“Hold At All Cost”

24 hours on the Golan Front during the October War of 1973

by Major Michael D. Wickman

At 1400 hours on 6 October First, topography afforded the

1973, Syrian and Egyptian Israelis well thought-out supe-
forces surged across their rior defensive positions. Sec-
borders with Israel. The mas- ond, Syrian devotion to the
sive surprise attack found prevailing Soviet operational
Israel outnumbered in vehi- level doctrine limited available
cles, equipment, and person- openings for the massive as-
nel, in some instances, by 50 saults prescribed by that doc-
to 1. Israel’s vaunted air force trine. An anti-tank barrier was
was held at bay by a wall of constructed to limit a Syrian
surface to air missiles and armored attack over the 1967
anti-aircraft guns, and Israeli cease fire or Purple Line. The
armored columns were made purpose of the barrier was to
vulnerable by the Syrians’ ex- delay the Syrians sufficiently
cellent use of anti-tank mis- until reserve forces could be
siles. During the first days of committed to reinforce units on
the battle, it appeared that Some Israeli tankers fought in M51 modified Shermans. the line. Time was the primary
Israel’s defenses would be issue for both the Israelis and
overrun, but due to the heroic the Syrians. The IDF needed
efforts of Israeli soldiers, the Israeli dan on Israeli soil in preparation for a time to deploy reserves before a Syrian
Defense Force (IDF) was able to turn further breakthrough into Galilee. Ma- breakthrough or, “if politically possi-
apparent defeat into a sudden rout of jor-General Yitzhak Hofi, head of Is- ble, to mount spoiling attack” as a pre-
the armies of Syria and Egypt. No- rael’s Northern Command, had been emptive measure. The Syrians needed
where was the situation more critical concerned for some time over the to quickly penetrate the IDF defenses
than on the Golan Heights. growing concentration of Syrian ar- and reach the edge of the plateau over-
mored forces. He had expressed his looking the bridges of the River Jordan
The purpose of this article is to focus concerns to Minister of Defense Moshe before the arrival of IDF reserve forces.
on the bravery and achievements of a Dayan, who authorized units of the 7th This would force the IDF to move their
few soldiers fighting on the Golan Armored Brigade, which were being
Heights and their effect on the outcome reserves across choke points and up
held in General Headquarters Reserve steep narrow winding roads, making a
of the Yom Kippur War. Of particular in the southern part of Israel, to move successful counterattack nearly impos-
note are the actions of one Israeli armor up to the Golan Heights. This move
officer, Lieutenant Zvika Greengold. sible.
increased the number of Israeli tanks on
The primary objective of Syrian the Golan Heights from an initial num- The Israeli forces defending the Golan
ber of some 60 to 170. Heights were composed of two Israeli
forces was the recapture of the 480 armored brigades, the 7th in the north-
square miles of the Golan Heights lost The Syrian forces arrayed along the
to the IDF during the 1967 Six Day ern sector and 188th (Barak) Brigade in
Golan Heights consisted of the 7th In- the southern sector, consisting of ap-
War. Syria planned to mount a major fantry Division, the 9th Infantry Divi- proximately 170 tanks and some 60
breakthrough attempt in the north with sion, and the 5th Infantry Division.
the 7th Infantry Division, supported by artillery pieces. Israeli armored forces
Each was organized along Soviet lines, were composed of British Centurions
elements of the 3rd Armored Division. with an armored brigade totaling some and M51 Shermans.
The main thrust, however, was to be 130-200 tanks per division. Behind
farther south in the vicinity of Rafid. these first echelon divisions were con- The massive Syrian air and artillery
This attack was to be carried out by the centrated the 1st and 3rd Armored Di- strike against Israeli positions on the
5th Infantry Division, the 9th Infantry visions, each with approximately 250 Golan Heights achieved tactical sur-
Division, the 1st Armored Division, tanks, along with several independent prise. The Syrian 7th, 9th, and 5th In-
and elements of the 3rd Armored Divi- brigades. The total Syrian force facing fantry Divisions attacked across the
sion, all concentrated against Israel’s Israel numbered approximately 1,500 Purple Line, while in the north, the
188th Brigade, which could field only Russian T-54/55 and T-62 tanks sup- Israeli 7th Armored Brigade repulsed
around 60 tanks. The Syrian plan called ported by 1,000 artillery pieces, includ- the Syrian 7th Infantry Division. The
for the occupation of the whole of the ing heavy mortars. Syrian 3rd Armored Division, commit-
Golan Heights by the evening of Sun- ted to pass through Israeli’s 7th Infan-
day, 7 October, followed by a reorgani- The IDF’s plan for defending the Go- try Division, also suffered heavily and
zation in the area along the River Jor- lan Heights was based on two points. gained little ground. In the south, the

