -The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; it will not denounce criticism made by anyone against the Court for, if well-founded, can truly have constructive effects in the task of the Court, but it will not countenance any wrongdoing nor allow the erosion of the peoples faith in the judicial system, let alone, by those who have been privileged by it to practice law in the Philippines. -The attention of Atty. Paguia has also been called to the mandate of Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibiting a member of the bar from making such public statements on a case that may tend to arouse public opinion for or against a party. Regrettably, Atty. Paguia has persisted in ignoring the Courts well-meant admonition. The Court has already warned Atty. Paguia, on pain of disciplinary sanction, to become mindful of his grave responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court. Apparently, he has chosen not to at all take heed. Disposition Atty Paguia indefinitely suspended from the practice of law ZALDIVAR V GONZALES PER CURIAM; October 7, 1988 (joey capones) NATURE Petition to review the decision of the Sandiganbayan FACTS Enrique A. Zaldivar had a pending case for graft and corruption in the Sandiganbayan initiated by Tanodbayan Gonzalez. Zaldivar filed a petition in the SC alleging that Gonzalez, as Tanodbayan and under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, was no longer vested with power and authority independently to investigate and to institute criminal cases for graft and corruption against public officials and employees, and hence the information filed in his criminal cases were all null and void. The SC issued a temporary restraining order. Petitioner later filed another petition because Gonzalez filed additional criminal charges against petitioner and five other individuals. Gonzalez instituted another criminal case in the Sandiganbayan. Four days later, the SC issued another TRO. Zaldivar then filed a petition to cite in contempt Special Prosecutor Gonzalez for filing new information before the Sandiganbayan and for making contemptuous statements to the media. In a news art in the Phil Daily Globe, Gonzalez made the ff. statements: (1) while the rich and influential persons get favorable actions from the SC, its difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due course, (2) while Pres. Aquino had been prodding him to prosecute graft cases even if they involve the high and mighty, the SC had been restraining him, (3) while he doesnt wish to discuss the merits of the Zaldivar petition before the SC, He was disturbed that the order can aggravate the thinking of some people that affluent persons can prevent the progress of a trial. The SC ordered the nullification of the criminal cases and for Gonzalez to cease and desist from further acting on Zaldivars case In the motion for reconsideration, Gonzales claimed that 3 handwritten notes, sent by some members of the SC interceding for cases pending before his office, were in his possession. He said that he doubts whether the judges will remain impartial to him, there being at least 4 members who definitely wont, and prayed that these 4 inhibit themselves in the deliberation. When this was denied, he filed a motion to transfer administrative proceedings to the IBP. He also released statements to the press saying, in effect, that the SC deliberately rendered an erroneous decision, that members of the SC have improperly pressured him to render decisions favorable to their friends and colleagues, and that the Sc dismisses judges without rhyme or reason and disbars lawyers without due process. Gonzalez didnt deny

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he said/wrote those statements. exercising his freedom of speech. His defense is that he was just ISSUES 1. WON the SC should punish Gonzalez for contempt of court and give administrative sanctions 2. WON Gonzales is not liable because he was just using his constitutional right of freedom of speech. HELD 1. YES Ratio Statements which constitute gross disrespect of the Court, and degrade the SC and the entire system of justice are clearly contemptuous. The SC should exercise its disciplinary authority over the source. Reasoning The SC cited several cases wherein the Court held that the statements were contemptuous and warranting the exercise of the courts authority. These are: (1). Monteciollo v. Gica Atty del Mar moved to reconsider a decision of the CA with a veiled threat that he should interpose his next appeal to the President. He said the court knowingly rendered an unjust judgment thru negotiations. He was convicted of contempt of court. (2) Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel counsel asked CJ Concepcion and J Castro to inhibit themselves from judging the case since the brother of Castro was the VP of favored party and CJs son was the Secretary of the Board of Investments. He even threatened that if he didnt get a favorable decision, hed bring the case to the World Court and invoke the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid to the Philippines. 3. In re Almacen the SC committed a great unjust to his client; justice administered by the SC wasnt only blind, but also deaf and dumb; hell argue the cause of his client in the peoples forum (published in Manilla Times). Almacen was suspended from the practice of law because he exceeded the boundaries of fair criticism. 4. Paragas v. Cruz counsel alleged that the SC violated the Constitution, which was a ground for impeachment; hoped that an incident wherein 2 SC employees were killed wouldnt happen again (covert threat upon the members of the Court) 5. In re Sotto a newspaper reporter refused to divulge his source and was sent to jail. Atty. Sotto published in a newspaper that the SC erroneously interpreted the law, theyre narrow-minded, and that the members of the SC should be changed. He was held in contempt of Court. 6. Salcedo v. Hernandez Atty Francisco: the Courts resolution is erroneous and is a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls. 2. NO Ratio A lawyers right of free expression may have to be more limited than that of a layman. Reasoning The freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that the freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests. One of the fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. The lawyers duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly administration of justice. [Discussion on the SCs power to discipline its lawyers] The SC, as the regulator and guardian of the legal profession, has plenary disciplinary auth over attorneys. This stems from the Courts Constitutional mandate to regulate admission to the practice of law, which includes as well authority to regulate the practice itself. This is an inherent power incidental to the proper administration of justice and essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. It also has inherent power to punish for contempt, to control in the furtherance of justice the conduct of ministerial officers of the court including lawyers and all other persons connected in any manner with a case before the Court. This is necessary for its own protection against improper interference with the due administration of justice and not dependent upon the complaint of the litigant. There are two related powers here: (1) Courts inherent power to discipline attorneys broader than contempt power; lawyer doesnt need to be in contempt of court to be punished under this; (2) contempt power - may be committed by both lawyers and non-lawyers, in and out of court; if this is done by a lawyer, its usually accompanied with professional misconduct. A lawyer is not just a professional but also an officer of the court and as such, is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society. Any act which tends to obstruct the administration of justice constitutes both professional misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action against him and conduct warranting application of the contempt power. Disposition Atty. Raul M. Gonzales was found guilty of contempt of court in facie curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the Bar. He was suspended from the practice of law indefinitely. CASTANEDA V AGO CASTRO; July 30, 1975 (glaisa po) NATURE - Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS - 1955 Castaneda and Henson filed a replevin suit against Ago in the CFI of Manila to recover certain machineries. -1957 judgment in favor of Castaneda and Henson - 1961 SC affirmed the judgment; trial court issued writ of execution; Agos motion denied, levy was made on Agos house and lots; sheriff advertised the sale, Ago moved to stop the auction; CA dismissed the petition; SC affirmed dismissal - Ago thrice attempted to obtain writ of preliminary injunction to restrain sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution; his motions were denied - 1963 sheriff sold the house and lots to Castaneda and Henson; Ago failed to redeem - 1964 sheriff executed final deed of sale; CFI issued writ of possession to the properties - 1964 Ago filed a complaint upon the judgment rendered against him in the replevin suit saying it was his personal obligation and that his wife share in their conjugal house could not legally be reached by the levy made; CFI of QC issued writ of preliminary injunction restraining Castaneda the Registed of Deeds and the sheriff from registering the final deed of sale; the battle on the matter of lifting and restoring the restraining order continued - 1966 Agos filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to enjoin sheriff from enforcing writ of possession; SC dismissed it; Agos filed a

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similar petition with the CA which also dismissed the petition; Agos appealed to SC which dismissed the petition - Agos filed another petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA which gave due course to the petition and granted preliminary injunction. ISSUE WON the Agos lawyer, encourage his clients to avoid controversy HELD - No. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the annulment of the sheriffs sale, justice demands that the petitioners, long denied the fruits of their victory in the replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the respondents Agos abetted by their lawyer Atty. Luison, have misused legal remedies and prostituted the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the judgment, to the extended prejudice of the petitioners. - Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as an officer of the court, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to become an instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice. - A counsels assertiveness in espousing with candor and honesty his clients cause must be encouraged and is to be commended; what the SC does not and cannot countenance is a lawyers insistence despite the patent futility of his clients position. It is the duty of the counsel to advice his client on the merit or lack of his case. If he finds his clients cause as defenseless, then he is his duty to advice the latter to acquiesce and submit rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his clients propensity to litigate. LEDESMA V CLIMACO FERNANDO; June 28, 1974 (mini bernardo) NATURE Original action in the SC, Certiorari FACTS Petitioner Ledesma was assigned as counsel de parte for an accused in a case pending in the sala of the respondent judge. On October 13, 1964, Ledesma was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Negros Occidental. He commenced discharging his duties, and filed a motion to withdraw from his position as counsel de parte. The respondent Judge denied him and also appointed him as counsel de oficio for the two defendants. On November 6, Ledesma filed a motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, because the Comelec requires full time service which could prevent him from handling adequately the defense. Judge denied the motion. So Ledesma instituted this certiorari proceeding. ISSUE WON a member of the bar may withdraw as counsel de oficio due to appointment as Election Registrar HELD No. 1. The ends of justice would be served by requiring Ledesma to continue as counsel de oficio because: the case has been postponed at least 8 times at the defense's instance; there was no incompatibility between duty of petitioner to defend the accused, and his task as an election registrar. 2. Ledesma's withdrawal would be an an act showing his lack of fidelity to the duty rqeuired of the legal profession. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is burdened with conditions. The legal profession is dedicated to the ideal of service, and is not a mere trade. A lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio to aid in the performance of the administration of justice. The fact that such services are rendered without pay should not diminish the lawyer's zeal. 3. The Constitution provides that the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel. "Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel..." ---manifest the indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the defense of an accused. The right to be assisted by counsel is so important that it is not enough for the Court to apprise the accused of his right to an atty, but is essential that the court assign on de oficio for him if he desires/ is poor. Thus, Ledesma should exert himself sufficiently, if not with zeal, if only to erase doubts as to his fitness to remain a member of the profession in good standing. Disposition Petition for certiorari dismissed.

IN RE: TAGORDA MALCOLM; March 23, 1929 (boots tirol) FACTS Luis Tagorda, a practicing lawyer and a member of the Provincial Board of Isabela admits that the previous election he used a card which states what he can do for the people as a lawyer and a notary public (he can execute deed of sales, etc). He also admits that he wrote a letter to a lieutenant of his barrio asking him to inform the people in any town meetings that despite his election as member of the Board, he will still exercise his profession as a lawyer and notary public, even adding that he will only charge three pesos for registration of their land titles. ISSUES 1. WON Tagorda is guilty of malpractice for soliciting employment 2. WON Tagorda should be disbarred HELD 1. YES. Sec 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure (as amended by Act 2828) states that "The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally, or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." Canons 27 and 28 of the Code of Ethics provide:

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27- The publication or circulation of ordinary simple business cards, being a matter of personal taste or local custom, and sometimes of convenience, is not per se improper. But solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal communications or interviews not warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional... Indirect advertisement for business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interests involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower the tone of our high calling, and are intolerable. 28 -It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do so. Stirring up strife and litigation is not only unprofessional, but it is indictable at common law. It is disreputable to hunt up defects in titles or other causes of action and inform thereof in order to be employed to bring suit, or to breed litigation by seeking out those with claims for personal injuries or those having any other grounds of action in order to secure them as clients A duty to the public and to the profession devolves upon every member of the bar having knowledge of such practices upon the part of any practitioner immediately to inform thereof to the end that the offender may be disbarred. - The law is a profession and not a business. The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through others for to do so would be unprofessional. - With the admitted facts, the respondent stands convicted of having solicited cases in defiance of the law and those canons. 2. NO. The commission of offenses of this nature would amply justify permanent elimination from the bar. But as mitigating circumstances working in favor of the respondent there are: first, his intimation that he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts, second, his youth and inexperience at the bar, and third, his promise not to commit a similar mistake in the future. ULEP V LEGAL CLINIC REGALADO; June 17, 1993 (dahls salamat) FACTS - Petitioner prays that respondent cease and desist from issuing ads similar to annexes A and B and to prohibit them from making ads pertaining to the exercise of the law professions other than those allowed by law - Annex A SECRET MARRIAGE? P560 for a valid marriage Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. ANNULMENT. VISA. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC. Pls call: 5210767, 5217232, 5222041 8:30am-6pm 7F Victoria Bldg, UN Ave, Mla - Annex B GUAM DIVORCE DON PARKINSON An Atty in Guam, is giving FREE BKS on Guam Divorce thru the Leg Clinic beg Mon-Fri during office hours Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Probs, Visa ext. Quota/Non-quota Res and Special Retirees Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Sp/Shil. Call Marivic THE LEGAL CLINIC, etc Petitioners Claim: -Ads are unethical and demeaning of the law profession and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar. -As a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the ads Respondents Comment: -They are not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of leg support services thru paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines - Even if they are leg services, the act of advertising them should be allowed under Bates v. State bar of Arizona ISSUES 1. WON the services offered by The Legal Clinic constitutes practice of law? 2. WON their services can be advertised? HELD 1. Yes. The Practice of law involves any activity, in or out of the court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and expertise - To engage in the practice is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession; to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge/skill - Not limited to the conduct of cases in court; includes legal advice and counsel and preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are secured regardless of WON theyre pending in court 3 types of legal profession activity: 1. legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations 2. preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman 3. appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty and property according to law, in order to assist in proper inter and enforcement of law Respondents description of its services shows it falls within the practice of law: Giving info by paralegals to laymen and lawyers thru the use of comps and modern info tech - computerized legal research, document search, evidence gathering, locating parties/witnesses to a case, fact finding investigations, assistance to laymen in need of services from agencies like birth, marriage, prop, bus registrations, etc. *even if some of the services offered merely involve mechanical and technical know how like installing computer system for law offices, this doesnt make it an exception to the general rule - gives out leg info to laymen and lawyersnot non-advisory and nondiagnostic ex. foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption have to explain to client the intricacies of the law and advise him on the proper course of action - what its ads represent and what it will be paid for

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- It doesnt matter that they dont represent clients in court since practice of law isnt limited to ct appearances but also leg research, leg advice and drafting contracts Phil Star Art Rx for Leg Probs, int by proprietor Atty Nogales: - Takes care of probs as complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic sit - lawyers, who like drs, are specialists in various fields and can take care of it (taxation, crim law, medico-leg probs, labor, litigation, fam law) - backed up by paralegals, counselors and attys - caters to clients who cant afford big firms - can prepare a simple deed of sale or affidavit of loss and also those w/ more extensive treatment -The fact that they employ paralegals to carry out its services doesnt matter; whats important is that its engaged in the practice of law cause of the nature of the services it renders, which brings it within the statutory prohibitions against ads only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar and whos in good and regular standing is entitled to the practice of law - public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character to protect the public, court, client and bar from incompetence/dishonesty of those unlicensed to the practice and not subject to the discipline of court 2.No. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer, in making known his legal services, shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective info/statement of facts - not supposed to use any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement re his qualifications/legal services - not supposed to pay representatives of the mass media in return for publicity to attract legal business Canons of professional Ethics (before CPR) provides that lawyers shouldnt resort to indirect ads for professional employment like furnishing newspaper comments, publishing his pictures with causes the lawyers been engaged in, importance of his position and other selflaudation Stands of legal profession condemn lawyers advertisement of his talents like a merchant does of his goods because of the fact that law is a profession. The canons of profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct Good and efficient service to a client and the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention; this shouldnt be done thru propaganda EXCEPTIONS: 1. expressly allowed publication in reputable law lists of informative data thats not misleading and may include only: name, professional assoc, adds, nos, branches of law practiced, date and place of birth and admission to the bar, schools attended w/ dates of grad, degrees , public offices, posts of honor, legal authorships, legal teaching positions, membership and offices in bar association, legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities, listings in other reputable law lists, names and adds of references with written consent and clients regularly represented - cant be mere supplemental feature of paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical thats published for other purposes - never in a law list that are calculated or likely to deceive/injure the public/the bar or lower the dignity/standing of the profession - ordinary simple professional card allowed name, law firm, add, no and special branch of law practiced - publication of simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or change in partnership, assoc, firm name or office add, for the convenience of the profession - have name listed in phone directory but not under designation of special branch of law 2. necessarily implied from the restrictions Bates v. State Bar of Arizona: allowed lawyer to publish a statement of leg fees for an initial consultation or give, upon request, a written schedule of fees or estimate for spec servicess as an exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers - none expressly/impliedly provided for in the Canons of Professional Ethics or Code of Professional Responsibility *survey conducted by the American Bar Assoc on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing TC commercials pub opinion dropped significantly: Trustworthy 71-14% Professional 71-14% Honest 65-14% Dignified 45-14% With the present situation of our legal and judicial system, to allow the publication of like advertisements would aggravate whats already a deteriorating pub of the legal profession whose integritys been under attack by media and the community in general - all efforts should be made to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the leg profession Atty Nograles (prime incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of the Leg Clinic) is REPRIMANDED w/ a warning that a repetition will be dealt w/ more severely for misbehavior in advertising his servIces and aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law KHAN, JR. V SIMBILLO YNARES-SANTIAGO; August 19, 2003 (apple maramba) NATURE ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court and SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari. FACTS - Atty. Rizalino Simbillo publicized his legal services in the July 5, 2000 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer via a paid advertisement which read: Annulment of Marriage Specialist 532-4333/521-2667. - A staff member of the Public Information Office of the Supreme Court took notice and called the number posing as an interested party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who said that her husband was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within four to six months, and that the fee was P48,000.

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- Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information Office revealed that similar ads were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of the Philippine Star. - Atty. Ismael Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of the Public Information Office filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. - The case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. - IBP found respondent guilty - Respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied - Hence, this petition for certiorari ISSUE WON Atty. Rizalino Simbillo is guilty of violating Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court HELD Yes. Petitioner was suspended from the practice of law for one year and was sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely. Ratio The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money is the primary consideration. Reasoning - Rule 2.03 - A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business. - Rule 3.01 - A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. - Rule 138, Sec 27 of the Rules of Court states: Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore.A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so. - The following elements distinguish legal profession from business: 1. A duty of public service 2. A relation as an officer of the court to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability 3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary 4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients. - Respondent advertised himself as an Annulment Specialist, and by this he undermined the stability and sanctity of marriageencouraging people who might have otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained form dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so. - Solicitation of legal business sis not altogether proscribed, however, for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. DACANAY V BAKER & MCKENZIE AQUINO; May 10, 1985 (ice baguilat) NATURE Administrative Case FACTS Dacanay seeks to enjoin Torres and 9 other lawyers from practicing law under Baker & McKenzie (a law firm organized in Illinois, USA). Torres used the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie on a letter to Rosie Clurman that asks her to release 87 shares of Cathay Products Intl. Inc. to HE Gabriel (a client). Dacanay denied any liability of Clurman and asked whether she is being represented by Baker & McKenzie as counsel as well as the purpose of the letterhead. No reply coming from Clurman thus this Administrative Case. ISSUE WON the lawyers should be enjoined from practicing law under Baker & McKenzie HELD Yes, they should be enjoined. Baker & McKenzie is an alien law firm and cannot practice law in the country. Using the name constitutes representation of being associated with the firm which is deemed to be unethical. Respondents are enjoined from practicing law under the firm name Baker & McKenzie. SAMONTE V GATDULA GONZAGA-REYES; February 26, 1999 (athe odi) NATURE Administrative matter. Grave Misconduct. FACTS - The complainant, Julieta Borromeo Samonte charged Rolando R. Gatdula with grave misconduct consisting in the alleged engaging in the private practice of law which is in conflict with his official functions as Branch Clerk of Court. - The complainant represents her sister as plaintiff in a civil case for ejectment. Contrary to their expectation that execution will proceed, they instead received a temporary restraining order. Santos contends that the order was hasty and irregular as she was never notified of the application for preliminary injunction. - Gatdula, when asked by the complainant of the reason of the decision, blamed Santos lawyer for writing the address in the complaint for ejectment and told her that if she wanted the execution to proceed, she should change her lawyer and retain the law office of respondent, at the same time giving his calling card with the name Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera. - The decision of the Court continued not to be favorable to Samonte, which cause her to file administrative complaint against Gatdula. ISSUE WON Gatdula is guilty of infraction

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HELD Yes. The inclusion/retention of his name in the professional card constitutes an act of solicitation which violates Section 7, sub-par. (b)(2) of RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees) which declares it unlawful for a public official or employees to, among others: (2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constituion or law, provided that such practice will not conflict with official functions. Disposition Respondent is reprimanded for engaging in the private practice of law. He is further ordered to cause the exclusion of his name in the firm name of any office engaged in the private practice of law. CRUZ V SALVA MONTEMAYOR; July 25, 1959 (chris capul) NATURE Original action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction. FACTS - A certain Manuel Monroy was murdered. CFI Pasay found Castelo, de Jesus, Bonifacio, Mendoza, Berdugo et al. guilty of murder. They all appealed and Castelo sought new trial. Castelo was again found guilty. - Pres Magsaysay ordered reinvestigation. Philippine Constabulary questioned people and got confessions pointing to persons other than those convicted. - Castelo et al wrote to Fiscal Salva to conduct reinvestigation on basis of new confessions. Fiscal conferred w/ SolGen and the Justice Sec decided to have the results of investigation made available to counsel for appellants. - Chief of Phil Constabulary furnished Fiscal Salva copies of the affidavits and confessions. Salva organized a committee for reinvestigation and subpoenaed Timoteo Cruz, who was implicated as instigator and mastermind in the new affidavits and confessions. Cruz counsel questioned jurisdiction of the committee and of Salva to conduct preliminary investigation bec the case was pending appeal in the SC. Counsel filed this present petition. - Salva said he subpoenaed Cruz bec of Cruz oral and personal request to allow him to appear at the investigation. - SC issued writ of preliminary injunction stopping the prelim investigation. ISSUES 1. WON Salva and his committee can push through with the investigation 2. WON Cruz can be compelled to appear and testify before Salva 3. WON Salva conducted the investigation property HELD 1. Yes. - SC believed Salva that it was Cruz who personally reqested to allow him to appear at the investigation. - Normally, when a criminal case handled by fiscal is tried and decided and appealed to a higher court, functions of fiscal have terminated. However, Salva has justified his reinvestigation bec in the orig case, one of the defendants (Salvador Realista y de Guzman) was not included in COLLANTES V RENOMERON PER CURIAM; August 16, 1991 (aida villanueva) FACTS - A complaint of disbarment is filed with a related administrative case against Renomeron of the Registrar of Deeds in Tacloban. - Collantes was the house counsel for V & G Better Homes Subdivision and filed the case with regard to the application of V & G for registration of 163 pro forma Deeds of Absolute Sale with Assignment of lots in its subdivision in Jan 1987. - Feb 16, 1987 no action was made by Renomeron despite follow-ups made by Collantes. Renomeron requested Collantes to submit additional requirements which Collantes complied with. - Renomeron suspended the registration of the documents pending compliance of V&G with certain special agreement between then that V&G would provide Renomeron with a weekly Tacloban-Manil round trip ticket with P2,000 pocket money. He said he would act favorably on their application if that agreement would be fulfilled. - Collantes sent plane fare (P800) to Renomeron through his niece. But pocket money was not given. - Renomeron then imposed additional requirements which angered Collantes, leading the latter to challenge Renomeron to act on the 163 pending applications by V&G within 24 hours. - May 22, 1987 Renomeron denied the application for ambiguity of the subject matter. - Collantes appealed for a reconsideration and elevated the matter to the Administrator of the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration. - The NLTDRA ruled that the documents were registrable. - The NLTDRA recommended Renomerons case to the DOJ and the Secretary of Justice found him guilty. The president then dismissed Renomeron from public service. - A disbarment case was then filed by Collantes against Renomeron. ISSUE the trial. - The duty of a prosecuting attorney is not only to prosecute and secure conviction of the guilty but also to protect the innocent. - Writ of preliminary injunction dissolved. Investigation may continue. - Petition for certiorari and prohibition granted in part, denied in part. 2. No - Under the law, Cruz had right to be present at the investigation but he need not be present. His presence is more of a right than a legal obligation. 3. No - Salva shld have done investigation privately in his office and not publicly in the session hall of Municipal Court of Pasay where microphones were installed and media people were present. He should also not have made the media people ask questions. SC was disturbed and annoyed by such publicity. - Salva is publicly reprehended and censured.

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WON the disbarment case against Renomeron would prosper given the administrative case HELD - Yes, the administrative complaint has to do with his position in public service. The disbarment case has to do with his status as member of the Integrated Bar. - Renomeron violated the lawyers oath. - The Code of Professional Responsibility 1.01 forbids a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. PEOPLE V PINEDA SANCHEZ; July 21, 1967 (jojo mendoza) FACTS - On the night of July 29, 1965, the occupants of the home of the spouses Teofilo Mendoza and Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza in Pugaan City of Iligan, were asleep. It was then that guns (rifle, caliber 22) and paliuntod (homemade gun) were fired in rapid succession from outside the house. Teofilo Mendoza fell dead. Thereafter, defendants below destroyed the door of the house, entered therein, and let loose several shots killing Neceforo Mendoza, all minor children of the couple and wounding Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza. - Tomas Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and Rufino Borres were indicted before the CFI of Lanao del Norte, as principals, in five (5) separate cases for murder. The five informations were based on facts gathered by the prosecuting attorney from his investigation. - Two of the three defendants in the five criminal cases (Tomas Narbasa and Tambak Alindo) moved for a consolidation thereof into one (1) criminal case. Their plea is that said cases arose out of the same incident and motivated by one impulse. The respondent Judge approved the motion and directed the City Fiscal to unify all the five criminal cases, and to file one single information and drop the other four cases. The City Fiscal sought reconsideration thereof. The respondent Judge denied the motion to reconsider. He took the position that the acts complained of stemmed out of a series of continuing acts on the part of the accused, not by different and separate sets of shots, moved by one impulse and should therefore be treated as one crime though the series of shots killed more than one victim; and that only one information for multiple murder should be filed, to obviate the necessity of trying five cases instead of one. Hence, this appeal to the Court on certiorari with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, and for other reliefs. ISSUE WON the City Fiscal shall file only one information HELD - YES, ruling Article 48 provides for two classes of crimes where a single penalty is to be imposed: first, where a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (delito compuesto); and, second, when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other ( delito complejo). It is to be borne in mind, at this point, that apply the first half of Article 48, there must be singularity of criminal act; singularity of criminal impulse is not written into the law. The respondent Judge reasons out that consolidation of the five cases into one would have the salutary effect of obviating the necessity of trying five cases instead of one. To save time, indeed, is laudable. Nonetheless, the statute confers upon the trial judge the power to try these cases jointly, such that the fear entertained by respondent Judge could easily be remedied. Upon the facts and the law, we hold that the City Fiscal of Iligan City correctly presented the five separate informations four for murder and one for frustrated murder. A rule of presumption long familiar is that official duty has been regularly performed. A prosecuting attorney, by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a particular criminal information where he is not convinced that he has evidence to prop up the averments thereof, or that the evidence at hand points to a different conclusion. This is not to discount the possibility of the commission of abuses on the part of the prosecutor. But we must have to recognize that a prosecuting attorney should not be unduly compelled to work against his conviction. In case of doubt, we should give him the benefit thereof. A contrary rule may result in our courts being unnecessarily swamped with unmeritorious cases. Worse still, a criminal suspect's right to due process the sporting idea of fair play may be transgressed. So it is, that in People vs. Sope, the Court made the pronouncement that "it is very logical that the prosecuting attorney, being the one charged with the prosecution of offenses, should determine the information to be filed and cannot be controlled by the off ended party." - The impact of respondent Judge's orders is that his judgment is to be substituted for that of the prosecutor's on the matter of what crime is to be filed in court. The question of instituting a criminal charge is one addressed to the sound discretion of the investigating Fiscal. The information he lodges in court must have to be supported by facts brought about by an inquiry made by him. It stands to reason then to say that in a clash of views between the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those of the Fiscal's should normally prevail. In this regard, he cannot ordinarily be subject to dictation. We are not to be understood as saying that criminal prosecution may not be blocked in exceptional cases. A relief in equity "may be availed of to stop it purported enforcement of a criminal law where it is necessary (a) for the orderly administration of justice; (b) to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner; (c) to avoid multiplicity of actions; (d) to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights; and (e) in proper cases, because the statute relied upon is unconstitutional or was held invalid." Nothing in the record would as much as intimate that the present case fits into any of the situations just recited. Disposition The writ of certiorari is granted. MISAMIN V SAN JUAN FERNANDO; August 31, 1976 (bry san juan) FACTS - It certainly fails to reflect credit on a captain. in the Metro Manila Police force and a member of the bar, respondent Miguel A. San Juan, to be charged with being the legal representative of certain establishments allegedly owned by Filipinos of Chinese descent and, what is worse, with coercing an employee, complainant Jose Misamin to agree to drop the charges filed by him against his employer Tan Hua, owner of New Cesar's Bakery, for the violation of the Minimum Wage Law. There was a denial on the part of respondent. The matter was referred to the Office

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of the Solicitor-General for investigation, report and recommendation. Thereafter, it would seem there was a change of heart on the part of complainant. That could very well be the explanation for the nonappearance of the lawyer employed by him at the scheduled hearings. The efforts of the Solicitor General to get at the bottom of things were thus set at naught. - Under the circumstances, the outcome of such referral was to be expected. For the law is rather exacting in its requirement that there be competent and adequate proof to make out a case for malpractice. Necessarily, the recommendation was one of the complaints being dismissed. This is one of those instances then where this Court is left with hardly any choice. Respondent cannot be found guilty of malpractice. Respondent, as noted in the Report of the SolicitorGeneral, "admits having appeared as counsel for the New Cesar's Bakery in the proceeding before the NLRC while he held office as captain in the Manila Metropolitan Police. However, he contends that the law did not prohibit him from such isolated exercise of his profession. He contends that his appearance as counsel, while holding a government position, is not among the grounds provided by the Rules of Court for the suspension or removal of attorneys. The respondent also denies having conspired with the complainant Misamin's attorney in the NLRC proceeding in order to trick the complainant into signing an admission that he had been paid his separation pay. Likewise, the respondent denies giving illegal protection to members of the Chinese community in Sta. Cruz, Manila." ISSUE WON a lawyer-public officer may represent a private client during his tenure HELD NO, but since evidence is lacking to discipline Atty. Miguel San Juan, the case is dismissed. The Court noted that the Report of the SolicitorGeneral did not take into account respondent's practice of his profession notwithstanding his being a police official, as "this is not embraced in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides the grounds for the suspension or removal of an attorney. - The conclusion arrived at by the Solicitor-General that the complaint cannot prosper is in accordance with the settled law. As far back as in re Tionko, decided in 1922, the authoritative doctrine was set forth by Justice Malcolm in this wise: "The serious consequences of disbarment or suspension should follow only where there is a clear preponderance of evidence against the respondent. The presumption is that the attorney is innocent of the charges preferred and has performed his duty as an officer of the court in accordance with his oath." The Tionko doctrine has been subsequently adhered to. - This resolution does not in any wise take into consideration whatever violations there might have been of the Civil Service Law in view of respondent practicing his profession while holding his position of Captain in the Metro Manila police force. That is a matter to be decided in the administrative proceeding as noted in the recommendation of the Solicitor-General. Nonetheless, while the charges have to be dismissed, still it would not be inappropriate for respondent member of the bar to avoid all appearances of impropriety. Certainly, the fact that the suspicion could be entertained that far from living true to the concept of a public office being a public trust, he did make use, not so much of whatever legal knowledge he possessed, but the influence that laymen could assume was inherent in the office held not only to frustrate the beneficent statutory scheme that labor be justly compensated but also to be at the beck and call of what the complainant called alien interest, is a matter that should not pass unnoticed. Respondent, in his future actuations as a member of the bar. should refrain from laying himself open to such doubts and misgivings as to his fitness not only for the position occupied by him but also for membership in the bar. He is not worthy of membership in an honorable profession who does not even take care that his honor remains unsullied VITRIOLO V DASIG PER CURIAM; April 1, 2003 (lora alamin) NATURE Administrative case for disbarment filed against Atty. Felina S. Dasig, an official of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED). FACTS - Almost all complainants are high-ranking officers of the CHED. They allege that while respondent was OIC of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, committed acts that are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court - During her tenure as OIC, Legal Services, CHED, attempted to extort from Betty C. Mangohon, Rosalie B. Dela Torre, Rocella G. Eje, and Jacqueline N. Ng sums of money as consideration for her favorable action on their pending applications or requests before her office - Complainants likewise aver that respondent violated her oath as attorney-at-law by filing eleven (11) baseless, groundless, and unfounded suits before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, which were subsequently dismissed. - Complainants charge respondent of transgressing subparagraph b (22), Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 807, for her willful failure to pay just debts owing to Borela Tire Supply and Novas Lining Brake & Clutch as evidenced by the dishonored checks she issued, the complaint sheet, and the subpoena issued to respondent. - Complainants also allege that respondent instigated the commission of a crime against complainant Celedonia R. Coronacion and Rodrigo Coronacion, Jr., when she encouraged and ordered her son, Jonathan Dasig, a guard of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, to draw his gun and shoot the Coronacions on the evening of May 14, 1997. As a result of this incident, a complaint for grave threats against the respondent and her son, was lodged - Complainants allege that respondent authored and sent to then President Joseph Estrada a libelous and unfair report, which maligned the good names and reputation of no less than eleven (11) CHED Directors calculated to justify her ill motive of preventing their reappointment and with the end view of securing an appointment for herself. - The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline concluded that respondent unlawfully used her public office in order to secure financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the Commission on Higher Education. It was recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for the maximum period allowable of three (3) years with a further warning that similar action in the future will be a ground for disbarment of respondent. - The IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002393, adopting and approving the Report and Recommendation of

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the Investigating Commissioner and Respondent SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years. was PCGG V SANDIGANBAYAN PUNO; April 12, 2005 (marge alias) NATURE Special civil action in the SC. Certiorari and prohibition. FACTS -1976: General Bank and Trust Co. (Genbank) encountered financial difficulties, prompting the Central Bank to extend to it emergency loans reaching a total of P310 million. Despite this, Genbank failed to recover and the following year Central Bank had to issue a resolution declaring Genbank insolvent and ordering its liquidation. A public bidding of Genbanks assets was held; Lucio Tan Group submitted the winning bid. -Former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza field a petition with CFI praying for the courts assistance and supervision in the liquidation as mandated by RA 265, section 29. -After EDSA I, Pres. Aquino established the PCGG to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of Marcos, his family and his cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, PCGG filed a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting, and damages against respondents Lucio Tan Group and the Marcos family. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the 2nd division of the Sandiganbayan (SB). In connection with this, PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on the properties of the Lucio Tan Group. -Lucio Tan Group questioned the writs through petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and injunction with the SC. The latter referred the cases to the SB for proper disposition. In these cases docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 Lucio Tan Group was represented by their counsel, former SolGen Estelito Mendoza who has then resumed private practice. -05 Feb 1991: PCGG, invoking Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), filed motions to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents in Civil Case Nos. 0005 & 0096-0099. The motions allege that Atty. Mendoza intervened in the acquisition of Genbank by the Lucio Tan Group when, in his capacity as then SolGen, he advised the Central Banks officials on the procedure to bring about Genbanks liquidation& appeared as counsel for the central Bank in connection with its petition for assistance in the liquidation. -22 April 1991: SB denied the motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005 for PCGGs failure to prove the existence of an inconsistency between Mendozas former function as SolGen and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group; it also ruled that Mendozas appearance as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. was beyond the one-year prohibited period under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 since he ceased to be Solicitor General in the year 1986. PCGG did not file a MFR. -When Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 were transferred from the SBs 2nd Division to the 5th Division, the latter also denied the motion to disqualify. PCGGs MFR was denied. Hence this petition. ISSUE WON respondent attorney-at-law, as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of Legal Services, CHED, may be disciplined by this Court for her malfeasance, considering that her position, at the time of filing of the complaint, was Chief Education Program Specialist, Standards Development Division, Office of Programs and Standards, CHED. HELD YES. Ratio Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. However, if said misconduct as a government official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar. The Attorneys Oath is the source of the obligations and duties of every lawyer and any violation thereof is a ground for disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary action. The Attorneys Oath imposes upon every member of the bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice. Said duty is further stressed in Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Reasoning Respondents misconduct as a lawyer of the CHED is of such a character as to affect her qualification as a member of the Bar, for as a lawyer, she ought to have known that it was patently unethical and illegal for her to demand sums of money as consideration for the approval of applications and requests awaiting action by her office. - Respondents demands for sums of money to facilitate the processing of pending applications or requests before her office violates such duty, and runs afoul of the oath she took when admitted to the Bar. Such actions likewise run contrary to Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. - A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional obligations. Hence, the Code of Professional Responsibility, was not meant to govern the conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including those in government service. This is clear from Canon 6 of said Code. - Respondents attempts to extort money from persons with applications or requests pending before her office are violative of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits members of the Bar from engaging or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of Rule 6.02 of the Code which bars lawyers in government service from promoting their private interests. Promotion of private interests includes soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of his office or which may be affected by the functions of his office. Respondents conduct in office falls short of the integrity and good moral character required from all lawyers, specially from one occupying a high public office. For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Disposition Respondent was found liable for gross misconduct and dishonesty in violation of the Attorneys Oath as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility, and was ordered DISBARRED.

KEY ISSUE WON Rule 6.03 of the CPR applies to Atty. Mendoza. Rule 6.03: A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept

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engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service. Obiter The History of Rule 6.03 -17th and 18th centuries: ethical standards for lawyers were pervasive in England and other parts of Europe; the principal thrust of the standards was directed towards the litigation conduct of lawyers. It underscored the central duty of truth and fairness in litigation as superior to any obligation to the client. -colonial and early post-revolutionary America: The forms of lawyer regulation did not differ markedly from those in England. Only three of the traditional core duties can be fairly characterized as pervasive in the formal, positive law of the colonial and post-revolutionary period: the duties of litigation fairness, competency and reasonable fees. -19th century: the dark ages of legal ethics in the United States. -mid 19th century: American legal reformers were filling the void in two ways: (1) David Dudley Field, the drafter of the highly influential New York Field Code, introduced a new set of uniform standards of conduct for lawyers; (2) legal educators, such as David Hoffman and George Sharswood, and many other lawyers were working to flesh out the broad outline of a lawyer's duties. -As in the colonial and early post-revolutionary periods, these standards were isolated and did not provide a comprehensive statement of a lawyer's duties. -end of 19th century, a new form of ethical standards began to guide lawyers in their practice the bar association code of legal ethics. The bar codes were detailed ethical standards formulated by lawyers for lawyers. 2 primary sources of ethical guidance: academic discourses & the bar association codes -1887: Alabama - the 1st state with a comprehensive bar association code of ethics. 1887 Alabama Code of Ethics was the model for several states codes, and it was the foundation for the American Bar Association's (ABA) 1908 Canons of Ethics. -1917: Philippine Bar Association adopted as its own, Canons 1 to 32 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics. -1924: some ABA members start to question the form and function of the canons. Among their concerns was the revolving door or the process by which lawyers and others temporarily enter government service from private life and then leave it for large fees in private practice, where they can exploit information, contacts, and influence garnered in government service. (a) Adverse-interest conflicts - exist where the matter in which the former government lawyer represents a client in private practice is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt with while employed by the government and the interests of the current and former are adverse. (b) Congruent-interest representation conflicts are unique to government lawyers and apply primarily to former government lawyers. -ABA attempted to correct and update the canons through new canons, individual amendments and interpretative opinions. To deal with problems peculiar to former government lawyers, Canon 36 was minted to disqualify such lawyers both for adverse-interest conflicts and congruent-interest representation conflicts. Canon 36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of which he has previously acted in a judicial capacity. A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ should not, after his retirement, accept employment in connection with any matter he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ. -1946: the Philippine Bar Association again adopted as its own Canons 33 to 47 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics. -mid 20th century: growing consensus that the ABA Canons needed more meaningful revision. 1964: ABA President-elect Lewis Powell asked for the creation of a committee to study the adequacy and effectiveness of the ABA Canons. The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to replace it with Canon 9 in the 1969 ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 9 states: A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety. -The drafting committee reformulated the canons into the Model Code of Professional Responsibility which was approved by the ABA House of Delegates in August 1969. Canon 9 was supplemented by Disciplinary Rule 9-101(b): A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter in which he had substantial responsibility while he was a public employee. -Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained unsatisfied with the results and indefinite standards. -August 1983: ABA adopted new Model Rules of Professional Responsibility, doing away with Canon 9, citing the hopeless dependence of the concept of impropriety on the subjective views of anxious clients as well as the norms indefinite nature. -1980: Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) adopted a proposed Code of Professional Responsibility which it submitted to SC for approval. The Code was drafted to reflect the local customs, traditions, and practices of the bar and to conform with new realities. -21 June 1988: SC promulgated the Code of Professional Responsibility. CPR Rule 6.03 which deals particularly with former government lawyers retained the general structure of paragraph 2, Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics but replaced the expansive phrase investigated and passed upon with the word intervened. It is, therefore, properly applicable to both adverseinterest conflicts and congruent-interest conflicts. SUB-ISSUES 1. WON this case involves the adverse interest aspect of Rule 6.03 2. WON there exists a congruent-interest conflict sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from representing the Lucio Tan Group. 2a. WON Atty. Mendozas act of advising the Central Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate Genbank is included within the concept of matter under Rule 6.03 2b. WON the intervention of Atty. Mendoza in the liquidation of Genbank is significant and substantial HELD 2a. NO. Ratio American Bar Association Formal Opinion 342s definition of matter : any discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct involving a particular situation and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law. Reasoning Based on PCGGs case for disqualification, the matter or the act of Atty. Mendoza as Solicitor General involved here is advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said banks liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila.

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-The procedure of liquidation is given in black and white in Republic Act No. 265, sec. 29. Said legal provision provides for the role of the SolGen in proceedings upon insolvency. -Also, CPR Rule 6.03 cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a SolGen in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 (liquidation of Genbank) is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096 (sequestration of the stocks in Allied Bank, the successor of Genbank, on the ground that they are ill-gotten). 2b. NO. Ratio in light of the history of CPR Rule 6.03, the 2nd meaning is more appropriate to give to the word intervention. The intervention cannot be insubstantial and insignificant. Reasoning 2 interpretations of the intervene (basis: Webster): (a) intervene includes participation in a proceeding even if the intervention is irrelevant or has no effect or little influence. (b) intervene only includes an act of a person who has the power to influence the subject proceedings. -The petition in the special proceedings is an initiatory pleading, hence, it has to be signed by Atty. Mendoza as the then sitting Solicitor General. The record is arid as to the actual participation of respondent Mendoza in the subsequent proceedings. -The principal role of the court in this proceeding for dissolution is to assist the Central Bank in determining claims of creditors against the Genbank. The role of the court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding, the participation of the Office of the Solicitor General is not that of the usual court litigator protecting the interest of government. Obiter Balancing Policy Considerations -CPR Rule 6.03 represents a commendable effort on the part of the IBP to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in the government service. It should not be interpreted to cause a chilling effect on government recruitment of able legal talent. -At present, it is already difficult for government to match compensation offered by the private sector and it is unlikely that government will be able to reverse that situation. It is true that the only card that the government may play to recruit lawyers is have them defer present income in return for the experience and contacts that can later be exchanged for higher income in private practice. To make government service more difficult to exit can only make it less appealing to enter. -In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye on its use as a litigation tactic to harass opposing counsel as well as deprive his client of competent legal representation. The danger that the rule will be misused to bludgeon an opposing counsel is not a mere guesswork. -Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the prejudice to the client which will be caused by its misapplication. It cannot be doubted that granting a disqualification motion causes the client to lose not only the law firm of choice, but probably an individual lawyer in whom the client has confidence. -The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a truncated reading of the rule on the official independence of lawyers in the government service. -No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the former government lawyer of the freedom to exercise his profession. Given the current state of our law, the disqualification of a former government lawyer may extend to all members of his law firm. -As well observed, the accuracy of gauging public perceptions is a highly speculative exercise at best which can lead to untoward results. Notably, the appearance of impropriety theory has been rejected in the 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. -Also the switching sides concern does not cast a shadow in the case at bar. The danger that confidential official information might be divulged is nil, if not inexistent. There are no inconsistent sides to be bothered about in the case at bar. In lawyering for the Lucio Tan Group, Atty. Mendoza is indirectly defending the validity of the action of Central Bank in liquidating Genbank and selling it later to Allied Bank. Their interests coincide instead of colliding. Disposition Petition denied. No costs. SEPARATE OPINION PANGANIBAN [dismiss] -The petition should be dismissed on two grounds: (1) res judicata, specifically, conclusiveness of judgment; and (2) prescription. -The material issue in the present controversy is whether Atty. Mendoza may still be barred from representing these respondents despite (1) a final Order in another case resolving the very same ground for disqualification involving the same parties and the same subject matter as the present case; and (2) the passage of a sufficient period of time from the date he ceased to be solicitor general to the date when the supposed disqualification (for violation of the CPR) was raised. -There is no need to delve into the question of whether Rule 6.03 has been transgressed; there is no need to discuss the merits of the questioned Sandiganbayan Resolutions allowing Atty. Mendoza to represent private respondents in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099. After all, a Resolution issued by the same court resolving the very same issue on the disqualification of Atty. Mendoza in a case involving the same parties and the same subject matter has already become final and immutable. It can no longer be altered or changed. -CPR Rule 6.03 does not expressly specify the period of its applicability or enforceability. But it cannot be inferred that the prohibition is absolute, perpetual and permanent. All civil actions have a prescriptive period. Unless a law makes an action imprescriptible or lays down no other period, the action is subject to a bar by prescription five years after the right of action accrued. (Arts. 1140-1149, Civil Code; Tolentino v CA) SANDOVAL-GUTTIERREZ [dismiss] -In evaluating motions to disqualify a lawyer, our minds are not bound by stringent rules. There is room for consideration of the combined effect of a partys right to counsel of his own choice, an attorneys interest in representing a client, the financial burden on a client of replacing disqualified counsel, and any tactical abuse underlying a disqualification proceeding. -An order denying a motion to disqualify counsel is final and, therefore, appealable. The issue of whether or not Atty. Mendoza should be disqualified from representing Tan et al. is separable from, independent of and collateral to the main issues in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099. In short, it is separable from the merits. Clearly, the present petition for certiorari is dismissible. -The Resolution dated April 22, 1991 in Civil Case No. 0005 constitutes a bar to similar motions to disqualify Atty. Mendoza under the doctrine of res judicata. The PCGG may not relitigate such issue of disqualification as it was actually litigated and finally decided in G.R. Nos. 112707-09.

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-Atty. Mendozas participation in the liquidation of GENBANK does not constitute intervention. CPR Rule 6.03 cannot apply to Atty. Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Special Proceedings No. 107812 is an intervention in a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096. CARPIO-MORALES [grant] -The doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment does not apply since in the case at bar, the question of whether the motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza should be granted is undoubtedly a legal question. Also, this is the first time that the issue to disqualify Atty. Mendoza has been elevated before the SC. -We cannot characterize the denial of PCGGs motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as a final order. It is only interlocutory since it does not finally dispose of the case. -the prohibition in Rule 6.03 is perpetual. It does not prescribe in 5 yrs. -Atty. Mendozas lack of participation in the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK is immaterial. What is material is his role in facilitating the liquidation of GENBANK through his legal expertise. In advising the Central Bank, Atty. Mendoza did not just mechanically point to section 29 of Republic 265. As then Solicitor General, and as a lawyer known for his keen legal acumen, Atty. Mendoza synthesized facts, which by reason of his position he was privy to, and law with a view to successfully liquidate the bank. -While it is desirable to recruit competent lawyers into government service, this does not justify the disturbance of our mores. The canons and rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility must be strictly construed. -While financial considerations are important, they are not the sole factor affecting recruitment of lawyers to the government sector. I would like to think that serving in government is its own reward. One needs only to look at all of us members of this Court to know that money is not everything. All of us have, at one point in our legal careers, been tempted by the promise of financial success that private practice usually brings. But in the end, we decided to take the road less traveled and serve in government. And I would like to believe that each and everyone of us has made a difference. There is more to this mortal coil than the pursuit of material wealth. CALLEJO, SR. [partially grant] -The Code of Professional Responsibility is not designed for Holmes proverbial bad man who wants to know just how many corners he may cut, how close to the line he may play, without running into trouble with the law. Rather, it is drawn for the good man as a beacon to assist him in navigating an ethical course through the sometimes murky waters of professional conduct. (General Motors Corp. v City of New York) -CPR establishes the norms of conduct and ethical standards in the legal profession and the Court must not shirk from its duty to ensure that all lawyers live up to its provisions. The Court must not tolerate any departure from the straight and narrow path demanded by the ethics of the legal profession. -The Resolution denying PCGGs similar motion to disqualify Mendoza was an interlocutory order as it did not terminate or finally dispose of the said case. It merely settled an incidental or collateral matter arising therein. As such, it cannot operate to bar the filing of another motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza in the other cases. -Atty. Mendozas present engagement as counsel for Lucio Tan Group in Civil Case No. 0096 violates the ethical precept embodied in Rule 6.03. -The subject matter in Civil Case No. 0096 is connected with or related to a matter, i.e. the liquidation of Genbank, in which Atty. Mendoza had intervened as the Solicitor General -Rule 6.03 applies even if Atty. Mendoza did not switch sides or did not take inconsistent sides. Rule 6.03 applies even if no conflict of interest exists between Atty. Mendozas former government client (Central Bank) and his present private practice clients (respondents Tan, et al.) -Rule 6.03 purposely does not contain an explicit temporal limitation since cases have to be resolved based on their peculiar circumstances. The peculiar circumstances of this case justify the strict application of said rule. TINGA [partially grant] -Section 6.03 cannot be made applicable in the present case to Atty. Mendoza, as to do so would be violative of his right to due process. Whether it be at the time then Solicitor General Mendoza participated in the process of the dissolution of General Bank in 1977, or at sometime in 1987 when he agreed to represent the respondents, the Code of Professional Responsibility had not yet been promulgated. -The Code of Professional Responsibility was promulgated by the Supreme Court on 21 June 1988. Prior to its official adoption, there was no similar official body of rules or guidelines enacted by the Supreme Court other than the provisions on Legal Ethics in the Rules of Court. -Atty. Mendoza may have violated Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, which some authorities deemed as a source of legal ethics prior to the Code of Professional Responsibility. But the prohibition under Canon 36 was not prescribed by this Court or by statute as a norm until the enactment of the Code of Professional Responsibility in 21 June 1988. Accordingly, when Atty. Mendoza agreed to represent the respondents, there was no definitive binding rule proscribing him from such engagement or penalizing him for such representation. LIM-SANTIAGO V SAGUCIO CARPIO; March 31, 2006 (maia reiza) NATURE Disbarment case FACTS - Ruthie Lim-Santiago is the daughter and administratrix of the property of Alfonso Lim, the former president of Taggat Industries. After his death, Lim-Santiago took over the management of the company. Respondent Carlos Sagucio was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat Industries, until he was appointed Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tuguegarao, Cagayan in 1992. - Some employees of Taggat filed a criminal complaint against LimSantiago for withholding payment of their salaries and wages without valid cause for 1 year and 3 months (1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997). Sagucio, as the asst. Prov. Prosecutor, was assigned to conduct the preliminary investigation. He recommended the filing of 651 Informations for violation of Art288 of the labor code of the Philippines. - Lim-Santiago alleges that Sagucio is guilty of representing conflicting interests, a violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional

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Responsibility (CPR), and of engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor, which is expressly prohibited in RA6713. Sagucio defends himself by saying that he accepted payment from Taggat even after his appointment as government prosecutor but said that such payments were not for representation but for consultancy services. Also, he contends that 5 years have passed since he was connected with the company, thus there was no conflict of interest. ISSUES 1. WON there are conflicting interests in this case 2. WON the private practice of law includes consultancy services 3. WON disbarment is the appropriate penalty HELD - There are no conflicting interests. Sagucio is not guilty of representing conflicting interests as prohibited in Rule 15.03 of CPR. He left Taggat in 1992, and the non-payment of wages occurred in 1996-1997, years after the relation to Taggat has been terminated. In a charge for representing conflicting interests, evidence must be presented to prove that respondent used against the former client any CONFIDENTIAL information acquired through his previous employment. Although a lawyer owes a former client to maintain inviolate of the clients confidence, this responsibility does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyers employment with the client. That he was a former personnel manager and the case is labor-related is not sufficient basis to charge Sagucio of representing conflicting interests. - The payment for consultancy services conducted by Sagucio falls under the private practice of law which is specifically prohibited by RA6713 (the court applies the liberal definition of the practice of law as given in Cayetano v Monson). However, Sagucio cannot be punished for this violation under the CPR, for such violations are not subject to disciplinary action under the CPR. On the other hand, this violation is also a violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 (a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful conduct), thus he can be punished for violating canon 1. The penalty is a suspension of 6 months and 1 day to 1 year (basis is the Civil Service Law and Rules). RE: 1989 ELECTIONS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES PER CURIAM; October 6, 1989 (anton arcilla) NATURE An inquiry into the 1989 Elections of the integrated bar of the Philippines. The Supreme Court, en banc, exercising its power of supervision over the Integrated Bar, resolvd to suspend the oath-taking of the IBP officers=elect and to inquire into the veracity of the reports. FACTS - June 3, 1989, the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) was held at the Philippine International Convention Center (PICC).The newly elected officers were set to take their oath of office on July 4, 1989, before the Supreme Court. However, because of widespread reports about the intensive electioneering and overspending by the candidates, the Supreme Court resolved to suspend the oath-taking of the IBP officers-elect to investigate. - the elections were led by the main candidates for the office of IBP President, namely Attorneys Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce, and Violeta C. Drilon. - Among the allegations were the use of government planes, and the officious intervention of certain public officials to influence the voting, all of which were done in violation of the IBP By-Laws. (poured heart, soul, money and influence to win over the 120 IBP delegates.) - Emil Jurado (Manila Standard) reported that there was rampant votebuying by some members of the U.P. Sigma Rho Fraternity as well as by some lawyers of ACCRA, and that government positions were promised to others by the office of the Labor Secretary. - There was also the billeting of out-of-town delegates in plush hotels where they were reportedly wined and dined continuously, womened, and subjected to endless haggling over the price of their votes xxx which ranged from P15K to P20K, and on election day, to as much as P50K. - In a resolution calling for investigations, the Court called to mind that a basic postulate of the IBP xxx is that the IBP shall be non-political in character and that there shall be no lobbying nor campaigning in the choice of members of the Board of Governors and of the House of Delegates and of the IBP officers. - Article I, Section 4 of IBP By-Laws emphasizes the strictly nonpolitical character of the IBP: SEC. 4. Non-political Bar. the IBP is strictly non-political, and every activity tending to impair this basic feature is strictly prohibited and shall be penalized accordingly. No lawyer holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the government xxx shall be eligible for election or appointment to any position in the IBP or any chapter thereof. Section 14 of By-Laws enumerates the prohibited acts relative to IBP elections: o Distribution of election campaign material; o Distribution of campaign material other that a statement of the biodata of candidate not more than one page of legal paper; o Campaigning for or against any candidate, whle holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, prosecutory office in Govt; o Formation of tickets, single slates, or combinations of candidates, as well as the advertisement thereof; o For purpose of influencing a member, by payment of dues or other indebtedness of the member; giving of food, drink, entertainment, transpo, any article of value; making a promise or causing an expenditure to be made. - Section 12(d) of the By-Laws prescribes the sanctions: o Violation of the by-laws of the IBP shall be a ground for the disqualification of a candidate or his removal from office if elected, without prejudice to the imposition of sanctions upon any erring member xxx - Atty. Paculdo admitted having spent some P250K during his three weeks of campaigning; Atty. Nisces hotel bills at the Hyatt amounted to P216K ++, not including previous expenses for his campaign; Atty . Drilons campaign rang up over P600K in hotel bills (Westin). ISSUE WON the candidates are guilty of massive electioneering, inappropriate use of government resources, and vote-buying during the IBP national elections. HELD

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Ratio - IBP elections should be as they are annulled. - The provisions of the IBP By-Laws for direct election by the House Delegates of officers, IBP President, and exec. VP be repealed. - Former sstem of IBP President and Exec. VP elected by Board of Governors from among themselves should be restored. - At the end of Presidents 2-year term, the EVP shall automatically succeed to the office of the president. The incoming board of governors shall elect an EVP from among themselves. Reasoning - It is evident that the manner in which the principal candidates for the national positions in the Integrated Bar conducted their campaign preparatory to the elections violated Sec. 14 of the IBP By-laws and made a travesty of the idea of a strictly non-political IBP shrined in Sec. 4. - The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only violated the By-Laws of the IBP but also the ethics of the legal profession which imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation to: Obey and uphold the constitutionand the laws; Duty to promote respect for law and legal processes; Abstain from activities aimed at defiance of law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. - It is speculated that the IBP ticket to the Judicial and Bar Council as provided in Art. VIII Sec. 8 may be the reason why the position of IBP president has attracted so much interest among the lawyers. - The decision is meant to impress upon participant the seriousness of their misconduct, and to restore the non-political character of the IBP. SANTOS V LLAMAS MENDOZA; January 20, 2000 (dahls salamat) FACTS Petitioners Claim: -Llamas has not indicated proper PTR and IBP OR No and data in his pleadings, he merely indicates IBP Rizal 259060 as his PTS and IBP OR No for 3 years as shown in various court pleadings. -Llamas last payment of IBP dues, as certified by IBP pres, was in 1991 --in the context of Rule 138 section 1 that only a duly admitted member of the bar who is in good and regular stnding is entitled to practice law and Rule 139-A,Section 10 which provides that default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the integrated bar,and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys -respondents track record shows that he was once dismissed as Pasay City Judge, and was convicted of estafa. Respondents Comment: -SC has already dismissed the case for his dismissal as well as the criminal case, and he was in fact promoted as RTC Judge, -Respondent is engaged only in a limited practice of law,his principal occupation being a farmer -Being a senior citizen he is exempt from payment of taxes,and he honestly believes that his dues with the IBP is covered by such exemption -in fact he does not exercise his rights to vote as an IBP member -he is willing to pay his dues should he be in fact not exempt from payment thereof ISSUES 1.WON RA 7432 (Senior Citizen) exempts respondent from payment of his dues with the IBP 2.WON respondent is guilty of misleading the court of his standing with the IBP for using the same IBP OR number for at least six years HELD 1.RA 7432 exempts him only from payment of taxes but not from payment of his association dues such as IBP dues. Since he openly admitted that he was still engaged in the practice of law eventhough his practice is already limited he is still subject to the payment of IBP dues and failure to do so would warrant his suspension under Sec 10 of Rule 139-A. He can only engage in the practice of law by paying his dues and it doesnt matter if his practice is limited. 2.By Indicationg IBP Rizal 259060 in his pleadings, he is guilty of misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he has paid his dues to IBP Rizal Chapter and of violating Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: Rule 1.01-A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,dishonest,immoral or deceitful conduct. CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession,and support the activities of the Integrated Bar. CANON 10 A Lawyer owes candor,fairness nd goodfaith to the court. Rule 10.01- A lawyer shall not do any falsehood,nor consent to the doing of an court;nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice. Disposition Because of his old age, respondent was only suspended from practice of law for one year or until he pays his dues. RE: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS PER CURIAM; February 4, 2004 (chris lao) NATURE ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Bar Scandal. FACTS - On September 22, 2003, the day following the bar examination in Mercantile Law, Justice Jose C. Vitug, Chairman of the 2003 Bar Examinations Committee, was apprised of a rumored leakage in the examination on the subject. He then reported to Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. and to the other members of the Court, recommending that the examination on the subject be nullified and that an investigation be conducted forthwith. - On September 2003, the Court adopted the recommendation of Justice Vitug and resolved to nullify the examination in Mercantile Law and to hold another exam on the said subject against which petitions were filed. The petitions voiced out the support to nullifying the exam on the said subject and not to take another exam due to the emotional, physical and financial burdens it will cause the barristers. Alternative proposals were submitted to the Court. The Court moved to nullify and to spread out the weight of the Mercantile Law among the remaining seven bar subjects. - The Court resolved also to create a Committee composed of three retired members of the Court that would conduct a thorough

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investigation of the incident subject of the September 23, 2003 resolution. The Investigating Committee found that the leaked test questions in Mercantile Law were the questions which the examinee, Atty. Balgos had prepared and submitted to Justice Jose Vitug. His questions constituted 82% of the questions asked in the examination in Mercantile Law in the morning of September 21, 2003, Sunday, in some cases with slight changes which were not substantial and in other cases exactly as Atty. Balgos, 71 years old, proposed. - The circumstances that the leaked test questions consisted entirely of test questions prepared by Atty. Balgos proves conclusively that the leakage originated from his office, not from the Office of Justice Vitug. Atty. Balgos claimed that the leaked test questions were prepared by him on his computer. Without any doubt, the source of the leaked test questions was Atty. Balgos computer. The culprit who stole or downloaded them from Atty. Balgos computer without the latters knowledge and consent, and who faxed them to other persons, was Atty. Balgos legal assistant, Atty. Danilo De Guzman, who voluntarily confessed the deed to the Investigating Committee. De Guzman revealed that he faxed the test questions, with the help of his secretary Villasis to his frat brods in Beta Sigma Lambda Fraternity, namely, Garvida, Arlan, and Erwin Tan. In turn, Garvida faxed the test questions to Iigo and Bugain. Iigo passed a copy or copies to other Betan Guiapal who gave a copy to the MLQU-Beta Sigmas Most Illustrious Brother, Ronald Collado who ordered the printing and distribution of 30 copies to the MLQUs 30 bar candidates. - Atty De Guzmans act of downloading Balgos test questions in mercantile law from the latters computer, without his knowledge and permission, was a criminal act of larceny. It was theft of intellectual property. - Besides theft, De Guzman also committed an unlawful infraction of Balgos right to privacy of communication and to security of his papers and effects against unauthorized search and seizurerights zealously protected by the Bill of Rights of our Constitution. He transgressed the very first canon of the lawyers Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for law and legal processes. - De Guzman also violated rule 1.01 of Canon 1, as well as Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for members of the Bar, which provide: Rule 1.01A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Canon 7A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar. - He is guilty of grave misconduct unbecoming a member of the Bar. Also, the Investigating committee does not believe that he acted alone. Palma, secretary of Atty. Balgos and Atienza knew of the password. Certain brods should also be investigated. The committee does not believe De Guzman did this out of love for the fraternity. There must have been an ulterior material consideration for his breaking the law and tearing the shroud of secrecy that, he very well knows, covers the bar examinations. - Atty. Balgos is also negligent.He could have just used the typewriter considering his lack of adeptness with the computer. ISSUE WON Danilo De Guzman should be disbarred HELD YES. He should be disbarred plus he ought to make a public apology and pay damages to the Supreme Court - Atty. Balgos should be reprimanded by the Court and make a written apology as a result of his negligence. He is not entitled to receive any honorarium as examiner for that subject. - Further examination of the others should be held to show accountability and also to find out how De Guzman was able to secure a copy of the Supreme Courts CALR database without the courts permission. LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUES CHICO-NAZARIO; May 9, 2005 (keefe dela cruz) NATURE Bar Matter in the Supreme Court. Request for Exemption from Payment of IBP Dues. FACTS - Petitioner, Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr., is being assessed P12,035 in IBP dues for the years 1977-2005 - After admittance to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of the Phil Civil Service from 1962 to 1986, then migrated to, and worked in, the US from 1986 to his retirement in 2003. ISSUES WON Petitioners inactivity in the practice of law that is, when he was in the Civil Service and when working abroad, entitles him to exemption from payment of IBP dues. HELD Ratio No. Reasoning - The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire law population. This requires membership and financial support of every attorney as condition sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the SC. This is toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they themselves belong. - Membership in the bar is a privilege (as opposed to a property right) burdened with conditions, one of which is the payment of membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants. Disposition Wherefore, petitioners request for exemption from payment of IBP dues for the years 1977-2005 is Denied within 10 days from receipt of this decision, failure to do so will merit suspension from the practice of law. ZAGUIRRE V CASTILLO PER CURIAM; MARCH 6, 2003 (sarah Cabrera) NATURE Petition for Disbarment on the ground of Gross Immoral Conduct (Adulterous Relationship). FACTS

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- Complainant and respondent met while working in the NBI. Respondent courted complainant and promised to marry her while representing himself to be single. Soon they had an intimate relationship that started sometime in 1996 and lasted until 1997. During their affair, respondent was preparing for the bar examinations which he passed. On May 10, 1997, he was admitted as a member of the Philippine Bar. - It was only around the first week of May 1997 that complainant first learned that respondent was already married when his wife went to her office and confronted her about her relationship with respondent. - On September 10, 1997, executed an affidavit, admitting his relationship with the complainant and recognizing the unborn child she was carrying as his. - On December 09, 1997, complainant gave birth to a baby girl, Aletha Jessa. By this time however, respondent had started to refuse recognizing the child and giving her any form of support. - Respondent claims that: he never courted the complainant; what transpired between them was nothing but mutual lust and desire; he never represented himself as single since it was known in the NBI that he was already married and with children.; complainant is almost 10 years older than him and knew beforehand that he is already married; the child borne by complainant is not his, because the complainant was seeing other men at the time they were having an affair. He admits that he signed the affidavit dated September 10, 1997 but explains that he only did so to save complainant from embarrassment. Also, he did not know at the time that complainant was seeing other men. - The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found Atty. Castillo guilty of gross immoral conduct and recommends that he be meted the penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law. ISSUES 1. WON respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct 2. WON it is relevant to this case if the complainant knew he was married 3. WON the respondent should be disbarred HELD 1. YES - The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the IBP. The Code of Professional Responsibility: Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar. Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. Immoral conduct has been defined as: xxx that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. Furthermore, such conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. *Siring a child with a woman other than his wife is a conduct way below the standards of morality required of every lawyer. Moreover, the attempt of respondent to renege on his notarized statement recognizing and undertaking to support his child by Carmelita demonstrates a certain unscrupulousness on his part which is highly censurable, unbecoming a member of a noble profession, tantamount to self-stultification. - This Court has repeatedly held: as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. *Complainant he seeks understanding from the Court, pointing out that men by nature are polygamous, and that what happened between them was nothing but mutual lust and desire. The Court is not convinced. In fact, it is appalled at the reprehensible, amoral attitude of the respondent. 2. NO *That complainant entered into a relationship with him knowing full well his marital status does not absolve him of gross immorality for what is in question in a case like this is respondents fitness to be a member of the legal profession. It is not dependent whether or not the other party knowingly engaged in an immoral relationship with him. In Mortel vs. Aspiras: In a disbarment proceeding, it is immaterial that the complainant is in pari delicto because this is not a proceeding to grant relief to the complainant, but one to purge the law profession of unworthy members, to protect the public and the courts. *The illicit relationship with Carmelita took place while respondent was preparing to take the bar examinations. Thus, it cannot be said that it is unknown to him that an applicant for admission to membership in the bar must show that he is possessed of good moral character, a requirement which is not dispensed with upon admission to membership of the bar. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to admission to the legal profession, but its continued possession is essential to maintain ones good standing in the profession. 3. NO Clearly therefore, respondent violated the standards of morality required of the legal profession and should be disciplined accordingly. *As consistently held by this Court, disbarment shall not be meted out if a lesser punishment could be given . Records show that from the time he took his oath in 1997, he has severed his ties with complainant and now lives with his wife and children in Mindoro. As of now, the Court does not perceive this fact as an indication of respondents effort to mend his ways or that he recognizes the impact of his offense on the noble profession of law. Nevertheless, the Court deems it more appropriate under the circumstances that indefinite suspension should be meted out than disbarment. The suspension shall last until such time that respondent is able to show, to the full satisfaction of the Court, that he had instilled in himself a firm conviction of maintaining moral integrity and uprightness required of every member of the profession. The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good

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demeanor. Disposition Court finds respondent GUILTY of Gross Immoral Conduct and ordered to suffer INDEFINITE SUSPENSION from the practice of law. TAN V SABANDAL MELENCIO-HERRERA; February 24, 1992 (jat tabamo) FACTS - Nov. 29, 1983 - Court sustained charge of unauthorized practice of law filed against respondent Sabandal and denied the latters petition to be allowed to take oath as member of the Phil. Bar and to sign the roll of attorneys. - From 1984-1988 - Sabandal filed motions for reconsideration all of which either denied or noted without action. - Feb. 10, 1989 Court finally allowed Sabandal to take the lawyers oath after consideration of his plea for mercy and forgiveness, willingness to reform and several testimonies attesting to his good moral character and civic consciousness. However, before a date could be set for Sabandals oath taking, complainants Dagpin, Tan and Boquia each filed motions for reconsideration of the Resolution of Feb, 10, 1989. - Complainant Tan contests the testimonial of IBP Zamboanga Del Norte Chapter (ZDN) certifying that respondent was acting with morality and has been careful in his actuations in the community. Tan claims that said testimonial was signed only by the then President of that IBP chapter, without authorization from its Board of Officers. Attached to her motion was a certification signed by the current IBP ZDN Chapter President Atty. Nuevas, stating that the present Board of Officers had not issued any testimonial attesting to the good moral character and civic consciousness of Sabandal. Tan later on desisted and informed the Court that her relationship with Sabandal has already been restored, as he had asked her forgiveness and that she finds no necessity in pursuing her case against him, even recommending his admission to the legal profession. - Complainants Boquia and Dagpin submitted their own comments vehemently contesting the Courts Resolution setting the date for respondents oath-taking and filed a separate comment as regards complainant Tans personal disposition, questioning whether personal forgiveness is enough basis to exculpate and obliterate their cases - The Executive Judge of ZBN RTC, Judge Pelagio Lachica, in a separate comment stated that he is not well acquainted personally with the respondent and unaware of any acts committed by him so as to disqualify him from admission to the Bar. Said Judge also mentioned that there is a Civil Case, Rep. of the Phil. v. Sabandal which was pending in the Supreme Court. The IBP ZBN chapter also submitted a certification that Sabandal has not been convicted of any crime and that there is no pending criminal case against him, therefore finding no reason to disqualify him from admission to the Bar. - The Court then deferred setting the date of the oath-taking of respondent Sabandal and required Judge Lachica to inform the Court of the outcome of the case Republic v. Sabandal. Judge Pacifico Garcia, who succeeded Judge Lachica, informed the Court on Dec. 12, 1990, that Sabandals case was already considered closed and terminated, and that the principal parties have reached an amicable settlement approved by the trial court. Judge Garcias letter was noted in the Resolution of Jan. 29, 1991, where complainants Tan, Boquia and Dagpin were required to comment on said Judges letter. - On Dec. 20, 1990, a certification was sent by Exec. Judge Jesus Angeles of RTC of ZDN upon request of Sabandal, certifying that he has no pending case with his Court and that he has no cause to object to his admission to the Bar. - Meanwhile, Sabandal reiterated his prayer to be allowed to take the lawyers oath in a motion dated June 8, 1991. The Court again deferred action on the motion pending the complainants compliance with the Jan. 29, 1991 resolution. - Only complainant Tan complied, and stated in a comment dated Aug. 29, 1991, that the termination of Sabandals civil case is proof of his sincere reformation, and repentance. - Finally, in a Manifestation, dated Dec. 6, 1991, Sabandal reiterated his plea to be allowed to take the lawyers oath. ISSUE WON Respondent Sabandal should be allowed to take the lawyers oath HELD Ratio The practice of law is not a matter of right. It is a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to possess good moral character. Although the term good moral character admits of broad dimensions, it has been defined as including at least common honesty. It has also been held that no moral qualification for bar membership is more important than truthfulness or candor. No. The Resolution of Feb. 10, 1989, allowing Sabandal to take the oath 10 years after passing the Bar, was prior to the Court receiving the objections by complainants, and before it had become aware of the gravity of the civil case against him. - As it turned out, the case of Republic v. Sabandal was brought about when Sabandal, by way of his employment as Land Investigator at the Bureau of Lands procured a certificate of free patent over a parcel of land belonging to public domain (which he could not but have known to be public land), which he used as security for mortgage in order to obtain a loan. The Case was eventually settled when respondent surrendered the bogus certificate of title to the government and paid-off the mortgagor. The Solicitor General did not object to the approval of the settlement and even stated that, the amicable settlement may amount to a confession by the defendant. The Court found it manipulative on his part to take advantage of his employment to facilitate such an act and a manifestation of gross dishonesty while in the public service, which cannot be cannot be erased by termination of his case where no determination of his guilt or innocence was made because the suit had been compromised. - The Court also noted that at the time the case was instituted, Sabandal had already been filing motions for reconsideration alleging his good moral character without mentioning the pendency of the civil case against him. His failure to reveal to this Court the pendency of the civil case for Reversion filed against him during the period that he was submitting several motions for reconsideration reveals his lack of candor and truthfulness. - As to the testimonials attesting to his good moral character, they were confined to lack of knowledge of the pendency of any criminal case against him and were obviously made without awareness of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case instituted by the Government against him. Those testimonials can not, therefore, outweigh nor smother his acts of dishonesty and lack of good moral character.

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- That complainants, namely, Boquia and Dagpin have not submitted any opposition to his motion to take the oath, is of no moment. They have already expressed their objections in their earlier comments. That complainant Tan has withdrawn her objection to his taking the oath can neither tilt the balance in his favor, the basis of her complaint treating as it does of another subject matter. Disposition Respondent Sabandal found to be unfit to become a member of the BAR, Courts Resolution of Feb. 10, 1989 is recalled and his prayer to be allowed to take the lawyers oath is denied. TAPUCAR V TAPUCAR PER CURIAM; July 30, 1998 (terry ridon) FACTS - Complainant Remedios Tapucar seeks the disbarment of husband, Atty. Lauro Tapucar, on the ground of continuing grossly immoral conduct for cohabiting with Elena Pena under scandalous circumstances. - Prior to complaint, he has already been charged four times for conduct unbecoming of an officer, and has already been suspended, and dismissed from being a CFI judge - The suspension and dismissal on immorality did not stop him from continue living with Elena and leaving Remedios and her 11 children. He and Elena even moved back to Antipolo from GenSan, where they got married despite the subsistence of a previous marriage - His lawyer-daughter filed the disbarment proceedings, represented her mother, from which the IBP recommended his disbarment ISSUE WON the recommendation for disbarment is justified HELD - The recommendation by the IBP is sufficient to justify his disbarment as a good moral character is not only a condition precedent for admission to the legal profession but must remain intact in order to maintain good standing in the profession. It is essential that we have a high-toned sense of morality - CPR Rule 7.03 is clear that a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public of private life behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession - Lawyers must maintain a high standard of legal proficiency and morality, especially Tapucar as he was once a member of the bench who must be free from impropriety; like judges, lawyers are invested with public trust, that faith and confidence by the public to the law is ensured - As such, the court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for misconduct whether in his professional or personal capacity, but this is only exercised if there is a clear case of misconduct - In case at bar, despite the previous sanctions, he still persisted in his illicit relations and arrogant even, in the face of charges against him. All of these are violative of the lawyers oath and in great disregard of the law BUGARING V ESPANOL DE LEON; January 19, 2001 (ricky cantre) NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated March 6, 1998 of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite, declaring petitioner Rexie Efren A. Bugaring guilty in direct contempt of court. FACTS - The incident subject of the petition occurred during a hearing held on December 5, 1996 of Royal Becthel Builders, Inc. vs. Spouses Luis Alvaran and Beatriz Alvaran, et al., for Annulment of Sale and Certificates of Title, Specific Performance and Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order in the sala of respondent judge Dolores S. Espaol of the RTC of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite. - Pursuant to a motion filed by the previous counsel of Royal Bechtel Builders, Inc., the trial court issued an order on February 27, 1996 directing the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite to annotate at the back of certain certificates of title a notice of lis pendens. Before the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite could comply with said order, the defendant Spouses Alvaran on April 15, 1996, filed a motion to cancel lis pendens. On July 19, 1996, petitioner, the newly appointed counsel of Royal Bechtel Builders, Inc., filed an opposition to the motion to cancel lis pendens. On August 16, 1996, the motion to cancel lis pendens was granted by the court. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was opposed by the defendants. On November 5, 1996, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Resolve, and on November 6, 1996, filed a Rejoinder to Opposition and a Motion for Contempt of Court. - During the hearing of the motion for contempt of court held on December 5, 1996, the following incident transpired (pls see case for full stenographic record of incident): [discussing Deputy Reg of Deeds manifestation that the receiving clerk did not inform him of the court order] ATTY. BUGARING: Yes your Honor please, we know that but we want to be specific because we will be [filing] a case against this receiving clerk who did not [inform] him your Honor please, with this manifestation of the Deputy of the Register of Deeds that is irregularity in the performance of the official duty of the clerk not to inform the parties concerned. COURT: Counsel, the Court would like to find out who this fellow who is taking the video recording at this proceedings. There is no permission from this Court that such proceedings should be taken. ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor, my Assistant. I did not advise him to take a video he just accompanied me this morning. COURT: Right, but the video recording is prepared process and you should secure the permission of this Court. ATTY. BUGARING: Actually, I did not instruct him to take some video tape. COURT: Why would he be bringing camera if you did not give him the go signal that shots should be done. ATTY. BUGARING: This Court should not presume that, your Honor please, we just came from an occasion last night and I am not yet come home, your Honor please. I could prove your Honor please,

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that the contents of that tape is other matters your Honor please. I was just surprised why he took video tape your Honor please, that we ask the apology of this Court if that offend this Court your Honor please. COURT: It is not offending because this is a public proceedings but the necessary authority or permission should be secured. ATTY. BUGARING: In fact I instructed him to go out, your Honor. COURT: After the court have noticed that he is taking a video tape. ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor, in fact that is not my personal problem your Honor please, that is personal to that guy your Honor please if this representation is being . COURT: That is very shallow, dont give that alibi. ATTY. BUGARING: At any rate, your Honor please, we are going to mark our documentary evidence as part of our motion for contempt, your Honor please. COURT: What has the Register of Deeds got to say with this matter? ATTY. CONCEPCION (Deputy Reg of Deeds): Well as I have said before, I have not received any motion regarding this contempt you are talking. I am willing now to testify. ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor I am still of the prosecution stage, it is not yet the defense. This is a criminal proceedings, contempt proceedings is a criminal. ATTY. CONCEPCION: Your Honor please, may I ask for the assistance from the Fiscal. COURT: If this is going to proceed, we need the presence of a Fiscal or a counsel for the Register of Deeds. .................... ATTY. CONCEPCION: As a matter of fact I have a lawyer here, Atty. Barzaga if he is willing ATTY. BARZAGA: Yes, your Honor, I will just review the records. ATTY. BUGARING: Anyway your Honor please, I will not yet present my witness but I will just mark our documentary exhibits which are part of the record of the case and thereafter your Honor please. COURT: You wait for a minute counsel because there is a preparation being done by newly appointed counsel of the respondent, Atty. Barzaga is considered as the privately hired counsel of the register of deeds and the respondent of this contempt proceedings. How much time do you need to go over the record of this case so that we can call the other case in the meanwhile. ATTY. BARZAGA: Second call, your Honor. -----------------COURT: Are you ready Atty. Barzaga? ATTY. BARZAGA: Yes, your Honor. Well actually your Honor, after reviewing the record of the case your Honor, I noticed [quite a long manifestation followed but irrelevant to this case] ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor please, may we proceed your Honor, will first mark our documentary evidence. COURT: You wait until the Court allows you to do what you want to do, okay. The counsel has just made manifestation, he has not prayed for anything. So let us wait until he is finished and then wait for the direction of this Court what to do to have an orderly proceedings in this case. ATTY. BARZAGA: Considering your Honor, that the issues appear to be a little bit complicated [continued manifestation Judge Espaol making intermittent comments] ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor please, it is the position of this representation your Honor please, that we will be marking first our documentary evidence because this is set for hearing for today, your Honor please. COURT: If you are going to mark your evidence and they do not have their comment yet what are we going to receive as evidence. ATTY. BUGARING: If your Honor please COURT: Will you listen to the Court and just do whatever you have to do after the submission of the comment. ATTY. BUGARING: I am listening, your Honor please, but the record will show that the motion for contempt was copy furnished with the Register of Deeds and Diosdado Concepcion. COURT: Precisely, if you are listening then you will get what the Court would want to do. This should be an orderly proceedings and considering that this is a Court of record the comment has to be in first then in your reply you can submit your evidence to rebut the argument that is going to be put up by the respondent and so we will be able to hear the case smoothly. ATTY. BUGARING: My point here your Honor please, is that the respondent had been long time furnished of this contempt proceedings. With a copy of the motion they should have filed it in due time in accordance with the rules and because it is scheduled for trial, we are ready to mark our evidence and present to this Court, your Honor. COURT: (Banging the gavel) Will you listen! ATTY. BUGARING: I am listening, your Honor. COURT: And this Court declares that you are out of order. ATTY. BUGARING: Well, if that is the contention of the Court your Honor please, we are all officers of the Court, your Honor, please, we have also ---- and we know also our procedure, your Honor. COURT: If you know your procedure then you follow the procedure of the Court first and then do whatever you want. ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor please, because we could feel the antagonistic approach of the Court to this representation ever since I appeared your Honor please and I put on record that I will be filing an inhibition to this Hon. Court. COURT: Do that right away. (Banging the gavel) ATTY. BUGARING: Because we could not find any sort of justice in town. COURT: Do that right away. ATTY. BUGARING: We are ready to present our witness and we are deprive to present our witness. COURT: You have presented a witness and it was an adverse witness that was presented. ATTY. BUGARING: I did not. COURT: With respect to this, the procedure of the Court is for the respondent to file his comment. ATTY. BUGARING: Well your Honor please, at this point in time I dont want to comment on anything but I reserve my right to inhibit this Honorable Court before trying this case. COURT: You can do whatever you want. ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor, that is our prerogative your Honor. COURT: As far as this Court is concerned it is going to follow the rules. ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor, we know all the rules. COURT: Yes, you know your rules thats why you are putting the cart ahead of the horse. ATTY. BUGARING: No your Honor, Ive been challenged by this Court that I know better than this Court. Modestly (sic) aside your Honor please, Ive been winning in many certiorari cases, your Honor. COURT: Okay, okay, do that, do that. I am going to cite you for contempt of Court. (Banging the gavel) You call the police and I

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am going to send this lawyer in jail. (Turning to the Sheriff) ATTY. BUGARING: I am just manifesting and arguing in favor of my client your Honor please. COURT: You have been given enough time and you have been abusing the discretion of this Court. ATTY. BUGARING: I am very sorry your Honor, if that is the appreciation of the Court but this is one way I am protecting my client, your Honor. COURT: That is not the way to protect your client that is an abuse of the discretion of this Court. (Turning to the Sheriff) Will you see to it that this guy is put in jail. - Pursuant to said Order, the petitioner served his three (3) day sentence and paid the fine of P3,000. The CA found that it was obvious that the petitioner was indeed arrogant, at times impertinent too argumentative to the extent of being disrespectful, annoying and sarcastic towards the court. It affirmed the order of the respondent judge, but found that the fine of P3,000 exceeded the limit of P2,000 prescribed by the ROC and ordered the excess of P1,000 returned to petitioner. ISSUE WON the contempt order by Judge Espaol had factual basis HELD Yes Ratio The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due administration of justice. Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge and can be punished summarily without hearing. Reasoning Petitioner cannot claim that there was irregularity in the actuation of respondent judge in issuing the contempt order inside her chamber without giving the petitioner the opportunity to defend himself or make an immediate reconsideration. The records show that petitioner was cited in contempt of court during the hearing in the sala of respondent judge, and he even filed a motion for reconsideration of the contempt order on the same day. Petitioners alleged deference to the trial court in consistently addressing the respondent judge as your Honor please throughout the proceedings is belied by his behavior therein: 1. The veiled threat to file a petition for certiorari against the trial court is contrary to Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates that a lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts. 2. The hurled uncalled for accusation that the respondent judge was partial in favor of the other party is against Rule 11.04, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins lawyers from attributing to a judge motives not supported by the record or have no materiality to the case. 3. Behaving without due regard to the trial courts order to maintain order in the proceedings is in utter disregard to Canon 1 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which makes it a lawyers duty to maintain towards the courts (1) respectful attitude in order to maintain its importance in the administration of justice, and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates lawyers to observe and maintain the respect due to the Courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others. 4. Behaving without due regard or deference to his fellow counsel who at the time he was making representations in behalf of the other party, was rudely interrupted by the petitioner and was not allowed to further put a word in edgewise is violative of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Canon 22 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which obliges a lawyer to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and 5. The refusal of the petitioner to allow the Registrar of Deeds of the Province of Cavite, through counsel, to exercise his right to be heard is against Section 1 of Article III, 1997 Constitution on the right to due process of law, Canon 18 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which mandates a lawyer to always treat an adverse witness with fairness and due consideration, and Canon 12 of Code of Professional Responsibility which insists on a lawyer to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. The Court cannot therefore help but notice the sarcasm in the petitioners use of the phrase your honor please. For, after using said phrase he manifested utter disrespect to the court in his subsequent utterances. Surely this behavior from an officer of the Court cannot and should not be countenanced, if proper decorum is to be observed and maintained during court proceedings. A lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his clients cause. He should not forget that he is an officer of the court, bound to exert every effort and placed under duty, to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice pursuant to Canon 12, Canons of Professional Responsibility. He should not, therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the ends of justice per Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Canons of Professional Responsibility, or unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes, in accordance with Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the same Canons. Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration of justice. Any conduct which tends to delay, impede or obstruct the administration of justice contravenes such lawyers duty. Disposition Decision of the CA affirmed. RTC ordered to return to the petitioner, Rexie Efren A. Bugaring, the sum of P1,000 out of the original fine of P3,000. CAMACHO V PANGULAYAN VITUG; March 22, 2000 (kiyo miura) NATURE ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Violation of the Code of Professional Ethics FACTS - 9 students from the AMA Computer College (AMACC), all members of the Editorial Board of DATALINE, allegedly published certain objectionable features - the Student Disciplinary Tribunal found them guilty and the students were expelled - the 9 students appealed but were denied by the AMACC President giving rise to a civil case calling for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction with Camacho as their counsel and Pangulayan and associates representing the defendant, AMACC

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- while the case was pending, letters of apology and re-admission agreements were separately executed by and/or in behalf of the students by their parents - following this, the Pangulayan Law Offices filed a Manifestation stating, among other things, that 4 of the students had acknowledged their guilt and agreed to terminate all proceedings - apparently, Pangulayan procured and effected the re-admission agreements through negotiations with said students and their parents without communicating with Camacho ISSUE WON Pangulayan is guilty of disregarding professional ethics HELD YES, this action violates Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Ethics which states: A lawyer should not in anyway communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel, much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should only deal with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel and he should not undertake to advise him as to law. - respondent violated professional ethics and disregarded a duty owing to his colleague - the Board of Governors of the IBP passed a resolution suspending Pangulayan for 6 months and dismissed the case against the other respondents since they took no part in it - the court concurred with IBPs findings but reduced the suspension to 3 months SUAREZ V SALAZAR RESOLUTION; September 29, 1999 (rean balisi) NATURE Motion to Expunge All Pleading Filed by Atty. Filemon A. Manangan with Motion to Hold Him in Contempt of Court or to Dismiss Petion FACTS At the hearing on the same date, Atty. Filemon A. Manangan admitted that he is not a lawyer entitled to practice law in the Philippines. He is also the same Filemon A. Manangan who was found by the Court in Filemon Manangan v. CFI Nueva Vizcaya, Br.28, decided on August 30, 1999, to be in reality Andres Culanag who is not a member of the Philippine Bar. ISSUE WON Filemon Manangan / Andres Culanag should be held in indirect contempt of the Court HELD Yes. Despite the facts as found by the Court, he has continued to misrepresent himself to be an attorney-at-law and has appeared as counsel for petitioners in this case. Atty. Filemon A. Manangan, who is in reality Andres Culanag, is hereby declared in indirect contempt of this Court. Wherefore, he is hereby sentenced to 3 months imprisonment to be served at the Headquarters of the National Bureau of Investigation, Taft Ave., Manila, until further orders of this Court. AGUIRRE V RANA CARPIO; June 10, 2003 (monch bacani) NATURE Administrative matter on unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law and grave misrepresentation FACTS - On May 21, 2001, one day before respondent Edwin Rana participated the oath-taking of successful bar examinees as member of the Philippine bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar on the ground of unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation. - The Court allowed respondent to take the oath, but did not allow him to sign the Roll of Attorneys. - The complainant charges him with unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct since she claims that he already appeared as counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate of Mandaon, Masbate, George Bunan before the Municipal Board of Canvassers. She also claims that he signed the pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor as counsel for the said candidate. - On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that the respondent is a municipal government employee and as such, he is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body. - On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of acting as counsel George Bunan without the latter engaging respondents services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate. - Respondent claims though George Bunan sought his specific assistance, he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law. He also admitted signing the pleading, but not as a lawyer. - In reply to the charge of violation of law, he claims that he already resigned from the said government post May 11, 2001. He further claims that the complaint is politically charged since the complainant is the daughter of the losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. - In the complainants reply to the respondents comments, she further alleges that on May 19, Emily Estipona-Hao filed a petition for proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor wherein the respondent signed as counsel for her. - On July 17, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confident (OBC). The OBC found that the respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan, as seen in the minutes of the MBEC proceedings. The OBC also believes that respondents unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to the practice of law. ISSUE WON the respondent should be denied admission to the Philippine Bar

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HELD Yes. Records show that he indeed appeared as lawyer for Bunan. He also signed the pleading as his lawyer. In the first paragraph of the same pleading respondent stated that he was the (U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN. Bunan himself also wrote to the MBEC that he had authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him before the MBEC and similar bodies. - Emily Estipona-Hao also wrote to the MBEC that the respondent will be the legal counsel for her party. The respondent also signed the pleading as their lawyer. - All these happened before he took his lawyers oath. It is clear that he engaged in the practice of law. - It is also irrelevant the respondent has already passed the bar and taken his oath, for it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys which makes one a full-fledged lawyer. - As for the charge of violation of law, it is clear that the respondent has already resigned from the said position before appearing as counsel. - On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan indeed authorized respondent to represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice law. Disposition Respondent is denied admission to the Philippine Bar OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR V LADAGA KAPUNAN; January 26, 2001 (jonas azura) NATURE This is an administrative matter in the Supreme Court. Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees which prohibits civil servants from engaging in the practice of their profession. FACTS Respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga, Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC of Makati, represented his cousin Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga as pro bono counsel in a criminal case for falsification of public document. The Court denied respondents request for authorization to appear as counsel and directed the Office of the Court Administrator to file formal charges against him for appearing in court without the required authorization. In his Comment, respondent explained that he and Ms. Ladaga are close blood cousins who belong to a powerless family from an impoverished town in Surigao del Norte. Ms. Ladaga had supported and guided respondent from childhood until he finished his law degree. Because of their close relationship, Ms. Ladaga sought respondents help and advice when she was charged in a criminal case by Lisa Payoyo Andres. Respondent claims that Ms. Andres only purpose in filing the case was to seek vengeance on Ms. Ladaga. He explains that the discord between his cousin and Ms. Andres started when the latters husband, SPO4 Pedro Andres, left the conjugal home to cohabit with Ms. Ladaga. During the course of their illicit affair, SPO4 Andres and Ms. Ladaga begot 3 children. The birth certificate of their eldest child is the subject of the falsification charge against Ms. Ladaga. Respondent stated that he felt it was his duty to accept Ms. Ladagas plea to be her counsel as she could not pay for the services of a lawyer and he was the only lawyer in the family. Respondent also pointed out that in 7 years of government service he had performed his duties with honesty and integrity and it was only in this particular case that he had been administratively charged for helping a close relative by giving free legal assistance for a humanitarian purpose. He never took advantage of his position as branch clerk of court since the questioned appearances were made in the MTC of Quezon City and not in Makati where he is holding office. Respondent also stressed that during his court appearances, he was on leave as shown by his approved leave applications. ISSUES 1. WON respondent violated the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees by appearing as counsel 2. WON respondent obtained written permission from the head of the department as required by Sec. 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules HELD 1. No. Private practice of a profession, specifically the law profession, does not refer to an isolated court appearance. It contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding ones self to the public as a lawyer. The isolated instances when respondent appeared as pro bono counsel for his cousin does not constitute the private practice of the law profession as contemplated by law. 2. No. It is true that respondent filed leave applications corresponding to the dates he appeared in court, which were approved. However, the presiding judge of the court to which respondent is assigned is not the head of the Department contemplated by law. Disposition Respondent is REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that any repetition of such act would be dealt with more severely. HALILI V COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS MAKASIAR; April 30, 1985 (eva sison) FACTS - initial cases involve disputes regarding claims for overtime of more than 500 bus drivers and conductors of Halili Transit; litigation initially commenced with the filing of a complaint for the overtime with the defunct CIR on August 1958; disputes were eventually settled when the contending parties reached an agreement on Dec. 1974 - under the agreement: the Administratrix would transfer to the employees title to the tract of land containing an area of 33,952 sq.m. in San Bartolome, Caloocan and pay in addition the cash amount of P25,000 in full and final satisfaction of all the claims and causes of action of all of the employees against the estate of Fortunato Halili; the union shall withdraw and dismiss the case; the transfer of title and the cash release and quitclaim Halili Enterprises, Halili Transit, Fortunato Halili, his estate, his heirs and successors - a Deed of Conveyance of Real Property was executed - on Aug. 1982, the Union, through Atty. Pineda, filed an urgent motion with the Ministry of Labor and Employment requesting for authority to sell and dispose of the propertymotion was granted - prospective buyer, Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, however, had apprehensions regarding the authority of the Union to sell. So, Atty. Pineda filed a motion with the SC on Dec. 1982

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- but, in an order dated Feb. 1983 Labor Arbiter Raymundo Valenzuela granted the motion; so the sale was consummated on June 1983 and the purchase price was deposited with the Manila Bank-Cubao - When Atty. Jose Espinas, the principal counsel, learned of the sale and apportionment of the proceeds, he requested Labor Arbiter Valenzuela to allow him to look into the records. He was told, however, that the records were missing; it was located for him by Director Pascual Reyes of the NLRC - Atty. Espinas filed the urgent motion with prayer for a temporary mandatory restraining order on August 1983questions the legality of the orders dated Sept. 1982 and Feb. 1983 issued by Labor Arbiter Valenzuela which authorized the sale of the awarded property and the distribution of the proceeds - Movants Union and Espinas prayed for the court to: require Atty. Pineda to deposit with NLRC the amount paid to him representing 35% attorneys fees; require the Halili Drivers and Conductors Union through Domingo Cabading or any of his reps to deposit with the NLRC the 6% union expenses paid to them; implead the Manila Bank-Cubao to require it to prevent further withdrawals of amount deposited in the name of Pineda and the Union; that the order of Valenzuela be nullified insofar as it allows Pineda 35% attorneys fees; NLRC to equitably dispose 20% as fees to all lawyers who participated and any excess amounts to be distributed to the workers - Aug. 1983 Espinas filed a supplement to urgent motion praying for the nullification of Valenzuelas order - the court issued a temporary mandatory restraining order: enjoined Pineda to deposit with NLRC the amount representing 35% attorneys fees (P712,992); directed the Union to deposit with the NLRC 6% union expenses; ordered NLRC and Manila Bank not to allow withdrawals -Union, through Pineda said that the subject matter sought to be enjoined or mandated by the restraining order is moot and academic - Espinas filed a manifestation and motion to require Atty. Pineda and the union to comply with the temporary mandatory restraining order - Solicitor General filed his comment with the recommendations that the orders of Valenzuela be nullified, that the case must be remanded to the NLRC, and that the TRO issued by the court on Sept.1983 be maintained pending final resolution by NLRC - on the mandatory restraining order, Pineda claims that as of Oct. 1983 he had a balance of P2,000 in his account with Manila Bank - resolution of court dated Oct. 1983, the court set aside as null and void the orders of Valenzuela, directed the Manila Bank, Pineda and the Union to comply with the temporary mandatory restraining order issued on Sept. 1983, and remanded cases to NLRC - Oct. 1983 motion was filed to cite Pineda, Union and Bank in contempt - Dec. 1983- rejoinder reiterating plea to declare Pineda and Capuno of the union in contempt of court and to mere out the proper penalty - crucial facts which have surfaced: > then Union President Amado Lopez informed JC Espinas and Associates that the general membership of the said Union had authorized a 20% contingent fee for the law firm > Espinas, the original counsel, established the award of 897 workers claimnotice of judgment in 1968 was served on JC Espinas & Associates; and a notice of judgment in 1970 was sent to Atty. BC Pineda and Associates under the same address as the Espinas firm > when Pineda appeared for the Union, still an associate of the law firm, his appearance carried the firm name BC Pineda and Associates, giving the impression that he was the principal lawyer in the cases > Pineda did not reveal to his partners that he had a retainers contract entered into on Jan. 1967; he did not divulge, only the Union officers knew of the contract > the retainers contract between Pineda and the Union appears anomalous and even illegal: only 14% of the total membership was represented which is a violation of Art.242 of the Labor Code; contingent fees worked to the prejudice of those who were no longer working (Pineda knew that all the workers would be out of work because Halili Transit had already stopped operations in Metro Manila); contract was not notarized > the decision of Manila Memorial Park cemetery to stop questioning the Unions authority to sell and the expeditious manner by which Valenzuela granted motion for such authority make the entire transaction dubious and irregular ISSUE WON Atty. Benjamin Pineda, Ricardo Capuno and Manila Bank-Cubao should be cited in contempt for the alleged failure to comply with the temporary mandatory order and the resolution issued by the SC HELD Ratio a. Atty. Pineda: Atty. Pineda should be cited for indirect contempt. Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful order of a court, any abuse of or any interference with the proceedings of a court, and any improper conduct tending to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice shall be punished as indirect contempts in order to preserve order in judicial proceedings and to enforce judgments, orders and mandates of the court. Atty. Pineda should likewise be subject to disbarment proceedings. The Court may suspend or debar a lawyer whose acts show his unfitness to continue as a member of the Bar. b. Manila Banking Corporation: Manila Banking Corporation is not liable for contempt. When there is a sufficient compliance with the courts order, a party can no longer be liable for contempt of court. c. The Union and its officers are dropped from the within contempt charge. Reasoning a. the court already nullified the orders of the labor arbiter as violative of the due process clause - the act of Pineda of filing a motion in the SC for authority to sell property in question was by itself an admission on his part that he did not possess the authority to sell the property and that the SC was the proper body which had the power to grant such authority - he did not wait for such valid authority but instead previously obtained the same from the labor arbiter whom he knew was not empowered to so authorize - the 45% attorneys lien on award of those union members who were no longer working and the 30% lien on the benefits of those who were still working as provided for in the retainers contract are very exorbitant and unconscionable (under sec.11 rule VIII of Book III, attorneys fees should not exceed 10% of the amount awarded) - the pleadings show a deceitful pattern on the part of Pineda - contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority and admin of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses during litigation - the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts

