Contemporary Sociological Theories PDF

Contemporary sociological
theories
Sorokin, Pitirim Aleksandrovich, 1889-1968
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Book
To My Wife
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
For friendly criticism and stimulation the author is indebted to
Professor F. Stuart Chapin. For encouragement, to the
distinguished sociologists, Professors Franklin H. Giddings and
Edward A. Ross. For help in the preparation of the manuscript he
is obliged to Professors Ross L. Finney and Carl C. Zimmerman.
For an effort to bring out a German edition of the book, to a
prominent professor of the University of Berlin, Dr. R. Thurnwald,
and Dr. H. Kasspohl. A readiness to render help requested on the
part of the distinguished scholars of Europe and Russia, L. von
Wiese in Germany, Gaston Richard in France, Corrado Gini in
Italy, Adolfo Posada in Spain, Ivan Pavlov and E. V. Spectorsky in
Russia, is gratefully acknowledged. The author offers his sincere
thanks to the International Institute of Sociology, the International
Institute of Sociology and Social Reforms, to the German and
Ukrainian Sociological Societies, and to the Czecho-Slovakian
Academy of Agriculture for the honor of membership granted to
him. The Staff of the Library of the University of Minnesota, by its
unfailing service, has greatly helped the composition of the book.
Finally, and last but not least, to the students of the author's
classes and seminars he is indebted for many a happy moment in
mutual scientific work. Minneapolis, October, 1927
EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION
Students of sociological theory are prone to fall into two

contrasting types of error; either they accept speculative
explanations of social phenomena with credulity, or they dismiss
all theorizing as unscientific escapes from the hard reality of
laborious research. Professor Sorokin's book is a sound antidote
for both extremes.
By assembling quantitative data on social phenomena from an
amazing variety of reputable sources, he confronts unfounded
speculation wîth cold facts, and provides the student with
tangible criteria for evaluating theory. By exhibiting time and again
the recurrence of type theories, he shows how necessary it is for
the research student to take pains to inform himself about the
works of other students before plunging into fact-gathering and
then drawing inferences which he naively considers are original
with himself. In these two respects the present book is a
substantial corrective for these most egregious forms of'error
often found in the works of contemporary social scientists.
The book is quite unique among works on social theory because
of the enormous amount of factual and quantitative data
assembled as the test of theories that various writers have
expounded, and which so often are content to rest their validity on
distinctions of a purely verbal sort. Professor Sorokin has no
patience with what may be termed ''substitute speech reactions."
If young students of sociology will read this book with care they
will save themselves much wasted time in following theories that
are mere "painful elaborations of the obvious," and incidentally
discover how pure speculative theorizing leads unerringly to
logical contradiction and fallacy.
Aside from the characteristics just mentioned, this book is a
contribution to the scientific literature of sociology in that it deals
primarily with contemporary theories. Earlier theoretical
conceptions are considered only as it becomes necessary to link

up
the present with the past to preserve a balanced sense of
historical perspective.
Serious students of the other social sciences, anthropology,
economics, history and political science, will find this work a
useful addition to their libraries, and a demonstration of the values
and limitations of contemporary sociological theories. In this
connection the work has real synthetic significance.
F. Stuart Chapin
CHAPTER PAGE
ness cycles and the rhythm of economic life. 9. Geographical
environment and race. 10. Geographical conditions and health.
11. Climate and human energy and efficiency. 12. Climate and
mental efficiency. 13. Climate and suicide. 14. Climate and
insanity. 15. Climate and crime. 16. Climate and birth, death, and
marriage rates. 17. Geographic conditions and religion, art, and
literature. 18. Geographic conditions and social and political
organization of society. 19. Climate and genius and the evolution
of civilizations.
IV Biological Interpretation of Social Phenomena:
Bio-Organismic School 195
1. Principal types of biological theories in sociology.
2. Bio-organismic school and its relation to other organic theories.
3. Predecessors. 4. Contemporary bio-organismic theories in
sociology. 5. Criticism. 6. Biological and social differentiation. 7.
Critical remarks.
V Anthropo-Racial, Selectionist, and Hereditarist

School 219
I. Predecessors. 2. Historical-philosophical branch of the school:
A. de Gobineau and H. S. Chamberlain.
3. The Racial-anthropometrical branch of the school: G. V. de
Lapouge and O. Ammon. 4. Biometric branch of the school:
Francis Galton and Karl Pearson. 5. Other anthropo-racial,
hereditarist, and selectionist interpretations of social phenomena.
6. Criticism of the school. 7. Valid principles of the school. 8.
General conclusions.
VI Sociological Interpretation of the "Struggle for
Existence" and the Sociology of War .... 309 I. General
characterization of the branch. 2. Uncertainty of the meaning of
"the struggle for existence" in biological and sociological literature.
3. Forms of the struggle for existence, and their modification in
the course of human history. Criticism. 4. Social functions and the
effects of war and struggle: war's selections ; war's effects on the
health of the population; influence of war on vital processes and
economic phenomena; war as a means of expansion for solidarity
and peace; the moral effects of war; influence of war on political
organization; war, revolution, and reform movements; war and
social mobility; war and change of opinions, attitudes, and
dispositions; influence of war on science and arts; g-eneral
conclusion about the effects of war. 5.
CHAPTER PAGE
War's factors. 6. General conclusion about biological sociology.
VII Bio-Social Branch; Demographic School 357
I. Predecessors. 2. Adolphe Coste. 3. Size and density of the

population and vital processes; death and birth rates and growth
of population. 4. Size and density of population and migration. 5.
Demographic conditions and war. 6. Demographic factors and
revolution.
7. Demographic factors and economic phenomena: technique of
production, forms of ownership and possession, and economic
prosperity. 8. Size and density of population correlated with the
forms of social organization : social stratification, differentiation,
and segregation ; family organization. 9. Demographic factors
correlated with forms of political and social institutions. 10. Size
and density of population correlated with inventions and men of
genius. 11. Demographic factors correlated with mores and
customs. 12. Demographic factors correlated with other
ideological phenomena: language, religion, mysticism,
equalitarian ideology. 13. Demographic factors correlated with the
progress and decay of societies.
Mil SocioLOGiSTic School 433
I. General characteristics of the school. 2. Predecessors. 3.
Sociologistic interpretations of De Roberty, Espinas, Izoulet,
Draghicesco, Cooley and others. 4. Durkheim and his school. 5.
Gumplowicz, Op-penheimer, and others.
IX Sociologistic School: The Formal School and a
Systematics of Social Relationship 488
I. The characteristics of the school and its leading
representatives. 2. Criticism. 3. The formal systematics of social
processes and human relationship in contemporary sociology.
X Sociologistic School: Economic Branch 514
I. Predecessors. 2. K. Marx and F. Engels: their theories,

interpretation and criticism, 3. Contemporary studies of the
correlation between various economic conditions and other social
phenomena. 4. The economic conditions and bodily and mental
characteristics of population. 5. Economic conditions and vital
processes. 6. Economic conditions, suicide, pauperism, and
crime. 7. Economic conditions and migration.
8. Economic conditions, social organization, and instituCHAPTER PAGE
tions. 9. Economic conditions, including the technology of
production, and forms of social organization and political
institutions. 10. Economic conditions, strikes, disorders, and
revolutions. 11. Economic conditions, and various political
phenomena and attitudes. 12. Economic conditions and
ideologies, religion, and arts. 13. Economic conditions, and decay
or progress of a society. 14. General conclusions of the economic
school in sociology.
XI Psychological School 600
1. Predecessors and principal branches of the school.
2. Instinctivist interpretations. 3. Behaviorist interpretations. 4.
Interpretations in terms of desires, conations, pain and pleasure,
interests, wishes, wants, volitions, and attitudes. Criticism.
XII PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGISTIC THEORIES OF ReLIGION,
MoRES,
Law, Public Opinion, Arts, and Other Cultural
Phenomena as Factors 660
I. Beliefs, magic, myths, superstitions, ideologies, and religion as

a factor: predecessors, and contemporary theories. Max Weber's
sociology of religion. Criticism. 2. Social role of folkways, mores,
and customs.
3. Social functions of law. 4. Public opinion and propaganda, as
factors. 5. Other cultural agencies. 6. General conclusion.
XIII Other Psycho-Sociologistic Studies of the Correlation
Between Various Psycho-Social
Phenomena and Their Dynamics 712
I. Studies of a correlation between family or home, and other
social phenomena. 2. Studies of the correlation between the
character of a neighborhood and other social phenomena. 3.
Studies of the influence of occupation, and occupational
correlation. 4. Studies of the effects of urban and rural
environment. 5. Studies of psychosocial types of individuals and
groups, and the correlations between the psychological traits and
social affiliations of individuals. 6. Studies in a correlation of
leadership and intelligence with a number of social groups
participated in and with a social shifting. 7. Studies of conditions
which facilitate interindividual and intergroup sympathy and
repellence. 8. Studies of the fluctuations, rhythms, and cycles of
social processes.
9. Studies of the velocity of change of various parts of culture, and
the closeness of a correlation between them.
10. Studies in migration, diffusion, and mobility of culCHAPTER PAGE
tural objects, features, values and individuals. ii. Studies of
sudden, cataclysmic, revolutionary, and catastrophic changes. 12.
Beginning of the stage of experimental sociology. 13. Conclusion
about special studies. 14. Conclusion about the sociologistic and

psychological school.
XIV Conclusion : Retrospect and Prospect 757
To-day's status of sociological field. Its ^'weeds'' and "sterile
flowers." Real subject-matter of sociology and definition of
sociology as a science.
Index 763
INTRODUCTION
Object of the Book. This book deals with the sociological
theories of the last sixty or seventy years. Its objective is to survey
the principal types of these theories and to find to what extent
they are scientifically valid. All other approaches to a study of the
theories, such as, for instance, why a certain theory is set forth by
a certain author, or why it has become popular, or what is the
personality of an author, are intentionally excluded. The reason is
that the first task may be solved independently from the others.
Moreover, it is impossible to embrace in one book all the possible
approaches to the study of sociological thought. This book deals
with the character and the validity of the theories, but does not
deal with their authors. So much for this point.
Reasons for Its Writing and Publication. In the opinion of the
writer, the primary task of a scholar is to deal with facts rather
than theories. If, however, disregarding this, he writes a book
about other books, he does it because he has several reasons. In
the first place we do not have any single book which gives a
concise survey of all the principal sociological theories of the
period mentioned. \Vt have many an excellent monograph about a
certain problem or a sociologist, but all such cover only a small
part of the whole field.^ We have several valuable works in the
history of sociological thought," but they pay inadequate attention
to the last period of sociology. There are many valuable essays in