32 ARMOR — March-April 2001

 LEBANON

Golan Heights

on
rm
Syrian 5th and 9th Infantry Divisions,

He
taking advantage of the less restrictive

t.
M
terrain, broke through the defenses of
the Barak Brigade. In two days of fight- 104 SYRIA
ing, the Barak Brigade was virtually Mas’ada
105
destroyed, and the command post at
Nafakh surrounded. The Syrian 9th
Infantry Division “had split the Israeli 106
defensive forces, and now threatened
107
the command center at Nafakh.”1 The
remnants of the Barak Brigade were
108
barely hanging on and were in desper-
ate need of reinforcements. The col- Kunietra
lapse of the northern sector could have Jordan River
forced the IDF to fall back to the Jor- 109
dan River and therefore changed the 110
outcome of the war. The original plan Nafakh
of reinforcing with reserve brigades “Purple Line”

Ta
Sindiana
was falling apart. “As Israeli reserves (1967 Cease Fire)
arrived on the shore of Lake Tiberius pli
ne Hushniya Kudne
and the west bank of the River Jordan, Ro
111
they were immediately sent forward in ad
113
small groups into battle.”2
Rafid
“At this time, something just short of
a miracle was underway at Nafakh. 114
115
Frantically trying to reach the Golan by Juhader
any means possible was [Lieutenant]
Tzvi ‘Zvika’ Greengold, who had been ISRAEL 116
on a fortnight’s leave.”3 Lieutenant
Greengold had been safely at home,
near Haifa, only seven hours earlier. He
had just been released from service 117
with the Barak Brigade and was on
leave for two weeks prior to attending a
company commander’s course. He was
Sea of
Galilee El Al .
one of the first soldiers to make his
own way back to the battlefield.
At the Nafakh headquarters of the Ba- Yarmuk River
rak Brigade, the commander, Colonel
Ben-Shoham, was analyzing spot re- JORDAN
ports coming in from his battalion
commanders on the size of the Syrian
attack. While he was deciding his next By that time, Colonel Ben-Shoham Along the southern flank, where the
moves, he was approached by Lieuten- was greatly concerned by the Syrian battle was then heaviest, the fight was
ant Greengold, who arrived to find advances in the southern sector, where more difficult. Israeli tanks fought
Nafakh in chaos. Greengold, having no the 51st Tank Brigade had broken through and relieved Bunker 114 and
troops nor tanks to command, assisted through and was bypassing the Israeli Bunker 115, but Bunker 116 was com-
with the removal of the dead and fortifications in the vicinity of the pletely surrounded.
wounded from disabled vehicles. He Hushniya-Tapline crossroads. Savage
soon learned that four tanks, three of Unable to get out, the Israelis sat tight
nighttime firefights were taking place in their defenses and called for artillery
which had been battle-damaged, were across the southern Golan Heights, and
about to arrive. Zvika requested and Israeli troops were cut off in their front- support. The only available artillery
received command of the four tanks. was a single battery of 155mm guns,
line fortifications. Transmissions to which was ordered to concentrate on
He was delighted. their headquarters at Nafakh finally
produced authorization to withdraw, Bunker 116’s position. The fire mission
Lieutenant Greengold was ordered to was extremely effective and provided
take the four tanks and move towards but this was easier said than done, with temporary relief to the troops inside.
the Tapline Route, a major Syrian ave- Syrian forces to their rear. At Kudne, a
nue of approach. Lieutenant Greengold relieving tank force broke through to Because of the penetration in his sec-
and his four tanks were to be known on Bunker 111, despite strong Syrian tor along the Tapline Road, Colonel
the brigade communications network as forces in the immediate vicinity, and Ben-Shoham attempted to move the
Force Tzvika.4 succeeded in evacuating all the men. forward headquarters (one tank and one