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- exercise of this power has a twofold aspect: the proper punishment of the guilty party for his disrespect to the court or its order, and to compel his performance of some act or duty required of him by the court which he refuses to perform---> due to this twofold aspect, contempts are classified as civil or criminal - civil: failure to do something ordered to be done by a court or a judge for the benefit of the opposing party -criminal: conduct directed against the authority and dignity of a court or of a judge, as in lawfully assailing or discrediting the authority or dignity of a court or of a judge, or in doing a duly forbidden act - where the punishment imposed is wholly or primarily to protect or vindicate the dignity and power of the court, either by fine or by imprisonment or both, it is deemed a judgment in a criminal case - if made before final decree, contempt judgment will be treated as in the nature of an interlocutory order; if made after the final decree, as remedial in nature, and may be reviewed only on appeal from the final decree - whether civil or criminal does not affect the power of a court to punish it - On Disbarment sec.27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court: attorneys may be removed or suspended for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, for any violation of the lawyers oath, for a willful disobedience of a lawful order of a superior court... - a lawyer may be criminally liable for breach of professional duty, and under the Anti-Graft Act for knowingly inducing a public official to commit an offense b. the bank had transmitted to the NLRC the remaining balance which was a sufficient compliance c. Mr. Capuno clarified that with regard to attorneys fees, Pineda made the Union officers believe that he would be the one to pay the fees of Espinas and Lopez for which reason the 35% increased fees was approved by the Unions board in good faith - Union was aware that Espinas was the principal counsel - they knew of the original contract for 20% attorneys fees Disposition Atty. Pineda is found guilty of INDIRECT CONTEMPT of court. He is sentenced to imprisonment until the orders of the court are complied with. He is also directed to show cause why he should not be disbarred. TING-DUMALI V TORRES PER CURIAM; April 14, 2004 (eva sison) NATURE Administrative matter in the Supreme Court. Presentation of false testimony, participation in, consent to, and failure to adduce against, the forgery of complainants signature, and gross misrepresentation. FACTS - complainant-affidavit filed on Oct. 22, 1999 where complainant Isidra Ting-Dumali charges respondent Atty. Rolando Torres with presentation of false testimony, participation in, consent to, and failure to advise against, the forgery of complainants signature in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement, and gross misrepresentation in court for the purpose of profiting from it, thereby violating his oath as a lawyer and the canons of legal and judicial ethics. - complainant is one of six children of late spouses Julita Reynante and Vicente Ting. - siblings involved are Miriam Saria, Marcelina Rivera and Felicisima Torres who is married to respondent - parents died intestate, leaving 3 parcels of land Complainants Claim - respondent took advantage of his relationship with her and her brothers and used his profession to deprive them of what was lawfully due them - Felicisima and Miriam executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate where they made it appear that they were the sole heirs; respondent participated in, consented to and failed to advise against this act; he presented said document to the Register of Deeds for the transfer of the title in the names of his wife and Miriam (involving lot 1586) - complainants signature was forged in another Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement involving a different lot to enable Felicisima and Miriam to transfer the title in their names, thus enabling them to sell the land (which they did, to Antel Holdings, Inc); respondent, again, consented to and participated in this act (involving lot 1603) - respondent made gross misrepresentation and offered false testimony to the effect that Marcelina and Felicisima are the only children and legal heirs of deceased spouses in the petition for Judicial Reconstitution of the Original Copy of a title covering the last parcel of land (lot 1605) - made gross and false misrepresentations for the purpose of profiting therefrom when he requested the buyer of the last parcel of land to release the full payment under the pretense that the order of reconstitution would be released within a month when he knew that it would be impossible because he presented evidence in the reconstitution case only on August 1997 (he said this to buyer on Nov. 1996) Respondents Comment - denies the allegations - lot 1586: his wife and Miriam were not motivated by any desire to solely profit the sale; he had no part in the execution of the document; he believed in good faith that the Ting sisters had already agreed on how to dispose of the lot; if ever complainants signature was affixed on that document, it was done in good faith - admits he was counsel in the reconstitution case; the false testimony of Marcelina could not be faulted on him because it was a clear oversight - regarding gross and false misrepresentation that the reconstitution order would be released within a month, assurance was made by the Clerk of Court -believes the complainant intends to harass him Complainants Reply -denies the presence of toka or verbal will allegedly made by her mother because her mom met a sudden death, when she died four siblings were still minors, and on Feb 2000 Eliseo wrote his siblings, denying the existence of a toka Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP - on june 2000, SC referred the case to IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation or decision - on Jan 2003, Investigating Commissioner Milagros San Juan of the Commission on Bar Discipline found the actuations of the respondent to be violative of Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of Canon 1 and Rule 10.1 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

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- recommended the disbarment of respondent - in its resolution, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved and adopted San Juans report, but reduced the penalty to a 6-year suspension ISSUES 1. WON respondent has sufficiently demonstrated that he is morally and legally unfit to remain in the exclusive and honorable fraternity of the legal profession 2. WON disbarment is the imposable disciplinary sanction proceedings, which is to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable, and reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. - given the peculiar factual circumstances prevailing in this case, it is found that respondents gross misconduct calls for the severance of his privilege to practice law for life Disposition We find respondent guilty of gross misconduct and violation of the lawyers oath, as well as Canons 1 and 10 of the CPR, thereby rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession. He is ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law. MASINSIN V ALBANO VITUG; May 31, 1994 (javi bautista) NATURE Petition for certiorari and prohibition. FACTS This case emerged from an ejectment suit filed by Vicente Caneda against Miguel and Thelma Masinsin. As a result of the case, the trial court ordered the spouses to vacate the premises and to remove their house/apartment an surrender possession of the subject land; to pay the sum of P100 a month from January 1987 as compensation for the use of the premises until the land is actually vacated. No appeal having been taken therefrom, the judgment became final and executory. On August 22 1985, the Masinsins filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC of Manila seeking the annulment of the decision of the ejectment case and to set aside the order of its execution. Petition was dismissed. On October 7 1985, petitioners filed a complaint for Annulment of the judgment, Lease Contract and Damages was filed by the Masinsins asking for the nullification of the judgment in the ejectment case. The complaint was dismissed due to res judicata. Petitioners appealed to the CA but the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. When petitioners refused to remove their house, a demolition order was issued. But before the completion of the demolition, a restraining order was issued by the RTC following a petition for certiorari, with preliminary injunction and for declaratory relief. Petition again was denied. Petitioners again filed the same suit before a different branch of the Manila RTC. Petition was ultimately dismissed on August 23 1990. In this present petition, petitioners contend that the MTC of Manila has lost jurisdiction to enforce its decision in the ejectment suit, when the property in question was proclaimed an area for priority development by the National Housing Authority on December 1 1987 by authority of PD 2016. ISSUE WON MTC of Manila lost its jurisdiction to enforce its decision in the ejectment suit due to PD 2016 HELD No. according to a report by manager of the Metro Manila Project Department of the National Housing Authority, pursuant to PD No. 1967 (which after amendments became PD No. 2016), the disputed lot is not for acquisition by the NHA. It is located outside of the NHA projects under the Zonal Improvement Project. The NHA is definitely not acquiring the said land and therefore is not part of PD 2016. Thus the

HELD 1. Yes, respondent has sufficiently demonstrated that he is morally and legally unfit to remain in the exclusive and honorable fraternity of the legal profession. A lawyer is a servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which society has entrusted the administration of law and the dispensation of justice. Thus, he should make himself more an exemplar for others to emulate and he should not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Reasoning the lawyers oath is a sacred trust that lawyers must uphold and keep inviolable at all times - the oath is reflected in CPR (Canon 1, 7, 10); they underscore the role of a lawyer as a vanguard of our legal systemin this covenant, respondent miserably failed - respondent knew of his wifes siblings, yet he presented the document stating that his wife and Miriam are the only children to the Register of Deeds - the falsification of complainants signature in the document which contains a waiver by the complainant of her right over the property, a matter consulted to respondent, is tantamount to falsification of a public document; he presented such document, therefore, he himself may also be held liable for knowingly using a falsified document to the damage of the complainant - respondent did not advise his wife from doing acts which are contrary to law; he must have kept in mind that it is his duty to uphold the Consti and obey the laws of the land - regarding respondents argument that the non-declaration of other siblings was an oversight does not deserve credence because the petition clearly names only Felicisima and Marcelina as the petitioners and because during the hearing when respondent asked Marcelina WON she has bros and sis, latter said none - he allowed Marcelina to commit a crime by giving false testimony in court and he himself may be punished as guilty of false testimony - under canon 10, lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court; this was openly violated by respondent - respondents acts or omissions reveal his moral flaws and doubtless bring intolerable dishonor to the legal profession 2. The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar. Reasoning - In the determination of the imposable disciplinary sanction against an erring lawyer, we take into account the primary purpose of disciplinary

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MTC of Manila has jurisdiction to enforce its decision in the ejectment case. - What immediately catches ones attention to this case is the evident predilection of petitioners, through different counsel, to file pleadings, one after another, from which not even this court has been spared. The utter lack of merit of the complainants and petitions simply evinces the deliberate intent of petitioners to prolong and delay the inevitable execution of a decision that has long become final and executory. The petitioners through different counsels tried to nullify the same MTC decision before different branches of the court. The lawyers oath is a sacred trust that must be upheld and kept inviolable. The pertinent part of the lawyers oath involved in this case: I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will not delay any mans cause for money or malice and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients and I impose upon myself this obligation voluntary, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. In no uncertain terms that any act on the part of a lawyer, an officer of the court, which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, impede and degrade the administration of justice is contumacious calling for both an exercise of disciplinary action and warranting application of the contempt power. Disposition Petition is dismissed. Petitioners counsel of record is strongly CENSURED and WARNED that a similar infraction of the lawyers oath in the future will be dealt with mot severely. YOUNG V BATUEGAS YNARES-SANTIAGO; May 9, 2003 (owen ricalde) NATURE Administrative matter in the Supreme Court. Disbarment. FACTS - On December 29, 2000, Atty. Walter T. Young, private prosecutor in People of the Philippines versus Crisanto Arana, Jr. , pending in RTC Manila, filed a Verified Affidavit-Complaint for disbarment against Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas, Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino for allegedly committing deliberate falsehood in court and violating the lawyers oath. - On December 13, 2000, Batuegas and Llantino, as counsel for accused, filed a Manifestation with Motion for Bail, alleging that the accused has voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority. As such, he is now under detention. Upon personal verification with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) where accused Arana allegedly surrendered, Young learned that he surrendered only on December 14, 2000, as shown by the Certificate of Detention - Susa, the Branch Clerk of Court of RTC of Manila, calendared the motion on December 15, 2000 despite the foregoing irregularity and other formal defects, namely > lack of notice of hearing to the private complainant > violation of the three-day notice rule > failure to attach the Certificate of Detention - According to respondents on December 13, 2000, upon learning that a warrant of arrest was issued against their client, they immediately fetched the accused in Cavite and brought him to the NBI to voluntarily surrender but due to heavy traffic, they arrived at the NBI at 2:00 a.m. the next day; hence, the certificate of detention indicated that the accused surrendered on December 14, 2000 TF there was neither unethical conduct nor falsehood in the subject pleading as their client has voluntarily surrendered and was detained at the NBI. - WRT the lack of notice of hearing, they contend that Young was not entitled to any notice. Nevertheless, they furnished the State and City prosecutors copies of the motion with notice of hearing thereof. Moreover, the hearing of a motion on shorter notice is allowed under Rule 15, Sec. 4(2) of the Rules of Court. - In August 13, 2001, referred to IBP for investigation, report and recommendation or decision. - On December 7, 2001, the Investigating Commissioner VillanuevaMaala submitted a report and recommended Atty. Ceasar G. Batuegas and Atty. Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino be suspended from the practice of their profession as a lawyer/member of the Bar for a period of six (6) months ISSUE WON Batuegas and Llantino are guilty of deliberate falsehood HELD YES. Ratio To knowingly allege an untrue statement of fact in the pleading is a contemptuous conduct that we strongly condemn. They violated their oath when they resorted to deception. Reasoning - Anticipating that their Motion for Bail will be denied by the court if it found that it had no jurisdiction over the person of the accused, they craftily concealed the truth by alleging that accused had voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority and was under detention. Obviously, such artifice was a deliberate ruse to mislead the court and thereby contribute to injustice. - A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his admission to the Bar that he will do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court and he shall conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients. - a lawyer should bear in mind that as an officer of the court his high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusion - courts, on the other hand, are entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before them - while a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his clients rights and is expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of his clients cause, his conduct must never be at the expense of truth. - Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity, and good demeanor, thus proving unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. - In Comia vs. Antona, we held: It is of no moment that the accused eventually surrendered to the police authorities on the same date tentatively scheduled for the hearing of the application for bail. To our mind, such supervening event is of no bearing and immaterial; it does not absolve respondent judge from administrative liability considering that he should not have accorded recognition to the application for bail filed on behalf of persons who, at that point, were devoid of personality to ask such specific affirmative relief from the court.

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- In the case at bar, the prosecution was served with notice of hearing of the motion for bail two days prior to the scheduled date. Although a motion may be heard on short notice, respondents failed to show any good cause to justify the non-observance of the three-day notice rule. Verily, as lawyers, they are obliged to observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. Disposition Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas, Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino are found guilty of committing deliberate falsehood. Accordingly, they are SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU V THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO. LTD. CASTRO; January 30, 1971 (rach mayuga) NATURE Appeal by certiorari to review a decision and resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations dismissing the Unions complaint FACTS - The following UNIONS (Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd, Employees Assn-NATU; FGU Insurance Group Workers and Employees AssnNATU; Insular Life Bldg Employees Assn-NATU) while still members of the Federation of Free Workers, entered into separate collective bargaining agreements with these COMPANIES (Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd; FGU Insurance Group) - Lawyers of the Unions include Enaje and Garcia (Sec-treasurer of FFW). When they left FFW, the Companies then hired them and Garcia became Asst. Corporate Sec and Legal Asst in the Legal Dept, and Enaje became personnel manager of the Companies. He was also made chairman of the negotiating panel for the Co. in the CBA with the Unions. - Sept 16, 1957 Unions jointly submitted proposals for a modified renewal of their respective CBA contracts w/c were due to expire on 9/30 - Sept/Oct 1957 - negotiations were conducted but snagged by deadlock on issue of union shop; Unions then filed on 01/27/1958 notice of strike for deadlock on collective bargaining - April 15, 1958 Unions dropped their demands regarding security but the Companies still refused to negotiate - Apr 25 to May 6 They tried negotiating but with no satisfactory results - May 15, 1958 Unions voted to declare a strike in protest against what they considered as unfair labor practices - May 20, 1958 Unions went on strike and picketed the offices of Insular Life Bldg - May 21, 1958 Companies through the Acting Manager Olbes sent to each of the strikers a letter specifying incentives should they decide to go back to work - Garcia and Abella (Chief of Personnel Records Section) tried to penetrate the picket lines. When Garcia approached the picket line, he engaged into a fight with one of the strikers and both of them suffered injuries. - Companies organized 3 bus-loads of employees, including a photographer who succeeded in penetrating the picket lines causing injuries to picketers. - Alleging that some non-strikers were injured, the Companies filed criminal charges against strikers and they also filed a petition for injunction. - May 31, 1958 CFI Mla granted injunction. Companies sent individually to the strikers another letter which states If you are still interested in continuing in the employ of the Group Companies, and if there are no criminal charges against you, we are giving you until June 2 to report for work at the home office. Otherwise, we may be forced to obtain your replacement. - All of the more than 120 crim charges, except for 3, were dismissed. But employees decided to call of the strike and to report back to work on June 2. - Before readmitting, Companies required them to secure clearances from the City Fiscals Office and to be screened by a management committee - July 29, 1958 CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for unfair labor practice - Aug 17, 1965 CIR dismissed the complaint Relevant to the assigned topic (read pages 277-280!) - Martinez, the Presiding Judge of the CIR, misquoted a SC decision in the case of Lopez Sr v. Chronicle Publication Employees Assn: (1) 60 words of the paragraph quoted by Martinez do NOT appear in the original; (2) Martinez used For it is settled that...; the original reads, For it must be remembered... (3) Last sentence in the quoted paragraph of Martinez is actually part of the immediately succeeding paragraph in the SC decision. - In the respondents brief, counsels for respondents quoted the CIRs decision ISSUES 1. WON the Companies are guilty of unfair labor practice a) In sending out letters individually directed to the strikers b) For discriminating against the striking members of the Unions in the matter of readmitting employees after the strike c) For dismissing officials and members of the Unions without giving them the benefit of investigation and the opportunity to present their side 2. WON the officials and members of the Unions are to be reinstated with full back wages, from June 2, 1958 to date of actual reinstatement 3. WON Presiding Judge Martinez and counsels of respondents are to be cited for contempt for misquoting a Supreme Court decision HELD 1.a) YES. Ratio It is an unfair labor practice for an employer operating under a collective bargaining agreement to negotiate with his employees individually, in connection with the changes in the agreement. Although the union is on strike, the employer is still under the obligation to bargain with the union as the employees bargaining representative. Reasoning It is an act of interference for the employer to send a letter to all employees notifying them to return to work at a specific time, otherwise new employees would be engaged to perform their jobs. The first letter contains promises of benefits to employees; the second letter contains threats to obtain replacements. Free speech protection under the Constitution is inapplicable where the expression of opinion by the employer or his agent contains a promise of benefit, or threats or reprisal.

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- The circumstance that strikers later decided to return to work on account of injunction cannot alter the intrinsic quality of the letters which tended to interfere with the employees right to engage in lawful concerted activity in the form of strike. - Totality of Conduct Doctrine: Expressions of opinion by an employer, though innocent in themselves, were held to be culpable because of the circumstances under which they were uttered. (1) Before Unions submission of proposals for renewal of CBAs, respondents hired former legal counsels of petitioners; (2) After notice to strike was served on the Companies, they reclassified 87 employees as supervisors, compelling them to resign from unions; (3) During negotiations in Dept of Labor, they refused to answer the Unions demands en toto; (4) Strikers were individually sent letters inducing them to return to work with promises of special privileges; (5) Three truckloads of non-strikers crashed through the picket line, which resulted in injuries on the part of picketers; (6) Criminal charges were brought upon picketers; (7) An injunction was obtained from CFI; (8) Another letter was sent individually and by registered special delivery mail threatening them with dismissal if they didnt report for work on June 2; (9) When they did report for work, a screening committee refused to admit 63 members of the Unions on ground of pending criminal charges; (10) When almost all were cleared by fiscals office, they were still refused admission; but all non-strikers were readmitted immediately. It is clear that the main reason for the strike was when it became clear that management will not negotiate in good faith. 1.b) YES. Ratio The companies are guilty of discrimination in their process of rehiring. They refused to readmit strikers with pending criminal charges, even after these employees have secured the required clearances. At the same time, the Companies readily readmitted non-strikers who also had criminal charges, without requiring clearances. They even separated active from the less active unionists on the basis of their militancy, or lack of it, on the picket lines. Reasoning There are 3 conditions for readmission of the strikers: (1) he must be interested in continuing his work with the companies; (2) no criminal charges against him; (3) report for work on June 2, 1958, otherwise he would be replaced. All employees are considered to have complied with first and third condition. - In an anticipatory effort to exculpate themselves from charges of discrimination in rehiring, they even delegated the power to readmit to a committee composed of Abella and Garcia. Both were involved in unpleasant incidents with the picketers during the strike, and the mere act of placing the power of reinstatement in their hands is a form of discrimination. 1.c) YES. Ratio The Companies refused to take the employees back on account of their acts of misconduct even if all, except three, were able to secure the required clearances. Record shows that not a single dismissed striker was given the opportunity to defend himself against the supposed charges. 2. YES. Ratio The members and officials of the Unions went on strike because of the unfair labor practices committed by the Companies. They are now entitled to reinstatement with back pay because when they reported back for work, upon the invitation of their employers, they were discriminatorily dismissed. 3. NO. Ratio The misquotation is more a result of clerical ineptitude than a deliberate attempt on the part of the respondent Judge to mislead. Counsels of respondents have the prima facie right to rely on the quotation as it appears in the Judges decision, to copy it verbatim and to incorporate it in their brief. Import of sentences in the quotation is substantially the same as the cited decision. Impt: In citing SCs decisions and rulings, it is the bounden duty of courts, judges and lawyers to reproduce or copy the same word-forword and punctuation mark-for-punctuation mark. This is because only the decisions of this Honorable Court establish jurisprudence or doctrines in this jurisdiction. (Miiranda v. Imperial) - Ever present is the danger that if not faithfully and exactly quoted, the decisions and rulings of SC may lose their proper and correct meaning, to the detriment of other courts, lawyers and the public who may thereby be misled. Also, appellate courts will be precluded from acting on misinformation, and be saved precious time in finding out whether citations are correct. Disposition Decision of the CIR is reversed and set aside. Respondents are ordered to reinstate the dismissed members of the petitioning Unions to their former or comparatively similar positions with back wages. IN RE SOTTO FERIA; January 21, 1949 (bri bauza) NATURE Original action in Supreme Court. Contempt FACTS - On December 7, 1948, Respondent Atty. Vicente Sotto was required by this Court to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of court for having issued a written statement in connection with the decision of this Court in In re Angel Parazo for contempt of court, which statement, as published in the Manila Times and other daily newspapers of the locality, reads as follows: As author of the Press Freedom Law (RA 53), interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case of Angel Parazo, reporter of a local daily, who has now to suffer 30 days imprisonment, for his refusal to divulge the souce of a news published in his paper, I regret to say that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but that it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its members. In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last years, I believe that the only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court. To this effect, I announce that one of the first measures, which I will introduce in the coming congressional sessions, will have as its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it is now constituted, the Supreme Court of today constituted a constant peril to liberty and democracy. It need be said loudly, very loudly, so that even the deaf may hear: the Supreme Court of today is a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of Justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary. - Respondent does not deny having published the above quoted threat and intimidation as well as false and calumnious charges against this Supreme Court. But he contends that under section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, which confers upon this Supreme Court the power to

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promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, this Court has no power to impose correctional penalties upon the citizens, and that the Supreme Court can only impose fines and imprisonment by virtue of a law, and a law has to be promulgated by Congress with the approval of the Chief Executive. - He also alleges in his answer that in the exercise of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution, the respondent made his statement in the press with the utmost good faith and with no intention of offending any of the majority of the members of this high Tribunal, who, in his opinion, erroneously decided the Parazo case; but he has not attacked, nor intended to attack the honesty or integrity of anyone. ISSUES WON the Supreme Court may hold respondent guilty for contempt of court. HELD Ratio Any publication; pending a suit, reflecting upon the court, the parties, the officers of the court, the counsel, etc., with reference to the suit, or tending to influence the decision of the controversy, is contempt of court and is punishable. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts. The summary power to commit and punish for contempt tending to obstruct or degrade the administration of justice, as inherent in courts as essential to the execution of their powers and to the maintenance of their authority is a part of the law of the land. (In re Kelly) Reasoning In re Kelly lays down the doctrine of the power of courts to hold contempt proceedings. - Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith may be tolerated; because if well founded it may enlighten the court. But in his above-quoted statement, he not only intends to intimidate the members of this Court with a presentation of a bill in the next congressional session, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the number of Justices from eleven to seven, so as to change the members of this Court which decided the Parazo case, who according to his statement, are incompetent and narrow-minded, in order to influence the final decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice. But the respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court for the apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court into the disrepute and degrading the administration of justice. - The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law in their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos may be the result. - As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. - As Justice Holmes very appropriately said in U.S. v Sullens: The administration of justice and freedom of the press, though separate and distinct, are equally sacred, and neither should be violated by the other. The press and courts have correlative rights and duties and should cooperate to uphold the constitution and laws, form which the former receives its prerogative and the latter its jurisdiction This Court must be permitted to proceed with the disposition of its business in an orderly manner free from outside interference obstructive of its constitutional functions. This right will be insisted upon as vital to an impartial court, and, as a last resort, as an individual exercises the right of self-defense, it will act to preserve its existence as an unprejudiced tribunal. Disposition In view of all the foregoing, we find the respondent Atty. Vicente Sotto guilty of contempt of this Court by virtue of the abovequoted publication, and he is hereby sentenced to pay, within the period of fifteen days from the promulgation of this judgment, a fine P1000, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The respondent is also hereby required to appear, within the same period, and show cause to this Court why he should not be disbarred from practicing as an attorney-at-law in any of the courts of this Republic, for said publication and the following statements made by him during the pendency of the case against Angel Parazo for contempt of Court. The respondent misrepresents to the public the cause of the charge against him for contempt of court. He says that the cause for criticizing the decision of this Court in said Parazo case in defense of the freedom of the press, when in truth and in fact he is charged with intending to interfere and influence the final disposition of said case through intimidation and false accusations against this Supreme Court. GUERRERO V VILLAMOR FERNAN; NOVEMBER 13, 1989 (jaja estoy) NATURE Petition for certiorari to review the order of the Regional Trial Court of Subprovince of Biliran, Leyte, Br. 16. FACTS - Consequent to the dismissal of five criminal cases for qualified theft against Naval by respondent Judge Villamor, the offended party, petitioner Carlos, through his lawyer and co-petitioner Guerrero filed before the RTC Br. 21 of Cebu City an action for damages against respondent Judge for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment in the aforesaid consolidated criminal cases. Consequently, respondent Judge issued in Criminal Cases Nos. N-0989-0993 an Order of Direct Contempt of Court against petitioners, finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of direct contempt and sentencing them both to imprisonment of five days and a fine of P500 for degrading the respect and dignity of the court through the use of derogatory and contemptuous language before the court. - The derogatory and contemptuous language adverted to by respondent judge are the allegations in the complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-6478 reading: "12. That the dismissal of criminal cases Nos. 0989, 0990, 0991, 0992 and 0993 for qualified theft was arrived at certainly without circumspection-without any moral or legal basis-a case of knowingly rendering unjust judgment since the dismissal was tantamount to acquittal of the accused Gloria P. Naval who is now beyond the reach of criminal and civil liability-all because the defendant Hon. Adriano R. Villamor was bent backwards with his eyes and mind wilfully closed under these circumstances which demanded the scrutiny of the judicial mind and discretion free from bias x x x;"

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"xxx xxx xxx "14. By the standard of a public official and a private person the conduct of defendant Honorable Judge-not only shocking, but appalling-in giving the plaintiff before his court the run-around is at the very least distasteful, distressing and mortifying and moral damages therefore would warrant on this kind of reprehensible behaviour x x x "15. That the aforecited manifestly malicious actuations, defendant judge should also visit upon him x x x for reducing plaintiff his agonizing victim of his disdain and contempt for the former who not only torn asunder and spurned but also humiliated and spitefully scorned. - Petitioners assert that no direct contempt could have been committed against respondent Judge in the complaint for damages in Civil Case No. 6478 because whatever was mentioned therein was not made "before" respondent Judge while in session or in recess from judicial proceedings or in any matter involving the exercise of judicial function of the Court while it is at work on a case before it. Furthermore, petitioners contend that the words used in the subject complaint were ISSUE WON petitioners committed direct contempt of court through the use of derogatory and contemptuous language before the court justifying the award of damages being sought HELD 1. No. Direct contempt could not have been committed against respondent Judge in the complaint for damages because whatever was mentioned therein was not made before respondent judge while in session or in recess from judicial proceedings or in any matter involving the exercise of judicial function of the court while it is at work on a case before it. Furthermore, the words they used In the subject complaint were merely words descriptive of the plaintiffs cause of action based on his reaction and remorse and the willful infliction of injury on him and that the same are all privileged communications made in the course of judicial proceedings because they are relevant to the issue and therefore cannot be contemptuous. Strong words were used to lay stress on the gravity and degree of moral anguish suffered by petitioner as a result of the dismissal of the subject criminal merely words descriptive of plaintiffs cause of action based on his reaction and remorse and the wilfull infliction of the injury on him and that the same are all privileged communications made in the course of judicial proceedings because they are relevant to the issue and therefore cannot be contemptuous. - In his Comment, respondent Judge maintains that petitioners harp too much on the fact that the five criminal cases are closed cases and therefore the language or words employed to describe, opine, criticize or condemn the dismissal of said criminal cases in no way obstruct or hamper, ruin or disturb the dignity and authority of the court presided over by respondent judge, as said court was no longer functioning as such in the dispensation of justice. This, according to respondent Judge, is a very dangerous perception for then the court becomes vulnerable to all forms of verbal assaults, which would shake the foundation of judicial authority and even of democratic stability, so that the absence of such proceedings should not be made a shield to sully the court's prestige. - The Court sustains petitioners contention that the alleged derogatory language employed in the complaint in the civil case did not constitute direct contempt but may only, if at all, constitute indirect contempt subject to defenses that may be raised by said petitioners in the proper proceedings. Stress must be placed on the fact that the subject pleading was not submitted to respondent Judge nor in the criminal cases from which the contempt order was issued but was filed in another court presided by another judge and involving a separate action: the civil case for damages against respondent Judge. Although the allegations in the complaint for damages criticized the wisdom of respondent Judges act of dismissing the criminal cases, such criticism was directed to him when he was no longer in the process of performing judicial functions in connection with the subject criminal cases so as to constitute such criticisms as direct contempt of court. - The power to punish for contempt should be used sparingly, so much so that judges should always bear in mind that the power of the court to punish for contempt should be exercised for purposes that are impersonal, the power being intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise. Any abuse of the contempt citation powers will therefore be curtailed and corrected. - Be that as it may, lawyers, on the other hand, should bear in mind their basic duty "to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers and x x x (to) insist on similar conduct by others." This respectful attitude towards the court is to be observed, "not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance." And it is "through a scrupulous preference for respectful language that a lawyer best demonstrates his observance of the respect due to the courts and judicial officers x x x." IN RE ALMACEN RUIZ CASTRO; Feb 18, 1970 (kooky talon) NATURE Proceedings For Disciplinary Action Against Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen FACTS - Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant in the civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H. Calero. The trial court tendered judgment against his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a copy of the decision, and on July 5, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration. He served on the adverse counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter of the time and place of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. For "lack of proof of service," the trial court denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for reconsideration to which he attached the required registry return card. This second motion for reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who, on August 22, 1966, had already perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed no objection to the record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial court elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. - CA, citing Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co. dismissed the appeal, for the reason that the motion for reconsideration dated July 5, 1966 does not contain a notice of time and place of hearing thereof and is, therefore, a useless piece of paper (Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. Inc. vs. Bain Construction At Co.), which did not interrupt the running of the period to appeal, and, consequently, the appeal was perfected out of time." - Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. is not decisive. At the same time he filed a

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pleading entitled "Latest decision of the Supreme Court in Support of Motion for Reconsideration," citing Republic of the Philippines vs. Gregorio A. Venturanza, as the applicable case. Again, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration. - Atty. Almacen then appealed to the SC by certiorari. SC refused to take the case, and by minute resolution denied the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his motion for reconsideration as well as his petition for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and for extension of time. Entry of judgment was made on September 8, 1967. Hence, the second motion for reconsideration filed by him after the said date was ordered expunged from the records. - Atty. Almacen then filed his "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," a pleading that is interspersed from beginning to end with insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks, against the Court as well as its individual members, a behavior that is as unprecedented as it is unprofessional. The petition was filed on September 25, 1967, in protest against what he asserts is "a great injustice committed against his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts the Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "people by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violation of the Constitution with impunity." His client, he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the' altar of hypocrisy.'' In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of the Court, saying "that justice as administered by the present members, of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustices committed by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that ". . . . a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest profession." - Sept 28, 1967, SC resolved to withhold action on his petition until he shall have actually surrendered his certificate. When nothing came from him, Atty. Almacen was reminded to turn over his certificate so that the Court could act on his petition. - To said reminder Atty. Almacen manifested "that he has no pending petition in connection with Calero vs. Yaptinchay, said case is now final and executory"; that this Court's September 28, 1967 resolution did not require him to do either a positive or negative act; and that since his offer was not accepted, he "chose to 'pursue the negative act." - Nov 17, 1967 SC resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show cause "why no disciplinary action should be taken against him." Denying the charges contained in the Nov 17 resolution, Atty. Almacen asked for permission to give reasons and cause in an open and public hearing. The Court required Atty. Almacen to state his reasons for such request, to which he manifested that since the Court is "the complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he preferred to be heard and to answer questions "in person and in an open and public hearing" so that the Court could observe his sincerity and candor. He also asked for leave to file a written explanation "in the event this Court has no, time to hear him in person." He was allowed to file a written explanation and thereafter was heard in oral argument. - Atty. Almacens written answer offered no apology. Far from being contrite, Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeated his jeremiad of lamentations, abundant with sarcasm and innuendo1. ISSUE WON the utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in question are properly the object of disciplinary sanctions HELD - Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their judicial actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which transcend the permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend to bring them into disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their integrity and in the orderly administration of justice, constitute grave professional misconduct which may be visited with disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court in the exercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian of the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity. - CA had fully and correctly considered the dismissal of Atty. Almacens appeal in light of the law and applicable decisions of the SC. As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew - or ought to have known - that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the period of appeal, the movant must not only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party (which he did), but also notify the adverse party of the time and place of hearing (which admittedly he did not). Atty. Almacens own negligence caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal, which, incidentally, is not a matter of right. There is no justification for his scurrilous and scandalous outbursts. - Every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority, or that it is articulated by a lawyer. Such right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded litigation, because then the court's actuations are thrown open to public consumption. - As citizen and officer of the court, every lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings and indiscretions of courts and judges. It is his right to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. - By constitutional mandate, it is the SCs solemn duty, amongst others, to determine the rules for admission to the practice of law. Inherent in this prerogative is the corresponding authority to discipline and exclude from the practice of law those who have proved themselves unworthy of continued membership in the Bar. - A critique of the Court must be intelligent and discriminating, fitting to its high function as the court of last resort. And more than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no means synonymous to obloquy, and requires detachment and disinterestedness, real qualities approached only through constant striving to attain them. The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral argumentation far transcend the permissible bounds of legitimate criticism.

1 Refer to the case for Atty. Almacens written answer. The way he addressed the Court and how he laid down his

points should be a matter of interest. As the court said, this is a matte r unprecedented and unprofessional. One paragraph reads: Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the Court that notwithstanding the violation of the Constitution, you remained unpunished, this Court in the reverse order of natural things, is now in the attempt to inflict punishment on your respondent for acts he said in good faith.

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- NOTE: disciplinary proceedings like the present are Sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not - and does not involve - a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. It may be initiated by the Court motu proptio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. Disposition Accordingly, it is the sense of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect immediately. SORIANO V COURT OF APPEALS PARDO; August 28, 2001 (yella bautista) FACTS - Deogracias and Rosalina Reyes pleaded that they were employed by Socorro as manager and administrative assistant of her property and real estate in 1968. - As payment for their services, in 1973, Socorro gave them one apartment unit to use as their dwelling for the duration of their lifetime and a token monthly rental on P150 was imposed. - In the same building, another unit was occupied by the spouses which was improved and converted by them into a pub and restaurant. For the use of the premises, the token amount of P1500 monthly was imposed. - On October 17, 1988, Socorro gave Deogracias and Rosalina notice to vacate the said two units - Deogracias and Rosalina owned two commercial lots with improvements. On May 28, 1968, they became indebted to Socorro in the amount of P638,635.36. The parties agreed to pay for the debt by selling the two lots for P2.5M. While looking for a buyer, Deogracias and Rosalina conveyed the property to Socorro by way of first mortgage. A deed of absolute sale was executed in place of a real estate mortgage. - Action was initiated by the spouses but the court released the two lots in favor of Socorro having presented the deed of absolute sale in her name. - On October 28, 1988, the spouses paid the filing fee and legal research. - On November 29, 1988, Socorro filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on two grounds: 1. the first cause of action was barred by the pendency of an ejectment case between the same parties over the same parties 2. the second cause of action was premature - On December 8, 1988, the Carmelite Sisters on behalf of their benefactress filed with the trial court an urgent ex-parte motion for restraining order. They talked to respondent judge Naval in his chambers and requested him to immediately act on Socorros urgent ex parte motion for a restraining order. On December 16, 1988, the TC denied the motion. - On January 16, 1989, Socorro through counsel Atty. Padilla filed a motion to inhibit Judge Naval 1. while still a law practitioner and politician, he was a frequent customer of the restaurant of the spouses and was a good friend of his 2. he was also a good friend of the attorney of the spouses - TC denied motion to inhibit - On April 17, 1989, Deogracias and Rosalina filed a motion to admit attached supplemental complaint which pleaded that they have already paid their debt to Socorro but the latter refused to accept said payment without just cause thus was a clear move on her part to let the 3 year period provided in their MOA elapse - TC admitted the supplemental complaint - Socorro moved to dismiss supplemental complaint - TC denied motion to dismiss supplemental complaint - TC ordered Deogracias and Rosalina to pay a deficiency in the docket fees - Socorro moved for an extension to file a responsive pleading to the supplemental complaint and to reset pre-trial - Deogracias and Rosalina complied with the order and paid additional filing fees - TC granted Socorros motion for an extension - Socorro again moved for another extension and resetting of the pretrial - The TC granted the second motion - Socorro again moved for another extension on which the TC did not act upon - Socorros counsel Atty. Padilla filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration of various orders of the respondent court - Deogracias and Rosalina filed an opposition - The TC denied Socorros motion - The TC directed Atty. Padilla to show cause whey he should not be cited for contempt of court. He consequently failed to do so and the court declared Socorro in default and Atty. Padilla was sentenced to 5 days imprisonment with a P100 fine for direct contempt of court. - Socorro and Atty. Padilla filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and mandamus with temporary restraining order assailing the orders of Judge Naval. ISSUES 1. WON the TC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to restrain or to remedy the forcible seizure by the plaintiffs of the property subject of the litigation 2. WON the TC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to order the payment of the correct fling fee upon failure to pay the same, to dismiss the case 3. WON the TC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to inhibit 4. WON the TC gravely abused its discretion in admitting the supplemental complaint with a theory directly contrary to the original complaint and in not dismissing it upon motion of defendant. 5. WON the TC gravely abused its discretion and acted in excess of jurisdiction in finding Atty. Padilla, Jr. guilty of direct contempt 6. WON the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in sanctioning the orders of the TC except the Order admitting the supplemental complaint HELD

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1. No. The issue has already become moot and academic since the parties had already entered the premises in question. 2. No. There was no intention on the part of Deogracias and Rosalina to degraud the government. They were in good faith and relied on the assessment of the Clerk of Court. 3. No. Rule 137, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court provides only the following grounds for the disqualification of judges- No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest signed by them and entered upon the record. A judge may, in his exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above. 4. Yes. The supplemental complaint contains matters directly different from and even contrary to the cause of action stated in the original complaint. The rule allowing amendments to a pleading is subject to the general limitation that the cause of action shall not be substantially changed or that the theory of the case shall not be altered. 5. The CA erred when it stated that a certiorari proceeding assailing the judgment of direct contempt was not proper as Atty. Padilla may have appealed therefrom. Rule 71, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: A person adjudged in direct contempt by any court may not appeal therefrom, but may avail himself of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition. The court also erred when it affirmed the trial courts finding of direct contempt of court against Atty. Padilla (see comments made by Atty. Padilla in the original text of the case) Atty. Padillas innuendoes are not necessarily disrespectful to the court. The salutary rule is that the power to punish for contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment. MACEDA V VASQUEZ NOCON; April 22, 1993 (edel cruz) NATURE Petition for Certiorari of the order of the ombudsman FACTS - This is a prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or restraining order for the Office of the Ombudsman to stop it from entertaining a criminal complaint regarding the alleged falsification of a judges certification submitted to the SC. - Petitioner Judge Maceda was accused of falsification of Certificate of Service, and now seeks to review orders of the Ombudsman - Napoleon Abiera of PAO alleged that the petitioner had falsified his Certificate of Service by certifying that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decisions have been determined and decided on or before Jan 31 1989 when in truth 15 cases were still to be determined. (Abiera alleges Maceda lied that he finished the cases but he hasnt yet.) ISSUES 1. WON Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case despite the Courts ruling in Orap v. Sandiganbayan 2. WON the investigation of the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the SCs constitutional duty of supervision over all the inferior courts HELD 1. NO. There is nothing in Orap that would restrict it only to offenses committed by a judge unrelated to his official duties. A judge who falsifies his certificate of Service is administratively liable to the SC for serious misconduct and inefficiency. And criminally liable to the state under the RPC for his felonious act. 2. YES. In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by this Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation of the Ombudsman encroaches into the Courts power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. - ART VIII, sec 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests on the SC administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel. The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers granted to it by the Constitution for such a justification not only runs counter to the specific mandate of the Constitution granting supervisory powers to the SC. - The Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioners certificates of service to the SC for determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending case load. (SO admin case first before criminal.) Disposition Petition granted. Ombudsman is directed to dismiss the complaint filed by the public respondent.2 MALONSO V PRINCIPE TINGA; December 16, 2004 (giulia pineda) NATURE Administrative case in the Supreme Court. Disbarment. FACTS In the early part of 1997, Napocor instituted expropriation proceedings against several lot owners in Bulacan including the complainant in this case. - April 1, 1997, a Contract of Legal Services was entered into between the law firm Principe Villano and Clemente Law Offices and SANDAMA, Inc. represented by its President Danilo V. Elfa. SANDAMA is the organization of lot owners affected by the expropriation proceedings. Complainant is a member of this organization. - November 27, 1997, complainant executed a Kasulatan ng Pagbibigay Kapangyarihan in favor of Danilo Elfa appointing the latter as the attorney-in-fact of the complainant on the matter of negotiation with the NPC. - December 21, 1999, NPCs Board of Directors approved the amicable settlement of the expropriation cases by paying all the lot owners the total of One Hundred Three Million Four Hundred Thirteen Thousand Two Hundred Pesos (P103,413,200.00).

2 NOTE: Lawyer has a duty to defend a judge from unfounded criticism or groundless personal attack, irrespective of

whether he loses or wins a case in a judges sala. But a lawyer can file admin complaints against erring judges. SC- ADMIN CASES (THROUGH COURT ADMINISTRATOR) OMBUDSMAN CRIMINAL CASE

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- More that two (2) years after the expropriation cases were instituted and while complainant was represented therein by Atty. Benjamin Mendoza, or on January 18, 2000, respondent filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Separate Legal Fees From Selling Price Between Plaintiffs and Defendants. - About ten days after respondent filed his motion to separate legal fees, respondent filed his Notice of Entry of Appearance (dated January 28, 2000) claiming that respondent is the legal counsel of the complainant, a defendant in said case. - February 12, 2000, (69) lot owners including the complainant wrote a letter to NPC informing the latter that they have never authorized Mr. Danilo Elfa to hire the services of the respondents law firm to represent them in the expropriation cases. - February 17, 2000, complainant filed an Opposition to respondents entry of appearance and motion to separate legal fees. - March 7, 2000, respondent filed a Notice of Attorneys Lien claiming 40% of the selling price of the properties being expropriated by NPC. - April 10, 2000, respondent filed a Notice of Adverse Claim before the Register of Deeds of Bulacan claiming 40% of the rights, title and interest of the lot owners over their lots being expropriated including that of complainant. - November 20, 2000, respondent herein filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene in the expropriation case claiming to be a co-owner of the property being expropriated. - February 26, 2001, respondent filed an Opposition to the Compromise Agreement submitted by the lot owners and NPC for court approval. Because of the actions taken by the respondent, the execution of the decision approving the compromise agreement between the lot owners and the NPC was delayed - June 6, 2001 - a complaint for disbarment was filed before the IBP. Julian Malonso claimed that Atty Principe, without authority entered his appearance as Malonsos counsel in the expropriation proceedings initiated by Napocor. After illegally representing him, Pincipe claimed 40% of the selling price of his land by way of attorneys fees and in a Motion to Intervene, claimed to be a co-owner of Malonsos property. - In the respondets anawer, he claims that the services of his law office was engaged by Samahan ng mga Dadaanan at Maapektuhan ng NAPOCOR (SANDAMA) through its president, Danilo Elfa, as embodied in the Contract of Legal Services executed on April 1, 1997 3. Respondent claims that Malonso is a member of SANDAMA and that the said member executed an SPA in favor of Elfa which served as Elfas authority to act in behalf of Malonso - In Malonsos reply, he claimed that he did not authorize Elfa as the SPA was executed after the Contract of Legal Services. He also claims that he also had his own lawyer, Atty. Benjamin Mendoza. - Principe counters this argument saying that the agreement is a continuing one, hence Malonso was within the coverage of the contract.
3 The Contract states in part:

- According to the findings of the IBP investigator, the Contract of Legal Services is between SANDAMA as a corporate being and the respondents law firm. SANDAMA is not a party in all of the expropriation proceedings instituted by Napocor, neither does it claim co-ownership of the properties being expropriated. It was also found that the SPA was executed by Malonso in favor of Elfa after the Contract of Legal Services, and the right of co-ownership cannot be derived from the said documents. A contract of legal services between a lawyer and his client is personal and cannot be performed through intermediaries. From the evidence presented by both parties, the Investigating Commissioner found Principe guilty of misrepresentation. He was found to have violated Canon3, Rule 10, Rule 10.01 and Rule 12.04. the report recommended the penalty of a 2 year suspension. - October 25, 2003 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors suspended him for 1 year - In his Appeal Memorandum, respondent claims that the Resolution has no factual and legal basis, the complaint having been motivated by pure selfishness and greed, and the Resolution itself invalid for having failed to comply with Rule 139-B of the RoC. According to the respondent, the Investigating Commissioner continued to investigate the instant case despite the lapse of three months provided under Section 8 of Rule 139B, without any extension granted by the SC. Moreover, in the subsequent review made by the IBP Board of Governors, no actual voting took place but a mere consensus, and the required number of votes provided by the Rules was not secured considering that there were only five (5) governors present. Respondent opines that the actions of the IBP Board were aimed at preventing him from pursuing his known intention to run for IBP National President. ISSUES 1. WON Atty. Principes suspension in the practice of law properly arrived at 2. WON Principe illegally represented the petitioners HELD 1. Ratio Before a lawyer may be suspended from the practice of law by the IBP, there should be (1) a review of the investigators report; (2) a formal voting; and (3) a vote of at least five (5) members of the Board. The rationale for this rule is simple: a decision reached by the Board in compliance with the procedure is the official decision of the Board as a body and not merely as the collective view of the individual members thereof. Without a vote having been taken, the Resolution is void and has no effect. - Normally, non-compliance with the procedural rules would result in the remand of the case. However, the Court, in the public interest and the expeditious administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits instead of remanding them for further proceedings, such as where the ends of justice would not be subserved by the remand of the case, or when public interest demands an early disposition of the case, or where the trial court had already received all the evidence of the parties. In view of the delay in resolving the instant complaint against the respondent, the Court opts to resolve the same based on the records before it. 2. Ratio - The duty of the courts is not alone to see that lawyers act in a proper and lawful manner; it is also their duty to see that lawyers are paid their just and lawful fees.

The parties mutually agree one with the other as follows: I. SECOND PARTY engages the services of the FIRST PARTY as their lawyer of the collection, claim, and/ or payment of just compensation of its members with the NAPOCOR; II. FIRST PARTY accepts the engagement; both parties further agree on the following conditions: A. Scope of Work - negotiation, legal documentation, attendance to court proceedings and other related activities; B. Payment of Fees is on contingent basis. No acceptance fees, appearance and liaison fees; C. The legal fees or payment to FIRST PARTY: 1. Forty (40%) Percent of the selling price between NAPOCOR and the SANDAMA members; this forty (40%) [percent] is the maximum rate and may be negotiated depending on the volume of work involved; 2. Legal Fees as stated above shall cover: i.) Attorneys Fees of FIRST PARTY; ii.) His representation expenses and commitment expenses; iii.) Miscellaneous Expenses, etc. D. Both parties agree to exert their best efforts to increase or secure the best price from NAPOCOR.

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- It is the duty of the Supreme Court to see to it that a lawyer accounts for his behavior towards the court, his client, his peers in the profession and the public. However, the duty of the Court is not limited to disciplining those guilty of misconduct, but also to protecting the reputation of those wrongfully charged, much more, those wrongfully found guilty. - On the other hand, the IBP is aimed towards the elevation of the standards of the law profession, the improvement of the administration of justice, and the enabling of the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively. Despite its duty to police the ranks, the IBP is not exempt from the duty to promote respect for the law and legal processes and to abstain from activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. Respect for law is gravely eroded when lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be minions of the law, engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules formulated for their observance. Reasoning - There are two stages in every action for expropriation. The first is concerned with the determination by the courts of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. The second phase is concerned with the determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to be taken which relates to the valuation thereof. But as it frequently happens, the public purpose dimension is not as fiercely contested. Moreover, in their quest to secure what they believe to be the fair compensation of their property, the owners seek inroads to the leverages of executive power where compensation compromises are commenced and given imprimatur. In this dimension, the services of lawyers different from the ordinary litigator may prove to be handy or even necessary. Negotiations are mostly out of court and reliant on the sagacity, persuasion, patience, persistence and resourcefulness of the negotiator. - In the instant case, the trial court had already ruled on the valuation of the properties subject of the expropriation, the same order which is subject of the appeal filed by the NAPOCOR. Aware that it might take a long time before the said appeal is finally resolved, and in view of the delay in the adjudication of the case, the landowners and NAPOCOR negotiated for a compromise agreement. To assist them, the landowners, through SANDAMA and its president, Danilo Elfa, engaged the services of a lawyer in the person of respondent. It is clear that respondent was hired precisely for the negotiation phase of the case. - As a legal entity, a corporation has a personality distinct and separate from its individual stockholders or members and from that of its officers who manage and run its affairs. The rule is that obligations incurred by the corporation, acting through its directors, officers and employees, are its sole liabilities. Thus, property belonging to a corporation cannot be attached to satisfy the debt of a stockholder and vice versa, the latter having only an indirect interest in the assets and business of the former. Thus, as summed by the IBP investigator, respondent is the lawyer of SANDAMA, but SANDAMA is not a party litigant in all of the expropriation cases; thus respondent had no basis to interfere in the court proceedings involving the members. But things are not as simple as that. - A review of the records reveals that respondent had grounds to believe that he can intervene and claim from the individual landowners. For one, the incorporation of the landowners into SANDAMA was made and initiated by respondents firm so as to make negotiations with NAPOCOR easier and more organized. SANDAMA was a non-stock, non-profit corporation aimed towards the promotion of the landowners common interest. It presented a unified front which was far easier to manage and represent than the individual owners. In effect, respondent still dealt with the members, albeit in a collective manner. - Second, respondent relied on the representation of Danilo Elfa, former SANDAMA president and attorney-in-fact of the members, with whom he entered into a contract for legal services. Respondent could not have doubted the authority of Elfa to contract his firms services. After all, Elfa was armed with a Board Resolution from SANDAMA, and more importantly, individual grants of authority from the SANDAMA members, including Malonso. - Third, the contract for legal services clearly indicated a contingent fee of forty percent (40%) of the selling price of the lands to be expropriated, the same amount which was reflected in the deed of assignment made by the individual members of SANDAMA. Respondent could have easily and naturally assumed that the same figure assigned to SANDAMA was the same amount earmarked for its legal services as indicated in their service contract. Being a non-stock, non-profit corporation, where else would SANDAMA get the funds to pay for the legal fees due to respondent and his firm but from the contribution of its members. - Lastly, respondents legal services were disengaged by SANDAMAs new President Yolanda Bautista around the same time when the SANDAMA members abandoned and disauthorized former SANDAMA president Elfa, just when the negotiations bore fruit. With all these circumstances, respondent, rightly or wrongly, perceived that he was also about to be deprived of his lawful compensation for the services he and his firm rendered to SANDAMA and its members. With the prevailing attitude of the SANDAMA officers and members, respondent saw the immediate need to protect his interests in the individual properties of the landowners. - The Court cannot hold respondent guilty of censurable conduct or practice justifying the penalty recommended. While filing the claim for attorneys fees against the individual members may not be the proper remedy for respondent, the Court believes that he instituted the same out of his honest belief that it was the best way to protect his interests. After all, SANDAMA procured his firms services and was led to believe that he would be paid for the same. There is evidence which tend to show that respondent and his firm rendered legal and even extra-legal services in order to assist the landowners get a favorable valuation of their properties. They facilitated the incorporation of the landowners to expedite the negotiations between the owners, the appraisers, and NAPOCOR. They sought the assistance of several political personalities to get some leverage in their bargaining with NAPOCOR. Suddenly, just after concluding the compromise price with NAPOCOR and before the presentation of the compromise agreement for the courts approval, SANDAMA disengaged the services of respondents law firm. - With the validity of its contract for services and its authority disputed, and having rendered legal service for years without having received anything in return, and with the prospect of not getting any compensation for all the services it has rendered to SANDAMA and its members, respondent and his law firm auspiciously moved to protect their interests. They may have been mistaken in the remedy they sought, but the mistake was made in good faith. Indeed, while the practice of law is not a business venture, a lawyer nevertheless is entitled to be duly compensated for professional services rendered. It is

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but natural that he protects his interest, most especially when his fee is on a contingent basis. - Respondent was disengaged by SANDAMA after a compromise agreement was entered into by the lot owners and NAPOCOR. Its motions for separate legal fees as well as for intervention were dismissed by the trial court. Presiding from the ultimate outcome of an independent action to recover attorneys fees, the Court does not see any obstacle to respondent filing such action against SANDAMA or any of its members. - The fact that the contract stipulates a maximum of forty percent (40%) contingent fees does not make the contract illegal or unacceptable. Contingent fees are not per se prohibited by law. Its validity depends, in large measure, upon the reasonableness of the amount fixed as contingent fee under the circumstances of the case. Nevertheless, when it is shown that a contract for a contingent fee was obtained by undue influence exercised by the attorney upon his client or by any fraud or imposition, or that the compensation is clearly excessive, the Court must, and will protect the aggrieved party. Disposition WHEREFORE, this case is DISMISSED and considered CLOSED. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines is enjoined to comply with the procedure outlined in Rule 139-B in all cases involving the disbarment and discipline of attorneys. - The defendant claimed that in exchange for his waiver of his right to redeem the first property resold by PNB, the bank would not collect from him the balance of the judgment. - The CFI ruled that there was in fact a condonation made by the bank through one of its officer, a certain Mr. Pecson. - Hence this appeal ISSUES 1. WON PNB condoned the balance of the judgment 2. WON a lawyer can appear as both counsel and witness in the same case HELD 1. No. There was no evidence presented except the uncertain testimony of the defendant, that the bank did in fact agree to the condonation. Even if the SC grants that Mr. Pecson did agree to the condonation, there is not evidence presented that Mr. Pecson was authorized by the bank through its board of directors or persons authorized by the said board to bind the bank to the agreement. 2. Yes (No). The SC held that the appearance of a lawyer as both counsel and witness in a trial is not strictly prohibited. The SC however stated that it would be preferable if the lawyer in this case can appear only as one or the other. In other words, if they are to testify as required by the case, they should withdraw from the active management of the case. This is embodied in Canon 19 of the Code of Legal Ethics. Disposition The decision of the CFI is reversed and the defendant is ordered to pay PNB the sum of P11,574.38 with interest thereon at the rate of seven percent per annum to be reckoned from August 1, 1930. Costs for the defendant. NESTLE PHILIPPINES INC. VS. SANCHEZ PER CURIAM; SEPTEMBER 30, 1987 (cha mendoza) NATURE Resolution FACTS - During the period July 8-10, 1987, members of the respondent labor unions (Union of Filipino Employees and Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-Olalia) intensified the intermittent pickets they had been conducting since June 17, 1987 in front of the Padre Faura gate of the Supreme Court building. They set up pickets' quarters on the pavement in front of the Supreme Court building, at times obstructing access to and egress from the Court's premises and offices of justices, officials and employees. They constructed provisional shelters along the sidewalks, set up a kitchen and littered the place with food containers and trash in utter disregard of proper hygiene and sanitation. They waved their red streamers and placards with slogans, and took turns haranguing the court all day long with the use of loudspeakers. - These acts were done even after their leaders had been received by Justices Pedro L. Yap and Marcelo B. Fenian as Chairmen of the Divisions where their cases are pending, and Atty. Jose C. Espinas, counsel of the Union of Filipro Employees, had been called in order that the pickets might be informed that the demonstration must cease immediately for the same constitutes direct contempt of court and that the Court would not entertain their petitions for as long as the pickets

PNB V UY TENG PIAO VICKERS; 1932 (romy ramirez) NATURE APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila FACTS - Defendant-appellant, Uy Teng Piao, was sued by PNB for non payment of obligations at the CFI of Manila and said court rendered judgment in favor of PNB on September 9, 1934 for the sum of P17,232.42 with interest of seven percent per annum from June 1, 1924. The court ordered the defendant appellant to deposit the money due with the clerk of the court within three months from the date of judgment. In case of failure to pay, the mortgage properties should be sold at auction in accordance with law and the proceeds to be applied to the payment of the judgment. - The defendant failed to comply with the payment order and the properties were auctioned by the sheriff of Manila for a total of P1,300 with PNB as the buyer. - On February 11, 1925, PNB secured from defendant a waiver of the latters right to redeem one of the properties described as TCT no. 8274 and thereafter sold the same to one Mariano Santos for P8,600. - The other property, TCT No. 7264 was likewise resold and the proceeds was credited to the account of Uy. The total amount generated with the resale of the lots amonted to P 11, 300. - On August 1, 1930, PNB instituted another court action for the recover of the balance of the judgment amounting to P11,574.38 with interest at seven percent per annum.

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were maintained. Thus, on July 10, 1987, the Court en banc issued a resolution giving the said unions the opportunity to withdraw graciously and requiring the leaders of the respondent union leaders to appear before the Court on July 14, 1987 at 10:30 A.M. and then and there to SHOW CAUSE why they should not be held in contempt of court. Atty. Jose C. Espinas was further required to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be administratively dealt with. - On the appointed date and time, the above-named individuals appeared before the Court, represented by Atty. Jose C. Espinas, apologizing for their actions described and assuring that the acts would not be repeated. Atty. Espinas likewise manifested to the Court that he had explained to the picketers why their actions were wrong and that the cited persons were willing to suffer such penalty as may be warranted under the circumstances. He, however, prayed for the Court's leniency considering that the picket was actually spearheaded by the leaders of the "Pagkakaisa ng Mang. gagawa as Timog Katagalogan" (PAMANTIK), an unregistered loose alliance of about seventy-five (75) unions in the Southern Tagalog area, and not by either the Union of Filipro Employees or the Kimberly Independent Labor union. - Atty. Espinas further stated that he had explained to the picketers that any delay in the resolution of their cam is usually for causes beyond the control of the Court and that the Supreme Court has always remained steadfast in its role as the guardian of the Constitution. - To confirm for the record that the person cited for contempt fully understood the reason for the citation and that they win abide by their promise that said incident will not be repeated, the Court required the respondents to submit a written manifestation to this effect, which respondents complied with on July 17, 1987 ISSUE WON the respondents and Atty. Espinas should be held in direct contempt of Court HELD NO. Contempt charges dismissed. Ratio The respondents who are nonlawyers are not knowledgeable in her intricacies of substantive and adjective laws. They are not aware that even as the rights of free speech and of assembly are protected by the Constitution, any attempt to pressure or influence courts of justice through the exercise of either right amounts to an abuse thereof, is no longer within the ambit of constitutional protection, nor did they realize that any such efforts to influence the course of justice constitutes contempt of court. The duty and responsibility of advising them, therefore, rest primarily and heavily upon the shoulders of their counsel of record. Atty. Jose C. Espinas, when his attention was called by this Court, did his best to demonstrate to the pickets the untenability of their acts and posture. It is their duty as officers of the court to properly apprise their clients on matters of decorum and proper attitude toward courts of justice, and to labor leaders of the importance of a continuing educational program for their members. Reasoning The Court will not hesitate in future similar situations to apply the full force of the law and punish for contempt those who attempt to pressure the Court into acting one way or the other in any case pending before it. Grievances, if any, must be ventilated through the proper channels, i.e., through appropriate petitions, motions or other pleadings in keeping with the respect due to the Courts as impartial administrators of justice entitled to "proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice. - courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies. Disposition WHEREFORE, the contempt charges against herein respondents are DISMISSED. Henceforth, no demonstrations or pickets intended to pressure or influence courts of justice into acting one way or the other on pending cases shall be allowed in the vicinity and/or within the premises of any and all courts. SO ORDERED. IN RE DE VERA TINGA; December 11, 2003 (joey capones) NATURE Administrative case for disqualification FACTS The election for the 16th IBP Board of Governors was set on April 26, 2003, a month prior to the IBP National Convention scheduled on May 22-24, 2003 in compliance with IBP by laws. Later on, the outgoing IBP Board reset the elections to May 31, 2003, or after the IBP National Convention. Respondent De Vera, a member of the Board of Directors of the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter in Eastern Mindanao, along with Atty. P. Angelica Y. Santiago, President of the IBP Rizal Chapter, sent a letterrequesting the IBP Board to reconsider its Resolution. Their Motion was anchored on two grounds viz. (1) IBP By Laws require the holding of the election of Regional Governors at least one month prior to the national convention of the IBP to prevent it from being politicized since post-convention elections may otherwise lure the candidates into engaging in unacceptable political practices, and; (2) holding the election on May 31, 2003 will render it impossible for the outgoing IBP Board from resolving protests in the election for governors not later than May 31, 2003, as expressed in the IBP By Laws. Motion was denied. After the IBP national convention had been adjourned, Attys. Oliver Owen L. Garcia, Emmanuel Ravanera and Tony Velez filed a Petition before the IBP Board seeking (1) the postponement of the election for Regional Governors to the second or third week of June 2003; and (2) the disqualification of respondent De Vera from being elected Regional Governor for Eastern Mindanao Region. IBP denied petition stating that there was no compelling justification for the postponement of the elections and that the petition for disqualification was premature. Petitioners filed the present Petition before this Court, seeking the same reliefs as those sought in their Petition before the IBP. The SC issued a TRO, directing the IBP Board, its agents, representatives or persons acting in their place and stead to cease and desist from proceeding with the election for the IBP Regional Governor in Eastern Mindanao. Petitioners Claim De Vera had transferred his IBP membership from the Pasay, Paranaque, Las Pinas and Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to Agusan del Sur Chapter because he coveted the IBP presidency. [Following the rotation rule, whoever will be elected Regional Governor for Eastern Mindanao Region in the 16th Regional Governors elections will automatically become the EVP. The EVP will automatically succeed the President in the next term]

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De Vera lacks the requisite moral aptitude. He was sanctioned by the Supreme Court for irresponsibly attacking the integrity of the SC Justices during the deliberations on the aconstitutionality of the plunder law. He also could have been disbarred in the United States for misappropriating his clients funds had he not surrendered his California license to practice law. De Vera actively campaigned for the position of Eastern Mindanao Governor during the IBP National Convention, a prohibited act under the IBP By-Laws Respondents Comments Court has no jurisdiction over the present controversy: the election of the Officers of the IBP, including the determination of the qualification of those who want to serve the organization, is purely an internal matter Petitioners have no legal standing because there is no disqualification in the by laws. Only election protests are provided for but only qualified nominees can file protest. Petitioners are not among qualified nominees. An IBP member is entitled to select, change or transfer his chapter membership. It was upon the invitation of the officers and members of the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter that he transferred his IBP membership. It is unfair and unkind for the petitioners to state that his membership transfer was done for convenience and as a mere subterfuge to qualify him for the Eastern Mindanao governorship He denies exhibiting disrespect to the Court or to any of its members during its deliberations on the constitutionality of the plunder law As for the administrative complaint filed against him by one of his clients when he was practicing law in California, which in turn compelled him to surrender his California license to practice law, he maintains that it cannot serve as basis for determining his moral qualification to run for the position as there is no final judgment finding him guilty of the administrative charge On the alleged politicking he committed during the IBP National Convention, he states that it is baseless to assume that he was campaigning simply because he declared that he had 10 votes to support his candidacy for governorship in the Eastern Mindanao Region and that the petitioners did not present any evidence to substantiate their claim that he or his handlers had billeted the delegates from his region at the Century Park Hotel ISSUES 1. WON this Court has jurisdiction over the present controversy 2. WON petitioners have a cause of action against respondent De Vera, the determination of which in turn requires the resolution of two subissues, namely: a. WON the petition to disqualify respondent De Vera is the proper remedy under the IBP By-Laws b. WON the petitioners are the proper parties to bring this suit; 3. WON the present Petition is premature 4. Assuming that petitioners have a cause of action and that the present petition is not premature, WON respondent De Vera is qualified to run for Governor of the IBP Eastern Mindanao Region HELD 1. Ratio As there exists a clear constitutional grant of power to the SC to promulgate rules affecting the IBP, the SC has jurisdiction over the present controversy. Reasoning Sec. 5, Art. 8 of the 1987 Constitution confers power to SC to supervise all activities of the IBP. The IBP by-laws also recognize the full range of the power of supervision of the SC over the IBP. 2A. Ratio Since the IBP By-laws do not provide for disqualification of candidates for IBP governor, petition to disqualify is not the proper remedy. Reasoning Petition has no firm ground to stand on. Changes previously adopted by the Court simplified the election process and made it less controversial. The grounds for disqualification were thus removed in the present by-laws. 2B. Ratio With the applicability of Section 40 of the IBP By-Laws to the present petition, petitioners are not the proper parties to bring the suit. Reasoning As provided in the aforesaid section, only nominees can file with the President of the IBP a written protest setting forth the grounds therefore. only IBP members from Agusan del Sur and Surigao del Norte are qualified to be nominated and elected at the election for the 16th Regional Governor of Eastern Mindanao. This is pursuant to the rotation rule enunciated in the aforequoted Sections 37 and 38 of the IBP By-Laws. Petitioner Garcia is from Bukidnon IBP Chapter while the other petitioners, Ravanera and Velez, are from the Misamis Oriental IBP Chapter. Consequently, the petitioners are not even qualified to be nominated at the forthcoming election. 3. Ratio Petition to seek disqualification of a person is premature when the person has not yet even been nominated. Reasoning Before a member is elected governor, he has to be nominated first for the post. In this case, respondent De Vera has not been nominated for the post. In fact, no nomination of candidates has been made yet by the members of the House of Delegates from Eastern Mindanao. Conceivably too, assuming that respondent De Vera gets nominated, he can always opt to decline the nomination. 4. Ratio As long as an aspiring member meets the basic requirements provided in the IBP By-Laws, he cannot be barred. Reasoning The basic qualifications for one who wishes to be elected governor for a particular region are: (1) he is a member in good standing of the IBP, 2) he is included in the voters list of his chapter or he is not disqualified by the Integration Rule, by the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar, or by the By-Laws of the Chapter to which he belongs, (3) he does not belong to a chapter from which a regional governor has already been elected, unless the election is the start of a new season or cycle, and (4) he is not in the government service. With regards to his transfer of membership the same is valid having been made 17 months prior election, The only condition required under the rules is that the transfer must be made not less than three months prior to the election of officers in the chapter to which the lawyer wishes to transfer. There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one must be morally fit before he can run for IBP governorship. For one, this is so because the determination of moral fitness of a candidate lies in the individual judgment of the members of the House of Delegates. For another, basically the disqualification of a candidate involving lack of moral fitness should emanate from his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law by this Court, or conviction by final judgment of an offense which involves moral turpitude. The contempt ruling cannot serve as a basis to consider respondent De Vera immoral. The act for which he was found guilty of indirect contempt does not involve moral turpitude (an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good

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morals.) On the administrative complaint in California, no final judgment was rendered by the California Supreme Court finding him guilty of the charge. On the allegation that respondent de Vera or his handlers had housed the delegates from Eastern Mindanao in the Century Park Hotel to get their support for his candidacy, again petitioners did not present any proof to substantiate the same. It must be emphasized that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof under our Rules of Court Disposition Petition to disqualify respondent Atty. Leonard De Vera to run for the position of IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao in the 16th election of the IBP Board of Governors is hereby DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on 30 May 2003 which enjoined the conduct of the election for the IBP Regional Governor in Eastern Mindanao is hereby LIFTED. PEREZ V ESTRADA VITUG; June 29, 2001 (glaisa po) FACTS - KBP, an association representing duly franchised and authorized television and radio networks throughout the country, sent a letter requesting this Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public of full transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history." - The request was seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino in his letter to the Chief Justice and, still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and Attorney Ricardo Romulo. - The Honorable Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez formally filed the instant petition; public interest, the petition further averred, should be evident bearing in mind the right of the public to vital information affecting the nation. - In effect, the petition seeks a re-examination of the 23rd October 1991 resolution of this Court in a case for libel filed by then President Corazon C. Aquino: Accordingly, in order to protect the parties' right to due process, to prevent the distraction of the participants in the proceedings and in the last analysis, to avoid miscarriage of justice, the Court resolved to PROHlBIT live radio and television coverage of court proceedings. Video footage of court hearings for news purposes shall be limited and restricted as above indicated." ISSUE WON live radio and television coverage of the trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against Pres. Estrada should be allowed HELD - NO. The propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve the weighing out of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the one hand, and the fundamental rights of the accused, on the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial. - Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in a trial that is not lifted above its individual settings nor made an object of public's attention and where the conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force or influence 10 but only by evidence and argument given in open court, where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is demanded. - An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secrete conclaves of long ago. - A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. - The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the right to public information. It also approves of media's exalted power to provide the most accurate and comprehensive means of conveying the proceedings to the public and in acquainting the public with the judicial process in action; nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding consideration is still the paramount right of the accused to due process17 which must never be allowed to suffer diminution in its constitutional proportions. - The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, in its Resolution of 16 Apri1 2001, expressed its own concern on the live television and radio coverage of the criminal trials of Mr. Estrada; to paraphrase: Live television and radio coverage can negate the rule on exclusion of witnesses during the hearings intended to assure a fair trial; at stake in the criminal trial is not only the life and liberty of the accused but the very credibility of the Philippine criminal justice system, and live television and radio coverage of the trial could allow the "hooting throng" to arrogate unto themselves the task of judging the guilt of the accused, such that the verdict of the court will be acceptable only if popular; and live television and radio coverage of the trial will not subserve the ends of justice but will only pander to the desire for publicity of a few grandstanding lawyers. - Parenthetically, the United States Supreme Court and other federal courts do not allow live television and radio coverage of their proceedings. - The sad reality is that the criminal cases presently involved are of great dimensions so involving as they do a former President of the Republic. It is undeniable that these cases have twice become the nation's focal points in the two conflicting phenomena of EDSA II and EDSA III where the magnitude of the events has left a still divided nation. - The transcendental events in our midst do not allow us to turn a blind eye to yet another possible extraordinary case of mass action being allowed to now creep into even the business of the courts in the dispensation of justice under a rule of law. At the very least, a change in the standing rule of the court contained in its resolution of 23 October 1991 may not appear to be propitious. MAGLASANG V PEOPLE PER CURIAM; November 4, 1990 (boots tirol) NATURE Resolution of the Petition for Certiorari to review the decision of the San Carlos City Court FACTS

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- a petition for certiorari entitled "Khalyxto Perez Maglasang vs. People of the Philippines, Presiding Judge, Ernesto B. Templado (San Carlos City Court) Negros Occidental," was filed by registered mail with the SC. Due to noncompliance with the requirements, specifically the nonpayment of the legal fees and the non-attachment of the duplicate originals or duly certified true copies of the questioned decision and orders of the respondent judge, the SC dismissed the petition. -On September 9, 1989, Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano, as counsel of the petitioner, moved for a reconsideration of the resolution dismissing the petition. This time, the amount of P316.50 was remitted and the Court was furnished with a duplicate copy of the respondent judge's decision, and also the IBP O.R. No. and the date of the payment of his membership dues. The motion for reconsideration did not contain the duplicate original or certified true copies of the assailed orders. Thus, in a Resolution dated October 18, 1989, the motion for reconsideration was denied with finality. - On January 22, 1990 the Court received from Atty. Castellano a copy of a strongly-worded complaint filed with the Office of the President of the Philippines whereby Khalyxto Perez Maglasang, through his lawyer, Atty. Castellano, as complainant, accused all the five Justices of the Court's Second Division with "biases and/or ignorance of the law or knowingly rendering unjust judgments or resolution." - Atty. Castellano was required to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt or administratively dealt with for improper conduct by reason of the strong and intemperate language of the complaint and its improper filing with the Office of the President, which has no jurisdiction to discipline, much more, remove, Justices of the Supreme Court. -On March 21, 1990, Atty. Castellano filed his "Opposition." In his "Opposition", Atty. Castellano claimed that the complaint "was a constructive criticism intended to correct in good faith the erroneous and very strict practices of the Justices concerned. Atty. Castellano further disputed the authority and jurisdiction of the Court in issuing the Resolution requiring him to show cause inasmuch as "they are Respondents in this particular case and no longer as Justices and as such they have no more jurisdiction to give such order." Thus, according to him, "the most they (Justices) can do by the mandate of the law and procedure (sic) is to answer the complaint satisfactorily so that they will not be punished in accordance with the law just like a common tao." ISSUE WON Atty Castellano is guilty of improper conduct and be punished for contempt HELD YES. In filing the "complaint" against the justices of the Court's Second Division with the Office of the President, even the most basic tenet of our government system-the separation of powers between the judiciary, the executive, and the legislative branches-has been lost on Atty. Castellano. The Supreme Court is supreme-the third great department of government entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate with finality all justiciable disputes, public and private. No other department or agency may pass upon its judgments or declare them 'unjust.' Not even the President of the Philippines as Chief Executive may pass judgment on any of the Court's acts. -Atty. Castellano's assertion that the complaint "was a constructive criticism intended to correct in good faith the erroneous and very strict practices of the Justices" is but an effort to sanitize his clearly unfounded and irresponsible accusation. The arrogance displayed by counsel in insisting that the Court has no jurisdiction to question his act of having complained before the Office of the President, and in claiming that a contempt order is used as a weapon by judges and justices against practicing lawyers, however, reveals all too plainly that he was not honestly motivated in his criticism. Atty. Castellano's complaint is a vilification of the honor and integrity of the Justices of the Second Division of the Court and an impeachment of their capacity to render justice according to law. Disposition Atty. Castellano found guilty of improper conduct and contempt of court and fined P1,000.00 and suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months HORNILLA V SALUNAT SANTIAGO; July 1, 2003 (dahls salamat) FACTS -Complainant : Benedicto Hornilla, Atty. FedericoRicafort (members of PPSTA) -Respondent : Atty. Erneto Salunat (member of ASSA Law Firm-> Retained counsel of Philippine Public School Teachers Association) -Complainants filed an intracorpoate case against members of the Board of Directors for terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1997 for unlawful spending and undervalued sale of real property of the PPSTA. -Respondent appeared as counsel for PPSTA Board Members in the said case. -Respondent in PPSTS v 1992-1995 Board of Directors of PPSTA, appeared as counsel for respondent despite being part of ASSA Law Firm the retained counsel of PPSTA Petitioners Claim -respondent is guilty of conflict of interest because he was engaged by PPSTA and was being paid out of its corporate funds to which they have contributed. -respondent violated rule 15.06 of the code of professional responsibility when he assured PPSTA Board Members in a meeting that he will win the PPSTA case Respondents Comment -He entered his appearance as counsel or the PPSTA Board members for and in behalf of ASSA Law and Associates. -His relationship with Aurelio Salunat is immaterial -He denies assuring victory of the PPSTA Board in the case but merely assured them the truth will come out. -Averred by way of Special and Affirmative Defenses, respondent averred that Atty. Ricafort himself was guilty of gross violation of his oath amounting to gross misconduct ,malpractice and unethical conduct for filing trumped up charges against him, and prayed that the complaint against him be dismissed and complainant be disciplined or disbarred. IBP Commission on Bar and Discipline recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six months. Board of Governors approved the report and recommendation. ISSUE WON a lawyer engaged by a corporation can defend members of the board of the same corporation in a derivative suit

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HELD No. A Lawyer engaged as counsel for a corporation cannot represent members of the same corporations board of directors in a derivative suit brought against them. To do so would be tantamount to representing conflicting interests which is prohibited by the Code of Professional Responsibility. -Pertinent rule of the CPR: Rule 15.03. A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. -There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. -TESTS FOR CONFLICT OF INTEREST: 1. WON in behalf of one client, it is the lawyers duty to fight for a issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for another client. 2. Whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof. Derivative suit: Where corporate directors have committed a breach of trust either by their frauds, ultra vires acts, or negligence, and the corporation is unable or unwilling to institute suit to remedy the wrong, a stockholder may sue on behalf of himself and other stockholders and for the benefit of the corporation and indirectly to the stockholders. -Respondent was found guilty of representing conflicting interests and was ADMONISHED to observe higher degree of fidelity in the practice of his profession. ILUSORIO V LOKIN,JR. CARPIO MORALES; December 14, 2005 (apple maramba) NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of a resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors FACTS On July 15, 1991, Potenciano Ilusorio, engaged the services of the law office of Liwanag Raval Pilando Suplico and Lokin to represent him in the Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0009, of which Ilusorio was one of the defendants -In that civil case, the Republic was claiming shareholdings in Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC) and Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) 99% of the shares of which appeared to be owned by POTC. Atty Luis Lokin, Jr., together with Attorneys Demaree Raval and Salvador Hizon, actively handled the case for Ilusorio -While the case was pending, Ilusorio, with the assistance of the law firm of Raval and Lokin (successor to Liwanag Raval Pilando Suplico and Lokin), entered into a Compromise Agreement with the Republic, where it was settled that the Republic was to get 4,727 POTC shares while Ilusorio was to get 673 POTC shares. -During the special stockholders meeting of PHILCOMSAT held on August 27, 1998, which was supposed to be a mere informal gathering to introduce the newly appointed government nominees for PHILCOMSAT to the private stockholders of POTC, the gathering, through the high-handed and deceitful maneuvers of respondent, was suddenly and without notice transformed into a Special Stockholders Meeting at which directors and officers of PHILCOMSAT were elected. -Ilusorio then contested the validity of the meeting by filing before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a complaint, against Manuel Nieto, et al. who were purportedly elected directors and officers of PHILCOMSAT, in which SEC case respondent Lokin, Jr. appeared as the counsel of Nieto, et al., contrary to his oath not to represent conflicting interests. -However, on account of the death of Ilusorio and the failure of his children, namely, Maximo Ilusorio, Sylvia Ilusorio, and Erlinda K. Ilusorio-Bildner (herein petitioner), to establish their qualification to substitute for him, his complaint was dismissed -Petitioner filed a new complaint against respondent -After hearing both parties, IBP Investigating Commissioner San Juan found merit in petitioners complaint and recommended that respondent be suspended for three months. -The IBP Board of Governors set aside the recommendation of Commissioner San Juan and dismissed the complaint -No copy of the notice of resolution was served upon petitioner. Petitioner, nonetheless, learned about the recommendation of Commissioner San Juan and the setting aside thereof by the Board of Governors - On March 10, 2004 petitioner wrote a letter to the Board in her own name requesting that the Board take up the matter once more and asking for the remanding of the case against Atty. Luis Lokin to the Board of Governors. - By letter of April 16, 2004, the Board of Governors said that it constrained to deny [petitioners] request for a remanding or a reconsideration of the case as there was no provision for a reconsideration of any such case either in Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court or in the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline. -Counsel for petitioner, Atty. Samuel Divina, then wrote a letter of July 19, 2004 to Atty. Jose Anselmo Cadiz, Chairman of the IBP Board of Governors and concurrently National President of the IBP, informing him that petitioner had not been notified of any final action on her complaint - Replying, the Board Chairman, by letter dated August 11, 2004, stated that the Board could no longer act on petitioners July 19, 2004 letter, otherwise it would, in effect, be considering the letter as a motion for reconsideration which is not provided for by the rules of procedure for cases of the kind. - Petitioner thus filed the present petition on September 2, 2004 ISSUES Procedural 1. WON the petition was filed within the 15-day reglamentary period 2. WON the case should be dismissed for being inappropriate and improper, it being based not on a resolution of the IBP Board 3. WON personal knowledge of the petitioner of the facts alleged in the complaint is required to pursue the complaint Substantive WON the respondent is guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility HELD Procedural Reasoning 1. Respondent contends that the petition was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period, as petitioner should be deemed to have received

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notice of the challenged IBP resolution, not on August 17, 2004 when her counsel received the August 11, 2004 letter of the IBP Board Chairman, but on March 10, 2004 when she wrote the Board admitting having acquired knowledge of the reversal of Commissioner San Juans recommendation. Hence, respondent claims, petitioner had only until March 25, 2004 to file a petition for review. - Section 12 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court which states: (c) If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary sanction imposed by it is less than suspension or disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand, or fine) it shall issue a decision exonerating respondent or imposing such sanction. The case shall be deemed terminated unless upon petition of the complaint or other interested party filed with the Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Boards resolution, the Supreme Court orders otherwise. - The notice of resolution referred to in said paragraph (c) refers not to an unofficial information that may be gathered by the parties, nor to any letter from the IBP Board Chairman or even of the Board, but to the official notice of resolution that is supposed to be issued by the Board, copy of which is given to all parties and transmitted to this Court. - Respondent IBP admits that no such notice has been sent to petitioner - Since no notice has been sent to petitioner, at least at the time this petition was filed, as the August 11, 2004 letter from the IBP Board Chairman cannot be deemed a notice of resolution, the present petition has been timely filed. 2. While, generally, a party who desires to appeal from the IBPs dismissal of a disciplinary case should await the notice of resolution, it bears noting in this instance that the Board, despite issuing a resolution on the subject complaint on February 27, 2004, failed to send a notice of resolution to petitioner. -The IBP has given no reason for the delay other than the nebulous explanation that records were still being completed. -In view thereof, petitioner, who had already confirmed that her complaint was dismissed through a letter coming from the IBP Board Chairman, cannot be faulted for appealing to this Court notwithstanding the absence of an official notice of resolution 3. Section 1, Rule 139-B states: SECTION 1. How instituted. Proceedings for disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts. -Personal knowledge is not a requisite for filing a disbarment complaint. Clearly, personal knowledge is required, not of the complainant, but of her witnesses, if there are any. Substantive Reasoning Respondent denies representing conflicting interests on the ground that SB Case No. 009 and SEC Case No. 09-98-6086 are totally distinct from each other -Nowhere is the conflict of interest clearer than in respondents Memorandum dated September 28, 1998 filed with the SEC wherein he argued in behalf of Nieto, et al. as follows: A continued exercise of jurisdiction and a subsequent disposition of the instant Petition by this Honorable Commission would pre-empt the resolution by the Sandiganbayan of the disputed shares. It would in fact affirm the ownership by the Petitioners of the said shares subject of the Sandiganbayan case. This Petition is a premature action to enforce the Compromise Agreement entered into by Mr. Ilusorio. Clearly, this is beyond the jurisdiction of this Honorable Commission. Any right to be derived from the Compromise Agreement is clearly inchoate at this point in time. -Plainly, when respondent represented Nieto, et al. in the SEC, he was advocating an interest hostile to the implementation of the same Compromise Agreement that he had priorly negotiated for Ilusorio Disposition The Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors dated February 27, 2004 is SET ASIDE. Respondent Luis K. Lokin, Jr. is found guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of Three (3) Months, with WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely. GONZALES V CABUCANA, JR. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; 2006 (ice baguilat) NATURE Administrative Case FACTS Gonzales being counseled by the law firm Cabucana, Cabucana, De Guzman and Cabucana Law Office, filed a civil case that was awarded to them in a judicial ruling and asked Gatcheco to execute such however Gatcheco failed to do so and Gonzales filed a complaint. Gatcheco harassed Gonzales and subsequently Gonzales filed a criminal case. Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr., represented Gatcheco. Gonzales filed an administrative case saying that Cabucana violated the lawyer-client relationship due to conflict of interest. ISSUE WON there is a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility for conflict of interest HELD Yes, the rule is that the lawyer is barred from representing conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Even the fact of appearing to be treacherous and double-dealing is discouraged because people are expected to entrust their secrets to their lawyers. Acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyers duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty. Although the firm was the one who represented the civil case the person is still in representation of the firm. It at the least invite suspicion of double-dealing. It is however mitigated by the fact that the case was done in good faith and with no malice as supported by the findings of IBP Commissioner Reyes and Gonzales move of withdrawing the case. Disposition Respondent fined and given a stern warning DE GUZMAN V DE DIOS PARDO; January 26, 2001 (athe odi) NATURE

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Complaint for Disbarment against Atty. De Dios on the ground of violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting interests. FACTS - De Guzman sought the assistance of Atty De Dios in forming a corporation engaged in hotel and restaurant business. They were able to have Suzuki Beach Hotel Incorporated (SBHI) registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Atty. De Dios was retained by De Guzman. - De Guzman was the majority stockholder. She subscribed to 29,800 shares, she paid up P745,000.00 during the stage of incorporation. However, the remaining 22,250 shares amounting to P2,235,000.00 was left unpaid. - The corporation, upon the advice of Atty. De Dios required De Guzman to pay the unliquidated shares. Later, they were auctioned and acquired by Ramon del Rosario, one of the incorporators of SBHI. Because of this, De Guzman was ousted from the corporation completely. While Atty. De Dios rose to be the president of the corporation. - In defense, Atty. De Dios argued that she represents the corporation, not De Guzman in her personal capacity. Moreover, what she did was for the best interest of the corporation, which was on the verge of bankruptcy then. ISSUE WON Atty. De Dios is guilty of representing conflicting interest. HELD Yes. Reasoning 1. Granting that the sale of her delinquent shares was valid, De Guzman still has original shares of P745,00.00, enough for her not to be ousted from the corporation. 2. There was an atty-client relationship between De Dios and De Guzman. The latter was the one who retained her as counsel not the corporation. 3. There was evidence of collusion between the board of directors and respondent. De Dios became the president a clear case of conflict of interest of the respondent. Disposition Atty. De Dios was SUSPENDED for 6 months. REGALA V SANDIGANBAYAN KAPUNAN; September 20, 1996 (chris capul) NATURE Petition for certiorari FACTS - This is an offshoot of the complaint before the Sandiganbayan through the PCGG against Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. for recovery of alleged illgotten wealth including shares of stocks in certain corporations. - ACCRA Law Firm performs legal svcs incl. organization and acquisition of business associations/orgs. Sometimes, members of the firm act as incorporators or stockholders. They acquire info relative to assets of clients and their personal/biz circumstances. In this case, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of said corps involved in sequestration proceedings. - PCGG filed Third Amended Complaint w/c excluded pvt respondent Raul Roco bec he promised to reveal identity of principal/s for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder - ACCRA lawyers said it was in furtherance of legit lawyering and they became holders of shares of stock only as incorporating or acquiring stockholders, and as such, they do not claim any proprietary interest in said shares. - Petitioner Paraja Hayudini, who separated fr ACCRA, filed a separate answer. - ACCRA lawyers filed a counter-motion that PCGG also exclude them as parties-defendant as it did to Roco. PCGG set conditions for exclusion of the petitioners: - disclosure of identity of clients - submission of docs substantiating lawyer-client relationship - submission of deeds of assignments petitioners executed in favor of its clients covering their respective shareholdings. - PCGG presented supposed proof to substantiate compliance by Roco of the said conditions. - Sandiganbayan denied exclusion of petitioners fr the PCGG case. That denial is now being questioned. ISSUES 1. WON lawyer-client confidentiality applies in this case 2. WON Roco and the ACCRA lawyers are similarly situated, thus, making the denial of the ACCRA lawyers exclusion from the PCGG case a violation of equal protection clause. HELD 1. Yes - PCGG is not really after the petitioners but the bigger fish. This is clear fr the PCGGs willingness to cut a deal w/ petitioners the names of clients in exchange for exclusion fr complaint. - Lawyer-client relationship is based on contract of lease of svcs and contract of agency. But it is more than relationship of principal-agent and lessor-lessee. An atty possesses special powers of trust given by client. He also occupies quasi-judicial ofc since he is an officer of the court. - Old Code of Civil Procedure forbids counsel w/o authority of client to reveal communication or advise given in course of professional employment. This was passed on into the Rules of Court. - Canon 17 of Code of Professional Responsibility says that a lawyer owes fidelity to cause of his client. Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also speaks of the devotion of a lawyer to the interest of the client. - The right to counsel of an accused is also involved in this issue. If client were made to choose bet legal representation w/o effective communication and disclosure and legal representation w/ all his secrets revealed then he might be compelled to stay away fr judicial system or lose right to counsel. - GENERAL RULE: - Court has right to know that client whose privileged info is sought to be protected is flesh and blood. - Privilege exists only after atty-client relationship has been established. It does not attach until there is a client. - Privilege generally pertains to subject matter of the relationship. - Due process requires that the opposing party should, as a general rule, know his adversary.

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- EXCEPTIONS - Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing clients name would implicate that client in the very activity for w/c he sought the lawyers advice. - It is also privileged where disclosure would open the client to civil liability. - It is also privileged when govts lawyers have no case against an attys client unless, by revealing the clients name, the said name would furnish the only link that would be necessary to convict an individual of a crime. - Apart fr the exceptions above, other situations could qualify as exceptions. Info relating to the identity of client may fall w/in privilege when clients name itself has independent significance such that disclosure would reveal client confidence. - The instant case FALLS UNDER AT LEAST 2 EXCEPTIONS. First, disclosure would lead to establish the clients connection w/ the very fact in issue. Also, the link bet the offense and the legal advice/svc was duly established by no less than the PCGG itself. Petitioners have a legitimate fear that identifying their clients would implicate them. Revelation of the name would provide the link for prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists. - It is diff when the client consults atty for illicit purposes, seeking advice on how to around the law. In this case, a client thinks he might have previously committed something illegal and consults atty abt it. - Court is trying to avoid fishing expedition by the prosecution. After all, there are alternative sources of info available to prosecutor w/c does not depend on utilizing a defendants counsel as convenient and readily available source of info. - Lawyer-client confidentiality and loyalty exists not only during relationship but even after termination of the relationship. 2. Yes - Respondents failed to show that Roco actually revealed the identity of his clients. PCGG shld show that Roco was treated as a species apart fr the ACCRA lawyers on basis of classification w/c made substantial distinctions based on real differences. No such substantial distinctions exist. RESOLUTIONS OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN ARE ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. SEPARATE OPINION VITUG - I find it unreasonable for Sandiganbayan to compel petitioners to breach the trust reposed on them and succumb to a thinly disguised threat of incrimination. DAVIDE [dissent] - The prerogative to determine who shall be made defendants in a civil case is initially vested in plaintiff (PCGG in this case). There has been an agreement/compromise settlement bet PCGG and Roco. If Rocos revelation violated confidentiality of lawyer-client, he would be solely answerable to his principals/clients and probably to the Court. - For ACCRA lawyers to be excluded, they must perform certain obligations as Roco did. - Confidentiality is not a cause to exclude a party. It is merely a ground for disqualification of a witness and may be invoked at an appropriate time. None of the lawyers in this case is being required to testify. - State has right to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials/employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees. - Rules of Court requires that complaint be against all persons who appear to be responsible. - Privilege does not extend to further criminal conduct. - Disclosure of clients identity is necessary proof of existence of lawyer-client relationship and is not privileged info. PUNO [dissent] - Person claiming atty-client privilege must present underlying facts. Without proofs, Court has no factual basis to determine whether petitioners fall w/in exception to the general rule.

PEOPLE V SANDIGANBAYAN REGALADO; July 16, 1997 (aida villanueva) NATURE Special civil action in the SC FACTS - The annulment of a resolution of the Sandiganbayan is being sought, with the Sandiganbayan denying the motion to utilize Atty. Sansaet as state witness. - Honrada was a clerk of court in a municipality in Agusan del Sur. Paredes was the provincial attorney of Agusan del Sur who later became governor and congressman. - Sansaet was a lawyer who served as counsel for Parades in several instances petinent to the criminal charges involved in the present recourse. - 1976 Paredes applied for a free patent over a piece of land. His application was approved and a title was issued to him. - 1985 Director of Lands cancelled the patent of Paredes, saying that the land had already been designated and reserved as a school site. - It was also discovered that Paredes got the lot through fraudulent means. - An information for perjury was filed against Paredes. Another allegation was that he had used his position to get what he wanted. Sansaet was still Paredes counsel. - Gelacio, a taxpayer, wrote the Ombudsman and asked for the investigation of Sansaet, Honrada and Paredes. According to him, he conspired with the other two. ISSUES 1. WON projected testimony of Sansaet is barred by the atty-client relationship 2. WON Sansaet qualified as particeps criminis (accomplice to the crime) for discharge from the criminal prosecution in order to testify for the State HELD 1. NO Ratio If a client seeks his lawyers advice with respect to a crime he committed, it is given the virtual confessional seal. This does not apply to a crime which a client intends to commit.