the history of the sociology of a certain country for the last few
decades,^ but again, they cover only a part of the field.
' They are indicated further.
^ See the text of the book.
3 For America see Sm.\ll, Albion, "Fifty Years of Sociology in the
United States," American Journal of Sociology, May, 1916;
Barnes, H. E., "American Psychological Sociology," The
Sociological Review for 1922, 1924, 1925; Gillin, John L.,
Presidential Address in Publications of the American Sociological
Society, Vol. XXI. For England, Barnks, M. E., " English
wSociology," in Publications of the American Sociological Society,
Vol. XXI. For Germany, Vierkandt, A., " Die Ubervvindung des
Posilivismus in der deiitschen Soziologie der Gegenwarl,"
Jahrbuch fiir Soziologie, Vol. II; Barth, P., Die Philosophie der
Geschichte als
Finally, even such valuable works as P. Earth's Die Philosophic
der Geschichte als Soziologic, or F. Squillace's Le dottrine sociologiche, or M. Kovalevsky's Contemporary Sociologists (in
Russian), or H. E. Barnes' The New History and the Social
Studies, or papers of F. H. Hankins in H. E. Barnes' The History
and Prospects of the Social Sciences, and of Charles A. Ellwood
in E. C. Hayes' Recent Developments in Social Sciences, are
either not translated into English, or are not up to date, or deal
with the historical rather than the sociological aspect of the
theories, or else they are too short to give a sufficient account of
the principal schools in contemporary sociology. The situation is
such that the writer has found difficulty in obtaining any book
suitable as a text for the graduate students in his course in
Contemporary Sociological Theories. Such a situation is the first
excuse for the publication of the book.
In the second place, the field of sociology has grown to such an

extent that, for a sociologist who is devoted to a study of a special
sociological problem, it is extremely difficult to have an adequate
knowledge of the whole field of the science. Being absorbed in his
special study, he does not have time to go through the hundreds
of various sources where information about the theories is given.
Meanwhile, some approximate knowledge of the general situation
in contemporary sociology is necessary for any sociologist. Not
knowing that a certain theory has been developed long ago, or
that a certain problem has been carefully studied by many
predecessors, a sociologist may easily devote
Soziologie, Leipzig, 1922, Vol. II; von Wiese, L., "German
Sociology," The Sociological Review, Vol. XIX, No. i; Brinkmann,
Carl, "German Sociology," Publications of the American
Sociological Society, Vol. XXL For Italy, Michels, Robert,
"Elemente zur Soziologie in Italien," Kolner Vierteljahrshefte filr
Soziologie, III Jahrgang, 4 Heft, translated and published in
Revue International de Sociologie and in Suspilstvo, Vol. III-IV.
For France, see Duprat, G. L., "La psycho-sociologie en France,"
Archiv fiir Geschichte der Philosophie und Soziologie, Vol. XXX,
Heft i and 2; Faucounet, P., "Durkheim Sociological School," The
Sociological Review, Vol. XIX, No. i. For Russia, Sorokin, P., "Die
Russische Soziologie in Zwanzigsten Jahrhundert," Jahrbuch fiir
Soziologie, Vol. II, translated and published in Suspilstvo, Vol. IIIIV, and in an abbreviated form in Publications of the American
Sociological Society, Vol. XXI; Hecker, J., The Russian Sociology,
N. Y., 1915. For Czechoslovakia, Blaha, Arnost, "Die
zeitgenossische tschechische Soziologie," Jahrbuch fiir
Soziologie, Vol. II. These \vorks are only representative samples
of the studies of this type.
his time and energy to the discovery of a new sociological
America after it was discovered long ago. Instead of a
comfortable crossing of the scientific Atlantic in the short period of
time necessary for the study of what has been done before, such
a sociologist has to undergo all the hardships of Columbus to find,
only after his time and energy are wasted, that his discovery has
been made long ago, and that his hardships have been useless.
Such a finding is a tragedy for a scholar, and a waste of valuable
ability for society and sociology. As a rule, explorers do not
receive anything for such ''discoveries." Meanwhile, if the energy
and time had been given to the study of an unexplored part of the
sociological field, sociology might have been enriched, and
society would have received something from its scholar. This
consideration is not a mere possibility, but a real situation which
has happened many times. For this reason the books which give
a general survey of the whole field of a certain science are not
entirely useless.
In the third place, sociology has not suffered during the period
mentioned from a lack of various theories. They have been
produced in a great abundance, and have been appearing like
mushrooms after rain. At the present moment the field of
sociology is overcrowded by a multitude of various and
contradictory systems. Every novitiate who enters the field is likely
to be lost in it, and what is more important, such a novitiate has
the greatest difficulty in discriminating between what in all these
theories is valid and what is false. Therefore, one of the most
urgent tasks of the contemporary sociologist is to separate what is
really valid from that which is false or unproved in these theories.
Such a separation is likely to be as necessary as the setting forth
of a new hypothesis. Providing that it is done carefully, a critical
analysis of the contemporary sociological theories may be of a
real service to the science of sociology. This task is attempted in
the book and is its primary purpose. A lack of space has not
permitted me to criticize the theories in detail; nevertheless, the
critical remarks are so developed as to suggest to a thoughtful
reader the principal shortcomings of a theory or hypothesis. Not
adding other reasons, the above excuses may
be sufficient to explain why this book about other books has been
written.
Plan of the Book and Distribution of the Materials. The number
of sociologists and sociological works for the period mentioned
has become so great as to make impossible a substantial
analysis of the contributions of all the individual sociologists in
one volume. If such an attempt is undertaken, it is likely to result
in a kind of a biographical dictionary with all its plusses and
minuses. Among its minuses is liable to be a lack of a logical and
coherent perspective of the whole field. This shortcoming is so
serious as to make necessary some other method of survey
which will be free from it. As we are not concerned with the
biographies of sociologists, the best way seems to be this: to
segregate all the important sociological theories into several
classes or schools, and to analyze not so much the works of
individual sociologists as the fundamental principles of the
schools. Providing that in each school several of the most
representative individual theories are given, that all the principal
works are mentioned, and that all its principal generalizations and
propositions are described, such a plan appears to be more
plausible scientifically than any other one. It is more economical
than the chronological and biographical plan of a dictionary. It is
likely to give a more systematic and coherent knowledge of the
field than a distribution of the materials on an incidental
chronological basis, or on the data of the works of several
individual sociologists picked up by a surveyor.
The above explains the logical construction of the book. It is in
detail as follows: All the theories are divided into a few major
schools, each one being subdivided into its varieties, and each
variety being represented by several of the most typical works. At
the beginning of each school, or its variety, a short paragraph
about its predecessors is given to connect the present sociology
with its past. A characterization of the principles of the school or
theory is followed by a critical paragraph to show its fallacies or

shortcomings. This plan, to be sure, has its own disadvantages,
but they seem to be not so great as those of any other method.
The Classification of the Schools of Contemporary Sociology.
The classification of the schools and their varieties in the book is
as follows :
I. Mechanistic School Social mechanics Social physics Social
energetics
Mathematical sociology of Pareto XL Synthetic and Geographic
School of Le Play
III. Geographical School
IV. Biological School
Bio-organismic branch
Racialist, Hereditarist and Selectionist branch Sociological
Darwinism and Struggle for Existence theories V. Bio-Social
School
Demographic sociology VI. Bio-Psychological School
Instinctivists' sociology VII. Sociologistic School
Neo-positivist branch Durkheim's branch Gumplowicz's branch
Formal sociology
Economic interpretation of history VIII. Psychological School
Behaviorists Instinctivists
Introspectivists of various types IX. Psycho-Sociologistic School
Various interpretations of social phenomena in terms of culture,
religion, law, public opinion, folkways, and other "psycho-social
factors" Experimental studies of a correlation between various

psycho-social phenomena
It goes without saying that this classification is quite conditional. It
has a significance only as far as it helps to distribute a vast
material into relatively few classes. It may, however, be replaced
by any other classification if it happens to serve an investigator's
purposes better. In other words, the classification is to be
regarded as purely technical rather than something principal and
dogmatic.
Some Additional Points. The impossibility of surveying
separately all the numerous individual theories makes some
subjectivism inevitable in the choice of which theories are to be
taken as representative and which are to be merely mentioned. It
is probable that, in spite of the writer's desire to be impartial,
some amount of subjectivism has slipped into the book.
Nevertheless, the writer hopes that the amount is not very great.
Probably almost all the competent sociologists would agree that
the theories taken as representative for a certain school or its
variety are really typical, and have been set forth earlier than
many other similar theories.
There is, however, one point which may meet with disagreement
on the part of sociologists. This point is that the writer has given
relatively less attention to the textbook type of sociological works
than to the monographic investigations; and to the speculative
and "philosophical" works rather than to the factual, quantitative,
and special studies. This has been done deliberately and the
writer takes full responsibility for it. The very nature of a textbook
forces its author to fill it with commonplaces which are but a
popularization of the results obtained by monographic studies.
There are a few exceptions, and they are noted in the book; but
the rule remains and explains the writer's standpoint. As to the
speculative systems of social philosophy, we must discriminate
those ''social philosophies" which have given a deep insight into

the nature of social phenomena from those which have been a
mere "word-polishing." The speculations of the first type deserve
the greatest attention; the speculations of the second type must
be passed by.
Finally, there is no need to stress the great importance of the
factual and "inductive" studies. To them, primarily, belongs the
credit of a real promotion of sociology as a science. They
represent the only basis for deciding whether a certain
philosophical generalization is valid or not. Through such studies
we are
given relatively accurate sociological correlations and causal
formulas, and in such studies mainly lies the hope of a further
perfecting of sociology as a science. Hence the attention given to
them throughout the book. Their results are used to test the
validity of the general sociological theories. Their conclusions are
utilized for the demonstration of an inadequacy in a theory. Their
data are laid down to show the existence or non-existence of a
correlation in a certain field. In addition, a special chapter is
added where the principal studies of this type are surveyed. It is
certain that not all of the studies are mentioned, but probably no
important type is omitted.
The next point to be mentioned is this: The book deals exclusively
with those sociological theories which face the facts, that is, which
try to describe and analyze social phenomena as they are. All the
theories which try to preach what ought to be, in what way the
social world should be changed, and what ought to be done for
this purpose, are omitted. The reason is that as far as such
theories are busy not with what was, is, and will be, but with what
ought to be, or ought not to be, they are out of science. Although
valuable from a practical standpoint, they belong to a field beyond
that of science.
Last, but not least, almost all the important sociological theories
are criticized in this book. The writer wants to stress the fact that
his criticism of a theory does not mean at all that he does not
appreciate it, or does not have respect for its author. The opposite
conclusion is true. This should be borne in mind to understand the
writer's real attitude. His criticism is due to the very nature of the
science,it appeared with criticism, has grown with criticism, and
lives with criticism. If we care to promote sociology as a science,
a critical attitude must be displayed by all sociologists as regards
any sociological theory, without any exception whatsoever. Being
grateful and reverent to all the builders of sociology, the best way
in which we may be faithful to them is to separate what is true and
what is false in the large mental heritage left by them. Otherwise,
instead of a scientific sociology we will have a pseudo-scientific
complimentary art, having nothing in common with a real science.
CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES
3
CHAPTER I THE MECHANISTIC SCHOOL
In this school may be classified all sociological theories which
interpret social phenomena in the terminology and concepts of
physics, chemistry, and mechanics. Its various branches exhibit
some differences of detail; one branch gives preference to the
interpretation modo geomeirico, another, modo mechanico ct
physico, still another, modo energetico, and, finally, another,
modo mathematico. These diflFerences will be elaborated in
some detail as we proceed; but they do not annul the general
similarity that pervades all branches of this school, which for the
sake of brevity may be designated in the following discussion as
*'The Mechanistic School."
I. PREDECESSORS
The essential elements of the mechanistic interpretation of man's