ARMOR — March-April 2001 33

halftrack) of his brigade from Nafakh from the Centurion’s 105mm gun left back to the Nafakh headquarters by the
to Juhader, where he believed he could the enemy tanks blazing brightly, and Tapline Road, they had better cut
better control the battle. He moved the illumination of the area from the across country. Colonel Ben-Shoham
carefully along in the dark, avoiding fire greatly aided Zvika’s movement. directed his tank and the headquarters’
Syrian formations, and his staff was re- “The intruders belonged to the 51st half-track to head west toward the ridge
lieved to reach Juhader. By then, they Independent Tank Brigade, and they of the Golan Heights near Ramat Mag-
were under constant heavy shelling, were feeling their way into the Israeli shimim. At approximately 0200 on
due to poor IDF communications disci- rear, seeking to exploit the break- October 7, they reached the Gamla Rise
pline and successful Syrian SIGINT through. Apparently they had turned on overlooking the Sea of Galilee, a pri-
operations. The Syrians obtained radio their sidelights to see better, to gain mary objective of the Syrian forces.
fixes every time a communications speed.”7 They were dismayed to observe new
officer tried to contact his subordinate Zvika shifted into a new position and Syrian T-62 tanks not far away along
commanders. the escarpment, and in full view of
within minutes destroyed three more Galilee. At that rate, Syrian forces
In the meantime, TF Zvika, which had T55s. Zvika realized that the Tapline
left Nafakh several hours before, was Road was a major avenue of approach, would soon cross into Israel proper.
The Israeli tank and its accompanying
moving cautiously along the Tapline that he was frequently outnumbered half-track continued to move along in
Route. Zvika had been intent on joining and he was facing tanks with superior
Colonel Ben-Shoham, but instead had night fighting capabilities.8 Zvika chose dim moonlight, keeping among the
boulders on the slopes to screen them-
run into a Syrian tank company. Zvika to hold in his current position, take selves from the large Syrian force mov-
promptly sent a contact report to Colo- advantage of the defensible terrain, and
nel Ben-Shoham and first engaged the wait for Syrian forces. Thirty minutes ing parallel to their position. Colonel
Ben-Shoham tried to determine the
enemy at 2100 hours on 6 October. passed until they were alerted by the status of his brigade, and feared that
Zvika took advantage of the terrain and sound of heavy engines. A long column
limited visibility, moving his force into of T-55s appeared out of the darkness, very little remained. Meanwhile back in
Nafakh, a reserve battalion commander
hull-down positions and letting the en- followed by a procession of trucks. “It named Lieutenant Colonel Uzi More
emy come to him. Zvika’s force waited was as if the main body of Major Is-
only a short time until one of his tank mail’s 452nd Tank Battalion was on received permission from the CinC of
Northern Command to leave the base
commanders reported contact with an parade, so perfectly aligned and spaced and take command of the tanks along
approaching Syrian column consisting was the column.
mostly of T-55s. Zvika peered into the the Tapline Route. He was to fight a
Zvika waited until the lead tank was delaying action along the Tapline
gloom and saw them by the dim glow only twenty meters from where he was Route to slow the Syrian advance to-
of their “formation lamps and infra-red
‘cats eyes’.”5 hunkered down. The first shot stopped wards Nafakh Camp. This force in-