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Reasoning A distinction must be made between confidential communications relating to past crimes already crimes and future crimes intended to be committed. - The period is the date when the privileged communication was made by the client to the attorney. - Paredes was planning to commit the crime of falsification. - But for the application of the attorney-client privilege, however, the period to be considered is the date when the privileged communication was made by the client to the attorney in relation to either a crime committed in the past or with respect to a crime intended to be committed in the future. - The testimony sought to be elicited from Sansaet as state witness are the communications made to him by physical acts and/or accompanying words of Parades at the time he and Honrada, either with the active or passive participation of Sansaet, were about to falsify, or in the process of falsifying, the documents which were later filed in the Tanodbayan by Sansaet and culminated in the criminal charges now pending in respondent Sandiganbayan - Sansaet himself was a conspirator and it is settled that for the attyclient privilege to apply in communication, it must be for a lawful purpose. The existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the attachment of the privilege. 2. YES Ratio Despite his involvement in the crime, Sansaet fulfills all the requirements needed for his discharge as state witness. Reasoning Sansaet was a conspirator in the crime of falsification and in a conspiracy the act of one is the act of all. One of the requirements for state witness is that he does not appear to be the most guilty (not that he is the least guilty as to what has been erroneously interpreted in some instances). - It is the identity of the mens rea which is considered the predominant consideration and warrants an imposition of the same penalty. - In the case of People v Ocemar: And by most guilty we mean the highest degree of culpability in terms of participation in the commission of the offense and not necessarily the severity of the penalty imposed. While all the accused may be given the same penalty by reason of conspiracy, yet one may be considered least guilty if We take into account his degree of participation in the perpetration of the offense. - The other requisites for the discharge of Sansaet as state witness are present. - Sansaet is the only cooperative witness to the actual commission of the crime of falsification. - There is absolute necessity for Sansaets testimony because the prosecution has no direct evidence available. - He does not appear to be the most guilty. - His testimony can be corroborated by reputable witnesses. - Sansaet has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. CASTILLO V SANDIGANBAYAN BUENA; February 21, 2002 (jojo mendoza) NATURE Petition for certiorari, seeking to annul the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. FACTS On July 23, 1987, the Republic of the Philipines Filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages against several persons, one of which is petitioner. The complaint alleges that- defendant Gregorio Castilo acted as dummy, nominee and/or agent of defendants Ferdinand Marcos, Imelda Marcos, et al in establishing Hotel Properties, Inc. in order to acquire beneficial interest and control, and conceal ownership, of Silahis Hotel; defendant Gregorio Castillo signed all pertinent documents as attorney-in-fact of the defendants Enriquezes and Panlilio. - On October 1992, petitioner died. - On October 15, 1996, petitioner, represented by his heirs, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint against him is violative of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege and must be dismissed pursuant to the Supreme Courts decision in Regala v Sandiganbayan. - On November 26, 1998, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion to dismiss. Respondent contends that the ruling in Regala does not apply to the present case, because in said case, there was a clear finding that the ACCRA lawyers were impleaded by the PCGG as co-defendants to force them to disclose the identity of their clients as shown by PCGGs willingness to cut a deal with the ACCRA lawyers the names of their clients in exchange for exclusion from the complaint. In this case, the petitioner is being sued as a principal defendant for being in conspiracy with other defendants in the commission of the acts complained of and he is not being required to name his clients. ISSUE WON petitioners inclusion in the complaint violates the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege HELD YES. While it is true that unlike in Regala, petitioner in not being required to name his clients, the case of Regala is still applicable in the present case because the two cases are the same in more important aspects. - The fact of the lawyer-client relationship between petitioner and defendants Enriquezes and Panlilios was immediately raised by petitioner as one of his affirmative defenses. In the same vein, in Regala, the professional relationship was raised merely as a defense by defendant lawyers and was not yet proven during the trial. This not withstanding, the court struck out the complaint against the lawyers. - Similar to the petitioners in Regala, petitioner is not a mere witness. He is a co-principal in the case for recovery of ill-gotten wealth. He has made his position clear from the very beginning that he is not willing to testify and he cannot be compelled to testify in view of his constitutional right against self-incrimination and of his fundamental legal right to maintain inviolate the privilege of attorney-client confidentiality. - Since the doctrine of adherence to judicial precedents or stare decisis is provided in Art. 8 of the Civil Code, Sandiganbayan is ordered to exclude petitioner Gregorio Castillo as party defendant in the case RP v Enriquez. DALISAY V MAURICIO SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ; January 23, 2006 (bry san juan) NATURE

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Motion for reconsideration of our Decision dated April 22, 2005 finding Atty. Melanio Batas Mauricio, Jr., respondent, guilty of malpractice and gross misconduct and imposing upon him the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months. FACTS - On October 13, 2001, Valeriana U. Dalisay, complainant, engaged respondents services as counsel in Civil Case No. 00-044, entitled Lucio De Guzman, etc., complainants, v. Dalisay U. Valeriana, respondent, pending before the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 1, Binangonan, Rizal. Notwithstanding his receipt of documents and attorneys fees in the total amount of P56,000.00 from complainant, respondent never rendered legal services for her. As a result, she terminated the attorney-client relationship and demanded the return of her money and documents, but respondent refused. - On January 13, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline, found that for the amount of P56,000.00 paid by the complainant x x x, no action had been taken nor any pleadings prepared by the respondent. She recommended that respondent be required to refund the amount of P56,000.00 to the complainant, and surprisingly, that the complaint be dismissed. On February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2004-121, adopting and approving in toto Commissioner Navarros Report and Recommendation. On April 22, 2005, we rendered the assailed Decision. Incidentally, upon learning of our Decision, respondent went to the MTC, Branch I, Binangonan, Rizal to verify the status of Civil Case No. 00-044. There, he learned of the trial courts Decision dated December 6, 2001 holding that the tax declarations and title submitted by complainant are not official records of the Municipal Assessor and the Registry of Deed. Thereupon, respondent filed a Sworn Affidavit Complaint against complainant charging her with violations of Article 171 and 172 and/or Article 182 of the Revised Penal Code. He alleged that complainant offered tampered evidence. - In this motion for reconsideration, respondent raises the following arguments. First, complainant did not engage his services as counsel in Civil Case No. 00-044. She hired him for the purpose of filing two new petitions, a petition for declaration of nullity of title and a petition for review of a decree. Second, Civil Case No. 00-044 was considered submitted for decision as early as August 6, 2001, or more than two months prior to October 13, 2001, the date he was engaged as counsel, hence, he could not have done anything anymore about it. Third, complainant refused to provide him with documents related to the case, preventing him from doing his job. And fourth, complainant offered tampered evidence in Civil Case No. 00-004, prompting him to file falsification cases against her. - In her opposition to the motion, complainant contends that:: (1) respondent violated the principle of confidentiality between a lawyer and his client when he filed falsification charges against her; (2) respondent should have returned her money; (3) respondent should have verified the authenticity of her documents earlier if he really believed that they are falsified; and (4) his refusal to return her money despite this Courts directive constitutes contempt. ISSUE WON respondent lawyer should be disciplined for failing to render services despite payment of his client HELD YES. It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline employment. But once he accepts money from a client, an attorney-client relationship is established, giving rise to the duty of fidelity to the clients cause. From then on, he is expected to be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latters cause with wholehearted devotion. - Respondent assumed such obligations when he received the amount of P56,000.00 from complainant and agreed to handle Civil Case No. 00-044. Unfortunately, he had been remiss in the performance of his duties. As we have ruled earlier, there is nothing in the records to show that he (respondent) entered his appearance as counsel of record for complainant in Civil Case No. 00-044. Neither is there any evidence nor pleading submitted to show that he initiated new petitions. - Undoubtedly, respondents present version is a flagrant departure from his previous pleadings. This cannot be countenanced. A party should decide early what version he is going to advance. A change of theory in the latter stage of the proceedings is objectionable, not due to the strict application of procedural rules, but because it is contrary to the rules of fair play, justice and due process. The present administrative case was resolved by the IBP on the basis of respondents previous admission that complainant engaged his legal services in Civil Case No. 00-044. He cannot now unbind himself from such admission and its consequences. In fact, if anything at all has been achieved by respondents inconsistent assertions, it is his dishonesty to this Court. - At any rate, assuming arguendo that complainant indeed engaged respondents services in filing the two (2) new petitions, instead of Civil Case No. 00-044, still, his liability is unmistakable. There is nothing in the records to show that he filed any petition. The ethics of the profession demands that, in such a case, he should immediately return the filing fees to complainant. In Parias v. Paguinto,[10] we held that a lawyer shall account for all money or property collected from the client. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for filing fee, but not used for failure to file the case must immediately be returned to the client on demand. Per records, complainant made repeated demands, but respondent is yet to return the money. - Neither do we find merit in respondents second argument. The fact that Civil Case No. 00-044 was already submitted for decision does not justify his inaction. After agreeing to handle Civil Case No. 00-044, his duty is, first and foremost, to enter his appearance. Sadly, he failed to do this simple task. He should have returned complainants money. Surely, he cannot expect to be paid for doing nothing. - In his third argument, respondent attempts to evade responsibility by shifting the blame to complainant. He claims that she refused to provide him with documents vital to the case. This is preposterous. When a lawyer accepts a case, his acceptance is an implied representation that he possesses the requisite academic learning, skill and ability to handle the case. As a lawyer, respondent knew where to obtain copies of the certificates of title. As a matter of fact, he admitted that his Law Office, on its own, managed to verify the authenticity of complainants title. It bears reiterating that respondent did not take any action on the case despite having been paid for his services. This is tantamount to abandonment of his duties as a lawyer and taking undue advantage of his client.

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- Finally, in an ironic twist of fate, respondent became the accuser of complainant. In his fourth argument, respondent accuses her of offering falsified documentary evidence in Civil Case No. 00-004, prompting him to file falsification cases against her. He thus justifies his inability to render legal services to complainant. Assuming that complainant indeed offered falsified documentary evidence in Civil Case No. 00-044, will it be sufficient to exonerate respondent? We believe not. First, Canon 19 outlines the procedure in dealing with clients who perpetrated fraud in the course of a legal proceeding. Consistent with its mandate that a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal and only within the bounds of the law, Rule 19.02 of the same Canon specifically provides: Rule 19.02 A lawyer who has received information that his clients has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall promptly call upon the client to rectify the same, and failing which he shall terminate the relationship with such client in accordance with the Rules of Court. - As a lawyer, respondent is expected to know this Rule. Instead of inaction, he should have confronted complainant and ask her to rectify her fraudulent representation. If complainant refuses, then he should terminate his relationship with her. Understandably, respondent failed to follow the above-cited Rule. This is because there is no truth to his claim that he did not render legal service to complainant because she falsified the documentary evidence in Civil Case No.00-044. This brings us to the second reason why we cannot sustain his fourth argument. The pleadings show that he learned of the alleged falsification long after complainant had terminated their attorney-client relationship. It was a result of his active search for a justification of his negligence in Civil Case No. 00-044. In fine, let it be stressed that the authority of an attorney begins with his or her retainer. It gives rise to a relationship between an attorney and a client that is highly fiduciary in nature and of a very delicate, exacting, and confidential character, requiring a high degree of fidelity and good faith. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. DEE V COURT OF APPEALS REGALADO; August 24, 1983 (lora alamin) NATURE Petition for a writ of certiorari to overturn Court of Appeals r esolution, dated February 12, 1987, reinstating the decision of May 9, 1986. FACTS - Petitioner and his father went to the residence of private respondent, accompanied by the latter's cousin, to seek his advice regarding the problem of the alleged indebtedness of petitioner's brother, Dewey Dee, to Caesar's Palace, a well-known gambling casino at Las Vegas, Nevada, U.S.A. Petitioner's father was apprehensive over the safety of his son, Dewey, having heard of a link between the mafia and Caesar's Palace and the possibility that his son may be harmed at the instance of the latter. - Private respondent assured petitioner and his father that he would inquire into the matter, after which his services were reportedly contracted for P100,000.00. From his residence, private respondent called up Caesar's Palace and, thereafter, several long distance telephone calls and two trips to Las Vegas by him elicited the information that Dewey Dee's outstanding account was around $1,000,000.00. Further investigations, however, revealed that said account had actually been incurred by Ramon Sy, with Dewey Dee merely signing for the chits. - In June, 1981, private respondent personally talked with the president of Caesar's Palace at Las Vegas, Nevada. He advised the president that for the sake and in the interest of the casino it would be better to make Ramon Sy answer for the indebtedness. The president told him that if he could convince Ramon Sy to acknowledge the obligation, Dewey Dee would be exculpated from liability for the account. Upon private respondent's return to Manila, he conferred with Ramon Sy and the latter was convinced to acknowledge the indebtedness. - In August, 1981, private respondent brought to Caesar's Palace the letter of Ramon Sy owning the debt and asking for a discount. Thereafter, the account of Dewey Dee was cleared and the casino never bothered him. - Having thus settled the account of petitioner's brother, private respondent sent several demand letters to petitioner demanding the balance of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees. Petitioner, however, ignored said letters. Private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for the collection of attorney's fees and refund of transport fare and other expenses. - Private respondent claimed that petitioner formally engaged his services for a fee of P100,000.00 and that the services he rendered were professional services which a lawyer renders to a client. - Petitioner, however, denied the existence of any professional relationship of attorney and client between him and private respondent. He admits that he and his father visited private respondent for advice on the matter of Dewey Dee's gambling account. However, he insists that such visit was merely an informal one and that private respondent had not been specifically contracted to handle the problem. On the contrary, respondent Mutuc had allegedly volunteered his services "as a friend of defendant's family" to see what he could do about the situation. As for the P50,000.00 inceptively given to private respondent, petitioner claims that it was not in the nature of attorney's fees but merely "pocket money" solicited by the former for his trips to Las Vegas and the said amount of P50,000.00 was already sufficient remuneraion for his strictly voluntary services. - After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment ordering herein petitioner to pay private respondent the sum of P50,000.00 with interest thereon. - On appeal, said judgment was affirmed by the then Intermediate Appellate Court on May 9, 1986. - Petitioner, filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the Appellate Court overlooked two important and decisive factors, to wit: (1) At the time private respondent was ostensibly rendering services to petitioner and his father, he was actually working "in the interest" and "to the advantage" of Caesar's Palace of which he was an agent and a consultant, hence the interests of the casino and private respondent were united in their objective to collect from the debtor; and (2) Private respondent is not justified in claiming that he rendered legal services to petitioner and his father in view of the conflicting interests involved. - In its resolution of July 31, 1986, respondent court reconsidered its decision and held that the sum of P50,000.00 already paid by petitioner to private respondent was commensurate to the services he rendered, considering that at the time he was acting as counsel for petitioner he

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was also acting as the collecting agent and consultant of, and receiving compensation from, Caesar's Palace. - However, upon a motion for reconsideration thereafter filed by private respondent, the present respondent Court of Appeals issued another resolution, dated February 12, 1987, reinstating the aforesaid decision of May 9, 1986. ISSUE WON there was a lawyer-client relationship between petitioner and private respondent HELD YES. Both the lower court and the appellate court concur in their findings that there was a lawyer-client relationship between petitioner and private respondent Mutuc. The Court found no reason to interfere with the factual finding. There may be instances when there is doubt as to whether an attorney-client relationship has been created. The issue may be raised in the trial court, but once the trial court and the Court of Appeals have found that there was such a relationship the Supreme Court cannot disturb such finding of fact, absent cogent reasons therefor. Ratio The absence of a written contract will not preclude the finding that there was a professional relationship which merits attorney's fees for professional services rendered. Documentary formalism is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession. An acceptance of the relation is implied on the part of the attorney from his acting on behalf of his client in pursuance of a request from the latter. Reasoning There is no question that professional services were actually rendered by private respondent to petitioner and his family. Through his efforts, the account of petitioner's brother, Dewey Dee, with Caesars Palace was assumed by Ramon Sy and petitioner and his family were further freed from the apprehension that Dewey might be harmed or even killed by the so-called mafia. For such services, respondent Mutuc is indubitably entitled to receive a reasonable compensation and this right cannot be occluded by petitioner's pretension that at the time private respondent rendered such services to petitioner and his family, the former was also the Philippine consultant of Caesar's Palace. - On the first aspect, the evidence of record shows that the services of respondent Mutuc were engaged by the petitioner for the purposes hereinbefore discussed. The previous partial payments totaling P50,000.00 made by petitioner to respondent Mutuc and the tenor of the demand letters sent by said private respondent to petitioner, the receipt thereof being acknowledged by petitioner, ineluctably prove three facts, viz: that petitioner hired the services of private respondent Mutuc; that there was a prior agreement as to the amount of attorney's fees to be given to the latter; and there was still a balance due and payable on said fees. - On the second objection, aside from the facts stated in the resolution of respondent Court of Appeals, it is also not completely accurate to judge private respondent's position by petitioner's assumption that the interests of Caesar's Palace were adverse to those of Dewey Dee. True, the casino was a creditor but that fact was not contested or opposed by Dewey Dee, since the latter, as verifications revealed, was not the debtor. Hence, private respondent's representations in behalf of petitioner were not in resistance to the casino's claim but were actually geared toward proving that fact by establishing the liability of the true debtor, Ramon Sy, from whom payment was ultimately and correctly exacted. - Even assuming that the imputed conflict of interests obtained, private respondent's role therein was not ethically or legally indefensible. Generally, an attorney is prohibited from representing parties with contending positions. However, at a certain stage of the controversy before it reaches the court, a lawyer may represent conflicting interests with the consent of the parties. A common representation may work to the advantage of said parties since a mutual lawyer, with honest motivations and impartially cognizant of the parties' disparate positions, may well be better situated to work out an acceptable settlement of their differences, being free of partisan inclinations and acting with the cooperation and confidence of said parties. - Even indulging petitioner in his theory that private respondent was during the period in question an agent of Caesar's Palace, petitioner was not unaware thereof, hence he actually consented to and cannot now decry the dual representation that he postulates. A lawyer is entitled to have and receive the just and reasonable compensation for services rendered at the special instance and request of his client and as long as he is honestly and in good faith trying to serve and represent the interests of his client, the latter is bound to pay his just feeds. Disposition The resolution of respondent Court of Appeals, dated February 12, 1987, reinstating its original decision of May 9, 1986 was AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioner. NAKPIL V VALDES PUNO; March 4, 1998 (marge alias) NATURE -Administrative case in the SC. Misconduct. -This case involves the disbarment of a CPA-lawyer for his demeanor in his accounting profession and law practice in connection with the property of his client. FACTS -1965: Jose Nakpil became interested in purchasing a summer residence in Moran Street, Baguio City. For lack of funds, he requested long time friend (family business consultant, lawyer and accountant) Atty. Carlos J. Valdes to purchase the Moran property for him. They agreed that Atty. Valdes would keep the property in trust for the Nakpils until the latter could buy it back. Pursuant to their agreement, respondent obtained 2 loans from a bank amounting to P140k which he used to purchase and renovate the property. Title was issued in Atty. Valdes name but it was the Nakpils who occupied the Moran summer house. -When Jose Nakpil died, Atty. Valdes acted as the legal counsel and accountant of his widow Imelda Nakpil whom the Court appointed as the estate administratix. Respondents law firm, Carlos J. Valdes & Associates, handled the proceeding for the settlement of Joses estate. -The ownership of the Moran property became an issue in the intestate proceedings when Atty. Valdes excluded the Moran property from the inventory. He even transferred his title to the Moran property to his company, the Caval Realty Corporation.

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-March 29, 1979: Imelda sought to recover the Moran property by filing with the Baguio City CFI an action for reconveyance with damages against Atty. Valdes (&his corporation) who claimed absolute ownership over the property and denied that a trust was created over it. -During the pendency of the action for reconveyance, Imelda filed this administrative case to disbar the respondent. Petitioners Claim Atty. Valdes violated professional ethics when he: 1. assigned to his family corporation the Moran property which belonged to the estate he was settling as its lawyer and auditor. 2. excluded the Moran property from the inventory of real estate properties he prepared for a client-estate and, at the same time, charged the loan secured to purchase the said excluded property as a liability of the estate, all for the purpose of transferring the title to the said property to his family corporation. 3. prepared & defended monetary claims against the estate that retained him as its counsel and auditor. Preliminaries - CFI dismissed the action for reconveyance. CA reversed. - OSG relying on CA decision recommended dismissal of admin charge. - CA decision in reconveyance case has been reversed by SC. Factual Issues (as settled in the reconveyance case) 1. Ownership of the Moran property: Atty. Valdes and the late Jose Nakpil agreed that the former would purchase the Moran property and keep it in trust for the latter. In violation of the trust agreement, respondent claimed absolute ownership over the property and refused to sell the property to complainant after the death of Jose Nakpil. To place the property beyond the reach of Imelda and the intestate court, Atty. Valdes later transferred it to his corporation. 2. Loan of P140k: Atty. Valdes, through his accounting firm, charged the two loans as liability of the estate, after obtaining said loans for the purchase and renovation of the property he claimed for himself. It is clear that the information available to the accounting firm as to how these two loans should be treated could have only come from Atty. Valdes himself as the said loans were in his name. 3. Resignation from law firm not supported by any documentary proof 4. Resignation from accounting firm in 1972 and 1974 is proven. But when Atty. Valdes transferred the Moran property to his corporation, the intestate proceedings was still pending in court. He could not have been totally ignorant of the proceedings in the intestate case. ISSUES 1. WON Atty, Valdes violated the Code of Professional Responsibility 2. WON Atty. Valdes is guilty of representing conflicting interests 3. WON Atty. Valdes can be administratively charged before SC given that his alleged misconduct pertains to his accounting practice HELD 1. YES. When he subordinated the interest of his client to his own pecuniary gain, he clearly violated CPR Canon 17 which provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to his clients cause and enjoins him to be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. -A lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business transaction must be characterized with utmost honesty and good faith. No presumption of innocence or improbability of wrongdoing is considered in an attorneys favor. Atty. Valdes misuse of his legal expertise to deprive his client of the Moran property is clearly unethical. 2. YES. There is clearly a conflict between the interest of the estate which stands as the debtor, and that of the two claimants (Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc) who are creditors of the estate. -The proscription against representation of conflicting interests finds application where the conflicting interests arise with respect to the same general matter and is applicable however slight such adverse interest may be. Representation of conflicting interests may be allowed only after full disclosure of facts and informed consent of the clients. There is nothing in the records to show that Atty. Valdes or his law firm explained the legal situation and its consequences to Imelda. -When a creditor files a claim against an estate, his interest is per se adverse to the estate. The relationship of the claimants to the late Nakpil does not negate the conflict of interest. -The test to determine whether there is a conflict of interest in the representation is probability, not certainty of conflict. It was respondents duty to inhibit either of his firms from said proceedings to avoid the probability of conflict of interest. 3. YES. A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for ANY misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. -Possession of good moral character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a continuing requirement to the practice of law. Respondent exhibited less than full fidelity to his duty to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in his dealings/transactions with his clients. Disposition Atty. Carlos J. Valdes found guilty of misconduct and suspended from the practice of law for one year with a warning that a similar infraction shall be dealt with more severely in the future. QUIAMBAO V BAMBA DAVIDE; August 25, 2005 (maia rieza) NATURE RESOLUTION on administrative case for disbarment FACTS Felicitas Quiambao used to be the president of Allied Investigation Bureau, Inc. (AIB), a family-owned security and investigation agency. She procured the services of respondent Atty. Nestor Bamba for the corporate affairs of AIB, but also used his services for a personal case (an ejectment case wherein respondent is the counsel of record). After, Quiambao resigned as president. Six months later, AIB, through Bamba, filed a complaint for replevin and damages against Quiambao to recover a car assigned to Quiambao as a service vehicle by AIB. Bamba filed this latter complaint without withdrawing as counsel in the ejectment case, which was still pending. Quiambao then filed for disbarment and charged Bamba with acts of disloyalty and double-dealing. Complainants arguments -that she resigned as president because Bamba proposed that she organize her own security agency, and that he will assist in its organization. -that such security agency was organized and Bamba was a silent partner -that while serving as a silent partner, Bamba convinced Quiambaos brother to organize another security agency (yes, hobby nilang gumawa ng security agencies) where respondent served as incorporator, stockholder, and president. Respondents arguments

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-although he admits representing Quiambao in the ejectment case, he claims that he was made to believe that it was part of his function as counsel for AIB to handle even the personal cases of its officers -that the ejectment case and replevin case were unrelated cases, thus privileged information that may have been gathered from one case would have no use in the other -that he was never a silent partner in the security agency organized by Quiambao -that he serves AIB and the agency organized with Quiambaos brother in different capacities: in AIB, as legal counsel, while in the latter, as president ISSUE WON respondent is guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting interests (WON there was representation of conflicting interests) HELD Yes, respondent is guilty Ratio Lawyers are deemed to represent conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is their duty to contend for something which duty to another client requires them to oppose. There are various tests in determining conflicting interests, few of which are: whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other client whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyers duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment - While the respondent may assert that the complainant expressly consented to his continued representation in the ejectment case, the respondent failed to show that he fully disclosed the facts to both his clients and he failed to present any written consent of the complainant and AIB as required under Rule 15.03, Canon 15. - That the representation of conflicting interest is in good faith and with honest intention on the part of the lawyer does not make the prohibition inoperative. Moreover, lawyers are not obliged to act either as an adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to become their client. They have the right to decline such employment. - That he served in different capacities in two competing agencies does not justify the involvement in conflicting interests. In the process of determining whether there is a conflict of interest, an important criterion is probability, not certainty, of conflict. Loyalty to AIB becomes dubious with his interest as the president in another security agency. - The nature of a lawyer-client relationship is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. It requires lawyers to remain inviolate of the clients confidence and to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. - Rule 15.03, Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Disposition Guilty for violation of Rule 15.03 of Canon 15. Suspended for 1 year.

BERBANO V BARCELONA PER CURIAM; September 23, 2003 (anton arcilla) NATURE Administrative matter in the Supreme Court re: Disbarment. FACTS - A case was pending regarding a 244-hectare lot situated at Alabang, Muntinlupa, owned by Rufino Estaban Hilapo. Petitioner Felicitas Berbano is one of the heirs of REH, and the heirs chose Atty. Porfiro Daen as their attorney-in-fact. - January 26, 1999: Mr. Daen was arrested by Muntinlupa police, and subsequently detained at Muntinlupa City Jail until his release on February 18, 1999. - Mr. Daen needed the assistance of a lawyer for his release. The heirs (including petitioner) approached Atty. Wenceslao Barcelona to assist them. Mr. Daen has engaged the services of Atty. Barcelona to facilitate Daens release. - Barcelona asked for P50K to cause the release of Daen from prison the following day. Barcelona declared that he was going to see a justice from the Supreme Court who could help the release of Daen. - At a meeting in Maxs restaurant, Barcelona reported that he just came from the Supreme Court where he fixed the case of Daen, but did not show any documents supporting the claim. - Barcelona continued to asked for money on several occasions. Petitioner gave him P10K and P15K on different times. Petitioner also gave Barcelona P1000 for gasoline. - February 18, 1999 petitioner and Barcelona met at Putatan, Muntinlupa. There Barcelona promised that he will return entire amount of P64 on February 18, 1999. Petitioner never saw Barcelona since then. - Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP required respondent to submit his answer to the complaint, but despite due notice respondent fail to file his answer. Upon a motion to declare respondent in default, Investigating Commissioner again required respondent to answer. Barcelona failed to appear despite due receipt of notice. - IBP Board of Governors found Barcelona guilty of malpractice and serious breach of the Code of Professional responsibility, but reduced the penalty to suspension from practice of law for 6 years. ISSUE WON Barcelona should be disbarred or merely suspended HELD Ratio Wenceslao C. Barcelona is barred from the practice of law for gross misconduct. Reasoning The object of a disbarment proceeding is not so much to punish the individual attorney himself, as to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court, and to remove from the profession persons unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them.

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- Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are neither purely civil nor purely criminal. - Respondent is guilty of culpable violations of the following Canons: CANON 1a lawyer shall xxx promote respect for law and for legal processes. CANON 7a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. CANON 11a lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers xxx. CANON 16a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that ma come into his possession. Rule 16.01a lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received fro or from the client. - Barcelona was previously charged with and found guilty of conduct unbecoming a lawyer, when he misrepresented to the complainant that eh could secure the restructuring of the complainants loan with PNB through his connection with a certain Mericullo (who did not really exist). - In addition, the Judiciary has been besieged enough with accusations of corruption and malpractice. A member of the legal profession who invites mistrust on the judicial system with irresponsible representations is reprehensible and cannot be tolerated. LICUANAN V MELO PER CURIAM; February 9, 1989 (apple maramba) NATURE Administrative matter in the Supreme Court. Disbarment. FACTS Melo (respondent) was hired as counsel by Licuanan (petitioner) in an ejectment case filed against her tenant, Aida Pineda -On August 8, 1979, respondent, as Licuanan's attorney, obtained judgment in Licuanan's favor against Pineda whereby the latter was directed by the City Court of Manila to pay Licuanan all her monthly rentals from October, 1978 and succeeding months thereafter. - When several months had elapsed without them hearing a word from Pineda, respondent decided to send her a letter demanding that she pay the monthly rental of her apartment otherwise he will be constrained to take the necessary legal action against her to protect the interest of his client - Pineda yielded to the demand of Melo. She went to respondent's office and paid him P3,060.00 for rental payments for October, 1978 to February, 1980 at the rate of P180.00 per month. -Pineda continued paying her obligations religiously to Melo, covering the period between March 1980-January 1981. -During the entire twelve-month period that respondent had been receiving the said rental payments of Pineda, he did not bother to inform or report to complainant about the said payments and instead unnecessarily retained the money -On April 27, 1981, complainant, not knowing that respondent had been receiving the rental payments of Pineda, instituted an administrative case against her (Aida Pineda) before the Chief of the Philippine Tuberculosis Society accusing her of "moral turpitude" arising from her alleged failure to pay the rent of her apartment as ordered by the City Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 037276 and claiming that she has ignored and refused to pay her just obligation -Pineda brought an action against Licuanan for damages before the then Court of First Instance of Manila, for she allegedly suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation arising from the unfounded administrative case filed against her since as borne out by the records, she had been paying her obligation religiously to the lawyer of Licuanan - It was only when Atty. Ponciano B. Jacinto, the new counsel retained by complainant, wrote respondent a letter on May 4, 1981, advising him to surrender the money to complainant, that he accounted for it -Respondent admitted having received the payment of rentals from complainant's tenant, but explained that he kept this matter from the complainant for the purpose of surprising her with his success in collecting the rentals ISSUE WON the respondent is guilty of violating paragraph 11 of the Canons of Professional Ethics and breaching the Lawyers Oath HELD Reasoning The actuations of respondent in retaining for his personal benefit over a one-year period, the amount of P5,220.00 received by him on behalf of his client, the complainant herein, depriving her of its use, and withholding information on the same despite inquiries made by her, is glaringly a breach of the Lawyer's Oath to which he swore observance, and an evident transgression of the Canons of Professional Ethics particularly: 11. DEALING WITH TRUST PROPERTY The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client Money the client or collected for the client of other trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly, and should not under any circumstance be commingled with his own or be used by him. - By his professional misconduct, respondent has breached the trust reposed in him by his client. He has shown himself unfit for the confidence and trust which should characterize an attorney-client relationship and the practice of law. By reason thereof complainant was compelled to file a groundless suit against her tenant for non-payment of rentals thereby exposing her to jeopardy by becoming a defendant in a damage suit filed by said tenant against her by force of circumstances, complainant was further compelled to engage the services of another counsel in order to recover the amount rightfully due her but which respondent withheld from her. - The court is constrained to find him guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct in office. He has displayed lack of honesty and good moral character. He has violated his oath not to delay any man for money or malice, besmirched the name of an honorable profession and has proven himself unworthy of the trust reposed in him by law as an officer of the Court. He deserves the severest punishment. Disposition Consistent with the crying need to maintain the high traditions and standards of the legal profession and to preserve undiminished public faith in attorneys-at-law, the Court Resolved to DISBAR respondent, Atty. Manuel L. Melo, from the practice of law. His name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

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(Paragraph 11 of the Canons of Professional Ethics referred to is reiterated in Rules 16.01. 16.02 and 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility promulgated by the Supreme Court on 21 June 1988). HERNANDEZ V GO PER CURIAM; January 31, 2005 (chris lao) NATURE Resolution of the verified letter-complaint for disbarment against Atty. Jose C. Go dated June 23, 1975 filed by Nazaria S. Hernandez (now deceased) FACTS - Both parties are from Zamboanga City. - The allegations in the letter-complaint are: Sometime in 1961, complainants husband abandoned her and her son, Luciano S. Hernandez, Jr. Shortly thereafter, her husbands numerous creditors demanded payments of his loans. Fearful that the various mortgage contracts involving her properties will be foreclosed and aware of impending suits for sums of money against her, complainant engaged the legal services of Atty. Jose C. Go, herein respondent. - Respondent instilled in complainant a feeling of helplessness, fear, embarrassment, and social humiliation. He advised her to give him her land titles covering Lots 848-A, 849-Q, and 849-P at Zamboanga City so he could sell them to enable her to pay her creditors. He then persuaded her to execute deeds of sale in his favor without any monetary or valuable consideration. Complainant agreed on condition that he would sell the lots and from the proceeds pay her creditors. - Complainant also owned Lots 2118, 2139, and 1141-A, likewise located in Zamboanga City, which were mortgaged to her creditors. When the mortgages fell due, respondent redeemed the lots. Again, he convinced her to execute deeds of sale involving those lots in his favor. As a result, respondent became the registered owner of all the lots belonging to complainant. - Sometime in 1974, complainant came to know that respondent did not sell her lots as agreed upon. Instead, he paid her creditors with his own funds and had her land titles registered in his name, depriving her of her real properties worth millions. - In our Resolution dated September 24, 1975, respondent was required to file his comment on the complaint. - Instead of filing his comment, respondent submitted a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint is premature since there is pending before the then Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City Civil Case No. 1781 for recovery of ownership and declaration of nullity of deeds of sale filed by complainant against him involving the subject lots. - On November 14, 1975, we issued a Resolution denying respondents motion and requiring him to submit his answer. - In his answer dated December 19, 1975, respondent denied the allegations in the instant complaint. He averred that he sold, in good faith, complainants lots to various buyers, including himself, for valuable consideration. On several occasions, he extended financial assistance to complainant and even invited her to live with his family. His children used to call her Lola due to her frequent visits to his residence. He prayed that the complaint be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. - On January 17, 1977, we referred the case to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for investigation, report, and recommendation. - It was only on March 13, 1990 or after 13 years, 1 month and 26 days that the OSG filed a motion to refer the instant case to the IBP for the retaking of the testimonies of complainants witnesses and the submission of its report and recommendation. - On April 4, 1990, we issued a Resolution referring the case to the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation. - The Report and Recommendation dated June 15, 2004 of Atty. Lydia A. Navarro, Commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, is quoted as follows: A careful examination and evaluation of the evidence submitted by the parties showed that all the properties of the complainant are presently owned by the respondent by virtue of several deeds of sale executed by the complainant in favor of the respondent without monetary consideration except Lot 849-D situated in Tomas Claudio which was returned by the respondent to the complainant on September 5, 1974. - It is evident from the records that respondent was the one who notarized the documents involving the said properties redeemed or repurchased by the complainant from her creditors which ended up in respondents name like in the deed of sale executed by Victoriano Dejerano in favor of Nazaria Hernandez over Lots 1141-A-3-A and 1141-A-3-B; deed of sale executed by Antonio Masrahon on September 3, 1961regarding Lot No. 1141-A; deed of absolute sale executed by Francisco Esperat over the Curuan properties on November 9, 1971 and the cancellation of the mortgage executed by Alfonso Enriquez on July 18, 1964 over the Tomas Claudio properties. - The foregoing legal activities and operations of the respondent in addition to his having discussed, advised and gave solutions to complainants legal problems and liabilities to her creditors and even requested her creditors for extension of time to pay complainants accounts constitute practice of law as legal counsel for consultation aside from representing complainant in other cases; a mute proof of a lawyer-client relations between them, a fact also admitted by the respondent. - It is incumbent upon the respondent to have rendered a detailed report to the complainant on how he paid complainants creditors without selling her properties. Instead of selling to buyers at higher price, he paid them out of his own funds; then later on admitted that he was one of the purchasers of complainants properties in utter disregard of their agreement and no evidence was submitted by the respondent concerning the value of the said sale of complainants properties. - As such, respondent did not adhere faithfully and honestly in his obligation and duty as complainants legal adviser and counsel when he took advantage of the trust and confidence reposed in him by the complainant in ultimately putting complainants properties in his name and possession in violation of Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the undersigned respectfully recommends that respondent Atty. Jose C. Go be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months from receipt hereof and the IBP Chapter where he is a registered member be furnished a copy of the same for implementation hereof, subject to the approval of the Honorable Members of the Board of Governors. - On July 30, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2004-39 adopting and approving the Report of Commissioner Navarro with modification in the sense that the recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law was increased from six (6) months to three (3) years.

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ISSUE WON the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors finding that respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility be sustained HELD Yes. However, we have to modify its recommended penalty. - Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the principal source of ethical rules for lawyers in this jurisdiction, provides: A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession. - Respondent breached this Canon. His acts of acquiring for himself complainants lots entrusted to him are, by any standard, acts constituting gross misconduct, a grievous wrong, a forbidden act, a dereliction in duty, willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. Such conduct on the part of respondent degrades not only himself but also the name and honor of the legal profession. He violated this Courts mandate that lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealing with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. - Canon 17 of the same Code states: A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. - The records show that complainant reposed such high degree of trust and confidence in herein respondent, that when she engaged his services, she entrusted to him her land titles and allowed him to sell her lots, believing that the proceeds thereof would be used to pay her creditors. Respondent, however, abused her trust and confidence when he did not sell her properties to others but to himself and spent his own money to pay her obligations. As correctly observed by Investigating IBP Commissioner Lydia Navarro, respondent is duty-bound to render a detailed report to the complainant on how much he sold the latters lots and the amounts paid to her creditors. Obviously, had he sold the lots to other buyers, complainant could have earned more. Records show that she did not receive any amount from respondent. Clearly, respondent did not adhere faithfully and honestly in his duty as complainants counsel. - Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended by this Court for any of the following acts: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyers oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so. - In Rayos-Ombac vs. Rayos, we ordered the disbarment of lawyer when he deceived his 85-year old aunt into entrusting him with all her money and later refused to return the same despite demand. In Navarro vs. Meneses III, we disbarred a member of the Bar for his refusal or failure to account for the P50,000.00 he received from a client to settle a case. In Docena vs. Limson, we expelled from the brotherhood of lawyers, an attorney who extorted money from his client through deceit and misrepresentation. In Busios vs. Ricafort, an attorney was stripped of his license to practice law for misappropriating his clients money. - Considering the depravity of respondents offense, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP too light. It bears reiterating that a lawyer who takes advantage of his clients financial plight to acquire the latters properties for his own benefit is destructive of the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. Thus, for violation of Canon 16 and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which constitutes gross misconduct, and consistent with the need to maintain the high standards of the Bar and thus preserve the faith of the public in the legal profession, respondent deserves the ultimate penalty, that of expulsion from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers. Disposition Respondent JOSE S. GO is found guilty of gross misconduct and is DISBARRED from the practice of law. His name is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY. BUSINOS V RICAFORT PER CURIAM; December 22, 1997 (keefe dela cruz) NATURE Complaint for disbarment against Atty. Francisco Ricafort FACTS - Respondent Atty. Ricafort was entrusted P30,000 by complainant Businos to deposit in the bank account of complainants husband, which amount respondent used for himself and delayed in payment. - Respondent required a bond of P2,000 from Businos supposedly for one of her Civil Cases when no such bond was required. - Hence, Businos filed a complaint for disbarment against Ricafort - The court required respondent to comment on the complaint time and again. But respondent failed to comply. As such, the court considered his right waived, and referred the complaint to the Office of the Bar Confidant. - The Office ordered respondent suspended for 1 year. ISSUE WON the 1-year suspension is commensurate sanction for the offenses committed by respondent Atty. Ricafort HELD NO. Ratio With dishonesty, grave misconduct, grossly unethical behavior, and palpable disregard of: - Section 25 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court - unlawful retention of clients funds - Code of Professional Responsibility - Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. - Canon 16 A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession - Canon 11 - Respect due to courts respondent chose to forget that by swearing the lawyer's oath, he became a guardian of truth and the rule of law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair an impartial administration of justice a vital function of democracy a failure of which is disastrous to society. Any departure from the path which a lawyer must follow as demanded by the virtues of his profession shall not be tolerated by this Court as the disciplining authority.

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Reasoning Respondent's transgressions caused dishonor, not merely to respondent, but to the noble profession to which he belongs, for it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants for the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of the Bar betrays their trust and confidence. Disposition Consistent with the urgent need to maintain the esteemed traditions and high standards of the legal profession and to preserve undiminished public faith in the members of the Philippine Bar, the Court resolves to DISBAR respondent ATTY. FRANCISCO RICAFORT from the practice of law. His name is hereby stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. QUILBAN V ROBINOL PER CURIAM; April 10, 1989 (sarah cabrera) NATURE ADMINISTRATIVE CASES in the Supreme Court. Disbarment. FACTS - The Colegio de San Jose, through its administrator, Father Federico Escaler, sold a land to the Quezon City Government as the site for the Quezon City General Hospital but reserved an area of 2,743 square meters as a possible development site. Squatters, however, settled in the area since 1965 or 1966. In 1970, the Colegio, through Father Escaler gave permission to Congressman Luis R. Taruc to build on the reserved site a house for his residence and a training center for the Christian Social Movement. Seeing the crowded shanties of squatters, Congressman Taruc suggested to Father Escaler the idea of donating or selling the land cheap to the squatters. Congressman Taruc then advised the squatters to form an organization and choose a leader authorized to negotiate with Father Escaler. Following that advice, the squatters formed the "Samahang Pagkakaisa ng Barrio Bathala", with Bernabe Martin as President. - But instead of working for the welfare of the Samahan, Martin went to one Maximo Rivera, a realtor, with whom he connived to obtain the sale to the exclusion of the other Samaban members. The land was ultimately sold to Rivera at a cheap price of PI5 per square meter or a total consideration of P41,961.65. The prevailing price of the land in the vicinity then was P1 00 to P1 20 per square meter. Father Escaler had been made to believe that Rivera represented the squatters on the property. - In 1972, thirty-two heads of families of the Samahan filed the case against Rivera, et. al. The CFI, however, dismissed the case. - To prosecute the appea in the CAl, the Samahan members hired as their counsel Atty. Santiago R. Robinol for which the latter was paid P2,000.00 as attorney's fees on. Atty. Robinol was also to be given by the members a part of the land, subject matter of the case, equal to the portion that would pertain to each of them. What was initially a verbal commitment on the land sharing was confirmed in writing. - On 14 November 1978, the Court of Appeals reversed the CFI Decision and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. - To raise the amount of P41,961.65 ordered paid by the Court of Appeals, plus expenses for ejectment of the non-plaintiffs occupying the property, conveyance, documentation, transfer of title etc., the five officers of the Samahan collected, little by little, P2,500.00 from each head of family. The Treasurer, Luis Agawan, issued the proper receipts prepared by Atty. Robinol. - On 18 May 1979, the sum of P68,970.00 was turned over to Atty. Robinol by the officers; on 31 May 1979 the amounts of P1,030.00 and P2,500.00 respectively; and on 2 June 1979, the sum of P2,500.00, or a total of P75,000.00. - After almost a year, the five officers discovered that no payment had been made to Rivers. When queried, Atty. Robinol replied that there was an intervention filed in the civil case and that a Writ of Execution bad not yet been issued by the CFI of Quezon City. However, it turned out that the motion for intervention had already been dismissed. After confronting Atty. Robinol with that fact, the latter gave other excuses, which the officers discovered to have no basis at all. - On 6 March 1980, 21 out of 32 plaintiffs arrived at a "first consensus" to change their counsel, Atty. Robinol. The officers of the Samahan thereafter approached Atty. AnacIeto R. Montemayor, who agreed to be their counsel, after he was shown the document containing the consensus of the Samahan members to change Atty. Robinol as their lawyer. Upon Atty. Montemayor's advice, the officers sent Atty. Robinol a letter informing the latter of their decision to terminate his services and demanding the return of the P75,000.00 deposited with him. Atty. Robinol turned deaf ears to the demand. A subsequent letter of the same tenor was similarly disregarded by Atty. Robinol. - On 20 March 1980, Atty. Montemayor formally entered his appearance in a civil case as counsel for the plaintiffs, vice Atty. Robinol, on the strength of the authority given him by plaintiffs in said civil case through the five officers. Atty. Montemayor then filed on 20 March 1980 a Motion for Execution praying that the defendants and/or the Clerk of Court be directed to execute a deed of conveyance in favor of the plaintiffs. At the hearing of the Motion for Execution, Atty. Robinol manifested that he had no objection to the appearance of and his substitution by Atty. Montemayor. - Because Atty. Robinol, however, still questioned the first consensus, another document labelled the a second consensus" was signed by 21 plaintiffs during a meeting held for the purpose on 24 November 1980 to the effect that they had decided to change Atty. Robinol as their counsel because he had delayed paying for their land notwithstanding the Decision of the Court of Appeals in their favor. - Administrative Case No. 2144: On 15 April 1980 the Samahan officers filed this Administrative Complaint before this Court requesting the investigation of Atty. Robinol for refusal to return the P75,000.00 and praying that the Court exercise its power of discipline over members of the Bar unworthy to practice law. - Administrative Case No. 2180: Atty. Robinol filed a complaint for Disbarment against Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor for alleged gross unethical conduct unbecoming of a lawyer in that Atty. Montemayor readily accepted the case without his (Robinol's) formal withdrawal and conformity and knowing fully well that there was no consensus of all the plaintiffs to discharge him as their counsel. - Court referred administrative cases to the Sol. Gen. who recommended: 1. That Atty. Santiago R. Robinol be suspended for three months for refusing to deliver the funds of the plaintiffs in his possession, with the warning that a more severe penalty will be imposed for a repetition of the same or similar act, and that he be ordered to return to the plaintiffs, the sum of P75,000.00. 2. That the case against Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor, be dismissed, since he has not committed any misconduct imputed to him by Atty. Robinol. ISSUES 1. WON Atty. Robinol should be suspended

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2. WON Atty. Montemayor should be disbarred HELD 1. YES Reasoning Atty. Robinol has, in fact, been guilty of ethical infractions and grave misconduct that make him unworthy to continue in the practice of the profession. After the CA had rendered a Decision favorable to his clients and he had received the latter's funds, suddenly, he had a change of mind and decided to convert the payment of his fees from a portion of land equivalent to that of each of the plaintiffs to P50,000.00, which he alleges to be the monetary value of that area. Certainly, Atty. Robinol had no right to unilaterally appropriate his clients' money not only because he is bound by a written agreement but also because, under the circumstances, it was highly unjust for him to have done so. His clients were mere squatters who could barely eke out an existence. They had painstakingly raised their respective quotas of P2,500.00 per family with which to pay for the land only to be deprived of the same by one who, after having seen the color of money, heartlessly took advantage of them. - Atty. Robinol has no basis to claim that since he was unjustly dismissed by his clients he had the legal right to retain the money in his possession. Firstly, there was justifiable ground for his discharge as counsel. His clients had lost confidence in him for he had obviously engaged in dilatory tactics to the detriment of their interests, which he was duty-bound to pro. tect. Secondly, even if there were no valid ground, he is bereft of any legal right to retain his clients' funds intended for a specific purpose-the purchase of land. He stands obliged to return the money immediately to their rightful owners. - The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that complainants' evidence on this is the more credible. And that he had, in fact, received the total sum of P75,000-00. Inevitable, therefore, is the conclusion that Atty. Robinol has rendered himself unfit to continue in the practice of law. He has not only violated his oath not to delay any man for money and to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his clients . He has also brought the profession into disrepute with people who had reposed in it full faith and reliance for the fulfillment of a life-time ambition to acquire a homelot they could call their own. 2. NO Reasoning In so far as Atty. Montemayor is concerned, we agree with the findings of the Solicitor General that he has not exposed himself to any plausible charge of unethical conduct in the exercise of his profession when he agreed to serve as counsel for the plaintiffs.There is no doubt that clients are free to change their counsel in a pending case at any time (Section 26, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and thereafter employ another lawyer who may then enter his appearance. In this case, the plaintiffs in the civil suit below decided to change their lawyer, Atty. Robinol, for loss of trust and confidence. That act was well within their prerogative. In so far as the complaint for disbarment filed by Atty. Robinol against Atty. Montemayor is concerned, therefore, the same is absolutely without merit. Disposition - Atty. Santiago R. Robinol is hereby DISBARRED for having violated his lawyer's oath to delay no man for money, broken the fiduciary relation between lawyer and client, and proven himself unworthy to continue in the practice of law. By reason of his unethical actuations, he is hereby declared to have forfeited his rights to attorney's fees and is ordered to return the amount of P75,000.00 to the plaintiffs. - Administrative Case No. 2180 against Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor for disbarment is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. BARNACHEA V QUIOCHO CALLEJO; March 11, 2003 (jat tabamo) NATURE Administrative matter. Breach of Lawyer-Client Relations FACTS - Complainant Ruby Barnachea sought the services of respondent Atty. Edwin Quiocho, a lawyer who has stopped practicing for some time and was only in the second month of resuming practice, to cause the transfer under her name the title over a property previously owned by her sister. She paid P 41, 280 for the expenses for said transfer and for respondents legal services. - Respondent failed to cause the transfer and consequently, complainant demanded that she be refunded and that the documents she entrusted to respondent to cause the transfer be returned to her. Respondent failed to comply with the demands. - On Nov. 1, 2001, Respondent wrote complainant a letter saying he failed and that he would return the documents and the title entrusted to him as well as refund the P 41, 280 through a personal check. He however failed to fund the check despite the demands of complainant. - In his answer to the complaint, respondent: 1. Denied that complainant contracted his legal services. Received the P 41, 280 payment but claimed they were for actual and incidental expenses and not for legal services 2. Asserted that he acted in good faith as shown by the fact that he returned the documents with an explanatory letter and refunded complainant by issuing a personal check. 3. Alleged that his failure was caused by his difficulty in making good the claimed amount, along with the fact that he was afflicted with diabetes and loss of sight of his right eye. 4. Claimed that he only agreed to help complainant with the condition that his task was merely to go through the regular process of presenting available documents, paying taxes and fees, and following up on the transfer, a task that a non-lawyer familiar with the procedure can perform. 5. Claimed to have discovered that the original copy of the transfer certificate of title had been burned and that complainants copy therefore needed to be reconstituted before it can be cancelled and transferred. During this time, communication between both parties broke down, as respondents mobile phone was stolen, he has no home phone and that phone calls between him and complainant at his work place had been cute due to souring relationship with his co-workers. - A formal investigation was conducted by IBP thereafter and it found that the complainant engaged the legal services of the respondent as admitted by respondent himself in his letter to the complainant; that respondent was not able to meet his financial obligations due to financial difficulties and that he was in good faith in his failure. The IBP Investigation Commissioner also recommended that he be ordered to repay his client within 90 days from receipt of notice and warned that a repetition would be dealt with more severely. - The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioners recommendations with an additional sanction of reprimand.

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ISSUE WON the penalty recommended by the Board of Governors corresponds to the gravity of the wrong committed by respondent HELD No. The Court finds that the penalty recommended by the Board of Governors is not commensurate to the gravity of the wrong committed by respondent. Ratio 1: Respondents claim that complainant did not retain his legal services flies in the face of his letter to complainant. Even if it were true that no attorney-client relationship existed between them, case law has it that an attorney may be removed or otherwise disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in the profession but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties Reasoning In this case, respondent failed to comply with his undertaking for almost two months. Worse, despite demands of complainant, he failed to refund the amount of P 41, 280 and to return to complainant the deed of absolute sale and title over the property. Respondents claim that complainant could not contact him because he did not have any landline at his residence and that his mobile phone was stolen in October 2001, is hard to believe. He failed to adduce a morsel of evidence to prove that his telephone at the business center was cut or that his mobile phone had been stolen. Even then, respondent could have easily contacted the complainant at her residence or could have written her a letter informing her that the original copy of TCT No. 324411 in the custody of the Register of Deeds was burned when the Quezon City Hall was gutted by fire and that there was a need for the reconstitution of said title. Neither did respondent adduce evidence that he had been sick with diabetes and had lost his sight in his right eye. Respondent simply refused to adduce evidence to prove his allegations in his Answer to the complaint. Ratio 2: A lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money or property of his client that may come to his possession. He is a trustee to said funds and property. He is to keep the funds of his client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose such as for the registration of a deed with the Register of Deeds and for expenses and fees for the transfer of title over real property under the name of his client if not utilized, must be returned immediately to his client upon demand therefor. Reasoning The lawyers failure to return the money of his client upon demand gives rise to a presumption that he has misappropriated said money in violation of the trust reposed on him. The conversion by a lawyer of funds entrusted to him by his client is a gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. Ratio 3: The relation of attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature and is of a very delicate, exacting and confidential character. A lawyer is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients. The profession, therefore, demands of an attorney an absolute abdication of every personal advantage conflicting in any way, directly or indirectly, with the interest of his client. Reasoning In this case, respondent miserably failed to measure up to the exacting standard expected of him. Although the Court is led to believe that respondents failure to cause the transfer of the title of the property under the name of complainant was due to a financial problem that beset him shortly after he received the checks from complainant. It can easily be inferred from respondents letter that he used complainants money to alleviate if not solve his financial woes. What compounded respondents unethical conduct was his drawing of a personal check and delivering the same to complainant without sufficient funds in his bank account to cover the check. Even as he promised to fund his account with the drawee bank, respondent failed to do so when the check became due. In this case, respondent intransigently refused to return to the complainant the amount of P 41,280 which he received for the expenses for the transfer to her of the title of the property and for his professional fees. His dishonest conduct was compounded by his interjection of flimsy excuses for his obstinate refusal to refund the amount to complainant Disposition Respondent Atty. Quiocho is found guilty of violating Canons 15 and 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is suspended from the practice of law for 1 year with a warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely. He is also directed to restitute the complainant the full amount of 41,280 within 10 days from notice. - If respondent fails to restitute the said amount within the aforesaid period, he shall be meted an additional suspension of 3 months for every month or fraction thereof of delay until he shall have paid the said amount in full. In case a subsidiary penalty of suspension for his failure to restitute the said amount shall be necessary, respondent shall serve successively the penalty of his one year suspension and the subsidiary penalty. RUBIAS V BATILLER TEEHANKEE; May 29, 1973 FACTS - On August 31, 1964, plaintiff Domingo D. Rubias, a lawyer, filed a suit to recover the ownership and possession of certain portions of lot located in Barotac Viejo, Iloilo which he bought from his father-in-law, Francisco Militante in 1956 against its present occupant defendant, Isaias Batiller, who illegally entered said portions of the lot on two occasions in 1945 and in 1959. In his answer with counter-claim defendant claims that he and his predecessors-in-interest have always been in actual, open and continuous possession since time immemorial under claim of ownership of the portions of the lot in question. Unfortunately, his title - Francisco Militante claimed ownership of a parcel of land located in the Barrio of General Luna, municipality of Barotac Viejo province of Iloilo, which he caused to be surveyed on July 18-31, 1934 - Before WWII, Francisco Militante filed with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo an application for the registration of the title of the land but was opposed by the Director of Lands, the Director of Forestry and other oppositors. During WWII, the record of the case was lost. After the war, Francisco Militante petitioned this court to reconstitute the record of the case but in the end, the registration was denied. - He appealed but pending the decision (which was denied in the end), Francisco Militante sold to the plaintiff, Domingo Rubias the land, and was registered in the Registry of Deeds - Soon after, both Rubias and Militante were declaring the land for taxation purposes - On April 22, 1960, the plaintiff filed forcible Entry and Detainer case against Isaias Batiller in the Justice of the Peace Court of Barotac Viejo Province of Iloilo - During the trial of this case on the merit, the plaintiff will prove by competent evidence the following:

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> That the land he purchased from Francisco Militante under Exh. "A" was formerly owned and possessed by Liberato Demontao but that on September 6, 1919 the land was sold at public auction by virtue of a judgment in a Civil Case entitled "Edw J. Pflieder plaintiff vs. Liberato Demontao Francisco Balladeros and Gregorio Yulo, defendants", of which Yap Pongco was the purchaser (Exh. "1-3"). The sale was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo on August 4, 1920, under Primary Entry No. 69 (Exh. "1"), and a definite Deed of Sale was executed by Constantino A. Canto, provincial Sheriff of Iloilo, on Jan. 19, 1934 in favor of Yap Pongco (Exh. "I"), the sale having been registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo on February 10, 1934 (Exh. "1-1"). > On September 22, 1934, Yap Pongco sold this land to Francisco Militante as evidenced by a notarial deed (Exh. "J") which was registered in the Registry of Deeds on May 13, 1940 (Exh. "J-1"). - Defendants, on the other hand will prove by competent evidence during the trial of this case the following facts: > That lot No. 2 of the Psu-1552 it (Exh. '5') was originally owned and possessed by Felipe Batiller, grandfather of the defendant Basilio Batiller, on the death of the former in 1920, as his sole heir. Isaias Batiller succeeded his father , Basilio Batiller, in the ownership and possession of the land in the year 1930, and since then up to the present, the land remains in the possession of the defendant, his possession being actual, open, public, peaceful and continuous in the concept of an owner, exclusive of any other rights and adverse to all other claimants. > That the alleged predecessors in interest of the plaintiff have never been in the actual possession of the land and that they never had any title thereto. > That Lot No. 2, Psu 155241, the subject of Free Patent application of the defendant has been approved. - On August 17, 1965, defendant's counsel manifested in open court that before any trial on the merit of the case could proceed he would file a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint which he did, alleging that plaintiff does not have cause of action against him because the property in dispute which he (plaintiff) allegedly bought from his father-in-law, Francisco Militante was the subject matter of LRC No. 695 filed in the CFI of Iloilo, which case was brought on appeal to this Court and docketed as CA-G.R. No. 13497-R in which aforesaid case plaintiff was the counsel on record of his father-in-law, Francisco Militante. - Invoking Arts. 1409 and 1491 of the Civil Code which reads: > Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning: (7) Those expressly prohibited by law. > ART. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire any purchase, even at a public auction, either in person of through the mediation of another: . + (5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights of in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring an assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession. - Defendant claims that plaintiff could not have acquired any interest in the property in dispute as the contract he (plaintiff) had with Francisco Militante was inexistent and void. (See pp. 22-31, Record on Appeal). Plaintiff strongly opposed defendant's motion to dismiss claiming that defendant can not invoke Articles 1409 and 1491 of the Civil Code as Article 1422 of the same Code provides that 'The defense of illegality of contracts is not available to third persons whose interests are not directly affected' (See pp. 32-35 Record on Appeal). - On October 18, 1965, the lower court issued an order disclaiming plaintiffs complaint (pp. 42-49, Record on Appeal.) In the aforesaid order of dismissal the lower court practically agreed with defendant's contention that the contract (Exh. A) between plaintiff and Francism Militante was null and void. ISSUES WON the contract of sale between appellant and his father-in-law, the late Francisco Militante over the property subject of Plan Psu-99791 was void because it was made when plaintiff was counsel of his fatherin-law in a land registration case involving the property in dispute HELD YES. - The purchase by a lawyer of the property in litigation from his client is categorically prohibited by Article 1491 paragraph (5) of the Philippine Civil Code, reproduced supra; 6 and that consequently, plaintiff's purchase of the property in litigation from his client (assuming that his client could sell the same since as already shown above, his client's claim to the property was defeated and rejected) was void and could produce no legal effect, by virtue of Article 1409, paragraph (7) of our Civil Code which provides that contracts "expressly prohibited or declared void by law' are "inexistent and that "(T)hese contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set up the defense of illegality be waived." - In a case, the Court ordered the issuance of a writ of possession for the return of the land by the lawyer to the adverse parties without reimbursement of the price paid by him and other expenses, and ruled that counsel is a lawyer and is presumed to know the law. He must, therefore, from the beginning, have been well aware of the defect in his title and is, consequently, a possessor in bad faith." - Article 1491 of our Civil Code (like Article 1459 of the Spanish Civil Code) prohibits in its six paragraphs certain persons, by reason of the relation of trust or their peculiar control over the property, from acquiring such property in their trust or control either directly or indirectly and "even at a public or judicial auction," as follows: (1) guardians; (2) agents; (3) administrators; (4) public officers and employees; judicial officers and employees, prosecuting attorneys, and lawyers; and (6) others especially disqualified by law. - New Civil Code recognizes absolute nullity of contracts "whose cause, object, or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy" or which are "expressly prohibited or declared void by law" and declares such contracts "inexistent and void from the beginning." - nullity of such prohibited contracts is definite and permanent and cannot be cured by ratification. The public interest and public policy remain paramount and do not permit of compromise or ratification. In his aspect, the permanent disqualification of public and judicial officers and lawyers grounded on public policy differs from the first three cases of guardians, agents and administrators (Article 1491, Civil Code), as to

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whose transactions it had been opined that they may be "ratified" by means of and in "the form of a new contact, in which cases its validity shall be determined only by the circumstances at the time the execution of such new contract. The causes of nullity which have ceased to exist cannot impair the validity of the new contract. Thus, the object which was illegal at the time of the first contract, may have already become lawful at the time of the ratification or second contract; or the service which was impossible may have become possible; or the intention which could not be ascertained may have been clarified by the parties. The ratification or second contract would then be valid from its execution; however, it does not retroact to the date of the first contract." - As applied to the case at bar, the lower court therefore properly acted upon defendant-appellant's motion to dismiss on the ground of nullity of plaintiff's alleged purchase of the land, since its juridical effects and plaintiff's alleged cause of action founded thereon were being asserted against defendant-appellant. CANTILLER V POTENCIANO PER CURIAM; December 18, 1989 (ricky cantre) NATURE Administrative complaint versus Atty. Humberto V. Potenciano. FACTS - Subject of this administrative complaint is Humberto V. Potenciano, a practicing lawyer and a member of the Philippine Bar under Roll No. 21862. He is charged with deceit, fraud, and misrepresentation, and also with gross misconduct, malpractice and of acts unbecoming of an officer of the court. - Complainant is the sister of Peregrina Cantiller, defendant in an action for "ejectment" before the MTC of Manila, Branch 57, San Juan, Metro Manila. Another action, likewise involving Peregrina but this time as plaintiff, was then pending before the RTC, Branch 168, Pasig, Metro Manila for "reconveyance with damages." Both actions involve the apartment unit being rented by Cantiller and her sister. When the two cases were concluded, Peregrina came out the losing party. The civil case for reconveyance was ordered dismissed by the RTC on June 9, 1987 while the civil case for ejectment was decided by the MTC against her. - On October 8, 1987 pursuant to the writ of execution issued in the civil case for ejectment, Cantiller and Peregrina were served a notice to vacate the rented premises within four (4) days from receipt of notice. Desperate and at a loss on what to do, they consulted a certain Sheriff Pagalunan on the matter. Pagalunan, in turn, introduced them to Potenciano. After such introduction, the parties "impliedly agreed" that Potenciano would handle their case. - A petition entitled "Annulment of Judgment, Annulment of Sale and Damages with prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Status Quo Order, etc." was prepared by Potenciano to forestall the execution of the order to vacate. In the afternoon of October 9, 1987, Cantiller was made to sign by Potenciano what she described as a "[h]astily prepared, poorly conceived, and haphazardly composed" petition for annulment of judgment. Cantiller alleges that Potenciano promised her that the necessary restraining order would be secured if only because the judge who would hear the matter was his "katsukaran" (close friend). Potenciano demanded from Cantiller P1,000 as attorney's fee which the latter paid that same afternoon. However, when the case was raffled and assigned to Branch 153, the presiding judge asked Potenciano to withdraw as counsel in the case on the ground of their friendship. - On October 11, 1987, Potenciano went to the house of Cantiller and asked her to be ready with P2,000 to be given to another judge who will issue the restraining order in the ejectment case. Cantiller and her sister were only able to raise the amount of P1,000 which they immediately gave to Potenciano. Later Potenciano informed Cantiller and her sister that he could not locate the judge who would issue the restraining order. The parties, then, instead went to the Max's Restaurant where Potenciano ordered some food-including two plastic bags of food allegedly to be given to the judge who would issue the restraining order. At this juncture, Potenciano asked for the remaining balance of the P2,000 which he earlier demanded. Cantiller gave her last money-a ten dollar ($10.00) bill. - Sometime after the filing of Civil Case No. 55118, Potenciano informed complainant and Peregrina that there was a need to file another case with the RTC to enable them to retain possession of the apartment. For this purpose, Potenciano told complainant to prepare the amount of P10,000.00 allegedly to be deposited with the Treasurer's Office of Pasig as purchase price of the apartment and another P1,000 to cover the expenses of the suit. Potenciano stressed to the complainant the need and urgency of filing the new complaint. Complainant and Peregrina raised the said amounts through the kindness of some friends and relatives. On October 26, 1987, the money was handed over to the respondent. - At the hearing of the preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 55118 on October 30, 1987, Potenciano, contrary to his promise that he would secure a restraining order, withdrew his appearance as counsel for complainant. Complainant was not able to get another lawyer as replacement. Thus, no restraining order or preliminary injunction was obtained. As a consequence, the order to vacate was eventually enforced and executed. - Sometime thereafter, it came to complainant's knowledge that there was really no need to make a deposit of P10,000 relative to Civil Case No. 55210. After another inquiry, she found out that in fact there was no such deposit made. Thus, on December 23, 1987, complainant sent a demand letter to Potenciano asking for the return of the total amount of P11,000 which the former earlier gave to the latter. However, this letter was never answered and the money was never returned. Hence, complainant lodged this administrative complaint against herein respondent. - Potenciano in his answer contends that the filing of Civil Cases Nos. 55118 and 55210 was done in good faith and that the allegations of complainant relative to the administrative charge against him are all lies, product of one's imagination and only intended to harrass him. ISSUE WON Potenciano is guilty if the charges against him HELD Yes. Ratio When a lawyer takes a clients cause, he thereby covenants that he will exert all effort for its prosecution until its final conclusion. The failure to exercise due diligence or the abandonment of a client's cause makes such lawyer unworthy of the trust which the client had reposed on him. Reasoning The acts of Potenciano in this case violate the most elementary principles of professional ethics. Public interest requires that an attorney exert his best efforts and ability in the prosecution or

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defense of his client's cause. A lawyer who performs that duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interests of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession. This is so because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar or to the public. That circumstance explains the public concern for the maintenance of an untarnished standard of conduct by every attorney towards his client. The Court finds that Potenciano failed to exercise due diligence in protecting his client's interests. Potenciano had knowledge beforehand that he would be asked by the presiding judge in Civil Case No. 55118 to withdraw his appearance as counsel by reason of their friendship. Despite such prior knowledge, Potenciano took no steps to find a replacement nor did he inform complainant of this fact. Even assuming that Potenciano had no previous knowledge that he would be asked to withdraw, the record is quite clear that four (4) days prior to the hearing of the preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 55118 Potenciano already filed a motion therein withdrawing as complainant's counsel interposing as reason therefore his frequent attacks of pain due to hemorrhoids. Despite this void, Potenciano failed to find a replacement. He did not even ask complainant to hire another lawyer in his stead. This Court agrees that the petitions in Civil Cases Nos. 55118 and 55210 appear to be poorly prepared and written. Having represented himself capable of picking up the cudgels for the apparently lost cause of complainant Potenciano should have carefully prepared the pleadings if only to establish the justness of his representation. The little time involved is no excuse. Complainant reposed full faith in him. His first duty was to file the best pleading within his capability. Apparently Potenciano was more interested in getting the most out of the complainant who was in a hopeless situation. He bragged about his closeness to the judge concerned in one case and talked about the need to "buy" the restraining order in the other. Worse still he got P10,000.00 as alleged deposit in court which he never deposited. Instead he pocketed the same. The pattern to milk the complainant dry is obvious. The allegation of Potenciano that the P10,000 was given to him as fee for his services, is simply incredible. Indeed, such amount is grossly disproportionate with the service he actually rendered. And his failure to return even a portion of the amount upon demand of complainant all the more bolsters the protestation of complainant that Potenciano does not deserve to remain as an officer of the court. Disposition Court finds Atty. Humberto V. Potenciano be guilty of the charges against him and hereby SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for an indefinite period until such time he can demonstrate that he has rehabilitated himself as to deserve to resume the practice of law. Respondent is ordered to return to complainant herein the sum of P11,000 with legal interest from the date of this resolution until it is actually returned. ALISBO V JALINDOON GRINO-AQUINO; July 18, 1991 (kiyo miura) FACTS - 3/16/70: Ramon Alisbo engaged respondent Atty. Jalandoon as his counsel in an action to recover his share of the estate of the deceased sps Catalina Sales and Restituto Gozuma w/c had been adjudicated to him under the judgment of CC No. 4963 because Alisbo failed to file a motion for execution of judgment in his favor w/in the reglementary 5year period. The salient provisions of the Contract for Professional Services (Exhibit A) between Alisbo and Attorney Jalandoon were the following: 1. That respondent will decide whether or not to file a suit for the recovery of Ramon Alisbo's share 2. That respondent will shoulder all expenses of litigation; and 3. As attorney's fees, respondent will be paid 50% of the value of the property recovered. - 4/18/70: respondent prepared a complaint w/ Ramon, Teotimo, and Pacifico Alisbo as plaintiffs and Carlito Sales as defendant signed by him alone (CC No. 9559); on the same day, he withdrew it and replaced it with a complaint w/ Ramon as sole plaintiff and Teotimo and Pacifico impleaded as defendants w/c respondent and Atty. Pablo signed as counsel - 12/8/71: an amended complaint was filed w/ Ramon, his judicial guardian Norberto, and eight others as plaintiffs, signed by Atty. Pablo alone (10 years after final judgment) - 8/21/73: defendant Sales filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the action had prescribed - 10/3/73: the CFI of Negros Occidental dismissed the case on the ground of prescription (though Ramon filed the complaint w/in the ten-year prescriptive period, it was null and void since Ramon was insane and hence w/o capacity to sue) - 1/2/74: complainants charged Jalandoon w/ having deliberately caused the dismissal of CC No. 9559 and concealing the fact that he had been the former legal counsel of Sales - Jalandoon claims he only discovered his previous professional relationship with Sales during the pre-trial on Oct. 6, 1972 ISSUE WON Jalandoon is guilty of non-disclosure to client of adverse or conflicting interest

HELD - YES because: 1. Before filing the complaint, he had several interviews w/ Ramon and Norberto re: CC No. 4963 2. He must have done research on the court records of CC No. 4963 3. For CC No. 9559, he had to inform himself of the personal circumstances of defendant Sales -w/ this knowledge, he should have declined employment by Alisbo due to conflict of interest - The actuations of respondent attorney violated Paragraphs 1 and 2, No. 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provide: 6. ADVERSE INFLUENCE AND CONFLICTING INTEREST It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of retainer to disclose to the client all the circumstances of his relations to the parties, and any interest in or connection with the controversy, which might influence the client in the selection of counsel. It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty

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to another client requires him to oppose. (pp. 14-15, Solicitor General's Report.) -Jalandoon had delayed the filing of CC No. 9559, instead asking the court to resolve the pending incidents in CC No. 4963. The first complaint w/ Ramon and his brothers was only partially defective due to Ramons insanity; by making Ramon the sole plaintiff in the second complaint, it was rendered wholly defective and ineffectual in stopping the prescriptive period - Jalandoon alleges to have only found out about Ramons incapacity on July 17, 1971, he only amended the complaint impleading his guardian as plaintiff 5 months . later when it had prescribed Disposition It was more than simple negligence; the Court found respondent guilty of serious misconduct and infidelity and was suspended for a period of 2 years. NGAYAN V TUGADE PER CURIAM; February 7, 1991 (rean balisi) NATURE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Violation of subparagraphs (e) and (f) of Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court FACTS - Respondent, Atty. Faustino Tugade, had been complainants (Fulgencio, Tomasa and Bella Aurora Ngayan) counsel for a number of cases prior to this complaint. Complainants asked Atty. Tugade to prepare an affidavit to be used as basis for a complaint to be filed against Mrs. Rowena Soriano and Robert Leonido as a consequence of the latter's unauthorized entry into complainants' dwelling. Without thoroughly reading the same, Mrs. Tomasa A. Ngayan allegedly signed it because she was rushed to do the same. After signing, Mrs. Ngayan noted a paragraph which did not mention Leonido was with Soriano when both suddenly barged into complainants' residence. Mrs. Ngayan allegedly told respondent about his omission and in front of her, Atty Tugade crossed out the paragraph she complained about and promised to make another affidavit. Respondent was subsequently discharged by complainants as counsel. After discharging respondent they found out that the name of Robert Leonido was not included in the charge. This omission was however remedied by their new counsel. When the adverse parties Soriano and Leonido filed a motion for reinvestigation of their case against herein complainants, Soriano and Leonido presented Ngayans first affidavit which contained herein respondents omission. This was allegedly made by Atty. Apolo P. Gaminda, a former classmate of respondent. It appears then that Atty. Tugade submitted an affidavit to the Court favorable to the cause of Soriano and Leonido. Further, it was found out that herein respondent attorney was also a lawyer of the brother of Robert Leonido in an insurance company. WON Atty. Tugade violation of subparagraphs (e) and (f) of Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.4 Simply put, whether he failed to uphold the trust and confidence conferred to him by his clients HELD YES. [a] Respondent's act of executing and submitting an affidavit as exhibit for Robert Leonido and Rowena Soriano advancing facts prejudicial to the case of his former clients demonstrates clearly an act of offensive personality against complainants, violative of the first part of paragraph (f), Section 20, Rate 138, Rules of Court. Likewise, respondent's act of joining the adverse parties in celebrating their victory over the dismissal of the case against them shows not only his bias against the complainants but also constitutes a degrading act on the part of a lawyer. It was meant only to titillate the anger of complainants. [b] Respondent's failure to answer the complaint against him and his failure to appear at the investigation are evidence of his flouting resistance to lawful order, of the court and illustrate his despiciency for his oath of office in violation of Section 3, Rule 138, Rules of Court. IN RE: SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW TINGA; July 30, 2004 (monch bacani) FACTS - On August 6, 1987, Edward Benavente, the creditor of a certain Castro, obtained a judgment against Castro in a civil case. Maquera served as Castros counsel in said case. Castros property subject of the case, a parcel of land, was to be sold at a public auction in satisfaction of his obligation to Benavente. Castro, however, retained the right of redemption over the property for one year. The right of redemption could be exercised by paying the amount of the judgment debt within the aforesaid period. - At the auction sale, Benavente purchased Castros property for $500.00, the amount which Castro was adjudged to pay him. - On December 21, 1987, Castro, in consideration of Maqueras legal services in the civil case involving Benavente, entered into an oral agreement with Maquera and assigned his right of redemption in favor of the latter. - On January 8, 1988, Maquera exercised Castros right of redemption by paying Benavente $525.00 in satisfaction of the judgment debt. Thereafter, Maquera had the title to the property transferred in his name. - On December 31, 1988, Maquera sold the property to C.S. Chang and C.C. Chang for $320,000.00 - The Superior Court of Guam suspended Atty. Mosquera from the practice of law for 2 years as he acquired his clients property as payment for his legal services, then sold it and as a consequence obtained an unreasonably high fee for handling his clients case. It was in violation of Rules 1.5 and 1.8(a) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in Guam. - The IBP on the other hand, concluded that although the said court found Maquera liable for misconduct, there is no evidence to establish that he committed a breach of ethics in the Philippines. However, they
4 Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides: "(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to

ISSUE

himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his client's business except from him or with his knowledge and approval; "(f) To abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witnesses, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged"

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suspended him indefinitely for failure to pay his annual dues as a member of the IBP. ISSUE WON Maqueras acts in Guam constitute as grounds for suspension in the Philippines HELD Yes. - Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated. The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension - The Superior Court of Guam found that Maquera acquired his clients property by exercising the right of redemption previously assigned to him by the client in payment of his legal services. Such transaction falls squarely under Article 1492 in relation to Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Paragraph 5 of Article 1491 prohibits the lawyers acquisition by assignment of the clients property which is the subject of the litigation handled by the lawyer. Under Article 1492, the prohibition extends to sales in legal redemption. - The prohibition ordained in paragraph 5 of Article 1491 and Article 1492 is founded on public policy because, by virtue of his office, an attorney may easily take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client and unduly enrich himself at the expense of his client. - Mosqueras acts are violative of a lawyers sworn duty to act with fidelity toward his clients. They are also violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically, Canon 17 and Rule 1.01. Disposition Atty. Mosquera is required to show cause within 15 days why he should not be suspended or disbarred. For the meantime, he is suspended from the practice of law for 1 year or until he shall have paid his membership dues, whichever comes later. SOLATAN V INOCENTES TINGA; August 9, 2005 (jonas azura) NATURE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court FACTS - Atty. Jose A. Camano was an associate in the firm of Atty. Oscar Inocentes. The Oscar Inocentes and Associates Law Office was retained by spouses Genito, owners of an apartment complex when the Genito Apartments were placed under sequestration by the PCGG. They represented the spouses Genito before the PCGG and the Sandiganbayan and in ejectment cases against non-paying tenants occupying the Genito Apartments. - Complainants sister was a tenant of the Genito Apartments. It appears that she left for the States and her apartment was used by members of her family. A complaint for ejectment for non-payment of rentals was filed against her and a decision was rendered in a judgment by default ordering her to vacate the premises. - Complainant was occupying said apartment when he learned of the judgment. He informed Atty. Inocentes of his desire to arrange the execution of a new lease contract by virtue of which he would be the new lessee of the apartment. Atty. Inocentes referred him to Atty. Camano, the attorney in charge of ejectment cases against tenants of the Genito Apartments. During the meeting with Atty. Camano, an verbal agreement was made in which complainant agreed to pay the entire judgment debt of his sister, including awarded attorneys fees and costs of suit. Complainant issued a check in the name of Atty. Camano representing half of the attorneys fees. - Complainant failed to make any other payment. The sheriff in coordination with Atty. Camano enforced the writ of execution and levied the properties found in the subject apartment. Complainant renegotiated and Atty. Camano agreed to release the levied properties and allow complainant to remain at the apartment. Acting on Atty. Camanos advice, complainant presented an affidavit of ownership to the sheriff who released the levied items. However, a gas stove was not returned to the complainant but was kept by Atty. Camano in the unit of the Genito Apartments where he was temporarily staying. - complainant filed the instant administrative case for disbarment against Atty. Camano and Atty. Inocentes. The IBP Board of Governors resolved to suspend Atty. Camano from the practice of law for 1 year and to reprimand Atty. Inocentes for exercising command responsibility. ISSUES 1. WON Atty. Camano violated the Code of Professional Responsibility 2. WON Atty. Inocentes violated the Code of Professional Responsibility

HELD 1. YES Ratio An attorney has no right to act as counsel or legal representative for a person without being retained. No employment relation was offered or accepted in the instant case. Reasoning Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires all lawyers to observe loyalty in all transactions and dealings with their clients. Unquestionably, an attorney giving legal advice to a party with an interest conflicting with that of his client may be held guilty of disloyalty. However, the advice given by Atty. Camano in the context where the complainant was the rightful owner of the incorrectly levied properties was in consonance with his duty as an officer of the court. It should not be construed as being in conflict with the interest of the spouses Genito as they have no interest over the properties. The act of informing complainant that his properties would be returned upon showing proof of his ownership may hint at infidelity to his clients but lacks the essence of double dealing and betrayal. 2. YES Ratio His failure to exercise certain responsibilities over matters under the charge of his law firm is a blameworthy shortcoming. As name practitioner of the law office, Atty. Inocentes is tasked with the responsibility to make reasonable efforts to ensure that all lawyers in the firm should act in conformity to the Code of Professional Responsibility. Reasoning Atty. Inocentes received periodic reports from Atty. Camano on the latters dealings with complainant. This is the linchpin of his supervisory capacity over Atty. Camano and liability by virtue thereof. Partners and practitioners who hold supervisory capacities are legally

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responsible to exert ordinary diligence in apprising themselves of the comings and goings of the cases handled by persons over which they are exercising supervisory authority and in exerting necessary efforts to foreclose violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility by persons under their charge. Disposition Petition granted. Sanction on Atty. Camano is affirmed. Atty. Inocentes is admonished with the warning that repetition of the same or similar omission will be dealt with more severely. LEGARDA V COURT OF APPEALS PER CURIAM; June 10, 1992 (ajang pineda) FACTS - Victoria Legarda was the defendant in a complaint for a specific performance with damages filed by private respondent New Cathay House Inc (NCHI). The complaint is aimed at compelling Victoria Legarda to sign a lease contract involving her house and lot which Cathay House Inc. intended to use in operating a restaurant. As prayed for in the complaint, the lower court issued a TRO enjoining Victoria Legarda and her agents from stopping the renovation of the property. - Thereafter, Antonio Coronel of the Coronel Law office entered his appearance as counsel for Legarda. - He filed an urgent motion for extension of 10 days which was granted by the court. However, Legarda was not able to file her answer within the 10 days given so she was declared in default, thereby paving way for the presentation of evidence ex parte - The lower court then rendered a decision by default leaving Legarda on the losing end. Upon appeal, the CA found the petition unmeritorious and dismissed it. It said, It is our belief that this case is one of pure and simple negligence on the part of the defendants counsel, who simply failed to file the answer in behalf of the defendant. - But inspite of the CAs tirade on his professional competence, Atty. Coronel did not lift a finger to file a motion for reconsideration, neither did he initiate moves towards an appeal on the decision which was adverse and prejudicial to his client. Thus the CA decision became final. - Victoria Legarda then got a new lawyer and won the case. - The court then required Atty. Coronel to show cause w/in 10 days from notice why he should not be held administratively liable for his acts and omissions w/c resulted in grave injustice to petitioner. - He filed for another 30-day extension. Then another 30-day extension. Not filed in time, the 2nd motion was denied ISSUE WON Atty. Colorado was negligent thus violating Canon 18 of the Professional Code of Responsibility HELD Yes. - Atty. Colorado violated Canon 18 which states that A lawyer shall serve his client w/ competence and diligence specifically Canon 18.03, a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. - This is not the only case wherein in dealing w/ the courts orders, Atty. Coronel appears to exhibit a pattern of negligence, inattention to his obligations as counsel, sloppiness and superciliousness. In Imelda Marcos vs PCGG, the court imposed a fine on him after he was found guilty of negligence Ratio - Lawyers are indispensable part of the whole system of administering justice in this jurisdiction. At a time when strong disturbing criticisms are being hurled at the legal profession, strict compliance w/ ones oath of office and the canons of professional ethics is an imperative. - Lawyers should be fair, honest, respectable, above suspicion and beyond reproach in dealing w/ their clients. The profession is not synonymous w. an ordinary business proposition. It is a matter of public interest. ENDAYA V OCA TINGA; September 3, 2003 (ajang pineda) NATURE A complaint filed by Artemio Andaya against Atty. Wilfredo Oca for violation of the lawers oath and for professional delinquency or infidelity FACTS - Nov. 7, 1991 - a complaint for unlawful detainer was filed against Endaya and his spouse, Patrosenia Endaya. The complaint was filed by Apolonia Hornilla, Pedro Hernandez and Dominador Hernandez - Dec. 13, 1991 the Endaya couple filed their answer which was prepared by a certain Isaias Ramirez. A preliminary conference was conducted w/c the couple attended w/o counsel. During the conference, complainant categorically admitted that plaintiffs were the declared owners for taxation purposes of the land involved in the case - Thereafter, the complainant couple sought services of the public attorneys office in Batangas City wherein the respondent attorney was assigned to handle the case - At the continuation of the preliminary conference, respondent appeared as counsel; he also moved for the amendment of the answer previously filed by the couple, but his motion was denied - the court thereafter ordered the parties to submit their affidavits and position papers w/in 10 days from receipt of order but the respondent failed to do so. Nonetheless, the court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the plaintiffs were not the real parties in interest - The plaintiffs appealed the decision. The RTC directed the parties to file their memoranda. Once again, the respondent failed to do so. The courts original decision was reversed and set aside. Petitioners' Claim - Having lost the case, the complainant filed this administrative issue for professional delinquency consisting of his failure to file the required pleadings. The complainants contend that due to respondents inaction, he lost the opportunity to present his cause and ultimately, the case itself Respondents' Comments - respondent denies this and stresses that he was not the original counsel of the couple - he avers that when he agreed to represent complainant at the continuation of the preliminary conference in the main case, it was for the sole purpose of asking leave of court to file an amended answer bec, he was made to believe that it was made by a non-lawyer. When found out that it was actually made by lawyer, he asked the court to relieve him as the couples counsel, but he was denied.

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- He also asserts that he purposely did not file a rejoinder believing in good faith that it wasnt anymore necessary ISSUE WON Atty. Oca (respondent) violated the lawyers oath through his professional deliquency HELD Yes. - His failure to file the affidavits did not prejudice his clients for the court nevertheless rendered a decision favorable to them. But failure to do so per se is a violation of Rule 18.03 - The respondent did not submit the affidavits and position paper when required by the MCTC. With his resolution not to file the pleadings already firmed up, he did not bother to inform the MCTC of his resolution in mockery of the authority of the court - Respondents stubborn and uncaring demeanor surfaced again when he did not file a rejoinder to complainants reply Ratio - The lawyers oath embodies the fundamental principles that guide every member of the legal fraternity. From it springs the lawyers duties and responsibilities that any infringement thereof can cause his disbarment, suspension or other preliminary action - Canon 18: A lawyer shall serve his client w/ competence and diligence - Much is demanded from those who engage in the practice of law because they have a duty not only to their clients but also to the court, to the bar and to the public. The lawyers diligence and dedication to his work and profession not only promote the interest of his client, it likewise help attain the ends of justice by contributing to the proper and speedy administration of cases, maintain respect to the legal profession. - The facts and circumstances in this case indubitably show respondents failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer BLANZA V ARCANGEL BENGZON; September 5, 1967 (javi bautista) NATURE Original Proceeding in the Supreme Court. Disciplinary action. FACTS - On April, 1955, Atty. Arcangel volunteered to help them in their respective pension claims in connection with the death of their husbands, both P.C. soldiers. They handed Arcangel pertinent documents and also affixed their signatures on blank papers. After which, they noticed that respondent lost interest and no progress was made. After 6 years they finally asked respondent to return the said documents but the latter refused. Upon questioning by Fiscal Rana to whom the case was referred by the Solicitor General respondent admitted having received the documents but explained that it was for photostating purposes only. His failure to immediately return them was due to complainants refusal to hand him money to pay for the photostating costs which prevented him from withdrawing the documents. Anyway, he had already advanced the expenses himself and turned over the documents to the fiscal. - Fiscal found respondents explanation satisfactory and recommended the respondents exoneration. However, Sol Gen feels that respondent deserves at least a severe reprimand considering 1) his failure to attend to complainants pension claims for 6 years; 2) his failure to immediately return the documents despite repeated demands upon him, and 3) his failure to return to complainant Pasion, allegedly all of her documents. ISSUE WON Atty. Arcangel is guilty of professional non-feasance HELD No. Respondents explanation for the delay in filing the claims in returning the documents has not been controverted by complainants. On the contrary, they admitted that respondent asked them to shoulder the photostating expenses but they did not give him any money. Hence, complainants are partly to blame. Moreover, the documents and their photostats were actually returned by respondent during the fiscals investigation with him paying for the photostating costs himself. As for the alleged failure of the respondent to all her documents to complainant Pasion, the former denies this. the affidavit of Mrs. Blanza pardoning respondent cannot prejudice complainant Pasion because res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. Complainant Pasion had another opportunity to substantiate her charges in a hearing but she let it go. Neither she nor her counsel of record appeared. Thus, the Curt refused to take disciplinary action against respondent due to lack of clear preponderance of evidence substantiating the accusations against him. - Nevertheless the Court also stated that we cannot but counsel against his actuations as a member of the bar. A lawyer has a more dynamic and positive role in the community than merely complying with the minimal technicalities of the statute. As a man of law, he is necessarily a leader of the community looked up to as a model citizen. His conduct must, perforce, be par excellence, especially so when, as in this case, he volunteers his professional services. Respondent here has not lived up to that ideal standard. It was unnecessary to have complainants wait and hope, for 6 long years in their pension claims. Upon their refusal to co-operate, he should have terminated their professional relationship rather than keep them hanging. And although we voted that he not be reprimanded, in a legal sense, let this be a reminder to Atty. Arcangel of what the high standards of his chosen profession require of him. ABAY V MONTESINO PANGANIBAN; December 4, 2003 NATURE Original Proceeding in the Supreme Court. Disciplinary action. FACTS - June 21, 2002 - Eduardo T. Abay charges Atty. Raul T. Montesino with gross negligence, gross incompetence and evident bad faith, in violation of his oath as a member of the Philippine bar - Negros Institute of Technology (NIT), of which Abay is a stockholder, hired Montesino as counsel in an action for Cancellation of Title of Ownership, Recovery of Ownership and Possession and Damages with Preliminary Injunction against the estate of Vicente T. Galo - April 27, 1995 - RTC dismissed the civil case. - November 3, 1995 - Motion for Reconsideration of the judgment of dismissal was denied by the trial court

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- Although Montesino filed a Notice of Appeal with CA, he failed to submit an appellants brief and in March 19, 1999, CA dismissed the appeal with the following admonition: We made a warning in our Resolution dated as early as October 20, 1998 that no further extension will be entertained. Precisely because of non-submission of the Brief, we directed, on January 8, 1998, the dismissal of the appeal. This is not to mention the fact that a total of 120 days extension, over and above the 45-day reglementary period, had already been granted We cannot see any reason why the courts admonishing for a limited time to do compliance does not apply to this case now before Us. - Abay attributes the failure of Montesino to submit the brief to the latters gross negligence and evident bad faith - Montesino allegedly abandoned the appeal without the knowledge and consent of the NIT and supposedly never told NIT that its appeal had already been dismissed thus the complaint - Montesino answered (October 29, 2002) that 1. pending appeal, he discovered that the property that it was seeking to recover had been the subject of another case which was a result of the overlapping transfers of rights effected by the heirs of Vicente Galo 2. he felt that to pursue the appeal would be dilatory, expensive, frivolous and taxing to the precious time of the CA and it was wise to advise the stockholders of the NIT to abandon the appeal and instead file appropriate Complaints against Grandea, et al to recover NITs claimed properties 3. complainant was unjustly adamant in his demand to continue with the appeal despite legal advice and since he sincerely felt that the best way to protect the rights of NIT was to file appropriate complaints, he allowed the period to submit NITs Appellants Brief to lapse 4. although NIT did not pay his legal fees or reimburse him for his expenses, he still faithfully performed his duty during the entire time he served as its counsel - April 24, 2003 IBP Report by San Juan found respondent guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility because: 1. not able to justify his failure to file the brief. > if respondent actually believed it was futile to pursue the appeal, why did he request from CA numerous extensions of time to file 2. Montesino admits that after he advised NIT and herein complainant on the futility of pursuing the appeal, the latter expressed the wish to continue the appeal > should have given due importance to the decision of his client to avail of a legal remedy available to it under the legal system 3. recommended suspension from the practice of law for a period of six months, with a warning that a harsher penalty would be meted out for a similar infraction in the future ISSUE WON pursuing methods not according to the clients wish and consent deserves sanction HELD YES and SC agrees with the findings and recommendation of the IBP. Reasoning - The legal profession is invested with public trust. Its goal is to render public service and secure justice for those who seek its aid. They must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients in accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession, as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Any conduct found wanting in these considerations, whether in their professional or private capacity, shall subject them to disciplinary action. Failure of respondent to file the appellants brief was a clear violation of his professional duty to his client - The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates lawyers to serve their clients with competence and diligence. Rules 18.03 and 18.04 specifically provide: Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Rule 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for information. - Client and lawyer disagreed on the legal course to be taken regarding the appealed case. The lawyer advised the client to abandon the appeal and to consider the other available remedies but the client wanted to pursue it. Feeling that he was unjustly adamant in wanting to do so, the lawyer contrary to the desire of the client deemed it wise to abandon the appeal without informing his client and not filing an appellants brief is prejudicial because such failure could result in the dismissal of the appeal. - The conduct of shows that he failed to exercise due diligence, and that he had a cavalier attitude towards the cause of his client. The abandonment by the former of the latters cause made him unworthy of the trust that his client reposed in him. Even if respondent was honestly and sincerely protecting the interests of complainant, the former still had no right to waive the appeal without the latters knowledge and consent. - If indeed respondent felt unable or unwilling to continue his retainership, he should have properly withdrawn his appearance and allowed the client to appoint another lawyer. - Moreover, the appellate court noted that respondent failed to file the appellants brief despite being granted several extensions of time to file it. He therefore violated Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates that lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so - We emphasize that all lawyers owe fidelity to their clients cause. Regardless of their personal views, they must present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law in support of that cause. Disposition Atty. Raul T. Montesino is found guilty of negligence and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six months, effective upon receipt of this Decision. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely. QUIRANTE V INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT REGALADO; January 31, 1989 NATURE Appeal by certiorari to review the judgment of the IAC FACTS - Atty. John QUIRANTE is the counsel of Dr. Indalecio CASASOLA in a case involving a contract with a building contractor named Norman

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GUERRERO, who failed to perform his part of the contract within the period specified. Dr. Casasola also sued PHILAMGEN, (The Philippine American General Insurance Co. Inc.) which acted as bondsman for Guerrero. - Oct 16, 1981 RTC Manila ruled in favor of CASASOLA by rescinding the contract. It ordered Guerrero and Philamgen to pay actual damages, moral damages, exemplary damages, liquidated damages, amount of surety bond, and attorneys fees (P30T). It also denied MFR filed by Philamgen on Nov 4, 1982. (During this period, Dr. CASASOLA died, leaving his widow and several children as survivors.) - Philamgen brought the case to the appellate court, and the IAC, on May 4, 1983, dismissed petition for quashal of the writ of execution. The case was then elevated to SC and is now still pending. - June 18, 1983 QUIRANTE filed a motion for the confirmation of his attorneys fees, which was granted by the RTC. RTC also denied MFR filed by the opposing party. But the IAC reversed the decision of RTC (IAC granted petition for certiorari filed CASASOLA heirs.) Hence, QUIRANTE filed this appeal by certiorari in the SC. Petitioners Claims - There was an oral agreement between him and the late Dr. Casasola with regard to his attorney's fees, which agreement was allegedly confirmed in writing by the widow, Asuncion Vda. de Casasola, and the two daughters of the deceased, Mely Garcia and Virginia Nazareno. - The attorney's fees would then be computed as follows: (A). In case of recovery of the P120,000.00 surety bond, the attorney's fees of the undersigned counsel (Atty. Quirante) shall be P30,000.00. (B). In case the Honorable Court awards damages in excess of the P120,000.00 bond, it shall be divided equally between the Heirs of I. Casasola, Atty. John C. Quirante and Atty. Dante Cruz. IACs ruling - Firstly, there is still pending in the Supreme Court a petition which may or may not ultimately result in the granting to the Casasola family of the total amount of damages given by RTC. Hence the award of damages may be premature. Secondly, assuming that the grant of damages to the family is eventually ratified, the alleged confirmation of attorney's fees will not and should not adversely affect the nonsignatories thereto. ISSUES 1. WON confirmation of attorneys fees is premature 2. WON IAC correctly ruled that the alleged confirmation of attorney's fees would not be binding on all heirs HELD 1. YES Ratio An attorney's fee cannot be determined until after the main litigation has been decided and the subject of recovery is at the disposition of the court. The issue over attorney's fee only arises when something has been recovered from which the fee is to be paid. Reasoning Since the main case from which the petitioner's claims for their fees may arise has not yet become final, the determination of the propriety and amount of attorneys fees should be held in abeyance. This is especially true given the subsequent developments in the civil case against Guerrero and PHILAMGEN: On May 21, 1987, the SC rendered judgment setting aside the May 1983 decision of IAC. - Also, the supposed contract alleged by petitioners as the basis for their fees provides that the recovery of the amounts claimed is subject to certain contingencies. Obiter Counsel's claim for attorney's fees may be asserted either in the very action in which the services in question have been rendered, or in a separate action. If the first alternative is chosen, the Court may pass upon said claim, even if its amount were less than the minimum prescribed by law for the jurisdiction of said court, upon the theory that the right to recover attorney's fees is but an incident of the case in which the services of counsel have been rendered. Also, there is the assumption that the court trying the case is to a certain degree already familiar with the nature and extent of the lawyer's services. - However, what is being claimed here as attorney's fees by petitioners is different from attorney's fees as an item of damages provided for under Article 2208 of the Civil Code, wherein the award is made in favor of the litigant, not of his counsel, and the litigant, not his counsel, is the judgment creditor who may enforce the judgment for attorney's fees by execution. Here, the petitioner's claims are based on an alleged contract for professional services, with them as the creditors and the private respondents as the debtors. - In filing the motion for confirmation of attorney's fees, petitioners chose to assert their claims in the same action. This is also a proper remedy under our jurisprudence. 2. NO Reasoning This decision is also pre-emptive of factual and evidentiary matters that may be presented for consideration by the trial court. The orderly administration of justice dictates that such issue be likewise determined by the trial court inasmuch as it also necessarily involves the same contingencies in determining the propriety and assessing the extent of recovery of attorney's fees. Disposition Decision of IAC is affirmed except for the portion which holds that the alleged confirmation to attorney's fees should not adversely affect the non-signatories thereto. TANHUECO V DE DUMO PER CURIAM; April 25, 1989 NATURE Administrative case in the Supreme Court. Disbarment. FACTS - On February 24, 1975, complainant Hilaria Tanhueco filed before the Court a petition for Disbarment against respondent Justininao G. de Dumo for having violated the Canons of Professional Ethics by his a0 refusal to remit her money collected by him from debtors of the complainant; and b) refusal to return documents entrusted to him as counsel of complainant in certain collection cases. SOLICITOR-GENERALS REPORT: Evidence for Complainant - Complainant secured the legal services of respondent to collect indebtedness from her different debtors. Although she offered to execute a document evidencing their lawyer-client relationship, respondent told her that it was not necessary. She nonetheless offered to give him 15% of what he may be able to collect from the debtors. - Complainant also declared that respondent borrowed from her P2,000.00, P1,300.00 and P3,000.00 on three separate occasions, but she could not remember when she gave those amounts. Respondent did not pay those loans.