nature, behavior, and social activities were set forth long ago.
Since the mechanistic school views all social phenomena as mere
variations of physical phenomena, its essential characteristic is a
monistic conception of the universe as a whole, including the
universal application of all natural law, or unity of all its laws. For
this reason potentially all the monistic conceptions of the world,
and especially the materialistic monism, contained one of the
substantial elements of the mechanistic school. As is well known,
the monistic philosophies in their materialistic, as wêll as their
idealistic varieties, are very old. We find them in the remotest
past. Thales' statement that ''the essence of all things in the
universe is water," or Anaximenes' theory that **the essence" is
air, or the materialistic and atomistic monism of Empedocles,
Leucippus, Democritus, Anaxagoras, and Lucretius are
representative samples of that monistic interpretation of the
universe in which psychical and social phenomena were viewed
as mere variations of material phenomena; more than that,
psychical and social
a
4
phenomena were interpreted in a strictly mechanistic way by
these Greek philosophers, especially in the theories of
materialistic atomism. Similar theories existed also in ancient
India and China. Another element of the mechanistic
interpretation of social phenomena, that was known also to the
past, is the application of mathematics to their interpretation and a
belief in the universality of quantitative regularities, or laws, in the
dynamics of social, as of all other, processes. These elements
were strongly emphasized by Pythagoras and his school, as well
as by the atomistic philosophers mentioned above. Further, both
elements of the mechanistic sociology are found in the theories of
the Epicureans and the Stoics. Cicero stresses their presence in

the theory of Epicurus.^ Seneca and certain other Stoics, with
their rather materialistic monism, regarded even time, virtue, and
evil as "things," and even as sensual or physical things.^
Generally speaking, in the periods of conspicuous progress in the
physical and mathematical sciences, their conclusions have been
carried over into the field of social phenomena; and, as a result,
have called forth a mechanistic interpretation in that field also.
This explains why ''the mechanistic sociology" became a
dominant type of interpretation for social phenomena in the
seventeenth century. This was the conspicuous century for
creative work in physics, mechanics, and mathematics. As
Professor E. Spektorsky rightly declares, it was not the centuries
of the Renaissance, nor even the eighteenth (which actually
produced but little in these fields), but the seventeenth century
which was the most productive epoch in the progress of physical
and mathematical sciences.^ To support this statement it is
enough to mention
^ "/w physicis plurimum posuit,'" says he about the teaching of
Epiciirus. See Cicero, Definibus bonorum et malorum, Lib. I, chap.
VT, XIX, and passim.
2 See Stoicorum veterum fragmenta. Collegit J. ab. Amim,
Volumen III, Lipsiae, 1903, pp. 20 ff; Seneca, Episfola, 117;
''placet nostris quod bonum est corpus esse," writes Seneca to
his correspondents.
3 See the excellent work of Spektorsky, E., The Problems of
Social Physics in the Seventeenth Century, Vol. I, Warsaw, 1910,
Vol. II, Kiev, 1917; in Russian Problema sozialnoy physiki v X VII
Stoletii. This work is probably the best for the study of social
physics of the seventeenth century. I am indebted to Professor
Spektorsky for kindly sending me the only copy of his work which
he himself could obtain. The work is so valuable for the history of
social, political, and ethical thought, that it ought to be translated

to make it available for the foreign specialists.
5
the names of Newton, Galileo, Copernicus, Descartes, Leibnitz,
Pascal, Huygens, Kepler, Francis Bacon, R. Boyle, and Leeuwenhoek, though many others might be added.
The extraordinary progress of physics, mechanics, and
mathematics during this century called forth an extraordinary
effort to interpret social phenomena, in the same way that
mechanics had so successfully interpreted physical phenomena.
As a result we have ''The Social Physics" of the seventeenth
century, which, at least in its plan and aspirations, has not been
surpassed by all the mechanistic theories of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. More than that, in their efforts to create a
social mechanics the thinkers of the seventeenth century laid
down those principles of psychology, of the social and political
sciences, which at the present moment are regarded by many as
something that has been quite recently discovered."* The
essential characteristics of the social physics of the seventeenth
century may be summed up as follows: First, in contrast with the
preceding thinkers the social theorists of the seventeenth century
(Hobbes, Spinoza, Descartes, Weigel, Leibnitz, and others)
abandoned anthropomorphism, tele-ologism, moralism, and
hierarchism in their study of man's nature, mentality, behavior,
and social phenomena. Second, they began to study social and
psychic phenomena as a physicist studies physical phenomena,
rationally but objectively. Man wâs re* Such for instance is the behavioristic school in psychology. Its
aspiration to study man's behavior and mentality without any
reference to "inner psychical experience," that is, to study them as
a kind of mechanistic phenomena, is nothing but a modification of
the mechanistic and quantitative psychology of the seventeenth
century (Descartes, Leibnitz, Spinoza, Malebranche, and others),

which viewed man as an automaton, and tried to study the
psychical processes as physical ones, measuring and interpreting
them in terms of physical mechanics. See Spektorsky, Vol. I, pp.
8i ff., 339 ff.; Vol. II, p. 408. The same is true of their efforts to be
objective in their methods, and to study social and psychical
phenomena as specialists in physics study theirs and so be free
from any ethical, religious, and other considerations. It is true also
of their efforts to measure everything in a strictly scientific way. In
sociology and social psycholog>' recent theories of conation (L.
Ward) or theories of "instinctive" inteq^retation of social and
behavioristic facts, or such theories as Thomas's "four wishes," or
Ratzenhofer's and A. Small's "sixfold interests" (declared by
vSmall to be "the latest word of sociology"), or many other
varieties of this type of "interpretations," all were formulated by
Hobbes, Spinoza, Weigel, Malebranche, G. Grotius, Descartes,
Leibnitz, J. Am. Komensky, and others. See Spektorsky, ibid.,
Vol. II, pp. 411-422, and passim. The same must be said of
Pareto's or Tarde'a *monadologies."
6
garded as a physical objecta kind of machine ^ or physical
automaton. His life and action were regarded "as a regular
functioning of the human machinery; his death, as a wreck of it."
''There was not admitted any vitalistic force." Descartes and
Hobbes compared death with the stopping of a watch
mechanism.^ The human soul is interpreted as a movement as
regular as any motion studied in mechanics. ''Vita mot us est
perpetuus," says Hobbes. "Notre nature est dans le mouvement;'
wrote Pascal. ''Human life is nothing but a circulation of blood and
circulation of thoughts and desires," explains Malebranche.
Where there is movement there is inertia, according to
mechanics; and inertia is to be recognized also in human society
and psychical movement. It is manifested in a human being's
tendency to preserve himself and to look after his own interests.

''Siimn esse conser-vare, suiim sibi utile quaerere," says Spinoza.
This is a universal law of nature, and it is the law of human nature
also. Viewing the human soul in this mechanical way, the
physicists of the seventeenth century tried to analyze it into its
components, as a mechanism may be disassembled into its parts.
The corresponding components of the human soul were found in
a series of primary "tendencies," or "conations" (self-preservation,
gravitation to or repulsion from other human beings, etc.) or
"affections," or "appetites." Classifying them (six principal
affections, according to Descartes, or three, according to
Spinoza), they regarded a human being as an embodiment of
these components, and human activity as a result of these
conations (gravitation or repulsion or relationship). Their mutual
gravi^ ''Hominis corpus quatenus machinamentum quoddam . . .
machinamentum humani corporis,'' wrote Descartes. ''Von pent
fort bien comparer les nerfs de la (humaine) machine aux tuyaux
des machines de ces fontaines, ses muscles et ses tendons aux
autres divers engins et ressorts. . . . De plus, la respiration et
autres telles actions . . . sont comme les mouvements d'une
horloge," and so on. Renati Des Cartes Meditationes de prima
philosophia, Meditatio sexta, p. 43 of the Amsterdam edit., 1685;
his 'THomme," in Oeuvres, Cousin, IV, pp. 347-348. ''Quid est cor
nisi elastrum, quid nervi nisi chordae, articuli nisi . . . rotulae,''
wrote Hobbes, Leviathan, Introductio, Opera, III, i. "Le corps de
Vanimal est une machine en meme temps hydraulique,
pneumatique et pyrobolique . . . une Espece d'un Automate
Naturel, qui surpasse infiniment les Automates artificiels," says
Leibnitz. See Spektorsky, op. cit., passim.
^ "The body of a living man differs from that of a dead man only
as much as a watch or any other automaton when they are wound
up differ from the same watch or automaton when they are
broken." Descartes, "Les passions de Tame," Art. VI, Oeuvres,