the first target and stalled the entire cluded Zvika’s small group and two
“At about 2120 hours, Zvika spotted a column”9 Zvika was up against terrible reserve tank platoons of the Northern
solitary Syrian tank on the road about odds, but he had the enemy fixed and Command Reserve, which were the
four kilometers outside Nafakh and was in position to destroy the entire only reserves available in the southern
only ten meters from his own Centu- column. Zvika withdrew into the dark- sector. Lieutenant Colonel More re-
rion. Zvika tapped his gunner, and the ness, taking advantage of the scrub and ceived the order from Colonel Ben-
Syrian burst into flames. Fearful of rocky outcrops, only to appear and fire Shoham to mount a counterattack, and
being seen or set ablaze in the horren- before disappearing again. He kept this proceeded southwards along the Ta-
dous flash of burning fuel and muni- uneven match going for over an hour. pline Route, while Tzvika and a pla-
tions, Zvika ordered his driver to back The Syrians’ sole warning was a crash toon of tanks drove parallel along the
up fast. He then found that he had no and a long jet of white flame shooting road’s wire fences.
way of communicating with the other through the night to destroy another of Almost immediately, the first tank in
tank or of even speaking with his own their vehicles. The Syrians were ex-
crew. The shock of the explosion of the tremely bewildered by the single shots Zvika’s column was set ablaze by a
rocket-propelled grenade. Zvika saw
Syrian tank had jolted out the radio and that kept hitting their tanks from all Syrian tanks equipped with searchlights
intercom circuits. Zvika jumped down along the roadway. Frustrated, several
to the roadway and stalked over to the Syrian tankers switched on searchlights blocking the road ahead, and Zvika
ordered one of the remaining tanks
other Centurion, ejecting its com- to try and locate what they thought was forward to rescue the crew of the burn-
mander and motioning him to climb a sizeable enemy force. The illumina-
aboard the defective tank. “Watch me,” tion gave Zvika and his gunner more ing Centurion. He positioned his own
tank to cover in the flank, and both
he cautioned the other man, “and do as clear targets to engage. Ten armored tanks were hit. Zvika’s gunner was
I do, if possible.”6 vehicles were either destroyed or dam-
aged before Major Ismail ordered the injured, while Zvika himself reeled
Zvika then continued to work his way from the shock of the blast and searing
south along the Tapline Road, the two remnants of his battalion to withdraw. pain. Zvika and his crew scrambled
What the Syrians believed was a siz-
tanks moving slowly forward, using the able force was actually the work of a from their blazing Centurion, falling to
terrain to mask their movement. Zvika the ground in flames and screaming as
soon realized that he was alone, the single tank crew.10 flames seared their faces and hands.
other tank having lost its position in the Several miles further along the Ta- Zvika’s shirt and trousers were burning,
dark. Moving over the crest of a hill, pline Road at Nafakh, Colonel Ben- but he rolled into a ditch and somehow
Zvika was confronted by three Syrian Shoham realized he was surrounded. smothered the flames. He was fearful
tanks moving towards them with their His brigade intelligence officer sug- that at any moment his tank, still carry-
driving lights on. Three rapid shots gested that as it was impossible to get ing fuel and ammunition, would blow