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- Respondent filed cases against her debtors and that one of them, Constancia Manosca, paid P12,500.00 to respondent. Informed of such payment by Manosca herself, complainant confronted respondent but the latter denied having received payment from any of her debtors. Complainant then brought the matter to the attention of Malacanang which referred her to Camp Crame. Notwithstanding subsequent demands of complainant for the money, respondent had refused to give her the amount. Evidence for Respondent - Complainant indeed secured services of respondent to collect from her debtors, with the agreement that he gets 50% of what he may be able to collect. He thus filed cases against Tipace, Manosca, Morena, Jr., and others, and was able to obtain favorable judgment in the cases against Manosca, Tipace and Leonila Mendoza. The initial payments made by these judgment-debtors were all given to complainant. With respect to Manosca, respondent obtained a judgment for P19,000.00 although the debt was only P12,000.00. - Respondent also declared that complainant was influenced by her debtors, who were also her friends, into distrusting him. Ultimately, because comlainant filed a complaint against him, he terminated his relationship with complainant and demanded his attorneys fees equivalent to 50% of what he had collected. Complainant refused to pay him, hence, he did not also turn over to her the P12,000.00 initial payment of Manosca, which he considered, or applied, as part payment of his attorneys fee. Respondent estimated his attorneys fee due from complainant in the amount of P17,000.00 - Respondent denied having borrowed the amounts of P2,000.00, P1,300.00, P3,000.00 and P1,000.00, pointing out that complainant did not even have money to pay him so that he handled the cases for her on contingent basis. He also denied having received documentary evidence from the complainant. What evidence he had were all gathered by him on his initiative. Findings and Recommendation - Both respondent and complainant admit of an attorney-client relationship between them. - Respondent also admitted having received P12,000.00 from judgmentdebtor Constancia Manosca, without turning over the amount to his client, complainant herein, and applying it instead as part of his attorneys fees. - Undoubtedly, respondents failure to account for the P12,000.00, representing payment of the judgment-debt of Manosca constitutes unprofessional conduct and subjects him to disciplinary action. - As regards the charges that respondent received documents evidencing the debts to complainant and had refused to return them to the latter, and that respondent also borrowed some amounts from her, there is no competent, conclusive evidence to support them. Perforce, such allegations have no factual basis. - It is recommended that respondent be severely reprimanded and admonished that repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely. (To this recommendation, the Court does not agree) ISSUES 1. WON respondent violated Canon 11 (now Canon 16) regarding trust of clients moneys 2. WON respondent violated Canon 13 (now Canon 20) regarding attorneys fees. HELD 1) Ratio Moneys collected by an attorney on a judgment rendered in favor of his client, constitute trust funds and must be immediately paid over to the client. Reasoning When respondent withheld and refused to deliver the money received by him for his client, the deceased complainant Hilaria Tanhueco, he breached the trust reposed upon him. The fact that a lawyer ahs a lien for fees on moneys in his hands collected for his client, does not relieve him from his duty to promptly account for the moneys received; his failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. In the present case, what respondent could have properly done was to make an accounting with his client, the complainant, deduct his attorneys fees due in respect of the amount actually collected by him, and turn over the remaining balance to the complainant. 2) Ratio Contingent fees are not per se prohibited by law. But when it is shown that a contract for a contingent fee was obtained by undue influence exercised by the attorney upon his client or by any fraud or imposition, or that the compensation is clearly excessive, the Court must and will protect the aggrieved party. Reasoning Respondent claimed that he charged complainant, his client, a contingent fee of 1) 50% of the sum of principal and interest collected from different debtors; and 2) attorneys fees charged to the defendant and not to be included in the computation. Under this scheme, respondent was actually collecting as attorneys fees more than half of the total amount due from defendant debtors. The contingent fee here is grossly excessive. And there is reason to believe that fraud was committed complainant was an old and sickly woman and, in respondents words, penniless. She was already 76 yrs. old when she filed the complaint. In her circumstance, and given her desire to realize debts owed to her before death took over, she would easily succumb to the demands of respondent attorney regarding his attorneys fees. In Mambulao Lumber Company v PNB, it was explained that the principle that courts should reduce stipulated attorneys fees whenever it is found under the circumstances of the case that the same is unreasonable is deeply rooted in this jurisdiction. A lawyer is primarily a court officer charged with the duty of assisting the court in administering impartial justice between the parties, and hence, the fees should be subject to judicial control. Disposition WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved that: 1. respondent is guilty of violation of the attorneys oath and of serious professional misconduct and shall be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six months and WARNED that repetition of the same or similar offense will be more severely dealt with; 2. the attorneys fees that respondent is entitled to in respect of collection cases here involved shall be an amount equivalent to fifteen percent of the total amount collected by respondent from the debtors in those cases; 3. respondent shall return forthwith to the estate of complainant Hilaria Tanhueco, the P12,000.00 respondent received on behalf of his client less attorneys fees due to him in respect of that amount (P12,000.00 less fifteen percent thereof) or a net amount of P10,200.00; and 4. respondent shall return to the estate of complainant Hilaria Tanhueco any documents and papers received by him from the deceased complainant in connection with the collection cases for which he was retained. If he has in fact made any other collections from deceased complainants debtors, he shall promptly account

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therefore to complainants estate and shall be entitled to receive in respect thereof the fifteen percent attorneys fees provided for herein. Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished each to the Bar Confidant and spread on the personal record of respondent attorney, and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. ALBANO V COLOMA FERNANDO; OCTOBER 11, 1967 NATURE Original Action in the Supreme Court. Disbarment. FACTS Coloma was the counsel of Albano and his mother during the Japanese occupation. Albano alleged that after liberation and long after the courts had been reorganized Coloma failed to expedite the hearing and termination of their civil case, as a result of which they had themselves represented by another lawyer. He also claimed that Coloma intervened in the case to collect her attorneys fees. Coloma denied that she did nothing to expedite the hearing and termination of the civil case as the record would show that she filed more than 20 papers and pleadings; went to trial for several days and, with the assistance of her sister who was also a lawyer, obtained a favorable judgment in the Court of First Instance for the petitioner and his co-plaintiffs; and filed with the Court of Appeals a 35-page brief, finished after careful, conscientious, and exhaustive study and preparation. She likewise denied that she could have been removed for her failure to comply with the obligations as counsel as she served faithfully, efficiently, continuously, and to the best of her knowledge and capacity. Her dismissal then, according to her, was made without just cause and without her consent and only when she had already won the case for them in the Court of First Instance and in the Court of Appeals. ISSUE WON Coloma may recover attorneys fees HELD Yes. Any counsel who is worthy of his hire is entitled to be fully recompensated for his services. With his capital consisting solely of his brains and with his skill, acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but in the expenditure of time and energy, he is entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of a client to escape payment of his fees. It is indeed ironic if after putting forth the best that is in him to secure justice for the party he represents, he himself would not get his due. Such an eventuality this Court is determined to avoid. It views with disapproval any and every effort of those benefited by counsels services to deprive him of his hard-earned honorarium. Such an attitude deserves condemnation. METROBANK V CA REGALADO; January 23, 1990 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari impugning the decision of CA affirming order of RTC, fixing attorneys fees and directing petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) to pay its attorneys, private respondent Arturo Alafriz and Associates, the amount of P936,000 as attorneys fees on a quantum meruit5 basis. FACTS - Private respondent handled civil cases for the declaration of nullity of certain deeds of sale, with damages, in behalf of Metrobank from March 1974 to September 1983. - Celedenio Javier bought 7 parcels of land owned by Eustaquio Alejandro, et al. These were mortgaged by Javier with Metrobank to secure a loan obligation of Felix Angelo Bautista and/or International Hotel Corporation. Obligors defaulted and Metrobank foreclosed the mortgages. - Alejandro brought suit against Javier and included Metrobank as defendant, alleging deceit, fraud and misrepresentation committed against him by Javier. - it was during the pendency of these suits that the lands were sold by Metrobank to its sister corporation, Service Leasing Corporation, for P600,000. On same day, properties were resold to Herby Commercial and Construction Corporation for P2.5M. Herby then mortgaged the same properties to Banco de Oro for P9.2M. Private respondent did not have knowledge of such transactions. - Aug 16, 1983 private respondent then filed a motion to enter the charging lien6 in the records of the civil cases, pursuant to Sec 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, equivalent to 25% of the actual and current market values of the litigated properties, as attorneys fees. - Alejandro et al filed a motion to dismiss their complaints, which lower court granted. - May 28, 1984, private respondent filed motion to fix its attorneys fees, based on quantum meruit. Metrobank manifested it had fully paid private respondent. Private respondent, however, countered that the P50,000 given by petitioner could not be considered as full payment but merely a cash advance, including P14000 paid on Dec 15, 1980. It also appears that private respondent attempted to arrange a compromise with Metrobank in order to avoid suit, offering a compromise amount of P600,000 but negotiations were unsuccessful. - Oct 15, 1984, RTC issued an order granting payment of attorneys fees, P936,000, to private respondent. Respondent CA affirmed trial courts order. ISSUES 1. WON private respondent is entitled to the enforcement of its charging lien for payment of its attorneys fees. 2. WON a separate civil suit is necessary for the enforcement of such lien 3. WON private respondent is entitled to 25% of the actual and current market values of the litigated properties on a quantum meruit basis. HELD 1. NO. A charging lien to be enforceable as security for the payment of attorneys fees requires as a condition sine qua non a judgment for money and execution in pursuance of such judgment secured in the main action by the attorney in favor of his client. - in this case, the dismissal order neither provided for any money judgment nor made any monetary award to any litigant, much less in
quantum meruit - (lit. so much as he deserved) cause of action for reasonable value of services rendered, or occasionally of goods or materials provided, under circumstances in which there was no enforceable contract to pay for them but it would be unfair to leave plaintiff uncompensated. 6 Charging lien or attorneys lien a lien on money, papers, and property of a client in the hands of an attorney, or a lien that an attorney may request from a court on a fund or judgment obtained for the client by the attorneys efforts, to secure payment of attorneys fees.
1

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favor of petitioner. Private respondents supposed charging lien is thus without legal basis. - an attorney may acquire a lien for his compensation upon money due his client form the adverse party in nay action or proceeding in which the attorney is employed, but such lien does not extend to land which is the subject matter of the litigation. An attorney merely defeating recovery against his client as e defendant is not entitled to a lien on the property involved in litigation for fees and the court has no power to fix the fee of an attorney defending the clients title to property already in the clients possession. 2. NO. A lawyer may enforce his right to fees by filing the necessary petition as an incident in the main action in which his services were rendered when something is due his client in the action from which the fee is to be paid. - an enforceable charging lien, duly recorded, is within the jurisdiction of the court trying the main case and this jurisdiction subsists until the lien is settled. This, however, applies only where the charging lien is valid and enforceable. 3. The Court refrained from resolving the third issue so as not to preempt or interfere with the authority and adjudicative facility of the proper court to hear and decide the controversy in a proper proceeding which may be brought by private respondent. NOTE: in fixing a reasonable compensation for the services rendered by a lawyer on the basis of quantum meruit, the elements to be considered are generally (1) the importance of the subject matter in controversy (2) extent of services rendered (3) professional standing of lawyer . Disposition Petition for review is granted, decision of CA is reversed and set aside, without prejudice to appropriate proceedings as may be brought by private respondent to establish its right to attorneys fees and the amount thereof. - Resolution No. 1174 dated December 16, 1985, issued by the NHA, stated that the property would be acquired at a cost of P19.50 per square meter and that it will be paid in NHA Bonds which the yield would be based on the Central Bank rate at the time of the payment - As a result of the NHA Resolution, a Compromise Agreement was executed and it was approved by the Court in a Decision dated December 20, 1985. - Computed at P19.50 per square meter, the property of the Zuzuarreguis was expropriated at a total price of P34, 916, 122. The total amount released by the NHA was P54, 500, 00. The difference of P19, 583, 878 is, undoubtedly, the yield of the bonds. - The amount turned over to the Zuzuarreguis by Atty. Roxas amounted to P30, 520, 000 in NHA bonds - On August 25, 1987, a letter was sent by the Zuzuarreguis new counsel to Attys. Roxas and Pastor demanding that the latter deliver to the Zuzuarreguis the yield corresponding to bonds paid by the NHA within a period of 10 days from receipt, under pain of administrative, civil and/or criminal action - Attys. Roxas and Pastor answered stating that the amount that they go seems huge from the surface but it just actually passed their hands. - On September 29, 1987, a letter was again sent to Attys. Roxas and Pastor formally terminating their services - The Zuzuarreguis then filed a civil action for Sum of Money and Damages, they demanded that the yield on the NHA bonds be turned over to them - The RTC dismissed the complaint - The Zuzuarreguis filed a Notice of Appeal - The Court of Appeals ordered Attys. Roxas and Pastor to return to the plaintiffs the amount of P12, 596, 425, already deducting the reasonable attorneys fees in the amount of P4,4 76,426.275 - Attys. Roxas and Pastor filed a MFR - The Zuzuarreguis also filed a MFR - The NHA and Pedrosa also filed a MFR - All MFRs were denied for lack of merit - Attys. Roxas and Pastor then filed a petition for certiorari ISSUES 1. WON the letter-agreement executed by the parties should stand as law between them 2. WON the contingent fees were reasonable HELD 1. Yes. A contract is a meeting of the minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service. The Zuzuarreguis, in entering into the LetterAgreement, fully gave their consent thereto. In fact, it was them who sent the said letter to Attys. Roxas and Pastor, for the purpose of confirming all matters which they had agreed upon previously. There is absolutely no evidence to show that anybody was forced into entering into the Letter-Agreement. It is basic that a contract is the law between the parties. 2. No. Under the contract in question, Attys. Roxas and Pastor are to receive contingent fees for their professional services. Canon 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics states: a contract for contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be subject t o the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness

ROXAS V DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR. CHICO-NAZARIO: January 31, 2006 FACTS - 1977, the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed expropriation proceedings against the Zuzuarreguis for parcels of land belonging to them situated in Antipolo, Rizal with a total land area of 1, 790, 570.36 - The Zuzuarreguis engaged the legal services of Attys. Romeo G. Roxas and Santiago N. Pastor - They executed a Letter-Agreement dated April 22, 1983 which indicated that the contingent fees that the lawyers will receive at P11 or more per square meter is thirty percent of the just compensation - The appropriate proceedings thereafter ensued and on October 29, 1984, a Partial Decision was rendered fixing the just compensation to be paid to the Zuzuarreguis at P30 per square meter - The NHA filed a Motion for Reconsideration for the lowering of the amount of just compensation in accordance with applicable laws - Pending the resolution of the MFR filed by the NHA, a joint special power of attorney was executed by the Zuzuarreguis in favor of Attys. Roxas and Pastor - On December 10, 1985, a Letter-Agreement was executed by and between the Zuzuarreguis and Attys. Roxas and Pastor which fixed the just compensation due the Zuzuarreguis at P17, and anything in excess of that shall be the contingent fees of Attys. Roxas and Pastor for their legal services

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Canon 20, Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states the guidelines by which a lawyer should determine his fees (see original) - Indubitably entwined with the lawyers duty to charge only reasonable fees is the power of this Court to reduce the amount of attorneys fees if the same is excessive and unconscionable (Section 24, Rule 138, Rules of Court). Attorneys fees are unconscionable if they affront ones sense of justice, decency or reasonableness. Therefore, the power to determine the reasonableness of attorneys fees stipulated by the parties is a matter falling within the regulatory prerogative of the courts. - In the instant case, Attys. Roxas and Pastor received an amount which is equal to 44% of the just compensation paid by the NHA to the Zuzuarreguis. Considering that there was no full blown hearing in the expropriation case, ending as it did in a Compromise Agreement, the 44% is undeniably excessive. In the opinion of the Court, 87.17% of the yields of the bond should go to the Zuzuarreguis computing from the amounts stipulated in the Letter-Agreement. The remaining amount is what is due to Attys. Roxas and Pastor. The SC affirms the decision of CA with modification in the computation of the attorneys contingent fees. URBAN BANK, INC. V ATTY. MAGDALENO M. PEA PUNO; September 7, 2001 NATURE Administrative Matter. Disbarment FACTS - Complainant charges that respondent is guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct in violation of Section 27, Rule 138, of the Revised Rules of Court. - 1 December 1994, Complainant bought a parcel of land located along Roxas Boulevard from the Isabela Sugar Company (ISC for brevity). - One of the conditions of the sale was for ISC to cause the eviction of all the occupants found in said property. This condition was incorporated in the Contract to Sell and adopted in the subsequent Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between ISC and Complainant. - ISC hired Atty. Magdaleno M. Pea. He proceeded to take the necessary steps to evict the occupants of the property subject of the sale. - During the eviction process, Complainant was informed by ISC and Pea about the necessity of a letter of authority in favor of the latter, granting him the authority to represent the bank in maintaining possession of the aforesaid property and to represent the bank in any court action that may be instituted in connection with the exercise of said duty. - Complainant acceded to the request and issued a letter-authority dated 15 December 1994, but only after making it very clear to Pea. that it was ISC which contracted his services and not Complainant. - Pea then requested for a modification of said letter of authority by furnishing Complainant with a draft containing the desired wordings (including the date, i.e., 19 December 1994) and asking Complainant to modify the previous letter by issuing a new one similarly worded as his draft. - If only to expedite and facilitate matters, Complainant willingly obliged and re-issued a new letter of authority to Respondent, this time incorporating some of Pea s suggestions. - Eventually, the eviction of the occupants of the property in question was successfully carried out. - After the lapse of more than thirteen (13) months, Pea filed a collection suit against herein Complainant and its senior officers for recovery of agents compensation and expenses, damages and attorneys fees on the basis of the letter given to him for the purposes of evicting the occupants. - According to Complainant: Pea, knowing fully well the circumstances surrounding the issuance of said letter of authority, constitutes deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. Said provision enumerates the grounds for the suspension and disbarment of lawyers, namely: Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court, on what grounds, - A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath of which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without any authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied) - Pea denied all the allegations and moved to dismiss the complaint. - He added that there was no reason for him to deceive complainant into writing a letter of authority because he knew very well that the verbal agreement was sufficient to constitute an attorney-client relationship. - We referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation. - The IBP decided in favor of Pea and recommended that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit. ISSUE WON Pea should be disbarred on the ground of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct HELD NO. Reasoning ***Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest, undertaken for public welfare and for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of the persons unfit to practice them. - Complainant has not proferred any proof tending to show that respondent really induced it, through machination or other deceitful means, to issue the December 19 letter of authority ostensibly for the purpose of evicting illegal occupants, then using the very same letter for demanding agents compensation. - No evidence in respect of the supposed deceit, malpractice or gross misconduct was adduced by the complainant. It is one thing to allege deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct, and another to demonstrate by evidence the specific acts constituting the same. - The letter, from respondents own admission, just served to officially confirm a done deal. It was, hence, utilized solely as documentary evidence to buttress respondents assertion regarding the existence of the agency agreement. (Respondent here is not suing by virtue of the letter of authority as what the Complainant is saying, but grounded on the oral contract of agency the two purportedly entered into.

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- Indeed, respondent, with or without the letter, could have instituted a suit against the complainant. There is no gainsaying that a verbal engagement is sufficient to create an attorney-client relationship. - Respondent can hardly be faulted and accused of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct for invoking the aid of the court in recovering recompense for legal services which he claims he undertook for the complainant, and which the latter does not deny to have benefited from. Indeed, what he did was a lawful exercise of a right. Disposition The disbarment complaint against respondent Atty. Magdaleno M. Pea is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit CORPUZ V CA DAVIDE; January 26, 1998 NATURE Petition to set aside the decision of CA which reversed the resolution of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), the latter declaring that petitioners separation from the service as Atty V in the MTRCB was not in order and directed that he be automatically restored to his position. FACTS - Atty Corpuz was appointed MTRCBs legal counsel Prosecutor and Investigation Services (Supervising Legal Staff Officer). The appointment was approved by the Asst Regional Director of the CSCNCR. Subsequently, he was designated Attorney V under the Salary Standardization Law. - August 1991, the MTRCB passed MTRCB Resolution No. 8-1-91 5 entitled "An Act To Declare The Appointments Of The Administrative And Subordinate Employees Of This Board As Null And Void." This undated resolution noted that the past and present Chairmen of the MTRCB had failed to submit for approval the appointments of administrative and subordinate employees to the MTRCB before forwarding them to the CSC, in violation of Section 5 of P.D. No. 876-A, and later, P.D. No. 1986. - CORPUZ was unaware of the promulgation of Resolution No. 8-1-91 as he was then on leave. The Resolution was likewise kept secret and it was only on 12 March 1993 that an announcement 8 of its contents was posted by an Ad Hoc Committee on the MTRCB bulletin board. This announcement invited the submission of any information concerning the appointments involved therein to the Committee. It appears, however, that nothing was immediately done to implement Resolution No. 8-1-91. - At the MTRCB meeting of 19 January 1993, MTRCB Chair Mendez was informed about Resolution No. 8-1-91. An Ad Hoc Committee composed of MTRCB members was then constituted to look into the appointments extended by former Chairman Morato, as well as the qualifications of the appointees. - The Committee resolved to recommend to the MTRCB the approval of the appointments, except that of Corpuz and seven others - On 27 July 1993, Corpuz and one Larry Rigor filed a complaint with the CSC requesting a formal investigation and hearing. In her comment to the complaint, Mendez stated that she discovered that the appointments extended by Morato were not submitted to the MTRCB for approval pursuant to Section 5(c) of P.D. No. 1986; hence to cure the defect, she submitted the appointments to the MTRCB. - On 31 August 1993, the CSC promulgated Resolution No. 93-3509 granting the MTRCB authority to fill up positions vacated in the agency due to appointments, which were not submitted to the MTRCB for approval. In the Resolution of the CSC dated December 23, 1993, they ruled that: The appointment of Atty. Corpuz, if defective, could have been the subject of a direct action for revocation or recall which may be brought to the Commission within a reasonable period of time after its approval. . . Since no such action was filed with the Commission, we can safely state that Corpuz had already acquired security of tenure in the said position. Hence, the Commission can not allow the current Board's disapproval of the said appointment to produce any effect. Atty. Corpuz can no longer be separated from the service except for cause and after observing the requirements of due process. - The MTRCB filed with us a special civil action for certiorari, which we referred to the CA in view of Republic Act No. 7902. In its decision, the CA declared null and void Resolution No. 93-5964 of the CSC, ruling that since the appointment of Corpuz was not approved by the MTRCB, the appointment was invalid and he could not invoke security of tenure. The record shows that the appointment of Corpuz was not approved by the Board, as mandated by PD 1986 Sec16. As such, he cannot invoke the security of tenure, even if he has rendered service for a number of years. - Corpuz filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. He then filed an instant petition under Rule 45 RoC and asked the Court to reverse the decision of CA on the ground that: THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE APPOINTMENT OF PETITIONER ATTY. DAVID B. CORPUZ DID NOT HAVE THE APPROVAL OF THE MTRCB BOARD WHICH IF NOT CORRECTED, IS TANTAMOUNT TO A VIOLATION OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO SECURITY OF TENURE - In his memorandum, he declared that he is no longer seeking reinstatement but for the continuity of his government service from the time he was illegally dismissed up to the time he was permanently employed with the Office of the Ombudsman. ISSUE WON Corpuz can invoke security of tenure HELD Ratio No, he cannot invoke security of tenure. Reasoning - There are two stages in the process of appointing MTRCB personnel, other than its Secretary, namely: (a) recommendation by the Chairman which is accomplished by the signing of the appointment paper, which is among his powers under Section 5(d); and (b) approval or disapproval by the MTRCB of the appointment. - It is long settled in the law of public offices and officers that where the power of appointment is absolute, and the appointee has been determined upon, no further consent or approval is necessary, and the formal evidence of the appointment, the commission, may issue at once. Where, however, the assent or confirmation of some other officer or body is required, the commission can issue or the appointment may be complete only when such assent or confirmation is obtained. In either case, the appointment becomes complete when the last act required of the appointing power is performed. Until the process is completed, the appointee can claim no vested right in the office nor invoke security of tenure. - A public official or employee who assumed office under an incomplete appointment is merely a de facto officer for the duration of his occupancy of the office for the reason that he assumed office under color of a known appointment which is void by reason of some defect or

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irregularity in its exercise. Undeniably, under the facts here, CORPUZ was such a de facto officer. Disposition WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of 13 October 1995 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP-No. 37694 is AFFIRMED. HILADO V DAVID TUASON;1949 NATURE Original action. Certiorari FACTS - Blandina Gamboa Hilado brought an action Against Selim Jacob Assad to annul the sale of several houses and lot executed by her now deceased husband during the Japanese occupation. - In the course of the case, Hilado consulted respondent Vicente J. Francisco with regard the case filed against Assad despite the fact that she had previously retained a different set of lawyers to act on her behalf. Francisco claims that at the time, he already advised her that her case cannot prosper on the basis of what was told him by her. - In any case, Hilado brought to his office documents related to the case. Francisco claims that these documents were received by his assistant. Atty Agrava. When advised of the same, he instructed Atty. Agrava to return the documents as the firm will not handle her case against Assad. - Atty Agrava thought that in returning the documents a proper explanation be made as to why the firm is not taking her case. Atty. Francisco signed the letter to Hilado without reading the same. - On January 28, 1946, Atty Francisco entered his appearance as attorney of record for Assad in the case instituted by Hilado. - On May 29, 1946, the lawyers of Hilado wrote Francisco urging him to discontinue representing Assad on the grounds that he was consulted by Hilado with regard to her case. and that during the consultation, certain documents were turned over to him. - When Francisco did not reply, Hilados lawyers, on her behalf, filed this original action. ISSUE WON Francisco should be disqualified from representing his clients against Hilado HELD Ratio - Yes. Based on the facts, a relationship of attorney and client between Francisco and Hilado ensued when he issued the written opinion to Hilado. The letter binds and estops him in acting for others against Hilado. Reasoning - The SC noted that it is in the interest in the administration of justice that lawyers are viewed without reproach in their actuations. Hence, even if it were true that what was given to Francisco were facts that were already public knowledge, there is no way of knowing if this was in fact the case. - In citing jurisprudence on the matter, the court held that a lawyer is engaged professionally when he is just in fact listening to a clients preliminary statement of his case or when he is giving advice thereon. That formality is not the essence of employment. - The fact that the action against Francisco was brought four months after he filed in appearing in the case does not operate as a waiver of Hilados right to ask for his disqualification. The confidence once reposed cannot be divested by expiration of professional employment. The Court also stated that in matters of the practice of law the jurisdiction of the court is pervasive. This flows from the fact that lawyers are officers of the court where they practice, forming a part of the machinery of the law for the administration of justice and as such are subject to the disciplinary authority of the court. - The Court then expounded on the nature of the retaining fee as a means of compensating the lawyer who was asked to give professional advise to the detriment of the lawyer not being able to act as counsel for the other side, even if he has declined to perform the services required by the original client. The fee is separate from the fee that a client is obligated to pay the lawyer for the services which he was retained to perform. GENATO V SILAPAN PUNO, July 14, 2003 NATURE Complaint for disbarment FACTS Complainants Side - July 1992, respondent allegedly asked the complainant if he could rent a small office space in complainants building in Quezon City for his law practice. Complainant acceded and introduced respondent to Atty. Benjamin Dacanay, complainants retained lawyer, who accommodated respondent in the building and made him handle some of complainants cases. - Respondent borrowed two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) from complainant which he intended to use as down payment for the purchase of a new car. In return, respondent issued to complainant a postdated check in the amount of P176,528.00 to answer for the six (6) months interest on the loan. He likewise mortgaged to complainant his house and lot in Quezon City but did not surrender its title claiming that it was the subject of reconstitution proceedings before the Quezon City Register of Deeds. - The respondent bought the car but the document of sale was issued in the complainants name and financed through City Trust Company. - January 1993: respondent introduced to complainant a certain Emmanuel Romero who wanted to borrow money from complainant. Complainant lent Romero the money and, from this transaction, respondent earned commission in the amount of P52,289.90. Complainant used the commission to pay respondents arrears with the car financing firm. - Subsequently, respondent failed to pay the amortization on the car and the financing firm sent demand letters to complainant. Complainant tried to encash respondents postdated check with the drawee bank but it was dishonored as respondents account therein was already closed. - Respondent failed to heed complainants repeated demands for payment. Complainant then filed a criminal case against respondent for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and a civil case for judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage. - In the foreclosure case, the respondent alleged that the complainant is engaged in buy and sell of deficiency taxed imported cars, shark loans and shady deals, and has many cases pending in court, which the

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complainant denied, adding that the allegations were libelous and were irrelevant to the foreclosure case. A particular allegation states that in one case, the complainant would only give the respondent the document of sale of the car if the latter would bribe the review committee of the DOJ for a case of the complainant. According to the complainant, the allegation was, aside from being false, immaterial to the foreclosure case and maliciously designed to defame him, the respondent was also guilty of breaking their confidential lawyer-client relationship and should be held administratively liable. - the complainant then filed this complaint for disbarment, praying also that an administrative sanction be meted against respondent for his issuance of a bouncing check Respondents Side - It was complainant who offered him an office space in his building and retained him as counsel as the latter was impressed with the way he handled a B.P. 22 case filed against complainant. - There was nothing libelous in his imputations of dishonest business practices to complainant and his revelation of complainants desire to bribe government officials in relation to his pending criminal case. He claimed to have made these statements in the course of judicial proceedings to defend his case and discredit complainants credibility by establishing his criminal propensity to commit fraud, tell lies and violate laws. He argued that he is not guilty of breaking his confidential lawyerclient relationship with complainant as he made the disclosure in defense of his honor and reputation. - Respondent asserted that he executed the real estate mortgage in favor of complainant without consideration and only as a formal requirement so he could obtain the P200,000.00 loan and for this reason, he did not surrender his title over the mortgaged property to complainant. - Respondent claimed that he issued the postdated check, not for account or for value, but only: (a) to serve as some kind of acknowledgment that he already received in advance a portion of his attorneys fees from the complainant for the legal services he rendered, and (b) as a form of assurance that he will not abandon the cases he was handling for complainant. - Respondent denied that he received a P52,289.90 commission from Romeros loan which he allegedly helped facilitate, alleging that the amount paid to him was for attorneys fees. He used this amount to pay his arrears with the car financing firm. On January 29, 1993, before paying the next amortization on the car, he asked complainant to execute a deed of sale transferring ownership of the car to him. Complainant refused and insisted that he would transfer ownership of the car only after the termination of his criminal case which respondent was handling as his defense lawyer. Consequently, respondent stopped paying the amortization on the car. Respondent also alleged that he filed a perjury case against complainant who, in turn, filed a complaint for libel against him. - October 27, 1993: the Court referred the administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. - August 3, 2002, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved the report of the investigating commissioner finding the respondent guilty as charged and recommending his suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year. ISSUES 1. WON the court has the jurisdiction to sanction respondent for his issuance of the bouncing check 2. WON the respondent committed a breach of trust and confidence by imputing to complainant illegal practices and disclosing complainants alleged intention to bribe government officials in connection with a pending case, and thus would be sanctioned HELD 1. NO, it is not for the Court to sanction respondent for his issuance of a bouncing check, which would be determined by the trial court. Ratio We shall not delve into the merits of the various criminal and civil cases pending between the parties. It is for the trial courts handling these cases to ascertain the truth or falsity of the allegations made therein. 2. YES, respondents allegations and disclosures in the foreclosure case amount to a breach of fidelity sufficient to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against him. Ratio A lawyer must conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients, with integrity in a manner that is beyond reproach. His relationship with his clients should be characterized by the highest degree of good faith and fairness. Reasoning Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. The longestablished rule is that an attorney is not permitted to disclose communications made to him in his professional character by a client, unless the latter consents. -The obligation to preserve the confidences and secrets of a client arises at the inception of their relationship. The protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the partys ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client. -However, the privilege against disclosure of confidential communications or information is limited only to communications which are legitimately and properly within the scope of a lawful employment of a lawyer. It does not extend to those made in contemplation of a crime or perpetration of a fraud. If the unlawful purpose is avowed, as in this case, the complainants alleged intention to bribe government officials in relation to his case, the communication is not covered by the privilege as the client does not consult the lawyer professionally. It is not within the profession of a lawyer to advise a client as to how he may commit a crime as a lawyer is not a gun for hire. Thus, the attorney-client privilege does not attach, there being no professional employment in the strict sense. -The disclosures were not indispensable to protect his rights as they were not pertinent to the foreclosure case. It was improper for the respondent to use it against the complainant in the foreclosure case as it was not the subject matter of litigation therein and respondents professional competence and legal advice were not being attacked in said case. Disposition IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Essex L. Silapan is ordered suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective upon receipt of this Decision. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The Court Administrator is directed to circulate this order of suspension to all courts in the country. SO ORDERED.

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DOMINGO V AQUINO TEEHANKEE; April 29, 1971 NATURE An original action for certiorari challenging a judgment of the Court of Appeals as null and void for having been allegedly entered in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion. FACTS Asuncion Domingo Sta. Maria and Atty. Luis Domingo, Jr. were appointed co-special administrators of the estate of Luis Domingo, Sr. Pedro Aquino filed a money claim on the estate. CFI approved the money claim of Aquino. Both parties appealed to the CA. CA affirmed CFI judgment with modifications in favor of Aquino (allowed compounded interest). The estate's counsel in the CA, Atty. Jose A. Unson, did not receive the notice and copy of the judgment sent to him by registered mail; but the estate's attorneys in the intestate proceedings pending in the lower court, Attys. Primicias, Del Castillo and Macaraeg, were verbally informed by respondent's counsel of the judgment. Consuelo Domingo de Lopez filed on March 9, 1967, with the CA an "Appearance with Motions for Substitution and to be served with a copy of the Judgment," stating that Asuncion Domingo Sta. Maria had long resigned as special administratrix with the permission of the intestate court, that Atty. Luis Domingo, Jr. (who had caused the prosecution of the appeal) was removed from his trust by the intestate court, for having squandered cash funds of the estate, that, as a consequence, she was appointed judicial administratrix and has since been administering the estate alone; that as judicial administratrix, she wished to file a motion for reconsideration and that the clerk of court be directed to serve copy of said judgment on her counsel instead of on Atty. Unson and praying that as present judicial administratrix, she be substituted in lieu of the former joint administrators and that her counsel be served with copy of the CAs decision. CA denied motion for reconsideration. After almost 5 mos. and after respondent had filed in the intestate court a motion for execution of the judgment, petitioner filed this petition alleging that CA decision was entered in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion. This was opposed by Aquino on the ground of finality. ISSUE WON CAs decision has become final HELD YES Ratio CA decision has become final and executory in accordance with the Rules of Court and since no appeal was filed. Reasoning Motion for reconsideration was filed out of time and delay was without legal basis. Petitioners motion for substitution filed with the appellate court after its decision recognized the fact that the appellate court had already duly handed down its adverse decision and petitioner merely expressed her wish to belatedly file a motion for reconsideration on behalf of the petitioner estate. She was apparently resigned to the futility of filing any such motion, in view of the finality of the appellate court's decision for such motion was never filed. She cannot use as an excuse the substitution of administrators/counsels. The records at bar amply show that Atty. Jose A. Unson was the counsel on record of the petitioner estate in the appellate court and never filed any withdrawal as such counsel. He was representing the estate and not the administrator, Luis Domingo, Jr., so that even after latters removal, the former remains to be counsel of estate. No withdrawal as counsel or petition for change of counsel was filed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Notice and copy of the CA's decision were duly served by registered mail on the estate's counsel of record at his address of record in accordance with Rule 13, section 8 of the Rules of Court. And in accordance with said Rule, service by registered mail of the appellate court's decision upon the petitioner's counsel of record was deemed completed and effected upon the addressee's failure to claim his mail on the fifth day after the first notice of the postmaster. The present administratrix gives no satisfactory explanation as to her failure to substitute herself vice Luis Domingo, Jr., since the latter's removal or to then engage new counsel vice Atty. Unson in the appellate court. Disposition Petition dismissed; petitioners counsel shall pay treble costs for falsely representing to the SC that the CA had granted new and further relief to Aquino when, in fact, he had duly prayed for the relief awarded and for filing unmeritorious cases that clog the court dockets; writ of preliminary injunction issued on Nov. 7, 1967 is dissolved. MONTANO V IBP KAPUNAN, May 21, 2001 FACTS - Montano hired the services of Atty. Dealca as his counsel in collaboration with Atty. Gerona in a case pending before the Court of Appeals wherein the complainant was the plaintiff-appellant. - The parties agreed upon attorneys fees in the amount of P15,000, 50% of which was payable upon acceptance of the case and the remaining balance upon the termination of the case. Accordingly, complainant paid respondent the amount of P7,500 - Even before Atty. Dealca had prepared the appellants brief and contrary to their agreement that the remaining balance be payable after the termination of the case, Atty. Dealca demanded an additional payment from complainant. - Complainant obliged by paying the amount of P4,000. - Prior to the filing of the appellants brief, Atty. Dealca again demand payment of the remaining balance of 3,500. - When complainant was unable to do so, lawyer withdrew his appearance as complainants counsel without his prior knowledge and/or conformity. - Montano claimed that such conduct exceeded the ethical standards of the law profession and prays that the latter be sternly dealt with administratively. Complainant later on filed motions praying for the imposition of the maximum penalty of disbarment. - IBP conducted investigation, report and recommendation. It found respondent counsel guilty of unprofessional conduct and recommended that he be severely reprimanded. - IBP Board of Governors resolved that the penalty be amended to 3 months suspension from the practice of law. - Atty. Dealca sought reconsideration saying: > Complainant went to him just to prepare and submit complainants appellants brief on time at the agreed fee of P15,000.00, 50% down and 50% upon its completion > He was able to finish the appellants brief ahead of its deadline, so he advised the complainant about its completion with the request that the remaining balance of P7,500.00 be

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paid. > Complainant paid P4,000.00 only, promising to pay the P3,500.00 tomorrow or on later particular date. This promise-non-payment cycle went on repeatedly until the last day of the filing of the brief. > Even without being paid completely, he, of his own free will and accord, filed complainants brief on time; Such P3,500.00 remains unpaid until now ISSUE WON Atty. Dealcas conduct just and proper HELD No. We find Atty. Dealcas conduct unbecoming of a member of the legal profession. - Under Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice appropriate in the circumstances. - Although he may withdraw his services when the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services, under the circumstances of the present case, Atty. Dealcas withdrawal was unjustified as complainant did not deliberately fail to pay him the attorneys fees. In fact, complainant exerted honest efforts to fulfill his obligation. - Rule 20.4 of Canon 20, mandates that a lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his compensation and shall resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. - Only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the bar will disbarment be imposed as a penalty. It should never be decreed where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, would accomplish the end desired. Reprimand is deemed sufficient. OBANDO V FIGUERAS NARVASA; 1990 NATURE Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the RoC, seeking to annul a Decision of the CA which affirmed dismissal, without prejudice, of Petitioner Felizardo Obandos action for annulment of contract and reconveyance earlier ordered by the RTC of QC. FACTS - 1964: Alegria Figueras and her stepsons Eduardo and Francisco filed a Petition for settlement of the intestate estate of her deceased husband Jose Figueras. - pending settlement of the estate, Alegria died. Eduardo assumed administration of the joint estates of Jose and Alegria. - Eduardo was served a Petition for Probate of what purported to be Alegrias Last Will and Testament, filed by Felizardo Obando, Alegrias nephew (herein petitioner) - the alleged Will bequeathed to Obando properties left by the Figueras couple, including 2 parcels of land in Quezon City. - Probate case was consolidated with the intestate proceedings, and Obando was appointed as Eduardos co-administrator of the joint estates. - upon investigation, the NBI found the Will was a forgery, which led to the conviction of Obando for estafa through falsification of a public document - 1990: probate court denied Eduardos Motion for authority to sell the parcels of land. Despite denial, he sold the lots to Amigo Realty Corporation, on the strength of an Order issued by the probate court in 1991. New titles were issued in the name of Amigo Realty. - 1992: Petitioner Obando, as co-administrator and universal heir of Alegria, filed Complaint against Eduardo and Amigo Realty (respondents), for the nullification of the sale. - 1997: the probate court removed Obando from his office as coadministrator. - Consequently, respondents filed Motion to Dismiss, based on Obandos loss of his legal standing to pursue the case. - 1993: Trial Court granted the Motion and dismissed the civil case - Petitioner Obando filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Denied. - CA dismissed Obandos Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus - rejected Obandos contention: that he did not lose his legal personality to prosecute the civil case, since there was no categorical statement that the purported will was a forgery, and its probate was still pending - affirmed the dismissal of the action because the probate courts Order alluded to the fact that the Will was a forgery. - that the probate of the Will had not been decided on the merits did not change the fact that the probate court had removed Petitioner Obando as co-administrator. Petitioners' Claim -Assignment of Errors: Simply stated, the following issues are raised by the petitioners: (1) whether the trial court could act on a motion filed by a lawyer who was allegedly no longer Eduardo's counsel of record; (2) whether a motion to dismiss filed after the responsive pleadings were already made can still be granted; (3) whether the conviction of Petitioner Obando for estafa through falsification and the revocation of his appointment as administrator, both of which are on appeal, constitute sufficient grounds to dismiss the civil case; and (4) whether there was a conflict between the Order dismissing the civil case and the previous actions of the trial court. ISSUES 1. WON the trial court could act on a motion filed by a lawyer who was allegedly no longer Eduardo's counsel of record 2. WON a motion to dismiss filed after the responsive pleadings were already made can still be granted 3. WON that it was premature for the trial court to dismiss the civil case because Obando's conviction for estafa through falsification was still on appeal 4. WON trial court whimsically and capriciously departed from its previous rulings when, in its Resolution dated February 11, 1993, it granted Eduardo's later Motion to Dismiss HELD 1. the lawyer was still Eduardos counsel of record. Ratio Representation continues until the court dispenses with the services of counsel in accordance with Section 26, Rule 138 of RoC. Counsel may be substituted only with the ff requisites: (1) new counsel files a written application for Substitution; (2) the clients written consent is obtained; (3) the written consent of the lawyer to be substituted is secured

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Reasoning Eduardo did not dismiss his Atty (Yuseco). The Motion to Dismiss was beneficial to respondent Eduardo, he had no reason to complain. At the discretion of the court, an atty. who has been dismissed by a client is allowed to intervene in a case in order to protect the clients rights. In this case, any irregularity should have been raised by respondent Eduardo, and not the petitioners. 2. YES Ratio if the plaintiff loses his capacity to sue during the pendency of the case, as in the present controversy, the defendant should be allowed to file a motion to dismiss, even after the lapse of the reglementary period for filing a responsive pleading. Reasoning The period to file a motion to dismiss depends upon the circumstances of the case. Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court requires that, in general, a motion to dismiss should be filed within the reglementary period for filing a responsive pleading. However, even after an answer has been filed, the Court has allowed a defendant to file a motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction,22 (2) litis pendentia,23 (3) lack of cause of action,24 and (4) discovery during trial of evidence that would constitute a ground for dismissal.25 Except for lack of cause of action or lack of jurisdiction, the grounds under Section 1 of Rule 16 may be waived. If a particular ground for dismissal is not raised or if no motion to dismiss is filed at all within the reglementary period, it is generally considered waived under Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules.26 - the respondents did not waive their right to move for the dismissal of the civil case based Petitioner Obando's lack of legal capacity. It was only after he had been convicted of estafa through falsification that the probate court divested him of his representation of the Figueras estates. It was only then that this ground became available to the respondents. Hence, it could not be said that they waived it by raising it in a Motion to Dismiss filed after their Answer was submitted. Verily, if the plaintiff loses his capacity to sue during the pendency of the case, as in the present controversy, the defendant should be allowed to file a motion to dismiss, even after the lapse of the reglementary period for filing a responsive pleading. 3. NO. Ratio When an appointment as co-administrator of an estate is revoked by a probate court, a final conviction in a criminal case has nothing to do with such revocation. Reasoning This argument has no bearing at all on the dismissal of the civil case. Petitioner Obando derived his power to represent the estate of the deceased couple from his appointment as co-administrator.27 When the probate court removed him from office, he lost that authority. Since he lacked the legal capacity to sue on behalf of the Figueras estates, he could not continue prosecuting the civil case.28 Thus the trial court properly granted the Motion to Dismiss on this ground.29 Whether a final conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is necessary to remove him from his administration is not a proper issue in this Petition. He should raise the matter in his appeal of the Decision removing him from administration of the Figueras estates. 4. NO. There is no conflict between these court rulings. Reasoning they were based on different grounds. The first Motion to Dismiss was denied because, at the time, Petitioner Obando still had legal capacity to sue as co-administrator of the Figueras estates. The second Motion was granted because the probate court had already removed him from his office as co-administrator. The change in his legal capacity accounts for the difference in the adjudication of the trial court. Disposition the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. 68. People vs. Sandiganbayan Facts: Petitioner wished to discharge Generoso Sansaet as state witness, an attorney who served as counsel for one Paredes, provincial attorney of Agusan del Sur and then governor Case against Paredes was for fraudulent misrepresentation in his application of free patent over land at Rosario Public Land Subdivision Survey o Violation of section 3(a) of RA 3019 Pending such case for perjury and graft, taxpayer Teofilo Gelacio prayed 3 respondents be investigated (inc. Honradoclerk of court and acting stenographer of Municipal Circuit Trial Court) o Falsified documents making it appear that since perjury case had already been dismissed, filing a graft case would constitute double jeopardy o Sansaet testified that he was induced by Paredes

Issue: WON Sansaets projected testimony is barred by the attorneyclient privilege Held: NO, facts surrounding case constitute exception to the rule Ratio: privileged confidentiality does not apply to crimes which the client intends to commit in the future the communications made to him by physical acts and/or accompanying words of Parades at the time he and Honrada, either with the active or passive participation of Sansaet, were about to falsify, or in the process of falsifying, the documents which were later filed in the Tanodbayan by Sansaet and culminated in the criminal charges now pending in respondent Sandiganbayan Sansaet was himself a co-conspirator in the falsification o Privilege will only attach if it is for a lawful purpose or lawful end However, Sansaet was discharged as state witness because he has a co-conspirator to the crime committed. 69. Regala vs. Sandiganbayan Facts Raul Roco and his colleagues from the ACCRA Law Office were charged together with Eduardo Conjuangco for acquiring ill-gotten wealth. The PCGG based its charge from the refusal of the law firm to divulge information as to who had been involved in PCGG Case No. 0033, despite the nature of the services performed by ACCRA (e.g. the law firm knows the assets, personal transactions, and business dealings of their clients). Later, the PCGG amended the complaint, resulting in the exclusion of Roco from the list of defendants. Such exclusion was based from the manifestation of Roco that he would identify the persons and stockholders involved in the said PCGG case.

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a) The law firm petitioned for the PCGG to grant them the same treatment as what had been accorded to Roco. It was only at this point that the PCGG answered with a set of requirements and conditions for exclusion which were: 1) disclosure of the identity of the clients 2) 3) submission of documents purporting to the substantiation of the lawyer-client relationship presentation of the deeds of assignments which the lawyers executed in favor of its clients, covering the shareholdings of the latter revealing the name of a client would implicate the latter in the very activity for which he sought the advice of the lawyer the disclosure would expose the client to civil liability the content of the client communication is relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which the client seeks legal assistance

b) c)

the case of the prosecution must be built upon evidence gathered by them from their own sources, not from compelled testimony requiring them to reveal information prejudicial to their client the confidentiality privilege extends even after the termination of the lawyer-client relationship

To bolster this set-up, the PCGG presented supposed proof to the effect that Roco had complied with such conditions The 1st Division of the Sandiganbayan denied the petition of ACCRA.

Issue/s 1) whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in not giving the law firm equal treatment as that of Roco despite the fact that the confession of Roco did not really reveal the information being asked by the PCGG 2) 3) whether or not the Sandiganbayan strictly applied the concept of agency whether or not the Sandiganbayan did not uphold the sanctity of the lawyer-client relationship

70. Lantoria vs. Bunyi Facts: Cesar Lantoria sought disciplinary action against Bunyi, counsel for Mrs. Constancia Mascarinas in certain civil cases allegedly committed acts of "graft and corruption, dishonesty and conduct unbecoming of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and corruption of the judge (Vicente Galicia of Esperanza, Agusan del Sur) and bribery o in cases for ejectment of squatters in Mascarinas land, Bunyi allegedly was the one who prepared the decisions and judge simply signed them Issue: WON Bunyi is guilty of unethical conduct Held: YES Ratio: letters show that he indeed prepared draft decisions for the judge to sign o does not matter if it was clearly shown that the judge consented to such act or even asked for it violated canon 3: attempts to exert personal influence on the court violated: CANON 13 A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court. Rule 13.01 A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for, cultivating familiarity with judges.

Resolution 1) yes violation of the equal protection clause 2) no 3) yes violation of the confidentiality privilege

Rationale 1) the inclusion of the ACCRA lawyers was merely being used as a leverage to compel them to name their clients classifying persons as to those who can give valuable information apart from those who cannot is not a valid classification espoused by the equal protection clause 2) an attorney is more than a mere agent or servant because he possesses special powers of trust and confidence reposed on him by his client as a general rule, the identity of the client should not be shrouded with mystery, as a requirement of due process, except when :

SUSPENDED FOR A YEAR. 71. Ombac vs. Rayos Facts: petition for disbarment filed by Mrs. Irene Rayos-Ombac against her nephew, Atty. Orlando A. Rayos, a legal practitioner in Metro Manila, for "his failure to adhere to the

3)

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standards of mental and moral fitness set up for members of the bar Atty. Rayos induced 85 year old Mrs. Ombac to withdraw all her bank deposits and entrust them to him for safekeeping o if she withdraws all her money in the bank, they will be excluded from the estate of her deceased husband and his other heirs will be precluded from inheriting part of it o withdraw Php 588,000 o advised complainant to deposit the money with Union Bank where he was working. He also urged her to deposit the money in his name to prevent the other heirs of her husband from tracing the same o offered to pay 2 second hand cars and Php 40,000 DISBARRED.

73. Licuanan vs. Melo Facts: Atty. Manuel Melo for breach of professional ethics o Was counsel for Licuanan in an ejectment case filed against her tenant o Failed to turn over collected rentals o Did not even report the receipt of such rentals o Only returned such when Licuanan demanded it from him o Defense: he wanted to surprise her of his success in collecting the rentals

Issue: WON respondent violated Code of Professional responsibility Held: Yes Ratio: he deceived his 85-year old aunt into entrusting to him all her money, and later refused to return the same despite demand aggravated by the series of unfounded suits he filed against complainant to compel her to withdraw the disbarment case she filed against him

Issue: WON Melo breached professional ethics Held: Yes.

Ratio: violated:

DISBARRED. 72. Daroy vs. Legaspi Facts: Attorney Ramon Chaves was charged with malpractice for having misappropriated the sum of four thousand pesos which he had collected for them. (from sale of coconut land) prayed that the respondent be disbarred. 1 o (He was 59 years old in 1974. He passed the 1954 bar examinations with a rating of 75.75%). o Was hired to represent petitioners in the intestate proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the spouses Aquilino Gonzaga and Paz Velez-Gonzaga

11. DEALING WITH TRUST PROPERTY The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client. Money of the client or collected for the client of other trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly, and should not under any circumstance be commingled with his own or be used by him. * Licuanan was then compelled to file groundless suits(moral turpitude) against her tenant (Pineda). <new lawyer for Licuanan was Atty. Jacinto>

Issue: WON lawyer is guilty of wrongful conduct charged Held: Yes Ratio: respondent made it appear that the said sum of P4,000 was going to be withdrawn on "December 8, 1969 at nine o'clock when in fact he already withdrew such amount guilty of deceit, malpractice and professional misconduct for having misappropriated the funds of his clients

DISBARRED. 74. Navarro vs. Meneses Navarro in behalf of and for Pan-Asia International Commodities Inc Facts:

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Atty Meneses was charged with: 1) malpractice and gross misconduct unbecoming a public defender; (2) dereliction of duty, by violating his oath to do everything within his power to protect his client's interest; (3) willful abandonment; and (4) loss of trust and confidence, due to his continued failure to account for the amount of P50,000.00 entrusted to him to be paid to a certain complainant for the amicable settlement of a pending case received Php 50, 000 from Arthur Bretania to settle case with one Gleason but never really appropriated such amount to the amicable settlement of the case The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client. Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly and should not under any circumstance be comingled with his own or be used by him. Issue: WON lawyer breach Code SUSPENDED FOR 6 MONTHS AND WARNED Held: Yes 76. Quilban vs. Robinol (repeat case) Ratio: 77. Cruz vs. Jacinto RTC records did not show any motion to dismiss case despite claimed out-of-court-settlement with money involved Amicable settlement was not settled and finalized Violated Rule 16.01 of canon 16: a lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from his client Facts A certain Concepcion Padilla requested a P285,000 loan from the Cruz spouses through Atty. Ernesto Jacinto. The spouses, believing the representation of their lawyer that Padilla was a good risk, authorized Jacinto to prepare the necessary documents for the registration of the Real Estate Mortgage as a security of the loan in favor of the couple. When the loan became due, Padilla was nowhere to be found. Later it was discovered that the mortgage had for its object a fake TCT. Estrella Palipada (secretary of Jacinto) testified that she was instructed by Jacinto to notarize the mortgage by signing the name of Atty. Ricardo Neri. His housemaid Avegail Payos also admitted that she simulated the signature of Emmanuel Gimarino (Deputy Register Of Deeds) upon the command of her amo. as for the contingent fees, it was shown that he had been collecting 60 percent instead of 50 no sufficient evidence as regards 2nd charge

DISBARRED. 75. Tanhuenco vs. de dumo (a) (b) de dumo allegedly violated Canons in his: refusal to remit to her money collected by him from debtors of the complainant; and refusal to return documents entrusted to him as counsel of complainant in certain collection cases. borrowed different amounts from Tanhuenco on 3 separate occasions but didnt pay for them collected 12,500 from debtor Maosca but didnt remit it to Tanhueco defenses: denied having borrowed money, 12000 he retained as his attorneys fees with Tanhueco refused to pay him

Issue/s whether or not Jacinto committed malpractice

Issue: WON he breached Canon Held: Yes Ratio: violated canon 11: 11. Dealing with trust property.

Resolution malamang !!! suspended from the practice of law for 6 months

Rationale 1) business transactions between an attorney and his client are disfavored and discouraged by the policy of law no presumption of innocence or improbability of wrongdoing is considered in an attorneys favor

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2) a higher standard of good faith is required of a lawyer when he engages in business dealings this is because his position gives him an advantage which he might abuse Issue/s whether or not Ruste committed malpractice

Resolution yes suspended from the practice of law for 1 year 78. Rubias vs. Batiller Facts: one Militante sold a piece of land to Atty. Rubias ( his counsel in a land registration case involving the very same land sold here) when defendant, Batiller had better right over it because of actual possession years before Militante sold such land

Rationale whether the deed of sale in question was executed at the instance of the spouses driven by financial necessity (as contended by Ruste) or at their behest (as contended by the couple) is immaterial in either case, the lawyer occupies a vantage position to press upon or dictate his terms to a harrassed client 80. Go Beltran vs. Fernandez

Decision: purchase by a lawyer of the property in litigation from his client is categorically prohibited by Article 1491, paragraph (5) of the Philippine Civil Code plaintiff's purchase of the property in litigation from his client (assuming that his client could sell the same since as already shown above, his client's claim to the property was defeated and rejected) was void and could produce no legal effect, by virtue of Article 1409, paragraph (7) of our Civil Code which provides that contracts "expressly prohibited or declared void by law' are "inexistent and that "(T)hese contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set up the defense of illegality be waived." Facts Honorio Pajaron and Natividad Ypan-Pajaron conveyed two parcels of land to Gerardo Go Beltran. The sellers maintain that Lot C was not part of the plan, but Go Beltran had already attached a sketch to the plan which included Lot C. This misunderstanding as to the identity of the lot became the cause of action of both parties in a series of civil and criminal cases they filed against each other. Ehile the criminal suit was pending appeal, Inocentes Fernandez (counsel for the spouses) purchased Lot C.

Issue/s whether or not Fernandez committed malpractice Sale to Rubias voided. 79. In re Ruste Facts Melchor Ruste appeared as counsel for the San Juan spouses in a cadastral proceeding. An 11/12 share of the estate was adjudged in her favor. Ruste demanded for his fees. The couple did not have enough money to pay him, so he asked them to execute in his favor a contract of sale of their share of Lot No. 3764, intending to apply a portion of the would-be proceeds as payment for his fees. The spouses complied. On 21 March 1931, the land was sold to Ong Chua. The P 375 payment of Chua through Ruste never reached the hands of the San Juan couple. Resolution yes suspended from the practice of law for 6 months

Rationale Article 1459 Civil Code 81. Laig vs. Ca facts: Galero was able to obtain land which he sold to one Mario Escuta becoz such alienation allegedly violated section 118 of Public Land act o Laig was lawyer for Galero Galero then sold land to Laig for Php1500 plus attorneys fees

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When Laig died, wife noticed that tile to land was still not transferred to husbands name.filed for such transfer Pending such application, Galero however sold the land to Carmen verzon for 600 pesos 2) it is true that the NBI found the signature of Daroy to have been forged, but notary public Erasmo Damasing affirmed that Daroy and his wife signed the document before him in his presence

Decision: Mrs. Laig has better right over land for having acquired it in good faith o Verzo was landlady of Atty. Laig when latter bought land from Galero o Her sister witnessed said sale o Baldomero Lapak was also in bad faith Knowing of the existence in his records of the original of OCT No. 1097, Baldomero Lapak effected the issuance of the second duplicate of OCT No. 1097 to Petre Galero in just four (4) days, dispensing with the requirements of notice and hearing to interested parties 1. his son Jose was the notary public of sale between Verzo and Galero

Daroy had the burden of proving that the signature was not his even the NBI personnel who investigated the signatures was not
presented before the court to give their testimony

83. Cantiller vs. Potenciano Potenciano is charged with deceit, fraud, and misrepresentation, and also with gross misconduct, malpractice and of acts unbecoming of an officer of the court. Cantiller sisters impliedly contracted services or Potenciano after they lost in an ejectment case Asked 2000 to give to a judge who could issue restraining order 10,000 to be deposited with treasurer as purchase price of apartment prepared a "[h]astily prepared, poorly conceived, and haphazardly composed 3 petition for annulment of judgment

Lapaks: disciplined. Not mentioned how. Decision: GUILTY 82. Daroy vs. Abecia Facts Atty. Esteban Abecia, counsel for Regalado Daroy, was able to obtain a favorable judgement in the ejectment case that they filed. To satisfy the monetary considerations of the judgement, the sheriff auctioned a parcel of land belonging to one of the defendants, with Daroy as the highest bidder. Daroy claimed that the affixed signature on the Deed Of Sale that covered the said parcel of land was forged by Abecia. Daroy avers that Abecia did this to have the land sold to Jose Gangay, which the latter would then sell to Nena Abecia (his wife). Abecia responded that it was Daroy who sold the land to Gangay, which the latter then happened to sell to Nena. Issue/s whether or not Abecia is guilty of malpractice Resolution no case for disnarment is dismissed Rationale 1) the prohibition set forth by Article 1491 of the Civil Code does not apply to the sale of the property of the client to his counsel if the property was not the subject of litigation first duty was to file best pleading within his capability depended on his closeness to judge to get desired decision extorted 10,000 from client as deposit but deposit was not required and such was also not made failed to exercise due diligence in protecting his clients interest 4 days before hearing of preliminary injunction, he already withdrew as counsel (frequent attacks of pain due to hemorrhoids) o did not find replacement, did not inform client

INDEFINITE SUSPENSION 84. People vs Ingco Facts Atty. Alfredo Barrios was appointed as counsel de officio for Gaudencio Ingco. The latter was sentenced to death for the crime of rape with homicide. The high tribunal, in a resolution concerning the said case, asks for an explanation from Barrios as to why he incurred a 15-day delay in the filing of the motion for the extension for the filing of the brief of his client. Barrios answered that he was busy in the preaparation of the pleadings of another client, and that his schedule was fully booked for appearances in different courts, mostly in the provinces.

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Issue/s whether the delay incurred by Barrios is tantamount to negligence which exposes him to the disciplinary power of the court Resolution yes severe reprimand Rationale The mere fact that the counsel de oficio has an extensive practice that required him to appear in provincial courts does not lessen the degree of care required of him in defending an impoverished litigant 85. Alisbo vs. Jalandoon Facts: Jalandoon was former counsel for Alisbo spouses o to recover his share of the estate of the deceased spouses Catalina Sales and Restituto Gozuma which had been adjudicated to him o complaint was dismissed but it was discovered that Jalandoon was former legal counsel of Carlito Sales, adversary in the probate proceedings violation of sub-paragraphs (e) and (f) of Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines.

e. when the affidavit he prepared for complainants but subsequently crossed-out was submitted as evidence against complainants in the motion for reinvestigation f. when he sent a letter to the fiscal saying that his name was being adversely affected by the false affidavits of complainants and for that reason, respondent was contemplating to file a criminal and civil action for damages against them. asked respondent to prepare an affidavit to be used as basis for a complaint to be filed against Mrs. Rowena Soriano and Robert Leonido as a consequence of the latter's unauthorized entry into complainants' dwelling *Roberts name was not included in first document)

Decision: suspended for a year furnished the adverse parties in a certain criminal case with a copy of their discarded affidavit, thus enabling them to use it as evidence against complainants was partial to the adverse parties as he even tried to dissuade complainants from filing charges against Robert Leonido (lawyer is counsel for Robertos brother; also classmate of adverse partys lawyer)

Decision: suspension for 2 years betrayed his client Ramon Alisbo's trust and did not champion his cause with that wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion that a lawyer is obligated to give to every case that he accepts from a client

87. Quilban vs. Robinol (repeat case) 88. Legarda vs. CA Facts: Atty. Coronel was Victoria Legardas lawyer when new Cathay House filed an action for specific performance and damages against her. o To compel Legarda to sign a lease contract which Cathay intended to use for a resto o Lawyer failed to file an appeal therefrom within reglemetary period o Did not make an appeal from CA decision o When Cathay house sent notice to Legarda for her to vacate property in 3 days, lawyer did not inform client

1. He did not verify the real status of Ramon Alisbo before filing the case. Otherwise, his lack of capacity to sue would not have been at issue. 2. He postponed the motion to revive judgment and gave way instead to a motion to resolve pending incidents in Civil Case 4963. In doing so, he frittered away precious time. 3. He dropped Ramon Alisbo's co-plaintiffs and impleaded them as defendants. Otherwise, the complaint would have been defective only in part. used his position as Alisbo's counsel precisely to favor his other client, Carlito Sales, by delaying Alisbo's action to revive the judgment in his favor and thereby deprive him of the fruits of his judgment which Attorney Jalandoon, as Sales' counsel, had vigorously opposed did not immediately take action regarding Ramons insanity

Decision: suspended for 6 months violated Canon 18: a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence violated rule 18.03: shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable By neglecting to file the answer to the complaint against petitioner, he set off the events which resulted in the deprivation of petitioner's rights over her house and lot

86. Ngayan vs. Tugarde Facts:

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Coronel is a dean of a law school. Hmm, which one? 89. Reontoy vs. Ibadlit Facts:

for having been negligent in handling her case for partition, accounting and reconveyance then pending with the RTC-Br. 4, Kalibo, Aklan. 1 filed notice of appeal only on July 17, 1989 when due date was July 4 defense: Proculo Tomazar, complainants brother, was asked to inform complainant about adverse decision and futility of any possible appeal

91. Wack Wack Golf and Country Club vs. CA Facts: Balcoff, Poblador and Angel C. Cruz represented Wack-Wack in a case filed against it by former employees (Arcangel and Bernardo) for: o a money claim for overtime services rendered to said employer, o for unenjoyed vacation leave, o moral damages and o attorney's fees Said lawyers did not appear in court on May 12 working on the assumption that they had already been released by the Club and that office of Juan Chuidian was now handling case (however, such substitution was only formally effected and recognized by court on May 14, 1955). Because of such failure to appear in court, plaintiffs were allowed to present evidence even without defendant. Suntay of Chuidian office appeared for old counsel to secure postponement.

Decision: suspended for a year was shown that brother was not given authority to communicate with counsel about case when complainant asked lawyer about status of case, he only told her period for appeal was over and then returned records of case to her did not even consult clients opinion if latter wants to make an appeal; no authority to waive his clients right to appeal

90. Sibagat vs. CA (sabi ni sir, if we cant find the case, di na lang daw ididiscuss)

Issue: WON there was excusable neglect on the part of both counsels to the extent of making the action of the trial court, as well as the Court of Appeals in denying relief based thereon, an abuse of discretion constituting reversible error. Held: NO Ratio: as of may 5, 1955, both firms knew of the Clubs desire to change lawyers. o Should have then made the necessary arrangement for the protection of the interest of their client o Should have turned over files to Chuidian group for them to prepare a valid defense o Chuidian knew of trials date and he should have filed his appearance opportunely and prepare for the trial on May 12 (yikes, tama ba?read the case) 92. Blanza vs. Arcangel Facts: Atty. Arcangel volunteered to held Olegaria Blanza and Maria Pasion in their respective pension claims in connection with the deaths of their husbands, both P.C. soldiers. Lawyer did not act on case for 6 years and refused to return documents turned over to him by clients. Issues: 1. WON he was legally entitled to recover fees for services rendered

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Held: NO Ratio: volunteered to held them out but even so, there was attorney-client relationship which expected him to exercise due diligence in the handling of the cases However, there was insufficient evidence to warrant discimplinary action against lawyer. 1. delay was partly complaiants fault failed to deposit money to copy documents (photostating) lawyer has no obligation to shoulder such expenses no sufficient proof to establish that lawyer did not return documents Court however counsels against his actuations as a member of the bar. he should not have prolonged case for 6 years should have terminated relationship with clients when latter refused to cooperate with him in the preparation of necessary documents Perpetua Colomo was counsel for Angel Albano and Mother in a civil case. respondent failed to expedite the hearing and termination of the case, as a result of which they had themselves represented by another lawyer respondent intervened in the case to collect her attorney's fees o presented evidence that Albanos promised to pay her a contingent fee of 33-1/3% of whatever could be recovered whether in land or damages Issue: violated code? entitled to claimed fees? Held: No Yes Case against Coloma dismissed Ratio: 1. there was a written contract of professional services proven to be authentic 2. witness Sergio Manuel testified to the genuineness of the signatures in the contract 3. Felicidad Albanos testimony showed that Angel Albano was authorized to give such contingent fee 4. bad faith could be on the part of the Albanos: took advantage of lawyers services and then dismissed her right after she won the case for them

93. Millare vs. Montero Facts: Atty. Eustaquio Montero represented Elsa Dy Co in an ejectment case filed against her by Millares mother. RTC decided in favor of Pacifica Mallare and Co, thru counsel, filed the following actions: o Manifestation and Motion that RTC and MTC decisions were void for allowing lessor to increase rentals by 300 percent for an old house o Petition for Annulment of Decisions which was dismissed o Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Set Motion for Reconsideration for Oral Arguments of the CA decision, denied o Petition for Review on Certiorari, denied o Motion for the Issuance of a Prohibitory or Restraining Order o Special civil action 95. Quirante vs. IAC Facts: Atty John Quirante represented Dr. Indalecio Casasola in a case which the latter filed against Guerero who failed to comply with his obligations as the building contractor. Trial court ruled in favor of Casasola Nov. 16, 1981: Dr. Guerrero died and subsequently, Quirante filed a motion in trial court for the confirmation of his fees pending adverse partys filing of a petition for review on certiorari o That he and the doctor had an oral agreement regarding said fees and such was confirmed in writing by the wife o In case of recovery of the P120,000.00 surety bond, the attorney's fees of the undersigned counsel (Atty. Quirante) shall be P30,000.00. o In case the Honorable Court awards damages in excess of the P120,000.00 bond, it shall be divided equally between the Heirs of I. Casasola, Atty. John C. Quirante and Atty. Dante Cruz. Issue: WON Quirante could claim attorneys fees Held: NO Ratio: petition for review on certiorari was still pending in court o an attorney's fee cannot be determined until after the main litigation has been decided and the subject of recovery is at the disposition of the court o even if there was supposedly a contract, the provisions thereof were made to depend on the outcome of the case i.e. if 120,000 surety bond would be recovered even if heirs allegedly confirmed contract, court would still be in better position to determine basis of fees

Decision: VIOLATED CODE, suspended for a year Canon 19: a lawyer is required to represent his client "within the bounds of the law. to employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client (Rule 19.01) warns him not to allow his client to dictate the procedure in handling the case (Rule 19.03 unethical for a lawyer to abuse or wrongfully use the judicial process delayed the execution of judgment 94. Albano vs. Coloma Facts:

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issue on attorneys fees held in abeyance until after final decision of case. 96. supra 97. supra 98. Zulueta vs. Pan-Am Facts: (persons case to so we shud now this) Court ruled in favor of the Zuluetas and ordered Pan-am, among other things, to pay for attorneys fees together with the award for exemplary damages Pan-am opposed the P75, 000 attorneys fees accorded to Zuluetas lawyer, Alfredo Benipayo and deemed it to be excessive. Issue: WON fee was excessive Held: NO Ratio: fee was only a little over 10 percent of the damages collectible by the Zuluetas other factors were considered: o quantity and quality of the services rendered o nature of the case and the amount involved therein o his prestige as one of the most distinguished members of the legal profession in the Philippines 99. Sison vs. Suntay Facts: Atty. Teofilo Sison claimed 400thou for attorneys fees for services rendered as counsel for Federico Suntay Suntay in intestate estate proceedings (Jose Suntays estate). Federico claims that Sison had already received 67thou and such was sufficient compensation. Issue: WON 400thou was reasonable Held: YES plus additional 75thou Ratio: 1. determination of what would be reasonable compensation for the attorney for an administrator or executor of the intestate estate should consider: the size and value of the decedent's estate (estate was worth 4 million, lawyer entitled to 10 percent) Cases handled were all for the declaration of nullity of certain deeds of sale, with damages.

Issues: (1) whether or not private respondent is entitled to the enforcement of its charging lien for payment of its attorney's fees; Held: NO Ratio: all civil cases were dismissed upon plaintiffs initiative "in view of the frill satisfaction of their claims." No money judgment or monetary award was provided o Section 7, rule 138 provides that a lawyer is entitled to the enforcement of its charging lien for payment of its attorneys fees only when money judgment or monetary award is provided for by court (di ko to naintindihan)

(2) whether or not a separate civil suit is necessary for the enforcement of such lien and Held: Not necessary. Court trying main case will determine attorneys fees (3) whether or not private respondent is entitled to twenty-five (25%) of the actual and current market values of the litigated properties on a quantum meruit basis. Held: court refused to resolve issue but gave the elements to be considered in fixing a reasonable compensation for the services rendered by a lawyer on the basis of quantum meruit These are: (1) the importance of the subject matter in controversy, (2) the extent of the services rendered, and (3) the professional standing of the lawyer order of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, without prejudice to such appropriate proceedings as may be brought by private respondent to establish its right to attorney's fees and the amount thereof. 101. Rilloraza vs. ETPI Facts: Petitioner was awarded attorneys fees worth P26,350,779.91 handled the case for its client Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. filed with the Regional Trial Court, Makati, though its services were terminated in midstream and the client directly compromised the case with the adverse party.

the services performed by counsel 2. mere approximation, oral evidence sufficient to establish value of estate 100. Metropolitan Bank vs. CA Facts: Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company was ordered to pay its attorneys, Arturo Alafriz and Associates, movant therein, the amount of P936,000.00 as attorney's fees on a quantum meruit basis.

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Petitioner was a partner of San Juan, Africa, Gonzales and San Agustin (SAGA) Handled case from the very beginning till 1988 SAGA was later dissolved and Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo & Africa (RADA) was formed o RADA was retained as counsel but such retainer agreement was subsequently terminated ETPI entered into a compromise agreement when it ended the services of petitioner and through the effort of ETPI's new lawyers, the law firm Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc and De los Angeles. o defray all expenses, for the suit, including court fees. Held: Yes Ratio: contrary to Canon 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides that a lawyer may not properly agree with a client to pay or bear the expenses of litigation. [See also Rule 16.04, Code of Professional Responsibility lawyer may advance expenses but subject to reimbursement: this was not provided for in the contract suspended for 6 months.

Issue: WON RADA was entitled to amount they were claiming for services rendered Held: NO, but they were entitled to attorneys fees nevertheless Ratio: attorney-client relationship between petitioner and respondent no longer existed during its culmination by amicable agreement To award the attorneys' fees amounting to 15% of the sum of One Hundred Twenty Five Million Six Hundred Seventy One Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty Six Pesos and Four Centavos (P125,671,886.04) plus Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) paid by PLDT to ETPI would be too unconscionable. "In any case, whether there is an agreement or not, the courts shall fix a reasonable compensation which lawyers may receive for their professional services. " REMANDS the case to the court of origin for the determination of the amount of attorney's fees to which petitioner is entitled. Recovery of attorney's fees on the basis of quantum meruit is authorized when (1) there is no express contract for payment of attorney's fees agreed upon between the lawyer and the client; (2) when although there is a formal contract for attorney's fees, the fees stipulated are found unconscionable or unreasonable by the court; and (3) when the contract for attorney's fee's is void due to purely formal defects of execution; (4) when the counsel, for justifiable cause, was not able to finish the case to its conclusion; (5) when lawyer and client disregard the contract for attorney's fees 102. Bautista vs. Gonzales Facts: Ramon Gonzales was charged with malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct and violation of lawyer's oath Issue: WON Gonzales committed alleged acts of misconduct specifically in entering into a contingent fee contract with the Fortunados o We the [Fortunados] agree on the 50% contingent fee, provided, you [respondent Ramon Gonzales]

103. Research and Services Realty vs. CA Facts: Atty. Manuel Fonacier was hired by petitioner when the Carreons and a certain Patricio C. Sarile instituted before the RTC of Makati City an action against the petitioner for rescission of the Joint Venture Agreement which provided that: o petitioner shall undertake to develop, subdivide, administer, and promote the sale of the parcels of land owned by the Carreons o The proceeds of the sale of the lots were to be paid to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) for the landowner's mortgage obligation, o and the net profits to be shared by the contracting parties on a 50-50 basis. While case was pending, the petitioner, without the knowledge of the private respondent, entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) 5 with another land developer, Filstream International, Inc. (hereinafter Filstream). Under this MOA, the former assigned its rights and obligations under the Joint Venture Agreement in favor of the latter for a consideration of P28 million, payable within twenty-four months. March 31, 1993: petitioner terminated services of Fonacier Petitioner had already received 7 million from Filstream Upon knowing the existence of the MOA, Fonacier filed an action to recover the sum of P700,000.00 as his contingent fee in the case even if he had no participation in the negotiation and preparation thereof.

Issue: proper fee? Held: No, excessive and unreasonable Ratio: P600,000.00 attorney's fees, whether on contingent basis or quantum meruit, is excessive and unreasonable. o Lawyers contribution was merely to ask for suspension or postponement of proceedings 104. Corpuz vs. CA Facts:

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Juan David sought to recover attorneys fees for professional services rendered by the plaintiff, to Mariano Corpus. o Administrative case filed against Corpus by several employee of the Central Bank Export Department of which the defendant is the director o Initially Corpus was represented by Atty. Alavarez. They lost the case. o Father of Corpus then asked David to handle case because he thought former lawyer wanted to give up the case. o Alleged that David offered services gratuitously Linsangan claimed that Risma instigated his client to file a false and malicious complaint resulting in what respondent Linsangan called "embarrassment, humiliation and defamation" of a brother in a profession In such action against Linsangan, Risma sought to collect fifteen per cent of the recovery obtained by his client, contrary to the explicit provision in the Workmen's Compensation Act allowing only a maximum of ten per cent and that only where the case is appealed o

Issue: WON David was entitled to attorneys fees Held: YES Ratio: 1. There was an implied understanding between the petitioner and private respondent that the former will pay the latter attorney's fees when a final decision shall have been rendered in favor of the petitioner reinstating him to -his former position in the Central Bank and paying his back salaries. Corpus gave David 2thou and even mentioned that he wished he could give more: implied promise to pay procedure in filing claim proper: when Corpus was re-instated, David made a written demand on April 19, 1965 upon petitioner Corpus for the payment of his attorney's fees in an amount equivalent to 50% of what was paid as back salaries absence of written contract regarding fees: excusable based on close relationship of parties 20thou was reasonable compensation; basis were: a. Corpus received P150,158.50 as back salaries and emoluments after deducting taxes as well as retirement and life insurance premiums due to the GSIS b. Extent of services rendered (4 years as collaborating counsel)

Decision: 1. case against tolentino was dismissed for lack of merit 2. Risma is exculpated from the charge of having instigated the filing of an unfounded suit However, admonished to exercise greater care in ascertaining how much under our law he could recover by way of attorney's fees Admonished only because he had made no effort to collect on the same and had even advanced expenses for a poor client 106. Perez vs. Scottish Union Facts: Petitioner sought to recover: (1) P6,000. as attorney's fees in a criminal case for arson against the defendant Miguel H. Mitre who, in a written contract, had covenanted to pay the same out of the proceeds of a fire insurance policy for P12,000, issued in his favor by the defendant Scottish Union and National Insurance Co., and

2. 3.

4. 5.

(2) P1,485, unpaid balance of attorney's fees owing by the defendant Miguel H. Mitre in four other cases Decision: entitled to 6000. Fees claimed in number 2 were not supported by sufficient evidence 1. validity of contract upheld A contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable. Contract was binding: obvious that complainant respected services of lawyer coz he even retained services of counsel even after conviction by trial court 2. lawyer properly defended client which led to an acquittal fee was valid for being contingent upon acquittal

David was held in contempt though: filed on or about September 13, 1978 a motion with the court a quo for the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce its decision in Civil Case No 61802, subject of the present petition, knowing fully well that it was then still pending appeal before this Court

105. Narido vs. Linsangan Facts: Flora Narido charged Atty. Linsangan with a violation of his lawyers oath by submitting a perjured statement Counsel for Narido was Risma.

Claim that lawyers present income should also be considered in deciding amount of fee was not given attention by court: * The income of a lawyer is not a safe criterion of his professional ability.

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107. Sato vs. Rallos Facts: for the collection of attorney's fees by plaintiff Primitivo Sato, against Simeon Rallos in his capacity as administrator and distributor of the Testate Estate of Numeriana Rallos and the Intestate Estate of Victoria Rallos Issue: WON lawyer was entitled to fees. Held: YES, Court fixed sum of 12, 500 Ratio: estates and distribute thereof were greatly benefited (Colloector of Internal revenue effected a revised assessment which was the basis for the payment of P22,545.47 as taxes, as against the original amount of P130,076.43 Issue: WON procedure for filing claim was sufficient Held: No, more than the legal procedural requirements Ratio: complaint was not only filed against the administrator as such and as a distributee but also against the other distributes would have been enough for counsel to request the administrator to make payment and file an action against him in his personal capacity and not as an administrator should he fail to pay or attorney also may, instead of bringing such action, file a petition in the Testate or Intestate Proceeding asking that the Court, after notice to all persons interested, allow his claim and direct the administrator to pay it as an expense of administration Figueroa vs. Barranco, 276 SCRA 445 Nature: Administrative Matter in the SC. Disbarment. Facts: That Barranco should be denied admission to the legal profession. He passed 1970 bar exams but failed 1966-1968 exams. She and Barranco had a child out of wedlock and that Barranco did not fulfill his promise to marry her. 1971: she learned that he married another woman. Charge: gross immorality It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community. *took his oath at 62!!!! Leslie Ui vs. Bonifacio, 333 SCRA 38 Nature: Administrative Matter in the SC. Disbarment Facts: Atty. Iris Bonifacio allegedly carried on an immoral relationship with Carlos Ui, husband of Leslie Ui. Had a daughter out of that illicit relationship Lived together in Ayala Alabang Village. Respondent was admitted to the bar in 1982.

Issue: WON act constituted gross immorality Held: No Ratio: Even if the following occurred: should have exercised prudence and had been more vigilant in finding out more about Carlos Uis personal background did not exert effort to find out if indeed Carlos and the Chinese woman were unmarried despite marriage, she and Carlos never lived together even after they had first child. Immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and opinion of good and respectful members of community. To warrant disciplinary action, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree. In fairness, she distanced herself from Carlos after learning of his true civil status.

Vda. De Mijares vs. Villaluz, 274 SCRA 1 Nature: Administrative Matter in the Supreme Court. Gross Immorality and Grave Misconduct. Facts:

Issue: WON grounds invoked were sufficient to grant a petition for disbarment Held: No Ratio: acts suggest a doubtful moral character but not grossly immoral conduct A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree.

Judge Priscilla Vda. De Mijares charged a retired justice of the CA, Onofre Villaluz, with gross immorality and grave misconduct.

Villaluz married Mijares knowing fully well that the annulment of his marriage to his first wife, Librada Pea, had not yet attained finality. After breaking up with Mijares, he proceeded to marry Lydia Geraldez, after making a false statement in his application for marriage license that his previous marriage had been annulled. Suspension for 2 years with severe warning that a more severe penalty shall be imposed should he commit the same or similar

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offense hereafter. Guilty of immoral conduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Cordova vs. Cordova, 179 SCRA 680 (1989) Melendres vs. Decena, 176 SCRA 663 (1989) Nature: Administrative case in the SC. Malpractice and Breach of Trust Acts constituted deception and dishonesty and conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar. Contrary to justice, honesty, modesty and good morals. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. making it appear on the real estate mortgage that the amount loaned was 5,000 instead of 4,000 exacting usurious interest making it appear that amount had escalated to 10 thousand failing to inform complainants of the import of the documents failing to demand from complainants before effecting extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged property failing to inform then that mortgage had been foreclosed and that they had right to redeem property within a period of time. Nature: Administrative Case in the SC. Immorality. Facts: Salvacion Delizo charged her husband, Atty. Laurence D. Cordova, with immorality and acts unbecoming a member of the Bar. He maintained for about 2 years an adulterous relationship with a married woman, Fely Holgado. Refused to support family. After promising to be a reformed man, went on to have another mistress, Luisita Magallanes

SUSPENDED. People vs. Tuanda, 181 SCRA 692 (1989) Nature: Administrative Case in the SC. Motion to Lift Order of Suspension Facts: Atty. Fe Tuanda issued bouncing checks to Ms. Marquez (sale on commission basis of several pieces of jewelry). Traders Royal Bank

In the estafa case against Reynaldo Pineda: Lawyers cannot without special authority, compromise their clients litigation or receive anything in discharge of a clients claim but the full amount in cash. Gross misconduct on the part of a lawyer, although not related to the discharge of his professional duties as a member of the Bar, which puts his moral character in serious doubt, renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law. DISBARRED. Delos Reyes vs. Aznar, 179 SCRA 653 (1989) Nature: Administrative Case in the SC. Disbarment. Facts: Atty Jose B. Aznar, then chairman of Southwestern University, had carnal knowledge with second year med student, Rosario de los Reyes. He did so several times by threatening her that she would fail in her Pathology subject if she would not submit to his desires. When she became pregnant, he forced her to undergo abortion under Dr. Gil Ramas. DISBARRED. Took advantage of his position. Conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar.

DENIED. Crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of her attorneys oath and the CPR under both of which she was bound to obey the laws of the land. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation of BP Blg. 22) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer, however, it certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such offense. Sebastian vs. Calis, 314 SCRA 1 Nature: Administrative case in the SC. Unlawful, Dishonest, Immoral or Deceitful Conduct and Violation of the Lawyers Oath Facts: Atty Dorotheo Calis exacted 150,000 from Marilou Sebastian as payment for his service. Process documents for her trip to USA. Issued documents informing complainant that she will be assuming the name Lizette Ferrer married to Roberto Ferrer.

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Complainant was apprehended at the Singapore Internationla Airport DISBARRED. Violated Canon I, Rule 101. deceived complainant all for material gain Luis Tagorda advertised his profession on a card. Offered legall services like execution of deed of sale for lands, affidavits, etc. Also wrote to a lieutenant of barrio informing him that despite of his membership to the provincial board, which hold sessions in Ilagan, he would still keep his residence in Echague where he would be performing legal services on Sundays.

C13: In re Terrel, 2 Phil 266 (1903) Nature: In the matter of the suspension of Howard D. Terrel from practice of law Facts: Terrel assisted in the organization of Centro Bellas Artes Club, created for the purpose of evading the law then in force in said city

SUSPENDED FOR A MONTH. SEC 21 of Code of Civil Procedure amd by Act No. 2828: The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice * disbarment sana but mitigated by his intimation that he as unaware of the impropriety of his acts, 2nd: his youth and inexperience, and 3rd: promised not to make the same mistake in the future. C17: Director of Religious Affairs vs. Bayot Nature: Original Action in the SC. Malpractice. Facts: published an advertisement in the Sunday Tribune on June 13, 1943 marriage license promptly secured thru assistance and the annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free for the poor. Everything confidential. Legal assistance service. Violated section 25 of Rule 127: The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice

SUSPENDED. Code of Civil Procedure sec 21: The promoting of orgs, with knowledge of their objects, for the purpose of violating or evading the laws against crime constitutes such misconduct on the part of the attorney, an officer of the court, as amounts to malpractice or gross misconduct in his office, and for which he may be removed or suspended. C14: Castaneda vs. Ago, 65 SCRA 505 (1975) Nature: Petition for review of the decision of the CA Facts: Atty. Jose M. Luison maneuvered for 14 years to resist execution of the judgment thru manifold tactics in and from one court to another (5 times in the SC). Allowed himself to become an instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation C15: Ledesma vs. Climaco Nature: Original Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari Facts: question the order of Judge Climaco denying a motion filed by petitioner to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio his appointment as ER of COMELEC: he was not in the position to devote full time to the defense of accused Denied: it is the responsibility of a member of the bar to act as counsel de oficio right to counsel could in effect be rendered nugatory if withdrawal was allowed

REPRIMANDED. Plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the misconduct

C18: Firm name cases Nature: Petition for Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name Facts: Petitioners prayed that they be allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the names of partners who had passed away Died: Atty. Alexander Sycip of Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano,Hernandez, and Castillo Died: Atty. Herminio Ozaeta of Ozaeta, Romulo, de Leon, Mabanta and Reyes Denied. 1815: names in a firm name of a partnership must either be those of living partners and in case of non-partners, should be living persons who can be subjected to liability 1825: prohibits a 3rd person from including his name in the firm name under the pain of assuming liability of a partner

C16: In re tagorda, 53 Phil 37 (1929) Nature: Original Action in the SC. Malpractice Facts:

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a professional partnership depends on the personal qualifications of its members a partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity but a mere relationship for a particular purpose no local custom in the Phils. Permits or allows the continued use of a deceased partners name: otherwise, there is the possibility of deception When various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes. A prosecution attorney shall file a particular information if he is convinced that he has evidence to prop up the averments thereof. When prosecution may be enjoined: 1. for the orderly administration of justice 2. to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner 3. to avoid multiplicity of actions 4. to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights 5. in proper cases, because the statue relied upon is unconstitutional or was held invalid C25: de la Cruz vs. Paras, 69 Phil 556 (1940) Nature: Petition for certiorari and/or mandamus from an order of the CFI, Bulacan Facts:

C19: Dacanay vs. Baker and Mckenzie Nature: Administrative case in the SC Facts: Dacanay sought to enjoin Juan Collas and nine other lawyers from practicing law under the name Baker and McKenzie, a law firm organized in Illinois Yes. Baker and McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec 1, Rule 138, ROC) C20: In re IBP

C21: Macoco vs. Diaz, 70 Phil 97 (1940) Nature: Original Action in the SC. Malpractice. Facts: Atty. Esteban Diaz misappropriated 300 pesos from Sagutan who also failed to return the money to Marcelino Macoco. DISBARRED. breach of trust his being a deputy fiscal aggravated his crime want of moral integrity is to be more severely condemned in a lawyer who holds a responsible public office C22: Cayetano vs. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210 Nature: Petition to review the decision of the COA Facts: Cayetano questioned the appointment of Monsod as chairman of the COMELEC; did not engage in the practice of law for 10 years PETITION DISMISSED. Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training, and experience. Lawyer-manager/entrepreneur/legislator C24: People vs. Pineda, 20 SCRA 748 (1967) Nature: Original Action in the SC. Certiorari with preliminary injunction. Facts: Teofilo Mendoza and Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza and their 3 children were killed by respondents. Tomas Narbasa Tambac Alindo Rufino Borres Respondent judge denied motion for recon by city fiscal and insisted that there should only be one case filed rather than five. Court held that fiscals five information were valid. C26: Penticostes vs. Ibaez, 304 SCRA 281 Nature: Administrative Matter in the Supreme Court. Misappropriation of SSS Contribution Facts: 1989: Encarnacion Pascual, sis-in-law of Atty. Prudencio Penticostes was sued for non-remittance of SSS payments. Complaint assigned to Prosecutor Diosdado Ibaez Pascual gave 1, 804 to respondent as payment of her SSS contributions on arrears. Respondent did not remit amount to system. Penticostes filed complaint. respondent remitted money. GUILTY of professional misconduct.

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duties of a prosecutor do not include receiving money from persons with official transactions with his office a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct Canon 6: These canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks. IBP committee that drafted code: A lawyer does not shed his professional obligations upon assuming public office. NECESSITY OF GOOD MORAL CHARACTER IN THE LIFE OF A LAWYER A. Requisite for admission to the Bar 1. Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines, and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, have been filed or pending in any court in the Philippines (Sec. 2, Rule 138, Rules of Court) 2. A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making false statement or suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar. (Rule 701, CPR) 3. A lawyer shall not support the application for admission to the bar of any person known by him to be unqualified in respect to character, education or other, or other relevant attribute. (Rule 7.02, CPR) B. Condition for maintenance of membership in the Bar 4. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. (Rule 1.01, Rule of Professional Responsibility [CPR]) 5. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, now should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Rule 7.03, CPR) 6. A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney-at-law by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or for gross misconduct in such office, gross immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for willful disobedience or any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers constitutes malpractice. (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court) C. Definitions of good moral character. 7. Good moral character includes at least common honesty (In E Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399, Royong vs. Oblena, 7 SCRA 859) 8. From a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are expected those qualities of truth-speaking, a high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty, and the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility all of which, throughout the centuries, have been compendiously described as moral character. (Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, Apostacy in the Legal Profession, 64 SCRA 784. 9. Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad moral character. Such character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. (Cordon vs. Balicanta, 490 SCRA 299)

Reprimanded with stern warning C27: Misamin vs. San Juan, 72 SCRA 491 (1976) Nature: Resolution Facts: Miguel San Juan: captain of MM Police force member of the bar legal representative of certain establishments owned by Filipinos of Chinese descent coerced Jose Misamin to drop charges the latter filed against Tan Hua, employer and owner of New Cesars Bakery charge was violation of the Minimum wage Law Dismissed for not having been duly proved * should refrain from laying himself open to such doubts and misgiving as to his fitness not only for the position occupied by him but also for membership in the bar In re 1989 Elections of the IBP, 178 SCRA 398 (1998) Facts: Responding to reports from lawyers and publishers about intensive electioneering and overspending by the candidates, SC en banc, exercising its power of supervision over the Integrated bar, resolved to suspend the oath-taking of the IBP officers-elect and to inquire into the veracity of the reports. Specifically, candidates Viola Drilon, Nisce, and Paculdo were investigated. Candidates for the presidency Issue/Held/Ratio: WON candidates violated section 14 of the IBP by laws Yes. Section 14 enumerates 5 prohibited acts relative to IBP elections. Basta maraming specific acts. basahin na lang.labo sobrang helpful na digest to.basta parang namigay ng plane tickets, nagsolicit ng votes, ginamit ang helicopter ng PNB para magcampaign. bastos noh? also violated the ethics of the legal profession which imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation to obey and uphold the constitution and the laws, the duty to promote respect for law and legal processes and to abstain from activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. (rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility) The unseemly ardor with which the candidates pursued the presidency of the association detracted from the dignity of the legal profession.

Decision: 1. IBP elections were annulled. 2. other modifications were added (wow, helpful)

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ROBERTO SORIANO vs. ATTY. MANUEL DIZON B. Good moral character and the duties of a lawyer CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and the legal processes.. A.C. 6057, June 27, 2006 PETER DONTON vs. ATTY. E. TANSINGCO By his own admission, respondent admitted that Stier, a U.S. citizen, was disqualified from owning real property. Yet, in his motion for reconsideration, [12] respondent admitted that he caused the transfer of ownership to the parcel of land to Stier. Respondent, however, aware of the prohibition, quickly rectified his act and transferred the title in complainants name. But respondent provided some safeguards by preparing several documents, including the Occupancy Agreement, that would guarantee Stiers recognition as the actual owner of the property despite its transfer in complainants name.In effect, respondent advised and aided Stier in circumventing the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of lands by preparing said documents. Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his oath and the Code when he prepared and notarized the Occupancy Agreement to evade the law against foreign ownership of lands. Respondent used his knowledge of the law to achieve an unlawful end. Such an act amounts to malpractice in his office, for which he may be suspended. Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. A.C. No. 5542, July 20, 2006 DAYAN STA. ANA CHRISTIAN NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC. vs. ATTY.NAPOLEON ESPIRITU The fiduciary duty of a lawyer and advocate is what places the law profession in a unique position of trust and confidence, and distinguishes it from any other calling. Once this trust and confidence is betrayed, the faith of the people not only in the individual lawyer but also in the legal profession as a whole is eroded. To this end, all members of the bar are strictly required to at all times maintain the highest degree of public confidence in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of their profession. The nature of the office of a lawyer requires that he shall be of good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to admission to the legal profession, but its continued possession is essential to maintain ones good standing in the profession. Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals who are competent intellectually, academically, and, equally important, morally. Because they are vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. A.C. No. 6792, January 25, 2006 The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral turpitude. By his conduct, respondent revealed his extreme arrogance and feeling of self-importance. As it were, he acted like a god on the road, who deserved to be venerated and never to be slighted. Clearly, his inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident reflected poorly on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. His overreaction also evinced vindictiveness, which was definitely an undesirable trait in any individual, more so in a lawyer. In the tenacity with which he pursued complainant, we see not the persistence of a person who has been grievously wronged, but the obstinacy of one trying to assert a false sense of superiority and to exact revenge A.C. No. 5700, January 30, 2006. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION vs. ATTY. DANTE A. CARANDANG Clearly, even if the check was drawn by Bingo Royale, still respondent is liable. In People v. Tuanda, we explained the nature of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 as follows: The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment . . . . The thrust of the law is to prohibit under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property but an offense against public order. The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. A.C. No. 6963. February 9, 2006.] VICTORINA BAUTISTA vs. ATTY. SERGIO E. BERNABE Respondent's act of notarizing the Magkasanib na Salaysay in the absence of one the affiants is in violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Notarial Law. By affixing his signature and notarial seal on the instrument, he led us to believe that Basilia personally appeared before him and attested to the truth and veracity of the contents of the affidavit when in fact it was a certain Pronebo who signed the document. Respondent's conduct is fraught with dangerous possibilities considering the conclusiveness on the due execution of a document that our courts and the public accord on notarized documents. Respondent has clearly failed to exercise utmost diligence in the performance of his function as a notary public and to comply with the mandates of the law. A.C. 5377, June 15, 2006

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VICTOR LINGAN vs. ATTYS. CALUBAQUIB & BALIGA Notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public one and makes it admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. Notaries public must therefore observe utmost care with respect to the basic requirements of their duties. Being not only lawyers but also public officers, respondents should have been acutely aware of their responsibilities. Respondents acts did not amount to mere simple and excusable negligence. Having failed to perform their sworn duty, respondents were squarely in violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A.C. 5907, July 21, 2006 ELSA MONDEJAR vs. ATTY. VIVIAN RUBIA The document clearly appears to have been ante-dated in an attempt to exculpate Marilyn from the Anti-Dummy charge against her in 2002. The document was allegedly notarized on January 9, 2001 but a new revised/amended document was made in 2002 bearing the original date of execution/acknowledgment. If that were so, how could an error have been committed regarding the other year 2001 original entries in the notarial register, when the purported new document was to retain the original January 9, 2001 date as it would merely input additional conditions thereto? The above-quoted discussion by the Investigating IBP Commissioner of why he discredited respondents explanation behind the conflicting dates appearing in the document is thus welltaken. A.C. No. 6010, August 28, 2006 ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY HIGH SCHOOL FACULTY & STAFF vs. ATTY. ROLANDO DELA CRUZ Undoubtedly, respondents act constitutes immoral conduct. But is it so gross as to warrant his disbarment? Indeed, he exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage while the first marriage was still in place, is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality However, measured against the definition, we are not prepared to consider respondents act as grossly immoral. This finds support in the following recommendation and observation of the IBP Investigator and IBP Board of Governors. : A.C. No. 6313, September 7, 2006 CATHERINE JOIE P. VITUG vs. ATTY. DIOSDADO RONGCAL While it is has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. A.C. No. 54171 . March 31, 2006. AMADOR Z. MALHABOUR vs. ATTY. ALBERTI R. SARMIENTO Respondent failed to comply with the above provisions. Records show and as found by Investigating Commissioner, respondent committed deceit by making it appear that complainant executed a Special Power of Attorney authorizing him (respondent) to file with the NLRC a Motion for Execution and to collect the money judgment awarded to the former. Worse, after receiving from the NLRC cashier the check amounting to P99,490.00, he retained the amount. It was only when complainant reported the matter to the NBI that respondent paid him P40,000.00 as partial payment of the "award." In fact, there still remains an outstanding balance of P10,000.00. Moreover, as correctly found by IBP Commissioner Maala, respondent has no right to retain or appropriate unilaterally his lawyer's lien by dividing the money into 60-40 ratio. Obviously, such conduct is indicative of lack of integrity and propriety. He was clinging to something not his and to which he had no right. A.C. No. 6288, June 16, 2006 MARILI C. RONQUILLO, et al. vs. ATTY. HOMOBONO CHAVEZ In the instant case, respondent may have acted in his private capacity when he entered into a contract with complainant Marili representing to have the rights to transfer title over the townhouse unit and lot in question. When he failed in his undertaking, respondent fell short of his duty under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It cannot be gainsaid that it was unlawful for respondent to transfer property over which one has no legal right of ownership. Respondent was likewise guilty of dishonest and deceitful conduct when he concealed this lack of right from complainants. He did not inform the complainant that he has not yet paid in full the price of the subject townhouse unit and lot, and, therefore, he had no right to sell, transfer or assign said property at the time of the execution of the Deed of Assignment. His acceptance of the bulk of the purchaser price amounting to Nine Hundred Thirty Seven Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P937,400.00). despite knowing he was not entitled to it, made matters worse for him. Rule 1/02 A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. A.C. No. 6968, August 9, 2006 ATTY. ORLANDO V. DIZON vs. ATTY. MARICHU LAMBINO In the main, Atty. Dizon invoked Section 1 (a) of Republic Act 157 (The NBI Charter) which empowers the NBI to undertake investigations of crimes and other offenses against the laws of the Philippines, upon its own initiative and as public interest may require [5] and to make arrests. The invocation does not impress. Said section does not grant the NBI the power to make warrantless arrests. The NBI Charter clearly qualifies the power to make arrests to be in accordance with existing laws and rules. Members of the investigation staff of the Bureau of Investigation shall be peace officers, and as such have the following powers:

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(a) To make arrests, searches and seizures in accordance with existing laws and rules. [6] x x x x (Emphasis supplied) By persisting in his attempt to arrest the suspected students without a warrant, Atty. Dizon violated Rule 1.02 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. CANON 5 A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in continuing legal education programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in law schools as well as in the practical training of law students and assist in dessiminating information regarding the law and jurisprudence. A.C. No. 6352, February 27, 2006 SPS. WILLIAMS vs. ATTY. RUDY ENRIQUEZ As pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires that a lawyer be updated in the latest laws and jurisprudence. Indeed, when the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. As a retired judge, respondent should have known that it is his duty to keep himself well-informed of the latest rulings of the Court on the issues and legal problems confronting a client. In this case, the law he apparently misconstrued is no less than the Constitution, the most basic law of the land. Implicit in a lawyers mandate to protect a clients interest to the best of his/her ability and with utmost diligence is the duty to keep abreast of the law and legal developments, and participate in continuing legal education programs. Thus, in championing the interest of clients and defending cases, a lawyer must not only be guided by the strict standards imposed by the lawyers oath, but should likewise espouse legally sound arguments for clients, lest the latters cause be dismissed on a technical ground. Ignorance encompasses both substantive and procedural laws. CANON 6 Thee canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasksRule 6.02 A lawyer in the government service shall not use is public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties. A, C. No. 6707, March 24, 2006 GISELLA HUYSSEN vs. ATTY. FRED L. GUTIERREZ Respondents act of asking money from complainant in consideration of the latters pending application for visas is violative of Rule 1.01 [17] of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits members of the Bar from engaging or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of Rule 6.02 [18] of the Code which bars lawyers in government service from promoting their private interest. Promotion of private interest includes soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of his office or which may be affected by the functions of his office. [19] Respondents conduct in office betrays the integrity and good moral character required from all lawyers, especially from one occupying a high public office. A lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government; he must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than his brethren in private practice. A.C. No. 6705. March 31, 2006. RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO vs. ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO . Nonetheless, respondent admitted that he rendered his legal services to complainant while working as a government prosecutor. Even the receipts he signed stated that the payments by Taggat were for "Retainer's fee." Thus, as correctly pointed out by complainant, respondent clearly violated the prohibition in RA 6713. However, violations of RA 6713 are not subject to disciplinary action under the Code of Professional Responsibility unless the violations also constitute infractions of specific provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Certainly, the IBP has no jurisdiction to investigate violations of RA 6713 the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees unless the acts involved also transgress provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Here, respondent's violation of RA 6713 also constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which mandates that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Respondent's admission that he received from Taggat fees for legal services while serving as a government prosecutor is an unlawful conduct, which constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01.. A.C. No. 4517, September 11, 2006 AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR. vs. ATTY VITALIANO FABROS, ET AL. As public officers, respondents failed to live up to the high degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill required of them. [16] As lawyers, they were found to have engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct. They also violated their oath as officers of the court to foist no falsehood on anyone. Furthermore, by express provision of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the avoidance of such conduct is demanded of them as lawyers in the government service: As lawyers in the government service, respondents were under an even greater obligation to observe the basic tenets of the legal profession because public office is a public trust. CANON 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his professional colleagues, and shall void harassing tactics against opposing counsel. A.C. 6501, August 31, 2006 ATTY. LEON L. ASA, et al. vs. ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO, et al.