Cousin, IV, 41. vSpektorsky, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 410.
7
tation or repulsion results in a regularity of human activity and of
psychical processes which, being similar to the regularity of
physical movement, could be interpreted by the principles of
mechanics. In this way they set forth ''the mechanics of psychical
processes" and of ''human activity." Thus a human soul was
interpreted as ''a kind of astronomical system" in which different
processes go on with the same regularity as in an astronomical
system interpreted by mechanics. The ''human individual was
regarded as a kind of astronomical system of affections or other
psychical elements bound together by mutual attraction or
repulsion." "^
From this it was easy to pass to the construction of "a social
mechanics" or of "a mechanistic interpretation of society."
"Society was regarded as a new astronomical system whose
elements were human beings, bound together by mutual
attraction or repulsion, like the atoms of physical substance."
Finally, the mutual relationship of societies and of states was
viewed again as a new system of balanced oppositions whose
elements themselves were human groups. Thus we have
gradually enlarging series of gravitations and repulsions (of man,
society, groups of societies) which, according to Spinoza, did not
constitute any specific realm in the kingdom of nature, but easily
entered, as a part, into the mechanistic kingdom of the universe
without a break in its mechanistic structure (Spektorsky, Vol. II, p.
422). The scheme of the social order may thus be seen to be in
three parts, as follows:
1. The human being: an astronomical system composed of the
attraction and repulsion of conations;
2. Society: an astronomical system composed of the attraction

and repulsion of individuals; and
3. Mankind: an astronomical system composed of the attraction
and repulsion of groups.
From the above it is clear that any supernaturalism, indeterminism, any freedom of the will, were expelled from the sociological
theories of these social physicists. Hiey viewed all these
phenomena as a result of the natural play of natural causes. Their
purpose was to study these phenomena as a system of
relationshi]),
' SrEKTORi^KY, Vol. rr, \)\^. 411-422.
8
to measure these relations and to give the results of such a study
in the forms of the laws of social mechanics.
Hence, the mathematical method of their studies. Of any science
they demanded that it be a science of mathematical type.
Generalem quandam esse dehere scientiam, . . . eamdemque . . .
Mathesim itniversalem nominari (Dtsca.vtts) IS thQ rnotto oi their
method. ''Without mathematics human beings would live as the
animals and beasts," Weigel declared. ''All truths are dis covered
only through measurement," said Malebranche. Hence their
geometrical and mathematical method. Hence their conception
that the truth is nothing but quantitatively described relationship.
Hence their attempts to create "Pantometrika," "Psychometrika,"
"Ethicometrika," "Sociometrika"; in brief, a universal quantitative
science of relations applied to the study of all phenomena,
including psychical, ethical, political, and social ones. (See
Spektorsky, Vol. I, pp. 328 ff.) ''Mens, mensura, quies, motiis,
positiira, figiira sunt cum materia cunctaruni exordia rerum/' Such
was their motto. H. Grotius interpreted the phenomena of law
''sicut Mathematici figuras a corporibus semotas considerant'\'

Leibnitz explained juridical relations in modo geo-metrico, with
charts and diagrams; Weigel and Puffendorff drew a series of
circles of human actions ''ad analogiam sysfematis Copernicaei."
"In societate inter homines nihil fere agitiir quod a numerorum et
mensurae scientia non dependeat/' claimed Richard
Cumberland.^ Politics was interpreted "per magnitudinem,
figurant et motuni." This is not all. In order that these declarations
and aspirations be realised the attempt became necessary to
build "social mechanics" factually. And wê see indeed some
attempts to do this. The conceptions of space, time, gravitation,
inertia, and force or powder are the fundamental principles by
which physical mechanics succeeded in interpreting the motion of
physical objects, beginning with that of atoms and ending with
that of the planets, stars, and systems of the universe. The social
physicists of the seventeenth century tried to do the same as the
physicists themselves. In the first place they constructed the
conception of a moral or social space in which social, and moral,
and political movements go on. It was a kind of space
^ See Cumberland, Richard, Disquisitio philosophka de Icgibus
naturae, 1671.
9
analogous to physical space, and superposed upon it. To the
position of a material object in physical space, there
corresponded, in social space, the conception of status, as of sex,
age, occupation, freedom, religion, citizenship, and so on. In this
way they constructed a system of social coordinates which
defined the position of man in this moral space as exactly as the
system of geometrical coordinates defines the position of a
material object in physical space.^ Physical mechanics explains
the motions, also, of physical objects by the principles of inertia
and gravitation. Similarly, social mechanics regarded the social
processes as a result of the gravitation and inertia of human

beings or groups. In physical mechanics any physical system is
regarded as an equilibrium. In the same way, any society or group
or state was regarded by the social physicists as a system of
equilibrium of centrifugal and centripetal forces. A series of
political institutions was interpreted as a system of counterbalances. The social and political organization of a society, and
the phenomena of power and authority were interpreted as
resultants of the pressures of ''social atoms" (individuals) and
''social molecules" (groups). In this way these social theorists
created "social statics" or a theory of social equilibrium,
analogous to "statics" in physical mechanics.
They also laid down the elements of social dynamics. In
mechanics motion or change is a function of space and time.
Time also plays its role in the social mechanics of the
seventeenth century; for these thinkers conceived the idea, not
only of a status in moral space, but in moral time as well. This led
them to constructions in rcspcctu ad durationcni and even to the
theory of a specific status quandicativus with a specific "moral
time." Historical and social events were viewed as motions or
movements and time as a coefficient of motion. ''Tcnipus nihil
aliud est quam magnitudo inotus," wrote Leibnitz. Any process
came to be understood as a kind of mechanically moving object.
"Time was depicted by a geometrical line; historical processes
began to be illustrated by various curves, and an individual's life
history, by a curve as of a falling body. Straight lines, parabolas,
and spiral curves began to be used to describe these processes."
In
Compare Sorokin, P., Social Mobilitv, Chan. I.
10
10 CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES
brief, the physicists were the real initiators in the social, as well as
in many other fields of science.^^ From the above it follows that
the plan of social mechanics outlined by the thinkers of the
seventeenth century was grand and magnificent indeed.^^ If they
did not succeed in realizing it more or less satisfactorily, it was not
the fault of lack of effort, but that of the complexity of the problems
studied. In spite of many failures and childish statements, their
effort to create a social physics yielded as a byproduct a series of
valuable contributions to the social and psychological sciences,
contributions which at the present moment are being rediscovered
as something quite new and unknown to the past.
Furthermore, the mechanistic interpretation of social phenomena
now in vogue is nothing but a repetition, with slight modifications
of the principles laid down by the great thinkers of the
seventeenth century, often, however, without any reference to
their names or works. It is true that some of the methods and
conclusions of these earlier thinkers have been further developed
in the biological, psychological, statistical, and sociological works
of the eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth centuries. This
has been the case with W. Petty's seventeenth century study of
1 See Spektorsky, Vol. I, passim, and pp. 328-554; Vol. II,
passim, and pp. 450-628.
" Especially interesting and imposing was the Pantometrika of a
forgotten thinker, Edhard Weigel. He perhaps more consistently
than any other tried to create the universal quantitative science,
''Mathesis universae.'' On this problem Weigel worked for a long
time and with great persistence. Its importance grew in his
opinion, as his efforts continued. He tried to solve the problem in
various ways. Finally he was broken under its burden. He became
almost a maniac and began to see everywhere only figures,
figures, and figures. According to his conception the universal
mathematics, or Pantometrika, was to be a specific science of
quantity, as opposed to quality. It ought to be because without

quantitative knowledge there is no real knowledge applied, he
contended, to any field of phenomena. Any causal relation,
indeed, any relationship whatsoever, may be measured. Real
scientific determinism is a quantitative determinism. In this way all
objects are resolved into quantity. The quantities studied in
Pantometrika were to be three kinds: physical, moral, and
terminological. Under moral quantities Weigel subsumed
economic value, social dignity, prestige, power, social
achievements, services, crimes and so on. All of these
phenomena were to be measured. Real moral philosophers or
jurisconsults were to be mathematicians. These ideas he tried to
develop in detail in a series of works: Idea Matheseos
Universynopsis, etc., 1669; Universi Corporis pansophici Prodromus de gradibus humanae cognitionis, etc., Jenae, 1672;
Corporis Pansophici Pantologia, etc. About Weigel, see
Spektorsky, Vol. I, pp. 488-563.
11
social and moral phenomena/^ and with that century's
deterministic and objective study of such phenomena irrespective
of any religious or moral evaluation. Such later development was
carried forwârd in ethics and psychology by Jeremy Bentham's
''moral arithmetic," by Herbart's studies in ''mechanistic
psychology," and by others in the field of statistics. But the same
cannot be said for the "social mechanics" of the seventeenth
century, in the narrower sense of that term. Almost all attempts in
that field which were made in the eighteenth and first half of the
nineteenth centuries were but variations of the social physics of
the seventeenth century.
Along the lines of social physics of the seventeenth century
George Berkeley (1685-1753) constructed his theory of moral
attraction and social stability.^^ According to his "social physics,"
physical gravitation has its analogue. The centrifugal forces are

manifest in the form of egoism, which drives persons apart; while
the social instincts correspond to the centripetal forces, because
they draw persons together. Society is stable when the centripetal
forces are greater than the centrifugal. The role of physical mass
in social mechanics is played by the population; the role of
physical distance, by the homogeneity or heterogeneity of
individuals.^^ In brief, Berkeley's theory of moral attraction is a
mere variation of the theories of the seventeenth century.
The same must be said of the majority of the mechanistic theories
in sociology of the eighteenth ^^ and of the beginning of the
nineteenth centuries. Some of the Encyclopedists may be
included here. Saint-Simon's attempts to interpret social
phenomena in the light of Newton's law of gravitation and system
of mechanics did not add anything essentially new to the social
physics of the seventeenth century. Later on F. M. Ch. Fourier,
among his many theories, made a sketch of the mechanistic inter12 Petty, W., Several Essays in Political Arithmetics, 1699.
" Sec Berkeley, G., The Principles of Moral Attraction, Works,
Fraser edition, Vol. IV.
^^ Comi:)are E. Bogardus' conception of "social distance," and F.
H. Giddings' theory of the social role of "the consciousness of
kind."
'^ See, for instance, Lord Kame, Sketches of the History af Man, 4
vols., 1788; Dunbar, James, Essay on the History of Mankind in
Rude and Cultivated Ages, 1780; vide HiiTH, H., Soziale und
individualistische Auffassung im 18 Jahrhun* dert, 1907.
12
pretation of history; but, like many of his other theories, it was not
systematically developed and was set forth in a somewhat erratic
and extravagant form. Finally, Auguste Comte and A. Quetelet
both show the influence of the seventeenth century's social
physics, especially in the terminology which they employ. ''Social
statics" and ''social dynamics" are the principal parts of sociology,
according to Comte; while Quetelet even uses the term "social
physics" as the title of his work. It should be distinctly stated,
however, that this use of an earlier terminology is misleading, for
their interpretations of social phenomena were far from being the
mechanistic interpretation of the seventeenth century. Since the
second half of the nineteenth century this has begun to show
decided symptoms of revival. Since that time there have
appeared several works which, though pretending to be a new
interpretation of social phenomena, have, as a matter of fact,
moved along the general plan of social physics in the seventeenth
century. Let us now turn to a survey and analysis of these recent
recapitulations and developments. Modern representatives of this
school of sociology are: H. C. Carey, Voronoff, E. Solvay, L.
Winiarsky, A. P. y Barcelo, Haret, W. Ostwald, W. Bechtereff,
Edgeworth, F. Carli, A. Bentley, T. N. Carver, Alfred J. Lotka, and
finally V. Pareto, not to mention other names.^*' Their works may
be divided into four or five principal branches : the branch of
social physics (Carey) ; of social mechanic Of other works in
which the authors claim to interpret social phenomena according
to the laws of physics and mechanics, but actually fail to do so,
may be mentioned the following: Planta, J. C, Die Wissenschaft
des Staates oder die Lehre vom Lebensorganismus, Chur, 1852;
Zacharia, K. S., Vierzig Biicher vom Staate, 7 vols., 1839-43;
Mismer, Principes sociologiques, 1880; De Marinis, Sistema di
Sociologia, Torino, 1901; Fiske, J., Outlines of Cosmic
Philosophy^ Lond., 1874; Bagehot, W., Physics and Politics, N.
Y., 1884. vSimmel and the formal school in sociology use
extensively geometrical analogies and forms; but trait is purely
incidental to their theories; therefore they have only the remotest
relation to the "mechanistic" interpretation of social phenomena.