34 ARMOR — March-April 2001

 “Colonel Ben-Shoham realized all that remained
of his brigade were a handful of tanks fighting for
their lives along the Tapline Route.”

up. Not realizing the extent of his the 3rd Armored Division, and a bri- from the Syrian 1st Armored Division
wounds, he ran towards another tank, gade of Moroccan troops. Fighting as the 91st Armored Brigade. Major
shouted garbled instructions, and took from prepared positions, the Centurion- Lenschner, Deputy Commander of an
command of the vehicle. He then acti- equipped 7th Armored Brigade held out independent Northern Command battal-
vated the communications system, an- against odds sometimes as high as 15 to ion, was commanding a hastily assem-
nouncing to all that TF Zvika was still 1. Under constant artillery and air at- bled force of initially 14 Centurions.
in existence.11 Even as Colonel Ben- tack, Colonel Ben Gal, the 7th Armored That was now down to two operable
Shoham’s relieved acknowledgment Brigade commander, calmly directed tanks. He reported sighting the T-62s of
faded on the radio, Zvika realized the his dwindling forces, maintaining a the 91st Armored Brigade and stated
extent of his wounds, and the terrible reserve which he moved from ambush that his position was untenable. Colonel
burns on his face and hands began to to blocking position to battle position Ben-Shoham urged the young major to
throb and blister. Only Colonel Ben- during 72 hours of continuous fighting. hold at any cost. Major Lenschner and
Shoham’s calm but insistent voice his small force were not heard from
brought him back to reality. Moving The 7th Armored Brigade, although again. It was later determined that Ma-
down to a handful of operational tanks,
straight for him were two Syrian tanks, never gave up their primary positions.13 jor Lenschner perished when the war-
bearing down with their guns firing. head of a Sagger missile punched
Zvika fired and screamed for his driver In the southern sector, the crisis con- through the Centurion’s turret armor
to reverse. The tank shuddered as its tinued to develop. Sunrise on the 7th of and his force was overrun.15 Out-
tracks tore around on the bare rocks, October revealed that the Syrians had flanked, the brigade headquarters at
then raced backward into the inferno of achieved a major breakthrough in the Nafakh was now under attack. Ben-
the night, its crew still battling against southern sector of the Golan Heights. Shoham was ordered to return to
the heavy odds. The 132nd Mechanized Brigade and Nafakh for the base’s defense, and or-
47th Independent Tank Brigade of the dered his deputy Lieutenant-Colonel
The remainder of Colonel Ben-Sho-
ham’s counterattack force also made 5th Infantry Division had made a major Yisraeli to set out and cover his force.
penetration along the Rafid El-Al road.
contact with the mechanized infantry The Syrians exploited this penetration Unknown to Colonel Ben-Shoham,
that had been accompanying the tanks Zvika had met up with Colonel Yis-
that Zvika encountered. More’s tanks with the 43rd, 51st, and 91st Armored raeli’s force at dawn and fought in the
Brigade, a force of more than 500 tanks.
were hit and disabled, one at a time. battle that delayed the Syrian 51st Tank
When More saw a Syrian soldier aim Colonel Ben-Shoham identified the Brigade’s attack along the Tapline
an antitank rocket at his command tank, advancing second-echelon Syrian col- Route. Just when Zvika had thought
he grabbed hold of his free machine umns, and chose to regroup his forces they were gaining the upper hand, Yis-
gun and opened fire. However, his ma- and attempt to delay the Syrian penetra- raeli frantically ordered his force back
chine gun jammed and the Syrian tion. His tank and half-track sped back to Nafakh to escape the Syrians’ out-
grenadier let fly. More was thrown towards Nafakh, dodging tank and RPG flanking movement.
from his tank and lost an arm and an fire along the entire route. Colonel
eye in the blast. 12 Ben-Shoham realized all that remained Throughout the retreat, Colonel Ben-
Colonel Ben-Shoham reported up the of his brigade were a handful of tanks Shoham’s tank came under heavy Syr-
fighting for their lives along the Ta- ian artillery and tank fire. Both he and
chain of command the failure of his pline Route. He decided his best course Yisraeli succeeded in destroying more
counterattack and did his best to stabi-
lize the situation. With minimal re- of action would be to rally his meager than twenty Syrian tanks and vehicles.
forces and join his deputy, Colonel As the battle raged and Syrian tanks
sources he calmed the nerves of his Yisraeli, and the 679th Reserve Ar- approached to close range, Yisraeli’s
commanders, called for artillery sup-
port, and attempted to maintain situ- mored Brigade (now reaching the front gunner announced that the tank was out
in small numbers). of ammunition. Yisraeli ordered his
ational awareness of the battle that sur- driver to charge an oncoming T-62 with
rounded. In order to improve command “Every three tanks now reaching the
and control, Colonel Ben-Shoham re- front were assembled into make-shift machine guns blazing. Within mo-
ments, his tank in flames, Lieutenant-
quested the command of all forces in platoons, patched into the communica- Colonel Yisraeli was dead. Ben-Sho-
the southern Golan from the regional tions network and rushed towards Ben-
commander. It was apparent that the Shoham’s position. All in all, two com- ham, unaware of the fate of his deputy,
continued to issue orders. Standing
Syrians were swarming all over the panies were pieced together, and the upright in the turret, Ben-Shoham ob-
southern sector of the Golan Heights. newly formed units reached Nafakh
and re-established the Barak Brigade’s served the battle, firing at Syrian crew-
In the north, the Israeli 7th Armored men fleeing their burning vehicles. As
Brigade was defending positions in and headquarters.”14 he searched the hills for Syrian com-
around Booster Ridge against the Syr- At approximately 1145, Major Baruch mandos, a sudden 7.62mm volley killed
ian 7th Infantry Division, elements of Lenschner identified a lead element Colonel Ben-Shoham. Losing radio con-

ARMOR — March-April 2001 35

 Israeli Centurions move up on the Golan front.

2Edgar O’Ballance, No Victor No Vanquished:

tact with his commanders, Zvika left shock of exhaustion and could no long-
the roadway and approached Nafakh er react to orders after twenty hours of The Arab-Israeli War 1973 (Novato: Presidio
cross-country from the southeast with- continuous, nerve-twisting battle.”16 Press, 1978), p. 132.
out encountering Syrian forces, but just During the pandemonium, Zvika at- 3Samuel Katz, Israeli Tank Battles: Yom Kippur