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A final word. The spectacle of members of the bar being engaged in bickering and recrimination is far from edifying. Mutual bickerings and unjustified recriminations between brother attorneys detract from the dignity of the legal profession and will not receive any sympathy from this Court. Personal colloquies between counsels which promote unseemly wrangling should thus be carefully avoided. CANON 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court. Rule 10.01. A lawyer shall not allow any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court, nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice. A.C. No. 5246, May 2, 2006 EDGAR O. PEREA vs. ATTY. RUBEN T. ALMADRO Said statement shows very clearly that Atty. Almadro has received a copy of the complaint. For how can he prepare a draft of his comment if it were not so? This should have alerted Atty. Alambra to verify the veracity of the claim of Atty. Almadro Atty. Alambra should not have relied on the statement given by Atty. Almadro. Their being classmates in the law school is not a reason to be less cautious in his dealings with the Court. He is an officer of the court, and as such, he owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court. A.C. NO. 6198, September 15, 2006 RENATO MALIGAYA vs. ATTY. ANTONIO DORONILA By stating untruthfully in open court that complainant had agreed to withdraw his lawsuits, Atty. Doronila breached these peremptory tenets of ethical conduct. Not only that, he violated the lawyers oath to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court, of which Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 are but restatements. His act infringed on every lawyers duty to never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law. Rule 10.03 A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. A.C. No. 7056, September 13, 2006 PLUS BUILDERS, INC. vs. ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR. It must be noted that when the Court of Appeals and this Court upheld that Decision, respondent resorted to a different forum to pursue his clients lost cause. In the disturbance compensation case, he represented his clients as tenants and acknowledged that complainants were the owners of the subject land. In the action to quiet title, however, he conveniently repudiated his previous admission by falsely alleging that his clients were adverse possessors claiming bona fide ownership. Consequently, he was able to obtain a temporary restraining order preventing the execution of the provincial adjudicators Decision. CANON 11 A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist in similar conduct by others. Rule 11.03 A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive and menacing language or behavior before The courts. A.C. No. 5921, March 10, 2006 JUDGE UBALDINO LACUROM vs. ATTYS. JACOBA Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. However, even the most hardened judge would be scarred by the scurrilous attack made by the 30 July 2001 motion on Judge Lacuroms Resolution. On its face, the Resolution presented the facts correctly and decided the case according to supporting law and jurisprudence. Though a lawyers language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of unnecessary language is proscribed if we are to promote high esteem in the courts and trust in judicial administration. Rule 11.04 A lawyer shall not attribute to a judge motives not supported by the record or having no materiality to the case. G.R. No. 145213. March 28, 2006. JIMMY T. GO vs. HON. ZEUS C. ABROGAR, et., al. Before closing, the Court has a few observations regarding the conduct of petitioner and his counsel in this case. The petitioner alleges that: Now it can be told, that the fishy and suspicious actuations of Atty. Javier was done for the sole purpose of making sure that Jimmy T. Go will lose his case. With due respect, to our mind, it can even be said that the respondent IBank and its counsel Atty. Benedicto Valerio, Alberto Looyuko, petitioner's nemesis against whom he initiated several cases, and Looyuko's counsel Atty. Flaminiano, the Honorable Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 150 Zeuz Abrogar and Petitioner's negligent counsel Atty. Javier are in cahoots with one another in their common objective to pin down Mr. Jimmy T. Go. Our apprehension is not without basis, consider the following: . Petitioner thereafter goes on to state the basis for his accusations against everyone connected to the case: 1) Looyuko had withdrawn his appeal; 2) Atty. Flaminiano conformed to the writ of execution; 3) Atty. Javier neglected his case and continued to represent Looyuko in other cases; 4) Looyuko supported the Motion to Cite petitioner for contempt that was filed by the Bank; and, 5) Judge Abrogar was once an assistant fiscal under then Manila City Fiscal Atty. Flaminiano. xxxxx The Court is also dismayed that such baseless attacks were assisted by counsel, who is an officer of the court. Under Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS. In particular, he shall not attribute to a judge motive not supported by the records or by evidence. A lawyer should submit grievances against a Judge to the proper authorities only. Atty. Caneda, Jr. should have known better than to permit the irresponsible and

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unsupported claim against Judge Abrogar to be included in the pleadings. Allowing such statements to be made is against a lawyer's oath of office and goes against the Code of Professional Responsibility. Petitioner Jimmy T. Go and Atty. Gregorio D. Caneda, Jr. are STRICTLY WARNED not to make disrespectful statements against a Judge without basis in the records or the evidence. CANON 12. A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. A.C. 6986, March 6, 2006 JULIUS AGUSTIN v. ATTY. ENRIQUE EMPLEO True, a lawyer cannot enter into a compromise agreement without his clients consent. Be it remembered, however, that a lawyer is also an officer of the court with the correlative duty to see to it that cases are disposed in the soonest possible time. Here, respondent, fully aware that there is a pending court order for the submission of a compromise agreement, should have taken pains to remind complainant about it and ascertain the true intent of the latter regarding the same, so that he, as complainants counsel, can make the necessary legal action in order for the case not to be unduly delayed and appear not to be indefinitely pending in the docket of the court concerned. Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes. A.C. No. 5649, January 27, 2006 DANDY V. QUIJANO vs. GEOBEL A. BARTOLABAC, et al. Both respondents labor arbiter and commissioner do not have any latitude to depart from the Courts ruling. The Decision in G.R. No. 126561 is final and executory and may no longer be amended. It is incumbent upon respondents to order the execution of the judgment and implement the same to the letter. Respondents have no discretion on this matter, much less any authority to change the order of this Court. The acts of respondent cannot be regarded as acceptable discretionary performance of their functions as labor arbiter and commissioner of the NLRC, respectively, for they do not have any discretions in executing a final decision. The implementation of the final and executory decision is mandatory. A.C. NO. 7062, September 26, 2006 RENERIO SAMBAJON, ET AL., vs. ATTY. JOSE A. SUING Herein complainants, four of the seven who purportedly executed the Release Waiver and Quitclaims, denied having signed and sworn to before the Labor Arbiter the said documents or having received the considerations therefor. Hence, spawned the administrative complaint at bar, alleging that respondent, acting in collusion with his clients Johnny and Manuel Rodil, frustrated the implementation of the Writ of Execution by presenting before the Labor Arbiter the spurious documents. CANON 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his delings with his client. Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. A.C. No. 6836, January 23, 2006 LETICIA GONZALES vs. ATTY. MARCELINO CABUCANA Complaint was plaintiff in a case for sum of money handled by Atty. Edmar Cabucna of the CABUCANA, CABUCANA, DE GUZMAN AND CABUCANA Law Office. After a decision was rendered in favor of the complainant, a writ of execution was issued but Sheriff Romeo Gatcheco failed to fully implement the same. This led to he filing by the complainant of civil and criminal case against the sheriff and his wife. Respondent Marcelino Cabucana (of the same law office) entered his appearance for the sheriff and his wife in he said cases. Complainant filed an administrative charge against him. Respondent claimed that his appearance for the sheriff and his wife was in good faith and pro bono, and there is no conflict of interest involved because it was his brother Edmar who handled the civil case for ms. Gonzales. Respondent is guilty of violating Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional responsibility. The representation of opposing clients in unrelated cases constitutes conflict of interests or, at the very least, invites suspicion of double-dealing. A.C. No. 6160, March 30, 2006 NESTOR PEREZ v. ATTY. DANILO DELA TORRE As found by the IBP, at the time respondent was representing Avila and Ilo, two of the accused in the murder of the victim Resurreccion Barrios, he was representing the family of the murder victim. Clearly, his representation of opposing clients in the murder case invites suspicion of double-dealing and infidelity to his clients. What is unsettling is that respondent assisted in the execution by the two accused of their confessions whereby they admitted their participation in various serious criminal offenses knowing fully well that he was retained previously by the heirs of one of the victims. Respondent, who presumably knows the intricacies of the law, should have exercised his better judgment before conceding to accuseds choice of counsel. It did not cross his mind to inhibit himself from acting as their counsel and instead, he even assisted them in executing the extrajudicial confession. A.C. No. 5303, June 15, 2006 HUMBERTO C. LIM vs. ATTY. NICANOR VILLAROSA The representation by a lawyer of conflicting interests, in the absence of the written consent of all parties concerned after a full disclosure of the facts, constitutes professional misconduct which subjects the lawyer to disciplinary action.

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Even respondents alleged effort to settle the existing controversy among the family members] was improper because the written consent of all concerned was still required. A lawyer who acts as such in settling a dispute cannot represent any of the parties to it. A.C. No. 6125, September 19, 2006 SIMON D. PAZ vs. ATTY. PEPITO A. SANCHEZ By respondents own admission, when he filed the DARAB case on Dizons behalf against complainant, both complainant and Dizon were respondents clients at thqat time. Respondent was representing complainant against Lizares where respondent was duty bound to defend complainants title over the properties against the claims of Lizares. While it is not clear from the records that the Lizares cases included Dizons property, it is undisputed that respondent acted as complainants counsel in the Lizares case. At the same time, respondent was also representing Dizon before the DARAB for cancellation of lis pendens involving Dizons property, which cancellation was needed for complainant to purchase the Dizon property. In filing the second DARAB case pn Dizons behalf, respondent was duty-bound to assail the complainants title over Dizons property, which complainant had purchased from Dizon. Respondent was clearly in a conflict of interest situation. CANON 16 A lawyer shal hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession. A.C. No. 6697, July 25, 2006 ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ vs. ATTY.LEONARD S. DE VERA In the instant case, the act of Atty. de Vera in holding on to his clients money without the latters acquiescence is conduct indicative of lack of integrity and propriety. It is clear that Atty. de Vera, by depositing the check in his own account and using the same for his own benefit is guilty of deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and unethical behavior. He caused dishonor, not only to himself but to the noble profession to which he belongs. For, it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants to the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of the profession betrays their trust and confidence. Respondent violated his oath to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his client. A.C. No. 2591, September 8, 2006 LETICIA ADRIMISIN vs. ATTY. ROLANDO JAVIER A lawyers failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment. A.C. No. 7057, July 25, 2006 DAVID ALMENDAREZ, JR. vs. ATTY. MINERVO L. LANGIT Respondent committed flagrant violation of his oath when he received the sum of money representing the monthly rentals intended for his client, without accounting for and returning such sum to the rightful owner. Respondent received the money in his capacity as counsel for the complainant. Therefore, respondent held the money in trust for complainant. CANON 17 A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. CANON 18 A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. A.C. No. 4285, May 2, 2006 FLORENCIA SOMOSOT vs. ATTY. ELIAS PONTEVEDRA Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that lawyers owe fidelity to the cause of their clients and must therefore be always mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them. Under Canon 18, they are mandated to serve their clients with competence and diligence. Specifically, they are not to neglect a legal matter entrusted to [them], and [their] negligence in connection therewith shall render [them] liable. Additionally, they are required to keep their client informed of the status of the latters cases and to respond within a reasonable time to requests for information. [13] Before admission to the bar, lawyers subscribe to an oath to conduct themselves with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to their clients. Failure to comply with these abiding precepts of ethical conduct renders counsel liable for violating the canons of his profession. In this case, respondent failed to exercise that degree of diligence required of him in the performance of his duties. While it was impossible for him to prepare a memorandum without the transcripts of stenographic notes and his case folder, and while respondent may have been constrained simply to enter into an agreement with the opposing counsel to submit the case for decision without memorandum, respondent failed to inform the trial court of said agreement. He should have filed a manifestation before the trial court informing it of the agreement instead of leaving the trial court waiting and wondering whether said memoranda will be filed at all. His omission not only gave complainant much anxiety, it also needlessly compounded the long delay in the resolution of the 23-year-old case. Worse, respondent did not inform complainant that the case had been submitted for decision without memorandum despite complainants repeated requests for information regarding the status of her case. Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. A.,C. No. 4676, May 4, 2006 SPS. ANTONIO SORIANO vs. ATTY. RENATO REYES Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. In this case, by reason of Atty. Reyess negligence, complainant suffered actual loss. He should have given adequate attention, care and time to his cases. This is why a practicing lawyer may accept only so many

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cases that he can efficiently handle. Otherwise, his clients will be prejudiced. Once he agrees to handle a case, he should undertake the task with dedication and care. If he should do any less, then he is not true to his lawyers oath. A.C. No/ 4809, May 3, 2006 SPS. WILLIAM ADECER vs. ATY. EMMANUEL AKUT Respondent is bound by the representations he made in his Memorandum in Support of the Petition for Probation, i.e., that a timely petition for probation was not filed due to the fact that he was out of town and that complainants were laboring under the misapprehension that the civil liability must be paid in full before probation could be availed of. Either of his two explanations is enough ground to render him liable for negligence under the Code of Professional Conduct. First, despite his receipt of a copy of the Decision and the consequent running of the fifteen (15)-day period to file a petition for probation, respondent went out of town without contacting complainants to give them proper legal advice. Furthermore, his admission that complainants were [1] under the impression that they first had to pay off their civil liabilities prior to filing a petition for probation and [2] unaware that they had only fifteen (15) days from their counsels receipt of a copy of the decision to file their petition, proves that he failed to give complainants timely legal advise CANON 19 A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law. A.C. 6317, August 31, 2006 LUZVIMINDA LIJAUCO vs. ATTY. ROGELIO TERRADO Respondents disregard for his clients interests is evident in the iniquitous stipulations in the compromise agreement where the complainant conceded the validity of the foreclosure of her property; that the redemption period has already expired thus consolidating ownership in the bank, and that she releases her claims against it. As found by the Investigating Commissioner, complainant agreed to these concessions because respondent misled her to believe that she could still redeem the property after three years from the foreclosure. The duty of a lawyer to safeguard his clients interests commences from his retainer until his discharge from the case or the final disposition of the subject matter of litigation. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorneyclient relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the clients cause. The canons of the legal profession require that once an attorney agrees to handle a case, he should undertake the task with zeal, care and utmost devotion. Respondents admission that he divided the legal fees with two other people as a referral fee does not release him from liability. A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law, except in certain cases. Rule 19.02 A lawyer who has received information that his client in the course of the representation, perpetuated a fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall promptly call upon the client to rectify the same, and failing which he has to terminate the relationship with such client in accordance with the Rules of Court. A.C. No. 5655, January 23, 2006 VALERIANA U. DALISAY v. ATTY. MELANIO MAURICIO, Assuming that complainant indeed offered falsified documentary evidence in Civil Case No. 00-044, will it be sufficient to exonerate respondent? We believe not. First, Canon 19 outlines the procedure in dealing with clients who perpetrated fraud in the course of a legal proceeding. Consistent with its mandate that a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal and only within the bounds of the law, . As a lawyer, respondent is expected to know this Rule. Instead of inaction, he should have confronted complainant and ask her to rectify her fraudulent representation. If complainant refuses, then he should terminate his relationship with her. CANON 21 A lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of the client. A.C. No. 7023, March 30, 2006 BUN SIONG YAO vs. ATTY.EDUARDO A. AURELIO Notwithstanding the veracity of his allegations, respondents act of filing multiple suits on similar cases of action in different venues constitutes forum-shopping, as correctly found by the investigating commissioner. This highlights his motives rather than his cause of action. Respondent took advantage of his being a lawyer in order to get back at the complainant. In doing so, he has inevitably utilized information he has obtained from his dealings with complainant and complainants companies for his own end. CANON 20 A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees. A.C. No. 152072, January 31, 2006 ROMEO G. ROXAS, et al. vs. ANTONIO DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR., et al. However, in cases where contingent fees are sanctioned by law, the same should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case, and should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness, such that, under Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is tasked to charge only fair and reasonable fees. CANON 22 A lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice appropriate in the circumstances. A.C. No. 6155, March 14, 2006 MA. GINA FRANCISCO, et al. vs. ATTY. JAIME J. PORTUGAL In a criminal case like that handled by respondent in behalf of the accused, respondent has a higher duty to be circumspect in defending the accused for it is not only the property of the accused which stands to be lost but more importantly, their right to their life and liberty. . Had respondent truly intended to withdraw his appearance for the accused, he as a lawyer who is presumably steeped in court procedures and practices, should have filed the notice of withdrawal himself instead of the accused. At the very least, he should have informed this Court through the appropriate manifestation that he had already given

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instructions to his clients on the proper way to go about the filing of the Notice of Withdrawal, as suggested by Commissioner Villadolid. In not so doing, he was negligent in handling the case of the accused. 1 LEDESMA V CLIMACO FACTS: Ledesma is counsel de parte of one accused. Thereafter, he was appointed as Election Registrar of Cadiz, Negros Occidental by COMELEC Ledesma withdrew as counsel on the basis that his appointment as Election Registrar would require full time service as well as on the volume or pressure of work will prevent him from handling adequately the defense. Judge Climaco denied his motion, and even appointed him as counsel de officio of the accused. ISSUE: WoN the withdrawal of Ledesma should be allowed HELD: No. RATIO: 1. There is obvious reluctance of Ledesma to comply with his responsibilities as counsel de oficio. Then, even assuming that he continues his position, his volume of work is likely to be very much less than present. There is no excuse for him to shirk from his obligation as member of the bar, who expects to remain in good standing, should fulfill. 2. Ledesma was not mindful of his obligation as counsel de oficio. He ought to know that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. Being appointed as counsel de oficio requires a high degree of fidelity (law is a profession and not a mere trade). Requires counsel of repute and eminence. 3. In criminal cases, right to counsel is absolute. No fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. 4. The denial by Judge Climaco was due to the principal effect to delay the case (case has already been postponed for 8 times) 2 IN RE SYCIP FACTS: This is a consolidated petition. The first one filed by the surviving partners of atty. Alexander Sycip and the other filed by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ovaepa. They pray that they be allowed to continue using the names of partners who had passed away. Petitioners based their petitions on the following arguments: o Art. 1840 of the Civil Code, o in regulating other professions, the legislature has authorized the adoption of firm names without any restriction as to the use of the name of a deceased partner, o the Canons of Professional Ethics allows the continued use of a deceased partner when permissible by local custom.

ISSUE: W/N law firms may continue to use the names o deceased partners in their firm names HELD: NO! Art. 1840 primarily deals with the exception of liability on cases of a dissolved partnership, of the individual property of the deceased partner for debts contracted by the person who continues the business using the partnership name. what the law contemplates is a hold over situation preparatory to formal reorganization. Art. 1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a good will to protect rather than a professional partnership whose reputation depends on the personal qualifications of its individual members. A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed by other professionals or for business. a partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is not a partnership formed for then purpose of carrying on trade or business or of holding property. Thus, assumed or trade name in law practice is improper. The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege or franchise. It must be considered that in the Philippines, no local custom permits or allows the continued use of a deceased partners name. Therefore, the cited provision on Canons of Professional Ethics is not applicable.

DISSENTING OPINION: Petition may be granted with the condition that it be indicated in the letterheads of the 2 firms that Sycip and Ovaepa are dead or the period when they served as partners sould be stated therein. 3 CAYETANO V MONSOD Facts: Pres. Aquino nominated Christian Monsod to the position of COMELEC chairman. The Commission on Appointments affirmed the nomination and appointed Monsod to the position. Renato Cayetano now assails the appointment. He says that Monsod is not qualified to the position because he has not been engaged in the practice of law for ten years (requirement is provided by Consti Art. 9-C Sec. 1(1)). W/n Monsod is qualified for the position of COMELEC chairman. SC says yes. Monsod passed the bar in 1960 and had been consistently paying his professional fees. He worked in a law firm for several years after graduating but after that, had been more engaged in business and politics (for a list of his jobs, see p.238). Still, the SC said that he can still be considered

Issue: Held:

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as practicing law, if we consider the modern concept of the practice of law. This modern concept pertains to any act, whether in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. SC now says that since most of Monsods jobs involved the law, even if he has not been engaged in traditional lawyering (i.e. making pleadings or appearing in court), he can still be considered as to have been engaged in the practice of law. was reinstated. This reinstatement is a recognition of his moral rehabilitation after proving what was required by the Bar. Antonios restoration to the roll of lawyers wiped out restrictions and disabilities resulting from the previous disbarment. 5 ALAWI V ALAUYA PARTIES ALAWI, sales rep of E.B. Villarosa ALAUYA, incumbent executive clerk of court FACTS Through ALAWIS agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by ALAUYA of a housing unit A housing loan was also granted to ALAUYA by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) Subsequently, ALAUYA wrote a letter to the President of Villarosa advising termination of his contract on the grounds that his consent was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by ALAWI and proceeded to expound using acerbic language A copy of the letter, which bore no stamps, was sent to the VP of Villarosa ALAUYA also wrote the NHMFC repudiating as void his contract with Villarosa and asking for cancellation of his loan Finally, ALAUYA wrote 3 other letters to officers of the SC to stop deductions from his salary regarding the loan from NHMFC NHMFC also wrote the SC requesting it to stop said deductions Learning of the letters, ALAWI filed a complaint alleging that ALAUYA o Committed malicious and libelous charges o Usurped the title of attorney ISSUE W/N ALAUYA VIOLATED THE CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES YES, PARTICULARLY SECTION 4 Section 4 public officials and employees at all times respect the rights of others, and refrain from doing acts contrary to law, public order, public safety and public interest ALAUYA, being a member of the Sharia Bar and an officer of the Court, may not use language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing or otherwise improper His radical deviation from these norms cannot be excused W/N ALAUYA BEING A MEMBER OF THE SHARIA BAR CAN USE THE TITLE ATTORNEY NO, RESERVED ONLY FOR THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN ADMITTED AS MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR

Dissents: Most of the dissents focused on the issue that the Consti requirement pertains to habitual practice of law. The dissenters pointed out that for the past ten years, Monsod really seldom practiced law. This group believed that the Consti required that the practice of law be on a regular basis. Justice Padilla even came up with qualifications habituality; compensation; application of law, legal principle, practice or procedure; and atty.-client relationship to determine w/n a person has been engaged in the practice of law.. 4 CUI V CUI Facts: The main concern in this case is the respective qualifications of Jesus Cui and Antonio Cui to the position of administrator of Hospicio de San Jose de Barii, a charitable institution established by Don Pedro Cui and Dona Benigna Cui. Jesus and Antonio are the sons of Mariano Cui, a nephew of the founders of the institution. Antonios claim to the position is based on a convenio where then administrator Teodoro resigned in favor of him. Jesus, however, had no prior notice of this. Jesuss claim is that he should be preferred pursuant to the deed of donation (which recognized their father Mariano as a legitimate descendant to the position) as he is the older of the two. The deed, however, gives preference to a descendant who has a titulo de abogado or a doctor, or a civil engineer, or a pharmacist (in order). Or to the one who pays the highest taxes. Jesus holds the degree of Bachelor of Laws but is not a member of the Bar, while Antonio is a member of the Bar (he was formerly disbarred, though, by the SC and was just reinstated weeks before assuming the position)

HELD RATIO ISSUE HELD

Issue: Who has a better right to the position of administrator between Jose and Antonio? What does the term titulo de abogado mean? Held: Antonio. The term titulo de abogado is not just mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one to the practice of law. Possession of the degree is not indispensable to qualify as a lawyer since completion of the prescribed courses may be shown in some other way. It was also argued that Antonio is disqualified for having been previously disbarred since the deed also provided that an administrator may be removed if found to lack a sound moral character. However, Antonio

RATIO

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Court has already had an occasion to declare that persons who pass the Sharia Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar and may practice law only before Sharia courts ALAUYAS wish of not using counsellor because of confusion with councilor is immaterial because disinclination to use said title does not warrant his use of the title attorney revoking those promulgated by this Court during the years affecting the bar candidates concerned Although the SC certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only the SC, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may be so. Any attempt on the part of any of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its functions, as in this case. Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated by this court, but the authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys-at-law and their supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court. Section 13, article VIII of the Constitution provides: "Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish increase or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Courts, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines." The Constitution has not conferred on Congress and the SC equal responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law. The primary power and responsibility which the Constitution recognizes continue to reside in the SC. Had Congress found that this Court has not promulgated any rule on the matter, it would have nothing over which to exercise the power granted to it. The Constitution does not say nor mean that Congress may admit, suspend, disbar or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a determinate group of individuals to the practice of law. Its power is limited to repeal, modify or supplement the existing rules on the matter, if according to its judgment the need for a better service of the legal profession requires it. But this power does not relieve this Court of its responsibility to admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate attorneys at law and supervise the practice of the legal profession. There is no motive stated by the authorities for the qualification in RA 972 because of this, the classification is fatally defective. 1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952, and (b) all of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without force and effect. 2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval of

6 IN RE CUNANAN Facts: This is the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 case. As per the Rules of Court. A bar candidate must have a general average of 75% in all subjects without failing below 50% in any subject. In spite of this, the court passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of only: 72% in 1946 69% in 1947 70% in 1948 74% in 1949 In 1950 to 53, the 74% was raised to 75% A few candidates who missed the above marks set by the courts approached Congress. Congress made a bill, which was allowed by the president to become a law without his signature. This is RA 972. Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, have obtained a general average of 69.5 per cent in the bar examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5 per cent in 1952, 71.5 per cent in 1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per cent in 1954, and 73.5 per cent in 1955, will be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar, notwithstanding that the rules require a minimum general average of 75 per cent, which has been invariably followed since 1950. A breakdown of the numbers is on page 538. The additional candidates who want to be admitted claim that they suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and of inadequacy of preparation. Issue: W/N RA 972 is valid. Held: RA 972 is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession. The public interest demands of the legal profession, adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problems evolved by the times become more difficult. In decreeing that bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be admitted in mass to the practice of law, the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment a judgment

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the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid and shall continue to be in force, in conformity with section 10, article VII of the Constitution. Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in the examinations of 1946 to 1952 inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates who in the examinations of 1953 obtained a general average of 71.5 per cent or more, without having a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, are considered as having passed, whether they have filed petitions for admission or not. After this decision has become final, they shall be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar on the date or dates that the Chief Justice may set. 7 ECHEGARAY V SECRETARY OF JUSTICE pp. 111-112 The 1973 Constitution Article X, Sec5 (5): The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: xxx xxx xxx (5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the admission in the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang Pambensa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform in all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The 1987 Constitution Article VIII, Sec5 (5): The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: xxx xxx xxx (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the admission in the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform in all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. former municipal mayor of Calapan, for which they were held guilty and sentenced to the penalty of death. Upon review by the Supreme court the penalty was changed to reclusion perpetua. After serving a portion of the sentence, Gutierrez was granted conditional pardon by the President. The unexecuted portion of the prison term was remitted on condition that the shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. The widow of the murdered victim then filed a complaint with the Supreme Court asking that Gutierrez be removed from the rule of lawyers pursuant to Rule 127, section 5. Issue: W/N the conditional pardon to Gutierrez places him beyond the rule of disbarment Held: NO. Under section 5 of Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Murder is, without doubt, such a crime. Moral turpitude includes everything contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. In the Lontok case, on which Gutierrez relies, the respondent, Lontok, was granted absolute or unconditional pardon after conviction for the crime of crime of bigamy. It was held that such pardon releases the punishment and blots out existence of guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. In the case at bar, the pardon granted was conditional, and merely remitted the unexecuted portion of his term. It was not a full pardon which could have blotted out the offense committed. The crime was qualified by treachery and aggravated by its having been committed in band, by taking advantage of his official position, and with the use of a motor vehicle. The degree of moral turpitude warrants disbarment. Admission of a candidate to the bar requires academic preparation and satisfactorytestimonials of good moral character. These standards are neither dispensed with nor lowered after admission: the lawyer must adhere to them or incur the risk of suspension or removal. 9 ROYONG v OBLENA FACTS: Royong, the niece it the common-law wife of Oblena, filed a rape case against the latter. In her complaint, Royong alleged that in 1958 Oblena forced her to have intercourse with her and that she refrained to report the incident because Oblena threatened to kill her family. As a result if the sexual intercourse, Royong gave birth to a child Oblena denied all the allegations and argued that he and Royong had a relationship and Royong consented to have intercourse with him. The Solicitor General recommended that Oblena be permanently removed from the roll of attorney eventhough the acts of the Royong before and after the rape incident showed

The 1987 molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. It expanded the rule-making power of the Supreme Court. For the first time, the court was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. It also granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure. 8 IN RE GUTIERREZ In re Gutierrez Facts: Gutierrez is a member of the Philippine Bar. While he was the municipal mayor of Calapan, he and other co-conspirators murdered the

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that she is more of a sweetheart than a victim because of the circumstances behind the incident The Solicitor General also charged Oblena of falsifying and deliberately alleging in his application in the bar in1958 that he is a person of good moral character while having an illicit and adulterous relationship with Angeles who is not only the aunt of Royong but also has a legal husband in the province Oblena moved to dismiss the case because the offenses charged are different from those originally charged in the complaint but the court overruled his petition After the hearing, the investigators concluded that A.) Oblena used his knowledge in law to commit immoral acts without incurring any criminal liability; B.) he committed gross immorality by continuously cohabiting with Angeles, his common-law wife, even after he became a lawyer and C.) Oblena falsified the truth as to his good moral character in his application to take the bar. General finds sufficient grounds to proceed against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint accompanied by the evidence introduced in his investigation. 10 CORDON v BALICANTA (complaint for disbarment against Balicanta) Facts: Cordon and her daughter inherited 21 parcels of land in Zamboanga City when Cordons husband died. Sometime after, Balicanta enticed Cordon to organize a corporation to develop the properties. 19 parcels of land was transferred in the name of the newly formed corporation. Balicanta became the Chairman of the Board, President, General Manager and Treasurer of the corporation (kupal talaga) Balicanta was able to transfer some of the land to a certain Tion Suy Ong through an SPA signed by Cordon. Balicanta was also able to obtain a loan from Land Bank using as collateral 9 parcels of land. Balicanta did not even try to redeem the properties and even sold the right to redeem to another person. Gago talaga to si Balicanta. Cordons ancestral home was demolished and Cordon was detained in a nipa shack. Buti na lang at nadiscover ni daughter kung ano nangyari. Sabi kasi ni Balicanta na hes just going to have the house remodeled and repainted, tapos dinemolish na niya. Gago talaga. Cordon and daughter demanded that Balicanta return all the properties given by them to the corporation but Balicanta is unable to do so (napunta na sa ibang tao eh) IBP investigation recommended that Balicanta be disbarred. Balicanta fought back and said that the investigation is prejudiced against him and filed a complaint for disbarment against the people who investigated his case and the lawyers of Cordon. Balicantas complaint was dismissed. W/N Balicanta should be disbarred Hello?! Siyempre he should be disbarred. Balicanta cannot invoke the separate personality of the corporation (wow, piercing the corporate veil) Balicanta has perpetuated massive fraud against his client. Lahat ng ginawa niya against The Code of Professional Responsibility.

ISSUE: W/N the illicit relationship with Royong and the open cohabitation with Angeles, a married woman, are sufficient grounds to cause Oblenas disbarment HELD: YES! Although Oblena is not yet convicted of the crime of rape, seduction or adultery and he is not guilty of any of the grounds for disbarment enumerated in Sec 25, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, the enumeration is not exclusive and the power of the court to exclude unworthy members of the bar is inherent and is a necessary incident to the proper administration of justice and can be exercised even without any statutory authority, in all cases unless properly prohibited by statutes. American jurisprudence provides that the continued possession of a good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of law. The loss requires suspension or disbarment eventhough the statues do not explicitly specify that as a ground of disbarment. Oblenas argument that he believed himself to be a person with good moral character when he filed his application to take the bar examination is wrong. Ones own approximation of himself is not a gauge of his moral character. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. Moral character is what the person really is and not what he other people thinks he is. His pretension to wait for the 18th birthday of Royong before having carnal knowledge with her shows the scheming mind of Oblena and his taking advantage of his knowledge of the law. Also, Royong is the niece of his common-law wife and he enjoyed moral ascendancy over her. Oblena took advantage of Royongs trust on him. Oblenas contention that the Solicitor General exceeded his authority in filing the present complain which is entirely different from the original complaint filed is untenable. There is nothing in the law requiring the Solicitor General to charge in his complaint the same offence charged in the original complaint. What the law provides is that if the Solicitor

Issue: Held:

11 TING-DUMALI v TORRES FACTS: Isidra Ting-Dumali charges Rolando Torres with violating his oath as a lawyer and canons of legal and judicial ethics. Isidras parents died intestate and left many parcels of land to their 6 children (Isidra, Marcelina, Miriam, Eliseo and Vicente and Felicisima (married to Rolando Torres))

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Torres consented to the forgery of Isidras signature for an Extrajudicial settlement making it appear that his wife and Miriam were the only sole heirs. Torres, on a reconstitution hearing, presented false testimony that Miriam and Felicisima were the only sole heirs Torres presented the reconstituted deed to the RD to enable them to profit by selling the land Torres contends that his acts were done in good faith believing for himself that his and the siblings had already agreed on how to dispose of the said lot. That the false testimony was a clear oversight. And that his conformity through his signature was pro forma because the property was a paraphernal property of Marcelina and his wife. Investigating Commissioner of IBP suggested disbarment complainant void ab initio. Edmundo claimed that he left complainant and their 2 children w/ her consent. Issue: W/n Edmundo should be disbarred... Held: Yes. Facts show that while Edmundo has a subsisting marriage w/ Helen Esparza s/ whom he had 2 children, he entered into a 2nd marriage with complainant. While the marriage between complainant Florence and Edmundo has been annulled by final judgment, this does not cleanse his conduct of impropriety. Even assuming arguendo that Edmunod was coerced by complainant to marry her, the duress has ceased after wedding day. Edmundo having freely cohabited with her and even begot a 2nd child. The decision of RTC annulling their marriage is not res judicata on the final resolution of this case. A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor criminal but is rather an investigation by the court on the conduct of its officers. 13 SICAT v ARIOLA Facts: Arturo Sicat, Board Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Rizal charged Atty. Gregorio E. Ariola of committing fraud, deceit, and falsehood in notarizing a Special Power of Attorney (SPA). Said SPA was purportedly executed by Juanito Benitez, of the JC Benitez Architect and Technical Management. Said company had a contract with the Municipality of Cainta for the construction of low cost houses. What is fraudulent about it is the fact that the SPA was notarized more than 2 months after the death of Benitez, the person who supposedly executed it. P3,700T was paid to JC Benitez Architect and Technical Management for services not rendered (as consultants). Ariola claims that the document he notarized was superfluous and unnecessary, and prejudiced no one, and therefore he should be exonerated the document was cancelled the same day he notarized it, hence legally there was no public document that existed. Issue: Held: W/N Ariola can be held liable. Yes. Notaries public should not authenticate documents unless the persons who signed them are the very same persons who executed them an personally appeared before the, to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. His assertion of falsehood in a public document contravened one of the most cherished tenets of the legal profession and

ISSUE: WoN Torres should be disbarred? HELD: YES RATIO: 1. The lawyers oath, to which all lawyers have subscribed in solemn agreement to dedicate themselves to the pursuit of justice, is not a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law to be forgotten afterwards, nor is it mere words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that lawyers must uphold and keep inviolable at all times. 2. A lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which society has entrusted the administration of law and the dispensation of justice, he should make himself more an exemplar for others to emulate and he should make himself more an exemplar for others to emulate and he should not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. 3. The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar. 12 MACARRUBO v MACARRUBO Facts: Florence Macarrubo by herself and on behalf of her 2 children files a complaint for disbarment against Edmundo Macarrubo alleging that Edmundo deceived her into marrying him despite his prior subsisting marriage with a certain Helen Esparza. Florence further averred that Edmundo entered into a 3rd marriage with Josephine Constantino; and that he abandoned Florence without providing them w/ regular support. Edmundo denied the allegations, insisting instead that complainant Florence was fully aware of his prior subsisting marriage, but that Florence dragged Edmundo against his will to a 'sham wedding'. Edmundo submitted the decision of RTC declaring his marriage to

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potentially cast suspicion on the truthfulness of every notarial act. Ariola is disbarred, and not merely suspended for a year. 14 CHUA v MESINA, Jr Facts: 15 DE YSASI III v NLRC FACTS This is a case filed by a son against his father Father employed Son as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao Son suffered various ailments and was hospitalized on 2 separate occasions, June and August 1982 Father took care of medical expenses while son continued to receive compensation However, in April 1984, Father ceased to pay Sons salary Son filed an action in NLRC for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and payment of full back wages NLRC dismissed case stating that Son has abandoned his work and termination is for a valid cause though ordered Father to pay P5,000 as penalty for failure to serve notice of said termination to son

Atty Simeon Mesina is the legal counsel of spouses Anna Chua and Chua An. The spouses leased a building owned by Mesinas family. The property, however, was actually mortgaged in favor of a bank for a loan obtained by Mesinas motherFelicisima Melencio (who was the registered owner as well). When Felicisima failed to meet her obligations to the bank, the spouses were convinced by Mesina to help his mother in consideration for the purchase of the same lot at a certain price. A deed of sale was made conveying the property to the spouses. But when the spouses were appraised for capital gains tax, Atty Mesina suggested to execute another deed of salethis time, the date of the transaction is 1979, which is before the effectivity of the law imposing capital gains tax. Not long after the title was handed over to the spouses, another lessee of the buildingTecsonquestioned the transaction as he was, himself, interested in buying the property. Tecson filed charges for falsification of documents. To avoid the falsification charge, Mesina proposed to simulate a deed of sale wherein the spouses would appear to resell the property to Felicisima. A new title was issued to Felicisima by virtue of said deed but this was entrusted in the hands of the spouses. Later on, Tecson desisted from pursuing the charges. Meanwhile, Mesina borrowed the title of the property from the spouses and promised to transfer, yet again, title in the name of the spouses. But Mesina failed to effect such transfer and the spouses learned that the property is being offered to a public sale. Hence the action. The case was investigated by the IBP and recommended that Mesina be suspended for gross misconduct.

ISSUE HELD

W/N SON WAS ILLEGALLY DISMISSED YES

RATIO Article 282 of Labor Code enumerates causes for which an employer may valid terminate an employment Father banks on the fact that Son has abandoned his work However, to constitute abandonment there must be a clear, deliberate and justified refusal to resume employment and not mere absence In the case at bar, the reason for the Sons absence was due to his illness of which Father was aware of since he paid hospital and medical bills Father is ordered to pay Son backwages in lieu of reinstatement and separation pay equivalent to 1 month for every year of service ISSUE W/N COUNSELS OF EACH PARTY ACTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY HELD NO

Issue: Was Atty. Mesina guilty of gross misconduct? Held: Blimey! Of course! When Atty Mesina advised Chua to execute a deed of sale antedated to 1979 to evade payment of capital gains tax, he violated his duty to promote respect for law and legal processes. When he convinced Chua to execute another deed to make it appear that the property was conveyed back to Felicisima, Mesina committed dishonesty. And when he obtained the title upon the misrepresentation that he will return the same after 4 months, he committed dishonesty again. There were also badges of fraud that can be attributed to Mesina as there were marked differences in the signatures of Felicisima. Clearly, Mesina violated his oath of office and Canons 1, 7, 15, and 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. His disbarment is warranted.

RATIO Rule 1.04 of the Code of Responsibility explicitly provides a lawyer shall encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement In the case at bar, records do not show that counsel of both parties took pains to initiate steps geared toward a rapprochment between their clients In the same manner, the labor arbiter has been less than faithful to the spirit of the Labor Code as he did not exert all efforts towards the amicable settlement of the labor dispute 16 PEOPLE v ROSQUETA

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Issue: W/N Atty. is liable to be sanctioned. Facts: There was a criminal case against Antonio Rosqueta, Jr., Eugenio Rosqueta and Citong Bringas. On appeal, the SC issued a resolution ordering Atty. Gregorio Estacio (counsel de parte of the accused) to explain why disciplinary actions should not be taken against him for his failure to file the brief for appellants during the required period. Estacio failed to explain, so he was suspended from the practice of law. He then filed a motion for reconsideration saying that he did file the briefs but he sent it to Rosqueta Sr., whose house was burned down along with the briefs. He also said that the reason why he did not file the briefs was because the accused declared that they intended t withdraw their appeal for lack of money. The SC did subsequently receive affidavits from the accused withdrawing their appeal. Issue: W/n Estacios acts should be punished. Held: SC says yes. His acts were not consistent with the idea that the law is not a business but a profession. Lawyers do their job not for the sole consideration of money. Estacio should have continued with his duties despite knowing that the accused did not have money anymore. SC commended what some lawyers would have done in that situation which was to be declared as counsel de officio so that the client remains properly represented by a lawyer who is already familiar with the case. SC said that Estacios suspension for 5 mos. is already sufficient punishment for his acts. Thus, the suspension is lifted and Estacio is not anymore required to file the briefs but he is censured for negligence and inattention to duty. 17 CANOY v ORTIZ Held: Atty. Ortiz is to be sanctioned. Suspension from the practice of law for one (1) month. Several of the canons and rules in the Code of Professional Responsibility guard against the sort of conduct. CANON 18A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. Rule 18.03A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Rule 18.04A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for information. His failure to do so constitutes a violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He owes entire devotion to the interest of the client. The relationship of lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is ever present the need for the client to be adequately and fully informed of the developments of the case and should not be left in the dark. Neither is the Court mollified by the circumstance of Atty. Ortizs election as a City Councilor of Bacolod City, as his adoption of these additional duties does not exonerate him of his negligent behavior. 18 PEOPLE v STA TERESA Facts: Angeles Sta. Teresa was found by the trial court to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt of raping his 12-year old daughter, and was given the penalty of death. The case is now on automatic review. When accused was arraigned, he pleaded not guilty. After 9 days, his counsel de oficio made a manifestation that the accused wanted to change his plea to guilty. The prosecution no longer presented testimonial evidence and merely presented exhibits to which counsel de oficio did not comment nor object. During the promulgation of RTCs decision, counsel failed to appear and the trial judge had to appoint another counsel de oficio for the purpose of promulgation. Issue: W/N counsel de officio discharged his duties properly Held: NO. The abbreviated and aborted presentation of the prosecution evidence and the improvident plea of guilty was not in accordance with requirements of due process Considering the gravity of the offense charged and the finality of the penalty, the counsel de oficios performance was utterly wanting. As a lawyer sworn to uphold justice and the law, he

Facts: A Complaint was filed Canoy accusing Atty. Ortiz of misconduct and malpractice. It was alleged that Canoy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Coca Cola Philippines. Atty. Ortiz appeared as counsel for Canoy in this proceeding. Canoy submitted all the documents and records to Atty. Ortiz for the preparation of the position paper. Thereafter, he made several unfruitful visits to the office of Atty. Ortiz to follow-up the progress of the case. He was shocked to learn that his complaint was actually dismissed way back in 1998, for failure to prosecute, the parties not having submitted their position papers. Canoy alleged that Ortiz had never communicated to him about the status of the case. Atty. Ortiz informs the Court that he has mostly catered to indigent and low-income clients, at considerable financial sacrifice to himself. Atty. Ortiz admits that the period within which to file the position paper had already lapsed. He attributes this failure to timely file the position paper to the fact that after his election as Councilor of Bacolod City, he was frankly preoccupied with both his functions as a local government official and as a practicing lawyer.

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had the duty to exert utmost efforts to defend his client and protect his rights, no matter how guilty or evil he appears to be. This duty becomes more compelling is his client is accused of a grave crime and is in danger of forfeiting his life The right to counsel means more that just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections. Counsel must provide effective legal assistance and commit himself to the cause for the defense. There must be active involvement by the lawyer and he must be well-versed on the case, the procedures, law, and jurisprudence. 19 KHAN V SIMBILLO FACTS: An advertisement in Philippine Daily Inquirer came out which reads: ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE SPECIALIST 5324333/521-2667. SC ordered its staff to call the number and ask some information. Espeleta called the number and the wife of Atty. Rizalino Simbillo answered who said that his husband was an expert in handling annulment cases and guarantees a court decree within 4-6 month. The services of Atty. Simbillo is for P48,000. half of which is payable at the filing of the case and the balance after the decision has been rendered. Similar advertisement also appeared in The Philippine Star and Manila Bulletin. Khan, Assist. Court Administrator, filed a case against Simbillo for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility, Rule 2.03 and 3.01. Simbillo admitted that he caused the advertisement but he argued that solicitation and advertisement is not prohibited per se and that it is about time to change our views about the prohibition on advertising and solicitation. He also said that the interest of the public is not served by the prohibition and suggested that the ban be lifted. IBP recommended that Simbillo be suspended for 1 year and that repetition of similar act will be dealt with more severely. While the case was being investigated upon by the court, Simbillo again advertised his legal services, for 2 times, in the Buy & Sell Free Ads Magazine. ISSUE: W/N Simbillo violated the Code of Professional Responsibility HELD: YES! Rule 2.03 provides a lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business while Rule 3.01 states that a lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, selflaudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which the duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. The gaining of livelihood should be a secondary consideration. Aside from advertising himself as an Annulment of Marriage Specialist, his assurance of his clients that an annulment may be obtained in 4-6 months from the filing of the case encourages people, who might other have 2nd thought, to dissolve their marriage. Solicitation of legal business is not proscribed. However, solicitation must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. The use of simple signs stating the name/s of the lawyers, the office and residence address and the fields of expertise, as well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible. The use of calling cards is now acceptable.

20 IN RE TAGORDA Facts:

Luis Tagorda is a member of the provincial board of Isabela Previous to the last election, he used placards which in a way was advertising his services as a lawyer and notary public He also wrote a letter to a lieutenant of a barrio in Echague,Isabela. In essence he was informing the lieutenant that he will be in Echague during the weekends and the lieutenant should convey this information to the other people in his town. W/N the acts of Tagorda is advertising Yes, Tagorda is in a way advertising his services and this is contrary to the Canons of Professional Ethics (wala pa yung code of professional responsibility, 1929 case to) The most worthy and effective advertising for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity. Solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal communications or interviews not warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional. It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring lawsuit. Solicitation of cases result in the lowering of the confidence of the community and integrity of the members of the bar. It results in needless litigations and in incenting to strife. Tagorda suspended for a month.

Issue: Held:

21 DIR OF LEGAL AFFAIRS V BAYOT FACTS: Bayot was charged with malpractice by publishing Marriagelicense promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free for the poor. Everything confidential. In the Sunday Tribune

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Bayot first denied the publication but later on admitted, and asked for mitigation saying: o o I only did it once. I wont repeat it again! I never had any case by reason of the publication substantial distinction. The use of the name the Legal Clinic gives the impression that the respondent corporation is being managed by lawyers and that it renders legal services. The advertisement in question is meant to induce the performance of acts contrary to law, morals, public order and public policy. This is in violation of Canon 1 Rule 1.02 that is counseling illegal activities. Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court which requires that application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. Applying the case Cayetano vs. Monsod, the court agrees that the activities of the respondent Legal Clinic constitute the practice of law. Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent does not represent clients in court since law practice is not limited merely to court appearances. Regarding the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Profession Responsibility provides that a lawyer, in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, and objective information or statement of facts. The proscription against advertising of legal services rests on the fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a profession. Exceptions: o Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canon o Ordinary, simple professional card. The card may contain only the statement of his name, the law firm, address and branch of law practiced. Considering that Atty. Nogales who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of the legal clinic is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded with a warning that the repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more severely.

ISSUE: WoN Bayot can be charged with malpractice? HELD: YES. 1. The publication is tantamount to a solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. In In re Tagorda, 53 Phil., the respondent attorney was suspended from the practice of law for the period of one month for advertising his services and soliciting work from the public by writing circular letters. That case, however, was more serious than this because there the solicitations were repeatedly made and were more elaborate and insistent..Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the misconduct, the Court is of the opinion and so decided that the respondent should be, as he hereby is, reprimanded. "The most worth and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)

2.

3.

22 ULEP V LEGAL CLINIC FACTS: Ulep prays the Supreme Court to order the Legal Clinic to cease, issuing advertisement similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes A and B (p381). Legal Clinic admits the facts of publication of said advertisement that claims that it is not engage in the practice of law but in the rendering of legal support services through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machine. ISSUE: W/N the services offered by Legal Clinic as advertised by it constitutes practice of law Whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisement complained of HELD: According to the IBP, notwithstanding the manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish the 2 terms, legal support services and legal services, common sense would readily dictate that the same are essentially without

23 SAN JOSE HOMEOWNERS V ROMANILLOS Facts:

This is a disbarment case against Atty. Roberto Romanillos, for representing conflicting interests and for using the title Judge despite having been found guilty of grave and serious misconduct (in Zarate v Romanillos). Apparently, Romanillos was previously an active board member as corporate secretary of Durano Corp. Inc. (DCI). But it allowed itself to represent San Jose Homeowners Association, Inc (SJHAI) before the human Settlements Regulation Commission in a case against the same DCI. Irrelevant info: the case above was an alleged violation of DCI of the Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protection Act. DCI sold a land designated as a school site, without disclosing it as such. (page 106) When SJHAIs petition over the land was denied, the SJHAIs Board terminated Romanillos services. Also, Romanillos acted as counsel for Lydia DuranoRodriguez who substituted for DCI. Thus, a disbarment case was filed for conflicting interests.

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The IBP handled the case, but he was merely reprimanded. In spite of this, he still continued to serve as counsel for Durano-Rodriguez. Thus, a second disbarment case was filed. It also included his use of judge although he was found guilty of grave and serious misconduct. W/N Romanillos should be disbarred Held: (The subsequent resolution of the DOJ Secretary exposed her blatant errors.) And despite the pending appeal, she filed the Information. It would be more prudent to wait for the DOJ resolution. o Office of the Prosecutor did not even inform the trial court of the pending appeal to the DOJ Secretary. Judge Rouras procedural lapses: o Deferred resolution on the motion for a hold departure order until such time that all the accused who are out on bail are arraigned o Denied the motion to defer proceedings for the reason that private prosecution has not shown any indication that the appeal was given due course by DOJ Judge Villons procedural lapses: o Ordered arraignment despite: a motion to defer proceedings; a ten-day period with which the complainants can file petition with the CA; resolution of the CA ordering the Yabuts to comment on the complainants action; pending appeal with the DOJ.

Issue:

Yes. It is inconsequential that SJHAI never questioned the propriety of respondents continued representation of DuranoRodriguez. The lack of opposition does not mean consent. As long as the lawyer represents 2 or more opposing clients, he is guilty of violating his oath. His continued use of judge violated Rules 1.01 and 3.01. The penalty imposed on him in the Zarate case forfeiture of all leave and retirement benefits and privileges: including the title judge. (he was a judge before, but he resigned instead of being booted out) The title judge should be reserved only to judges, incumbent and retired, an not to those who were dishonorably discharged from the service.

Issue: Can the orders of Judge Roura and Judge Villon be sustained despite procedural defects? Held: No. The orders of Judge Roura denying Motion to Defer proceedings are void and set aside. The order of Judge Villon on the arraignment, and the subsequent arraignment of the Yabuts are void and set aside. Office of the Provincial Prosecutor is ordered to comply with the DOJ Secretarys resolution. Prosecutors are the representatives not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win every case but that justice be done. They are servants of the law whose two-fold aim is that guilt shall not escape and innocence shall not suffer. The judge should always be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to promptly and properly administer justice. The judges action must not impair the substantial rights of the accused, nor the right of the State and offended party. When the State is deprived of due process in a criminal case by reason of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, the acquittal of the accused or dismissal of the case is void. 25 TRIESTE v SANDIGANBAYAN FACTS TRIESTE was charged with 23 separate violations of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act* because while being the Municipal Mayor and member of the Committee on Award of the Municipality of Numancia in Aklan and having financial or pecuniary interest in TRIGEN Agro-Industrial Development

24 DIMATULAC v VILLON Facts:

In the prosecution of the Yabuts for the murder of Dimatulac, the Office of the Public Prosecutor (particularly the Asst Prosecutor) and two Judges (who handled the case) committed serious procedural flaws resulting in the impairment of due process (prejudicial to both the offended party and the accused). Procedural irregularities in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor: o Warrants of arrest were issued by the MCTC, with no bail recommended, but the Yabuts were not arrested or were never brought unto the custody of the law. Yet, Asst Fiscal Alfonso-Reyes conducted a reinvestigation. Though a prosecutor may disagree with the findings of the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation (and conduct his own), the circumstance that the accused waived the filing of their counter-affidavits left Alfonso-Reyes no other choice but to sustain the MCTC findingswhich she did not do. And later on, Alfonso-Reyes allowed the Yabuts to file their counter-affidavits without first demanding that they surrender by virtue of the standing warrants of arrest. o Alfonso-Reyes recommended a bond of 20k for the Yabuts despite the fact that they were charged of homicide and that they were fugitives from justice (having avoided service of warrant of arrest). o Alfonso-Reyes was aware of the private prosecutions appeal to the DOJ from her resolution.

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Corporation, he awarded purchases of construction materials by the said municipality from the said corporation and signing the vouchers as evidence of said purchase The Sandiganbayan found TRIESTE guilty and sentenced him to suffer indeterminate penalty of imprisonment and perpetual disqualification TRIESTE, in his defense, alleges that he signed the vouchers only after all the purchases had already been made, delivered and paid for by the Municipal Treasurer hence he cannot be guilty under the provisions of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act W/N TRIESTE IS GUILTY UNDER THE ANTI GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT NO TRIESTE already sold his shares to a certain MRS TUASON before he assumed office and despite the absence of it in the SEC records, the court finds this fact immaterial as there is no law requiring submission of reports regarding sales and disposal of stocks (what is required is only submission of annual financial reports) The Municipal Treasurer testified that there was never a public bidding hence if there is no bidding then there could be no awarding by TRIESTE Testimonial and documentary evidence both confirm that TRIESTE signed vouchers after payment and since what is contemplated in the Anti-Graft Law is the actual intervention in the transaction which one has financial or pecuniary interest in, TRIESTE cannot be held liable under such Law TRIGEN did not gain any undue advantage in the transaction such that there is no complaint for non-delivery, underdelivery or overpricing in the transactions Hence, TRIESTE should be acquitted (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts) against Sec. of DPI Francisco Tatad. 1979 Tatad had a falling out with then Pres. Marcos and the charges became widely known. Dec. 12, 1979 a formal complaint was filed with the Tanodbayan Apr. 1, 1980 Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the PSC for investigation and report. June 16, 1980 report by PSC was submitted recommending the filing of charges for graft and corruption. Oct. 25, 1982 all affidavits and counter-affidavits were in and the case was ready for disposition. July 5, 1985 Tanodbayan issued a resolution calling for the filing of charges against Tatad in the Sandiganbayan. 5 informations were filed against Tatad in 1985. Tatad now questions the propriety of the filing of charges. He alleges that his rights to due process and speedy disposition of cases have been violated. W/n Tatads rights to due process and speedy disposition of cases have been violated. SC says yes they were violated by the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law and substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by law is part of procedural due process. The case was ready for disposition as early as 1982 but the informations were only filed in 1985. A delay of close to 3 years can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. The charges in the complaint, specially his failure to file his Statement of Assets and Liabilities, are not that complicated to require 3 years before formal complaints are filed.

ISSUE HELD RATIO

Issue: Held:

NOTE *Section 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers (h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest 26 TATAD v SANDIGANBAYAN Facts: Oct. 1974 Antonio de los Reyes, former Head Executive Assistant of the Department of Public Information (DPI), filed a report to the Legal Panel of the Presidential Security Command (PSC) containing charges of violations of RA3019 7

27 PNB v ATTY CEDO Facts: PNB filed a complaint against Atty. Cedo for violation of Rule 6.02 that states: A lawyer shall not, after leaving govt. service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter which he had intervened with in said service. Cedo was the former Asst. Vice-President of the Asset management Group of PNB. During Cedos stint with PNB, he became involved in 2 transactions: 1.) sale of steel sheets to Ms. Ong and 2.) intervened in the handling of a loan of spouses Almeda. When a civil action arose because of #1, Cedo, after leaving the bank appeared as one of the counsel of Ms. Ong. Also, when #2 was involved in a civil action, the Almedas were represented by the law firm Cedo, Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates of which Cedo was a Senior Partner.

(a) Giving DGroup, a private corporation owned by his brother in-law unwarranted benefits; (b) receiving a check from Roberto Vallar, Gen. Manager of Amity Trading Corp., as consideration for the release of a check to the said corp. for printing services rendered during the Constitutional Convention Referendum; and (c) failure to file his Statement of Assets and Liabilities.

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Cedo claims that he did not participate in the litigation of Ms. Ongs case. He also claims that even if it was his law firm handling the Almeda case, the case was being handled by Atty. Ferrer. Issue: W/N violated Rule 6.02. Held: Cedo violated Rule 6.02. In the complexity of what is said in the course of dealings between the atty. and the client, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of other matters that might only further prejudice the complainant cause. Whatever may be said as to w/n the atty. utilized against his former client information given to him in a professional capacity, the mere fact that their previous relationship should have precluded him from appearing as counsel for the other side. It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all the parties concerned after the disclosure of facts. A lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose. 28 DINSAY v CIOCO Facts: Planters Machinery Corporation (PLAMACO) mortgaged to Traders Royal Bank (the Bank) certain properties as security for the payment of its loan. PLAMACO defaulted in the payment of the loan so the Bank extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage. At a foreclosure sale conducted by the sheriff, the property was sold to the bank, who was the sole bidder. A certificate of Sheriffs sale was executed by Atty. Cioco, then clerk of Court and Ex-officio Sheriff. Records disclose that page four of the said Certificate was surreptitiously substituted. The new page lowered the bid price from the original amount of P3, 263, 182.67 to only P730,000. Cioco and the sheriff who conducted the sale had previously been administratively charged and dismissed from service. Now, Atty.Cioco is sought to be disbarred. He argues that there was res adjudicata due to the administrative case, and that disbarment was deemed adjudicated therein, thus he may now longer be charged. under the courts plenary authority over members of the legal profession. While Cioco is in effect being indicted twice for the same misconduct, there is no double jeopardy as both proceedings are administrative in nature. The general rule is that a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. The exception is , if that misconduct affects his qualification as a lawyer or shows moral delinquency. Ciocos participation in changing the bid price in the Certificate of Sheriffs Sale affects his fitness as a member of the bar. He knows it is patently illegal to alter its contents after notarization, since it is already a public document. Cioco is disbarred.

29 IGOY v SORIANO FACTS: Igoy is one of the petitioners in the case of Heirs of Gavino Igoy, et al. vs. Mactan Shangrila Hotel. Eng. William Redoblado introduced Atty. Soriano to Igoy as a Justice of the CA. According to Igoys friend, Atty. Soriano will be able to help him in his case which is pending in the CA Atty. Soriano demanded from Igoy P20,000 but the former reminded the latter the he will only be able to help in the case as soon as the case was lifted to the SC Igoys case received an unfavorable decision in the CA and Atty. Soriano offered to prepare the Petition for Review to be filed in the SC. Atty. Soriano asked for an additional P20,000 Igoy send the amount by courier to the address of Atty. Soriano which was received by his son. SC denied the petition for review of Igoy with finality Igoy later found out that Atty. Soriano is not a CA Justice and filed this complaint against Igoy in the SC Arguments of Atty. Soriano: o It is unnatural for a person to give money to someone whom he does not know well and whom he met only for the first time o The money was offered gratuitously by Igoy o it is impossible the Igoy handed the money to him on the SC parking lot for many employees were passing in that place o it is not Eng. Redoblado who introduced him to Igoy but Mr. Taneo o if the SC finds that he is guilty, he will retire from the service Atty. Soriano filed his letter of resignation/retirement under RA 1616 ISSUE: W/N Atty. Soriano violated Canon 6, Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility HELD:

Issue: W/N Cioco may be charged with disbarment (W/N res adjudicata appplies) Held: Ciocos contention has no merit. Res adjudicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of the Courts administrative powers, as in this case. Disbarment has not been adjudicated in the previous case. Therein, Cioco was administratively proceeded against as an erring Court personnel under the supervisory authority of the court. Herein, Cioco is sought to be disciplined as a lawyer

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Yes! Atty. Soriano was dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and is suspended from the practice of law. Atty. Sorianos offer to resign was obviously an attempt to evade whatever penalty may be imposed on him. However, resignation will not extricate him form the consequences of his acts Resignation should not be used either as an escape or an easy way out to evade administrative liability by court personnel facing administrative sanctions To accept the claim of Soriano that the money was offered gratuitously will open the floodgates to fraud or graft and corruption. Government lawyers who are public servants owe utmost fidelity to the public service for public service is a public trust. Government lawyers should be more sensitive to their professional obligations as their reputable conduct is more likely to be magnified in the public eye. The nature and responsibilities of public officers enshrined in the Constitution are not mere rhetorical words to be taken lightly as idealistic sentiments but as working standards and attainable goals that should e matched with actual deeds. Issue: Held: W/N Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility apllies to Estelito Mendoza No, it does not apply to Mendoza. Sandiganbayan decision is affirmed. The matter (see 3rd note), or the act of Mendoza as Solicitor General is advising the Central Bank on how to proceed with the liquidation of Genbank. This is not the matter contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The matter involved in the liquidation of Genbank is entirely different from the matter involved in the PCGG case against the Lucio Tan group. The intervention contemplated in Rule 6.03 should be substantial and important. The role of Mendoza in the liquidation of Genbank is considered insubstantial. SC is even questioning why PCGG took such a long time to revive the motion to disqualify Mendoza. Apparently, PCGG already lost a lot of cases against Mendoza. Kyles interpretation: PCGG getting desperate Something to think about: SC is somehow of the opinion that Rule 6.03 will make it harder for the government to get good lawyers in the future to work for them because of the prohibition of accepting cases in the future that were related to ones work as a government counsel.

30 PCGG v SANDIGANBAYAN *kalokohan na kaso to, 140++ pages (disclaimer) main decision 28 pages lang ** merong history of Rule 6.03 and other historical stuff sa case Facts: 1976: General Bank & Trust Company (Genbank) encountered financial difficulties. Central Bank extended loans to Genbank in the hope of rehabilitating it (P310M). Nonetheless, Genbank failed to recover. 1977: Genbank was declared insolvent. A public bidding of Genbanks assets was held with the Lucio Tan Group winning the bid. Solicitor General Mendoza, representing the government, intervened with the liquidation of Genbank. 1986: after EDSA I, Cory established the PCGG to recover the ill-gotten wealth of Marcos, his family and cronies. 1987: PCGG filed a case against Lucio Tan and certain other people (basta marami sila). In relation to this case, PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the respondents by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with Marcos. Sandiganbayan heard the case. Estelito Mendoza (Solicitor General during the time of Marcos) represented the respondents. 1991: PCGG filed a motion to disqualify Mendoza, because of his participation in the liquidation of Genbank. Genbank (now Allied Bank) is one of the properties that PCGG is seeking to be sequestered from the Lucion Tan group. PCGG invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Sandiganbayan denied PCGGs motion. According to the Sandiganbayan, Mendoza did not take an adverse position to that taken on behalf of the Central Bank. And Mendozas appearance as counsel was beyond the 1 year prohibitory period since he retired in 1986.

Concurring Opinions: Panganiban & Carpio: the congruent interest prong of Rule 6.03 should have a prescriptive period Tinga: Rule 6.03 cannot apply retroactively to Mendoza (when he was Solicitor General, no Rule 6.03 yet) Bottom line, they are all questioning the unfairness of the rule if applied without any prescriptive period and if applied retroactively Notes: Adverse-interest conflicts where the matter in which the former government lawyer represents a client in private practice is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt with while employed with the government and the interests of the current and former are adverse Congruent-interest conflicts the use of the word conflict is a misnomer, it does not involve conflicts at all, as it prohibits lawyers from representing a private person even if the interests of the former government client and the new client are entirely parallel Matter any discrete, isolatable act as well as indentifiable transaction or conduct involving a particular situation and specific party Intervention interference that may affect the interests of others

31 IN RE GALANG

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FACTS: Ramon Galang has a pending criminal case of slight physical injuries in the City Court of Manila He took the Bar Exams 7 times and was allowed to take the lawyers oath in 1972. BUT, he was allowed to do so only because he fraudulently concealed and withheld from the Court his pending criminal case in 1962,63,64,66,67,69 and 71. And in 1966,67,69 and 71 he committed perjury when he declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case in court ISSUE: WoN Galang should be disbarred? HELD: YES! RATIO: 1. It is well-settled in a long string of cases that concealment of an atty in his application to take the Bar of the fact that he had been charged with, or indicted for,an alleged crime is a ground for revocation of his license to practice law. (Guilty of Fraud upon the Court) 2. Galangs persistent denial of his involvement in any criminal case (which he later admitted) and his failure to clear his name for 13 years indicate his lack of the requisite attributes of honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is therefore unworthy to be a lawyer. (he did not offer any explanation for such omission). 3. Among other grounds for disbarment: a. Misrepresentations of, or false pretenses relative to, the reqt on applicants educational attainment b. Lack of good moral character c. Fraudulent passing of the Bar exams 32 IN RE CUEVAS Facts: Petitioner Arthur Cuevas Jr., recently passed the 1996 Bar Examinations. His oath taking was held in abeyance in view of the Court's resolution which permitted him to take the Bar Exams subject to the condition that should he pass the same he shall not be allowed to take the lawyer's oath pending approval of the court. This resolution was due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence resulting in Homicide. The conviction stemmed from Cuevas' participation in the initiation rites of the LEX TALIONIS FRATERNITAS, a fraternity in the SAN BEDA College of Law, where Raul Camaligan, a neophyte, died as a result of personal violence inflicted upon him. Thereafter, petitioner applied for and was granted probation. He was later discharged from probation and his case considered closed and terminated. In this petition, Cuevas prays that he be allowed to take the lawyer's oath at the court's most convenient time. Issue: W/n Cuevas should be allowed to take the lawyers oath... Held: YES. His deliberate participation in the senseless beatings over a helpless neophyte shich resulted to the latter's untimely demise indicates absence of that moral fitness required for admission to the bar. The court nonetheless is willing to give Cuevas a chance in the same manner that it recently allowed Al Caparros Argosino (case sa legprof), petitioner's co-accused below, to take the lawyer's oath. His discharge from probation without any infraction of the attendant conditions therefor and the various certification attesting to his righteous peaceful and civic-oriented character prove that he has taken decisive steps to purge himself of his deficiency in moral character. 33 DIAO v MARTINEZ Facts:

Telesfor Diao was admitted to the Bar in 1953. Two years after, Severino Martinez charged him for having falsely represented his application: that he had the requisite academic qualifications. The Solicitor General investigated and recommended that Diaos name be erased from the roll of attorneys. Diao has not completed BEFORE taking up law, the required pre-legal education prescribed by the Department of Private Education: o Diao did not complete his HS training; and o Diao never attended Quisumbing College Diao claims that he left HS in his third year, he entered the US Army, passed the General Qualification Test, which according to him, is equivalent to a HS diploma, and upon return to civilian life, the education authorities considered his army service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year HS. Also, he claims that he really got his college diploma from Arellano University in April 1949. He says he was erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing Collge, in his school records. W/N Diao should be removed from the roll.

Issue:

Held:

Yes. Diaos name is removed from the roll. The error or confusion was to his own making. Had his application showed that he graduated from Arellano, it would have showed that he took up law 6 months before obtaining his Associate in Arts degree. He then would have not been permitted to take the Bar. Rule: That PREVIOUS to the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the required prelegal education as prescribed by the Department of Education. The fact that he hurdled the bar is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law;

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taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential. 34 CALUB v SULLER Facts: ISSUE Atty Suller raped the wife of his neighbor Cristino Calub. A criminal complaint for rape was filed against Suller. A complaint for disbarment was also filed by Calub before the SC. The CFI acquitted Suller for failure of the prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. HELD o o IRIS indicated in Answer she got married to CARLOS in Oct 22, 1985 However, Certificate of Marriage certified by State Registrar revealed that date of marriage was actually Oct 22, 1987 W/N IRIS SHOULD BE DISBARRED NO

Issue: Can Atty Suller be disbarred? Held: Yes. Acquittal in a criminal case is not determinative of an administrative case for disbarment. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows that he lacks moral character to continue as officer of the court. The rape by a lawyer of his neighbors wife constitutes such serious moral depravity. 35 UI v BONIFACIO FACTS LESLIES side of the story o LESLIE Ui married CARLOS and had 4 children with him o Subsquently, LESLIE found out CARLOS was having illicit relations with Atty IRIS Bonifacio and begot a daughter o CARLOS admitted this relationship with LESLIE who confronted IRIS o IRIS told LESLIE everything was over between her and CARLOS o However, LESLIE found out later the illicit relations continued and IRIS even had 2nd child with CARLOS o LESLIE filed a complaint for disbarment against IRIS on ground of immorality IRIS side of the story o Met CARLOS who represented himself as a bachelor with children by a Chinese woman with whom he had long been estranged o CARLOS and IRIS got married in Hawaii o Upon return to Manila, they did not live together because CARLOS wanted his children with the Chinese woman to gradually know and accept his marriage with IRIS o When IRIS knew about the 1st marriage, she cut all ties with him In proceedings before the IBP Commission, LESLIE filed a motion to cite IRIS in contempt for making false allegations in her Answer to impress upon the IBP that her 1st child by CARLOS was within wedlock

RATIO Immorality Requisites to admission to practice of law includes being a person of good moral character and possession of such must be continuous Loss of good moral character is a ground of revocation of the privilege of the practice of law In the case at bar, IRIS was imprudent in her personal affairs Circumstances existed which should have at least aroused her suspicion that something was amiss (i.e. not living together as husband and wife, children by another woman, etc) but she did not do anything about it However, the fact remains that IRIS relationship with CARLOS was clothed with marriage and cannot be considered immoral Moreover, such conduct to warrant disciplinary action must be grossly immoral that is so corrupt and false to constitute a criminal act or moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community IRIS act of immediately distancing herself belies the alleged moral indifference and proves she has no intention of flaunting the law Hence, IRIS should not be disbarred False allegation Any normal bride would recall date and year of marriage Difficult to fathom how IRIS could forget the year of her marriage Moreover, any prudent lawyer would verify the information contained in an attachment to her pleading especially in this case since IRIS had personal knowledge of facts stated therein Hence, IRIS should be reprimanded for attaching marriage certificate with an altered date 36 ROYONG v OBLENA FACTS: Royong, the niece it the common-law wife of Oblena, filed a rape case against the latter. In her complaint, Royong alleged that in 1958 Oblena forced her to have intercourse with her and that she refrained to report the incident because Oblena threatened to kill her family. As a result if the sexual intercourse, Royong gave birth to a child

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Oblena denied all the allegations and argued that he and Royong had a relationship and Royong consented to have intercourse with him. The Solicitor General recommended that Oblena be permanently removed from the roll of attorney eventhough the acts of the Royong before and after the rape incident showed that she is more of a sweetheart than a victim because of the circumstances behind the incident The Solicitor General also charged Oblena of falsifying and deliberately alleging in his application in the bar in1958 that he is a person of good moral character while having an illicit and adulterous relationship with Angeles who is not only the aunt of Royong but also has a legal husband in the province Oblena moved to dismiss the case because the offenses charged are different from those originally charged in the complaint but the court overruled his petition After the hearing, the investigators concluded that A.) Oblena used his knowledge in law to commit immoral acts without incurring any criminal liability; B.) he committed gross immorality by continuously cohabiting with Angeles, his common-law wife, even after he became a lawyer and C.) Oblena falsified the truth as to his good moral character in his application to take the bar. Oblenas contention that the Solicitor General exceeded his authority in filing the present complain which is entirely different from the original complaint filed is untenable. There is nothing in the law requiring the Solicitor General to charge in his complaint the same offence charged in the original complaint. What the law provides is that if the Solicitor General finds sufficient grounds to proceed against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint accompanied by the evidence introduced in his investigation.

37 DE LOS REYES v AZNAR Facts: Delos Reyes filed a complaint against Atty. Aznar for gross immorality. It appears that Atty. Aznar raped Delos Reyes. From the evidence, it appears that Aznar was the Chairman of the Board of Southwestern University. Delos Reyes failed her Pathology subject. As such, she approached Aznar for reconsideration. Aznar assured her that she would pass. Despite her plea, she failed the subject. Aznar told Delos Reyes that she should go with him to Manila or else she will flunk. They went to Manila. After dining in a restaurant, Aznar raped her twice in the evening and thrice the next morning inside the Ambassador Hotel. Aznar denies all the allegations and says that when he went to Manila, he slept at the house of his friends. Issue: W/N Aznar is guilty of gross misconduct. Held: Aznar is guilty of gross misconduct. The court agrees with the Sol. Gen.s finding that Aznar committed gross misconduct. While Aznar denied having taken Delos Reyes to the Ambassador Hotel and had sexual intercourse with her, he did not present any evidence to show where he was on that date. It is the duty of the lawyer, whenever his moral character is put into question, to satisfy the court that he is fit and proper to enjoy continued membership in the bar. He cannot dispense with the high exacting moral standards of the profession. Good moral character is a continuing qualification necessary to entitle on to continue in the practice of law 38 SOBERANO v VILLANUEVA Facts:

ISSUE: W/N the illicit relationship with Royong and the open cohabitation with Angeles, a married woman, are sufficient grounds to cause Oblenas disbarment HELD: YES! Although Oblena is not yet convicted of the crime of rape, seduction or adultery and he is not guilty of any of the grounds for disbarment enumerated in Sec 25, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, the enumeration is not exclusive and the power of the court to exclude unworthy members of the bar is inherent and is a necessary incident to the proper administration of justice and can be exercised even without any statutory authority, in all cases unless properly prohibited by statutes. American jurisprudence provides that the continued possession of a good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of law. The loss requires suspension or disbarment eventhough the statues do not explicitly specify that as a ground of disbarment. Oblenas argument that he believed himself to be a person with good moral character when he filed his application to take the bar examination is wrong. Ones own approximation of himself is not a gauge of his moral character. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. Moral character is what the person really is and not what he other people thinks he is. His pretension to wait for the 18th birthday of Royong before having carnal knowledge with her shows the scheming mind of Oblena and his taking advantage of his knowledge of the law. Also, Royong is the niece of his common-law wife and he enjoyed moral ascendancy over her. Oblena took advantage of Royongs trust on him.

Soberano filed a petition for disbarment alleging that after Atty. Villanueva had induced her to take part in a fake wedding, the latter cohabited with her and later lived with her as husband and wife. As a consequence of this, she bore him two children, and subsequently, Villanueva abandoned them. Soon thereafter, Soberano sent a letter to the court asking that no action be taken on her petition until her mother has arrived and decided whether it should push though. Soberano sent another letter saying that her mother has arrived and that the case must case.

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Soberano again wrote a letter saying that the filing of the petition was not sincerely her own wish, and that she was finally withdrawing her complaint the last letter written by Soberano to the court however, prayed that her motion to withdraw the petition be denied, since Villanueva had procured the motion by means of threat and intimidation. father together with the affidavits of several people confirming Velascos illicit relationship with Lucy as evidence Atty. Velasco denied all the allegations of Rau Sheng with these arguments: o He could not deceive Rau Sheng for the Taiwanese was always represented in all their transactions by Atty. Purog o He refused to deliver the certificate of stocks and the land titles because of the Rau Shengs incomplete payment of the purchase price o As to the immorality claim, Atty. Velasco presented affidavits of his wife and Lucy Matienzo

Issue: W/N Villanueva should be disbarred Held: NO The letters of Soberano to Villanueva clearly indicated that intimate relations had existed between them prior to the date when the alleged fake wedding occurred. These indicate that there was o need for Villanueva to stage a fake wedding to induce Soberano to cohabit with him. Some of the letters showed that Soberano reminded him of his promise to marry her after he passed the bar As to whether the extra-marital relations between Soberano and Villanueva warrants disciplinary action, SC held that in light of the circumstances in this case, these acts are neither so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, nor so unprincipled as to warrant a disbarment of disciplinary action. Also, distinguished members of the bar had attested to Villanuevas good moral character. One is no less than the Executive Judge of the CFI of Negros Occidental, where Villanueva is practices his profession. The other is the Dean Montemayor of the Ateneo College of Law. The last one is Hon. Guillermo Santos, former Chairman of Agricultural Tenancy Commission, then Judge of CFI and Court of Agrarian Relations. 39 RAO SHENG v VELASCO FACTS: Rau Sheng Mao is a Taiwanese national who engaged the services of Atty. Angeles Velasco as his legal consultant and counsel of his company Foreign Investors Consultancy and Management, Inc (FICMI). Haru Gen Beach Resort and Hotel Corporation ,represented by Atty, Velasco as its director and stockholder, entered into a management agreement with FICMI Atty Velasco sold to Rau Sheng his 10,000 shares in Haru Gen for P1,000,000 but the former refused to deliver the certificates to the Taiwanese despite complete payment made by the Taiwanese Also, 3 lands of Atty. Velasco was bought by Rau Sheng for P3.3M with a remaining balance of P300,000, but Atty. Velasco still refused to deliver the titles Rau Sheng filed an administrative case against Atty. Velasco. Rau Sheng presented as evidence letters made by Atty. Velasco wherein the latter was asking money from the former to be given to judges hearing his cases An additional charge for immorality because of his illicit relationship with Lucy Matienzo who is not his legal wife was filed by Rau Sheng wherein he presented the baptismal certificate of Jenny Velasco which listed Atty. Velasco as its

ISSUE: W/N Atty. Velasco is guilty of all the allegations made by Rau Sheng HELD: YES! Atty. Velasco was found guilty of the having illicit relationship with Matieza and giving Rau Sheng the impression that he was in the position to influence the court and he was ordered suspended from the practice of law for 2 years The court found it unlikely that Rau Sheng was deceived by Atty. Velasco in all their transactions for he was always represented by Atty. Purog in all the dealings But Atty. Velasco is guilty of having an adulterous relationship with Matienza with whom he has 3 children all bearing his surname as seen in all the school records of the children. Velasco violated Canon 1, Rule 1.101 by engaging in unlawful and immoral acts. Lawyers are burdened with the highest degree of social responsibility and thus must handle their personal affairs with the greatest caution. Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand no less than the highest degree of morality. What is more, Velasco violated one of the basic tenets of legal ethics by giving Rau Sheng the impression that he was in the position to influence the courts. Velasco claimed that he has connections with judges and they were claiming money from Rau Sheng. A lawyer is duty bound to avoid improprieties which gave the appearance of influencing the courts and place the integrity of the administration of justice in peril. No profession offers greater opportunity for public service than that of a lawyer. For the privilege conferred upon him, a lawyer was tasked with the equally greater responsibility of upholding the ideals and ethics established. 40 OLBES v DECIEMBRE Facts: Spouses Olbes (Franklin & Lourdes) were employees of the Central Post Office in Manila. They filed this case for disbarment against Atty. Deciembre. Lourdes, with the help of Deciembre, acquired a loan from Rodela Loans in the amount of P10K. Lourdes then issued 5 PNB blank checks to respondent to serve as collateral. Subsequently, Lourdes paid Deciembre the amount of the loan plus interest and surcharges.

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Notwithstanding payment, Deciembre filled up the blank checks in the amount of P50k each. Siyempre tumalbog yun mga cheke. Deciembre then filed BP22 & estafa cases against the Olbes spouses. Reklamo siyempre sila Olbes. They are even saying that some of their officemates suffered the same fate under Deciembre. Investigating officer: Deciembres version of the facts is highly doubtful. There are discrepancies between his oral and written testimonies. W/N Deciembre should face disciplinary sanctions Siyempre! He is in violation of Rule 7.03 He committed falsification when he filled up the blank checks even if this was not agreed upon and despite knowledge that the loan had already been paid. He even filed BP22 cases against the couple. This shows the vileness and wretchedness of his soul. Franklin was even detained for 3 months because of the cases. Deciembre is found to be lacking good moral character. Good moral character includes at least common honesty. The penalty recommended by the IBP of suspension for 2 years is too mild. Deciembre is suspended from the practice of law indefinitely. Any wrongdoing which indicates moral unfitness for the profession, whether it be professional or non-pro, justifies disciplinary action. For a lawyers professional and personal conduct must at all times be kept beyond reproach and above suspicion. Her deliberate refusal to accept the notices served on her stains the nobility of the profession. How else would a lawyer endeavor to serve justice and uphold the law when she disdains to follow even simple directives. Also, Canon 1 says that a lawyer shall uphold the consti, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the legal processes. 42 COJUANGCO v PALMA Facts: Complainant Cojuangco wa a client of Angara Concepcion Regala and Cruz Law Offices and Palma was the lawyer assigned to handle his cases. Palma's relationship with the Cojuangcos became intimate. He frequented theis house and even tutored Cojuangco's 22-year old daughter Maria Luis Cojuangco. Wihtout the knowledge of complainant Cojuangco's family, Palma married Lisa in Hongkong. It was only the next day that Palma informed complainant of such fact. Complainant was shocked, knowing fully well that Palma is a married man and has 3 children. Complainant filed with CFI a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage between respondent Palma and Lisa. CFI delared that marriage null and void. Thereafter, Cojuangco fileed with the SC the instant complaint for disbarment. Meanwhile, the first division of SC issued a resolution setting aside the CFI Decision declaring the marriage null and void and remanding the case to the CFI for proper proceeding. To this date, the records fail to disclose the outcome of this case. Issue: W/n Palma should be disbarred... Held: YES. There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in the lawyer's professional capacity or in his private life. Professional competency alone does not make a lawyer worthy member of the Bar. Good moral character is always an indispensabel requirement. The truth is respondent married Lisa while he has a subsisting marriage with Elizabeth Herosisima. Therefore he exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar. Respondent's culpability is aggravated by the fact that Lisa was just 22 years old and was under psychological treatment for emotional immaturity. The subsequent judgment of annullment of marriage has no bearing to the instant disbarment proceeding. A disbarment case is sui generis for it is an investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers. 43 REYES v CHIONG JR. 2.

Issue: Held:

41 GRANDE v DA SILVA FACTS: Emilio Grande is the private offended party (of estafa and BP 22) against a certain Sergio Natividad, the client of Atty. De Silva De Silva tendered a check to Grande as settlement of the civil aspect of the case. The check was returned with the notation that the ACCT CLOSED Grande filed a suit against De Silva for violation of BP 22 and Estafa (sha naman ang nakasuhan tuloy hehe) De Silva refused to comment on notices of complaints sent to her. IBP recommended that de Silva be suspended for two years. ISSUE: WoN de Silva should be suspended? HELD: YES RATIO: 1. The nature of the office of an atty requires that a lawyer shall be a person of good moral character. Gross misconduct which puts the lawyers moral character in serious doubt may render her unfit to continue in the practice of law. A lawyer may be disciplined for evading payment of a debt validly incurred. The loss of moral character of a lawyer for any reason whatsoever shall warrant her suspension or disbarment.

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Facts: Atty. Ramon Reyes counsel for Zonggi Xu. Atty. Victoriano Chiong, Jr for Chia Hsien Pan. Xu, a Chinese-Taiwanese went into a business venture with Pan. Pan was supposed to set up a Cebu-based fishball, tempura and seafood products factory. He did not establish it, and so Xu asked that his money be returned. Xu then filed a case of estafa against Pan. Prosecutor Salanga then issued a subpoena against Pan. Atty. Chiong then filed a motion to quash, but he also filed a civil complaint for the collection of a sum of money and damages as well as for the dissolution of a business venture against Xu, Atty Reyes, and Prosecutor Salanga. He alleged that Salanga was impleaded as an additional defendant because of the irregularities the latter had committed in conducting the criminal investigation he still filed the complaint against Pan in spite of Pans motions. Atty. Reyes was allegedly impleaded because he allegedly connived with Xu in filing the estafa case which was baseless. IBP recommended that Chiong be suspended for 2 years. W/N Chiong should be suspended. Held: A complaint was filed against Pefianco for conduct unbecoming of a lawyer and for using improper and offensive language. Pefianco says that he was just moved by the sight of a crying woman whose husband had been murdered. He also averred that it was Alcantara who punched him and called him stupid.

Issue: Did Pefianco violate the Code of Professional Responsibility? Held: Yes. Pefianco violated Canon 8 of the Code which requires lawyers to conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor toward their fellow lawyers. It was Pefiancos meddling in a matter in which he had no right to do so that caused the untoward incident (shouting at Salvani and the woman). Though he thought that this is righteous, his public behavior can only bring down the legal profession in the eyes of the public and erode respect for it. Atty Pefianco was fined and reprimanded. 45 CAMACHO v PANGULAYAN FACTS 9 students of AMA were expelled for having apparently caused to be published objectionable features or articles in the school paper Denial of the appeal to AMA President Aguiluz gave rise to Civil Case 97-30549 CAMACHO was the hired counsel of the expelled students in an action for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injuction in the said civil case While the civil case was still pending, letters of apology and Re-admission Agreements were separately executed by the expelled students without the knowledge of CAMACHO CAMACHO filed a complaint against lawyers comprising the PANGULAYAN AND ASSOCIATES Law Firm (lawyers of AMA) because without his knowledge they procured and effected on separate occasions compromise agreements (letters of apology and Re-admission Agreements) with 4 of his clients which in effect required them to waive all kinds of claims they may have with AMA CAMACHO averred that such an act was unbecoming of any member of the legal profession warranting either disbarment or suspension PANGULAYAN in his defense claimed that the agreements were executed for the sole purpose of effecting the settlement of an administrative case ISSUE HELD RATIO W/N PANGULAYAN AND ASSOCIATES SHOULD BE SUSPENDED/DISBARRED YES

Issue:

Yes. Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. If Chiong believed that the two had conspired to act illegally, he could have instituted disbarment proceedings. As a lawyer, Chiong should have advised his client of the availability of these remedies. Thus the filing of the cases had no justification. Lawyers should treat their opposing counsels and other lawyers with courtesy, dignity and civility. Any undue ill feeling between clients should not influence counsels in their conduct and demeanor toward each other.

44 ALCANTARA v PEFIANCO Facts: Atty Pefianco is counsel in a criminal case. One day the private offended party went to the Public Attorneys Office to have her civil claims (in the criminal case) settled. Atty Salvani attended to her. While Atty. Salvani was talking to the woman, Atty Pefianco shouted at them and questioned the actions of the woman (pertaining to the settlement). Atty Pefianco was asked to calm down but he did not refrain from his outburst. District Public Attorney Alcantara, as head of the agency, talked to Pefianco. But Pefianco called Alcantara an idiot and a stupid (loud enough for other people to hear). A commotion in the office ensued (Pefianco even tried to attack Alcantara).

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It would appear that when individual letters of apology and Readmission Agreements were formalized, CAMACHO was already the retained counsel of the expelled AMA students PANGULAYAN and associates having full knowledge of this fact still proceeded to negotiate with the expelled AMA students and their parents without at least communicating the matter to their lawyer CAMACHO This failure of PANGULAYAN and associates, whether by design or oversight, is an excusable violation of the canons of profession ethics and in utter disregard of a duty owing to a colleague The excuse that agreements were executed for settling the administrative case was belied by the Manifestation which states 9 signatories agreed among others to terminate ALL civil, criminal and administrative proceedings they may have against AMA arising from their previous dismissal Hence, PANGULAYAN should be suspended for 3 months made in the course of judicial proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings, petitions and motions, are absolutely privileged so long as they are pertinent and relevant to the subject inquiry, however false or malicious they may be. For the first cause of action, the SC held that such statements made by Javier were necessary in order to resolve the petition for audit filed. These statements give a possible scenario as to the reason for the burglary in the UEFA office. As to the third cause of action, the SC gave Javier the benefit of the doubt that he issued these statements only in the defense of his client. As to the second (for which the SC found Javier guilty), the Court ruled that the statements made regarding Torres intellectual aptitude were not relevant to the attorneys fees case. The issue in the said case was whether the 10% attorneys fees checked off from the initial backwages/salaries of UEFA members is legal (I dont really understand this pero yan lang yun nakalagay). The SC pointed out that Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility instructs that respondents arguments in his pleadings should be gracious to both the court and opposing counsel and be of such words as may be properly addressed by one gentleman to another. Javier has disobeyed such mandate and is thus suspended from the practice of law for 1 month.

DOCTRINE A lawyers should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel, much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him but should only deal with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel and he should not undertake to advise him as to law. 46 TORRES v JAVIER Facts:

47 CAMBALIZA v CRISTOBAL-TENORIO Facts: Cambaliza, a former employee of Atty. Cristal-Tenorio, charged the latter with grossly immoral conduct. Cambaliza alleged that Atty. has been falsely representing herself to be married to Felicisimo Tenorio, when in fact Felicisimo was already married to another woman (Atty. got a fake marriage license.). She also alleges that the Atty. caused the dissemination to the public of a libelous affidavit against a Makati Councilor. At the helm of her complaint was the allegation that the Atty. cooperated in the illegal practice of law by her husband Felicisimo, who is not a member of the bar. Atty. denies all the allegations. She says that her firm is a sole-proprietorship; hence, she had no partners in her law office. Issue: W/N the lawyer is guilty of cooperating in the illegal practice of law. Held: The lawyer is guilty. The court agrees with the finding of the Commissioner on Bar Discipline. According to the Commissioner, Atty. cooperated in illegal practice, in violation of Rule 9.01 based on the ff. evidence: (1) letterhead of CristalTenorio Law office, with Felicisimo as senior partner, (2) Sagip Radio Comm. Group card of Atty. Felicisimo Tenorio (3) an ordered by the MTCC where Felicisimo entered his appearance as counsel. Any lawyer who allows a non-member of the Bar to misrepresent himself as a lawyer is guilty of violating rule 9.01.