(See "The Formal School" in this book.) Somewhat more
mechanistic or energetistic to some extent are the interpretations
of economic and juridical phenomena given by Helm, G., Die
Lehre von der Energy, pp. 72 ft"., Leipzig, 1887, and by Bozi, A.,
Die Weltanschauung der Jurisprudenz, pp. 108 ft. A
comparatively good (thpugh a little elementary and out of date)
characterization of the mechanistic school is given in F.
Squillace's Le dottrine sociologiche, Roma, 1902, Chap. I; and
Petre Trisca's Prolegomenes a une Mecanique Sociale, Vol. II,
Paris, Alcan. 1922; in G. Solomon's introduction to Bousquet's
Grundriss der Soziologie Paretos, 1926.
13
ics (Barcelo, Haret, Lotka) ; the social energetics (E. Solvay, W.
Bechtereff, W. Ostvvald, T. N. Carver, L. Winiarsky) ; and finally
of mathematico-functional ''pure sociology" (Pareto, Carli).
2. CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL PHYSICS
H. C. Carey's Principles of Social Science ^^ is one of the most
conspicuous attempts in the second half of the nineteenth century
at a physical interpretation of social phenomena. At the very
beginning of the first volume of the Principles we find his emphatic
declaration that ''the laws which govern matter in all its forms,
whether that of coal, clay, iron, pebble stones, trees, oxen,
horses, or men" are the same/^ Hence, the mechanistic monism
which permeates his sociological and economic theories. In
harmony with Carey's general "mechanistic" attitude are his
theories that "man is the molecule of society"; ^^ that association
is only a variety of "the great law of molecular gravitation";"^ that
"man tends of necessity to gravitate towards his fellow-man," "that
gravitation is here (in human societies), as everywhere else in the
material world, in the direct ratio of the mass (of cities), and in the
inverse ratio of the distance"; ^^ centralization and
decentralization of a State and of a population in the cities is

nothing but a variety of centripetal and centrifugal forces working
according to the laws of physical mechanics."" As in physics, the
greater the difference of the temperature of two bodies the more
intense is the process of the transmitting heat in the form of
motion from one body to another; in a similar way, the
" H. C. Carey was born in 1793 and died in 1879. The first volume
of his Principles was pubHshed in 1858 (Philadelphia, Lip])incott
Co.), earlier than H. Sj)encer's First Principles (1862), Principles
of Biology (1864), Principles of Sociology (1876) or Principles of
Ethics (1879).
1* Principles, Vol. I, 1858, p. 62; compare his The Unity of Law,
Chap. IV, and pp. 127 fT., Philadeli)hia, 1872.
19 Principles, Vol. I, p. 41.
20 Ibid., p. 42.
" /W^., pp. 42-43.
" By the way, Carey was also one of the earliest representatives
of the sociolo-gistic school. (vSce the chapter about this school.)
Like August Comte and the sociologistic school he contends that
psychology is to be based on sociology and psychological
lihenomcna are to be explained through social conditions, but not
contrariwise. See Principles, Vol. I, Chap. II.
14
greater the differences between individuals or grou])s the greater
is the power of association and commerce between them.
Among purely agricultural communities association scarcely

exists; whereas, it is found in a high degree where the farmer, the
lawyer, the merchant, the carpenter, the weaver, etc., are seen
constituting portions of the community.^^
Progress for Carey is a motion. "Motion comes with heat, and
heat results from association." ~^
Here are other samples of Carey's mechanistic interpretation of
social and economic phenomena.
From the indestructibility of matter, as the physical premise, it
obviously follows that what we term production and consumption
are mere transformation of substance. Whether fossil coal is
converted into heat, smoke, and ashes; corn into hogs' flesh;
corn, pork, turnips, and mutton into human muscle and brain; the
uniform phenomenon is alteration of matter in its quality merely,
without increase or diminution of its quantity. In every transition of
matter from one condition to another, force is employed, or, as we
say, consumed, and force is also evolved or produced. . .
Economic value is nothing but a kind of inertia; utility, an
equivalent of mechanical momentum.
Consumption of a product is "nothing else than its passage from a
state of inertness to one of activity." "^ Commerce is "a change of
matter in place"; "production, mechanical and chemical changes
in the form of matter." ^^
Such interpretations of social and economic phenomena involving
comparisons of these phenomena with physical ones, and
especially of man with various mechanisms, go on throughout all
Carey's works. While the so-called organismic school in sociology
drew analogies between social and organic phenomena, the
mechanistic school compares social processes with physical
mechanisms. In this respect Carey's works are representative
" Ibid., p. 199. In this theory Carey much earlier than Simmel or
Durkheim indicated the soHdaristic or cohesive role of the social
division of labor and, in a developed form, laid down the central
idea of Durkheim's work. And yet, his name is not mentioned
among the predecessors of Simmel and Durkheim.
^Îhid., p. 61.
25 The Unity of Law, pp. 127 ff.
15
THE MECHANISTIC SCHOOL
15
of the latter; and the above gives a general idea of his method of
interpreting social and economic facts. Carey's own summary of
his principles of social science is clear and comprehensive. It is
given at the end of the third volume of his Principles and in
abbreviated form it runs as follows :^^
Fundamental Physical Laws
Corresponding Social Forms of these Lazvs
The simple laws which govern matter in all its forms, and which
are common to physical and social science, may be briefly stated
thus:
I. All particles of matter gravitate towards each other, the
attraction being in direct ratio of the mass, and the inverse one of
the distance.
2. All matter is subjected to the action of the centripetal and the
centrifugal forces, the one tending to the production of local
centres of action, the other to the destruction of such centres, and
the production of a great central mass, obedient to but a single

law.
3. The more perfect the balance of these opposing forces, the
more imiform and steady is the movement of the various bodies,
and the more harmonious the action of the system in which they
are embraced.
1. Man becomes subjected to the great law of molecular
gravitation in the direct ratio of the mass, and in the inverse one of
the distance. [Phenomena of association and concentration of the
population.]
2. Local centres attract man in one direction, while great cities,
centres of the world, attract him in the other.
3. The more perfect the balance of these opposing forces, the
greater is the tendency towards the development of local
individualities, and towards the extension of association
throughout the interior of communities, with constant increase of
the power of i:)roduction, in the value and freedom of man, in the
growth of capital, in the equity of distribution, and in the tendency
towards harmony and peace.
"^ Principles, Vol. Ill, j)p. 466-468, Philadelpliia, 1867. For the
sake of clearness T \)\\t his physical and social laws in two
])arallel coliniins.
16
CONTEMrORARY SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES
4. The more intense the action of those forces, the more rapid is
the motion, and the greater the power.
Heat is a cause of motion and force, motion being, in its turn, a
cause of heat and force.
The more heat and motion produced, the greater is the tendency
towards acceleration in the motion and the force . . . towards
decomposition of masses, and in-dividuaHzation of the particles,
of which they are composed.
The greater the tendency towards individualization, the more
instant are the combinations, and the greater the force obtained.
The more rapid the motion, the greater the tendency of matter to
rise in the scale of form [ from inorganic to organic world, and
finally to man].
4. The greater is that motion and force, the more does man
become subjected to the law of gravitation (association).
The more intense becomes the heat, the more rapid is the societary motion, and greater the force exerted.
Individuality is developed in the ratio of the diversity of the modes
of employment, and consequently diversity in the demand that is
made for the production of human power.
The greater the diversity, the greater is man's power to control
and direct the great forces of nature, the larger the number of
persons who can draw support from any given space, and the
more perfect the development of the latent powers of both earth
and man.
Such are the essential physical laws and their social
manifestation. The above is sufficient to characterize the
essentials of Carey's social physics and its similarity to the
principles of the social physics of the seventeenth century.
3. CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL MECHANICS
Probably the most typical samples of a transfer and direct
application of the laws of physical mechanics to an interpretation
of social phenomena are the works of Voronoff, Haret, Alfred

Lotka and Antonio Portuondo y Barcelo."^ All these
2^ Voronoff, Foundations of Sociology, Russ., 1909; Haret,
Mecanique sociale, 1910; Barcelo, a., Essais de mecanique
sociale, Paris, 1925; previously part of it was published in Revue
Intern, de Sociologie, 1915; Lotka, Alfred J., Elements of Physical
Biology, Baltimore, 1925. Considerably different is the position of
R. de la Grasserie who tried to create a Cosmic vSociology. In his
theory of universal interaction and its varieties there is very Httle
from mechanics. See DE la Grasserie, R., De la cosmosociologie,
Paris, Giard and Bridre.
17
authors start their discussion with an indication that ''the body of
human individuals, with all its organs and material elements,
composes a system which is subjected to the laws of physical
mechanics," like any other material system; and that, "in spite of
man's desire to escape from the law of gravitation and from all
other laws of mechanics, he cannot do it" (Barcelo). ''The laws of
the chemical dynamics of a structural system . . . will be precisely
those laws . . . which govern the evolution of a system comprising
living organisms." -^ From such rather obvious |)remises these
writers infer that "if the principles and the laws of social
mechanics are applicable to all forms of force, they evidently are
also applicable to man and to those psychical forces that are
styled social." Having indicated these reasons, these writers
proceed in a true mechanistic fashion to transfer the coiv ceptions
and terminology of mechanics into the field of social phenomena,
and to give us such mechanistic interpretations as the following:
According to Voronoff, association and cooperation are "addition
and multiplication of forces"; war and social struggle, "subtraction
of forces" ; social organization, "an equilibrium of forces";
degeneration and decay, "disintegration of forces"; law and