missing a Syrian ambush. tached himself to the 679th Armored to Lebanon (London: Arms and Armour Press,
Brigade and with them forced the Syri- 1988), p. 18.
The 91st Armored Brigade continued
ans out of the ruined camp and back 4Ibid., p. 18.
its push towards Nafakh. Lieutenant- onto the Tapline Road. 5David
Colonel Menachem (Pinie) Cooper- Eshel, Chariots of the Desert: The Story
man, deputy commander of the Dis- The Syrian advance had been stopped of the Israeli Armoured Corps (New York:
trict (administrative) Brigade, organ- at Nafakh and the blackened, smoking Brassey’s Defence Publishers, 1989), p. 101.
ized Nafakh’s defenses and issued anti- wreckage of their tanks, personnel car- 6Asher and Hammel, p. 96.
tank weapons to soldiers manning the riers, and trucks lay everywhere, in the 7Ibid., p. 96.
perimeter. Standing at the southern pe- camp and on the dun-colored hills. 8Anthony
rimeter fence, he watched the advance “When the battle around Zvika ceased, Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner,
The Lessons of Modern War Volume I: The Arab-
of approximately two Syrian tank com- he found himself standing in the turret Israeli Conflicts, 1973-1989 (Boulder: Westview
panies, and ordered the advanced head- of his fifth or sixth Centurion, suddenly Press, 1990), p. 72.
quarters group to withdraw from unable to make a decision as to what to 9Asher
Nafakh. As this force left the base, hun- do next. The Barak Brigade intelligence and Hammel, p. 97.
10
dreds of Syrian shells rained down on officer — now the nominal brigade Ibid., p.97
the camp. Syrian tanks were now enter- commander — rushed up to greet the 11Samuel Katz, Israeli Tank Battles: Yom Kip-
ing Nafakh unhindered, firing point- lieutenant. As he fought an overwhelm- pur to Lebanon (London: Arms and Armour
blank at the base’s evacuated buildings, ing lethargy, Zvika painfully climbed Press, 1988), p. 20.
raking the Israeli defenders with coaxial from the turret and carefully dropped to 12Asher and Hammel, p. 105.
and turret-mounted machine guns. Lieu- the ground, where he leveled his eyes 13Peter
tenant-Colonel Cooperman grabbed the on the intelligence officer and apolo- Allen, The Yom Kippur War: The Poli-
division’s deputy intelligence and opera- getically murmured, ‘I can’t anymore.’ tics, Tactics and Individual Actions By Which
Israel Repelled the Arab Invasions of 1973 (New
tions officers, a bazooka and six shells, The intelligence officer said not a York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1982), p. 31.
and rushed to try and stop the Syrians word; he hugged Zvika close and led
14Katz, p. 21.
from taking Nafakh. him to the medical evacuation center.
There is no way to calculate the dam- 15Asher and Hammel, p. 137.
Suddenly, the 679th Reserve Armored age that that iron-willed redheaded 16Allen,
Brigade arrived to save the day. Firing youth inflicted upon the best plan with p. 91.
17Asher
at long range, the 679th managed to which Syria has ever entered a con- and Hammel, p. 146.
hold the Syrians and push them out of flict.”17 18 Katz, p. 25.
Nafakh. Yet Syrian tanks were still
inside the base, and Lieutenant Colonel To say that the actions of Lieutenant
Zvika Greengold directly affected the
Cooperman’s determined antitank unit, outcome of the Yom Kippur war would MAJ Michael D. Wickman, com-
now out of ammunition, was cornered missioned in Armor from OCS, has
by a T-62. As the T-62’s 115mm gun be an overstatement. But it goes with-
out saying that his actions greatly aided served as a mortar platoon leader
turned towards them, the tank went up the successful defense of the Golan
in a ball of flame. Approaching the in 2-37 Armor and a tank platoon
rescued officers was a battered tank Heights. leader in 1-37 Armor in Germany.
moving at a slow speed. It was Zvika! “For his incredible 24 hours on the He served as a tactical intelligence
Zvika had arrived at Nafakh camp just Golan, Lieutenant Greengold was officer in G2 TAC, 34th Infantry Di-
as the Syrians were breaking in, he had awarded the Ot Hagvura (Order of vision, and assistant J2, Task Force
joined forces with a reserve tank, and Bravery), the IDF’s medal for supreme Timberwolf, Guatemala. He served
with more enthusiasm than good sense valor.”18 as S2, S4, and tank company com-
his exhausted crew attacked the Syri- mander in 1-94 Armor. He is a
ans. “Zvika fired wildly at everything Notes
graduate of AOBC, AOAC, MIOTC,
in sight — at the hills and the fences 1Jerry Asher with Eric Hammel, Duel for the
and at the Syrian tanks that had already and CAS3. He is currently the XO
Golan: The 100 Hour Battle that Saved Israel
flattened the perimeter fence. The truth (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., of 1-94 AR. He can be reached at
was that his tank driver was in the 1987), p. 123. Mike.Wickman@mn.ngb.army.mil.

36 ARMOR — March-April 2001