Issue: Held:

This is an administrative case filed by Atty. Ireneo Torres against Atty. Jose Javier for malpractice, gross misconduct in office as an attorney and/or violation of the lawyers oath. There were 3 causes of action First, the allegations stem from statements/remarks made by Javier in the pleadings he filed in a petition for audit of all funds of the University of the East Faculty Association (UEFA) (Torres is the President). Javier implied that Torres had a motive to burglarize the office of UEFA to get certain documents. Second, Torres alleges that Javier used language that was clearly abusive, offensive, and improper, inconsistent with the character of an attorney as a quasi-judicial officer. This was with regard to Javiers Reply to Respondents Answer/Comment in the attorneys fees case where Javier made a comment on the intellectual capacity of Torres. Third, Torres finds fault in Javiers statement that implies that it is normal for notaries public to let their relatives sign the documents for them. Torres says that this statement is demeaning to the legal profession and the notarial service. IBP found Javier guilty and reprimanded him. W/n Javier should be held liable for his acts. SC says only as regards the second cause of action. The court made mention that it is well entrenched in Philippine jurisprudence that for reasons of public policy, utterances

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The lawyers duty to prevent or not assist in the unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. The purpose is to protect the public, the client, the bar, and the court from the incompetence and dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice. 48 TAN TEK BENG v DAVID Facts: Tan Tek Beng is a non-lawyer while David is a lawyer. David drafted a contract signed by him and Tan Tek Beng stating among others that On all commissions and attorneys fees that we shall receive from our clients, we shall divide fifty-fifty. In the same contract, David also agreed not to deal directly with their clients. The business relationship between David and Tan Tek Beng did not last since there were mutual accusations of doublecross. Tan Tek Beng accused David of not complying with the agreement and denounced the latter to then Presidential Assistant Ronaldo Zamora, to the Office of Civil Relations at Camp Crame, and to the Supreme Court. He did not file any action to enforce the agreement. While the case was being investigated by the Solicitor General, Tan Tak Beng died. This case was submitted for decision. disqualification to be admitted to the bar, they took their oaths as lawyers before a notary public and formally advised the SC of such oath taking and that they will engage in the practice of law in all courts of the Philippines RTC: not guilty of contempt of court unless the respondents actually engaged in the practice of law or held out to the public that they are lawyers by means of circulars

ISSUE: W/N the act of the respondents of taking their oath before a notary public constitutes contempt of court HELD: YES! The oath as lawyer is a prerequisite to the practice of law and may be taken only before the SC by those authorized by the latter to engage in such practice. Respondents clearly defied and challenged the orders of the SC by willfully taking the lawyers oath before the notary public despite the resolution of the SC denying their petition to be admitted to the bar. The ruling of the lower court is wrong for assuming to be an attorney, x x x, and acting as such without authority, is only one of the grounds under Rule 64, section 3. Also, by taking the oath of office as attorney-at-law and notifying the SC of what they had done and their intent to practice law in all courts of the Philippines, the respondents had, for all intent and purposes, held out to the public as such as attorney-at-law The case is remanded to the court of origin

Issue: W/N the agreement was valid. Held: NO. The agreement is void because it was tantamount to malpractice which is the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers. This meaning is in consonance with the principle that the practice of law is a profession, not a business. The commercialization of law practice is condemned in certain canons of professional ethics adopted by the American Bar Association: 34. No division of fees for legal services is proper, except with another lawyer, based upon a division of service or responsibility. 35. The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or exploited by any law agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes between client and lawyer David should have known better than to enter and act upon such void and unethical agreement. He is reprimanded for being guilty of malpractice. 49 PEOPLE v DE LUNA FACTS: De Luna, ET al., respondents, know that they did not pass the bas examination. Although they sought admission under the Bar Flunkers Act, they were notified of the decision of the SC denying their petitions. But notwithstanding their Issue: Held:

50 PHILIPPINE LAWYERS v AGRAVA Facts:

Agrava is the Director of the Philippines Patent Office (PPO). Agrava issued a circular announcing that there will be an examination to determine who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the PPO. Phil. Lawyers Assoc. (PLA) filed this case for prohibition and injunction against Agrava. PLA: one who passes the bar is licensed to practice law and is qualified to practice before the PPO. Agrava is in excess of his jurisdiction in issuing the additional qualification Agrava: prosecution of patent cases does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge. That like his US counterpart, he can require additional requirements to practice before the PPO. Take note Agrava has been issuing examinations before but it was only now that this power has been contended W/N appearance before the PPO constitutes or is included in the practice of law

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Yes, it is still within the ambit practice of law. Agrava is in excess of his jurisdiction when he requires an additional examination for lawyers. The SC has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the practice of law in the Philippines. The practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal principle, practice or procedure and calls for legal knowledge, training and experience. Although it is admitted that there is some technicality involved in the work for PPO, but everything still goes back to the Patent law as well as other laws. As to Agravas contention that he has the authority just like his US counterpart, this contention is wrong. The Phil. Patent law and the US Patent law are different as to the sections involving the powers of the director. Nowhere in the Philippine law is it provided for that the director has the power to require additional examinations for attorneys. Court held a penalty of 1 year suspension or until he paid his dues, as appropriate. 52 FAR EASTERN SHIPPING v CA Facts: M/V Pavlodar owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESC) arrived at the port of Manila. Senen Gavino was assigned by the Manila Pilot's Association (MPA) to conduct docking manuevers for the safe berthing of the vessel. Gavino stationed himself in the bridge, with the master of the vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside him. When the vessel was already about 2000 feet from the pier, Gavino ordered the anchor dropped. Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel. However the anchor did not hold as expected. The speed of the vessel did not slacken. A commotion ensued between the crew members. When Gavino inquired about the commotion, Kavankov assured Gavino that there was nothing to it. The bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing considerable damage to the pier. PPA filed a complaint for a sum of money against FESC, Gavino and MPA. CA ruled in favor of PPA holding them liable with MPA (employer of Kavankov) entitled to reimbursement from Gavino. Issue: Are the counsels for the parties committed acts which require the exercise of the court's disciplinary powers? Held: YES. The records show that the law firm of Del Rosario and Del Rosario thru its associate, Atty Tria, is the the counsel of record for FESC in both GR no 130068 and GR no 130150. GR 130068 which is assigned to the Court's second division, commenced with the filing of a verified motion for extension of time which contained a certification against forum shopping signed by counsel Tria stating that to the best of his knowledge there is no action or proceeding pending in the SC, CA or any other tribunal. Reviewing the records, the court finds that the petition filed by MPA in GR no, 130150 then pending with the third division was duly filed with a copy thereof furnished by registered mail to counsel for FESC (atty Tria). It would be fair to conclude that when FESC filed its petition GR no 130068, it would aready have received a copy of the copy of the petition by MPA. It wa therefore encumbent upon FESC to inform the court of the pending action. But considering that it was a superfluity at that stage of the proceeding , it being unnecessary to file such certification of non forum shopping with a mere motion for extension, the court disregarded such error. On the other hand it took the OSG, representing PPA, an ordinately and unreasonably long period of time to file its comment, thus unduly delaying the resolution of these cases. In GR no 130068, it took 210 days before the OSG filed its comment. FESC was not even furnished with a copy. In Gr no 130150 it took 180 days before comment was

51 SANTOS v LLAMAS FACTS: Soliman Santos, a member of the Bar filed a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues against Atty. Francisco Llamas Santos bases his claims on the grounds that 1) Llamas has been dismissed as Pasay City Judge and 2) his conviction for estafa Llamas contends that 1) his dismissal was reversed and set aside 2) that his principal occupation was a farm, which he had declared in his Income Tax Return. And moreover, since he was a senior citizen, he was exempt in paying (in pursuant to Sec 4, RA 7432),and that Llamas believed in good faith that he is only allowed a limited practice ISSUE: WoN Llamas can be held administratively liable? HELD: YES. RATIO: 1) a lawyer by indicating BP- Rizal xxxx in his pleadings, thereby misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP due, is guilty of violating a. Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonet, immoral or deceitful conduct b. Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all timed uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the IBP c. Canon 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the Court d. Rule 10.01- A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court, nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by an artifice 2) a lawyers failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings that he filed in court indeed merit the most severe penalty --HOWEVER, in view of Llamasadvanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law, the

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filed. This disinclination of the OSG to seasonably file required pleadings constitutes deplorable disservice to the public and can only be categorized as inefficiency on the part of the govt law office. Counsel for FESC, the law firm of Del Rosario and Del Rosario, specifically its asscociate Tria is reprimaded and warned that a repetition of the same acts shall be dealt with severely. The original members of the legal tean of the OSG are admonished and warned tha a repetition shall also be dealt with more stringently. Baka lang itanong kung ano ruling: The decision of the CA is affirmed. Gavino, MPA and FESC are declared solidarily liable with MPA entitled to reimbursement from Gavino for such amount of the adjudged pecuniary liability in excess of the amount equivalent to 75% of its prescribed reserved fund. 53 COMELEC v NOYNAY Facts: Judge Tomas Noynay ordered the records of a certain election case to be withdrawn and directed to the Comelec. The case was against Diosdada Amor, a public school principal and other public school teachers for having violated the Omnibus Election Code: for having engaged in partisan political activities. Comelec wanted to prosecute Amor et al. (This case is irrelevant to the main case) Apparently, the maximum imposable penalty in each of the cases does not exceed 6 years. The judge dismissed the cases, using as basis the Judiciary Reorganization Act: Not exceeding 6 years, not with RTC but with MTC. But the Omnibus Election Code states that the regional trial court shall have the exclusive jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of this code XXX A closer reading of the Judiciary Reorganization Act (in its first sentence says): Except in cases falling within the original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court XXX The Omnibus Election Code is an older law v the Judiciary Election Act Judge Noynay did not read at all the opening sentence of the Judiciary Election Act when he dismissed the cases. Comelecs lawyer was Atty. Jose Balbuena from the Comelec legal department. In his Motion for Reconsideration (see p 263), he quoted the memorandum of te Court Administrator (not the SC) and made it appear that these were the words of the SC. He cited a case, but erroneously: o What he used: Alberto Naldeza/Alberto o Alberto Naldoza He said the case was in volume 245 of the SCRA, but it was really in volume 254. Held: W/N Judge Noynay has the jurisdiction to handle the election cases in his sala. (RC Note: parts of the SC decision were in the Facts portion, since you will not understand the case if I placed it in the bottom Yes. Judge Noynay and Atty. Balbuena should also be admonished. The judge should be reminded of his duty to be studious of the principles of law, to administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, to be faithful to the law, and to maintain professional competence. Balbuena should also be admonished for his utter carelessness in his references. Rule 10.02 mandates that a lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the text of a decision or authority.

54 RIVERA v CORRAL Facts:

Issue:

A decision in a case for ejectment was sent to Atty Corral. His secretary received the decision on Feb 23, 1990. On March 13, 1990 Atty Corral filed a notice of appeal. The next day, Corral went to the Office of the Clerk of Court to change the date of receipt of the decision from Feb 23 to Feb 29 (which was later changed to Feb 28 when Corral realized that there was no Feb 29 that year). Para hindi siya madisqualify ng 15-day appeal period. Rivera filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty Corral for tampering the courts records without such courts permission or knowledge. The IBP investigating committee affirmed the charges and recommended suspension. Later on, the IBP Board ordered Corrals suspension. Corral claims he was not afforded due process or hearing.

Issue: Can Atty Corral be suspended? Held: Yes. Contrary to Corrals claim that he was not afforded due process, he was in fact given the opportunity to present his evidence during the course of the proceedings. According to the records, the hearings had to be rescheduled several times to accommodate his requests. But he did not appear on the scheduled hearings. He cannot now claim that he was denied due process. It should be remembered that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard. The Court finds that Atty Corral violated his oath by engaging in unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful conduct. By altering the material dates to make it appear that the notice of appeal was timely filed, Corral committed an act of dishonesty. A suspension for 1 year is warranted. 55 YOUNG v BATUEGAS

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FACTS YOUNG is the private prosecutor in People of the Phil v Arana BATUEGAS, et al are the counsels for the accused in the said criminal case On Dec 13, 2000, BATUEGAS filed a Manifestation with Motion for Bail alleging that the accused has voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority and, as such, is now under detention Upon verification with the NBI, YOUNG discovered that the accused surrendered on Dec 14, 2000 (not 13) BATUEGAS, et al in their defense alleged that o On Dec 13, 2000, upon learning that a warrant of arrest was issued against their client, they filed a Manifestation with Motion for Bail o They immediately fetched accused from Cavite and brought him to NBI to voluntarily surrender o However, due to heavy traffic, they arrived at NBI at 2am the next day o That was why the Certificate of Detention indicated that the accused surrendered on Dec 14, 2000 and not 13 o As to lack of notice, YOUNG being a private prosecutor, is not entitled to such as only the State and City prosecutors should be given notices Investigating Commissioner recommended suspension of 6 months IBP Commission on Bar Discipline in a resolution approved said recommendation ISSUE HELD RATIO W/N BATUEGAS, ET AL ARE GUILTY OF FALSEHOOD AND SHOULD BE SUSPENDED YES, CONCEALED TRUTH A lawyer must be a disciple of truth He swore upon his admission that he will do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court As officer of the court, his high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and facts of the case to aid it in arriving at the correct conclusion The courts, on the other hand, are entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before them His a lawyers solemn duty is to defend his client, his conduct must never be at the expense of truth In the case at bar, BATUEGAS, et al feel short of the duties and responsibilities expected of them as members of the bar Anticipating that their Motion for Bail will be denied by the Court found that it had no jurisdiction over the person of the accused, they craftily concealed the truth alleging that the accused had voluntarily surrendered To knowingly allege an untrue statement in the pleading is a contemptuous conduct that the Court strongly condemns Issue: Held: SC says that Florido should be held liable. He violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 10.01 and 10.02, by his act of making up a spurious CA resolution and using such false resolution to his aadvantage. The SC thinks that suspension of 6 years is too much so they lowered the penalty to just a 2-year suspension. W/n Florido should be held liable for his actions. BATUEGAS, et al violated their oath when they resorted to deception Hence, BATUEGAS, et al should be suspended for 6 months

56 HUEYSUWAN FLORIDO v FLORIDO Facts: Natasha Hueysuwan-Florido (H-F) filed this administrative complaint against her husband James Florido for violating his oath as a lawyer by manufacturing, flaunting and usng a spurious and bogus CA resolution/order. H-F admits that she and her husband live separately. They have two children. Sometime in Dec. 2001, Florido went to HFs house and showed her a photocopy of a resolution issued by the CA apparently giving to Florido the legal custody of their children. H-F doubted the authenticity of the CA resolution so she did not give her children to Florido. Then in 2002, while H-F and her children were in the ABC Learning Center, Florido arrived accompanied by armed men. Florido demanded that H-F surrender custody of their children to him. H-F, fearing for her childrens safety, called the police. In the police station, H-F agreed to let the children sleep with Florido just for one night at a hotel. But when H-F heard of news that Florido was planning to take the children to Bacolod, she immediately took them away. Florido then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the basis of the CA resolution he presented to H-F earlier. This petition was dismissed because Florido did not appear and HF presented a certification from the CA that there was no resolution granting Florido with legal custody of their children. Thus, this present action. The IBP has recommended that Florido be suspended from the practice of law for 6 years.

57 ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYAN Facts: Atty. Paguia is the counsel of Joseph Estrada in the case of Estrada vs. Arroyo. Atty. Paguia asserts that the members of the Supreme Court should inhibit themselves from hearing the petition because of Rule 5.10 of the Code of Judicial

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Conduct, which prohibits judges from participating in partisan political activities. According the Atty. Paguia, the justices have violated the rule by participating in the EDSA 2 rally and authorizing the assumption of office by President Arroyo. The Sandiganbayan denied the petition and motion for reconsideration of Atty. Paguia to dismiss all the criminal cases against Estrada. Atty. Paguia attacked the decision of the Court in the case of Estrada vs. Arroyo by saying: similar in the decisions involving admin. agencies, if the act of the justices is lawful, it is the act of the Supreme Court, and if the act of the judges is not lawful, it is not the act of the Supreme Court. As such, Atty. Paguia asserts that the decision in Estrada vs. Arroyo being unlawful in view of Rule 5.10 of Code of Judicial Conduct, is not the act of the SC. Atty. Paguia repeated his assault on the court in both broadcast and print media. For that reason, the court asked him to show cause why he should not be sanctioned. Issue: W/N Atty. Paguia should be sanctioned for conduct unbecoming. Held: Atty. Paguia is sanctioned. He is indefinitely suspended from practice of law. Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates the lawyer should observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers. In liberally imputing sinister and devious motives and questioning the impartiality, integrity, and authority of the members of the court, Atty. Paguia has only succeeded seeking to impede, obstruct and pervert the dispensation of justice. Atty. Paguia has also been called to the mandate of Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibiting a member of the bar from making such public statements on a case that may tend to arouse public opinion for or against a party. 58 TIONGCO v AGUILAR (Canon 10 Morada) Facts: Atty. Tiongco filed a petition with the Supreme Court for a review of a lower courts decision. The petition contained malicious and intemperate language. Tiongco stated that the decision of the trial court Judge was crafted to fool the winning party, a hypocritical judgment in plaintiffs favor, it was the devil who dictated it, the Judge was confused, being born and raised amongst the nonpropertied class Tiongco also filed a pleading with the SC stating that it is hard to imagine that this Honorable Court had read the petition and hold that the same failed to sufficiently show that the respondent Court had committed grave abuse of discretion. In a previous resolution, the SC required Atty. Jose B. Tiongco to show cause why he should not be dealt with administratively for the violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Issue: W/N Tiongco must be held administratively liable. In Tiongcos Compliance, he alleges that the SC failed to mention that he also called the judge a robber, a rotten manipulator, and abetter of graft and shady deals.

Held: YES Atty. Tiongco did not at all show cause why he should not be dealt with administratively. While Tiongco tried to justify as true his descriptions of the Judge as liar, thief, perfidious, and blasphemer, he did not offer any excuse for the other intemperate words and phrases he used. Neither did he show their relevance to the petition. By insinuating that this Court did not at all read the petition, Tiongco exhibited gross disrespect and attempted to discredit the Members of the First Division. He charged them with violating their duty to render justice, and he thereby promoted distrust in judicial administration. He also showed disrespect to and contempt for the respondent judge, thereby diminishing public confidence in the latter and in the judiciary. Although a lawyer has the righteven the dutyto criticize the courts, this right must be exercised responsibly. The criticism must be bona fide, without using language that would tend to create or promote distrust in judicial administration and undermine the peoples confidence in the integrity of the members of this Court. 59 RHEEM OF THE PHILS v FERRER FACTS: The SC issued an order directing Atty. Armonio and the senior partners in his law firm to show to cause why they should not be dealt with for contempt of court The law firm of Ponce Enrile. Sigiuon Reyne, etc. argued that: o It has never been their intent to be disrespectful o It was the result of overenthusiasm on the part of Atty. Armonio who thought best to focus the attention of the court to the issue in the case and was not in any way meant to slight or offend the court. o It was because Atty. Armonio became emotionally involved in the case o Not one of the partners was able to pass upon the draft or final form of the said motion, and that Atty. Armonio, an associate, prepared, signed and filed the motion without clearing it with any one of the partner of the firm ISSUE: W/N Atty. Armonio and the partners in his firm must be held in contempt because of the disrespectful language contained of the pleading prepared by Atty. Armonio. HELD: The SC decided that Atty. Armonio be warned that repetition of the incident will be dealt with more severely and that necessary attention must be employed by the partners in

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exercising adequate supervision and control of the pleadings submitted by its associate The pleading which contained one pitfall into which this court has repeatedly fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations comes into question and the sweeping charge that the decisions of this court blindly adhere to earlier rulings without as much as making any reference to and analysis of the pertinent statues implies that the court is so patently inept in determining the jurisdiction of the industrial court, it has committed error and continuously repeated that error to the point of perpetuation. Implicit in the quoted statement is that the pronouncements of this court on the jurisdiction of the industrial court are not entitled to respect. It detract much from the dignity of and respect due this court. It is the duty of lawyers to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers. It is his obligation to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbents of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance. It is proscribes to use unnecessary language which jeopardizes high esteem in courts, creates or promotes distrust in judicial administration, or which could have the effect of harboring or encouraging discontent which, in many cases, us the source of disorder, thus undermining the foundation upon which rests that bulwark called judicial power . The claim of Atty. Armonio that his statements was not in any way meant to slight or offend this court, want of intention is no excuse for the language employed. One cannot escape responsibility by claiming his words did not mean what any reader must have understood them as meaning. Napikon yata yung SC, they required Cabrera to file a reply to why he should not be held in contempt. Cabrera filed an apology but guess what, the language he used were still unfit and even insincere. W/N Cabrera should be held in contempt Yes! Fine of P500 and imprisonment for 50 days. The duty to observe and maintain the respect due the courts devolves not only upon lawyers but also upon those who will choose to enter the profession. Their failure to discharge such duty may prevent them from being inducted into the office of attorney. Pikon yung Supreme Court, huwag niyo silang subukan.

Issue: Held:

61 COBB-PEREZ v LANTIN FACTS: Ricardo Hermoso commenced a civil case against Damaso Perez and Gregorio Sumbong, for recovery of sum of P17,309.44 representing unpaid purchases of leather materials used in the shoe manufacturing business of Hermoso. Judgment was rendered in favor of Hermoso, ordering the defendants to be held jointy and severally liable. The Sheriff of Manila levied upon the shares of common stock registered in Damaso Perezname with the Republic Bank. Petitioners used the rules of procedure to suspend the execution of judgment. (and they managed to have the sale suspended 6x) o They alleged that levy was highly excessive and unjust o Even the wife of Damaso Perez, filed to lift the writ of execution alleging that the shares of stock were conjugal assets and that the debt was a personal obligation. ISSUE: WoN petitioners restored to tricky, sneaky and maneuvering tactics to thwart the ends of justice? HELD: YES RATIO: 1. During the protracted litigation, the petitioners resorted to a series of actions and petitions, at some stages alternatingly, abetted by their counsel, for the sole purpose of thwarting the execution of a simple money judgment which has long become final and executory. Some of the actions were filed, only to be abandoned or withdrawn. The petitioners and their counsel, far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to use them to subvert the very ends of justice. 62 MAGAT v SANTIAGO Facts: For delaying the termination of an unlawful detainer case by filing multiple petitions before the SC, involving the same subject matters and

60 ANDRES v CABRERA Facts: Stanley R. Cabrera (Cabrera) was a successful bar examinee in 1977. Atty. Emilia Andres was a legal officer in the Ministry of Labor. She dismissed a case filed by Cabreras mother against a certain Atty. Perez. Because of the dismissal, Cabrera filed with the city fiscal of Manila criminal charges against Andres (graft and corruption, falsification of public documents) Andres then filed a case of disqualification against Cabrera. Cabrera apparently used in his affidavit vile, incivil and uncouth language (e.g. moronic, unparalleled stupidity, idiotic) Cabreras oath-taking was therefore postponed. The SC required him to file an answer to why he should not be disqualified. In Cabreras reply he still used unfit language (e.g. calling Atty. Andres a moron). In subsequent motions by Cabrera, he used the words a victim of the courts inhuman and cruel punishment through its supreme inaction 1979: The court thereafter deferred his oath-taking until he has shown that he has changed his ways. Cabrera then filed a motion for contempt of court. And guess what, he still used unfit language (e.g. supreme stupidity, degradation of the administration of justice)

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cause of action, which were attempts by the same party and his counsel to delay enforcement of a judgment that has long become final and executory, the SC suspended Atty Magat from the practice of law . The court in ruling for the suspension of Magat stated that a lawyer owes the duty of good faith and honorable dealing to the judicial tribunal before whom he practices his profession. Inherent in that obligation is the duty to assist in the speedy disposition of cases. Atty Magat and members of his family is now praying for judicial clemency, expressing their profound regret for his past misconduct and his avowal ot amend his ways, in view if the said family's financial and economic difficulties to his inability to earn his livelihood as a lawyer. This plea has been reiterated for a period of more than 2 years since his suspension. Issue: W/n the suspension should be terminated... Held: YES. The court is satisfied that Magat appreciates the significance of his dereliction and he has assured the court that he now possesses the requisite probity and integrity necesary to guarantee that he is worthy to be restored to the practice of law. 63 MILLARE v MONTERO Facts: Montero has made a mockery of the judicial process. And disregarded the canons in intentionally frustrating the rights of a litigant in whose favor a judgment in the case was rendered: thus abused procedural rules to defeat the ends of substantial justice.

64 ETERNAL GARDENS v CA Facts:

(RC Note: The first part of the case is pointless. It just wants to impress on you that Atty. Montero used procedure to circumvent the administration of justice) Pacfica Millare, the mother of the complainant, obtained a favorable judgment against Elsa Co. The case was for ejectment filed with the MTC. The judgment of the MTC became final and executory on November 1986. Numerous appeals/complaints/petitions were filed to frustrate the execution of the MTC judgment. The summary of which is in page 8. There is no need to know what they are though.

Seelin spouses filed a case against Central Dyeing for quieting of title. The spouses won and the decision in their favor became final an executory. When the spouses filed a Motion for an Immediate Writ of Possession, Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corp opposed claiming that it is the true and registered owner of the propertyhaving bought the same from Central Dyeing in good faith. It also argued that it was not bound by the decision since it was not impleaded in the case. But the trial court favored the spouses and dismissed Eternal Gardens claim since the judgment (in the queting of title case) was binding upon the latter, being the successor-in-interest of Central Dyeing. The CA, on the same grounds, denied Eternal Gardens appeal. So Seelin spouses filed for a second writ of execution. Dahil sa makulit (not to mention optimistic) si Eternal Gardens, nagfile pa ito ulit ng motion reconsideration. It further contended that since there is a pending issue on possession (a different case), such should first be resolved before a writ of possession be issued to the spouses. Said motion was initially granted but was later denied. So nagfile ng certiorari si Eternal sa CA. And of course, they filed the case to the SC, essentially with the same arguments.

Issue: Is Eternal Gardens bound by the decision in the quieting of title case? Held: Yes. Having admitted that they bought the property from Central Dyeing, Eternal Gardens is the formers successor-in-interest who will be bound by the judgment. Moreover, being a transferee, it does not have to be included or impleaded by name in an action against the transferoraccording to the Rules of Court. As to the fear that owners of the grave lots will be disturbed by the writ, the order of the court shows that it took into account the interests of such lot ownersin fact certain limits were provided. Hence, the execution of the judgment need not necessarily desecrate these properties. *whats relevant to ethics: The case has delayed the execution of a final judgment for 17 years. While lawyers owe entire devotion to the interests of their clients rights, they should not forget that they are officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. They should not misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the ends of justice or unduly delay a case, or impede the execution of a judgment.

Issue: Held:

W/N Atty. Monteros acts are justified. No. Montero should be suspended for one year, as recommended by the IBP which found him guilty of malpractice. Judging from the number of actions filed, Montero is also guilty of forum shopping. By having willfully and knowingly abused his rights of recourse in his efforts to get a favorable judgment, which efforts were all rebuffed, respondents violated the duty of a member of the Bar to institute actions only which are just and put up such defenses as he perceives to be truly contestable under the laws.

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65 SPS GALEN v PAGUIRIGAN Spouses Galen, Rasdas and Villa (COMPLAINANTS) were defendants in a civil case for recovery of a residential lot. PAGUIRIGAN was their attorney. Judgment was rendered in favor of the COMPLAINANTS. Trusting in the able representation of Atty PAGUIRIGAN, the COMPLAINANTS continued the services of the said lawyer when the plaintiff in the civil case appealed. The COMPLAINANTS were informed that the CA reversed the trial courts decision. Upon inquiry in the CA, the COMPLAINANTS found out Atty PAGUIRIGAN failed to file an appellees brief in their behalf. When COMPLAINANTS confronted PAGUIRIGAN, the lawyer assured them that he would seek a review of the decision of the CA. The COMPLAINANTS gave PAGUIRIGAN P10,000 for docket fees. On Oct 14, 1997, PAGUIRIGAN filed a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review on certiorari which the SC granted in its resolution dated Nov 19, 1997. On Nov 20, 1997, PAGUIRIGAN filed the petition. However, it was denied for having been filed out of time, the due date being Nov 14, 1997. Subsequently, the COMPLAINANTS were surprised to receive a writ of execution issued by the trial court. Hence, this petition. PAGUIRIGAN alleges that he agreed to represent the COMPLAINANTS without remuneration when their former counsel withdrew, that he did not file an appellees brief since the filing of the same though required is not mandatory and that the Court granted his motion for extension belatedly, considering that the 30 day extension was to expire on Nov 14, 1997 but the SC acted on it only on Nov 19, 1997. ISSUE NEGLIGENCE HELD W/N PAGUIRIGAN SHOULD BE PUNISHED FOR YES, FOR FAILING TO FILE PETITION AFTER BEEN GRANTED EXTENSION OF TIME PAGUIRIGAN is thus guilty of violation of Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides a lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda and briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so. Hence, PAGUIRIGAN is suspended from the practice of law for 6 months and ordered to refund the COMPLAINANTS P10,000 with a warning that repitition of the same act will be dealt with even more severely. 66 SANTIAGO v RAFANAN Assignment no. 11 Santiago vs. Rafanan Lopez Facts: This administrative complaint was brought by Jonar Santiago against Atty. Edison Rafanan, a notary public, because of the latters failure to (a) make the proper notation regarding the community tax certificate of the affiants; (b) enter the details of the notarized documents in the notarial register; and (c) make and execute the certification and enter his PTR and IBP numbers in the documents he had notarized, all in violation of the Revised Administrative Code. Santiago also points out that Rafanan made an affidavit in favor of his (Rafanan) client and offered the same as evidence in the case wherein he (Rafanan) was actively representing his client. The IBP found Rafanan guilty of violating the requirements of the Notarial Law and imposed a fine of 3,000.

Issue: Held:

W/n Rafanans acts were contrary to law.

PAGUIRIGAN was clearly negligent in the performance of his duties. He admits that he failed to file the appellees brief which just shows the cavalier attitude he took towards his clients cause. Although the failure to file the appellees brief in a case is not a ground for an adverse ruling, the importance of filing an appellees brief cannot be gainsaid because upon appeal, the appellate court, can only place great reliance on the briefs and memoranda of the parties. Thus, the failure to submit these pleadings could very well be fatal to the cause of the client. To make matters worse, PAGUIRIGAN did not only fail to file an appellees brief but after being granted a 30 day extension of the time to file a petition for review of the decision of the CA, he again lost through default by failing to file said petition. And PAGUIRIGANS allegation about the SCs belated action on the petition only succeeds in showing his ignorance of 2 basic principles: first, that a party cannot presume that his motion will be granted, and, second, that any extension granted is always counted from the last day of the reglementary period which is Oct 14, 1997 (not from the day the resolution was dated).

SC says yes. It is mandated by the Notarial Law that a notary public should enter the number, place of issue and date of the Community Tax Certificate of the affiant in his affidavit. The law also says that a notary public should keep a notarial register to record all affidavits they have notarized. They are required to enter the number of the register and the page where a particular affidavit has been recorded. These requirements are mandatory due to the degree of importance and evidentiary weight attached to notarized documents. Having violated these requirements, Rafanan should be fined. As to the affidavit executed by Rafanan in favor of his client, the SC says that this is in violation of Rule 12.08 of Canon 12, which says that a lawyer should avoid testifying in behalf of his own client. The SC explained that appearing both as counsel and witness of a client will provoke unkind criticism and leave many people to suspect the truthfulness of the

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lawyer because they cannot believe the lawyer as disinterested. Obviously, if a lawyer appears as client and counsel, people would automatically think that his testimony as a witness is biased in favor of his client. Despite of this, Rafanan cannot be made administratively liable. First, the SC considered that it is the duty of a lawyer to assert every remedy and defense for the benefit of the client. Thus, in defense of his client, Rafanan is supposed to do everything in his power. Since, he is a witness to the crime, his affidavit is essential to the defense of his client. What he should have done though was to exempt himself from being counsel. This would ensure his credibility as a witness. In the end, because of his violation of the Notarial Laws and Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Rafanan is fined 3,000. under the pretext of having connections with a member of this court. 68 ALMARVEZ v PAAS Facts:

67 BERBANO v BARCELONA Facts: The heirs of Hilapo appointed Atty. Daen as their atty.-in-fact. Atty. Daen was subsequently arrested by the Muntinlupa police. The heirs of Hilapo tried to look for a lawyer to secure the release of Atty. Daen. The heirs were recommended to Atty. Barcelona. When the spouses visited Atty. Daen, they learned that Atty. Daen had decided to engage the services of Atty. Barcelona. Atty. Barcelona then proceeded to tell the heirs if they could produce P50K he could secure the release of Atty. Daen the next day. Because the heirs could not produce the total amount, they merely gave P15,700. There were several meetings between the heirs and Atty. Barcelona regarding the grease money to be used to allegedly bribe an SC justice. The heirs made another payment via a check worth P24,000. On another occasion, the heirs went to the house of Atty. Barcelona and gave P10,000. The total amount given by the heirs to Atty. Barcelona reached P64,000. Commissioner Bautista found Atty. to be guilty of malpractice and breach of duty and recommended that he be disbarred. Issue: W/N Atty. Barcelona should be disbarred. Held: Atty. Barcelona should be disbarred. Disbarment proceedings are sui generis. Its intention is to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the court and public from the misconduct of the officers of the court. In this case, Atty. demonstrated a penchant for misrepresenting that he had connections to secure the release of Atty. Daen. Atty. Barcelona misrepresented to the complainant that he could get the release of Atty. Daen with his connection with a Supreme Court Justice. Instead of promoting respect for law and the legal processes, Atty. Barcelona demeaned the legal profession by taking money from a client

Pasay City Metropolitan Trial Court Judge Estrellita Paas administratively charged Almarvez, a Court Aide/Utility Worker, with discourtesy to his fellow employees, neglect in performing duties (by not maintaining the cleanliness around the court premises and often being absent from work), and solicitation of money (from prisoners before serving them their Release Orders, and from litigants by offering to divulge confidential information in advance of its unauthorized release). The Court found that the aforementioned charges were not supported by evidence since those who filed affidavits as evidence against Almarvez were not presented at the hearings. The only offense which Almarvez was found to commit was inefficiency in the discharge of his duties. Thus he was suspended for 3 months. Almarvez had filed a counterclaim alleging that Judge Paas ordered him to undergo a drug test after the latter had already filed an administrative complaint against him. Regarding this, the court held that this elicits the suspicion the Judge is just fishing for more evidence to support the administrative case she had already filed against Almarvez. This was held to constitute conduct unbecoming of a member of the judiciary, for which Judge Paas should be duly reprimanded. In a separate case for inhibition of Judge Paas in a criminal case, it was found that Judge Paas husband, Atty. Paas, who is a private practitioner, was using his wifes office address in his law practice, particularly in a criminal case he was handling which was docketed at an RTC also in Pasay. In support of this charge, documents were submitted such as 1) a Notice of Appeal signed by Atty. Paas, and 2) notices from Pasay City RTC, and from the Supreme Court This was admitted by Judge Paas, but she claims that this was done only to ensure and facilitate the delivery of those notices.

Issue: W/N Judge Paas and Atty. Paas should be penalized for allowing the latter to use the office of the former as his return address in his private practice. Held: YES Using the Judges address is a subtle was of sending a message that Atty. Paas is the husband of a judge in the same building and should be given special treatment by other judges or court personnel. In SC Administrative Circular No. 01-99, it was stated that court officials and employees must never use their officesfor any other purpose that for court or judicial functions. Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a judge should avoid impropriety in all activities and shall not allow the use of the judicial office to advance the private interests of others.

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SC Circular No. 3-92 prohibits the use of halls of justice for residential or commercial purposes. It is unprofessional and dishonorable to misuse a public office to enhance a lawyers prestige. It violates canons 3, 10, 13, and 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Paas is suspended for 3 months from the practice of law, while Judge Paas shall pay a fine of P12,000 As members of the law firm, petitioners and Roco admit that they assisted in the organization and acquisition of companies included in Civil Case No. 0033. In keeping with the office practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders. Anong kalokohan yan? o Civil Case No. 0033 RP v. Eduardo Cojuangco et. al., for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of stock in certain corporations PCGG later on filed a motion to admit 3rd amended complaint, which excluded Roco in Civil Case 33 as party defendant. PCGG was removing Roco because Roco was going to make choochoo and reveal the identity of the principals. The ACCRA lawyers then filed a comment and/or opposition saying that they should also be removed the way that Roco was. PCGG then said that it will ask for their exclusion only if they will also disclose the identity of their clients During the proceedings, Roco did not actually reveal the identity of the client for whom he acted as nomineestockholder The ACCRA lawyers motion for exclusion was denied (they refused to comply with the PCGGs offer) by the PCGG and the court. Hence, this motion for certiorari W/N the ACCRA lawyers should be excluded from the case Yes. It is apparent that the ACCRA lawyers were only impleaded to force them to disclose the identity of their clients. PCGG has no valid cause of action W/N the attorney-client privilege prohibits the ACCRA lawyers from revealing the identity of their clients General rule: a clients identity should not be shrouded in mystery o Exceptions: where a strong probability exists that revealing the clients name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyers advice o Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability o Where revealing the identity would furnish the only link that would be necessary to convict an individual of a crime The prosecution should rely on the strength of their evidence and not on the weakness of the defense Roco merely stated that he was acting as nomineestockholder for the client and is part of legitimate lawyering. The ACCRA lawyers also made such statement and should also be dropped.

69 NESTLE v SANCHEZ FACTS: From July 8-10, union members of Union of Filipro Employees or the Kimberly Independent Labor Union, who filed a case in court intensified their pickets that they had been conducting since June 17 in front of the Padre Faura gate of the SC Despite of the warning given by the court to their leaders and counsel, the picketing continued The union members are obstructing the access to and egress from the courts premises. They have also constructed provisional shelters along the sidewalks, set up kitchens and littered the place. they took turns haranguing the court all day long with the use of loudspeakers ISSUE: W/N the rallyists must be held with contempt HELD: The contempt charges were dismissed The Counsel of the union members apologized to the court and promised that the incident will not be repeated again The picketing was actually done by the members of the PAMANTIK (Pagkakaisa ng MAnggagawa sa Timog Katalugan), an unregistered loose allegiance of about 75 unions in the Southern Tagalog and not by either the Union of Filipro Employees or the Kimberly Independent Labor Union. But the court will not hesitate in future similar incidents to apply the full force of the law and punish for contempt those who attempt to pressure the court to acting one way or the other in any case pending before it. The court is entitled to proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice. Any attempt to pressure or influence courts of justice through the exercise of either right amounts to an abuse thereof and is no longer within the ambit of constitutional protection, and that any such efforts to influence the court constitutes contempt of court. 70 REGALA v SANDIGANBAYAN Facts: Petitioners in this case and private respondent Roco were all then partners of the law firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices (commonly known as ACCRA) ACCRA performed services for clients which included acquiring and/or organizing business associations and/or organizations where it acted as incorporators or simply as stockholders

Issue: Held: Issue: Held:

In re: Canon 14 the relation of attorney and client is strictly personal and highly confidential and fiduciary

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the lawyer is more than a mere agent or servant because he possesses special powers of trust and confidence reposed on him by his client president told him that if he could convince Ramon Sy to acknowledge the obligation, Dewey would be exculpated from liability. Ramon Sy acknowledged the obligation, thereafter, the account of Dewey was cleared. Atty Mutuc sent demand letters to petitioner demanding the balance of P50,000 as attorneys fees. Petitioner Dee ignored said letters. Atty Mutuc filed a complaint against petitioner Dee for the collection of attorneys fees. Petitioner denied the existence of any professional relationship of attorney and client between hin and Atty Mutuc. Dee insists that the visits made to Atty Mutuc was merely informal and that Atty Mutuc had not been specifically contacted to handle the problem. The P50,000 given to Atty Mutuc was alleged to be given not in the nature of attorneys fees but merely pocket money. Issue: W/n there was a lawyer-client relationship Held: YES. The absence of a written contract will not preclude the finding that there was a professional relationship which merits attorneys fees for professional services rendered. To establish the relationship, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession. An acceptance of the relation is implied on the part of the attorney from his acting on behalf of his client in pursuance of a request from the latter. Therefore, Mutuc is entitled to receive a reasonable compensation. Atty Mutuc did not represent conflicting interests as claimed by Dee when Dee alleged that Mutuc was acting as agent of Ceasars Palace. Mutucs representations in behalf of petitioner Dee were not in resistance to the casinos claim but were actually geared toward proving the liability of true debtor, Ramon Sy. 73 BR SEBASTIAN v CA Facts: Dee and his father went to the residence of Atty Mutuc to seek his advice regarding the problem of the alleged indebtedness of petitioners brother Dewey Dee, to Ceasars Palace. Petitioners father was apprehensive over the safety of his son, Dewey having heard of a link between the mafia and Ceasars Palace and his possibility that his son may be harmed at the instance of the latter. Atty Mutuc assured petitioner and his father that he would inquire into the matter, after which his services were reportedly contracted for P100,000. Further investigations revealed that the alleged debt of Dewey had actually been incurred by Ramon Sy, with Dewey merely signing for the chits. Atty Mutuc talked with the president of Ceasars palace and advised the president that for the sake and in the interest of the casino it would be better to make Ramon Sy answer for the indebtedness. The Eulogio Reyes, before he died filed an action for damages against the Director of Public Works, and BR Sebastian. BR Sebastian (BRS) was held to be liable, but the Director of Public Works was exonerated. BRS appealed. During the pendency of the appeal, Reyes died. He was substituted by his heirs (the Reyeses). In 1974, BRS received notice to file Appelants Brief within 45 days from receipt. Counsel for BRS (The Baizas, Alberto and Associates) failed to file the brief. The appeal was then dismissed. Much later, around 5 months after the deadline, Baizas Law Office (different daw from the former one) file a motion for reconsideration. It alleged that as a result of the death of Atty Crispin Baizas, senior partner, the affairs of the aid firm are still being settled between Atty. Jose Baizas (son of Crispin) and Atty Ruby Alberto. And that Atty Espiritu, the lawyer who handled this case in the trial court and who is believed to have also attended to the preparation of the Appelants Brief but

71 DAROY v LEGASPI FACTS: Complainants charged Atty. Ramon Chavez- Legaspi with malpractice for having misappropriated the sum of P4,000.00 which he had collected for them. They prayed that he be disbarred FACTUAL EVIDENCE: Complainants hired Atty. Legaspi to represent them in the intestate proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the spouses Gonzaga. The complainant-heirs in a joint petition, which Atty. Legaspi signed as counsel agreed that the coconut land left by the decedents would be divided into 6 equal parts and that the proceeds of the sale of the land would be distributed among them. Atty. Legaspi wrote to the father of Mrs. Daroy, Teofilo Legaspi that the money deposited could be withdrawn. However, Atty. Legaspi had already withdrawn the money (therefore he acted in bad faith). It turned out that Atty. Legaspi was also an heir (although it wasnt shown how). ISSUE: WoN Atty. Legaspi should be disbarred because he violated the relation between attorney and his client? HELD: YES! RATIO: 1. The relation between an atty and his client is higly fiduciary in nature and of a very delicate, exacting and confidential character, requiring a high degree of fidelity and good faith. In view of that special relationship, lawyers are bound to promptly account for money or property received by them on behalf of their clients and failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. The fact that a lawyer has a lien for fees on money in his hands collected for his clients does not relieve him from the duty of promptly accounting for the funds received. 2. The complainants, however, have to recover the money in an ordinary action, and not in this disbarment proceeding. 72 DEE v CA

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failed to submit it through oversight and inadvertence, had also left the firm. Issue: Held: W/N the appeal of BR Sebastian should be reinstated. No. In this case, no fraud is involved. Only simple negligence on the part of the BRS counsel. The confusion in the office of the law firm following the death of Aty Crispin Baizas is not a valid justification for its failure to file the brief. The responsibility of the associates to the petitioner as counsel remained until withdrawal by the former of their appearance in the manner provided by the Rules of Court. The law firm should have assigned the case to another associate. Or it could have withdrawn as counsel in the manner provided by the Rules of Court so that the petitioner could contract the services of a new lawyer. The negligence of the counsel binds the client. Held: The firm of Francisco mailed a written opinion to Hilado on the merits of the case (with Franciscos signature); this opinion was reached on the basis of papers submitted at his office; and that Hilados purpose in submitting those papers was to secure Franciscos professional services. From these ultimate facts, an attorney-client relationship between Francisco and Hilado can be said to have ensued. To constitute professional employment it is not essential that the client should have employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had. When a person consults with his attorney in his professional capacity with the view of obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional employment must be regarded as established. The existence of attorney-client relationship precludes the attorney from representing (and receiving a retainer from) the opposite party in the same case. An information professionally obtained by an attorney from a client is sacred to the employment to which it pertains, and to permit it be used in the interest of another, or in the interest of the adverse party is to strike at the element of confidence which forms the basis of an attorneyclient relationship. The rule inhibiting an attorney from acting in behalf of both parties is implied in the Rules of Court (wala pang codified codes of professional responsibility noon). The defense that Francisco never read the written opinion nor the documents submitted by Hilado will not preclude the existence of an attorney-client relationship. The fact remains that his firm did give Hilado a formal professional advice from which emerged the relation. The letter binds and estops him in the same manner and degree as if he wrote it personally. And an information obtained from a client by a member or assistant of the firm is information imparted to the firm. The failure to object to counsels appearance does not operate as a waiver of the right to ask for counsels disqualification. Motion for disqualification against Attorney Francisco should be allowed. *A retaining fee (just in case itanong) is a preliminary fee given to an attorney or counsel to insure and secure his future services, and induce him to act for the client. 75 SANTOS v BELTRAN US. 76 NAKPIL v VALDES

74 HILADO v DAVID Facts: Blandina Hilado (ganda ng pangalan!) brought an action against Selim Assad to annul the sale of several houses and lot exected by Hilados husband. Delgado et al. was counsel for Hilado, while Ohnick et al filed an answer for Assad. Later on, Atty Vicente Francisco entered his appearance for Assad substituting Ohnick et al. The firm of Delgado urged Atty Francisco to stop representing Assad since there exists an atty-client relationship between him (Francisco) and the other party (Hilado) in the same case. It was alleged that Hilado consulted Francisco regarding the case and that the former turned over papers to the latter. From such documents, Francisco sent a written opinion to Hilado. Since makulit si Francisco, Delgado et al. sought to disqualify Francisco from representing Assad in the case. Franciscos defense was that he only met Hilado once and this was when the latter informed him about the case. He added that when Hilado left documents in their office, he told his assistant to tell Hilado that their firm would not handle her case. And that the written opinion was made by his assistant, which he signed without reading, and only for the purpose of explaining to Hilado why his firm rejected the case. David is the judge trying the case who dismissed the complaint for disqualification against Francisco. Said judge reasoned that no attorney-client relationship existed between Hilado and Francisco.

Issue: Was there an attorney-client relationship between Francisco and Hilado? Should Atty Francisco be disqualified from representing Assad?

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Facts: Jose Nakpil was interested in a piece of property situated in Moran, Baguio. He went into an agreement with Atty. Carlos Valdes for the latter to buy the property in trust for Nakpil. Valdes did buy the property by contracting 2 loans. The lands titles were transferred to his name. When Jose Nakpil died, Imelda Nakpil (his wife) acquired the services of Valdes and his accounting and law firms for the settlement of the estate of Jose Nakpil. What Valdes did was to exclude the property in Baguio from the list of assets of Jose Nakpil (he actually transferred the property to his company, the Caval Realty Corporation) while including the loans he contracted. What Imelda did was to file a suit for reconveyance in the CFI. While the case was pending, Imelda also filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against Valdes. The CFI dismissed the action for reconveyance. The CA reversed the CFI. The complaint for reconveyance went up to the SC and was decided in favor of Nakpil. The SC held that Valdes only held the lots in trust for Nakpil. W/n Atty. Valdes should be administratively sanctioned for his acts, namely: o Excluding the property in Baguio from the estate of Jose Nakpil; o Including his loans as claims on the estate; and o Apparently, representing conflicting interests when his accounting firm prepared the list of claims of creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN against the estate of Jose Nakpil, which was represented by his law firm. The SC found Valdes guilty of misconduct and suspends him for 1 year. The Court held that the first two acts clearly show that Valdes broke the trust reposed on him by Imelda Nakpil when the latter agreed to use his professional services as a lawyer and an accountant. It was clear that Jose Nakpil and Atty. Came to an agreement that the latter would be buying the property in trust for Jose. By his act of excluding the property from the estate and including the loans he contracted (and used for his own benefit) as claims, Valdes took for granted the trust formed between Jose and him (they had a close relationship since the 50s), which was the basis for Imeldas decision to use his services. As to the third charge, we hold respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests which is proscribed by Canon 15 Rule 15.03. In the case at bar, there is no question that the interests of the estate and that of its creditors are adverse to each other. Respondent's accounting firm prepared the list of assets and liabilities of the estate and, at the same time, computed the claims of two creditors of the estate. There is clearly a conflict between the interest of the estate which stands as the debtor, and that of the two claimants who are creditors of the estate. Facts: Echavia had a vehicular accident in Mandaue City. Echavia was driving a Ford Telstar owned by a Japanese national but in the name of his brother-in-law Villapez. The car rammed into a small carinderia owned by Artezuela. Artezuela engaged the services of Atty. Maderazo in filing a damage suit against Echavia. Artezuela paid Maderazo the amount of P10,000 as attorneys fees and P2,000 as filing fee. Artezuela filed a suit for disbarment against Maderazo. She alleged that Maderazo grossly neglected his duties as a lawyer. According to Artezuela, atty. did not do anything to keep the case moving and atty. withdrew his services without obtaining Artezuelas consent. Artezuela also alleged that Atty. Maderazo engaged in activities inimical to her interests. She says that while acting as her counsel, Atty. Maderazo prepared Echavias answer. Atty. Maderazo claims that the document of Echavia was not prepared by him. According to him, the answer by Echavia was only printed in his office. Issue: W/N Atty. Maderazo represented conflicting interests. Held: Atty. Maderazo represented conflicting interests. Suspension of 6 months. To be guilty of representing conflicting interests, a counsel-of-record of one party need not also be the counsel-ofrecord of the adverse party. He does not have to hold himself as the counsel of the adverse party. It is enough that the counsel of one party had a hand in the preparation of the pleading of another party who is claiming adverse and conflicting interests with that of the original client. Because of the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and the client, sound public policy dictates that the lawyer be prohibited from representing conflicting interests or discharging inconsistent duties. 78 HORNILLA v SALUNAT Facts: Salunat was a member of the Phil. Public School Teachers Association (PPSTA) Board, which approved Atty. Salunats engagement as counsel of PPSTA Complainants, who are members of PPSTA, filed an intracorporate case against its Board of Directors. Atty. Salunat entered his appearance as counsel for the board members in said cases. Complainants contend the Atty. Salunat was guilty of conflict of interest because he was engaged by PPSTA, of which complainants were members, and was being paid out of its corporate funds where complainants have contributed. Atty. Salunat pointed out that he entered his appearance as counsel for the board members for and in behalf of ASSA Law and Associates. He also stated that it was another partner of the firm, Atty. Agustin who handled the case. Issue: W/N Atty. Salunat engaged in conflicting interests.

Issue:

Held:

77 ARTEZUELA v MADERAZO

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Held: YES. In a derivative suit such as the one filed by the complainants against the BOD of PPSTA, the prevailing rule is that the lawyer engaged by the corporation may not represent the directors, since that would give rise to a conflict of interest. The interest of the corporate client is paramount and should not be influenced by the interest of the individual corporate officials. That Atty.Salunat entered his appearance in behalf of ASSA Law Firm doesnt exonerate him. He admitted that ASSA was the retained counsel of PPSTA. Since this is the first offense, respondent is admonished to observe a high degree of fidelity in the practice of his profession. 79 NATAN v CAPULE FACTS: Natan is the administrator of the estate of the deceased Maria Patero. Natan had filed an action against Santiago, the husband of Maria Patero to recover Marias share in the conjugal property. of Santiagos share in Hacienda Minit was ordered to be delivered to Maria Capule was contracted by Natan to file an action of forcible entry against Edonga, etc. and he delivered to him various documents including the decision of the previous court on the partition of the property of Santiago, specifically Hacienda Minit, which was received by Maria. Partial payments were received by Capule from Natan amounting to P275 but Capule was unable to attend the hearing. Since the Judge refused to grant postponement, Natan handled the case personally, being an attorney himself. Thereafter, Capule represented Olimpio Patero, claiming that he is the sole heir of Santiago Patero and in possession of Hacienda Minit, and filed an administrative case against Natan asking the court to order Natan to return of Hacienda Minit. ISSUE: W/N Capule violated his duty as a lawyer HELD: YES! And the court sentenced him to be suspended him from the exercise of his profession for the period of 2 years Capule had utilized the papers, knowledge and information that he had received from his former client Natan in connection to the Hacienda Minit against Natan and for the benefit of his new client Olimpio Patero Capule, because of his previous relationship with Natan, was disqualified to accept the case of Olimpio who claims ownership over Hacienda Minit. The fact the Capule retired from the forcible entry case prior to retaining the case of Olimpio did not relieve him from his obligation of fidelity and loyalty to his former client. The inconsistency between his position as attorney of Natan and that of Olimpio is so apparent that it could not have escaped his attention Issue: Held: An attorney may not do anything which will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which he formerly represented him, nor may he, at any time, use against his former client knowledge or information acquired by virtue of his previous relationship.

80 BAUTISTA v BARRIOS Facts: Rufina Bautista engaged the services of Atty. Barrios to draft an extra-judicial partition between Bautista and her brothers and sisters and Rovero on the other side. Barrios prepared the deed. Rovero later on refused to comply with the terms of the deed. Bautista sued him. Instead of representing Bautista, Barrios instead appeared for Rovero. Barrios defense: it was Rovero who engaged his services in preparing the deed and not Bautista W/N Barrios may handle a case nullify a contract which he prepared No, he may not. Suspended for 2 years. When Bautista approached Barrios to enforce the deed, Barrios merely said that she has no cause of action. Barrios did not inform her that he was already representing Rovero. Supposing that Barrios was indeed representing both Bautista and Rovero, he could not appear for one as against another.

81 GAMILLA v MARIO FACTS: Atty Marino, Jr. as president of the UST Faculty Union and other union officers entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the management of UST for the provision of economic benefits amounting to P35 Milllion. The 1986 collective bargaining agreement expired in 1988 but efforts to forge a new one unfortunately failed. In 1989, the faculty members of UST went on strike and as a counter-measure UST terminated the employment of 16 officers and directors of the UST Faculty Union including Atty Marino, Jr. The Sec of Labor prescribed the retroactivity of the collective bargaining agreement to 1988 when the 1986 collective bargaining agreement expired. In the same year, the administration of UST and the UST Faculty Union also entered into a compromise agreement for the payment to settle backwages. The important fact in this case is that Atty, Marino, as president, negotiated with UST as union attorney, even though he was an interested party since he was one of the officers who were dismissed (conflict of interests) ISSUE: WoN Marino should be reprimanded?

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HELD: YES RATIO: 1. Atty Marino failed to avoid conflict of interests, first, when he negotiated for the compromise agreement wherein he played the diverse roles of union president, union atty and interested party being one of the dismissed employees seeking his own restitution, and thereafter, when he obtained the attys fees of P4,200,000.00 without full prior disclosure of the circumstances justifying such clain to the members of the UST Faculty Union. 2. As one of the 16 union officers and directors seeking compensation from the UST for their illegal dismissal, Atty. Marino was involved in obvious conflict of interests when in addition he chose to act as concurrent lawyer and president of the UST Faculty Union in forging the compromise agreement. The test of conflict of interest among lawyers is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an atty from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance thereof. In the same manner, it is undoubtedly a conflict of interests for an atty to put himself in a position where self-interest tempts, or worse, actually impels him to do less than his best for his client. 3. Atty Marino. Both as lawyer and president of the union was duty bound to protect and advance the interest of the union members and the bargaining unit above his own. This obligation was jeopardized when his personal interest complicated the negotiation process and eventually resulted in the lopsided compromise agreement that rightly or wrongly brought money to him at the expense of the other faculty members. He also ought to have disclosed his interest (which he only did only years after the consummation of his share.. tsk bad.) 82 SUNTAY v SUNTAY Facts: The complaint for disbarment was filed by Frederico Suntay against his nephew, Atty Suntay, alleging that respondent was his legal counsel who was privy to all his legal, and political affairs. Since they parted ways, Atty Suntay had been filing complaints and cases against complainant making use of confidential information gained while their attorney-client relationship existed. In addition, complainant Suntay alleged that respondent Atty Suntay pursued a case against him for violation of PD 296 for the alleged disappearance of 2 creeks traversing complainants fishpond. Complainant alleged that Atty Suntay s possession of the TCT and the blueprint plan of the property while he was still counsel for complainant provided him with the information that there used to be 2 creeks traversing the fishpond In one case, Magno Dinglasan demanded from complainant P150,000 as consideration for the destruction of complainants record in the BIR, in which Dinglasan is an officer. When complainat declined the demand, Dinglasan charged complainant with the crime of false testimony and grave oral defamation. During the preliminary investigation, Atty Sntay Issue: Held: acted as counsel of Magno Dinglasan. Complainant testified that he consulted Atty Suntay about the demand made by Dinglasan. Issue: Whether the acts of Atty Suntay in filing the complaints constitute malpractice Held: YES. Atty Suntay acted as counself for clients in case involving subject matters regarding which he had either been previously helped complainant to administer as the latters counsel and confidant. A lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his clients even after termination of the attorney-client relation. It is also not necessary to specify the alleged confidential information used. To make the passing of confidential information a condition precedent would not enhance the welfare of the litigants. Hence, the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney and client as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. Atty Suntay is suspended for 2 years. 83 DOCENA V LIMON Facts: Atty. Limon was the Docena spouses lawyer for their appeal in a Forcible Entry case. He then required the Docena spouses to post a supersedeas bond in the amount of P10,000.00 allegedly to stay the execution of the appealed decision The Docenas obtained a loan of P3,000.00 from the Borongan, Eastern Samar Branch of the Development Bank of the Philippines; borrowed P2,140.00 from a private individual; and applied for an agricultural loan of P4,860.00 from the Borongan, Samar Branch of the Philippine National Bank, wherein Limon himself acted as guarantor. When The Docenas went to the CFI to withdraw the bond after the case, they discovered that no such bond was ever posted by Limon. Limon claims that the P10T was just his attorneys fees. W/N Limon should be sanctioned. He should be DISBARRED! By extorting money from his client through deceit and misrepresentation, respondent Limon has reduced the law profession to a level so base, so low and dishonorable, and most contemptible. He has sullied the integrity of his brethren in the law and has, indirectly, eroded the peoples' confidence in the judicial system. By his reprehensible conduct, which is reflective of his depraved character, respondent has made himself unworthy to remain in the Roll of Attorneys.

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84 SEVILLA v SALUBRE Facts: Salubre, prior to being a judge, was Sevillas counsel in a civil case for repurchase and damages. Upon advice of Salubre, Sevilla gave P45k to him to be consigned with the court as repurchase money. Instead of consigning it to the court, Salubre deposited the money in his own account and later used personally by him. Salubre promised Sevilla that he would pay the sum of money. He even issued a promissory note for said amount. Several extensions were sought by Salubre but he still failed to pay. Later on, checks were issued to cover the indebtedness. But these were dishonored on the ground account closed. By the time the case was referred to the Office of Court Administrator, the amount due was around P77k (45k as principal and 32k as interest). Salubres appointment as judge did not extinguish the obligation incurred by him when he was still a trial lawyer. Salubres defense was that the complaint was a result of misunderstanding and the filing of an Affidavit of Desistance is proof that the matter was already resolved. It was shown that Salubre later returned the funds to Sevilla after the case for estafa was filed. Salubre also claimed that the money he received from Sevilla was supposed to be the latters payment for his appearance and other litigation expenses Salubre, by delaying payment of his obligation, failed to keep up with the exacting standards of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. There was an allegation of violation of Canon 17 but this was not substantiated. Salubre is fined and given a stern warning. 85 CUNANAN v RIMORIN FACTS CUNANAN, a retired US citizen, engaged the services of ATTY RIMORIN in the matter of settling his overstaying alien status with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation so tat he could attend the funeral of his son, Andrew Cunanan, in the United States CUNANAN verbally agreed to pay ATTY RIMORIN P40,000 This amount was to be paid out of the goodwill money to be paid by ABS-CBN, represented by NOLI DE CASTRO, in exchange for an exclusive interview regarding the story of CUNANANS son, Andrew For the 1st partial payment, NOLI acting in behalf of ABS-CBN, issued a check for P100,000 payable to ATTY RIMORIN To complete payment, ABS-CBN deposited the balance of P100,000 in the bank account of ATTY RIMORIN According to the affidavit of NOLI, the 2 payments were intended for CUNANAN ATTY RIMORIN sent a letter to CUNANAN stating due to rains there is no way of checking whether the check deposited by ABS-CBN has been clearedIll try my very best to produce the other P30,000 today CUNANAN indeed received P30,000 but after that there was no more communication from ATTY RIMORIN Hence, CUNANAN filed an administrative case with the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline for the disbarment of ATTY RIMORIN and for failing to render the accounting of P200,000 which the lawyer received in trust for him] ISSUE REPRIMANDED HELD RATIO W/N ATTY RIMORIN SHOULD BE

Issue: Should Salubre still be held liable for his acts despite the desistance of the complainant? Held: Yes. The Affidavit of Desistance did not divest the Court of its jurisdiction to impose administrative sanctions upon Salubre. Complainants voluntary desistance does not confirm nor deny Salubres non-culpability. The primary object of administrative cases against lawyers is not only to punish and discipline erring lawyers but also to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the courts and the public from the misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from the legal profession persons whose utter disregard of their lawyers oath have proven them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar. Administrative cases against lawyers can still proceed despite the dismissal of civil and/or criminal cases against them. Salubre violated Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for his failure to return the funds of his client upon demand. His appointment as Judge is not a valid reason not to properly address the demand of complainant. The fact that he was eventually appointed as Judge will not exculpate him from taking responsibility of the consequences of his acts as an officer of the court. His defense that the money was supposed to be Sevillas payment for his services should have been made known to the latter at the earliest time when the demand was made. Instead, he bombarded complainant with a long line of promises hoping that the latter would allow the matter to be, eventually, left unsettled.

YES, VIOLATED CANON 16 RULE 16.01 It was established that the P200,000 were received by ATTY RIMORIN for the benefit of and in trust of CUNANAN, as corroborated by NOLI in his affidavit The highly fiduciary and confidential relation of attorney and client require that ATTY RIMORIN should promptly account for the said funds which he received and held for the benefit of his client, CUNANAN, because those funds properly belong to the latter From the time of the filing of the administrative case until the present, CUNANANS demand for accounting has not yet been satisfied by ATTY RIMORIN Thus, ATTY RIMORIN fell short of his duty as a lawyer under Canon 16 Rule 16.01 and should be penalized accordingly

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JUDGMENT Suspended for 1 year and to render an accounting of P170,000 representing the balance of P200,000 86 LICUANAN v MELO Facts: Leonila Licuanan won in an ejectment case against Aida Pineda. Her counsel in that case was Atty. Manuel Melo. The judgment ordered Pineda to pay rentals, in arrears and succeeding, to Licuanan. It was Melo who demanded payment from Pineda. After being threatened with another lawsuit, Pineda paid the rentals to Melo (worth P5,220). Licuanan never got the payments so she filed an administrative complaint against Pineda before the Chief of the Philippine Tuberculosis Society accusing her of moral turpitude. In response, Pineda filed an action for damages (on the ground of besmirched reputation and mental anguish) against Licuanan because Pineda believed that she had already paid her debt by paying to Melo. After 1 year, Licuanan, through another lawyer, then finds out that the money paid by Pineda was with Melo. Melo then gives the rentals to Licuanan. Licuanan then files this complaint with the Office of the Court Administrator against Melo for breach of professional ethics. W/n Melo should be sanctioned for his acts. Yes, he should be sanctioned. In fact, the SC disbarred him. The acts of respondent in retaining for his personal benefit over a one-year period, the amount of P5,220 received by him on behalf of his client, Licuanan, depriving her of its use, and withholding information on the same despite inquiries made by her, is a breach of the Lawyer's Oath to which he swore observance, and an evident transgression of the Canons of Professional Ethics (16.01, 16.02, 16.03). Respondent's unprofessional acts considered, the SC was constrained to find him guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct in office. He has displayed lack of honesty and good moral character. He has violated his oath not to delay any man for money or malice, besmirched the name of an honorable profession and has proven himself unworthy of the trust reposed in him by law as an officer of the Court. He deserves the severest punishment, which is disbarment. brother saying that Igdanes had paid the P75 to the sheriff as partial satisfaction and that Atty. Meneses had gotten all of the P75. Marquez went to see Atty. Meneses to claim P50 of the P75 that the latter got. Marquez claims that Meneses was only entitled to P25 of the amount paid because she had already given the Atty. P75. Atty. Meneses contends that Marquez owes her money because he was entitled to the retainer fee (P100) and whatever contingent fees that may be awarded by the court. Sol. Gen. says that Atty. Meneses must return the amount of P50 to Marquez. The Sol. Gen. also recommended the suspension of Atty. Meneses for at least 6 months. Issue: W/N Atty. Meneses should return the amount. Held: Atty. Meneses should return the amount of P 50. Suspension of 1 month. It is highly improbable that Marquez would agree to pay P175 as fees to atty. considering the fact that the claim was only for P210. An atty.s fee of P175 is unconscionable. It is well-settled that money collected by a lawyer in pursuance of a judgment in favor of his client is money held in trust and must be immediately turned over. Atty. Meneses should have made an accounting with his client of the amount he received. 88 CASTILLO v TAGUINES Facts: Castillo alleged that Atty. Taguines failed to delver to him P500 representing the monetary settlement of a civil suit between Castillo and Licup. Taguines was the counsel of defendant Licup in the said case, where Castillo was the plaintiff. It was agreed that Licup will give P500.00 for the settlement of the case to Taguines, and Taguines will give the amount to Castillo. For this consideration, Castillo had the case against Licup dismissed. No money was given to Castillo, and the latter only found out in the second week of January 79 that Licup had already given the money to Taguines since Dec.16, 78 Castillo found out when Licup showed him a certification signed by Taguines that the latter received the amount. Taguines defense is that although he received the money from Licup, he never bound himself to go out of his way to personally deliver the money to Castillo or his lawyer, and Taguines said he does not know personally Castillo or his address. Castillo states that Taguines set a date to meet with him but never showed up nor called afterwards. Taguines later on gave Castillo a bouncing check worth P500. Issue: W/N Taguines must be held administratively liable for not delivering the money to Castillo and for fooling the complainant by giving a bouncing check. Held: YES. Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall hold in trust all money and property of his client that may come into his possession. Rule 16.03 of the same canon provides that a lawyer shall deliver the funds or

Issue: Held:

87 MARQUEZ v MENESES Facts: Marquez was introduced by Atty. Peralta to Atty. Meneses as a prospective client. Marquez retained the services of Atty. Meneses to prosecute a claim of P210 against Igdanes. The agreement was that Marquez was to pay Meneses a fee of P100 whether the case was won or lost. Marquez advanced the amount from time to time, totaling P75. The decision of the Justice of the Peace Court was in favor of Marquez, ordering Igdanes to pay the P210 claim and P75 as attorneys fees. Marquez received a letter from her

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property of his client when due or upon demand. Taguines is suspended for one year. 89 LEMOINE v BALON FACTS: Lemoine is a French national who filed an insurance claim with Metropolitan Insurance. His friend Jesus Garcia arranged for the engagement of Balons services as his counsel Balon advised Lemoine that he was charging 25% of the actual amount to being recovered payable upon successful recovery. An advance payment of P50,000 to be deducted from whatever amount would be successfully collected. P1,000 as appearance and conference fee for each and every court hearing and legal expenses and other miscellaneous will be charged to Lemoines account which would be reimbursed upon presentment of account. Lemoine never gave his consent as to the fee. Lemoine signed an undated Special Power of Attorney authorizing Balon to bring any action against Metropolitan Insurance for the satisfaction of Lemoines claim as well as to negotiate, sign, compromise, encash and receive payments Metropolitan Insurance offered to settle Lemoines claim and Balon confirmed his acceptance of the offer December 1998, Metropolitan Insurance issued a China Bank check payable to Lemoine in the amount of P525,000 which was received by Balon When Lemoine asked Balon as to the status of the case, Balon answered that Metropolitan Insurance was offering P350,000 for settlement which Lemoine suggested that Balon accept to avoid litigation December 1999, Lemoine visited the office of Metropolitan Insurance to ask on the status of the case and it answered that the case was long settled via a check given to Balon. Balon acknowledge that he is in possession of the check and that he is keeping the check as attorneys lien pending Lemoines payment of his attorneys fee equivalent to 50% of the entire amount collected. He also threatened Lemoine that he will not hesitate to make proper representation with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, DOLE and BIR if Lemoine will make any trouble to Balon and that he has good network with the mentioned agencies. Balon later claimed that he gave P233,000 to Garcia on the representation of Lemoine. No written memorandum of the turn-over was made because Garcia was a co-Rotarian and co-attorney of Balon Balon was in possession of the said check for 5 years ISSUE: W/N Balon violated the Code of Professional Responsibility HELD: YES! And he was ordered disbarred by the SC The lawyers continuing exercise of his retaining lien presupposes that the client agrees with the amount of attorneys fees to e charged. In case of disagreement, however, the lawyer must not arbitrarily apply the funds in his possession to the payment of his fees. He can file the necessary action with the proper court to fix the fees Before receiving the check, he proposes a 25% attorneys fees, after receiving the check, he was already asking for 50%. under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful acts , must observe fairness in all his dealings with his client and must hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client a lawyer who practices deceit in his dealings with his client not only violates his duty of fidelity loyalty and devotion to the clients cause but also degrades himself and besmirches the name of an honorable profession.

90 MELENDRES v DECENA Facts: (1st cause of action) Aug. 5, 1975: Complainants (spouses Erlinda Dalman & Narciso Melendrez) obtained from Atty. Reynerio Decena (Decena) a loan of P4K. This loan was secured by a real estate mortgage. It was made to appear in the REM that the amount borrowed was P5K. Decena assured the spouses that the REM was a mere formality, and due to this assurance the spouses signed the REM. Despite the assurance, Decena collected from the spouses P500/month as usurious interest. The spouses paid such usurious interest for 3 months. Because of their failure to pay the amounts, Decena drafted a new REM o New contract of mortgage in the amount of P10K with interest at 19%/annum o A special power of attorney authorizing Decena to sell the mortgaged property in public auction Spouses never knew the implications of the new REM. They failed to pay their obligation and so Decena acquired their property in pulic auction and later sold it to Trinidad Ylanan for P12K Spouses then went to Decena with P10K in the hopes of getting their property back. Decena then informs them that their debt has soared to P20.4K. With shattered hopes and grief in their hearts (andrama!), the spouses filed this case for disbarment. (2nd cause of action) Spouses filed a case for estafa against Reynaldo Pineda for recovery of P2K Decena entered into a compromise agreement with Pineda. Pineda then paid P500 to Decena. This settlement was never brought to the attention of the spouses nor were they ever consulted about such. Issue: Held: W/N Decenas acts show gross misconduct and should therefore be disbarred

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Yes, Decena shall be disbarred The acts of Decena as to the 1st cause of action constitute deception, dishonesty and conduct unbecoming a member of the bar. As to the 2nd cause of action, Decena clearly failed to get the consent of the spouses before entering into a compromise. Decena also failed to inform the spouses or turn over to them the P500 given to him by Pineda as downpayment for the settlement of the case. Decenas failure to turn over to the spouses the money underscores his lack of honesty and candor in dealing with his clients give credence to Atty. Grupos claims that the money previously entrusted to him was later converted into a loan ISSUE: WoN Atty. Grupo violated Rule 16? HELD: YES RATIO: What he violated was the rule that a lawyer is bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealing and transactions with his client. ( he did not give security for the loan and he refused to pay the amount)And that Atty Grupo did not violate Rule 16 because Junio consented to and ratified to the use of the money, as evidenced by the PN. The court is constrained to give credence to Atty. Grupos claims that the money previously entrusted to him was later converted into a loan But in the dispositive portion, sabi he violated so ayun. As to the contention that no atty- client relationship exists: it is not necessary that any retainer should have been paid. All is needed is when a person consults with his atty in his professional capacity to obtain professional advice. Atty Grupo is suspended from practice of law for 1 month and to refund the money

91 JUNIO v GRUPO FACTS: Rosario Junio engaged the services of Atty. Salvador Grupo for the redemption of a land belonging to her parents. She gave P25,000 to be used in the redemption, yet Atty. Grupo did not redeem the property and has continuously refused to refund the money given. Junio filed a complaint for disbarment for malpractice and gross misconduct Attu. Grupo contends that the land could really not be redeemed anymore, and that since Junio knew that the mortgage has already expired, she knew that it was just a last ditch effort to redeem the property. Atty. Grupo then borrowed some of the money for himself to help defray his childrens educational expenses. (personal request evidenced by a PN executed in favor of Junio Atty. Grupo contends that their families were really very close and intimate with each other Junios sisters were maids of Atty. Grupo) Atty. Grupo claims that there was no atty-client relationship and further contends that he did not ask for any fee, not even charity. He claims that his services were just acts of a friend for a friend. (he claims that he is willing to pay, though) IBP found that Atty Grupo violated a rule forbidding lawyers from borrowing money from their clients unless the clients interests are protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice and suspended him indefinitely. what he violated was the rule that a lawyer is bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealing and transactions with his client. And that Atty Grupo did Not violate Rule 16 because Junio consented to and ratified to the use of the money, as evidenced by the PN. The court is constrained to

92 BUADO v LAYAG Facts: Herein complainant Lising and her sister Rosita de Guzman ( mother of herein complianat Susana Buado) were the plaintiffs in a civil case which was decided in favor of the plaintiffs. Atty Layag represented the said plaintiffs in that case. Inland Trailways, the defendant in that case, issued checks: (1)payable to Atty Layag for P15,000 (2) payable to Lising for P30,180 (3) payable to De Guzman, who had by then passed away (for P45,000). The checks were received by Atty Layag. Atty Layag did not inform the plaintiffs about the checks. Instead he gave the checks to one Marie Paz Gonzales for encashment on the strength of a Special Power of Attorney, purportedly executed by De Guzman constituting Gonzales as agent. After discovering that checks have already been issued, Lising and Buado, as heir of De Guzman demanded the delivery of the checks. Gonzales, the agent gave Lising P10,000. No furhter amounts were remitted. Issue: W/n Atty Layag's act of delivering the checks to Gonzales, the purported agent, constitutes malpractice... Held: YES. As a lawyer, with more than 30 years in practice, respondent is charged with knowledge of the law. He should know that it was error for

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him to rely on a Special Power of Attorney after the death of the principal, De Guzman. When De Guzman died, the Special Power of Attorney ceased to be operative. With respect to the check payable to Lising, Atty Layag should have delivered it directly to Lising. The Power of Attorney did not cover Lising's case. He is therefore, suspended indefinitely, subject to further orders by the SC. 93 DALISAY v MAURICIO Facts: This is the case against Batas Mauricio, the TV host. Allegedly, Mauricio demanded and received exorbitant attorneys fees but did not take any action on Valerina Dalisays case. Initially, she paid P25T as acceptance fee. In total, she paid Mauricio P56T: P8T filing fee (though the case was already filed) the balance might be a combination of the ff: o Additional acceptance fee P90,000.00, with the explanation that he can give a discount should she pay in cash. o P3,000.00 as appearance fee notwithstanding her payments, respondent never rendered any legal service. She terminated their attorney-client relationship and demanded the return of her money and documents. Mauicio refused. The IBP Board of Governors wanted to dismiss the case. W/N the case against Mauricio should be dismissed. Facts: The Morteras sued their mother, and 2 other personsAguilar and Bradfieldfor the rescission of a contract of sale. They secured a favorable judgment in which they are to receive P155k. Pagatpatan was counsel for the Morteras. After judgment was rendered, he entered into a secret agreement with Aguilar where he received P150k as partial payment of the judgment sum. This money was later deposited, by Pagatpatan, in his personal account without the knowledge of the Morteras. Morteras filed an action because Pagatpatan refuses to surrender the money despite the successive Orders of the RTC and CA. Pagatpatans defense is that the Morteras and their mother owed him money for services he previously rendered the family, and that he wouldnt be paid if he did not do what he did.

Issue: Should Pagatpatan be held administratively liable? What is the proper penalty? Held: Yes. Pagatpatan failed to observe Canon 15 and 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As counsel he: owes candor to his clients; is bound to account whatever money received for and from them; is obligated to keep his own money separate from his clients and; although he is entitled to a lien over the funds in order to satisfy lawful fees, he is bound to give prompt notice to his clients of such liens and to deliver the funds to them upon demand or when due. The claim that he need to protect his interests since there were other people claiming the money from the Monteras was not proved. The penalty of 1-year suspension recommended by the IBP is not commensurate to the fault done. Several factors warrant a more severe penalty: Considering that Pagatpatan is a seasoned practitioner, his actions are inexcusable; Counsel tried to subvert both law and proper procedure to recover his fees; Counsels actions were clearly tainted with bad faith, deceit, and utter contempt of his sworn duty as a lawyer. Pagatpatan is ordered to return the P150k and is suspended for 2 years. 95 HERNANDEZ v GO FACTS Sometime in 1961, HERNANDEZS husband abandoned her and her son Shortly thereafter, creditors of HERNANDEZS husband demanded payment of his loans Fearful of mortgage foreclosures, HERNANDEZ engaged the legal services of ATTY GO ATTY GO advised HERNANDEZ to give him land titles of lots in Zamboanga City belonging to her so that he may sell them to enable her to pay the creditors

Issue: Held:

No. He should be suspended for 6 months. When respondent accepted P56,000.00 from complainant, it was understood that he agreed to take up the latters case and that an attorney-client relationship between them was established. From then on, it was expected of him to serve complainant with competence and attend to her case with fidelity, care and devotion. But there is nothing on record that Mauricio entered his appearance as counsel of record. He did not even follow-up the case which remained pending up to the time she terminated his services. Regarding the P8T: (allegedly as docket fees for other cases): there was no evidence nor any pleadings submitted to show that respondent filed any case considering that the filing fee had to be paid simultaneously with the filing of a case. when a lawyer takes a clients cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting his rights. Just like any other professional, a lawyer is entitled to collect fees for his services. However, he should charge only a reasonable amount of fees.

94 MORTERA v PAGATPATAN

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Then, ATTY GO persuaded HERNANDEZ to execute deeds of sale in his favor without any monetary or valuable consideration ATTY GO also persuaded HERNANDEZ to execute deeds of sale involving the other lots in Zamboanga City which were redeemed by HERNANDEZ when their mortgages fell due In 1974, HERNANDEZ came to know that ATTY GO did not sell her lots as agreed but instead he paid her creditors with his own funds and had her land titles registered in his name, depriving her of real property worth millions HERNANDEZ filed a complaint with the IBP IBP: ATTY GO violated Canon 17 and should be suspended for 3 years W/N ATTY GO SHOULD BE REPRIMANDED YES, FOR VIOLATING CANONS 16 AND 17 ATTY GO violated Canon 16 o His acts acquiring for himself HERNANDEZS lots entrusted to him are acts constituting gross misconduct, a grievous wrong, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character and implies a wrongful intent and not a mere error in judgment o Such conduct on the part of ATTY GO not only degrades himself but also the honor of the legal profession ATTY GO violated Canon 17 o Records show that HERNANDEZ reposed high degree of trust and confidence in ATTY GO that when she engaged his services, she entrusted to him her land titles and allowed him to sell the same o ATTY GO, however, abused this trust and confidence when he did not sell her properties to others but to himself o ATTY GO is duty bound to render a detailed report to HERNANDEZ on how much he sold the lots and the amounts paid to her creditors but failed to do so In previous cases, the Court disbarred and expelled lawyers from the practice of law in similar circumstances, thus, the penalty recommended by the IBP is too light Issue: Held: Reontoy also said that he would never authorized Proculo to represent her to the court or to her lawyer because Proculo was unlettered. Ibadlit only filed the notice of appeal after the reglementary period for appeal. Obviously, the appeal was instantly dismissed. W/n Ibadlit should be sanctioned. SC says yes, Ibadlit is suspended for 1 year. A lawyer owes entire devotion in protecting the interest of his client, warmth and zeal in the defense of his rights. He must use all his learning and ability to the end that nothing can be taken or withheld from his client except in accordance with the law. He must present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law in support of his client's cause, regardless of his own personal views. In the full discharge of his duties to his client, the lawyer should not be afraid of the possibility that he may displease the judge or the general public. A lawyer has no authority to waive his client's right to appeal. His failure to perfect an appeal within the prescribed period constitutes negligence and malpractice proscribed by Rule 18.03, Canon 18, of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable."

ISSUE HELD RATIO

97 DE LAINO v CA De Liano vs. CA Mendiola Facts: The prior case involves the cancellation of 2 real estate mortgages in favor of San Miguel executed by Tango. De Liano was a senior executive of SMC. The prior case was decided against SMC. De Liano appealed the decision to the CA. Their counsel, Atty. Afable filed an Appellants Brief which failed to comply with the Rules of Court. Tango noticed this flaw of the Brief and immediately moved for the dismiss of De Lianos appeal. The CA decided that the Appellants Brief does not contain a Subject Index or a Table of Cases and Authorities; and that these lapses justify the dismissal of the appeal. De Liano asserts that the CA erred in declaring that the appeal be dismissed on the basis of the lapses in complying with the technical requirements in making of brief.

JUDGMENT ATTY GO is disbarred 96 REONTOY v IBADLIT Facts: Corazon Reontoy lost a decision in a civil case in the RTC with Atty. Liberato Ibadlit as her counsel. Ibadlit received the notice of the decision but he opted not to file an appeal. He says that he informed Reontoys brother, Proculo Tomazar, to inform Reontoy of his opinion that he did not think that an appeal would prosper. This statement was refuted by the testimony of Proculo saying that he was not given such info.

Issue: W/N the dismissal of the Appeal was proper. Held: The dismissal of the brief was proper. All appeals are merely rights that arise from statutes; thus, they must be exercised in the manner prescribed by law. It is to this end that rules governing pleadings must be exercised in the manner prescribed by law. These technical rules like the inclusion of the statement of facts or the subject index in the brief are meant to enable the appellate court to have a better grasp of the matter entrusted to it for appraisal. Relevant to the topic: Generally, the negligence of the counsel binds the client. Even if Atty. Afable may be said

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to be SMCs counsel, this does not operate in favor of De Liano. A corporation is an artificial being whose juridical personality is only a fiction created by law and it can only exercise powers and transact its business through its board of directors and its agents. That Atty. Afable was clothed with sufficient authority to bind SMC is undisputable. SMCs board resolution attests to that. As such, SMC must be held bound by the actuations of its counsel, Atty. Afable. 98 TABAS v MANGIBIN Facts: A deed of mortgage was delivered to Hilda Tabas evidencing a real property in La Union that was mortgaged to her by Galvan. The deed of mortgage was registered in the Register of Deeds of La Union. Subsequently, a certain Lilia Castillejos represented herself as Tabas and appeared before Mangibin, who was a notary public, and asked the latter to prepare a discharge of the mortgage and to notarize it afterwards. Mangibin prepared the discharge of real estate mortgage without asking Castillejos for anything to serve as identification except for a Community Tax Certificate (CTC). This enabled Galvan to mortgage the property again, this time to a rural bank Tabas informed Mangibin that her signature in the questioned discharge of REM was forged but Mangibin did nothing to help. He even threatened to file a counter suit against her if she files a case against him. Tabas filed this complaint for disbarment. Mangibin admitted that the discharge of REM was a forgery but interposed the defense that it was beyond the scope of his duty to ascertain the identity of persons appearing before him, and that he had no available means of ascertaining their real identities. Mangibin violated the Notarial Law and Canon 1. His notarial commission is revoked and he is disqualified from reappointment as notary public for 2 years.

99 SANTUYO v HIDALGO FACTS: Santuyo purchased a parcel of land covered by a deed of sale which was notarized by Hidalgo and was entered in his notarial register 6 years after the date of notarization, Santuyo had a dispute with Danilo German over the ownership of the land Germen presented an affidavit of Hidalgo denying the authenticity if his signature on the deed of sale and that it was forged Santuyo argued that: o The deed of sale contained all the formalities of a duly notarized document o They had no access to the dry seal of Hidalgo Hidalgo on the other hand claimed that: o He was on vacation at the time that the deed was allegedly notarized o An examination of the document will prove that his signature was forged o He would have remembered Santuyo for he requires that the parties exhibit their community tax certificates and made them personally acknowledge the documents before he notarize documents IBP: the signature was really forged but Hidalgo must be suspended for 2 years as a notary public ISSUE: W/N Hidalgo must be suspended HELD: YES! The responsibility attached to a notary public is sensitive. Hidalgo should have been more discreet and cautious I the execution of his duties as such and should not have wholly entrusted everything to the secretaries. Hidalgo is negligent not only in the supposed notarization but foremost in having allowed the office secretaries to make the necessary entries in his notarial registry which was supposed to be done and kept by him alone and should not have relied on somebody else.

Issue: W/N Mangibin should be held administratively liable for negligence in the performance of his duty as a notary public to ascertain the identity of the person appearing before him. Held: YES, Mangibin was negligent in performing such duty. Notarization is invested with public interest. It converts a private document into a public one, making it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. Such document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies, and the public must be able to rely upon an acknowledgement by a notary public appended to a document. A notary public should not notarize a document unless the person who signed the same is the very same person who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of matters stated in the document. Mangibin should have requested other forms of identification or asked questions to ascertain her identity.

100 ENDAYA v OCA Facts: A complaint for unlawful detainer was filed against Artemio Endaya and his wife. An answer was prepared by a Mr. Ramirez for the spouses. At the beginning of the preliminary conference, spouses appeared without counsel. Endaya sought the services of the Public Attorneys Office. Atty. Oca was assigned to handle the case.

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At the continuation of the prelim conference, Oca filed motion for amendment of answer. Motion was denied. The judge then ordered all parties to submit their affidavits and position papers. The court also said that 30 days after the submission of the last paper or upon expiration of the period for filing, judgment shall be rendered on the case. Oca failed to submit any affidavit or position paper. Nonetheless, the complaint for unlawful detainer was dismissed because those who filed the case were not reall parties-in-interest. The case was appealed to RTC. Oca failed to submit anything again. RTC reversed the MTC decision. Spouses were ordered to vacate the property and pay a certain amount for rentals. Endaya confronted Oca about the decision. Oca feigned that he did not receive anything. Upon checking with the clerk of court, Oca did indeed receive a copy of the decision (liar!). Hence this administrative complaint. W/N Oca committed professional misconduct Yes. Suspended for 2 months from practice of law. Facts to show may problema talaga to si Atty. Oca: o In his comment, Oca put up the defense that he did not file any paper in the MCTC because it would just be a repetition of the answer. Endaya filed his reply which just reiterated what he put in his complaint. o SC ordered Oca to file a rejoinder. Guess what, Oca once again failed to file anything. Oca explained that he failed to file a rejoinder because he believed in good faith that it was no longer necessary. o In the IBP investigation, Oca once again failed to submit anything. Oca only appeared once in the MCTC and practically abandoned the spouses thereafter. The facts show that Oca failed to employ every legal and honorable means to advance the cause of his client. For intentionally failing to submit the pleadings required by the court, respondent practically closed the door to the possibility of putting up a fair fight for his client. Oca cannot just appear only once for the spouses. A lawyer continues to be a counsel of record until the lawyer-client relationship is terminated. Ocas story shows his appalling indifference to his clients cause, deplorable lack of respect for the courts and a brazen disregard of his duties as a lawyer. Bakit hindi disbarred? o Endaya misrepresented that the original answer was prepared by a non-lawyer when in fact it was prepared by a lawyer o Endaya assured Oca that he had strong evidence to support their case. Endaya never gave anything to Oca to support their claim. o The PAO is burdened with a heavy caseload. FACTS: Emma de Juan dwas dismissed by Triple AAA without notice. She asked for the assistance of Banahaw Broadcasting Company (BBC) to search for a lawyer. The new lawyer, Atty. Oscar Barria III, who worked with BBC offering free legal services to indigents became the counsel of de Juan in the NLRC case against Triple AAA for illegal dismissal. When an adverse NLRC decision was rendered against de Juan, she asked Atty Baria as to what to do next. Atty replied "Paano ba yan, iha eh hindi ako marunong gumawa ng Motion for Reconsideration?" and the secretary of Atty. Baria told de Juan and the husband "wag na tumawag uli dahil galit..." De Juan charged Atty Baria with negligence and threats to her person. Atty. BAria contends that he forewarned his client not to expect too much from him because of his limited legal experience since he was a new lawyer. Also, he alleges that De Juan pocketed the money that Triple AAA has already paid off. After that, the NLRC decision was reversed, and Atty. Baria accused de Juan that she lied re: her employment, which made him lose his appeal. May incident pa re: Raffy Tulfo (pero d na kelangan un.. gusto nya kasuhan ng libel kasi may sinabing bad against him) ISSUE: WoN Atty. Baria can be administratively charged? HELD: Yes. RATIO: 1. Once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. 2. Rule 18.03 provides that the negligence of lawyers in connection with legal matters entrusted to them for handling shall render them liable. 3. Without a proper revocation of his authority and withdrawal as counsel, Atty Baria remains counsel of record and whether or not he has valid cause to withdraw from the case, he cannot just do so and leave his client out in the cold. 102 EDQUIBAL v FERRER FACTS: Edquibal charged Atty Ferrer with professional misconduct and neglect of duty. Edquibal engaged the services of Ferrer to assist his mother Ursula in cases she filed against his sister Delia involving a certain property. In one of the cases, the trial judge rendered a decision adverse to his mother. Atty Ferrer then advised complainant to appeal to the CA and that the cost involved is P4,000. When complainant Edquibal informed respondent Atty Ferrer that he does not have enough money, Atty ferrer said P2,000 is sufficient. Edquibal followed up the appealed case. He then learned that the appeal was dismissed for failure to file the required appelant's brief.

Issue: Held:

101 DE JUAN v BARIA III

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Respondent Atty Ferrer denied that he filed an appeal. He claimed that he never agreed to handle the appeal. ISSUE: W/n Atty Ferrer is guilty of professional misconduct... HELD: YES. Records show that respondnet was the counsel of record for Edquibal. The resolution of the CA clearly states that the "notice sent to counsel for defendants-appelants requiring him to file appelants brief wihtin 45 days from receipt thereof, was received by him...". However, respondent failed to file the appellants' brief despite receipt of such notice. Sec2 rule 44 of the Rules of CivPro provides that the counsel of the parties in the court of origin shall be considered their counsel in the CA. If it were true that Atty Ferrer did not agree to represent Edquibals, why did he not file with the CA a motion to withdraw as their counsel? The practice of law does not require extraordinary diligence. All that is required is ordinary diligence expected of a bonus pater familias. Suspended for 3 mos. 103 CUIZON v MACALIN Facts: Issue: Held: The legal services of the Atty Rodolfo Macalino was sought by the Susan Cuizon in behalf of her husband Antolin Cuizon who was convicted for Violation of Dangerous Drug Act. Since they cannot pay, he suggested that he be given possession of their Mitsubishi car. He then offered to buy, and bought it for only P85T. (Too cheap, even if this happened during the early 90s). In spite of everything, he still failed to appear in the case of Antolin Cuizon. The Cuizons got another attorney. He (Macalino) was sanctioned by the lower courts, and was fined by the SC for P1000. which he did not pay. He was ordered to be arrested by the NBI, who was not able to serve the warrant against him (allegedly, he no longer resided in his place) The IBP wanted to suspend him for 3 years. By his repeated cavalier conduct, the respondent exhibited an unpardonable lack of respect for the authority of the Court As an officer of the court, it is a lawyers duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court. The highest form of respect for judicial authority is shown by a lawyers obedience to court orders and processes.

104 DE JUAN v BARIA III Facts: De Juan was an employee of Triple AAA. Based on a performance evaluation she was terminated. De Juan filed a case for illegal termination against the company. Atty Baria III was her counsel. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of De Juan. When the company appealed to the NLRC, the decision was reversed. De Juan blamed Baria III for the reversal of the decision. She said that she only came to know of the reversed decision a month after it was promulgated. And when she asked counsel what to do, the latter said that he did not know how to make a Motion for Reconsideration. And when her husband called the office of the lawyer, the secretary told them not to talk with said counsel anymore. Baria IIIs defense was that he forewarned his clients that he was just new in the profession and that they should not expect much from him. He also claimed that did not fail in informing his clients regarding the development of the case. And when the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter, he advised De Juan to get a more experienced lawyer. He also cited that he was lambasted on air by a radio announcer-Raffy Tulfo. And that he received death threats after De Juans husband called their office and gave a warning to his secretary. In sum, Baria III asserts that he did not commit any breach of his oath and that he has vigorously pursued his clients cause. He further averred that it was De Juans negligence and folly that caused her to lose the case.

Issue: Whether Baria III committed culpable negligence, that would warrant disciplinary action, in failing to file for De Juan motion for reconsideration from the decision of the NLRC. Held: Yes. Once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a client, he owes fidelity to such cause and must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. A lawyer should carry the case of his client until its termination or until it has become final and executory. A lawyer may only abandon his client and withdraw his services for a reasonable cause and only upon appropriate notice. Baria III did fail to file a motion for reconsideration. His excuse that he did not know how to make one is inexcusable. After his client expressed her desire to file such motion, it is incumbent upon him to familiarize himself with the procedure to carry out such task. Anyway, filing a motion for reconsideration is not that complicated. Though he did inform his client of his lack of experience, this cannot absolve him. A lawyer is expected to be familiar with the rudiments of the law and procedure. It is

W/N Atty. Macalino should be sanctioned. He should be DISBARRED and not just suspended. Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion The respondent clearly breached his obligation under Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

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his duty to serve his client with competence and diligence and should exert his best efforts to protect the interests of his client. There was no proper revocation of authority and withdrawal by Baria III. So he remained De Juans counsel in the case. He did not obtain the written consent of his client or the permission of the court to withdraw from the case. Negligence of lawyers in connection with legal matters entrusted to them for handling shall render them liable (Canon 18 Rule 3). Baria III abandoned the cause of his client without a just reason. He was warned and fined in the amount of P5k. 105 ROLLON v NAVAL FACTS ROLLON, together with her SON, went to the office of ATTY NARAVAL to seek his assistance in a case filed against her (Collection of Sum of Money) After going through the documents, ATTY NARAVAL agreed to be ROLLONS lawyer and required her to pay P8,000 as filing and partial service fee As per instruction of ATTY NARAVAL, ROLLONS SON returned to his office to follow up however ATTY NARAVAL told the SON that he was not able to act on the case because he was busy After several follow-ups and still no action, ROLLON decided to withdraw the amount paid to ATTY NARAVAL for failure of the latter to comply with their mutual agreement ATTY NARAVAL said that he could not return the documents because the same were in his house and the P8,000 paid by ROLLON because he has no money ROLLON decided to refer the matter to the IBP President of Davao City INVESTIGATING COMMISSIONER: suspend for 1 year for neglect of duty and/or violation of Canons 15 and 18 IBP BOARD OF GOVERNORS RESOLUTION: suspend for 2 years for violation of Canons 15 and 18 and restitution of P8,000 ISSUE REPRIMANDED W/N ATTY NARAVAL SHOULD BE deserves full attention, diligence, skill and competence. Hence, practicing lawyers may accept only as may cases as they can efficiently handle. Otherwise, their clients would be prejudiced. In the case at bar, records show that after receiving P8,000, ATTY NARAVAL failed to render any legal service to ROLLON and despite ROLLONS repeated demands, ATTY NARAVAL failed to return the files of the case that had been entrusted to him and kept the money ROLLOON had likewise entrusted to him Furthermore, after going through her papers, ATTY NARAVAL should have given ROLLON a candid opinion on the merits and status of the case. Apparently, the civil suit against ROLLON had been decided against her and had long become final executory. However, ATTY NARAVAL withheld such vital information from ROLLON and even demanded P8,000 as filing and service fee giving her hope that her case would be acted upon.

JUDGMENT Atty. Camilo Naraval is found GUILTY of violating Rule 15.05 and Canons 16, 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. Furthermore, he is ORDERED TO RESTITUTE, within thirty (30) days from notice of this Decision, complainants eight thousand pesos (P8,000), plus interest thereon, at the rate of six percent per annum, from October 18, 2000, until fully paid. 106 MIRAFLOR v HAGAD Facts:

HELD YES, FOR VIOLATION OF RULE 15.05 AND CANONS 16, 17 & 18 RATIO Ordinarily, lawyers are not obliged to act either as advisers or as advocates of any person who may wish to become their client. They may decline employment and refuse to accept representation, if they are not in a position to carry it out effectively and competently. But once they agree to handle a case, attorneys are required by the Canons of Professional Responsibility to undertake the task with zeal, care and utmost devotion. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney client-relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to a clients cause. And every case accepted by a lawyer

Nilo Miraflor, with the help of Primo Miraflor, filed a complaint against Insular Lumber Co. Phils. (ILCOPHIL) for illegal dismissal. The Minister of Labor and Employment initially denied the petition but the NLRC reversed the ruling, which was affirmed by the Office of the President (OP). Respondent Atty. Jose Aguirre, as the Executive Labor Arbiter, issued a writ of execution to enforce the decision of the OP. ILCOPHIL, through Atty. Juan Hagad, filed a motion for reconsideration. Aguirre ordered ILCOPHIL to post a bond to stay the execution of the decision and ordered a trial to determine the correct amount of backwages and benefits to be awarded to Miraflor. Eventually, Aguirre lowered the amount adjudged by the OP (from 27k to 14k). Mirfalor now complains to the SC that the respondent-lawyers conspired to thwart the execution of the decision of the OP which may constitute malpractice, gross misconduct or violation of the lawyers oath. W/n Aguirre and Hagad acted properly as lawyers. SC says YES.

Issue: Held:

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Respondent Atty. Hagad can never be faulted for having filed said motion for reconsideration. As counsel for ILCOPHIL, he has the duty to pursue with zeal and dedication the best interests of his client and the filing of the motion for reconsideration was well within the scope of his authority and prerogatives as such counsel. Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that "a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence." With respect to respondent Atty. Aguirre, Jr., his explanation is reasonable and satisfactory. Complainants, except for their unsubstantiated allegations, never offered any satisfactory evidence to warrant the conclusion that Atty. Aguirre, Jr. acted maliciously in allowing ILCOPHIL to file the questioned motion for reconsideration. His explanation that he "merely complied with due process by granting the respondent company ILCOPHIL an opportunity to present evidence relative to its claim that complainant (Nilo Miraflor) had gainful employment during the time he was dismissed" is well taken. As a matter of fact, in allowing said motion for reconsideration, Atty. Aguirre was merely complying with the presidential directive to have a further adjudication on Nilo's salary differentials and other benefits due him. Facts: This is a disbarment proceeding against Atty. Montero Pacifica Millare, the mother of complainant, obtained a favorable judgment from the MTC which ordered Co to vacate the premises subject of the ejectment case. Co, through Montero as counsel, appealed the decision to the RTC. She neither filed a supersedeas bond nor paid the rentals adjudged by the MTC. Thus the appeal was dismissed. The CA also dismissed Cos appeal from the RTC decision for failure to comply with BP Blg. 129 and with the Interim Rules and Guidelines. According to CA, Co should have filed a petition for review and not an ordinary appeal. After the dismissal, the judgment of the MTC had already become final and executory. However, Cos counsel filed four more defective and dilatory petitions before the RTC, CA, and SC for the purpose of delaying the execution of judgment by MTC.

Issue: W/N Millare should be disbarred for violating Canons 12 and 19 Held: Montero is suspended for one year. Canon 19 requires a lawyer to represent his clients within the bounds of the law. He must employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client. He must not allow his client to dictate the procedure in handling the case. In short, a lawyer is not a gun for hire. The appeal from MTC to RTC was sufficient to protect Cos interest and fully ventilate her defenses. Montero is also guilty of forum shopping, considering the number of actions he filed.