judicial phenomena, "co-relation of forces," and so on.^^
Similar though somewhat more complex are the mechanistic
interpretations of Haret and Barcelo. In their works the translation
of the non-mechanistic language of social science into that of
mechanics goes on in the following way: The individual is
transformed into a material ])oint, and his social environment into
"a field of forces," {cJimnp dc force). As soon as this is done,
there is no difficulty in applying the formulas of mechanics to
social phenomena; all that is necessary is to copy these fornnilas, inserting the word individual instead of material point, and
the term social group instead of a physical system or a field of
forces. Proceeding in this way, both writers give us a series of
formulas of social mechanics like the following: "An increase of
kinetic energy- of an individual is etpiivalent to a decrease of his
potential energy." "The total energy of an individual in his field of
forces remains constant throughout all its modifica2LrtTKA, op. cit., p. 16.
'** See Vc)RONoi.i\ Osnovanija soziologii. txjssim
18
tions." ^^ "The total energy of a social group in regard to its action
{quant a line action) at a moment of time (Ti) is equivalent to that
total energy of the group which it had at an initial moment (To)
plus the total amount of work which during this period of time (TiTo) has been done by all forces exterior to the group which have
influenced individuals or elements of the group," and so on.^- To
complete the identity of social with physical mechanics these
thinkers, especially Barcelo, supply a considerable number of
mathematical formulas both simple and complex which they have
extracted from the subject matter of mechanics. Such are the

essential traits of this type of the mechanistic school in
sociology.^^
4. CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL ENERGETICS
Different varieties of this branch of mechanistic theory are
represented by the works of E. Solvay, the founder of the Solvay
Institute in Belgium; by those of W. Ostwald, great chemist and
theorizer of energetics; in the Collective Reflexology of a
prominent Russian psychologist, W. Bechtereff (1857- )' ^^^ '^^^
^^^^ Economy of Human Energy by a distinguished American
economist, T. N. Carver (1865- ). Let us briefly glance at the
framework of their energetistic interpretations.
The least serious and the least valuable of these works is
Bechtereff's Collective Reflexology.^"^ Although Bechtereff has
published several earlier investigations of recognized value, the
second part of this book is of questionable scientific worth. The
explanation is probably to be found in the abnormal conditions of
the Russian Revolution, under which this work was produced.
Having declared that "the laws of super-organic, that is, of social,
phenomena are the same as the laws of inorganic and organic
phenomena," into his interpretation of social phenomena he
simply
^^**L*energie total de I'individu dans son champ se conserve
constante d travers toutes ses modifications.''
32 See Haret, op. cit., Preface and passim; Barcelo, op. cit.,
passim.
33 Much more elaborate are the formulas of Lotka. Several
chapters of his book are really valuable and contribute something
beyond a mere transfer of the formulas of mechanics into the
social field.
3^ Bechtereff, W., Kollektivnaija Refiexologia, Russ., Petrograd,

1921; Part II, pp. 221-420.
19
imports all the laws of physics, mechanics, chemistry, and biology
that he can find. We have a total of twenty-three such laws
governing social phenomena; the law of the preservation of
energy; of the proportionality of the ratio of motion to motive force;
of gravitation; of repulsion; of the equality of action with counteraction; of similarity or homology; of rhythm; of inertia; of continuity
of movement and change; of entropy; of relativity; of evolution; of
differentiation; of reproduction; of elective generalization; of
historical sequence; of economy; of adaptation: of interaction; of
compensation; of dependable relationship and of individuality.
In order to show what is meant by each of these ''laws" in the field
of social phenomena two or three illustrations may be given. The
law of the preservation of energy means ''that each person is an
accumulator of energy," that "the spiritual personality of man
never disappears completely," that "a social group, having
created its culture, does not die spiritually." ^^' Such is the
essence of this law. The law of the proportionality of the rate of
motion with the moving force is illustrated by such facts as the
following, that "an addition of reinforcements to an army facilitates
a more rapid achievement of the military purpose in proportion to
the additional force"; or that "the development of a religious
movement is reinforced through the performance of religious
ceremonies," and so on."**^ The law of homology means that
"social organization everywhere proceeds according to the same
plan"; that "the historical development of the civilizations of all
peoples has been going on along the same general plan." ^^ The
law of inertia is manifested in the existence of conservatism,
tradition, habit, prestige, authority, and the like.'"^^ The law of
relativity consists in the fact that everything in social life is relative;
for example, "a theory of constitutional government may appear

radical in an absolute monarchy, while the same theory may
seem very conservative in a democratic country." ^^ These
^ Ibid., pp. 225-230. ^ Ibid., ])]). 314-319. '' Ibid., p]). 270-282. 3*
Ibid., pp. 292-307. ^^ Ibid., i)p. 230-240,
20
samples are sufficient to indicate the general character of Bechtereff's "law of social energetics."
The social energetics of E. Solvay does not need a detailed
characterization because its essential traits, with the exception of
Solvay's ''positive politics," are reproduced in W. Ostwald's work.
It is enough to say that, according to Solvay, ''social phenomena
are nothing but a combination of three factors : organic, psychic
and inorganic, the last of which plays an especially important and
primary role." Life is nothing but the phenomena of the
transformation of energy. Consequently, social life is also nothing
but "energetistic phenomena." For these reasons the general laws
of energetistic mechanics are applicable to social phenomena.
Sociology is social physics or social energetics. The primary task
of sociology is "to reduce the totality of biological and social
phenomena to fundamental physico-chemical actions and
reactions." "^^ Accordingly man and society are viewed as
"energetistic apparatuses"; man's life and society's history, as
processes of the transformation of energy, subject to the laws of
energetistic mechanics, and especially to the laws of the least
effort and realization of maximum energy. Production,
consumption, distribution and a series of other phenomena are
interpreted in the same way. All this culminates in his "Scientific
Positive Politics of Energetics," in which many liberal programs of
social and political reconstruction are suggested.
According to W. Ostwald (1853- ), "energetics can give to social

sciences (KiilHirwissenschaften) several fundamental principles,
but it cannot give all the principles needed by social sciences." ^^
Pursuant to this thesis, Ostwald offers his energetistic
interpretation of social phenomena. It may be summed up as
follows:
I. Any event, or any social or historical change in the last
'* Solvay, E., "Formules d'introduction a I'energetique physio et
psycho-sociologique,'' pp. 53 ff.,213 ff., in Questions
d'energetique sociale, Institut Solvay, Bruxelles. See there
passim. A systematic analysis of Solvay's "social energetics" is
given by the Director of the Sociological Institut of Solvay, G.
Bamich, in his ''Essai de politique positive basee sur I'energetique
social de Solvay," Bruxelles, 1919, passim and pp. 1-186.
"1 Ostwald, W., Energetische Grundlagen der
Kulttirwissenschaften, Vorvort, Leipzig, 1909. See also Ostwald,
W., Die Energien, Leipzig, 1908.
21
THE MECHANISTIC SCHOOL 1
analysis is nothing but a transformation of energy. (Lectures 1
and 2)
2. From the energetistic point of view the creation of culture is
nothing but a transformation of crude (rolie) energy into useful
energy {Sutzencrgy). The greater the coefficient of useful energy
obtained in such a transformation, the greater is the progress of
culture. A primitive lamp, for example, which transforms chemical
energy into light energy, gives only about three per cent of useful
energy, while a more perfect lamp gives fifteen or more per cent.
For this reason, we may say that the substitution of this better
lamp for the less perfect is progress. (Lecture 2)
3. Man is an apparatus for the transformation of all other forms of
energy.
4. Adaptation is nothing but the best possible utilization of crude
energy and its transformation into useful energy. The higher the
percentage of useful energy obtained in this way, the better is tli
adaptation. (Lectures 5-7)
5. Society, as a totality of individuals working together for a
common purpose, is an arrangement for the better utilization and
more perfect transformation of crude into useful energy. Where
there is no order and no regulation of mutual relations, but a
disorderly struggle, there is a useless waste of energy% and its
perfect transformation is impossible. Through its order society
makes possible the better transformation of energy. Only in so far
as society serves this purpose is its existence justified. When,
instead, it hinders rather than helps in obtaining this result it loses
the very purpose of its existence. (Lecture 8)
6. The functions of language, law, commerce, trade, production,
punishment, state, government and other cultural phenomena can
be expressed in the same terms. They all facilitate a better
utilization of crude energy and prevent its useless waste. In the
primitive stages of culture this purpose was achieved imperfectly,
since the methods of its achievement were rude. The principal
means of maintaining order were violence and coercion which led
to an enormous waste of energy. However, with the progress of
culture the methods of social control became less expensive.
(Lectures 9-11)
22
7. The value and justification of any state consists in a better and

better utilization of energy for the benefit of all its members; and
only in so far as this purpose is served by a state is its existence
justified. (Lecture 12)
8. Wealth and money are but concentrated forms of useful
energy. Their accumulation serves the same purpose. The
justification of private property consists in its facilitation of this
purpose. When it ceases to do that, it loses its reason for
existence. (Lecture 13)
9. Science is the most fundamental means of the utilization of
energy. For this reason it is the basis of civilization; "the best
blood and the deepest root of any culture." Great inventors and
scientists are to be appreciated because they serve this purpose.
Hence the great value of education, of schools, and of all
institutions for the accumulation, enrichment, and diffusion of
science. Hence also the necessity for conditions like freedom of
thought and investigation without which this purpose could not be
served successfully. (Lecture 14)
Such are the skeleton and principal considerations of W. Ostwald's energetistic interpretation of social phenomena.
Similar is the interpretation of civilization and social processes
given by T. N. Carver in his interesting book about human
energy.^" The life of an individual and the history of a group are
viewed by him as a transformation of ''the largest possible sum of
solar energy into human energy." The social process is a
transformation of energy and its redistribution; civilization is
nothing but an accumulation of this transformed energy; and
progress, its better and better utilization. Especial attention is
given by this author to an energetistic interpretation of ''economic
phenomena." Here he does not limit his task to a mere statement
of general principles, but attempts to develop a detailed,
sometimes even quantitative, analysis of basic economic

phenomena from the above point of view. The book, in general, is
*-Carver, T. N., The Economy of Human Energy, 1924. To this
school belongs further N. L. Sims' Society and its Surplus, N. Y.
1924. In the preface and at the beginning of the book Professor
Sims very emphatically sets forth an energetistic point of view. In
his analysis of various social phenomena he fails, however, to
carry on his energetistic "desiderata'' and gives a long survey of
social evolution and social processes in which the energetistic
point of view is very little in evidence.
23
better than many of the works mentioned above, and some of
Carver's theories are really valuable.
Let us next briefly outline L. Winiarsky's ''mechanistic and
energetistic interpretations." ^^
1. For Winiarsky, "a, social aggregate is nothing but a system of
points, i.e., individuals, who are in a perpetual movement of
approaching or withdrawing from one another."
2. 'The primary cause of these movements is attraction."
3. Like chemical affinity this attraction is elective and proceeds
along certain lines and in a certain direction, namely, toward a
maximum of pleasure and a minimum of resistance. The
phenomena of social attraction, or social interaction, have
accordingly a purely mechanical basis, though this mechanical
attraction has a more complex character among human beings
than among inorganic things, ana ib overgrown, so to speak, by
psychical phenomena. Our choice of friends and enemies is an
example of this principle.
4. Nevertheless, psychical phenomena themselves are nothing

but a modification of biological energy, which, in turn, is a form of
physico-chemical energy. For this reason, our choice itself is
subjected to the above laws of mechanics, as is shown by pure
political economy."*"^ The attraction between male and female is
another instance of the same principle. As the basis of this
attraction is the "gravitation" or "chemical affinity" of the
spermatozoa and the ovum. It manifests itself in the reciprocal
desires of the young man and the girl, which they themselves do
^3 See Winiarsky, L., "La Method math^matique dans la
sociologie et dans r^conomie," La revue socialiste, 1894, Vol. XX,
pp. 716-730; "Essai d'une nouvelle interpretation de ph^nomenes
sociologiqiies," ibid., Vol. XXIV, 1896, T)p. 430-454; "L'equilibrio
sociale," Rivista Italiana di sociologia, Sept., 1899; "Deux theories
d'equilibre economique," Revue internationale de sociologie,
1896, pp. 904-930; "Essai sur le mecanique sociale," Revue
philosophique, Vol. XLV, 1898, ])]). 351-386; "L'equilibre
esthetique," ibid., Vol. XLVII, 1899, pp. 569-605; "L'energie
sociale et ses mensurations," ibid., Vol. XLIX, 1900, pp. 113-134,
256-287. The last three articles are the most important. About
Winiarsky see Groppali, a., "Essai rc^ccnt de sociologie pure,"
Revue intent, sociologie, 1900, pp. 425-442, 487-519; vSqiillace,
op. cit., pp. 107-119; Trisca, Petre, op.cit., Vol. II. Like his
jjrcdecessors, Winiarsky names Herbart, Weber and Fechner,
Delbocuf, lulgeworth, Gossen, Walras, Jevons, Pareto, as having
tried to apply mathematical method to the study of i)sychical and
economic phenomena. As indicated in our previous discussion,
this list of Winiarsky's predecessors might well have been
lengthened by the addition of several dozen names at least. ''
L'hiergie sociale, p]). 113-115.
24
not always recognize as arising from this deeper drive. It is

subject to the same law of maximum pleasure. When this
attraction, which is really sexual, is not satisfied, then, according
to the law of the transformation of energy, it is sublimated into
other psychical phenomena, such as coquetry, ornamentation,
and other means of sexual attraction, which in turn give rise to
aesthetic phenomena, the fine arts, and poetry.'*'' The same is
true of other basic forms of gravitation or attraction such as food
attraction. In this way the psychical phenomena are interpreted as
a form of biological energy which in its turn is nothing but a form
of physico-chemical energy. Thus "psychical and physical
phenomena are reduced to the same laws of mechanics." ^^
5. Energy has various forms, and ma\ be transformed from one to
another as, for example, from potential to kinetic, anci znce versa.
Life is a specific form of physico-chemical energy. Organisms
generally, and the human organism especially, are an
embodiment of energy, and mechanisms for its transformation.
6. The transformation of energy by an organism proceeds through
the processes of alimentation and reproduction. In the field of vital
phenomena the general law of mechanical attraction manifests
itself in the form of the sex and food attractions. Love and hunger
are, so to speak, primary drives of organisms generally, and of
human beings particularly, determining their mutual attraction and
repellence. Human beings seek, first of all, the satisfaction of
these needs. It is under the influence of these needs that they
enter into contacts of various kinds with one another. This basic
fact accounts for the origin of all the various social phenomena,
and for all the more complex forms of the transformation of
energy by social groups."*^
7. ''As a bullet, when it encounters an obstacle, transforms its
energy of motion into an inner energy of heat, light or electricity;
so the crude movement of human masses that is driven by sex
and hunger, when it encounters an obstacle in the natural

environment or other groups which prevents the direct satisfaction
of those needs, likewise transmutes the energy of hunger
*^ Vequilihre esthetique, pp. 569-573.
'*'' L'enerîe sociale, pp. 114-116.
*' Essai sur le m^canique sociale, pp. 351-386.
25
and sex into economic, political, juridical, moral, aesthetic,
religious or intellectual form. In this way vital energy is
transformed into psychical and social." ^^ This theory of how the
energy of hunger and love originated and how they are
transformed into complex psycho-social phenomena, Winiarsky,
furthermore, developed in great detail.
8. These processes of the transformation of energy proceed,
moreover, according to the basic laws of thermodynamics. First
the amount of energy in all these transformations remains
constant. Second, the same laws of thermodynamics explain this
social phenomena of change, differentiation, equalization,
domination and historical progression generally. If the intensity of
thermal energy in two physical systems is not equal there results
transference of energy from one system to another and the
greater the difference the more intensive is the process. This
radiation of energy always proceeds from the system with a
greater intensity to that with a lower intensity of thermal energy. In
this sense the process of radiation is non-reversible. On the other
hand, as radiation proceeds, the dift'erence in the energy-intensity
of the two systems becomes less and less until both systems
become equal. This is the reversible aspect of the thermodynamic
processes. Thus they take place only when there is inequality of
energy, but proceeding tend to equality or entropy. Now the same
basic laws operate in the field of psycho-social phenomena also,

according to Winiarsky. The unequal amount and intensity of
energy with which different individuals and groups are charged,
account for all social and historical events. These are nothing but
manifestations of the radiation of energy from individual to
individual and from group to group. If energy had been equal in all
individuals the whole drama of human history would not have
taken place. Instead there would forever have been dead
equilibrium. Only where there exists an inequality of forceintensity there is motion, change, life, or history.''^ Similarly,
unequal distribution of energy among indi** Vencrgie sociale, p. 120. From this and from the article
L'equilibre esthetique^ one has to condude that Winiarsky laid
down the essentials of the Freudian theory considerably earlier
than it was done by Freud.
*^ This idea was developed by K. Leontieff much earlier than by
Winiarsky. Tt constituted the basic princi])lc in LcontiefT's criticism
of the equalitarian and
26
viduals and groups is responsible for all such social phenomena
as inequality, differentiation, stratification, domination and the like.
As in thermodynamics the process of thermal energy equalization
proceeds from the body with the higher temperature to that with
the lower, so the individuals or social groups with the greater
psycho-social energy radiate their energy to the individuals or
groups with less. From which it follows that all phenomena of
social differentiation, such as inequality, exploitation, domination,
class distinction, and caste stratification, are but manifestations of
the general phenomena of energy-radiation from systems of
higher to those of lower energy. But as in physics the

transference of heat leads to its gradual equalization in all the
bodies concerned, so, in the social process, the corresponding
transference leads to the rise and growth of social equality. "Such
is the explanation of the progress of liberty and the disappearance
of monopoly and other privilege in all fields of social phenomena."
The greater the inequality the more intensive will be this process
of equalization. Liberal, socialist, communist, and equalitarian
socialistic movements. "The upward evolution of an organism or
of a society always displays the phenomena of differentiation. Its
disintegration, on the other hand, always displays a fusion of what
before was separate and different. This fusion leads to a
weakened cohesion of the organism's or society's parts, which
results at last in its destruction." Hence Leontieff's "three periods
in the life-cycle of any society"; the initial period of simplicity, then
a period of blooming complexity and differentiation, and finally a
period of equalitarian disintegration and decay. In the history of
modern Europe the first of these periods lasted until about the
ninth century, while society was still simple. The second period
corresponds to the climax of European civilization between the
ninth and the seventeenth centuries. "But since the eighteenth
century Europe has entered u])on a period of fusion and
equalization. Its greatness lasted only a thousand years. The fact
that in the nineteenth century it is setting up equality as an ideal
means only that it is exhausted and is tending again toward an
undifferentiated simplicity. But before it can reach that it is
doomed to fall apart and give place to other societies. All that is
really great, fine and durable has been created, not, indeed, by
universal liberty and equality, but instead by differences in rights,
social positions and educational opportunitiesbut in a society
united under a supreme and sacred authority." The equalitarian
movement betrays a tendency toward the simplicity of a corpse
and the equilibrium of death. However, Leontieff was not the first
to set forth this theory, for similar ideas had already been
expounded by Danilevsky as early in the century as 1869. Thus

were O. Spengler's theories anticipated by half a century. Indeed,
in all its essential characteristics Spengler's work is a mere
repetition of the social speculations of Leontieff and Danilevsky.
wSee Leontieff, K., Bysantinism and Slaves, Russ., 1873;
Danilevsky, Russia and Europe, 1869, 2nd ed., 1871. See also
Berdiaieff, Philosophy of Inequality, Russ., 1923.
27
movements are all forms of this basic law of social
thermodynamics. "Even in a primitive group, order, power, law
and social control spontaneously appear; simply because the
energy arising from its inequalities passes in the form of
domination from a higher to a lower point, but never inversely.
Since the radiation of energy proceeds in this way, there is a
tendency toward the equalization of differing intensities; and this
goes on until an equilibrium is reached in which there are no such
differences; whereupon, according to the laws of
thermodynamics, all transformation stops." ^^
9. From this, Winiarsky logically concludes that, in the future, the
state of social entropy,a dead and immovable equilibrium, will
come in some way into the history of mankind, as it has in the
history of the whole universe. Equalization of individuals, classes,
castes, races, and so on, proceeds now with a great intensity. We
are already at the beginning of the long process of social entropy,
which is conspicuously manifested by the influence of socialistic
and equalitarian movements (Ibid., pp. 129-133).
10. From the above he infers that the object of social science is to
study this energetistic system of men and objects, subjected to
the laws of mechanics in their activities and relationship. In order
that this study may be really scientific, it has to be not alone
qualitative, but also quantitative. Corresponding phenomena must
be measured. To be able to do so, social science must have a
unit of measurement, such as money, which is the measure for

economic energy. Therefore, money (or price units) may serve as
a unit for the measurement of all the social transformations of
energy. The reasons are as follows:
''Biological energy is the central motor of social phenomena.
Passing through a series of transformations in the forms of
political, juridical, moral, aesthetical, intellectual, and religious
phenomena ; it eventually arrives at economic energy, which,
being measured through money (gold), serves for the
measurement of biological energy itself. Economic energy plays
there the same role as heat energy in mechanics." Comparing the
social utility (which is a general form of bio-social energy) of a
material, or its immaterial value, with the social utility of gold, we
may obtain
^^ Lenergie socialc, pp. 124-127.
28
an index of the intensity and the amount of energy in the social
object; comparing it with the indices of other objects expressed in
the same gold value we may obtain some of the approximate
quantitative data necessary for the creation of quantitative ''social
mechanics." ''Gold is a general social equivalent, an incarnation
and personification of bio-social energy. At the same time it is a
general transformer: the greater part of material and immaterial
values may be produced through corresponding money
expenditures." This furnishes the possibility of making them
measurable in units of the same money. It is up to the future
energetics to realize these quantitative social mechanics.^^
Such is the essence of Winiarsky's theory of social energetics or
mechanics. The above gives an idea of the principal varieties of
the contemporary schools of social physics and social energetics,