107 PEOPLE v PRIETO Facts: Prieto was prosecuted in the Peoples Court for 7 counts of treason. He entered a plea of guilty on counts 1, 2, 3, and 7, and made a plea of not guilty on counts 4, 5, 6. Prieto was found guilty on count 4, 1, 2, 3, and 7despite the fact that the prosecutor only presented evidence on count 4. Prieto seeks the reversal of the conviction alleging that the court failed to appoint another counsel de officio to him in "spite of the manifestation of the atty. de officio that he would like to be relieved for obvious reasons." Issue: W/N Prieto was denied the right to counsel. Held: Prieto was not denied the right to counsel. The court places reasonable presumption in favor of the legality and regularity of all the proceedings of the trial court, including the presumption that the accused was not denied the right to have counsel. The fact that the atty. appointed by the trial court to aid Prieto in his defense expressed reluctance to accept the designation (because he did not sympathize with Prietos cause) is not sufficient to overcome the presumption. The statement of the counsel in the court below did not necessarily imply that he did not perform his duty to protect Prieto. The court also finds the Prieto is not guilty of counts 1,2, 3, and 7, because of lack of evidence. His guilt in count 4 is maintained and the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua due to aggravating (torture) and mitigating (plea of guilt) circumstances. 108 MILLARE v MONTERO Millare v Montero

109 PHIL LAND v CEBU PORTLAND FACTS: PLASLU asked the Court of Industrial Relations to order Cebu Portland to pay overtime compensation and differentials due to them under the RA 1880 or the 40 Hours a Week Law. The Company argued that the sucurity guards are not under the said law and thery are not entitled to additional compensation CIR: PLASLU are not within the coverage of RA 1880 After 2 years form the decision of the CIR, PLASLU through their new counsel made ot of record that their former counsel was not authorized by them to enter into stipulations of facts. According to PLASLU, the stipulation of their previous attorney which states that "they were required by the company to work for 56 hours a week was due to the nature of thier services and in the interest of public notice" is a legal conclusion and were not authorized by them therefore, PLASLU filed a petition to reopen the case CIR: denied the motion to reopen the case ISSUE: W/N the court can reopen the case after it has long been final and executory

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HELD: NO! It has been settled that clients are bound by the acts and even mistakes of counsel in procedural techniques. The facts that were agreed upon were unfavorable to the client does not detract from the binding effect of the stipulation. the condition to reopen a case is: it must be upon grounds not already directly or indirectly litigated and the grounds must not be available to the aprties in the previous proceedings and the reopening must not affect the period already elapsed at the time the order to reopen was issued. 110 CABALLERO v DEIPARINE Caballero v. Deiparine Facts: There was a stipulation of facts stating the following: o Plaintiffs are the children by the first marriage, defendants (Ragas) are the children by the second marriage of Vicenta Bucao. o Vicenta Bucao and Tomas Raga acquired land in Cebu. of this land was sold to Antonio Caballero (one of the plaintiffs). Land was never transferred thru title. o Later on, Deiparine acquired the whole lot through purchase from Tomas Raga. TCT was issued to Deiparine. The stipulation was only signed by Atty. Guba(for plaintiffs) and Atty. Davide(for respondents). From the stipulation of facts, the CFI rendered decision in favor of the defendants (that Deiparine owns the whole lot). Plaintiffs filed for reconsideration saying that they were never made to participate in the preparation and formation of the stipulation of facts W/N the stipulation of facts is valid The case is remanded to court of origin for further proceedings and the amended complaint should be accepted. It is puzzling why the petitioners signatures were not affixed in the stipulation. The conduct of Atty. Guba in entering into a compromise agreement without the knowledge and consent of his clients is not in keeping with the sworn duty of a lawyer to protect the interest of his clients. It amounts to fraud. The stipulation of facts which was made the basis of the decision was null and void as it contained serious unauthorized admissions against the interest of the plaintiffs who had no hand in its preparation. Attorneys cannot, without special authority, compromise their clients litigation. PHIL ALUMINUM WHEELS, INC v FASGI FACTS: FASGI and PAWI entered into a distributorship contract wherein PAWI obligated itself to ship wheels for FASGI (foreign company) FASGI paid PAWI the FOB value of the wheels but later found the shipment to be defective and in non-compliance with their stated requirements (non stamping of country of origin, weight load limits, no proper indications and markings on the wheels, not fitted to the automobiles, etc) FASGI instituted an action against PAWI and FPS for breach of contract and recovery of damages where I was stipulated that PAWI and FPS would accept the return of not loess than 8,100 wheels after restoring to FASGI the purchase price via 4 irreovable letters of credit. PAWI was unable to comply with the foregoing agreement alleging that it was due to a restriction by the Central Bank (for approval of the L/C) PAWI and FASGI undertook a STIPULATION OF JUDGMENT agreeing that if PAWI still failed to undertake its obligation, FASGI would immediately have a right to apply to the Court for entry of judgment.THis was executed by the FASGI president and PAWI Counsel (Mr. Thomas Ready). PAWI still defaulted so FASGI filed with the US District Court of the Central District of California. (case was decided against PAWI to pay) FASGI filed with the Makati RTC for enforcement of foreign judgment but the latter held that there was unjust enrichment since PAWI was to pay, while FASGI was not ordered to return the wheels. FURTHERMORE, it held that the supplemental settlement agreement were a NULLITY for having been entered into by Mr. Thomas Ready, counsel for PAWI, without the latter's authorization. ISSUE: WoN the decision is binding against PAWI? HELD: YES RATIO: 1. In this jurisdiction, it is clear that an atty cannot without a client's authorization, settle the action or SM of the litigation even when he honestloy believes that such settlement will best serve his client's best interest. BUT when a client, upon becoming aware of the compromise and the judgment thereon, fails to promptly repudiate the action of his atty, he will not afterwards be heard to complain about it. (PAWI could have sent a disclaimer, and not have waited for more than a year to mention the alleged lack of authority)

Issue: Held:

111 PHIL WHEELS v FASGI

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2. A party, should not, after its opportunity to enjoy the benefits of an agreement, be allowed to later disown the arrangement when the terms thereof ultimately would prove to operate against its hopeful expectations.(PAWI was spared from possibly paying substantial amount of damages and incurring heavy litigation fees, and was even afforded time to reimburse FASGI) 112 MANALANG v ANGELES FACTS: This is an administrative case agaisnt Atty Angeles for grave misconduct as a lawyer and he stanes charged with infidelity in the discharge of fiduciary obligations to his clients, herein complainant Manalang. Manalang alleged that they were the complainants in a case for overtime and separation pay filed against their employer, the Phil Racing Club Restaurant. Atty Angeles was their counsel. Judgment was rendered in favor of Manalang, in the amount of P6500. However, without authority from his clients, Atty Angeles compromised the award and was able to collect P5500 only. Manalang made several demands upon Atty Angeles to turn over to them the amount collected minus the agreed upon attorney's fees of 30%, but the lawyer refuese and offered to give them only the sum of P2650. Atty Angeles, in his defense, stated the he refused because he was ordered to deduct from his attorney's fees the amount of P2000 representing the amount discounted by counsel of the Phil Racing Club Restaurant together with sheriff legal fees. ISSUE: Whether respondent Atty Angeles should be suspended from the practice of law because of grave misconduct related to his clients' funds. HELD: YES. In the instant case, there is no dispute that complainants were awarded P6500 for unpaid overtime and separation pay. 30% was agreed to be paid ot respondent as his attorney's fees. Alleging difficulties in collecting te full amount awarded, respondent compromised the award on execution and collected only P5500 from the losing party. This compromise was allegedly without authority from his clients. Atty Angeles failed to show any such authority. Atty Angeles exhibited an uncaring lack of devotion to the interest of his clients as well as want of zeal in the maintenance and defence of their rights. Suspended for 6 months. 113 GARCIA v CA Facts: Angelina Guevarra, while talking to Consuelo De Garcia, owner of La Bulakena Restaurant, recognized her (Guevarras) ring in the finger of Mrs Garcia. She inquired where she bought it. Apparently, Guevarras ring was stolen from her house in February 1952. Garcia handed the ring to Guevarra and it fitted her finger. They brought the ring to Mr. Rebullida, where the ring was allegedly bought, and he concluded that it was indeed the ring that Guevarra bought from him in 1947. But the ring was returned to Garcia, who later on didnt return the ring anymore. Garcia claims it was lost. A case was filed. During which an extra-judicial admission by Garcia was done. She claims there that she bought the ring from different persons, the ultimate source being Aling Petring. And that the ring of Guevarra might just be similar to hers. Apparently, Aling Petring was just a hoax. As per the case: mysterious and ephemeral figure. There was really no Aling Petring. W/N the extra-judicial admission of De Garcia, through his cousel, is binding on her. Counsels admission binds the client. Defendant (De Garcia) is refuted by her own extra-judicial admissions, although made by counsel. For an attorney who acts as counsel of record and is permitted to act as such, as the authority to manage the cause, and this includes the authority to make admission for the purpose of the litigation. Her explanation that her counsel misunderstood her is puerile (This means silly) because the liability to error as to the identity of the vendor and the exchange of the ring with another ring of the same value, was rather remote.

Issue: Held:

114 SANTIAGO v DE LOS SANTOS Facts: Luis Santiago filed an application for registration of a piece of land in San Mateo, Rizal. The application was opposed by the Director of Lands, Director of Forestry, and by a certain Pacita de los Santos. Upon examination of the records, the property appeared to be a part of the public domain. So Santiago was ordered to show cause to support his application. Motions to Dismiss (the application), on the ground that the property was public domain, were filed by the oppositors. (Mrs de los Santos was actually a lessee of the land by virtue of a Pasture Lease Agreement) (Whats funny is that) When Santiagos counselthe firm of Luna and Manalorequested that the case be calendared for hearing, the pleading contained attachments showing that the land is indeed part of the public domain (court said that counsel probably wanted to prove that despite the public character of the property, there was open and uninterrupted possession in the concept of an owner). This admission led to the dismissal of the application. Now, counsel wants to reverse the decision.

Issue:

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Can Santiago (more appropriately his counsel) properly call for the reversal of the decision? Held: NO. The court has adhered to the doctrine that an admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive to him, and that all proofs submitted by him contrary or inconsistent therewith, should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the party or not (Justice JBL Reyes in Joes Radio v Alto Electronics). Even if there would be a full hearing of the case, the result would still be the same. The lower court is constrained to dismiss the application. In a desperate effort to save the case, counsel tried to rely on procedural doctrinesparticularly citing that de los Santos has no interest in the case. However, even if such was admitted, they still failed to show open, uninterrupted, peaceful, and adverse possession in the concept of an owner. It should be noted that technicalities should give way (and even aid) to substantial justice. 115 PINEDA v CA FACTS JOSE VICTORIA filed a complaint for recovery of possession of 2 parcels of land in Taguig against EMMANUEL VICTORIA, ET AL praying after notice and hearing that the latter be ordered to vacate the premises Clerk of Court of Branch II issued a notice of pretrial to ATTY VICTORIA for JOSE VICTORIA and ATTY GONZALES AND ASSOCIATES for EMMANUEL VICTORIA, ET AL stating that the pre-trial will be held on May 29 On May 29, the designated judge, JUDGE NAVARRO was on leave so the Clerk of Court of Branch II entered the following minutes: Presiding Judge of this Court being on leave and as prayed by ATTY VICTORIA and ATTY CAPISTRANO* let the pre-trial be transferred to July 3 On July 3, JUDGE NAVARRO was still on leave and entered similar minutes noting the notification to ATTY CAPISTRANO as to the new date, Oct 16, of the pre-trial The case was transferred to the sala of JUDGE PINEDA without knowledge of EMANNUEL VICTORIA, ET AL or their lawyer On Oct 16, neither EMANNUEL VICTORIA, ET AL nor ATTY CAPISTRANO appeared so JUDGE PINEDA entered a default order against EMMANUEL VICTORIA, ET AL and commissioned the deputy clerk to receive evidence for JOSE VICTORIA and to submit a report A few days later, an associate in the office of ATTY GONZALES while appearing in another sala of the same court stumbled upon the scheduled reception of evidence of JOSE VICTORIA as ordered by JUDGE PINEDA EMMANUEL VICTORIA, ET AL filed a verified motion to reconsider and/or set-aside the order holding them in default but the same was denied On the contrary, a motion for execution pending appeal was granted EMMANUEL VICTORIA, ET AL elevated the matter to the CA who reversed the decision of the lower court and ordered JUDGE PINEDA to proceed with the pre-trial Hence, this petition Main argument of EMMANUEL VICTORIA, ET AL is that the minutes prepared by the clerk of court merely singles out ATTY CAPISTRANO as having been notified so since no notice was sent to them, the whole proceeding cannot stand the test of validity W/N NOTICE TO COUNSEL REGARDING SCHEDULED DATE OF PRE-TRIAL IS NOTICE TO CLIENT NO, THERE SHOULD ALSO BE NOTICE TO THE

ISSUE

HELD CLIENT RATIO

Generally, notice to counsel operates as notice to the party/parties represented However, application in a given case should be looked into and adopted according to its surrounding circumstances, otherwise, it may foster dangerous collusions to the detriment of justice The case at bar involves Section 1 and 2 of Rule 20 of the Rules of Court which state In any action after the last pleading has been filed, the court shall direct the parties AND their attorneys to appear The Court interpreting these provisions, uniformly emphasized that the pre-trial is mandatory, that the parties as well as their counsel, who are required to appear thereat, must BOTH be notified of the same In other proceedings presence of parties is not necessary so notice to counsel operates as notice to client but in a pre-trial, presence of parties is a must because one of the purposes of a pre-trial is to explore the possibility of an amicable settlement (which a counsel cannot compromise absent express authorization) so notice to the parties is necessary Records show that since only the counsel for EMMANUEL VICTORIA, ET AL was notified of the pre-trial, such notification is neither adequate nor sufficient for purposes of a pre-trial Judgment of CA affirmed

NOTE *ATTY CAPISTRANO - not mentioned but I presume he is an associate of ATTY GONZALES 116 SALONGA v CA Facts: Astra Realty Development Corp. (Astra) leased its property to Alelie Montojima. The latter tried to open a restaurant but it was not a success. Montojima then entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with Paul Geneve Entertainment Corp. (Paul Geneve) where the latter purchased the lease rights of Montojima over the property.

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Paul Geneve paid Montojima but when it was about to start its business, the Bel-Air Village Homeowners Association filed a complaint for violation of some municipal ordinances. Now comes George Salonga who was interested in buying the lease rights of Paul Geneve. Since Salonga had no money, he suggested that he (along with his company Solid Intertain) and Paul Geneve enter into a joint venture enterprise. The idea was to form a new corporation to be named Solidisque Inc. All the documents were prepared by the counsels of both parties (Atty. Garlitos for Salonga and Atty. Sadili for Paul Geneve). Paul Geneve signed the papers but Dalonga didnt. Having possession of the unsigned papers, Salonga started operating Metro Disco on the subject property. No corporation under the name Solidisque Inc. was ever registered as agreed upon in the Securities and Exchange Commission. Paul Geneve was totally left out. Paul Geneve filed a complaint for specific performance against Salonga and his company. Salonga and his counsel failed to appear in the trial dates so he was declared in default and judgment was rendered by the RTC in favor of Paul Geneve. Salonga was also adjudged guilty of civil contempt for his failure to appear in an earlier hearing. He was ordered arrested until he obeys the orders and judgment of the Court. The CA affirmed. W/n Salongas allegation of extrinsic fraud and denial of due process obtain to justify annulment of the default judgment rendered by the RTC. SC says NO. Petitioners George Salonga and Solid Intertain Corporation allege that the "inimical and antagonistic acts" of their counsel Atty. Onofre G. Garlitos constitute extrinsic fraud (see p. 543 for list of acts). SC said that extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party which is committed outside the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his side of the case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent. The nature of extrinsic fraud, as discussed previously, necessarily requires that its cause be traceable to some fraudulent act of the prevailing party committed outside the trial of the case. The Court notes that the previously enumerated negligent acts attributed to petitioner's former counsel Garlitos were in no way shown or alleged to have been caused by private respondents. Atty. Garlitos neither connived nor sold out to the latter. On the other hand, it is well-settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This is based on the rule that any act performed by a lawyer within the scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as an act of his client. Consequently, the mistake or negligence of petitioners' counsel may result in the rendition of an unfavorable judgment against them. Exceptions to the foregoing have been recognized by the Court in cases where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or when its application "results in the outright deprivation of one's property through a technicality." None of these exceptions has been sufficiently shown in the present case. Due process was never denied petitioners Salonga and Solid Intertain Corporation because the trial court had given them a reasonable opportunity to be heard and present their side in all the proceedings before it. In fact, petitioners were declared in default only on the third ex parte motion filed by private respondents.

117 PEOPLE v VILLANUEVA Facts: Villanueva was accused of raping his 11 year-old stepdaughter Nia. (The filing of the complaint was brought about by a kiss mark that Nias brother saw on her neck.) It was alleged that one night, Villanueva, holding a knife against Nias neck, threatened to kill her if she ever told anyone of the odious act. Villanueva attempted to insert his penis, but it would not fit. (According to Nia, it was too big.) Villanueva contented himself to licking Nias genetalia. In his defense, Villanueva gives an alibi that he could not have raped her and that the semen found on the victims vagina could not have been his (he already had vasectomy). The lower court, however, found Villanueva guilty of raping Nia and imposes the death penalty. In this mandatory review by the SC, Villanueva alleges that he is entitled to a new trial because of his counsels failure to present his common law wife (Nias mother). Issue: W/N Villanueva is entitled to a new trial. Held: Villanueva is not entitled to a new trial. The failure of the defense to present Nias mother by reason of the alleged inexperience of his lawyer is not a ground for new trial. The error of his defense counsel is neither an error of law nor an irregularity that will merit a new trial. The client is bound by the action of his counsel in the conduct of his case and cannot be heard to complain that the result of the litigation might have been different had his counsel proceeded differently. If this were to be allowed, then there would be no end to suits so long as new counsel could be employed who could allege that the previous counsel had not been diligent. Villanueva is still guilty of rape. There is no question about the credibility of the Nia as a witness. The trial judge had occasion to determine the demeanor of the witness. The alibi of Villanueva is also self-serving. It doesnt matter if Villanuevas [penis did not penetrate. What is important is that there was contract between the peis and the labia of the vagina. The fact that Nias hymen was intact does not negate rape, because it is not an element of rape. However, the charge cannot qualify as qualified rape, because the allegation that the accused is the stepfather (in fact he is not, he is merely a surrogate father and there exists no legal relation of step-father and step-daughter) was not averred in the complaint. 118 AGUILAR v CA

Issue: Held:

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Facts: Aguilar and Salvador were charged with Estafa in an Information filed before the RTC. Both were convicted by the trial court and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal as minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to indemnify the offended party the amount of P250,000. Aguilar, thru his former counsel, Atty.Arandia, timely appealed to CA. Unfortunately, Atty. Arandia failed to file petitioners brief on its due date. He neither communicated to Aguilar nor withdrew his appearance as counsel. Aguilars attempts to contact his counsel were futile. Aguilar hired Atty. Arias as his new counsel, and the latter entered his appearance in the case and asked an extension of 45 days to submit the appellants brief. The motion was denied for having been filed out of time. CA subsequently denied Aguilars motion to dismiss and his appeal. On the other hand, Salvador was granted an extension of time to file her brief, and the brief was admitted even though filed beyond the grace period. Astra under the following term: Montojima will sell all his rights over the property to PGEC for 3M. Montojima received 1M Bt before PGEC can open the business, the homeowners association of Bel-Air filed a complaint against PGEC for violation of some municipal ordinances PGEC and Salonga entered into a JVA wherein the corporation of Salonga and PGEC will form a new corporation. but the new corporation never existed and PGEC asked for specific performance from Salonga during the scheduled hearing, Salonga did not appear and was held in contempt salonga also asked for 2 motions foe extension of time but no answer was filed becasue of salonga's failure to file an answer, salonga was held in default and cited in contempt Salonga is now claiming that he received a copy of the decision only on 10-7 yet a motion for reconsideration was filed on 7-28 ISSUE: W/N the decision must be annulled on the ground of fraud on the part of Salonga's counsel HELD: NO! a decision can be annulle donly on 2 grounds: A. judgment is void for want of due process or jurisdiction and B. it was obtained by fraud there is no extrinsic fraud in the case the negligence of counsel binds the client. this is based on the rule that any acts performed by counsel within the scope of his general authority is deemed as an act of the client. lawyer of Salonga, Garlitos, is only guilty of simple negligence. although he failed to file a timely answer, hus efforts at defending thier cause is real. simple negligence would not amount to a deprivation of right to due process. to see all the negligent acts of Atty Garlitos see page 543 1st paragraph. 120 LEGARDA v CA *mahaba, di ko na sinama mga dissenting. Talo naman sila eh Facts: FACTS: Astra owned a propert located at Bel-Air Village, Makati. Montojima leased this property and opened a restaurant which did not prosper Montojima thereafter entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with Paul Geneve Entertainment Corp (PGEC) with the consent of New Cathay House, Inc. (Cathay) and Victoria Legarda entered into a lease agreement for a property in QC owned by Legarda. For some reason, Legarda refused to sign the contract. Cathay made a deposit and downpayment of rentals then filed for specific performance. Legardas counsel, Dean Antonio Coronel, requested a 10day extension to file an answer which was granted. But Dean Coronel failed to file an answer within that period. Cathay presented evidence ex parte. Cathay won the case (Katay si Legarda). Service of decision was made on Dean Coronel but he still did not do anything.

Issue: W/N CA committed GAD when it dismissed Aguilars appeal for failure to file his appellants brief on time. Held: YES. There is no reason to treat the two appellants differently. Both allegedly conspired in committing the crime of estafa. Their cases rest on the same facts. Equal protection of the law demands that persons situated similarly be treated alike. Aguilar faces a jail term of 17 yrs and 4 mos to 20 yrs. He cannot lose his liberty because of the gross irresponsibility of his lawyer. Losing liberty by default of an insensitive lawyer should be frowned upon despite the fiction that a client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer. The said rule must only be applied to advance the ends of justice, not when the circumstances of the case it becomes a hindrance to justice. In a criminal proceeding, where certain evidence was not presented because of counsels error or incompetence, new trial may be granted if the defendant satisfies the court that: 1) he has a good defense, and that 2) acquittal would in all probability have followed the introduction of the omitted evidence. CA should have considered the fact that the appellants brief was already filed and is already in the records of the case. This shows earnest efforts of counsel and petitioner to be heard and lack of intention to cause delay. 119 SALONGA v CA

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The QC property was then levied and auctioned off to pay for the judgment debt. Cathays manager, Cabrera, was the highest bidder in the auction. Legarda did not redeem the property within the 1 year period. Kahit natalo na sila dahil walang ginagawa si Dean (hindi nga niya sinabihan si Legarda kung ano na nangyari sa kaso nila, na wala na yung lupa), Legarda still did not lose faith in her counsel. Dean Coronel then filed a petition for annulment of judgment. Petition was denied. No motion for reconsideration or appeal was made on the order of denial (ibang klase ka dean!) So, Legarda hired a new lawyer. New lawyer asked for annulment of judgment upon the ground that the old lawyer was negligent in his duties. The petition was granted and the sale of the QC property to be set aside. The SC said that there was unjust enrichment on the part of Cathay because of the reckless, inexcusable and gross negligence of Dean Coronel. Hence this motion for reconsideration of SC decision. W/N Legarda can be bound by the gross negligence of her counsel Yes. Original decision is reinstated (Legarda=loser) As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend her interests in due course, she cannot be said to have been denied due process of law. If indeed Legarda is innocent, then all the more that Cathay is innocent. Between two innocent parties, the one who made it possible for the wrong to be done should be the one to bear the resulting loss. Legarda misjudged and hired the services of Dean Coronel who in the end sort of abandoned her case. Decision was res ipso final due to failure to appeal the decision. conscientiousness on her part. The SolGen further saight that if there was anyone guilty of bad faith in this case, it is the complainants who, after benefiting from the valuable services of atty COloma, tried to renege on their agreement for the payment of the latter's contingent atty's fees by dismissing her as their counsel after she had already won for them in the trial court and the CA, and later, by attempting to impugn the authenticity and genuineness of their written agreement for the payment of atty's fees ISSUE: WoN Atty COloma is entitled to her atty's fees (as agreed upon in their written agreement of contigent fee) HELD: YES RATIO: 1. Counsel is entitled to full recompense for his services He is entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of a client to escape payment of his fees. It is indeed ironic if after putting forth the best that is in him to secure justice for the party he represents, he himself would not get due. 2. Also, Atty COloma has good reputation.. SO his reputation as a lawyer must be protected. 122 TRADERS ROYAL BANK UNION v NLRC FACTS: Petitioner Union and private respondent Atty Cruz entered into a retainer agreement whereby the former obligated itself to pay the latter a monthly retainer fee of P3,000 in consideration of the Atty Cruz's undertaking to render the services enumerated in their contract. Petitioner Union referred to Atty Cruz the claims of its members for Holiday, mid year and year-end bonuses against their employer Traders Royal Bank (TRB). NLRC rendered a decision in favor of the union members. On appeal to the SC, the court modified the decision of the NLRC by deleting the award of mid year and year-end bonus. Bank complied with such decision. Atty Cruz, thereafter, notified the union , the TRB management and the NLRC of his right to exercise and enforce his attorney's lien over the award of holiday pay. He demanded the payment of 10% of the total award. Union opposed the demand. NLRC ruled in favor of Atty Cruz. The union insists that it is not guilty of unjust enrichment because all attorney's fees due to Atty Cruz were covered by the retainer fee of P3,000 which it has been regularly paying to Atty Cruz under their retainer agreement. To be entitiled to additional attorney's fees, it contends that there must be separate mutual agreement prior to the performance of the additional services of the counsel. Issue: W/n Atty Cruz is entitled to compensation other than the P3,000 retainer fee. HELD: YES. He is entitled to P10,000. An attorney is entitiled to have and receive a just and reasonable compensation for services performed at the special instance and

Issue: Held:

121 ALBANO v COLOMA FACTS: Angel Albano alleges that when he and his mom retained the services of Atty. Perpetua Coloma as their counsel, Atty Coloma failed to expediet the hearing and termination of the case, resulting to their having to procure another lawyer. Atty. Coloma intervened in the case to collect her atty's fees and presented a document showing that the complainants promised to pay her a contingent fee of 33 1/3% of whatever could be recovered whether in land or damages. Atty. Coloma likewise denied that she could have been removed for her failure to comply with her obligations as counsel as she served "faithfully, efficiently, continuously and to the best of her knowledge and capacity". Her dismissal, accdg to her, was made without cause and without her consent and when she had already won the case for them in the CFI and the CA. The facts as found by the SolGen in so far as the services of Atty Coloma as counsel for the complainants reveal the utmost diligence and

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request of his client. As long as the lawyer was in good faith and honestly trying to represent and serve the interests of the client, he should have a reasonable compensation for such services. The P3,000 which the union pays monthly does not cover the services the counsel actually rendered before the labor arbiter and the NLRC. The monthly fee is intended merely as a consideration for the counsel's commitment to render the services. The P3,000 was a general retainer. It is not payment for counsel's execution or performance of the services of the counsel. The fact that petitioner union and counsel failed to reach a meeting of the minds with regard to the payment of professional fees for special services will not absolve the client of civil liability for the corresponding remuneration. A quasi contract arose between the union and counsel, from the counsel's lawful, voluntry and unilateral prosecution of union's cause. Equity and fair play dictate that petitioner should pay the same after it accepted and benefited from counsel's services. The measure of compensation should be addressed by the rule of quantum meruit, meaning "as much as he deserves". 123 ONG v GRIJALDO Facts: This is a case for disbarment of Atty. Jose Grijaldo. Goretti Ong, the complainant, initially had Grijaldo as his counsel for a BP 22 case. The opposing party owed Ong, but they reached a compromised in the amount of P180T. Ong agreed to a compromise, provided he be paid in cash. When the time of payment came, Grijaldo (who facilitated the compromise deal) handed over P100T in cash and an P80T check. Ong initially refused, but was made to accept it. Grijaldo claims that the check is good, since it was drawn on the checking account of the opposing partys counsel, Atty. Reyes. Ong was made to execute an affidavit of desistance, but Ong instructed Grijaldo to file it with the court, only when the check has been cleared. But the check bounced. Later on, after many excuses, Ong went to Bacolod (where the case was filed) to find out for himself the status of the case and to seek payment. Ong found out that the affidavit was already filed in court and the case was already dismissed. Worse, Grijaldo already received the money from Reyesm but he used it to pay for his (Grijaldos) financial obligations. Hence this case. Ong filed a number of affidavits by other disinterested persons who complained of Grijaldos mischief. (bottom part of p 5) (irrelevant) W/N Grijaldo should be disbarred. Yes. It is clear that respondent gravely abused the trust and confidence reposed on him by his client. Were it not for complainants vigilance in inquiring into the status of her case, she would have not know that the case was already dismissed. Grijaldo deliberately withheld the fat from her. Grijaldo breached his futy wwhen he failed to inform the complainant of the status of the criminal case. his negligence shows a glaring lack of the competence and diligence required of every lawyer. His infraction is rendered all the more deplorable by the fact that complainant is a resident of QC, but the case was filed in Bacolod. That was the reason why Ong hired a Bacolod-based lawyer, to protect her interests. This is a gross betrayal of the fiduciary duty: failure to look after the clients welfare. And it is also a breach of the trust and confidence which was reposed on him.

124 SESBREO v CA Facts: Raul Sesbreo replaced Atty Pacquiao as counsel for 52 employees in a case against the Province of Cebu and Governor Espina for reinstatement to work and backwages. 32 of the employees agreed that Sesbreno would be paid 30% of the backwages as attorneys fees and 20% for expenses of litigation. RTC granted employees petition. CA affirmed. Judgment became final. Later on, a compromise was made between the employees and the Province of Cebu whereby said employees waived their right to reinstatement. Cebu released P2.3M (representing back salaries, terminal leave pay, gratuity pay) to Sesbreno for the employees as Partial Satisfaction of Judgment. 10 of the employees asserted that they only agreed to give 40% of their back salaries to Sesbreno. Lower court agreed with them and fixed attorneys fees for Sesbreno at 40% plus the 20% expenses. Employees filed an MR asserting that there was inadvertence in placing 60% where it should only be 50%. This was granted. Sesbreno was not satisfied by the decision so he went to the CA. And kawawang Sesbreno nabawasan pa lalo ang bayadCA deemed the award of 20% of the back salaries as the fair, equitable, and reasonable amount for attorneys fees. Punta siya ngayon sa Padre FauraSupreme Court

Issue: Whether the court acted properly in reducing Sesbrenos attorneys fees despite a pre-existing contract between the parties. Held: Yes. It is a settled rule that what a lawyer may charge and receive as attorneys fees is always subject to judicial control. When the courts find the amount to be excessive or unreasonable, public policy demands that the contract be disregarded to protect the client. When a lawyer takes his oath, he submits himself to the authority of the court and subjects his professional fees to judicial control.

Issue: Held:

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A stipulation on a lawyers compensation in a written contract for professional services ordinarily controls the amount of fees that the contracting lawyer may be allowed, UNLESS the court finds such stipulated amount unreasonable or unconscionable. Though generally, a much higher compensation is allowed in a contingent fee agreement (as in this case) in consideration of the risk that the lawyer may get nothing if the suit fails. But contingent fee contracts are under the supervision of the court in order that clients may be protected from unjust charges. Its validity rests largely on the reasonableness of the stated fees under the circumstances of the case. An attorneys fee is unconscionable when it is so disproportionate compared to the value of the services rendered. Nevertheless, the existence of an unreasonable fee (no matter the degree) does not bar recovery. It is only that the courts will fix a reasonable amount. Quantum Meruit which means as much as he deserves is often the courts basis for determining the amount. Considering its a labor case, an award of 50% of back salaries is excessive. The 20% award is justified. 125 FABILO v IAC FACTS JUSTINA Fabillo bequeathed to her brother FLORENCIO Fabillo a house in lot in San Salvador St, Leyte (San Salvador property) and to her husband GREGORIO Brioso a lot in Pugahanay, Leyte (Pugahanay property) FLORENCIO filed a petition for probate of JUSTINAS will who approved of the partition placed a reservation on the ownership of the San Salvador property 2 years later, FLORENCIO sought the assistance of ATTY MURILLO to recover the San Salvador property FLORENCIO and ATTY MURILLO entered into a Contract for Services wherein o If the property is awarded to FLORENCIO, ATTY MURILLO will be constituted as attorney in fact to sell and convey said property and will be given 40% of the purchase price o If mortgaged, ATTY MURILLO will be entitled to 40% of the proceeds of the mortgage o If leased, ATTY MURILLO will be entitled to 40% of the rentals o If the property is just occupied by FLORENCIO, ATTY MURILLO will have the option of occupying or leasing to any interested party 40% of the said property ATTY MURILLO filed a case for FLORENCIO against GREGORIO which ended in a compromise settlement wherein FLORENCIO was declared owner not only of the San Salvador property but also of the Pugahanay property ATTY MURILLO proceeded to implement the contract by taking possession of 40% of the properties and even installed a tent in the Pugahanay property FLORENCIO claimed exclusive right over the properties which prompted ATTY MURILLO to file a complaint LOWER COURT: ATTY MURILLO is owner of 40% of the properties ISSUE FLORENCIO argued that the contingent fee of 40% is excessive, unfair and unconscionable W/N THE CONTRACT OF SERVICES PROVIDING FOR CONTINGENT FEES VIOLATED ARTICLE 1491 NO, CONTINGENT FEES NOT COVERED BY

HELD ARTICLE 1491 RATIO

Article 1491 prohibits lawyers from acquiring by purchase even at a public auction, properties and rights which are objects of litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession However, said prohibition applies only if the sale or assignment takes place during the pendency of litigation involving the clients property Following that principle, a contract between a lawyer and his client stipulating a contingent fee is not covered by Article 1491 because payment of said fee is not made during the pendency of litigation but only after judgment has been rendered Hence, the Contract of Services entered into by FLORENCIO and ATTY MURILLO having provided for contingent fees is not violative of Article 1491 W/N FLORENCIO IS OWNER OF 40% OF THE NO, CONTRACT OF SERVICES VAGUE AS TO WHO IS THE OWNER SO MUST BE CONSTRUED AGAINST THE LAWYER WHO MADE IT, ATTY MURILLO The Court disagrees with the lower court that FLORENCIO is the owner of 40% of the properties for careful scrutiny shows that the parties intended 40% of the value of the properties as ATTY MURILLOS contingent fee The provisions are clear in cases where the properties are sold, mortgaged and leased as ATTY MURILLO is entitled to 40% of the purchase price, proceeds of the mortgage or rentals respectively However, with respect to a situation wherein the properties are neither sold, mortgaged or leased, the contract is vague and only provides that ATTY MURILLO shall have the option of occupying or leasing to any interested party 40% of the properties The ambiguity of said provision should then be resolved against ATTY MURILLO as it was he himself who drafted the contract Moreover, if the parties intended that ATTY MURILLO should become the lawful owner of 40% of the properties in case the same is not sold, mortgaged or leased, then they would have clearly and unequivocally stipulated in the contract such

ISSUE PROPERTIES HELD

RATIO

JUDGMENT

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Considering the nature of the case, the value of the properties subject matter thereof, the length of time and effort exerted by ATTY MURILLO, the Court holds that ATTY MURILLO is entitled to P3,000 as reasonable attorneys fees (nyek lugi!) 126 BAUTISTA v GONZALES Facts: Angel Bautista filed a complaint against Ramon Gonzales for the following acts: o Accepting a case where he agreed to pay all expenses for a contingent fee of 50% of the value of the property in litigation; o Acting as counsel for the Fortunados in a case where Eugenio Lopez, Jr. is one of the defendants and, without said case being terminated, acting as counsel for Lopez in another case; o Transferring to himself one-half of the properties of the Fortunados, which properties are the subject of the litigation, while the case was still pending; o Inducing complainant, who was his former client, to enter into a contract with him for the development of the land involved in a case into a residential subdivision, claiming that he acquired fifty percent (50%) interest thereof as attorney's fees from the Fortunados, while knowing fully well that the said property was already sold at a public auction; o Submitting to the CFI falsified documents purporting to be true copies of "Addendum to the Land Development Agreement" and submitting the same document to the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City, in connection with the complaint for estafa filed by respondent against complainant. W/n Gonzales should be punished for these acts. Yes, SC suspends him for 6 months. For the first allegation, the SC pointed out that a lawyer may indeed advance expenses of litigation but such payment should be subject to reimbursement. In this case, the contingent fee agreement between the Fortunados and Gonzales did not provide for such reimbursement. Such contract is against public policy because it gives undue leverage in favor of the lawyer. Second, the Court found that Gonzales did not violate any law because the Fortunados consented to his appearance for Lopez. Third act, the Court said that such is a violation of Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, which prohibits a lawyer from buying/acquiring the property of his clients which is the subject of a pending case. This Court has held that the purchase by a lawyer of his client's property or interest in litigation is a breach of professional ethics and constitutes malpractice. And although the Code of Professional Responsibility does not anymore contain Canon 10 of the old Canons of Professional Ethics, which states that "[t]he lawyer should not purchase any interests in the subject matter of the litigation which he is conducting," the Code still provides that a lawyer should follow the laws of the Phil. At all times. By acquiring the property in litigation, Gonzales has violated Art. 1491 of the Civil Code and can be administratively punished for such violation. The SC held that in withholding such information, respondent failed to live up to the rigorous standards of ethics of the law profession which place a premium on honesty and condemn duplicitous conduct. The fact that complainant was not a former client of respondent does not exempt respondent from his duty to inform complainant of an important fact pertaining to the land which is subject of their negotiation. Lastly, the SC held that the original copies of the documents Gonzales submitted were false because they bore the signatures of the Fortunados when, in fact, they did not sign the original copy but only a photocopy of the original. Such conduct constitutes willful disregard of his solemn duty as a lawyer to act at all times in a manner consistent with the truth. A lawyer should never seek to mislead the court by an artifice or false statement of fact or law.

127 BIASCAN v LOPEZ Facts: This controversy pertains to a 600 sq. m. lot. The lot was in the name of Florencio Biascan. Florencio died intestate. When Florencio died, Rosalina Biascan filed a complaint alleging that she is the administratrix of the estate of her father, Florencio. However, Maria Biascan opposed the claim of Rosalina. At that instant, Atty. Lopez entered his appearance as the counsel of Maria in the opposition. Rosalina complained that, without the approval of the intestate court, Atty. Lopex caused the registration of 210 sq. m. of the 600 sq. m. lot in his name (made through a deed of assignment executed by Maria and Atty. Lopez). According to Rosalina, the registration was made during the special proceedings regarding the settlement of the estate. In his defense, Lopez says that the transfer of a portion of the land was valid since it was a payment of his contingent fees. Atty. Lopez claims that Maria agreed to give him 35% of the area of the disputed land. Atty. Lopez argues that due to the absence of a notice of lis pendens on the TCT, he accepted the offer of Maria. Issue: W/N the land was a lawful payment of contingent fees. Held: The land cannot be regarded as contingent fees. Illegal. Suspend 6 months. When Atty. Lopez entered his appearance as Marias counsel, Rosalina had submitted an inventory report which listed the land as part of the estate of the deceased Florencio. As respondent of Maria, Atty. Lopez should have gone over the records. Also, the deed of assignment itself stated that the TCT was registered in Florencios name. Therefore, Atty. Lopez had actual knowledge that the lot formed part of the estate of Florencio. By registering the land in his name, Atty. Lopez transgressed Art. 1491, because he had knowledge that the land was the subject of the

Issue: Held: -

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litigation. Because the transfer was made during the pendency of the Special Proceedings, Art. 1491 clearly applies. 128 DALISAY v MAURICIO Facts: This is the case against Batas Mauricio, the TV host. Allegedly, Mauricio demanded and received exorbitant attorneys fees but did not take any action on Valerina Dalisays case. Initially, she paid P25T as acceptance fee. In total, she paid Mauricio P56T: P8T filing fee (though the case was already filed) the balance might be a combination of the ff: o Additional acceptance fee P90,000.00, with the explanation that he can give a discount should she pay in cash. o P3,000.00 as appearance fee notwithstanding her payments, respondent never rendered any legal service. She terminated their attorney-client relationship and demanded the return of her money and documents. Mauicio refused. The IBP Board of Governors wanted to dismiss the case. Barons was given a 60 day credit for the purchase of Phelps Dodges products Barons purchased electrical wires and cables worth P4.1M, on credit Under the sales invoice issued by Phelps Dodge, there is a stipulation: interests at 12% per annum will be charged on all overdue accounts plus 25% on said amount for attorneys fees and collections Barons failed to pay Phelps Dodge. The former asked the latter for installment payment but the request was refused An action for collection for sum of money was instituted by Phelps Dodge against Barons with a prayer for attorneys fees amounting to 25% pf the amount demanded RTC: ruled in favor of Phelps Dodge and ordered Barons to pay P3.1M and 25% of the preceding obligation for and as attorneys fees CA: corrected the amount due to Phelps Dodge and ordered Barons to pay P3.8M and 5% of the preceding obligation for and as attorneys fees

Issue: Held:

ISSUE: - W/N Barons is liable to Phelps Dodge for interest and attorneys fees HELD: - YES! But the amount stated in the sales invoice is reduced from 25% to 10% of the principal amount for attorneys fees. Barons is expressly liable as stated in the sales invoice of Phelps Dodge which provides that: interests at 12% per annum will be charged on all overdue accounts plus 25% on said amount for attorneys fees and collections The attorneys fees stated are in the nature of liquidated damages and the stipulation is aptly called a penal clause. It is settled that as long as such stipulation does not contravene law, morals, or public order, it is strictly binding. BUT, the courts are empowered to reduce such penalty of the same is iniquitous or unconscionable In the case at bar, the interest alone runs to some P4.5M, even exceeding the principal debt which is only P4M. 25% of the principal and the interest amounts to roughly P2M. In real terms, therefore, the attorneys fees and collection fees are manifestly exorbitant. 130 LIZARDO v MONTANO FACTS: Lizardo instituted a collection case against Eddie Mirano. Lizardo won. Judgment included 25% of the amount payable as attorneys fees. Miranos land was levied and Lizardo won the bidding. 13 years after the case, Atty. Montano, the lawyer of Lizardo, filed with the trial court (same trial court as in the previous decision) an omnibus motion for payment of his attorneys fees.

W/N the case against Mauricio should be dismissed.

No. He should be suspended for 6 months. When respondent accepted P56,000.00 from complainant, it was understood that he agreed to take up the latters case and that an attorney-client relationship between them was established. From then on, it was expected of him to serve complainant with competence and attend to her case with fidelity, care and devotion. But there is nothing on record that Mauricio entered his appearance as counsel of record. He did not even follow-up the case which remained pending up to the time she terminated his services. Regarding the P8T: (allegedly as docket fees for other cases): there was no evidence nor any pleadings submitted to show that respondent filed any case considering that the filing fee had to be paid simultaneously with the filing of a case. when a lawyer takes a clients cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting his rights. Just like any other professional, a lawyer is entitled to collect fees for his services. However, he should charge only a reasonable amount of fees.

129 BARONS MARKETING v CA FACTS: - Phelps Dodge appointed Barons Marketing as its dealer of electrical wires and cables

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Without hearing petitioner, the trial court rendered an order that Lizardo pay Montano 25% of the property and/or annotate in the TCT the attorneys lien. CA affirmed the RTC decision, hence this appeal. 2. AS to the contention that P50,000 was exorbitant--> IBP and SC held that is is reasonable recompense (1% of the 5,000,000 of the contract price sought to be notarized.) and also Cueto should have inquired first about the reasonableness. ALso, facts show that they agreed on the amount. 132 LEMOINE v BALON FACTS: - Lemoine is a French national who filed an insurance claim with Metropolitan Insurance. - His friend Jesus Garcia arranged for the engagement of Balons services as his counsel - Balon advised Lemoine that he was charging 25% of the actual amount to being recovered payable upon successful recovery. An advance payment of P50,000 to be deducted from whatever amount would be successfully collected. P1,000 as appearance and conference fee for each and every court hearing and legal expenses and other miscellaneous will be charged to Lemoines account which would be reimbursed upon presentment of account. Lemoine never gave his consent as to the fee. - Lemoine signed an undated Special Power of Attorney authorizing Balon to bring any action against Metropolitan Insurance for the satisfaction of Lemoines claim as well as to negotiate, sign, compromise, encash and receive payments - Metropolitan Insurance offered to settle Lemoines claim and Balon confirmed his acceptance of the offer - December 1998, Metropolitan Insurance issued a China Bank check payable to Lemoine in the amount of P525,000 which was received by Balon - When Lemoine asked Balon as to the status of the case, Balon answered that Metropolitan Insurance was offering P350,000 for settlement which Lemoine suggested that Balon accept to avoid litigation - December 1999, Lemoine visited the office of Metropolitan Insurance to ask on the status of the case and it answered that the case was long settled via a check given to Balon. - Balon acknowledge that he is in possession of the check and that he is keeping the check as attorneys lien pending Lemoines payment of his attorneys fee equivalent to 50% of the entire amount collected. He also threatened Lemoine that he will not hesitate to make proper representation with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, DOLE and BIR if Lemoine will make any trouble to Balon and that he has good network with the mentioned agencies. - Balon later claimed that he gave P233,000 to Garcia on the representation of Lemoine. No written memorandum of the turn-over was made because Garcia was a co-Rotarian and co-attorney of Balon - Balon was in possession of the said check for 5 years ISSUE: - W/N Balon violated the Code of Professional Responsibility HELD: YES! And he was ordered disbarred by the SC - The lawyers continuing exercise of his retaining lien presupposes that the client agrees with the amount of

ISSUE: W/N the trial court still has jurisdiction over the case 13 years after it rendered a final judgment HELD: No, the court no longer has jurisdiction over the claim for attorneys fees. Once a court acquires jurisdiction over a case, it retains such jurisdiction until the final termination of the case. It loses its jurisdiction upon the finality of the decision A final decision cannot be amended or corrected except for clerical errors, mistakes or misprisions. In the questioned order, the court ordered Lizardo to pay attorneys fees to counsel. That is not decreed in the judgment. Such variance rendered the order void. What the lawyer may do is file an independent action against petitioner for collection.

131 CUETO v JIMENEZ FACTS: - Engr. Alex Cueto engaged the services of Atty. Jose Jimenez Jr. as notary public, being the father of the building of the Construction Agreement to be notarized. After notarizing the agreement, Jimenez demanded P50,000 as notarial fee. Alex Cueto paid P30,000 in cash and issued a check of P20,000. However, Cueto requested Jimenez not to deposit the check for lack of sufficient funds. Cueto also informed Jimenez that his son had not yet paid his services as general contractor. - Jimenez still deposited the check, and of course, the check bounced (insufficient funds nga!)and the check issued by Jimenez' son was also dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account. - Atty. Jimenez filed a BP 22 case against Cueto. In return, Cueto filed his own administrative complaint against Jimenez and alleged that he violated Code of Prof Responsibility and Canons of Prof Ethics when he filed BP22 so that Jimenez can recover the balance of his notarial fee. ISSUE: WoN Jimenez can be held administratively liable? HELD: YES. Atty. Jimenez is severely reprimanded. RATIO: 1. It is highly improper for Jimenez in filing a criminal case for violation of BP 22 against Cueto when the check representing the balance of his notarial fee was dishonored because "A LAWYER SHALL AVOID CONTROVERSIES WITH CLIENTS CONCERNING HIS COMPENSATION AND SHALL RESORT TO JUDICIAL ACTION ONLY TO PREVENY IMPOSITION, INJUSTICE or FRAUD". In the case at bar, there was clearly no imposition, injustice or fraud... 1)Cueto already paid more than half of the fee 2) In all probablity, the reason why Cueto lacked funds was because of Jimenez' son failure to pay (so dapat mas lenient si Jimenez sa delay ng payment sa kanya ng balance)

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attorneys fees to e charged. In case of disagreement, however, the lawyer must not arbitrarily apply the funds in his possession to the payment of his fees. He can file the necessary action with the proper court to fix the fees Before receiving the check, he proposes a 25% attorneys fees, after receiving the check, he was already asking for 50%. under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful acts , must observe fairness in all his dealings with his client and must hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client a lawyer who practices deceit in his dealings with his client not only violates his duty of fidelity loyalty and devotion to the clients cause but also degrades himself and besmirches the name of an honorable profession. 134 IN RE HAMILTON Facts: L. Porter Hamilton advised and counseled Luciano Andrada in regard to a claim (by Andrada) against Isabelo Alburo. In lieu thereof, Hamilton received various documents (vouchers, notes) from Andrada. Hamilton prepared a formal petition for Andrada, and also prepared papers relating to attachment proceedings against the property of Alburo. It appeared, however, that Hamilton was not noted as attorney of record for Andrada. Later on, Hamilton entered appearance as attorney of record for Alburo (the defendant in the same case). Hamilton only surrendered the documents received from Andrada when the court ordered him to do so. Another misconduct was committed by Hamilton when he proposed, through a letter, to S.L. Joseph of Cebu that he be employed as attorney for S.L. Joseph Lumber Yard, under a threat to compel said person to accept his proposition. Judge Wislezinus said: Ah hindi pwede yan! He orderd the fiscal to file an action for disbarment against Hamilton for professional misconduct. Hamiltons defense was that there was no attorney-client relationship between him and Andradasince he was not the attorney of record. On the second misconduct, Hamiltons defense was that the letter (where he made the proposition) was privileged communication so it cannot be used as evidence against him.

133 SCC CHEMICALS v CA Facts: SCC Chemicals Corporation, through its chairman and vice president, obtained a loan from State Investment house (SIHI). Loan amount was P130T, with a 30% interest rate p.a. Surcharges: 2% per month on the remaining balance. The officers above mentioned executed a comprehensive security agreement on the loan. But SCC failed to pay the loan. SIHI sent demand letters, but no payment was made. SIHI presented one witness to prove his claim. The crossexamination was postponed many times. SCC was finally declared to have waived its right to cross examine. A lot of challenges were made by SCC on the validity of the document. But this is of no moment. (and irrelevant) Now, SCC is questioning the preponderance of evidence (irrelevant) and the amount of attorneys fees awarded.

Issue: Is Atty Hamilton guilty of professional misconduct? Held: Yes, and he should be suspended for 6 years. The existence of an attorney-client relationship could be established by overt acts. By accepting papers relating to the claim, the confidential relationship was established. Hamilton also counseled with Andrada regarding the subject matter of the suit. The fact that he did not allow his name to be place by the clerk of court as attorney of record for Andrada (when the papers were filed) can only be considered as proof of lack of good faith with the client to whome he was rendering professional services. A stipulated fee is not necessary to establish the relationship either. By representing the opposing party in the same case (without the others consent) and by refusing to surrender the documents received from Andrada (until there were court orders), counsel violated the confidence between him and Andrada. He did not offer his services in good faith to his client. As to the claim that the letter to S.L. Joseph was privileged, there was no proof that there was an attorney-client relationship between Hamilton and S.L. Joseph. Furthermore, in a disbarment proceeding, where the alleged client himself is not insisting on the privilege, counsel cannot be permitted to shield himself behind the privilege. 135 HILADO v DAVID

Issue: Held:

W/N SIHI is entitled to attorneys fees. No. The appeal is partially granted. Attorneys fees are deleted. Radio Communications of the Philippines v Rodriguez stated that the reason for the award of the attorneys fees must be stated in the text of the courts decision. Since the trial court did not state any reason for awarding the attorneys fees, the fees should have been disallowed by the appellate court. The award of attorneys fees is the exception rather than the rule, \hence it is necessary for the trial court to make findings of fact and law, which would bring the case within the exception and justify the grant of the award. Given the failure of the trial court to explicitly state the rationale for the award of attorneys fees, the same shall be disallowed.

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Facts: Blandina Hilado (ganda ng pangalan!) brought an action against Selim Assad to annul the sale of several houses and lot exected by Hilados husband. Delgado et al. was counsel for Hilado, while Ohnick et al filed an answer for Assad. Later on, Atty Vicente Francisco entered his appearance for Assad substituting Ohnick et al. The firm of Delgado urged Atty Francisco to stop representing Assad since there exists an atty-client relationship between him (Francisco) and the other party (Hilado) in the same case. It was alleged that Hilado consulted Francisco regarding the case and that the former turned over papers to the latter. From such documents, Francisco sent a written opinion to Hilado. Since makulit si Francisco, Delgado et al. sought to disqualify Francisco from representing Assad in the case. Franciscos defense was that he only met Hilado once and this was when the latter informed him about the case. He added that when Hilado left documents in their office, he told his assistant to tell Hilado that their firm would not handle her case. And that the written opinion was made by his assistant, which he signed without reading, and only for the purpose of explaining to Hilado why his firm rejected the case. David is the judge trying the case who dismissed the complaint for disqualification against Francisco. Said judge reasoned that no attorney-client relationship existed between Hilado and Francisco. An information professionally obtained by an attorney from a client is sacred to the employment to which it pertains, and to permit it be used in the interest of another, or in the interest of the adverse party is to strike at the element of confidence which forms the basis of an attorneyclient relationship. The rule inhibiting an attorney from acting in behalf of both parties is implied in the Rules of Court (wala pang codified codes of professional responsibility noon). The defense that Francisco never read the written opinion nor the documents submitted by Hilado will not preclude the existence of an attorney-client relationship. The fact remains that his firm did give Hilado a formal professional advice from which emerged the relation. The letter binds and estops him in the same manner and degree as if he wrote it personally. And an information obtained from a client by a member or assistant of the firm is information imparted to the firm. The failure to object to counsels appearance does not operate as a waiver of the right to ask for counsels disqualification. Motion for disqualification against Attorney Francisco should be allowed. *A retaining fee (just in case itanong) is a preliminary fee given to an attorney or counsel to insure and secure his future services, and induce him to act for the client. 136 REGALA v SANDIGANBAYAN Facts: Petitioners in this case and private respondent Roco were all then partners of the law firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices (commonly known as ACCRA) ACCRA performed services for clients which included acquiring and/or organizing business associations and/or organizations where it acted as incorporators or simply as stockholders As members of the law firm, petitioners and Roco admit that they assisted in the organization and acquisition of companies included in Civil Case No. 0033. In keeping with the office practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders. Anong kalokohan yan? o Civil Case No. 0033 RP v. Eduardo Cojuangco et. al., for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of stock in certain corporations PCGG later on filed a motion to admit 3rd amended complaint, which excluded Roco in Civil Case 33 as party defendant. PCGG was removing Roco because Roco was going to make choochoo and reveal the identity of the principals. The ACCRA lawyers then filed a comment and/or opposition saying that they should also be removed the way that Roco was. PCGG then said that it will ask for their exclusion only if they will also disclose the identity of their clients During the proceedings, Roco did not actually reveal the identity of the client for whom he acted as nomineestockholder

Issue: Was there an attorney-client relationship between Francisco and Hilado? Should Atty Francisco be disqualified from representing Assad? Held: The firm of Francisco mailed a written opinion to Hilado on the merits of the case (with Franciscos signature); this opinion was reached on the basis of papers submitted at his office; and that Hilados purpose in submitting those papers was to secure Franciscos professional services. From these ultimate facts, an attorney-client relationship between Francisco and Hilado can be said to have ensued. To constitute professional employment it is not essential that the client should have employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had. When a person consults with his attorney in his professional capacity with the view of obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional employment must be regarded as established. The existence of attorney-client relationship precludes the attorney from representing (and receiving a retainer from) the opposite party in the same case.

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The ACCRA lawyers motion for exclusion was denied (they refused to comply with the PCGGs offer) by the PCGG and the court. Hence, this motion for certiorari W/N the ACCRA lawyers should be excluded from the case Yes. It is apparent that the ACCRA lawyers were only impleaded to force them to disclose the identity of their clients. PCGG has no valid cause of action W/N the attorney-client privilege prohibits the ACCRA lawyers from revealing the identity of their clients General rule: a clients identity should not be shrouded in mystery o Exceptions: where a strong probability exists that revealing the clients name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyers advice o Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability o Where revealing the identity would furnish the only link that would be necessary to convict an individual of a crime Suing the lawyer to force him to disclose the identity of his client in any of these instances is improper and the suit, upon motion, may be dismissed on such ground. The prosecution should rely on the strength of their evidence and not on the weakness of the defense Roco merely stated that he was acting as nomineestockholder for the client and is part of legitimate lawyering. The ACCRA lawyers also made such statement and should also be dropped. the relation of attorney and client is strictly personal and highly confidential and fiduciary the lawyer is more than a mere agent or servant because he possesses special powers of trust and confidence reposed on him by his client directed the Deputy Minister of Justice to move for the dismissal of the case on the ground of prescription. After some time, Gelacio, the one who filed the perjury case, sent a letter to the OMB seeking the investigation of the 3 personalities for falsification of public documents. The alleged falsified documents were documents purporting to be a notice of arraignment and stenographic notes supposedly taken during the arraignment of the perjury charge. In a sudden turn of events, Atty. Sansaet revealed that Paredes contrived to have the graft case dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy by making it appear that the perjury case had been dismissed by the trial court . Atty. Sansaet was, in effect, asking to be a state witness against Paredes. However, the OMB denied the request of Atty. to be a state witness on the ground that the confession made by Paredes to Atty. was privileged communication. Issue: W/N the confession made by Paredes to Atty. is privileged communication. Held: The confession made by Paredes is not covered by privileged communication. This case is actually an exception to the rule. It can be assumed that there was confidential information made by Paredes to Sansaet in connection with the falsification case, because Sansaet was the counsel. A distinction must be made between communications relating to past crimes already committed, and future crimes intended to be committed by the client. It is true that by now those crimes had already been committed. But for the application of the atty.-client privilege to apply, the period to be considered is the date when the privileged communication was made by the client to the atty. In other words, if the client seeks the advice of the atty. with respect to a crime already committed at the time of the communication, it is privileged information. But if the client consults the atty. regarding a crime he is about to commit after the consultation, such is not privileged information. In the present case, the confession made by Paredes to Sansaet were in reference to a crime of falsification which had not yet been committed in the past by Paredes but which he later committed. Having been made for purposes of a future offense, those communications are outside the pale of the atty.-client privilege. Besides, for the rule to attach, the purpose of the consultation must be for a lawfule purpose. Without the lawful purpose, the privilege does not attach. 138 NGAYAN v TUGADE Facts: -Ngayan asked Tugade to prepare and affidavit to be used as basis for a complaint against Soriano and Leonido as a consequence of the latters entry into complainants dwelling. Ngayan signed the affidavit without thoroughly reading it but she noticed one paragraph which did not mention that Leonido was with Soriano when they both barged into complainants residence.

Issue: Held: Issue: Held:

137 PEOPLE v SANDIGANBAYAN Facts: Honrada was the clerk of court and acting stenographer of the First MCTC. Paredes was the Provincial Attorney of Agusan. Sansaet was the counsel of Paredes. It appears that Paredes applied for a free patent and Certificate of Title over a lot. It was initially approved, but the Director of lands subsequently filed for the cansellation of the patent and title on the ground that the land had been reserved as a school site. The lower court ruled to nullify the patent and title after finding out that Paredes obtained the same through fraudulent misrepresentations. An information for perjury was filed against Paredes. However, the fiscal

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-Upon being informed of this omission, Tugade crossed out the said paragraph. Ngayan asked Tugade to make another affidavit and the latter promised to do so. -Ngayan discharged Tugade as their counsel and found out that Tugade did not include the name of Leonido in the criminal case filed. -When the omission was remedied by their new counsel, the adverse parties filed a motion for reinvestigation through their counsel, Atty. Gaminda, who was a former classmate of Tugade. -Tugade was also a lawyer of the brother of Leonido in an insurance company. -In the hearing for the motion for reinvestigation, the adverse parties in affidavit which Tugade prepared for Ngayan, with one paragraph crossed out. Tugade himself presented an affidavit controverting the discarded affidavit which he prepared for Ngayan. -Thus Ngayan charged Tugade for violation of paragraphs (e) and (f), Sec.20, Rule 138 Rules of Court (e) to maintain inviolate the confidenceand to preserve the secrets of his client (f) to abstain from all offensive personality..against a party or witness Issue: W/N Tugade must be disciplined for violation of the said Rule HELD: YES, he is suspended from the practice of law for 1 year. -When Tugade furnished the adverse parties with a copy of the discarded affidavit, thus enabling the adverse parties to use it as evidence against complainants, he betrayed the trust and confidence of his clients in violation of paragraph (e) Sec.20 Rule 138 -Tugades actuations from the beginning show that he was partial to the adverse parties. This could be explained by the fact that he was a former classmate of Atty.Gaminda, the adverse parties counsel, and also by the fact that he was the lawyer of Leonidos brother in an insurance company. -Tugade submitted an affidavit containing facts prejudicial to his former client such as the fact that the crime charged by Ngayan had already prescribed, and that Ngayan asked him to make the offense more grave to prevent the offense from prescribing. This constitutes an act of offensive personality against complainants, violative of par.(f) Sec.20 Rule 138. 139 PFLEIDER v PALANCA FACTS: - Palanca is the lawyer of Pfleider. - Pfleider leased to Palanca an agricultural land, Hacienda Asia in Negros Occidental for a period of 10 years - It is stipulated in the lease agreement that a specified portion of the lease rentals would be paid to Pfleider and the remainder would be delivered by Palanca to the listed creditors of Pfleider - Pfleider filed a suit for the rescission of the lease agreement of the ground of alleged default in the payment of rentals of Palanca. - Pfleider also filed for the disbarment of Palanca on the grounds of: o Palanca did not follow the instructions of Pfleider to settle his estafa case against Matiao in 1965 and o o o the latter also failed to deposit the sum of P5,000 with the court Palanca has fraudulently charged the P5,000 as part of the lease rental of the Hacienda Asia Palanca also falsely represented having paid one Guintos the sum of P866 for the account of Pfleider when in truth and in fact, Guintos only received P86 The list of creditors which Pfleider has confidentially supplied Palanca was disclosed by Palance in violation of their attorney-client relationship

ISSUE: - W/N Palanca committed a breach of fidelity owing form a lawyer to his client HELD: NO! There is no substantial blame against Palanca inasmuch as the latters services were implicitly terminated by Pfleider when he sued his lawyer. While the object of the suit is the rescission of the lease contract, the conflict of interest became incompatible with the mutual confidence and trust essential to every lawyer-client relationship. Also, Pfleider delivered the list of creditors to Palanca not because of the professional relation then existing between them, but on account of the lease agreement. A violation thereof would partake more of a private and civil wrong than of a breach of fidelity owing from a lawyer to his client.

140 MERCADO v VITRIOLO FACTS: Rosa F. Mercado (complainant) is a Senior Education Program Specialist of CHED. Atty. Vitriolo is a Deputy Executive Director IV of CHED. Complainants husband filed an annulment case entitled Ruben Mercado v. Rosa Francisco. The case was dismissed. Complainants counsel later on died. Atty. Vitriolo substituted the counsel who just died. Later on, Atty. Vitriolo filed a criminal action against complainant. (falsification of documents: birth certificates of her children, making it appear that she was married to a certain Ferdinand Fernandez when in fact she was legally married to Ruben Mercado. Complainant alleged that the criminal complaint disclosed confidential facts and information relating to the civil case for annulment. She claims that in filing the criminal case, respondent is guilty of breaching their privileged and confidential relationship. 4 years later, the results of the investigation recommended that Vitriolo is indeed guilty and should be suspended for a month. Complainant then wrote Justice Davide that she is desisting from pursuing the case because she has found it in her heart to forgive respondent. Such desistance has no bearing.

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ISSUE: W/N Atty. Vitriolo is indeed guilty of violating the privilege and confidential relationship of attorney-client relationship HELD: NO. Case dismissed. Complainant did not even specify the alleged communication in confidence disclosed by respondent. All her claims were couched in general terms and lacked specificity. Court cannot be involved in a guessing game as to the existence of facts which the complainant must prove. The confidential information is a crucial link in establishing a breach of the rule on privileged communication. Burden of proving that the privilege applies is placed upon the party asserting the privilege. 142 BACARRO v CA FACTS: Bacarro is the registered owner of a lot located in Cagayan de Oro city. He claims that he was compelled by the Municipal Judge of Baungin, Bukidnon to appear before the judge's ofice and then and there coerced and forced, under threat of prosecution and loss said land, to execute a deed of reconveyance of 1/2 of the land to Gaerlan. Bacarro then filed a complaint for the annulment of said deed of reconveyance. Atty Luminarias and Caballero entered their appearance, in said cas as counsel of Bacarro in collaboration with Atty Pacana. The judge of the lower court ordered an amendment to th complaint of Bacarro. Mrs. Gaerlan filed a written manifestation inviting attention to the fact that petittoner Bacarro had not complied with said order. The judge then issued an order dismissing the complaint. A motion for new trial/ reconsideration was filed by Atty Caballero on behalf of Bacarro. Motion was denied in an order issued by the judge dated November 14, 1966. Notice of said order was not received by Atty Caballero until March 15, 1967, on which date he filed a notice of appeal. Gaerlan objected to the approval of said notice of appeal, upon the ground that the period to appeal should be reckoned from Nov 14, 1966, when a copy of the order was served upon Atty Pacana. On this allegation, the motion was dismissed. ISSUE: Whether or not period to appeal from order denyingh motion for new trial/ reconsideration began to run on Nov 14, 1966, when a copy of said order was served upon Pacana, or on March 16, 1967, when notice was served upon Atty Caballero. HELD: March 16, 1967. This is not a case of substitution. By entering his appearnce, Atty Caballero did not substitute Atty Pacana but became one of the attorneys for Bacarro. Neither did Atty Caballero substitute or try to substitute Atty Pacana. The statement in the motion for reconsideration to the effect that, through Atty Caballero, petitioner Bacarro, "after duly relieving his previous counsel moved for the reconsideration of the order, had the effect of continuig the services of Caballero and dropping Pcana. (walang substitution... sabay silang lawyer tapos naterminate ung employment ni Pacana...) Whether Bacarro could - as regards the Court of Gaerlan - validly dispense with the services of Pacana, without securing his consent, or without proof that he had been notified of Bacarro's motion for reconsideration... HELD: YES. Client may at any time dismiss his attorney. The relatioship between Bacarro and Pacana ceased to exist from the filing of the motion for reconsideration/ new trial, insofar as the court is concerned and form receipt of copy thereof by Atty Salcedo, insofar as Gaerlan

141 GENATO v SILAPAN FACTS: - Complaint for disbarment filed by William Ong Genato against Atty. Essex Silapan - The various criminal and civil cases were not discussed, because it was left for the trial courts to decide. (Genato lent Silapan money to purchase a new car. Silapan mortgaged his house and lot. When SIlapan failed to pay, GEnato sought the foreclosure of the mortgage and tried to encash a postdated check issued by Silapan, which subsequently bounced.) The Court, in this case, cannot sanction Atty. Silapan for his issuance of a bouncing check. - When Genato filed a BP 22 case against Atty. Silapan, the latter alleged in his answer that during the previous case (criminal case), Genato wanted Atty Silapan to offer bribe money to members of DOJ, even the prosecutor, and presiding judge. Atty. SIlapan refused since such acts are immoral and illegal but also because 'the complainant confided to him that he was really involved in the commission of the crime that was charged'. ISSUE: WoN Atty. Silapan committed a breach of trust and confidence by imputing to Genato illegal practices and disclosing alleged intention to bribe govt officials in connection with a pending case? HELD: NO. The privilege against disclosure of confidential communications or information is limited only to communications which are legitimately and properly within the scope of a lawful employment of a lawyer. It does not extend to those made in contemplation of a crime or perpetuation of a fraud. A lawyer is not a gun for hire. ISSUE: WoN disclosures were indispensable to protect Atty. Silapan's rights because they were pertinent to the foreclosure case HELD: NO. It was improper for the respondent to use it against Genato in the foreclosure case because it was not the subject matter of litigation and ATty. SIlapan's professional competence and legal advice were not being attacked in that case. A lawyer must conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients, with integrity in a manner that is beyond reproach. (Atty Silapan was ordered 1 year suspension)

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was concerned. 143 PEOPLE v CASIMIRO Facts: Atty. Manuel Sanglay was filed an administrative complaint for his failure to file a brief within the reglementary period for his clients Benjamin Icalla, Rodolfo Soriano and Benjamin Cinco. Sanglay was given 10 days from Feb 3, 1972 to explain, but his explanation came at the end of the month. He absolved himself from any blame as, in his view, no fault could be attributed to him. According to him, he contacted the parents of the appellants. It was mentioned to him that another lawyer whose services presumably were hired by the parents of appellants Icalla and Cinco. Sanglay then reminded them that failure to file the (appellants) brief would mean automatic withdrawal of the appeal. He was then assured that the new lawyer will file the brief, and that as a token for his hard work, he shoud not withdraw. have a wider area to cultivate and with the least intervention by the landowners agents. During the pendency of the action, counsel for Bicol FederationAtty Quirico Fabuldeclared that his authority to represent the group has been terminated and that the retainer was in behalf of the individual claimants and not of the Federation. This fact was used by the defendants (Cuyugans and the agents) as another defense. The Agrarian Court dismissed the claim of Bicol Federation solely on the ground that the action was not within its jurisdiction.

Issue:

Issue: Was the action by Bicol Federation within the competence of the Agrarian Court? (Ethics iss ue) Can Atty Fabul still represent the claimants despite the dismissal of his services (by Bicol Federation)? Held: Yes, the Court of Agrarian Relations has jurisdiction. Under the Code of Agrarian Reforms, and considering the policy and objectives of such legislation, the Agrarian Courts has jurisdiction over issues involving an individual(s) claiming for compensation from a landowner. (the relevant issue) Yes, Atty Fabul can represent the claimants in this case despite the declared termination. This is one of those rare instances where an attorney, whose authority has been terminated by his client, may be allowed to continue his representation. To prevent failure or miscarriage of justice and pursuant to the provisions of the Rules of Court, the names of the individual claimants should be added to the complaint under the legal representation of Atty Fabul until and unless each individual claimant should otherwise manifest before the court. Case was remanded to the Agrarian Court. 145 DOMINGO SR. v AQUINO FACTS Court of First Instance approved money claim of AQUINO against the Estate of Domingo and ordered Administratrix STA MARIA to pay P20,000 to AQUINO Both parties appealed CA affirmed the ruling of the CFI Copies of the judgment were sent to ATTY UNSON through registered mail The new administratrix DE LOPEZ alleges the coadministratrix of STA MARIA, ATTY DOMINGO, was removed from his trust by the intestate courts order for having squandered cash so being the one (ATTY DOMINGO) who engaged the services of ATTY UNSON, the removal of ATTY DOMINGO is in effect the removal of ATTY UNSON as counsel of the estate DE LOPEZ prays that the clerk of court be directed to serve a copy of the CA judgment on her counsel instead of ATTY UNSON

W/N Sanglay is liable for the late filing of the appellants brief. Held: No. (but he is reprimanded) It was not a willful act on his part. Nonetheless, the exculpation he seeks cannot be granted. Under the circumstances, the least that was expected of him was that he would inform the Tribunal of the developments set forth in his explanation and as that he be allowed to withdraw as counsel. Such a step he did not take until after the Feb 3 resolution. It did not wipe out the previous manifestation of negligence on his part. He cannot therefore escape liability. 144 BICOL FEDERATION v CUYUGAN Facts: Certain members of the Bicol Federation of Labor were hired by Doa Jacinta Cuyugan to clear her land and plant coconut seedlings on it. These planters were also allowed to plant other crops over the land. When the coconut trees bore fruit, the planters were being given half of 1/3 of the harvest. But the custom in the area was that the planter and the owner should share 50-50 in case the owner would not give monetary payment to the planters. During the harvesting, the agent of the owner of the land hired other people. This, in effect, was ousting the planters and preventing them from claiming their rightful compensation. Bicol Federation of Labor, in behalf of its individual members, filed an action before the Agrarian court to change their arrangement with the owner from sharing to a lease-hold system. Such desired arrangement would enable them to

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(In other words, yun court nagsend ng copy ng decision ng ca kay atty unson pero sabi ng estate hindi valid yun pagsend ng notice kasi hindi na nila lawyer si atty unson at the time notice was served) ISSUE W/N SERVICE OF THE JUDGMENT ON ATTY UNSON WAS VALID HELD YES, EVEN IF ESTATE CLAIMS THAT ATTY UNSON WAS NOT THEIR LAWYER AT THE TIME COPY OF THE JUDGMENT WAS SENT, ABSENCE OF MANIFESTATION OR NOTICE OF DISCHARGE FILED WITH THE COURT MAKES JUDICIAL NOTICE SENT TO THE COUNSEL OF RECORD BINDING UPON THE CLIENT Petitioners Santiago Aquio and Dionisia Aguirre filed a complaint against Dominga Salveron in the CFI, which the petitioners won. Salveron was represented in that case by Atty. Basilio Sorioso. Atty. Sorioso was appointed as Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo on Feb. 11, 1947. Despite the appointment, the judgment in the earlier mentioned case was served on Atty. Sorioso. Salveron was only informed of the judgment on Mar. 26, 1947 when a writ of execution was served on him. Salveron then filed a petition to vacate said writ of execution. This was granted by Judge Blanco. W/n the service of judgment made on Atty. Sorioso constitutes service upon his client, Salveron. SC says NO. When Attorney Sorioso was appointed to the position of assistant provincial fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law he ceased to engage in private law practice, and as a consequence he became simultaneously disqualified to continue representing his former client, the herein respondent Dominga Salveron, in the above-mentioned case. So that in contemplation of law the notice of the decision upon him on February 11, 1947, was not a notice upon said respondent, and the period for perfecting an appeal on the part of the latter in reality did not then commence to run but only, if at all, when she acquired knowledge of said decision upon the service on her of the writ of execution on March 26, 1947.

Issue: Held: -

RATIO Records show that ATTY UNSON was the counsel of record of the ESTATE OF DOMINGO in the appellate court and never filed any withdrawal as such counsel. Even after the removal of ATTY DOMINGO as administrator of the estate, ATTY UNSON filed in the appellate court his memorandum for the estate. Moreover, while it may be true that ATTY UNSON ceased as counsel for the estate and for the former administrator when the intestate court granted his motion to withdraw as counsel by virtue of his appointment to and assumption of public office of Assistant Administrator of the Sugar Quota Administration, this was true only as far as the intestate court was concerned. He continued on record in the appellate court and did not file any withdrawal as counsel. In addition to that, no appearance of new counsel for the estate was ever filed. It follows that since notice and copy of the appellate courts decision were served by registered mail on the estates counsel of record ATTY UNSON and the latter failed to claim his mail on the 5th day after the first notice of the postmaster, such service was deemed completed and effected and binding upon the client, in this case the Estate of Domingo. As to the contention that removal of ATTY DOMINGO as administratrix means removal of ATTY UNSON as the estates counsel because ATTY DOMINGO was the one who engaged the services of ATTY UNSON, the fact that ATTY UNSONS services were engaged by ATTY DOMINGO in his official capacity as administrator, did not make ATTY UNSON his personal counsel. ATTY UNSON continued to be authorized to represent the estate as its counsel until the new administrator DOMINGO DE LOPEZ should terminate his services which she never did. JUDGMENT SC: ATTY REGINO (petitioners counsel in this case) is reminded that cooperation of litigants and their attorneys is needed so that needless clogging of the court dockets with unmeritorious cases may be avoided. Hence, petition is dismissed and ATTY REGINO is ordered to pay treble costs. 146 AQUINO v BLANCO Facts:

147 WACKWACK GOLF v CA Facts: Arcangel, a former employee of Wack Wack (WW), filed with the CFI a money claim case for overtime services rendered to WW, for unenjoyed vacation, moral damages, and atty.s fees. At the hearing of the case, neither WW nor its counsel, Balcoff et. al., appeared, despite notification. As a result, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of Arcangel. The firm of Chuidian, on behalf of WW, filed a petition to set aside the judgment on the ground of mistake, misunderstanding, and excusable neglect. According to the firm of Chuidian, WW was first represented by Balcoff et. al. Thereafter, WW decided to replace Balcoff et. al. with the Chuidian Law Office. When the representative of Chuidian went to the firm of Balcoff to inform the latter of the replacement, Mr. Balcoff was not in the office. Atty. Cruz of Balcoff et. al. declared that he had no authority to turn over the records of the case to Chuidian Law Office. As a result, Atty. Chuidian called Atty. Balcoff. Atty. Chuidian said that, inasmuch as Balcoff et. al. was still representing the WW, the Chuidian Law Office will send a representative on the hearing day. However, no representative from the Chuidian Law Office came. (This is the misunderstanding that was mentioned above. Balcoff thought that Chuidian will be the one to appear instead of him. Issue: W/N the judgment in favor of Arcangel should be set aside based on misunderstanding.

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Held: The judgment should not be set aside. Misunderstanding alibi not accepted. The law firm of Balcoff and Cruz was still WWs counsel of record, because the firm of Chuidian only entered appearance after the date of the hearing mentioned above. As such counsel of record, Balcoff et. al. must have known that it is under obligation to protect WWs interest until its final release from the professional relationship. The lack of coordination and understanding between the two law firms cannot be considered a legal excuse within the ambit of excusable negligence. 148 AMPIL v AGRAVA Facts: -Ampil was the counsel for Angela Perez in several cases. The principal cases handled by Ampil were filed in the CFI by Angelas husband and son, Antonio and Benigno Perez, asking that Angela be placed under guardianship and that a suitable person be appointed to administer her properties. Later on, the parties submitted to court, which dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction. This dismissal was affirmed by SC. -A case was later filed by Antonio and Benigno with the domestic court of Manila, seeking the courts approval of the compromise agreement. The domestic court dismissed the proceeding on the ground of lack of jurisdiction because the case which was to be settled amicably by the compromise agreement had already been dismissed by CFI as affirmed by SC. -Ampil asserts that Angela terminated his services as counsel without just cause and without paying him for his profiessional services, for which he presented his bill and asserted his retaining lien over the three titles entrusted to him by Angela in the course of his professional employment. -Eventually, the compromise agreement mentioned above was approved by the Supreme Court. Benigno and Antonio thus filed a case to obtain the titles held by Ampil. They claimed that the attorneys lien must be exercised over the properties belonging to Angela, not over the properties belonging to them in the compromise agreement. They also argued that the compromise agreement was entered into 8 years before Ampil was discharged as Angelas counsel, besides, Ampil took a position adverse to them by seeking to have the compromise agreement annulled. They concluded that Ampil was therefore bound by the compromise agreement. Issue: W/N whether Ampil has a right to keep his retaining lien over the said titles until his services are paid for. Held: YES. -Three elements of attorneys retaining lien were met: 1) lawyer-client relationship; 2) lawful possession of the clients funds, documents, and papers; and 3) unsatisfied claim for attorneys fees. -Ampil obtained possession of the titles when they still belonged to his client Angela. It was only when Angela later on confirmed the compromise agreement that it became valid. The transfer of the properties to Antonio and Benigno could not retroact to the time the compromise was originally executed. -The situation would be different where title to the property is the very subject in dispute in the case and the court adjudges the clients adversary to be rightfully entitled thereto. In such as case the titles to the property could not be said to be properties of the client. The attorney may enforce his lien only over the properties of his client and not against those of his clients adversary. -Petitioner is in no way interfering with the taking possession of the properties and enjoyment of the fruits thereof. All that petitioner asserts and exercises is his passive lien of retaining the muniments of title thereto. Such retention only impedes the corresponding registration and transfer of titles to respondents. 149 MATUTE v MATUTE FACTS: Jose Matute filed an action against the administrator Matias Matute. Jose is asking Matias to surrender 17 titles to various properties of the estate Probate court granted the prayer of Jose and ordere3d the surrender of the titles Matias and his counsel Atty. Canlas appealed the decision ISSUE: W/N Atty. Canlas may be compelled to surrender the titles even though he was not yet paid his fees HELD: NO! An attorney is entitled to retain documents in the case pending settlement of attorneys fees. Sec 37 of Rule 138 provides that attorneys cannot be compelled to surrender the documents in his possession without prior proof that his fees has been duly satisfied But the court may require the attorney to deliver the papers in his possession provided that the client files proper security for the attorneys compensation

150 RUSTIA v ABETO FACTS: Atty. Rustia filed this case to annul orders of the CFI of Manila in the case of Intestate Estate of Antonio de la Riva. Atty. Rustia was the counsel of respondent, Milagros Schmid, the administrator of the intestate estate. When Rustia was relieved as attorney, he sent a bill for P32,330. He wanted to have a lien over all funds and documents that he is currently holding for the administrator. CFI of Manila ordered Atty. Rustia to hand over the certificate of a land. Atty. Rustia is objecting saying that he has a lien over the TCT for his professional fees. CFI nonetheless still went on with its previous order. Atty. Rustia obeyed the order. And then this case was filed. ISSUE: W/N Atty. Rustia has a valid lien over the documents in his possession

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HELD: YES. An attorney shall have a lien upon the funds, documents, and papers of his client which have lawfully come into his possession, and may retain the same until his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof. The general or retaining lien of an attorney is dependent upon the possession and does not attach to anything not in the attorneys hands. The courts may require the attorney to deliver up the papers in his possession provided the client files proper security for the attorneys compensation. action, this rule cannot find application here as the termination of the cases was not at the instance of the client, but of the opposing party. 4. There is an obvious necessity for a hearing because the persons who are entitled to or who must pay attys fees have the right to be heard upon the question of propriety or amount. 5. Regarding American jurisprudence stating a contrary rule - the Court held that in the absence of a statute or special agreement providing otherwise, the general rule is that an atty has no lien on the land 152 DORONILA-TIOSECO v CA FACTS: AS a result of dispute among the heirs of the late Alfonso Doronila and their counsel Ramon Gonzales, over his claim for attorney's fees, the RTC denied the heirs' Motion to Cancel Attorney's lien and declare Ramon Gonzales entitiled to 10% of the shares of the heirs of the late Doronila. Both of the parties appealed the decision. Ramon Gonzales filed a motion to annotate attorney's lien, praying that his attorney's lien be annotated on the title of parcels of land of the estate which the heirs had inherited. Administrator of the estate opposed the said motion by contending that an attorney's lien does not extend to land and that the proper remedy is attachment. Trial court granted the counsel's motion for annotation. ISSUE: W/n an attorney's lien extends to land... HELD: "We have ruled that an attorney's lien does not extend to land which is the subject matter of the litigation." (eto lang yung sinabi sa case... ung mga prior cases, applicable...) ISSUE: W/n the trial court retained jurisdiction to grand Ramon Gonzales' Motion to Annotate Attorney's lien on the title of the parcels of land of the estate after the perfection of the appeal of both the petitioners and respondent from the order declaring Ramon Gonzales entitled to attorney' fees... HELD: Trial court has no jurisdiction. Motion was filed long after they have perfected their appeals, therefore the trial court had no more jurisdiction. 153 GATCHALIAN PROMOTIONS v NALDOZA Facts: Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. filed a disbarment case against Atty. Promo Naldoza, their former counsel. Naldoza appealed a decision of the POEA. In line with this, Gatchalian assers that the disbarments should prosper since Naldoza committed the ff acts: o Appealing a decision, knowing that the same was already final and executory

151 METROPOLITAN BANK v CA FACTS: - ANTECEDAL FACTS (up to you guys kung gusto nyo basahin tong paragraph na toh... not pertinent to our lesson): Celedonio Javier bought 7 parcels of land owned by Eustaqio Alejandro. Javier mortgaged with Metrobank the lots to secure a loan of Bautista?Int'l Hotel Corp. Metrobank foreclosed on the properties. Alejandro alleged fraud in the sale, and brought suits against Javier and Metrobank. During the pendency of these suits, Metrobank sold lots to Service Leasing, resold to Herby Commercial, which mortgaged the same to Banco de Oro. - Arturo Alfariz and Associates handled the civil cases of Metrobank. All the civil cases were for the declaration of nullity of certain deeds of sale, with damages. The lawyers did not have any knowledge of any of the transfers made by Metrobank. They filed a motion to enter its charging lien (25% of the actual and current market values of the litigated properties as its attys fees.) Despite due notice, Metrobank failed to appear and oppose, so the RD annotated the atty's liens on the TCTs. - Alejandro (plaintiffs) filed a motion to dismiss which was granted with prejudice to the earlier order of annotation. The lawyers filed a motion to fix the atty's fees based on quantum meruit. CA affiremed order to Metrobank to pay ALfariz and ASsociates attys fees. ISSUE: WoN lawyers are entitled to atty's fees HELD: NO RATIO: 1. A charging lien to be enforceable requires as a condition sine qua non a judgment for money and execution in pursuance of such judgment. In the case at bar, the civil cases were dismissed upon the initiative of the plaintiffs "in view of the full satisfaction of their claims". The dismissal neither provided for any money judgment nor made any monetary award to any litigant. The charging lien was WITHOUT ANY LEGAL BASIS. 2. The lien of respondent is not of a nature which attached to the property in litigation but is at most a personal claim enforceable by a writ of execution. 3. While a client cannot defeat an atty's right to his charging lien by dismissing the case, terminating the services of his counsel, waiving his cause or interest in favor of the adverse party or compromising his

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o Deceitfully obtaining two thousand, five hundred and fifty-five US dollars (US$2,555) from complainant, allegedly for cash bond in the appealed case Issuing a spurious receipt to conceal his illegal act. client on the pretext that it was needed for the Petition before the Supreme Court, but he actually converted it to his personal gain. Not only did he misappropriate the money entrusted to him; he also faked a reason to cajole his client to part with his money. Worse, he had the gall to falsify an official receipt of this Court to cover up his misdeeds. Clearly, he does not deserve to continue being a member of the bar.

Naldoza was claimed to ask for a Cash Bond in UNITED STATES DOLLAR amounting to TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY FIVE (U.S. $2,555.00) (for payment) to the Supreme Court in order that the said appealed case could be heard or acted upon by the Supreme Court. Gatchalian came to know that there was no such Cash Bond paid to the SC, and in fact, the fees were only nominal (P622). Moreover, the receipt that Naldoza presented to Gatchalian which allegedly emanated from the SC was spurious. An estafa case was filed against Naldoza. It was later on dismissed, but he was held liable for the amount of $2,555. Naldoza seeks that he not be suspended in the practice of law.

154 VDA DE BARRERA v LAPUT Facts: Casiano Laput was Nieves Rillas Vda de Barreras counsel in the settlement proceedings for the estate of de Barreras husband. One time, Laput presented a Notice for Rendition of Final Accounting and Partition of Estate to de Barrera. Barrerra refused to signed and asked Laput to just leave the document in order that she may ask someone to interpret it for her. But Laput became angry and even placed a revolver on the lap of de Barrera (who actually was 72 years old). This compelled the old lady to sign the document. Laput denied the charges

Issue: Held:

Issue: Should Laput be disciplined? Held: Naku po naman! Of course. Laput was suspended for 1 year. It was found by the court that the documents were made by the counsel to end the proceedings and be able to collect his fees. The act of placing the gun on the clients lap cannot be interpreted other than as an act of threatening such client. Laputs acts were improper and censurable (especially considering that de Barrerra was 72 years old). Being a member of the Bar, Laput should have set the example as a man of peace and a champion of the Rule of Law. An attorneys client is a person who is supposed to be defended and protected by such counsel. 155 BARRIENTOS v DAAROL FACTS Victoria BARRIENTOS is single, a college student and about 20 years and 7 months old during her relationship with Transfiguracion DAVID, a lawyer and the General Manager of Zamboanga del Norte Electric Cooperative who was about 40 years old and married to SUMAYLO. Flashback Parang sine DAVID had been known by the BARRIENTOS family for quite sometime being the former student of Victoria BARRIENTOS father and a former classmate of Victoria BARRIENTOS mother. DAVID courted BARRIENTOS and after a week of courtship, BARRIENTOS accepted

W/N Atty Naldoza should be punished for his acts? Yes. Atty. Primo Naldoza is DISBARRED, not just suspended. On the first issue: o Complainant has failed to present proof regarding the status of the appeal. Neither has there been any showing that the appeal was dismissed on the ground that the POEA Decision had become final and executory. Worse, there has been no evidence that respondent knew that the case was unappealable. Indeed, the records of this Court shows that the Petition for Review was dismissed for petitioners (Gatchalians) failure to submit an Affidavit of Service and a legible duplicate of the assailed Order. Clearly, this charge has no leg to stand on. On the next two issues: o When Naldoza paid P10,000 and issued a check to complainant as his moral obligation, he indirectly admitted the charge. Normally, this is not the actuation of one who is falsely accused of appropriating the money of another. This is an admission of misconduct. (RC Note: Naldoza claims that Gatchalian owes him P180T in attorneys fees, and after accounting, he paid him P10T as his moral obligation) o the amount of $2,555 was not a part of his attorneys lien. He demanded the money from his

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DAVIDS love. At this time, DAVID was separated from his wife for 16 years. BARRIENTOS, with her parents permission, was DAVIDS partner during the Chamber Commerce affair. After the event and before going home, they parked the jeep at the beach and after the usual preliminaries (what a term), they consummated the sexual act. This was their set up until BARRIENTOS got pregnant. DAVID suggested abortion but BARRIENTOS disagreed. During her pregnancy until she gave birth, it was BARRIENTOS family who took care of her. BARRIENTOS then filed an administrative case against DAVID with the National Electrification Administration which was however dismissed. Hence, the present petition. ISSUE HELD W/N DAVID SHOULD BE DISBARRED YES, LACK GOOD MORAL CHARACTER --- A CONTINUING REQUIREMENT TO BE ABLE TO PRACTICE LAW o Issue: Held: o o altered the petition to apply for a notice of lis pendens over the property of Flores. But, his plan failed because the register of deeds denied his application. Chua caused the publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the Visayas of a portion of a SEC decision which ordered complainant and others to pay 68 million. In these publications, Chua was always in the forefront claiming to e the lawyer of the winning parties. However, this publication is false because the order had not yet become final, it was still pending appeal. In his defense, Chua submitted evidence to show that a complaint for libel filed by Flores against him was dismissed by the prosecutors office. Chua had already and has the propensity to bribe judges to gain a favorable judgment. Flores further alleges that there is a pattern of conduct on the part of Chua that tends towards the frustration of justice. Chua apparently uses dilatory tactics and has been reprimanded before. Chua is also charged with forum shopping.

RATIO From the records, it is indubitable that BARRIENTOS was never informed by DAVID of his real status as a married individual. The fact of his previous marriage was disclosed by DAVID only after BARRIENTOS became pregnant. Moreover, DAVID misrepresented himself as being eligible to re-marry for having been separated from his wife for 16 years and even dangled a marriage proposal. Interestingly enough, DAVID lived alone in Dipolog City though his son also studies in the same area. Moreover, he never introduced his son and went around with his friends as though he was never married. These circumstances belie DAVIDS claim that the BARRIENTOS family knew about his marital status at the very start of the courtship. But what surprises the Court is the perverted sense of DAVIDS moral values when he said that I see nothing wrong with this relationship despite my being married. Worse, he even suggested abortion. The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to the exacting standards of mental and moral fitness. DAVID having exhibited debased morality, the Court is constrained to impose upon him the most severe disciplinary action --- disbarment. 156 FLORES v CHUA Facts: Ban Hua Flores seeks the disbarment of Atty. Enrique Chua on the following grounds: o Chua notarized a deed of sale which contains the forged signature of Chua Beng (CB). The wife of CB says that CB could not have signed the deed because she was with CB the whole time before his death. Flores points out that Chua notarized the deed even if CB did not appear personally. o Chua falsified a petition filed with the SEC in order to molest and harass Flores. Apparently, Chua

W/n Chua is guilty of these acts and should be disbarred. SC says YES. Chua is disbarred On the first ground, SC finds Chua guilty of notarizing the deed of sale which contains a forged signature. Chua failed to exercise the required diligence and fealty to his office by attesting to the fact that CB appeared before him and signed the deed when in truth and in fact said person did not do so. This is clearly a violation of the duties of a notary public to certify that the person signing the instrument is known to him and that he is the same person who executed it. There was no basis for the second ground but the Court said that his filing of the application for notice of lis pendens even if he was not counsel for the petitioners in the SEC case meant that he knew of such case. Thus, he shouldnt have filed the civil case involving the same issues. His act of filing the civil case amounted to forum shopping. The SC also found sufficient evidence to support the third ground. The other grounds were dismissed for lack of merit. The Court reiterated that a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients.

157 BERBANO v BARCELONA Facts: The heirs of Hilapo appointed Atty. Daen as their atty.-in-fact. Atty. Daen was subsequently arrested by the Muntinlupa police. The heirs of Hilapo tried to look for a lawyer to secure the release of Atty. Daen. The heirs were recommended to Atty. Barcelona. When the spouses visited Atty. Daen, they learned that Atty. Daen had decided to engage the services of Atty. Barcelona. Atty. Barcelona then proceeded to tell the heirs if they could produce P50K he could secure the release of Atty.

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Daen the next day. Because the heirs could not produce the total amount, they merely gave P15,700. There were several meetings between the heirs and Atty. Barcelona regarding the grease money to be used to allegedly bribe an SC justice. The heirs made another payment via a check worth P24,000. On another occasion, the heirs went to the house of Atty. Barcelona and gave P10,000. The total amount given by the heirs to Atty. Barcelona reached P64,000. Commissioner Bautista found Atty. to be guilty of malpractice and breach of duty and recommended that he be disbarred. Issue: W/N Atty. Barcelona should be disbarred. Held: Atty. Barcelona should be disbarred. Disbarment proceedings are sui generis. Its intention is to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the court and public from the misconduct of the officers of the court. In this case, Atty. demonstrated a penchant for misrepresenting that he had connections to secure the release of Atty. Daen. Atty. Barcelona misrepresented to the complainant that he could get the release of Atty. Daen with his connection with a Supreme Court Justice. Instead of promoting respect for law and the legal processes, Atty. Barcelona demeaned the legal profession by taking money from a client under the pretext of having connections with a member of this court. 158 TABAS v MANGIBIN Facts: -A deed of mortgage was delivered to Hilda Tabas evidencing a real property in La Union that was mortgaged to her by Galvan. The deed of mortgage was registered in the Register of Deeds of La Union. -Subsequently, a certain Lilia Castillejos represented herself as Tabas and appeared before Mangibin, who was a notary public, and asked the latter to prepare a discharge of the mortgage and to notarize it afterwards. -Mangibin prepared the discharge of real estate mortgage without asking Castillejos for anything to serve as identification except for a Community Tax Certificate (CTC). This enabled Galvan to mortgage the property again, this time to a rural bank -Tabas informed Mangibin that her signature in the questioned discharge of REM was forged but Mangibin did nothing to help. He even threatened to file a counter suit against her if she files a case against him. -Tabas filed this complaint for disbarment. -Mangibin admitted that the discharge of REM was a forgery but interposed the defense that it was beyond the scope of his duty to ascertain the identity of persons appearing before him, and that he had no available means of ascertaining their real identities. Issue: W/N Mangibin should be held administratively liable for negligence in the performance of his duty as a notary public to ascertain the identity of the person appearing before him. Held: YES, Mangibin was negligent in performing such duty. -Notarization is invested with public interest. It converts a private document into a public one, making it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. Such document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies, and the public must be able to rely upon an acknowledgement by a notary public appended to a document. -A notary public should not notarize a document unless the person who signed the same is the very same person who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of matters stated in the document. -Mangibin should have requested other forms of identification or asked questions to ascertain her identity. -Mangibin violated the Notarial Law and Canon 1. His notarial commission is revoked and he is disqualified from reappointment as notary public for 2 years. 159 IN RE ALMACEN FACTS: Atty Almecen is the counsel of Calero in the case of Yaptinchay vs. Calero The trial court, after the hearing rendered judgment against his client he moved for reconsideration (MR) and served copy of the motion to the adverse party but failed to notify the latter of the date and place of the hearing In the CA, the court moved to also disamiss the case for the reason that the MR does not contain a notice of time and place of hearing and is nothing but a useless piece of paper The SC refised to tkae the cse and in a minute resolution denied the appeal It was at this pont that Atty Almacen filed his "PETITION TO SURRENDER LAWYER'S CERTIFICATE OF TITLE" The pleading filed by Atty Almacen is interspersed from beginning to end with insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and deregoratory remarks agaist the court, as well as its individual members. Atty Almacen described the court as "a tribunal peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas of justice, who ignore without reason thier own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity. he also referred to his client as "on who was deeply aggrieved by the court's unjust judgment" and has become " one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." He also referred to the member of the court as "justice as administered by the present members of the SUpreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." The court asked Atty Almacen to show cause why no disciplinary actions must be taken against him Atty Almacen asked that he be given permission permission to give his answer in an open and public hearing. He reasoned that since the court is the complainant, prosecutor and judge, he preferred that he answer and be heard in an open and public hearing sa that the court could observe its sincerity and candor. The court allowed Atty Almacen to file a written answer and thereafter be heard in an oral argument But his written answer offers no apology but is full of sarcasm and innuendo (SEE PAGE 569-572)

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ISSUE: W/N Atty Almacen is guilty HELD: YES! and he is indefinitely suspended until further order form the SC Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. The decisions of the courta public property and the press and the people have the undoubted right to comment on them, criticize and censure them as they see fit. BUT it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide and shall not spill over the walls of decency and rpopriety. A wide chasm exist between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and justices thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. it isn such misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action In his relations with the court, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. Statements made by an attorney in a private conversation or in the course of political campaign, if couched in insulting language as to bring scorn and disrepute to the administration of justice may subject the attorney to disciplinary action. post-litigation utterances or publication made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their juducial actions, whether amounting to a crime or not, which transcends the permissible bounds of fair commetns and legitimate criticism constitute grave professional misconduct. there is no comfort in the argument of Atty. Almacen that his utterances were made after the judgments against his client attained finality. he could still be liable for contempt as if it had been perpetrated during the pendency of the said appeal. THe pendency or non-pendency of a case in court is of no consequence. the sole objective of the proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal profession. 160 RAYOS-OMBAC v RAYOS Facts: Mrs. Irene Rayos-Ombac (lola) is the petitioner in this case. The respondent is Atty. Orlando Rayos (lawyer), her nephew. Jan. 1985: lawyer induced lola, who was then 85 years old, to withdraw all her bank deposits and entrust it to him for safekeeping. Lawyer made lola believe that if she would do so, all the money will be excluded from the estate of her deceased husband and therefore exclude the other heirs from inheriting. Lola then withdrew all her money (P588K) and deposited it in the account of lawyer in Union Bank. Upon demands that the amount be returned, lawyer informed lola that he can only return P400K on installment. Pumayag na lang si lola kasi kelangan niya talaga ng pera. They signed a MOA regarding this transaction. However, the check given by lawyer to lola was dishonored due to insufficient funds. Lola then filed an estafa case against lawyer. Lawyer offered as settlement 2 second-hand cars and cash amounting to P40K. Lola refused the offer. Lawyer also filed cases against Lola. Estafa - because lola allegedly reneged on her promise to sell a certain parcel of Issue: Held: land. Another accusing lola of making false statements in the testate proceedings of her deceased husband. Lola then filed a case for disbarment on 2 grounds. (1) defrauding lola and (2) filing frivolous cases against her. IBP recommended that lawyer be suspended for 2 years. Lawyer then filed this motion to lift the suspension stating that lola has already withdrawn her complaint for disbarment W/N lawyer should be suspended for 2 years Yes. In fact the SC raised the penalty to disbarment. (pinabayaan na lang sana niya yung suspension, baka di pa siya disbarred) The withdrawal of lola of her complaint has no effect on the disbarment proceedings. Lawyer violated the CPR as well as his oath when he deceived his 85 year old aunt. Lawyers wicked deed was aggravated by the series of unfounded suits he filed against lola. Lawyers deceitful conduct makes him unworthy of membership in the legal profession.

161 IN RE LOZANO FACTS - There was a complaint against a Judge of First Instance which was referred to the Atty General for investigation, report and recommendation. There was an SC resolution which makes such proceedings condiential in nature -The investigation was conducted secretly. Notwithstanding, the editor of El Pueblo, Severino Lozano, printed an article written by Anastacio Quevedo, indicating that the hearing was held behind closed doors, and that the info of the reporter was obtained from outside the screen and from comments in social circles. The testimonies of the witnesses were mutilated and the report reflected upon the action of the complainant to his possible advantage ISSUE: WoN Lozano and Quevedo are quilty of contempt of court? HELD: YES. They are each required to pay the nominal sum of P20 RATIO: 1. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in the SC. This power extends to administrative proceedings, as well as to suits at law. 2. As important as is the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the rights of the citizen is the maintenance of the independence of the judiciary 162 CUENCO v FERNAN See attachment=) 163 IN RE LAURETA Facts:

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This case is purely a discussion of Atty. Lauretas Motion for Reconsideration finding him guilty of grave professional misconduct and suspending him indefinitely. Also, there is a discussion on Eva Maravilla-Illustres Motion for Reconsideration holding her in contempt. Laureta is the counsel of Illlustre. In my understanding, Illustre lost a case with the SC First Division. And because of this, she filed a case with the Tanodbayan, in exasperation against those whom she felt had commited injustice against her in an underhanded manner. Laureta is in hot water for he had allegedly circulated/distributed copies to the press copies of the complaint filed before the Tanodbayan. And with this, he has manifested lack of respect for and exposed to public ridicule the two highest courts of the land. He also said that he has not authorized or assisted and or abetted and could not have prevented the contemptuous statements, conduct, acts and malicious charges of Eva Ilustre who was (allegedly) no longer his client. But he is sorry for the adverse publicity generated by the filing of the complaint against the Justices before the Tanodbayan! However, the Attorney-General prays for the removal of Lontok from the roll of attorneys despite such pardon. He argues that Lontok should still be disqualified from the practice of law as he was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

Issue: Should Lontok be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys? Held: No. An absolute pardon, unlike a conditional one, reaches not only the offense and the guilt for which a person was convicted of, but it also releases the punishment and blots out the existence of guilt, so that he may not be looked upon as never to have committed the offense. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores the person to all his civil rights. It does not, however, restore offices, property, or interests that have been forfeited. If the proceedings to disbar an attorney are founded on, and depend alone, on a statute making the fact of a conviction for a felony ground for disbarment, the pardon operates to wipe out the conviction and the attorney cannot be disbarred. But if the disbarment proceedings are founded on the professional misconduct in a transaction which resulted in a conviction for a felony, a pardon relieves the counsel of the penal offense but can still be subject to disbarment on the ground of lack of good moral character. Here, the motion for disbarment is based solely on the conviction for a crime for which Lontok has been pardoned. 165 IN RE DE GUZMAN FACTS A complaint for ejectment was filed by FLORO against LAPATHA. Judgment was rendered ordering LAPATHA to vacate the premises and surrender possession to FLORO. LAPATHA filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment, Orders & Other Proceedings (nax civpro ) alleging that at the initial hearing, she appeared without counsel so she approached ATTY DE GUZMAN, lawyer of FLORO, and begged for a 5 day postponement to which ATTY DE GUZMAN verbally agreed to with the condition that she (LAPATHA) sign the courts expediente of which she did. She then gave ATTY DE GUZMAN a check for P350 as partial payment of her arrears in the rentals. That was why she was surprised later on to receive a copy of a decision from the City Court wherein it appeared that she confessed judgment and upon verification of the expediente which she signed, she discovered ATTY DE GUZMAN wrote the words Confess Judgment below her signature without her consent. FLORO filed his Answer alleging that the decision of the City Court was based on an open admission by LAPATHA made in open court and it was after such open admission that the words Confess Judgment was written on the expediente. Moreover, the check of P350 was not given as partial payment of LAPATHAS arrears in rentals but was given to forestall the execution of judgment.

Issue: Held:

W/N Laureta should be punished for his alleged acts. Yes. Firstly, Laureta is really the counsel of Ilustre. o The copy of the Tanodbayan resolution indicated that he is the counsel for the complainant . And he didnt complain!! o Lauretas wife received from the process server the documents/resolutions of the court. If Laureta was really not the counsel, then the wife could have easily not accepted. o Atty. Laureta admitted that he is the counsel to a reporter of DZRH by the fact of his commenting with alacrity (RC note: this means eagerness) regarding the case. Lauretas protestations that he has done his best to protect and uphold the dignity of the Court are belied by environmental facts and circumstances. His apologetic stance for the adverse publicity rings with insincerity. He has deliberately sought to destroy the authenticity, integrity and conclusiveness of collegiate acts to undermine the role of the SC as the final arbiter of all justiciable disputes.

164 IN RE LONTOK Facts: Marcelino Lontok is a member of the Bar who was convicted, by final judgment, of bigamy. Subsequently, the Governor-General granted him absolute pardon.

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ISSUE HELD W/N ATTY DE GUZMAN SHOULD BE PUNISHED FOR HIS ACTS NO, NOT ENOUGH EVIDENCE HENCE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY RULE APPLIES SC says YES, Judge Flordeliza is fined 10,000 The SC was convinced that the charge of misconduct against the respondent judge was established by substantial evidence. Dr. Lachica presented the testimony of certain witnesses confirming that Judge Flordeliza was indeed drinking that night. There was also testimony debunking Judge Flordelizas excuse that he could not have acted in such a manner because the mayor was sitting with them (the testimony proved that the mayor was not with them). The Court believed that Judge Flordeliza did threaten Dr. Lachica in order to coerce the latter to sign the death certificate. Also, his inebriated demeanor and incoherent behavior during the festivities, as attested to by a witness, is reprehensible in a judge. Allowing himself to get intoxicated is not the conduct expected of a judge.

RATIO The Clerk of the City Court testified that when the ejectment case was called for hearing, the Trial Judge asked LAPATHA if she admitted the indebtedness alleged in the complaint filed by FLORO to which LAPATHA answered in the affirmative. It was then that the word Confess Judgment was written on the expediente which was afterwards signed by both ATTY DE GUZMAN and LAPATHA. This testimony of the Clerk of court deserves credit because the Clerk was present at the said hearing and is substantiated with the ruling of the City Judge who, sans evidence to the contrary, is presumed to have regularly performed his official duty. The only objective of LAPATHA in filing a Petition for Relief was to gain more time to stay in the leased premises. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that in the instant case, evidence is wanting to sustain a finding that ATTY DE GUZMAN committed any deceit or misconduct. As held in Go v Candoy, it is elementary in disbarment proceedings that the burden of proof rests upon the complainant and that to be made the basis for suspension of disbarment, such proof must be convincing. In the case at bar, LAPATHA failed to provide such convincing proof. Hence, the administrative complaint is dismissed and ATTY DE GUZMAN exonerated of the charge. 166 LACHICA v FLORDELIZA Facts: One day, Dr. Amparo Lachica, the Municipal Health Officer of Jose Abad Santos, Davao del Sur, was approached by Dina Masaglang and Norma Ruton, who were asking Dr. Lachica to sign a death certificate. Dr. Lachica refused to sign saying that the attending physician in Gen. Santos should be the one to sign. Later in the day, Dr. Lachica met the two again and the two told her that Judge Rolando Flordeliza, MTC judge, was ordering her to sign the death certificate. Dr. Lachica again refused. Later in the evening, at the Municipal Employees Night Party, Judge Flordeliza, who was drunk, asked Dr. Lachica to sit beside him. Judge Flordeliza then said to Dr. Lachica, in an angry manner, Bakit hindi mo pinirmahan and death certificate? Dr. Lachica then tried to explain but to no avail, this is when Judge Flordeliza threatened to bring an administrative complaint against Dr. Lachica. W/n Judge Flordeliza should be penalized.

167 ESTOYA v ABRAHAM-SINGSON Facts: A complaint signed by 47 employees and officers of several branches of the RTC Antique was filed with the SC. The signatories allege that Judge Singson "treats her staff in a dictatorial and terroristic manner without regard to the basic dignity and selfrespect of the individual," making the "working atmosphere entirely dependent on her moods on the particular day which most often fluctuates with the moon" The signatories allege that they could not understand the judges bizarre actuations and that sometimes she is excessively generous but in most occasions she is "oppressive, dictatorial, despotic, and unbearable, if not hysterical." The judge was further accused of gross and culpable incompetence for having delegated her authority to the Clerk of Court by requiring the latter to make orders or resolve or decide cases for her. Several persons testified regarding her attitude towards her workers (refer to P. 9). The lower court adjudged her to lack the temperament required of a judge. Her acts, according to the lower court, were not mere admonitions to correct the employees wrongdoings. Issue: W/N judge is guilty of gross incompetence and gross ignorance of the law. Held: The judge is guilty of gross incompetence and gross ignorance of the law. On gross ignorance of the law: She is grossly ignorant of the law because she considered unlawful aggression as a mitigating circumstance. She also made errors in the implementation of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. She also allowed the release on bail of several accused individuals without giving the prosecution to prove if the evidence of guilt is strong (on the fact that the crime committed by the accused individuals). A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. It is imperative that that he be conversant with basic legal principles. A judge owes it to the legal

Issue: Held:

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profession he belongs and to the public who depends on him to know the law which he is called to interpret and apply. On gross incompetence: According to the canons, a judge should organize his court with a view to a prompt and convenient dispatch of its business and he should not tolerate abuses and neglect by clerks. To be a good manager, one must be a good leader. The judge does not possess the virtues, qualities, temperament, aptitude, and skill of a good manager of court employees. She is tyrannical. (Please refer to the lengthy testimonies to have an idea of her tyrannical behavior.) 168 CUARESMA v AGUILAR Facts: -The Olarte, the Provincial Prosecutor of Mindoro charged Banite with the murder of Acosta, a relative of herein complainants. The Information carried no recommendation for bail. -The case was docketed in Branch 44 of the RTC, presided over by Judge Tarriela. Banite was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty. -Olarte amended the Information to homicide and recommended bail of P20,000 without leave of court. Judge Tarriela ordered the Olarte to explain his action considering Banite had already been arraigned. -Mrs. Zubiri, a Steno-Reporter at the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor went to see Aguilarthe Executive and Presiding Judge of Branch 45 of the RTCin his chambers. Zubiri was sent by Olarted to request for the release of the accused Banite on bail of P20,000. -All pertinent papers, including the Property Bail Bond, the Order approving the bond and directing the release of Banite were already prepared for the signature of respondent judge. -On the same day, Judge Aguilar signed and issued the order approving the property bond. Banite was released upon such order. Issue: W/N Judge Aguilar committed grave abuse of authority in ordering the release of Banite while the latters case was being tried in the sala of Judge Tarriela. Held: YES -Sec.14(a) Rule 114 states that : Bail in the amount fixed maybe filed with the court where the case is pending, or in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with another branch of the same court within the province or city -Judge Aguilar violated this rule and had no power to act on the request to release Banite on bail. -The record does not show that at the time Aguilar ordered Banites release, Judge Tarriela was absent or unavailable and could not have acted on said request. -It was also irregular for the judge to entertain the request considering that it did not appear that a formal motion had been filed by the accused to that effect. -He did not even examine the records of the case as he merely signed the Orders allegedly prepared by Olarte. His indifference prevented him from discovering that at the time he ordered the release of Banite, the information had not been properly amended. -The judge is ordered to pay a fine of P2,000 and is admonished to exercise greater care and prudence in the performance of his official duties. 169 IN RE: DEROGATORY NEWS ITEMS FACTS: - State prosecutor Formaran charged Yu Yuk Lai, together with her nephew before the RTC Manila with violation of RA 6425 - Accused of a non-bailable offense, both the accused were held at the detention cell of PNP Narcotics Group in Camp Crame - Yu Yuk Lai filed a petition for bail on the ground that the evidence against her was not strong. Denied! - Upon receiving information that the accused had been playing regularly in the casinos of Heritage Hotel and Holiday Inn Pavilion, Formaran filed an urgent ex-parte motion to transfer the detention of the accused to the city jail. Motion was granted by Judge Laguio - Accused filed a Motion for Inhibition arguing that Laguio do not inspire the belief that its decision would be just and impartial. Laguio inhibited himelf - Case was re-raffled to Branch 53 which was handled by Judge Muro. - Muro granted accused motion to order the confinement of the accused in a hospital for a period not exceeding 7 days. He also granted the extension of medical confinement of the accused for a period of 1 month or until such time that she is fit to be discharged from the hospital - Muro also grnated the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence with motion to admit demurrer to evidence. - Rumors started to circulate that Muro was partial towards the accused - Also, unidentified employees of the RTC manila calling themselves concerned court employees wrote to the Secretary of Justice alleging that Muro ordered the hospitalization of the accused even if she was not sick and there was already a rumor circulating that Muro had given the go signal to the counsel of the accused to file a motion to quash which would be granted for a consideration of millions of pesos and that the contact person is the daughter of the judge who is an employee in the said branch - Formaran filed a motion for inhibition praying that Muro inhibit himself from further handling the case - Thereafter, yu Yuk lai was arrested inside the VIP room of the Casino Filipino at the Holiday Inn Pavilion while playing bacarrat unescorted. - The motion for inhibition against Muro was submitted for resolution when Formarans secretary informed Formaran that Demetria called and that he wanted to speak to Formaran. - Demetria, Go Teng Kok and a close friend friend of Demetria went to the office of Formaran in the DOJ. But even prior to that meeting, Go Teng Kok was already asking Formaran to go easy on Muro and that Formaran has been politely declining the request. But in this meeting, he told them that he would bring the matter to his superior Zuno. When Demetrio heard this, he said:iyon pala, and left the office. - Zuno then received a call from Demetrio requesting him to instruct Formaran to withdraw his motion for inhibition aginst

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Muro so that the judge could already issue an order. Zuno politely replied that he would see what he can do. The Philippine Daily Inquirer reported that Justice Demetria and Go Teng Kok are drug lawyers A judge has the duty not only to render a just and impartial decision, but also to render it in such a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to its fairness and impartiality and as also to the judges integrity. The statement of the judge in the decision acquitting Bayongan to the effect that the crime was committed by Martinez render it impossible for the judge to be free from suspicion of impartiality.

ISSUE: - W/N Justice Demetria is guilty HELD: YES! And is dismissed from service with prejudice to reemployment in any government agency and GOCC with the forfeiture of all retirement benefits except accrued leave credits The timely call to Zuno was a logical follow up and no one could have made that call except Justice Demetria. Even the requested help for Go Teng Kok, whom Demetria claims he did not know and met only that time, could not have meant any other assistance but the withdrawal of the motion to inhibit Muro

171 COJUANGCO v PCGG 172 LUQUE v KAYANAN FACTS: Civil Case 4871 was commenced in the CFI of Quezon by Ilao, Enriquezes against Ona, Luque (petitioner herein), Africao, Castillo, and the Baldeos. Ilao etc., sought to set aside the decision in civil cases 6 and 26 approving the parties compromise agreement which was alledgedly procured thru duress and intimidation. Civil case 4871 was set for trial before Branch I of the CFI of Quezon presided over by Judge Valero. On the date set for hearing, Judge Kayanan first took cognizance of said Civil Case 4871. It was alleged by the Ilaos attorney that he found that civil case 4871 was not included in the calendar of cases scheduled for Branc I and that he found the case in the sala of Judge Kayanan. Defendant Luque (petitioner) was absent therein. Luque alleged that he was at Branch I. Hearings were rescheduled many times. Petitioner lodged a motion to dismiss the case upon the ground of estoppel. The motion was dismissed. Petitioner then moved to disqualify Judge Kayanan. He claimed that the judge doctored the records of the case in that he suppressed the true and genuine proceedings in open court in that the judge did not state that he moved the case to be dismissed. Petitioner was then ordered by Judge Kayanan to explain why he should not be cited for contempt. Petitioners explanations were filed and later on declared by the judge unsatisfactory to warrant his disqualification from trying the case. At a hearing, judge asked Luque to withdraw his pleading moving for the judges disqualification. Luque refused. Judge then verbally ordered a guard to commit petitioner to jail. Petitioner was restrained for 2 hrs. ISSUE: W/n Judge Kayanan should be disqualified W/n Luque a lawyer, should be disciplined HELD: YES. The act of the judge ordering the restraint of Luque; that at one instance judge irately told him I will have you disbarred!; that Judge Kayanan would not give Luque leeway to speak in court, interrupting him and continuing to say things against him in a derisive tone and in a humiliating and abusive manner; that after the judge became tired of talking, the judge told petitioner, who wasn not given the chance to speak fully: that is enough, sit down, and strongly banged the gavel

170 MARTINEZ v GIRONELLA Facts: Martinez was the principal accused in a murder case. Duclan and Bayongan were alleged to be accessories after the fact. Gironella is the Judge of CFI of Abra that tried the case. Bayongan was the only one arraigned so trial proceeded only against him. Bayongan was acquitted. Thereafter, Martinez surrendered to the police. He pleaded not guilty to the charge. Counsel for Martinez moved that the Gironella inhibit himself on the grounds that Gironella already had a chance to pass upon the issue and has formed an opinion as to who committed the murder. That the judge is no longer fair and impartial. Motion was denied. During the rebuttal stage, this petition for prohibition was filed. W/N there should be a new trial for Martinez No. Due process requires that a case be heard by a tribunal that is impartial and disinterested. In this case, there was no proof shown that the judge was unfair and impartial. After the motion for inhibition was denied, petitioner no longer filed a motion for reconsideration. Petitioner no longer took any action until the rebuttal stage. The conclusion that can be inferred is that the trial was fair and impartial. W/N the judge should inhibit himself from proceeding in the case Yes.

Issue: Held: Issue: Held:

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There was also an irregularity in the venue of the case as stated above. Taken all together, respondent judge is ordered to refrain from taking cognizance of the case. 173 HOLD DEPARTURE ORDER Facts: Judge Nartatez issued a Hold Departure Order. It was against Eileen Lope for alleged violations of BP 22. The Secretary of Justice calls attention to the fact that the order in question is contrary to Circular No. 39-97 of the SC, which limits the authority to issue hold departure orders to the RTC in criminal cases within their exclusive jurisdiction. Judge Nartatez admits his mistake, and thus recalls his hold departure order. Held: No. The incident could have been prevented had the Judge listened with care to the Fiscals observation on the allegedly wrong translation of the witness answer. The situation would not have reached grave proportions if the judge only listened carefully to the pleas of the fiscal and patiently allowed the fiscal to make his manifestation. From the transcript of records, Delgra did not so misbehave as to obstruct or interrupt court proceedings. Judge Gonzales abused his discretion in declaring the fiscal in contempt of court. Judges should be temperate and patient, courteous to counsel. They should avoid interrupting advocates in their arguments and shy away from a controversial tone in addressing them. In conversations between judges and counsel, the judge should be studious to avoid controversies. Remember, restraint is a desirable trait in those who dispense justice... right class?! The order adjudging Delgra in direct contempt was nullified. 175 FERNANDEZ v BELLO FACTS The Court Administrator recommended, that the SC reprimand the Judge and remind him to keep himself abreast of SC issuances so as not to commit the same mistake in the future. SC finds this well taken. The Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence. They can live up to this expectation only by diligent effort to keep themselves abreast of the legal and jurisprudential developments. The learning process in law is never ending and ceaseless process. TIMOTEA Perreyras through ATTY MANUEL Fernandez, as her counsel, instituted Special Proceedings for her appointment as guardian over her minor brothers Upon her appointment, she petitioned the court for authority to sell a nipa land owned in common by the wards for the purpose of paying outstanding obligations to UMANGAY The request was granted and the nipa land was sold to UMANGAY However, the nipa land sold by the guardian had already been previously sold with right to repurchase to RICARDO Perreyras and UMANGAY by FLORENTINO Perreyras, the father of the guardian and wards The interest of RICARDO and UMANGAY were in turn sold for P200 to ATTY MANUEL and another P200 for services rendered by him JUDGE BELLO issued an order requiring ATTY MANUEL to show cause why he should not be suspended from the practice of law and declared in contempt for having abused his relationship with the guardian and taken money from her without prior approval from the court ATTY MANUEL explained that when he received the P200, he was no longer the attorney of the guardian as at that time, TIMOTEA secured the services of ATTY BRAULIO Fernandez and that he was only paid P50 for his services to the guardian However, the Court found o ATTY MANUEL guilty of contempt because he had taken the amount of P400 from the proceeds of the sale without previous approval from the court and o ATTY MANUELS conduct anomalous for the reason that he instituted the guardianship proceedings only to enable him to collect the unpaid attorneys fees

Issue: Held:

W/N Judge Nartatez should be penalized?

174 DELGRA v GONZALES Facts: Martin Delgra was the assistant provincial fiscal of Davao. Gonzales was judge of the CFI of Davao. During the trial of a criminal case (entitled People v Suarez), where Delgra was the prosecutor and Gonzales was the presiding judge, an incident occurred which triggered this controversy. It so happened that while a witness was being crossexamined by the defense counsel, confusion arose as to the proper interpretation of the witness statement (since it was in the Cebuano dialect). Delgra objected to the translation (argued that it should be I called Angel instead of I called their names), but the Judge overruled him immediately. Delgra insisted. Judge Gonzales ordered that Fiscal Delgra be brought out of the court and into jail. Delgra was not brough to jail. When the Judge learned of this, he declared Delgra in direct contempt and called on the police for the Fiscals arrest.

Issue: Was the action of Judge Gonzales proper?

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ISSUE HE GOT HELD FEES RATIO W/N ATTY MANUEL SHOULD REFUND THE P200 NO, WOULD DEPRIVE HIM OF HIS LAWFUL 176 TE v CA Facts: Arthur Te civilly married Liliana Choa. They did not live together but occasionally met until Choa gave birth to a girl, which was when Te stopped seeing her. Choa then found out that Te married another woman (Santillo). Thus, upon the complaint of Choa, a criminal case was filed against Te for bigamy. On the other hand, Te filed a case for annulment in the RTC. Choa also filed administrative complaints against Te and Santillo with the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) to revoke their engineering licenses on the ground that they committed acts of immorality. Te filed a demurrer and motion to inhibit (directed at the Judge) in the criminal case. Both were denied. Thus, Te filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. Te also filed a motion to suspend proceedings in the PRC, which was also denied. Te also filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. CA consolidated the two petitions and denied both. W/n the civil case constituted a prejudicial question to the criminal case and administrative case. (More Important) W/n the motion to inhibit Judge Peralejo (on the ground of bias and prejudice) in the criminal case should be granted. SC says that there was no prejudicial question. The validity of the marriage of Te to Choa was considered valid at the time he contracted the marriage with Santillo even is Te alleges that it was void ab initio. This is because jurisprudence at that time say that there has to be a declaration of nullity before a marriage can be considered as void. Without such declaration, the marriage is presumed valid. SC says that the motion to inhibit should not be granted. The grounds raised by petitioner against Judge Peralejo did not conclusively show that the latter was biased and had prejudged the case. While bias and prejudice have been recognized as valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of a judge, the rudimentary rule is that the mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and partiality. The test for determining the propriety of the denial of said motion is whether petitioner was deprived a fair and impartial trial.http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/nov2 000/126746.htm - _edn40 The instances when Judge Peralejo allegedly exhibited antagonism and partiality against petitioner and/or his counsel did not deprive him of a fair and impartial trial. As discussed earlier, the denial by the judge of petitioners motion to suspend the criminal proceeding and the demurrer to evidence are in accord with law and jurisprudence. Neither was there anything unreasonable in the requirement that petitioners counsel submit a medical certificate to support his claim that he suffered an accident which rendered him unprepared for trial. Such requirement was evidently imposed upon petitioners counsel to ensure

While the reprimand is in order for ATTY MANUELS mistake, the mistake is no sufficient ground for the non-payment of the fees he lawfully earned Duty of the courts is not alone to see that lawyers act in a proper manner but also that they are paid their just and lawful fees JUDGE BELLO justifies his order for return of the P200 on the ground that ATTY MANUEL is below average standard of a lawyer However, the opinion of the judge as to the capacity of the lawyer is NOT the basis of the right to a lawyers fees but rather the contract between the lawyer and his client In the case at bar, P200 is the amount admitted by the guardian TIMOTEA as due ATTY MANUEL W/N ATTY MANUELS CONDUCT WAS NO, GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDING WAS THE PROPER REMEDY Wards were indebted to UMANGAY but they had no money with which to pay the debt thus the only way to settle was to sell the nipa land However, the nipa land could not be sold without the intervention of the guardian Hence, ATTY MANUEL was justified in instituting the guardianship proceedings in order to sell the nipa land, it being the proper remedy W/N THE DESIRE OF THE JUDGE TO HAVE PORTIONS OF ATTY MANUELS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION BE STRICKEN OUT FOR EMPLOYING STRONG LANGUAGE SHOULD BE GRANTED NO, JUDGE BELLO STARTED IT JUDGE BELLO used language such as calling the act of ATTY MANUEL anomalous and unbecoming and charging ATTY MANUEL of obtaining his fee through maneuvers of documents from the guardian If any one is to be blamed for the language used by ATTY MANUEL, it is JUDGE BELLO himself who has made insulting remarks in his orders which provoked ATTY MANUEL If a judge desires not be insulted, he should start using temperate language himself he who sows the wind will reap a storm! -

ISSUE ANOMALOUS HELD RATIO

Issues: Held: -

ISSUE

HELD RATIO

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that the resolution of the case was not hampered by unnecessary and unjustified delays, in keeping with the judges duty to disposing of the courts business promptly. 177 MANTARING v ROMAN Facts: Mantaring filed an administrative complaint against Judge Roman charging the latter of conduct unbecoming of members of the judiciary. Thereafter, Judge Roman issued a warrant of arrest against Mantaring and his son. The Judge alleges that the warrant was issued against Gamo and it just so happened that the place where the illegal firearms were seized was owned by Mantaring; hence, Mantaring and his son were arrested for they were in constructive possession of the illegal firearms. Mantaring now comes before this court alleging that it was improper for the Judge to take cognizance of the application of the arrest warrant. According to Mantaring, the Judge should have inhibited himself for there was a pending administrative case which involved him and Mantaring. Mantaring claims that the judge issued the warrant of arrest as a form of revenge against Mantaring and his son for filing the administrative case. Issue: W/N the judge should have inhibited himself from taking cognizance of the application for the warrant of arrest. Held: Yes, the judge should have inhibited himself. For the judge's failure to inhibit, he is reprimanded and warned that commission of the same act shall be severely dealt with in the future. It is true that the court had consistently held that mere filing of an administrative complaint against a judge does not constitute a ground for the disqualification of the judge. However, the factual milieu of these cases is different from the case at hand. In those cases, the administrative complaint was filed during the pendency of the criminal case. In the case at hand, however, the admiinistrative complaint was filed before the involvement of the judge in the criminal case against Mantaring. It cannot be otherwise concluded that the judge's action in this case was dictated by a spirit of revenge against Mantaring for having filed the administrative complaint. This circumstance should have underscored for the judge the need of steering clear of the case because he might be perceived to be suceptible to bias and partiality. 178 HECK v SANTOS Facts: -In a previous case entitled Flor v. Heck which was lodged at the Regional Trial Court, defendants therein, including Heck, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction since the case involved an intra-corporate matter which was within the jurisdiction of the SEC. -The motion was denied by Judge Santos. -Counsel for therein defendants, Atty. Jardin, subsequently filed a motion to withdraw as counsel which was granted by Santos, who reset the hearing date from April 1 to June 10. -As the defendants never received a copy of the order granting Jardins motion to withdraw, neither defendants nor their counsel appeared at the hearing on June 10. -At the said hearing, Santos admitted the evidence of the plaintiff and considered the defendants as having waived their right to present evidence. -The judge then authorized the counsel for the plaintiffs, Atty.Singson, to draft the decision. The defendants did not receive a copy of such order. -In October, Santos rendered a decision which was copied verbatim from the draft decision submitted by Atty. Singson. Issue: W/N Judge Santos act of ordering the counsel for one of the parties to draft a decision warrants disciplinary sanction. Held:YES. -Santos violated Canons 2* and 3** of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and Section 1 Rule 36 (A judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be in writing, personally and directly prepared by the judge) of the Revised Rules of Court. -By such order, the judge abdicated a function exclusively granted to him by the Constitution. Decision making is the most important duty of a judge. He must use his own perceptiveness in analyzing the evidence before him and his own discretion in determining the proper action. -Lack of malice or bad faith in issuing the questioned order is not an excuse. -Such act falls under the classification of a serious charge. The sanctions provided by Rule 140 Sec.10 are 1) disbarment 2) suspension for 3 mos, or 3) fine P20,000 40,000. -Since Santos had already retired, his dismissal or suspension is no longer feasible. He is thus ordered to pay a fine of P20,000 to be deducted from his retirement benefits. *A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. **A judge should perform official duties honestly, and with impartiality and diligence adjudicative responsibilities. 179 AVANCEA v JUDGE LIWANAG FACTS: - Avancena charged judge Liwanag of the MTC of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. - Avancena is the accused in a criminal case for violation of BP 22 - Her counsel filed a Motion to Postpone promulgation and to Re-Open Trial to Allow Accused to Present Further Evidence but the judge denied the motion on the ground that she was able represented by her counsel during the trial of the case - Prior to the dismissal of her motion, Liwanag summoned Avancena to his chamber and told her that she will be convicted unless she pay P1M. - Avancena refused to pay since her unpaid balance was only P140,000 and there is no reason for her to pay P1M - Liwanag summoned Avancena again and told her to raise only P500,000 if she could not afford the P1M

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Also, Liwanag sent Raymunda Flores a common friend of Avancena and Liwanag who was tasked to bring Avancena to the chambers of Liwanag but Avancena refused Liwanag also made Cora Espanola, a court interpreter, to telephone Avancena and tell her that the Judge is waiting for her until 4:30pm Judge Liwanag denied the allegations of Avancena and argued that all the contentions of Avancena are lies and fabricated. The case was referred to Executive Judge Herrera of the RTC Malolos, Bulacan for investigation, report and recommendation Judge Herrera gave more weight to the testimonies of Avancena and concluded that the charges against Liwanag are true. But he did not recommend a specific penalty to be meted out to respondent Order was issued in connection with a petition for certiorari which is a prohibited pleading in cases covered by rules on summary procedure Hontanosas answer to 2nd charge: o He is merely accompanying his wife to Cebu. That his wife just wants some excitement and recreation. o He admits that he goes to the cockpits on Sundays and holidays and gambles sometimes on this occasions. o W/N Hontanosas should be sanctioned for disobeying the order that he inhibit himself No. The order was merely mandatory. Rules of Court provide instances when a judge is under obligation to inhibit himself from hearing a case. The judges case does not fall under any of those mentioned in the provision. His case falls under the 2nd paragraph which leaves it to his discretion whether or not to inhibit himself. W/N Hontanosas should be sanctioned for gambling in casinos and cockpits Yes. Fine of P12K for violation of Circular No. 4 of August 1980. That circular prohibits actual gambling and mere presence in gambling casinos. Bases for the circular was PD 1067-B and Par. 3 and 22 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.

Issue: Held:

ISSUE: - W/N Liwanag is guilty HELD: YES! And Judge Liwanag is dismissed from service with prejudice to re-employment in any government agency and GOCC with the forfeiture of all retirement benefits except accrued leave credits The period of almost 4 months which elapsed form May 7, 1999, the date originally set for the promulgation of the decision of the criminal case and August 27,1999, the date it was actually promulgated indicates a deliberate effort on the part of the Judge to delay the promulgation of the decision in order to give complainant more time to raise the money demanded by him

Issue: Held:

180 CITY OF TAGBILARAN v HONTANOSAS Facts: City of Tagbilaran is charging Judge Hontanosas with (1) open defiance of a higher court ordering his inhibition from a case and (2) open and notorious habitual gambling in casinos. 1st charge: o RTC ordered MTC Judge Hontanosas to inhibit himself from a criminal case filed by the city against Ong. o Hontanosas forced the fiscal to rest its case and rendered a judgment of acquittal despite the order for him to inhibit 2nd charge: o Hontanosas goes to Cebu on the afternoon and goes back to Tagbilaran early the next day in order to go to the casinos in Cebu o Every Sunday, Hontanosas can be seen around cockpits o That a favorable judgment can be bought from Hontanosas with prices ranging from P500 P5K Hontanosas answer to 1st charge: o The order of the RTC was unlawful due to lack of hearing and failure to include the real parties in interest

181 RE: APPOINTMENT OF JUDGE CUBE FACTS:- Judge Cube was appointed Presiding Judge of MTC, Branch 22 of Manila. Information was received by the Judicial and Bar Council that he had previously been dismissed as Asst. Fiscal of Pasay City. It was bourne out of the records that an administrative case for gross misconduct and dereliction of duty was filed against Fiscal Cube by Sec of Justice Jose Abad Santos for failure to prosecute a criminal case which led to its dismissal with prejudice. Fiscal Cube was found guilty as charged. - Cube applied for appointment to the Judiciary and in the Personal Data Sheet that he was required to accomplish he deliberately concealed the fact that he was dismissed. He contended that he didnt act dishonestly in not disclosing such fact because his removal from office was WITHOUT PREJUDICE which legally meant that he can still be recalled by the govt to render public service, and that he was in fact RECALLED AND APPOINTED to sensitive positions in the govt prior to the questioned appointment and that he was even allowed by the same govt to avail of the Optional Retirement under RA 1145. ISSUE: WoN Judge Cube acted dishonestly?

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HELD: YES1.Judge Cube did not disclose the relevant fact that he had been dismissed for gross misconduct in the discharge of his duties as ASst FIscal of Pasay. That fact was deliberately suppressed. Judge Cube could not equate his dismissal with retirement and give both modes of separation an innocent character. By such disclosure, the Council was led to believe, on the strength of his misrepresentations, that he had a clean record and was not disqualified from appointment to the Judiciary 2. The circumstance that the dismissal was without prejudice is not material, and neither is his subsequent appointment to a municipal position. The fact remains that he was REMOVED and that he DID NOT RETIRE. He was removed after investigation and found guilty of gross misconduct and dereliction of duty in the prosecution of a smuggling case. He cannot now brush his removal aside as if it had never existed at all. It is a blot on his record that has spread even more because of his concealment of it. 3. Judge Cube committed an act of dishonesty that rendered him unfit to be appointed to, and to remain now in, the Judiciary he has tarnished with his falsehood. 182 ALFONSO v JUANSON FACTS: Complainant a doctor of medicine by profession filed with this court a sworn complaint charging the respondent with immorality and violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics. He accuses the respondent of maintaining illicit sexual relations with his wife Sol Alfonso. Complainant received a phone call from the wife of the respondent, Mrs. Juanson who informed him that Sol and respondent judge have been carrying on an affair and that she has in her possession the love letters of Sol which she wants to show to the complainant. When he told this to Sol, she denied it. Sol and complainant left for the USA. Sol returned ahead of complainant. Mrs. Juansosn called up father of complainant and divulged to the latter the illicit affair between respondent judge and Sol. The father of complainant engaged the services of a private investigator who discovered that Sol, after arrival from USA met with respondent judge at an apartment and stayed there for 3 hours. Complainant upon knowing this, complainant confronted Sol. At first she denied it but later, however, admitted having an illicit sexual affair with the judge. Respondent judge denied the allegations and claimed that they have been communicating with each other casually and innocently and not as lovers. He alleges that he came to know of Sol when Sol engaged his professional services prior to appointment to the office of RTC judge. ISSUE: Is the judge guilty of the charge of immorality? HELD: NO. It must be stressed that the respondent is not charged with immorality or misconduct committed before he was appointed to the judiciary. As to the post-appointment period, we find the evidence for the complainant insufficient to prove that the respondent and Sol continued their extramarital affair. In fact, no love notes were presented during trial that are dated after the appointment. Proof of prior immoral conduct cannot be a basis for his administrative discipline in this case. The respondent judge may have undergone moral reformation after his appointment. The imputation of the sexual acts upon the incumbent must be proven by substantial evidence, which is required in admin cases. This the complainant failed to do. However, judge should be held liable for becoming indiscreet. Such indiscretions indubitably cast upon his conduct an appearance of impropriety. Respondent and Sols meetings could incite suspicion of either the relationships continuance or revival. He violated Canons 3 and 2 requiring judges official conduct to be free from appearance of impropriety. Sentence to fine of P2,000. 183 MACALINTAL v TEH Facts: Atty. Romulo Macalintal filed a case against Judge Angelito Teh, the Executive Judge and the Presiding Judge of the RTC Branch 87 of Rosario Batangas. His case stemmed from Atty. Macs Election case. In that case, Atty. Mac received an adverse resolution from the Judge Teh. Mac then questioned the resolution, via a petition for Certiorari with the Comelec. While the case was pending with the Comelec, Judge Teh actively participated in the proceedings by filing his comment on the petition, and by also filing an urgent manifestation. Mac filed a motion for inhibition, but what Judge Teh did was to hire his own lawyer and files his answer before his OWN court. Teh ordered that Mac pay P100T in attorneys fees and litigation expenses. W/N Judge Tehs actions were correct. No. Judge Teh was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law, and he is dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all benefits and with prejudice for reemployment. The active participation of Teh being merely a NOMINAL or FORMAL party in the certiorari proceedings is not called for. Judges cannot also act as both party litigant and as a judge before his own court. Tehs gross deviation from the acceptable norm for judges is clearly manifest.

Issue: Held:

184 ZIGA v AREJOLA Facts: Nelia Ziga and Ramon Arejola are two of the heirs of Fabian Arejola. They inherited a land from Fabiana and became coowners (with 8 others) of the property.

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Ramon Arejola was an attorney in the Public Attorneys Office (PAO). He filed in behalf of his co-heirs an application for registration of title of the land. The petition was granted. A substantial portion of the lot was sold to the City of Naga. The unsold portion was subject to a dispute between the heirs and a 3rd party. Meanwhile, Ramon Arejola was appointed judge of the MTC of Daet, Camarines Norte. Notwithstanding such appointment, Judge Arejola continued to appear in the Land registration case (the dispute with the 3rd person). The court requested him to submit a written authority from the SC to appear as counsel. He did not comply. A second request was made but Judge Arejola insists that it is not needed. Then Judge Arejola wrote the City of Naga for the terms of payment for the sale of the land and his claim for contingent atty fees. Now, Nelia Ziga filed a complaint praying that Judge Arejola be disciplined for appearing before the court without the SCs permission and for asking contingent attys fees and commission. Judge Arejolas defense was that there was no need for the SCs permission, as he was appearing as representative of the heirs and not as counsel. He argues that he was a partyin-interest being one of the heirs. He also said that the complaint was filed merely to harass him and that complainant Ziga had a disturbed mind. The executive judge of the RTC found the charge of unauthorized legal practice to be without basis. The Office of the Court Administrator recommended that Judge Arejola be found guilty. the RTC to procure this written authority. But he did not comply. It appeared from the records that he tried to get a written authority later on. But when he was told by the Court Administrator to provide the details of the case in which he is appearing, he failed to comply. Nevertheless, his act of trying to procure authority was an admission that he was appearing as counsel and that he was aware that he is required to present such before the court. *side issue: Judge Arejola argues that he was not afforded due process as there was no hearing conducted by the Executive Judge. But due process does not require a hearing. Opportunity to be heard is sufficient. In this case, he was given ample opportunity to be heard when he was made to file oral arguments through pleadings. 185 OCA v SARDIDO FACTS In a Deed of Absolute Sale, MAGBANUA allegedly sold 2 parcels of land to DAVAO REALTY represented by ONG with PAGUNSAN as broker Judge HURTADO , who at that time was clerk of court and ex officio notary public but now an RTC judge, notarized the said deed However, MAGBANUA denies signing the Deed of Absolute Sale which states that the consideration for the sale was P600,000 and asserts that what she signed was a deed with a stated consideration of P16,000,000 MABGUNUA filed a case of falsification against PAGUNSAN, ONG and Judge HURTADO The case was raffled to JUDGE SARDIDO then presiding MTC judge Judge HURTADO filed a motion praying that the criminal complaint against him be forwarded to the SC pursuant to Circular # 3-89 requiring all cases involving justices and judges of the lower courts, whether or not such complaints deal with acts apparently unrelated to the discharge of their duties, forwarded to the SC Provincial Prosecutor opposed arguing that Judge HURTADO is not within the scope of Circular # 3-89 because the offense charged was committed when he was still a clerk of court and ex officio notary public JUDGE SARDIDO issued an Order excluding Judge HURTADO from the criminal Information filed by MAGBANUA on the ground that Circular # 3-89 does not qualify whether the crime was committed before or during his tenure of office and since the law does not qualify, he must not qualify (this Court cannot and shall not try this case against JUDGE HURTADO unless the Supreme Court shall order otherwise) Court Administrator BENIPAYO issued a Memorandum pointing out that Circular # 3-89 refers only to administrative complaints filed with the IBP against justices and judges of lower courts and does not apply to criminal cases before trial courts Court asked JUDGE SARDIDO to explain in writing why he should not be held liable for gross ignorance of the law for excluding Judge HURTADO from the Information filed by MAGBANUA

Issue: Was Judge Arejola guilty of violating the Code of Judicial Conduct by engaging in the unauthorized practice of law? Held: Yes and FINED 10,000. Practice of law is not confined to appearance in court as it also covers the preparation of pleadings and giving of advice to clients. Based on the records, Ramon Arejola engaged in the practice of law after he was appointed MTC Judge (And even if the complaint was filed before he became judge, the fact that he continued to act as counsel after the appointment sustains his liability). It was shown that he: prepared and signed pleadings; appeared for applicants in the case; wrote a letter to the buyer asking for checks and attys fees; etc. The representation made by Arejola was not just isolated as there was a succession of acts. His argument that he appeared as co-heir was belied by the tenor of the pleadings and letters showing that he was acting in representation of the heirs. Judge Arejola violated the Rules of Court and Code of Judicial Conduct which prohibits members of the bench from engaging in the private practice of law. Note that the purpose of the prohibition is founded public policythat is to ensure that judges give their full time and attention to judicial duties and prevent them from advancing private interests. The Civil Service Rules require him to secure a written permission to appear as counsel from the SC. Judge Arejola was even requested by

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ISSUE HELD RATIO W/N JUDGE SARDIDO COMMITTED GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW YES Under Circular #3-89, the Court has directed the IBP to refer to the SC for appropriate action all administrative cases filed with the IBP against justices of appellate courts and judges of lower courts Thus, Circular # 3-89 does NOT refer to criminal cases against erring justices and judges so trial courts retain jurisdiction over the criminal aspect of the offenses committed In the case at bar, the case filed against Judge HURTADO is not an administrative case filed with the IBP but a criminal case filed with the trial court While the complaint was being investigated on, Castillo filed an affidavit of desistance with the SC. She was saying that everything in the complaint were all lies. However, the Court had two witnesses (Ernesto Bustamante and Jose Javier) attesting to her earlier complaint. Plus, the National Bureau of Investigation Intelligence Service, upon the instruction of the Court, carried out a discreet verification of the facts raised in the testimonies and found them to be true. W/n Calanog should be held liable despite the desistance of the complainant, Castillo.

Issue: Held: -

Eto na ang mga pangaral ni lola basyang A judge is a called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statues and procedural rules such that he must be conversant with basic legal principles and well-settled doctrine JUDGE SARDIDO failed in this regard when he excluded Judge HURTADO as one of the accused in the Information and instead forwarded the criminal case to the Supreme Court Moreover, in a number of cases, JUDGE SARDIDO was reprimanded, fined and even dismissed from service With an unflattering service record, JUDGE SARDIDO eroded the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary The Court still imposes a fine of P10,000 for gross ignorance of the law despite his dismissal from the service 186 CASTILLO v CALANOG Facts: In a sworn complaint filed with the SC, Emma Castillo charged Judge Manuel Calanog, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 76, with immorality and conduct unbecoming of a public official. Castillo alleges that when she intervened for the intestate estate of her deceased husband, a friend of hers referred her to Calanog who was supposedly going to help her. Castillo also alleges that when she met with Calanog, the latter brought her to a motel and made sexual advances on her. When she refused, she says that Calanog offered to her the proposition that he be her sub-husband and that he would give Castillo his condominium unit in QC as well as provide financial support for her two minor children and place them in an exclusive school for girls. Castillo agreed to such a proposition. Their relationship also bore a son, who was allegedly named Jerome Christopher Calanog. Castillo is now complaining that Calanog has reneged on his promise. She says that Calanog is not anymore giving support, that her two children are not in an exclusive girls school and that Calanog has failed to pay the monthly installments on the condominium.

SC says YES and Calanog is dismissed from the roll of judges. - Generally, the Court attaches no persuasive value to affidavits of desistance, especially when executed as an afterthought, as in the case at bar. Even if Emma Castillo had not filed her "Affidavit of Desistance," the SC says that they would not have been swayed solely by her allegations, and they actually found from the testimony of Jose Javier that the Castillo's charges, indeed, rest on sufficient grounds. - It is of no import that the evidence on record is not sufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt the facts of concubinage having indeed existed and been committed. This is not a criminal case for concubinage but an administrative matter that invokes the power of supervision of this Court over the members of the judiciary. - The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. - It is worth noting here that the respondent judge, in violating a judicial precept, has also committed a grave injustice upon the complainant, who had sought his assistance in expediting the intestate estate proceedings of her deceased common-law husband. The judge, who was in the first place, prohibited by the Code of Judicial Conduct from intervening in a case in any court, took advantage of the complainant's helplessness and state of material deprivation and persuaded her to become his mistress. The exploitation of women becomes even more reprehensible when the offender commits the injustice by the brute force of his position of power and authority, as in this case. Gutierrez, Dissent: - He is mainly saying that Calanog should not be held solely liable and that the penalty of dismissal is too harsh. - He believes that Castillo is a liberated woman who was, at that time, willing to enter into the sexual relationship for the perks it included. - He is also saying that Castillo and Calanog are both offenders and victims. Thus, he thinks that the dismissal of Calanog is too severe, considering the situation. 187 DIONISIO v ESCANO Facts: Dionisio filed a complaint against Judge Escano charging the Judge of illegally using court facilities in advertising the hiring of attractive

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waitresses and personable waiters and cooks in the restaurant of the judge. Admissions to the effect that he was hiring the waitresses for his pub that will cater to the prurient desires of males was acquired through the help of the program "Hoy Gising." The judge, in his comment, said that he was only establishing a restaurant -- some sort of watering hole for friends. The judge said that the reason he posted the ad at the Court Bulletin Board was due to the fact that conducting the interviews in his office in the court will be more convenient for him. (He says that his house is too far from the gate and difficult for the applicants to locate.) The judge further alleges that he immediately ordered the removal of the ads when he learned of the displeasure of some people regarding his use of the Court Bulletin Board. The Investgating Justice of the CA who hadled the case recommended that the judge be fined in the amount of 15,000 for the misuse of the court facilities. Issue: W/N the Judge is guilty of misuse of court facilities. Held: Yes, the judge is guilty of misuse. Suspended for 6 months with a warning. It is of no import that the judge's act of using court facilities be motivated by good cause, no matter how honorable. The moment such act deviates from purposes not directly related to the functioning and operation for which the courts of justice have been established, it must be immediately rectified. Judges are not only to avoid impropriety, but must also avoid the appearance of impropriety. His act of posting the ads at the Court Bulletin Board tend to corrode the respect and dignity of the courts as the bastion of justice because there occured an interference in the judicial duties of Judge Escano by reason of his own business interests. HELD: *no.an attorney-client relationship is said to exist when a lawyer acquiesces or voluntarily permits the consultation of a person, who, in respect to a business of trouble of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view of obtaining professional advise or assistance. complainant's averment of the existence of lawyer-client relationship, presenting in evidence four letters and a memorandum of agreement drafted and sent to her by respondent, only strengthened the idea that the relationship between her and the respondent was mainly personal or business in nature, and that whatever legal sevices that may have been rendered by respondent for free were only incidental to said relationship. *the court cannot ascertain whether respondent indeed committed acts in violation of his oath as a lawyer concerning the sale and conveyance of the virgo mansion on account of factual matters that are subject of pending civil cases involving the same property. as a matter of prudence and so as not to preempt the conclusion that will be drawn by the courts where the same cases are pending, the court deems it wise to dismiss the present case without prejudice to the filing of another one, depending on the final outcome of said civil cases.

2.

MANIPUD vs. BAUTISTA

1.

VIRGO vs. AMORIN

FACTS: complainant filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent for alleged commission of forum shopping and for improper conduct when respondent filed two complaints for annulment of real estate mortgage on the property of which complainant is the mortgagee. respondent contended that he disclosed in his second complaint the esixtence of a pending suit involving the same property, and that his prompt withdrawal of the second complaint was indicative of is good faith. the ibp board of governors, upon recommendation of the investigating commissioner, dismissed the complaint for disbarment for lack of showing that the second complaint in question was deliberately and wilfully done to commit forum shopping. hence, this motion of reinvestigation filed by complainant. ISSUE: whether or not respondent in guilty of the charges against him. HELD: no. complainant only charged respondent with forum shopping and improper conduct. even assuming that he only learned on october 3, 2006 that the mortgagor had been dead since 1968, still he failed to raise this issue at the mandatory conference before the ibp where the issues were defined. thus, since respondent's act of allegedly resurrecting the dead mortgagor from the dead and for allowing an impostor to impersonate the former was never raised as an issue before the ibp, then complainant could not raise the same as this stage of the proceedings.

FACTS:complainant filed a disbarment case against respondent for the latter's fraudulent use of his legal knowledge in convincing complainant to part with her property, the virgo mansion. complainant alleged the existence of an attorney- client relationship, hence, respondent should be held liable for issuing postdated checks in payment for the purchase price of said mansion. respondent denied the same, raising in defense that it was complainant who defrauded him. the commissioner of the ibp committee on bar discipline found respondent guilty of misconduct and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for six months. the ibp board of governors approved the recommendation, with modification, suspending respondent for 1 year instead. ISSUES: *whether or not an attorney-client relationship exists between complainant and respondent *whether or not respondent is guilty of misconduct

3.

WEN MING CHEN vs. ATTY. PICHAY

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FACTS:following the raid and confiscation of counterfeit gucci and louis vuitton items involved in complaiant's business, the latter filed complaints against respondent for alleged extortion and gross misconduct amounting to gross ignorance of the law when respondent filed a complaint for damages before the DOJ and a motion for reconsideration before the RTC, seeking the inclusion of complainant's name in the hold departure list of the bureau of immigration and deportation. respondent denied all material allegations, raising good faith in defense, but the committee on bar discipline upheld, with modification, the findings of the investigating commissioner, thereby suspending him from the practice of law for one year. ISSUE: whether or not the imposition of suspension was proper HELD: no.as regards the issue of extortion, viewed against complainant's bare and self-serving allegations, evidence clearly proves that no such extortion took place. there is also nothing on record to show that the filing of complaint before the DOJ was done for the purpose of harassment. if at all, it was an error of judgment sans bad faith. it has been held that not all mistakes of members of the bar justify the imposition of disciplinary actions. an attorney-at-law is not expected to know all the law. the alleged errors are not of such nature as to warrant the imposition of the penalty of suspension for one year. 5. KUPERS vs. ATTY. HONTANOSAS

FACTS: complainant filed an administative case against respondent for allegedly preparing and notarizing contracts that are both invalid and illegal for being violative of the limitations on aliens leasing private lands. respondent was found guilty, necessitating the investigating commissioner of the ibp to suspend him from the practice of law for two months. upon review, the ibp board of governors dismissed the complaint on account of respondent's innocence, as his guilt may have been the result of ignorance of the law or plain negligence.hence, this petition lodged by the complainant. ISSUE: whether or not the dismissal of the complaint was proper HELD: no. in preparing and notarizing the illegal lease contracts, respondent violated the attorney's oath and several canons of the code of professional responsibility. one of the foremost sworn duties of an attorney-at -law is to obey the laws of the philippines. this duty is enshrined in the attorney's oath and in canon 1 of the CPR. aside from constituting violation of the lawyer's oath, the acts of the respondent also amount to gross misconduct under sec. 27, rule 138 of the rules of court which provides for the grounds for disbarment.

4.

RE 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS: ATTY. DANILO DE GUZMAN

6.

VALENCIA vs. ATTY. ANTINIW

FACTS:the leakage of bar questions in mercantile law during the 2003 bar examinations warranted the nullification of the results in that subject and the subsequent distribution of the corresponding percentage thereof among the seven bar subjects. thorough investigation revealed that a certain danilo de guzman, one of the assistant attorneys at the balgos and perez law firm, was responsible for the leakage. atty. marcial balgos, a senior partner in the firms, happened to have been commissioned by justice jose vitug to prepare questions in mercantile law. atty. de guzman admitted to downloading the questions from atty. balgos' computer and distributing the same to two of his brothers in the beta sigma lambda fraternity. from the point, the leaked questions spread and an unknown number of examinees were able to obtain copies thereof. atty. de guzman was thus disbarred, while atty. balgos was reprimanded for his negligence and lack of due care in safeguarding the proposed questions in mercantile law. ISSUE: whether or not disbarment was proper HELD: yes. atty. de guzman, by transmitting and distributing the stolen test questions to some members of the beta sigma lambda fraternity, possibly for pecuniary profit and to give them undue advantage over the other examinees in mercantile law, abetted cheating and dishonesty by his fraternity brothers in the examination, which is violative of rule 1.01 of canon 1 as well as canon 7 of the code of professional responsibility. de guzman was guilty of misconduct unbecoming a member of the bar. he violated the law instead of promoting respect for it and degraded the noble profession instead of upholding its dignity and integrity.

FACTS: this is an appeal for reinstatement to the bar of respondent who was disbarred on april 26, 1991 for falsifying a deed of sale and introducing the same as evidence for his client. In a span of 15 years since his disbarment, respondent had been undeterred in filing motions for reconsideration, appeals, petitions, and pleas for judicial clemency and readmission to the bar, submitting in support thereof favorable indorsements, letters, and recommendations from various civic and religious organizations. The IBP recommended his readmission to the bar and the office of the bar confidant likewise affirmed the same. ISSUE: whether or not respondent should be readmitted to the practice of law HELD: yes. Records show that the long period of respondents disbarment gave him the chance to purge himself of his misconduct, to show his remorse and repentance, and to demonstrate his willingness and capacity to live up once again of conduct demanded of every member of the bar. It is well-settled that the objective of disciplinary proceedings is restorative justice, not retribution. Guided by this doctrine and considering the evidence submitted by respondent satisfactorily showing his contrition and his being again worthy of membership in the legal profession, the court finds that it is now time to lift respondents disbarment.

7.

DALISAY vs. ATTY. MELANIO MAURICIO, JR.

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Facts: Complainant engaged respondents services as counsel in Civil Case No. 00-044, entitled "Lucio De Guzman, etc., complainants, v. Dalisay U. Valeriana, respondent," pending before the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 1, Binangonan, Rizal. Notwithstanding his receipt of documents and attorneys fees in the total amount of P56,000.00 from complainant, respondent never rendered legal services for her. As a result, she terminated the attorney-client relationship and demanded the return of her money and documents, but respondent refused. On the other hand, respondent contended that the complainant did not engage his services as counsel in that case. She hired him for the purpose of filing two new petitions, a petition for declaration of nullity of title and a petition for review of a decree and she refused to provide him with documents related to the case, preventing him from doing his job. Further, he argued that complainant offered tampered evidence in Civil Case No. 00-004, prompting him to file falsification cases against her. Issue: 1. Whether or not respondent violated the principle of confidentiality between a lawyer and his client when he filed falsification charges against her. Facts: Evangelina Masmuds husband, the late Alexander J. Masmud engaged the services of Atty. Rolando B. Go, Jr. in a case for non-payment of benefits and damages. In consideration of Atty. Gos legal services, Alexander agreed to pay attorneys fees on a contingent basis, as follows: twenty percent (20%) of total monetary claims as settled or paid and an additional ten percent (10%) in case of appeal. It was likewise agreed that any award of attorneys fees shall pertain to respondents law firm as compensation. The monetary claims of Alexander were granted except his claim for medical expenses. Several appeals were made by Alexanders employer to NLRC and CA, however both were dismissed and the former decision was affirmed. Eventually, the decision of the NLRC became final and executory, and consequently Evangelina received an amount of P3,454,079.20. Out of said amount, Evangelina paid Atty. Go the sum of P680,000.00. Dissatisfied, Atty. Go filed a motion to record and enforce the attorneys lien alleging that Evangelina reneged on their contingent fee agreement. Evangelina paid only the amount of P680,000.00, equivalent to 20% of the award as attorneys fees, thus, leaving a balance of 10%, plus the award pertaining to the counsel as attorneys fees. Evangelina contended that Atty. Gos claim for attorneys fees of 40% of the total monetary award was null and void based on Article 111 of the Labor Code. Issue: Whether or not CA erred in UPHOLDing RESPONDENT LAWYERS CLAIM OF FORTY PERCENT (40%) OF THE MONETARY AWARD IN A LABOR CASE AS ATTORNEYS FEES. Ruling: Contrary to Evangelinas proposition, Article 111 of the Labor Code deals with the extraordinary concept of attorneys fees. It regulates the amount recoverable as attorney's fees in the nature of damages sustained by and awarded to the prevailing party. It may not be used as the standard in fixing the amount payable to the lawyer by his client for the legal services he rendered. In this regard, Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court should be observed in determining Atty. Gos compensation. The retainer contract between Atty. Go and Evangelina provides for a contingent fee. The contract shall control in the determination of the amount to be paid, unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable. The Court finds nothing illegal in the contingent fee contract between Atty. Go and Evangelinas husband. The CA committed no error of law when it awarded the attorneys fees of Atty. Go and allowed him to receive an equivalent of 39% of the monetary award.

Ruling: Yes, respondent violated the principle of confidentiality between a lawyer and his client when he filed falsification charges against her. Canon 19 outlines the procedure in dealing with clients who perpetrated fraud in the course of a legal proceeding. Consistent with its mandate that a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal and only within the bounds of the law, Rule 19.02 of the same Canon specifically provides that a lawyer who has received information that his clients has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall promptly call upon the client to rectify the same , and failing which he shall terminate the relationship with such client in accordance with the Rules of Court. As a lawyer, respondent is expected to know this Rule. Instead of inaction, he should have confronted complainant and ask her to rectify her fraudulent representation. If complainant refuses, then he should terminate his relationship with her. Understandably, respondent failed to follow the above-cited Rule. This is because there is no truth to his claim that he did not render legal service to complainant because she falsified the documentary evidence in Civil Case No.00-044. The pleadings show that he learned of the alleged falsification long after complainant had terminated their attorney-client relationship. It was a result of his active search for a justification of his negligence in Civil Case No. 00-044. As a matter of fact, he admitted that he verified the authenticity of complainants title only after the "news of his suspension spread in the legal community." Obviously, in filing falsification charges against complainant, respondent was motivated by vindictiveness.

8.

EVANGELINA MASMUD vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

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9. Facts: Complainant filed for disbarment against Atty. Luciano D. Valencia on the following grounds: (a) serving on two separate occasions as counsel for contending parties; (b) knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary evidence; (c) initiating numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental fees; and (d) having a reputation of being immoral by siring illegitimate children. Issue: Whether or not Atty. Valencia must be disbarred. Ruling: On serving as counsel for contending parties. Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Further respondent is bound to comply with Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that "a lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his client even after the attorney-client relation is terminated." It is evident that respondent's representation of Valdez and Alba against Bustamante and her husband, in one case, and Valdez against Alba, in another case, is a clear case of conflict of interests which merits a corresponding sanction from this Court. Respondent may have withdrawn his representation in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK upon being warned by the court, but the same will not exculpate him from the charge of representing conflicting interests in his representation in Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK. On knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary evidence. Respondent failed to comply with Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be mislead by any artifice. It matters not that the trial court was not misled by respondent's submission of TCT No. 273020 in the name of Valdez, as shown by its decision dated January 8, 2002 dismissing the complaint for ejectment. What is decisive in this case is respondent's intent in trying to mislead the court by presenting TCT No. 273020 despite the fact that said title was already cancelled and a new one, TCT No. 275500, was already issued in the name of Alba. On initiating numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental fees. We find the charge to be without sufficient basis. The act of respondent of filing the aforecited cases to protect the interest of his client, on one hand, and his own interest, on the other, cannot be made the basis of an administrative charge unless it can be clearly shown that the same was being done to abuse judicial processes to commit injustice. SAMALA vs. ATTY. LUCIANO D. VALENCIA The filing of an administrative case against respondent for protecting the interest of his client and his own right would be putting a burden on a practicing lawyer who is obligated to defend and prosecute the right of his client. On having a reputation for being immoral by siring illegitimate children. We find respondent liable for being immoral by siring illegitimate children. Under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. It may be difficult to specify the degree of moral delinquency that may qualify an act as immoral, yet, for purposes of disciplining a lawyer, immoral conduct has been defined as that "conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community. 10. Venterez vs. Atty. Cosme Facts: A complaint filed by complainants against respondent Atty. Rodrigo R. Cosme, charging the latter with Abandonment, Gross Negligence and Dereliction of Duty.

Complainants contracted the legal services of respondent in Civil Case No. 981. They alleged that they directed the respondent to either file a Motion for Reconsideration or a Notice of Appeal, but respondent failed or refused to do so. Complainant Venterez was constrained to contract another lawyer to prepare the Motion for Reconsideration which was filed on 19 March 2004. However said motion was denied. On Zenaida C. de Vera, a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution was filed by the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 981 but respondent never bothered to file an opposition to or any comment on the said motion despite receipt thereof. The motion was eventually granted. Two months after respondent received a copy of the Decision, the respondent filed his Notice of Retirement of Counsel with the MTC on 3 May 2004.wFeeling aggrieved by respondents actuations, complainants filed the instant administrative complaint against him.c Issue:

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Whether the respondent committed culpable negligence in handling complainants case, as would warrant disciplinary action. Ruling: Yes, respondent committed culpable negligence in handling complainants case, as would warrant disciplinary action. Assuming, nevertheless, that respondent was justified in withdrawing his services, he, however, cannot just do so and leave complainants in the cold, unprotected. The lawyer has no right to presume that his petition for withdrawal will be granted by the court. Until his withdrawal shall have been approved, the lawyer remains counsel of record who is expected by his clients, as well as by the court, to do what the interests of his clients require. He must still appear before the court to protect the interest of his clients by availing himself of the proper remedy, for the attorney-client relations are not terminated formally until there is a withdrawal of record. All told, we rule and so hold that on account of respondents failure to protect the interest of complainants, respondent indeed violated Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Respondent is reminded that the practice of law is a special privilege bestowed only upon those who are competent intellectually, academically and morally. 11. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY, INC. vs. ATTY. LEOVIGILDO H. MIJARES III Facts: This disbarment case is about the need for a lawyer to account for funds entrusted to him by his client. Complainant Arellano University, Inc. engaged the services of respondent Leovigildo H. Mijares III, for securing a certificate of title covering a dried up portion of the Estero de San Miguel that the University had been occupying. The property was the subject of a Deed of Exchange dated October 1, 1958 between the City of Manila and the University. The University alleged that it gave him all the documents he needed to accomplish his work. Later, Mijares asked the University for and was given P500,000.00 on top of his attorneys fees, supposedly to cover the expenses for "facilitation and processing." He in turn promised to give the money back in case he was unable to get the work done. Mijares informed the University that he already completed Phase I of the titling of the property. The University requested Mijares for copies of the MMDA approval but he unjustifiably failed to comply despite his clients repeated demands. Then he made himself scarce, prompting the University to withdraw all the cases it had entrusted to him and demand the return of the P500,000.00 it gave him. The University wrote Mijares by registered letter, formally terminating his services in the titling matter and demanding the return of the P500,000.00. But the letter could not be served because he changed office address without telling the University. Eventually, the University found his new address and served him its letter on January 2, 2006. Mijares personally received it yet he did not return the money asked of him. Issue: whether or not respondent Mijares is guilty of misappropriating the P500,000.00 that his client, the University, entrusted to him for use in facilitating and processing the titling of a property that it claimed. Ruling: Yes, respondent Mijares is guilty of misappropriating the P500,000.00 that his client, the University, entrusted to him for use in facilitating and processing the titling of a property that it claimed. Every lawyer has the responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client such that he must promptly account for whatever money or property his client may have entrusted to him. As a mere trustee of said money or property, he must hold them separate from that of his own and make sure that they are used for their intended purpose. If not used, he must return the money or property immediately to his client upon demand, otherwise the lawyer shall be presumed to have misappropriated the same in violation of the trust reposed on him. A lawyers conversion of funds entrusted to him is a gross violation of professional ethics. The Court is not, therefore, inclined to let him off with the penalty of indefinite suspension which is another way of saying he can resume his practice after a time if he returns the money and makes a promise to shape up. 12. Angeles, et al. vs. Atty. Ibaez Facts: Complainants alleged that respondent Atty. Amado Ibaez notarized an "Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale" without a notarial commission and in the absence of the affiants. The complainants denied that they executed the said document or that they ever appeared before respondent Atty. Ibaez for this purpose.

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Issue: Whether or not Atty. Ibaez may be disbarred on the ground of notarizing a document without a notarial commission and in the absence of the affiants. Ruling: Yes, Atty. Ibaez may be disbarred on this ground. As a member of the Bar, respondent should well know that notarization of a private document converts such document into a public one, and renders it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. Notarization engages public interest in a substantial degree and the protection of that interest requires preventing those who are not qualified or authorized to act as notaries public from imposing upon the public and the courts and administrative offices generally. The court ruled that respondent should not be disbarred but he should be suspended as well as his notarial commission. Ruling: 1. Respondent claimed that it was erroneous to say that the issue was still pending with the arbitrator at the stage of execution because when he submitted the Decision, he was already in functus oficio. Respondent is mistaken. Jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated, or until the writ of execution has been issued to enforce the judgment. When respondent was appointed as Voluntary Arbitrator for the parties in the illegal dismissal case he was expected to exhibit neutrality and impartiality. However, what he displayed is the opposite. He even indorsed a criminal complaint against herein complainant, and signed the said Indorsement as counsel for complainants in the illegal dismissal case, an act which was clearly reprehensible and violative of the principle of conflict of interests. On the second issue, as a defense, respondent asserted that it was complainant who resorted to legal maneuvers to delay, if not evade, his monetary obligations. Thus, the former was compelled to ask for an Order to place petitioner in the Watchlist to prevent him from absconding, completely contravening Supreme Court Circular No. 39-97, which provides that said Orders shall be issued only in criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts. In doing so, responded showed gross ignorance of the law.

2.

BUEHS VS. BACATAN

Complainant Buehs instituted this disbarment when respondent represented Alvarez and Malukuh, complainants in a labor case filed against herein complainant as Executive Vice-President of Miramar Fish Company, Inc. (MFCI). Said labor case was assigned to respondent as an accredited Voluntary Arbitrator of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to decide upon. Respondent rendered a decision in favor of Alvarez and Malukuh and against complainant Buehs and MFCI. However, during the pendency of the proceedings, he recommended that a criminal case be filed against the Buehs and MFCI. In his Indorsement, respondent stated that he represents the Alvarez and Malukuh. Along with this, respondent issued an Order directing the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation to place herein complainant in its Watchlist and to issue a Hold Departure Order without notice and hearing. Complainant was not given a copy of the said Hold Departure Order. Hence this administrative case against Atty. Bacatan, complainant alleging that his (respondents) act of representing Alvarez and Malukuh, while a labor case involving the same parties was still pending before him, gave rise to a conflict of interests.

Based on the foregoing, the Court found respondent Atty. Inocencio T. Bacatan guilty of gross misconduct for representing conflicting interests, gross ignorance of the law for issuing an order without authority, and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years.

13. A.C. No. 7815

July 23, 2009

DOLORES C. BELLEZA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. ALAN S. MACASA, Respondent. Complainant availed respondents legal services in connection with the case of her son, with an agreement that the respondent will handle the case for P30,000 as Attorneys Fees. The complainant paid the amount after three installments but respondent did not issue any receipt for any of the installments. Aside from this, respondent also received P18,000 from complainant as a bond to secure the provisional liberty of her (complainants) son. Again, respondent did not issue any receipt. However, she later found out that respondent did not remit the amount to the court. Complainant then demanded the return of the P18,000 from respondent on several occasions but the latter ignored her. Moreover, respondent failed to act on the case of complainants son and complainant was forced to avail of the services of the Public Attorneys Office for her sons defense. Hence, the disbarment case.

Issues: 1.) respondent represented conflicting interests by acting as counsel for Alvarez and Malukuh in the criminal case they filed against herein complainant while the labor case filed by Alvarez and Malukuh against complainant was still pending before him. 2.) he usurped the judicial powers of the Regional Trial Court and the higher judicial authorities by issuing a Hold Departure Order/Watchlist Order without any notice or hearing

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Issue: Whether or not the respondent should be disbarred Ruling Philippines and for maliciously absconding with complainants P3.8 million. Issue: Whether or not atty. Mas name should be stricken out from the Roll of Attorneys and be disbarred from the practice of law.

Respondent Atty. Alan S. Macasa was found GUILTY not only of dishonesty but also of professional misconduct. He grossly neglected the cause of complainants son after accepting the criminal case against latter and receiving his attorneys fees by doing nothing that could be considered as effective and efficient legal assistance. Indeed, on account of respondents continued inaction, it did not only prejudice complainants son, it also deprived him of his constitutional right to counsel. Further, respondent also failed to return the money of the complainant despite several demands. His failure to return the money upon demand gave rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed in him by complainant. In view of the foregoing, the Court ordered that he be DISBARRED from the practice of law and to return to complainant the amounts of P30,000 and P18,000 with interests.

Ruling: The Court found the respondent to be dishonest and deceitful and "nothing more than an embezzler". He abused the trust and confidence reposed by complainant in him. Respondent, in giving advice that directly contradicted a fundamental constitutional policy, showed disrespect for the Constitution and gross ignorance of basic law. Worse, he prepared spurious documents that he knew were void and illegal. He advised the complainant that a foreigner could legally and validly acquire real estate in the Philippines and assuring complainant that the property was alienable. In this, respondent committed a serious breach of his oath as a lawyer and is also guilty of culpable violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the code of ethics of the legal profession. Thus the Court ordered that Atty. Mas be disbarred from further practicing legal profession and for him to return to complainant Keld Stemmerik the total amount of P4.2 million with interest.

14. A.C. No. 8010

June 16, 2009

KELD STEMMERIK, represented by ATTYS. HERMINIO A. LIWANAG and WINSTON P.L. ESGUERRA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. LEONUEL N. MAS, Respondent. Complainant Stemmerik was interested in acquiring real property in the Philippines. He consulted respondent who advised him that he could legally acquire and own real property in the Philippines. Respondent even suggested a property in Subic, Zambales with the assurance that the property was alienable. Trusting respondent, complainant purchased the property through him as his attorney-in-fact. Complainant also engaged his services for the preparation of the necessary documents. For this purpose, respondent demanded and received a P400,000 fee. Complainant left for Denmark and entrusted the processing of the necessary paperwork to respondent. However, instead of having the property registered in complainants name, it was registered and conveyed in the name of a certain Alvin Gonzales. When he further inquired as to the status of the property he supposedly bought, he was devastated to learn that aliens could not own land under Philippine laws. Moreover, upon verification, it was revealed that the property was inalienable as it was situated within the former US Military Reservation. Complainant filed a complaint for disbarment for gravely misrepresenting that a foreigner could legally acquire land in the

15. A.C. No. 7433 December 23, 2009 [Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1554] CESAR TALENTO and MODESTA HERRERA TALENTO, Petitioners, vs. ATTY. AGUSTIN F. PANEDA, Respondent. This case was initiated by petitioners with the filing of a Complaint1 before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) alleging that they secured the services of Atty. Agustin Paneda to help and defend them in a case for Quieting of Title filed against them. They paid the attorneys fees respondent required from them in order that they could avail of his services as counsel. However, much more to complainants surprise and predicament, after filing their answer to the complaint, respondent never made any appearance for and on their behalf. He also failed to submit pre-trial brief and to appear despite Courts order and notice to him. As a result thereof, petitioners were declared in default because of the failure of their counsel to file and submit pre-trial brief and lost the case. Atty. Paneda filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was dismissed. Atty. Paneda told petitioners that he will appeal the case to the Court of Appeals. He filed a notice of appeal, paid the required fees and even required petitioners to shell out more money for the preparation of the Appeal brief. Petitioners waited for so long for the

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decision of the Court of Appeals only to find out later that the appeal was dismissed due to lack of an appeal brief. before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD). Complainant averred that she gave her full trust and confidence to respondent, but the latter failed miserably in his duty as a lawyer and advocate. She also claimed that respondents failure to file the required position paper and memorandum on appeal constituted gross incompetence and gross negligence, which caused grave injury to complainant.9 Lastly, complainant alleged that not only did respondent fail to file the required pleadings, he also was remiss in informing her of the status of the case. Issue: Whether or not the respondent failed to exert his best effort and ability in the prosecution or defense of his clients cause.

Issue: Whether or not respondent committed gross negligence or misconduct in handling petitioners case both on trial in the RTC and on appeal in the CA which led to its dismissal without affording petitioners the opportunity to present their evidence. Ruling: Respondents documented acts evidence that his efforts fall extremely short of the standard of professional duty that all lawyers are required to faithfully adhere to. There is no doubt that respondent was remiss in his duty to display utmost diligence and competence in protecting the interests of his clients. The petitioners lost to the civil case as a result of their being declared in default in the said case as a consequence of respondents failure to appear at the pre-trial conference. It is beyond dispute that respondent is duty-bound by his oath as a lawyer to diligently prosecute the case of his clients to the best of his ability within the bounds of law. Regrettably, the facts of this case illustrate respondents dismal performance of that responsibility, which in its totality could amount to a reprehensible abandonment of his clients cause. Hence, the Court found respondent Atty. Agustin F. Paneda guilty of violating Canons 17 and 18 as well as Rules 18.02 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he was suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year.

Ruling: Respondents failure to file the required pleadings and to inform his client about the developments in her case fall below the standard exacted upon lawyers on dedication and commitment to their clients cause. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its importance, and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. It must be recalled that the MeTC (in the ejectment case) required the parties to submit their respective position papers. However, respondent did not bother to do so, in total disregard of the court order. In addition, respondent failed to file the memorandum on appeal this time with the RTC where complainants appeal was then pending. Therefore, dismissing said case on that ground alone. Further, respondents failure to file the required pleadings is per se a violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent also lacked candor in dealing with his client, as he omitted to apprise complainant of the status of her ejectment case. It should be stressed that the lawyer-client relationship is one of trust and confidence. Thus, there is a need for the client to be adequately and fully informed about the developments in his case. Atty. Tansinsin was suspended from the practice of law for three (3) months.

16. A.C. No. 8252

July 21, 2009

NATIVIDAD UY, Complainant, vs. ATTY. BRAULIO RG TANSINSIN, Respondent. Complainant engaged the services of respondent to defend him in an ejectment case wherein he was the defendant. Respondent was able to file on time an Answer to the complaint, however, when required to file a Position Paper, he failed to file one for and on behalf of the complainant. Eventually, a decision was rendered by the MeTC against the complainant. The case was elevated to the Regional Trial Court but the same was dismissed solely because of the failure of respondent to file a memorandum on appeal. Motion for reconsideration was likewise denied for having been filed out of time. Realizing that she lost her case because of the negligence of her counsel, complainant initiated the disbarment case against respondent,

17. A.C. No. 7813

April 21, 2009

CARLITO P. CARANDANG, Complainant, vs. ATTY. GILBERT S. OBMINA, Respondent. This is a complaint filed by Carlito P. Carandang against Atty. Gilbert S. Obmina. Atty. Obmina was counsel for Carandang in an Ejectment case he filed. Carandang brought suit for Atty. Obminas failure to inform Carandang of the adverse decision in said case and for failure to appeal the decision. The Commission on Bar Discipline, issued an Order

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directing respondent Atty. Gilbert S. Obmina to submit his Answer. However, what the Commission received was a Manifestation by a certain Atty. Ma. Carmencita C. Obmina-Muaa, allegedly daughter of respondent. She further alleged that her father is already a permanent resident of the United States of America since March 2001 and had already retired from the practice of law. On the scheduled Mandatory Conference, Commission directed Atty. Muaa to produce and present before the Court the alleged withdrawal of appearance filed by her father and proof that her father is now really a permanent resident of the United States of America. Issue: Whether or not Atty. Obmina is liable for failure serve his client with competence and diligence as pursuant to Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Ethics and to inform his client as to the stus of his case pursuant to Rule 18.03 of Canon 18. Ruling: There is nothing on record that will show that Atty. Obmina notified complainant in any manner about the decision. Blame should not be attributed solely to the respondent because it was observed that complainant is partly to blame for his loss for failure to maintain contact with Atty. Obmina. The Supreme Court held that "clients should maintain contact with their counsel from time to time and inform themselves of the progress of their case, thereby exercising that standard of care which an ordinary prudent man bestows upon his business (Leonardo vs. S.T. Best, Inc.,). Nonetheless, the Court underscored the duty of respondent to notify his client as to what happened to his case. However, the respondent who has in his possession the complete files and address of the complainant, should have exerted more efforts to notify Mr. Carandang as to what happened to his case. Whether the decision is adverse to or in favor of his client, respondent is duty bound to notify the clients pursuant to Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Ethics. That as a result of the respondents failure to notify the complainant, the latter lost the case leading to his eviction. The Court ordered that Atty. Gilbert S. Obmina be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year. Although the said respondent is reportedly in the United States of America and accordingly retired from the practice of law, the Commission resolved not to close its eyes on the negligence that respondent has committed while in the active practice. Defendants were rendered to be in default and subsequently a Decision in favor of complainant was made ordering defendants to vacate the leased premises and pay for compensatory damages.MTCC thereafter granted the Motion for Execution of Judgment filed by the complainant and issued a Writ of Execution on Feb. 18 2002.

Subsequently, respondent Atty. Goering G.C. Paderanga filed an Affidavit of Third-Party Claim over Lot No. 3653-D-1 and FUSO vehicle, which he bought from the defendants in 2001, both of which could be erroneously levied by the writ of execution.

Because of the delay in issuing the writ, herein complainant in June 3, 2002, filed with the OBC a complaint against Paderanga for deliberately falsifying documents causing delay and a possible denial of justice to be served in the Civil Case.

In respondent's comment on the administrative complaint, he argued that he did not falsify the document and that the genuiness and the due execution of the DOS was not affected by the fact that he failed to register them. He also alleged that the MTCC have no jurisdiction over the case for being based on spurious claims.

ISSUE: is Atty. Paderanga guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct?

HELD: The Court ruled that Atty. Paderanga is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct. Article 1491 of the Civil Code. It specifically states that justices, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigations or levied upon execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions cannot acquire the property subject of litigation. Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyers oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority. In the present case, the Court finds respondent administratively liable for engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct.

18. HEGNA vs. PADERANGA

This case stems out of a civil case for forcible entry filed by herein complainant to Eliseo Panaguinip in MTCC Branch 8 in Cebu City.

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Had respondent been the rightful owner of a parcel of land and motor vehicle that were still registered in the name of defendants-spouses, he should have immediately disclosed such fact immediately during the time when respondent and Panaguinip had engaged in previous meetings and filed a third- party claim, Respondent violated the Lawyers Oath, which mandates that he should support the Constitution, obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein, and do no falsehood or not consent to the doing of any in court. Further, he has also failed to live up to the standard set by law that he should refrain from counseling or abetting activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain. Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment A lawyers best advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct.27 For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards. This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the legal profession.

20. WILLIAMS vs. ENRIQUEZ

19. LINSANGAN vs. TOLENTINO

Facts: A complaint for disbarment was filed by Pedro Linsangan against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional services. According to the complainant, that respondent with the help of his paralegal Fe Labiano, convinced his clients to transfer to Tolentino and promised them financial assistance and expeditious collection on their claims. Tolentino persistently called and sent Linsangans clients. A calling card of Tolentino visibly states that his law office rendered financial assistance to his clients specializing in maritime cases for seafarers.

Spouses Williams are the defendants in a Civil Case where the plaintiff's counsel is herein respondent. According to Marissa Williams bought the lot subject of the controversy. in the Transfer Certificate of Title, it was stated that she is a Filipino married to DAvid Williams. Respondent Enriquez then filed a criminal case for falsification of public document. According to Enriquez, citing a stale law, Marisa automatically lost her Filipino citizenship when she married an American, and thus is prohibited to own a land in the Philippines, thereby making her guilty of falsification. he quoted a more outdated law when he said that the "act of marrying" her husband is equivalent to renouncing ehr citizenship.

Thus, herein complainants filed for disbarment of Atty. Enriquez

ISSUE: Did Atty. Tolentino encroached the professional practice of complainant?

Issue: Is Atty. Enriquez guilty for unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful acts in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics, and with conduct unbecoming an attorney.?

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that Atty. Tolentino had encroached complanants professional practice and constituted violations of ethical rules. , lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares.To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade the profession in the publics estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that high character of service to which every member of the bar is called. Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides that a lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.

HELD: Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires that a lawyer be updated in the latest laws and jurisprudence.10 Indeed, when the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.11 As a retired judge, respondent should have known that it is his duty to keep himself wellinformed of the latest rulings of the Court on the issues and legal problems confronting a client.12 In this case, the law he apparently

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misconstrued is no less than the Constitution,13 the most basic law of the land.14 Implicit in a lawyers mandate to protect a clients interest to the best of his/her ability and with utmost diligence is the duty to keep abreast of the law and legal developments, and participate in continuing legal education programs.15 Thus, in championing the interest of clients and defending cases, a lawyer must not only be guided by the strict standards imposed by the lawyers oath, but should likewise espouse legally sound arguments for clients, lest the latters cause be dismissed on a technical ground.16 Ignorance encompasses both substantive and procedural laws. For gross ignorance of the law, Atty. Rudy T. Enriquez is REPRIMANDED and ADVISED to carefully study the opinions he may give to his clients. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a similar act shall be dealt with more severely. CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the integrated bar. Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. The fact that there is no attorney-client relationship in this case and the transactions entered into by respondent were done in his private capacity cannot shield respondent, as a lawyer, from liability. A lawyer may be disciplined for acts committed even in his private capacity for acts which tend to bring reproach on the legal profession or to injure it in the favorable opinion of the public.28 Indeed, there is no distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in a lawyer's private life or in his professional capacity, for a lawyer may not divide his personality as an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another.29 In this case, evidence abounds that respondent has failed to live up to the standards required of members of the legal profession.

21. MENDOZA vs. DICIEMBRE Complainant, a postal employee, is a creditor of respondent in the amount of P 20,000 payable in 6 months at 20% interest, secured by 12 blank checks. Complainant although not faithfully paying her obligation, ,but made remittances in the amount of P12,910 in respondent's Metrobank account. Not satisfied with the remitted amount, respondent filled up two postal checks she issued in blank, in the amount of P50,000 each in which respondent claimed was for the P100,000 cash that complainant received in Nov. 15,1999. Complainant denied having borrowed the P100, 000 from respondent and claimed that respondent victimized other employees of Postal Office by filling up without authorization, blank checks issued to him as condition for loans. The case was referred to the IBP where it was initially found out in the Report dated Sept. 6, 2002, finding respondent guilty of dishonesty. The Supreme Court remanded the case and a second Report was made by Commissioner Funa stating among others, that respondent's allegations are mere fabrications for there were contradicting allegations. The loan alleged by respondent to have happened on November 15, 1999 never took place as it was respondent's modus operandi to demand a certain amount as "settlement" for the dropping of estafa complaints against his borrowers. The IBP in its Resolution indefinitely suspended Diciembre from practice of law.

22. SANTOS-TAN vs. ROBISO

FACTS: Complainant charged respondent with malpractice for grossly neglecting his duties and responsibilities as counsel for complainant and for issuing a bouncing chec for P85,000.

ISSUE: Is the indefinite suspension against Diciembre proper?

HELD: The Court ruled that Diciembre should not indefinitely suspended but instead be disbarred from the practice of law and his name be stricken out from the Roll of Attorneys. Respondent is guilty of gross misconduct and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Complainant engaged the legal services of respondent as her counsel for an intestate proceeding for her husband Eusebio Tan. She paid respondent P100,000 for acceptance fee. Several months passed and the case had no progress. not satisfied with respondent's services, she went to his office and demananded the return of the professional fees for there was no professional service rendered. Respondent then gave her a check amounting to P85,000. When she deposited the same, it was dishonored for insufficiency of funds. Complaianant made several demands but was unheeded by the respondent and said that he only issued the same to stop complainant's "acerbic verbal abuse."

Respondent alleged that he had been personally following-up the case but it was stagnant in the court for there was still no judge to preside. it was only later that respondent found out that the judged was suspended

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and not retired. he even made notes to record the dates of his visits in the court. years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.

ISSUE: (1) whether respondent was negligent in handling complainants case; and (2) whether respondent should be disciplined for issuing a bouncing check. ISSUE: Can Senator Santiago be suspended or disbarred for violating the Canons of Code of Professional Responsibility?

HELD: The Court affirmed the findings of the IBP, that respondent be suspended for one month with strong warning that a commission of a similar offense would be dealt with more severity in the future. He also recommended that respondent be ordered to reimburse complainant the amount of <span>P</span>70,000.00, <span>P</span>30,000.00 of which corresponds to the services rendered by him on a quantum meruit. He did not find respondent to be grossly negligent in the performance of his duties as there was nothing more respondent could do in accelerating the resolution of the motions which were already submitted for resolution. The filing of additional pleadings or papers with the court would not be necessary. During the time the motion for reconsideration was pending the regular presiding judge of the court was under suspension and the acting presiding judge who issued the resolution considering the motion as submitted for resolution was not disposed to act on said motion but instead opted to wait for the regular presiding judge to act on it. However, the hearing officer recommended that respondent be made liable for issuing the bouncing check. Whatever was respondents reason for issuing the check, the fact remains that the same was dishonored by the bank for having been drawn against insufficient funds. If respondents purpose was just to appease complainant to make her leave his office and he firmly believed that he had no obligation to return the <span>P</span>100,000.00, then he could have issued a stop-payment order to the bank before the encashment of the check, the hearing officer added.

HELD: To the Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct. It is at once apparent that her statements in question were intemperate and highly improper in substance. The lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily show that her statements were expressions of personal anger and frustration at not being considered for the post of Chief Justice. In a sense, therefore, her remarks were outside the pale of her official parliamentary functions. The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on Senator/Atty. Santiago. The factual and legal circumstances of this case, however, deter the Court from doing so, even without any sign of remorse from her. The Rules of the Senate enjoins a Senator from using offensive or improper language against another Senator or against any public institution. But as to Senator Santiagos unparliamentary remarks, the Senate President had not apparently called her to order, let alone referred the matter to the Senate Ethics Committee for appropriate disciplinary action. The lady senator clearly violated the rules of her own chamber but it is unfortunate that her peers bent backwards and avoided imposing their own rules on her. 25. ERLINDA I. BILDNER vs. ATTY. MANUEL R. SINGSON G.R. No. 157384 June 5, 2009 Velasco Jr., J.: Facts: In a case presided by Judge Antonio Reyes, Atty. Singson attempted to influence the outcome of the case as can be inferred from his acts evidenced by the following documents, to wit: 1. the transcript of the stenographic notes of the May 31, 2000 hearing in the sala of Judge Reyes when the judge made it of record that respondent offered Atty. Oscar Sevilla P500,000 to be given to Judge Reyes for a favorable decision; 2. the affidavit of Judge Reyes alleged that respondent, as soon as the case started, visited him about three times in his office, and made more than a dozen calls to his Manila and Baguio residences, some of which were even made late evenings; 3. the affidavit of Atty. Sevilla confirmed that he was approached by the respondent to convince the judge, his close family friend, to rule in Atty. Singsons favor. Issue:

23. POBRE vs. SANTIAGO

FACTS: a letter complaint was filed by Antero J. Pobre regarding the offensive speech against the Supreme Court and its members made by Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago on the Senate floor. Santiago does not deny making the offensive statements; however, she explained that those statements were covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity. The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution, which provides: "A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six

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Whether or not Atty. Singson should be administratively discipline or disbarred from the practice of law for the alleged misconduct in attempting to bribe Judge Antonio Reyes Held: Yes, Atty. Singson should be suspended from practice of law for one year. The fact that he did talk on different occasions to Judge Reyes, initially through a mutual friend, Atty. Sevilla, leads to the conclusion that Atty. Singson was indeed trying to influence the judge to rule in his clients favor. This conduct is not acceptable in the legal profession. Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence or gives the appearance of influencing the court. 3. accountable for the activities in his office as well as the acts of his personnel including his wife, who acts as his secretary. No. Sec. 2, (b), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document (1) is not in the notarys presence personally at the time of the notarization; and (2) is not personally known to the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.

27. CONRADO QUE vs. ATTY. ANASTACIO REVILLA, JR. A.C. No. 7054, December 4, 2009 Per Curiam Facts:

26. Judge Laquindanum vs. Atty. Quintana A.C. No. 7036, June 29, 2009 Puno, CJ. Facts: Judge Laquindanum sent a letter to the Supreme Court requesting that proper disciplinary action be imposed to Atty. Nestor Quintana for the following acts: 1. Notarizing documents outside of the area of his commission as notary public; 2. Allowing his wife to notarize documents in his absence; 3. Notarizing a document where one of the signatories therein was already dead at that time. Issues: 1. 2. 3. Whether or not a lawyer of good standing has the right to practice his profession including notarial acts in the entire Philippines, as so claimed by the respondent Whether or not Atty. Quintana can transfer the blame to his wife for the latters unauthorized practice of notarial acts Whether or not a notary public can notarize documents where one of the signatories therein was already dead at that time

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Committee on Bar Discipline (IBP Committee on Bar Discipline or CBD) recommended the 1 year suspension from practice of law of Atty. Revilla after it found him guilty of the following violations: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Abuse of court procedures and processes Filing of multiple actions and forum shopping Willful, intentional and deliberate falsehood before the courts Maligning the name of his fellow lawyers Unauthorized appearances

Prior to these findings, he was previously suspended from practice of law for 6 months for other ethical infractions. Issue: Whether the respondent can be held liable for the imputed unethical infractions and professional misconduct, and the penalty these transgressions should carry. Held: Given the respondents multiple violations, his past record as previously discussed, and the nature of these violations which shows the readiness to disregard court rules and to gloss over concerns for the orderly administration of justice, the Court orders to disbar the respondent to keep him away from the law profession and from any significant role in the administration of justice which he has disgraced. He is a continuing risk, too, to the public that the legal profession serves. Not even his ardor and overzealousness in defending the interests of his client can save him. Additionally, disbarment is merited because this is not the respondents first ethical infraction of the same nature.

Held: 1. No. While it is true that lawyers in good standing are allowed to engage in the practice of law in the Philippines, however, not every lawyer even in good standing can perform notarial functions without having been commissioned as notary public. He must have submitted himself to the commissioning court by filing his petition for issuance of his Notarial Practice. No. A notary public takes full responsibility for all the entries in his notarial register. Respondent cannot take refuge claiming that it was his wifes act and that he did not authorize his wife to notarize documents. He is personally

2.

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28. Rolando Pacana Jr. vs. Atty. Maricel Pascual-Lopez A.C. No. 8243 July 24, 2009 Per Curiam: Facts: Pacana, herein complainant, was the Operations Director for Multitel Communications Corporation. Distraught of the corporations obligation to its creditors, complainant sought the advice of respondent. From then on, the former disclosed all his involvement and interests in Multitel. Respondent, in turn gave legal advice to complainant. Both of them, however, did not forge a formal Retainer Agreement. Later on, complainant knew that respondent was representing the creditors of Multitel. Assuring the complainant that it was part of respondents strategy of settling all the legal problems of the former, both parties continued to work together. Respondent also asked money from complainant allegedly for safekeeping to be used only for his case whenever necessary. Complainant agreed and gave her substantial amount of money. Soon after, complainant dismayed with respondents arrogance and evasiveness filed a disbarment case against respondent before the IBP. Issues: 1. 2. Held: 1. A lawyer-client relationship was present. The absence of a written contract will not preclude the finding that there was a professional relationship between the parties. Documentary formalism is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession. Yes, respondent should be disbarred. There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. Indubitably, respondent took advantage of complainants hapless situation, initially, by giving him legal advice and, later on, by soliciting money and properties from him. Simultaneously, she was also doing the same thing to impress upon her clients, the party claimants against Multitel that she was doing everything to reclaim the money they invested with Multitel. Whether or not a lawyer-client relationship binds the herein complainant and respondent Whether or not respondent should be disciplined for representing conflicting interest Petitioner Rolanda Saa filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Freddie A. Venida on December 27, 1991. In a resolution dated February 17, 1992, Atty. Venida was required to comment on the complaint against him. He belatedly and partially complied with the said order. Consequently, the Court issued the June 14, 1995 resolution requiring Atty. Venida to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failure to comply with the February 17, 1992 resolution. Finally, Atty. Venida filed his full comment on September 4, 1995 which, without doubt, was a mere reiteration of his partial comment. Atty. Venida also added that he was merely performing his duty as counsel of Saas adversaries Issue: Whether or not Atty. Venida should be sanctioned for his unreasonable delay in complying with the orders of the court. Held: Yes, he should be suspended from practice of law for one year. Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar. As a lawyer, he had the responsibility to follow legal orders and processes. Yet, he disregarded this very important canon of legal ethics when he filed only a partial comment on January 26, 1993 or 11 months after being directed to do so in the February 17, 1992 resolution. Worse, he filed his complete comment only on June 14, 1995 or a little over three years after due date. 30. JOSE C. SABERON vs. ATTY. FERNANDO T. LARONG A.C. No. 6567 April 16, 2008 Carpio-Morales, J. Facts: Complainant filed before the BSP a Petition against Surigaonon Rural Banking Corporation and Alfredo Tan Bonpin, major stockholders of the bank, for cancellation of the bank's registration and franchise. Respondent, in-house counsel and acting corporate secretary of the bank, filed an Answer with Affirmative Defenses to the Petition stating, inter alia, 5. That this is another in the series of blackmail suits filed by plaintiff and his wife to coerce the Bank and Mr. Bonpin for financial gain. Issue: 1. Whether or not the respondent is guilty of Simple Misconduct for using the word blackmail to describe the suit filed by the complainant

2.

29. ROLANDO SAA VS. ATTY. FREDDIE A. VINEDA, ET AL. G.R. No. 132826 September 3, 2009 Corona, J.: Facts:

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LEGAL PROFESSION
Held: Yes. While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer's language even in his pleadings must be dignified The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates: Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper. Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.

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