or mechanics.^^ Postponing for a moment an analysis of
^^ Venergie sociale, pp. 262-287.
^2 The theories which refute any psychological interpretation of
social phenomena and any use of "subjective" terms, and which
use such terms as "social pressi-ire" or "pressures of social
groups" or "energies of social activity" and so on, remain
undiscussed. According to their intentions, they show also an
inclination to a "mechanistic" or "energetistic" interpretation of
social facts; but, in their realization of this intention, they usually
fail to carry it on. The Process of Government and Relativity in
Man and Society by Arthur F. Bentley, may serve as conspicuous
examples of the works of this kind. Being rather justified in his
criticism of various psychological explanations of social
phenomena, A. Bentley (see his The Process of Government,
1908, pp. 7-8, 17-18, 35-37, 50 and sbsqnt. and passim), in his
constructive plan, fails to carry on his objectivism and physicism
into his interpretation of social phenomena. He finally reduces his
"pressures" to the "interests," and, in this way, reintroduces into
sociological interpretation the same "psychical and subjective
factors" which he had so vigorously attacked in the first part of his
work. The same is true in regard to his new work. Relativity in
Man and Society, 1926, Besides not making a quite successful
application of the mathematical theory of relativity to social
science, Bentley's "reforming" of sociology in this book is purely
terminological, rather than factual. For any serious partisan of
objectivism in sociology, it is impossible to accept Ratzenhofer's
"interests," or Simmel's "forms" or Durkheim's "social mind" and
"collective representations," as basic explanatory principles of an
objective social science. It is evident that these principles are
purely subjective, and are of the same nature as H. Spencer's
"affections" and A. Small's "interests," which are so strongly
criticized by Bentley himself. In spite of this, as though forgetting
his own criticism, Bentley strongly praises these theories in his

new book and by this, he once more shows that his "objectivism"
is purely terminological. With still greater reason this may be said
of several other theories which criticize "psychologism" and
"subjectivism" in sociology; pleading for an "objective sociology,"
and abundantly using expressions like "social pressure." The
majority of them, however, are "subjective," "speculative," and
"psychological" through and through. Their "social pressures"
remain undefined, even to the authors themselves. As soon as
they start to
29
V. Pareto's works, which deserve much greater attention, let us
brietiy discuss the scientific value of the above theories.
5. CRITICISM
There is no doubt that the plans of either social physics, social
energetics, or of social mechanics, such as are laid down by the
above authors, are tempting. Indeed, what may be more
magnificent than a social mechanics which, by a series of
mathematical formulas, unveils all the mysteries of the most
mysterious drama of human history! What may be more scientific
than a discipline which successfully shows that all complex
phenomena of human behavior, of social relationship, and of
social processes, are but a mere variety of physical phenomena
subjected to the same laws and accurately described by them!
What may be more fascinating and more tempting than such a
theory! And yet, when we take the above theories and soberly try
to analyze their contributions, we are greatly disappointed.
Frankly, I think that all the above theories have contributed but
little to the scientific understanding of social phenomena. I believe
that they give only a series of superficial analogies; and that when
they attempt to reduce social phenomena to the physical, they
disfigure and misinterpret not only the social phenomena, but the
laws of physics, mechanics, energetics, and logic as well. I am

aware of the severity of this criticism, and yet it appears to me
quite justified. My reasons are as follows:
A. In the first place, the theories trangress the basic logical law of
the necessity for adequacy in a logical subject and a logical
predicate in a logical judgment. If I say, "A human being is an
animal with two eyes," my judgment is in some respects true,
because human beings have two eyes; but from the standpoint of
logical adequacy it is quite wrong, because not only human
beings, but many other animals, have two eyes also. The logical
"interpret something," the "subjectivism" and "psychologism,"
which they pitilessly banished before, are at once reintroduced
under slightly changed names, such as "psycho-social
environment," "psycho-social factors," and so on. As a result,
such works do not have the positive qualities of either a purely
psychological interpretation, or even of purely objective,
mechanistic, or be-havioristic interpretations; while they do have
the shortcomings of both. Their mtention to build an objective
sociology remains in fact a mere "^Va desideria."
30
predicate, *'animal with two eyes," is referred here to the class:
''human being," which is much narrower than the class of animals
which really has two eyes. Hence, the logical inadequacy of, the
judgment. If, on the other hand, I say, ''A human being is an
animal which shaves his whiskers," my judgment will be again
inadequate, because there are human beings who do not have
whiskers (females) and who do not shave them. Here the logical
predicate is referred to a logical subject which is in fact much
broader than is indicated in the judgment. These examples show
two kinds of logical inadequacy in judgments: one, where the
logical predicate is referred to a logical subject which, in fact, is

much narrower; and another, where it is really a much broader
class than the classes (logical subjects) to which the predicate's
characteristic are attached in the judgments. All such judgments
are unscientific, and the most common shortcomings of various
hypotheses and theories consist in just these two kinds of
inadequacies ; all the improved and more scientific
generalizations have consisted merely in the substitution of a
more adequate for a less adequate logical statement. Copernicus'
theory is better than Ptolemy's because it is more adequate.
Newton's laws of mechanics are better than those of Kepler for
the same reason.
Not all concepts and theories which may be unreproachable from
some standpoint, have a real scientific value. For instance about
such classes of phenomena as "ten-cent cigars" or ''dogs with
long tails and short necks," it would be possible to make so many
"true statements" that their exposition would fill many volumes.
About "ten-cent cigars" it would be possible to state that they are
subjected to the law of gravitation, that they fall down according to
such and such laws of mechanics, that their size may enlarge
according to such and such laws or physics, and so on.
Furthermore, it would be possible to make a series of "true
statements" concerning their chemical composition. Additional
volumes of our imaginary science on "ten-cent cigars" could be
filled by truths of a biological and botanical character. Similar
voluminous "sciences" could be created about "dogs with long
tails and short necks," about "pewter soldiers," and so on and so
forth. But such "sciences" would be nothing but a mockery of, or a
parody of, a real science.
31
These are conspicuous examples of how scientific theories ought
not to be made, rightly says Petrajitzky.'"^^
Their unscientific character consists in their logical inadequacy, in

that their statements (logical predicates) are referred to the
inappropriate,in this case to classes of logical subjects which
are too narrow,while these statements (logical predicates)
ought, in fact, to be referred to much broader classes of logical
subjects. For example, the statements of inertia, gravitation, and
so on in our pseudo-science, are made only about cigars,
specifically, "ten-cent cigars"; while they in fact ought to be
applied to all material objects, that is, to an incomparably broader
class of phenomena. Such pseudo-scientific theories are only
misleading, because they create the supposition that the
characteristics given to a class of objects represent only their
specific traits,something which belongs only to them, and to
nothing else.^*
As there is no limit to the creation of such classes, and as the
capacity of the human memory is limited, an abundance of such
theories and "sciences" would become a greater burden for us
than their absence. ^^
The same, with a corresponding modification, may be said of the
theories in which the logical predicate (the characteristics) is
ascribed to a much larger class of phenomena than that to which
it really belongs. Such are, for instance, the judgments* ''All
organisms have two hands," "All human beings are Roman
Catholics," "All Americans are blonds," "All professors are
geniuses," "All monarchs are cruel," and so on.
The above makes clear what I mean by the "logical inadequacy"
of a judgment or theory. Now it is easy to see why the above
energetistic or mechanistic theories are inadequate. In the first
place, they are a variation of the above pseudo-scientific theory of
"ten-cent cigars." The laws of physical mechanics do not say
" vSee a brilliant analysis of this principle of the logical adequacy
of the logical subject and i^redicate in Petrajitzkv, L., Introduction
to the Theory of Law and Morals, (Russ., Vedenie v teoriju prava i

nravstvennosty), St. Petersburg, 1907, passim. See also
Tschuproff, A. A., Essays in the Theory oj Statistics, (Russ..
Ocherki po teorii sfatistiki), St. Petersburg, 1909, passim.
Petrajitzsky, L., op cit., pp. 72-77, passim.
i*^ Tsciii TRoi-i', A., op. cit., pj). 1-20, and passim.
32
that they are appHed to all material bodies with the exception of
human bodies. They are applied to human bodies and to all other
social things of a physical character also. Therefore, there is no
reason to insist on, and to create, a special theory of "social
gravitation," or "social inertia," or a "law of social entropy," or any
special law of physical mechanics. The "mechanists" try to break
with violence into a room whose doors are open. The laws of
physics, mechanics, and chemistry are applied to all social
objects of a physical character, and there is no reason to make a
noise about creating a "human physics," a "human gravitation" or
a "human chemistry." Such attempts are nothing but efforts to
create a "physics, chemistry, and mechanics of dogs with long
tails and short necks." In this respect the theories discussed are
inadequate, and therefore defective.
But one form of inadequacy in a theory is usually followed by
another form, and this we see in the mechanistic theories. Trying
to interpret man and social phenomena in the light of the
principles of mechanics or general energetics, they disregard a
series of the specific characteristics of social phenomena, which
belong only to the human world, and which do not belong to other
physical, chemical, or energetic phenomena. As a result of the
school's "equalization" of social and physical phenomena, the
theories ascribe to physical phenomena a series of human

characteristics (anthropomorphism), and take off from social
phenomena a series of their specific traits. Because of this, the
laws of mechanics are disfigured, their "nature" is made
"anthropomorphic" and the essentials of social phenomena are
passed over, without even touching them.
It may be true that social instinct is nothing but a variety of
physkal gravitation, yet, can we say that each ])henomenon of
gravitation, for instance, of the earth and the moon, is a "social
instinct" ? It may be true, as Voronoff says, that the "social
phenomena of association and cooperation are nothing but those
of the addition and multiplication of forces"; but does this mean
that each case of addition and multiplication of forces studied by
mechanics is a social phenomenon of cooperation and
association? Evidently not. If not, then what is the difference
between social cooperation and association, and between other
33
cases of addition and multiplication of forces studied by
mechanics? We do not find any answer to the question in the
above theories. It may be true that war and social struggle are the
phenomena of ''subtraction of forces," but does this mean that
each case of subtraction of forces studied by mechanics is war
and social struggle? If the phenomena of law are those of "corelation and coordination of forces," then what is the dififer-ence
between this "coordination of forces" and the coordination of
forces A and B which are at the ends of a lever? In spite of the
fact that the second case is also "coordination of forces." it is by
no means a phenomenon of law. We are told by the energetists
that the dissipation of heat through radiation, and the
phenomenon of crime are both phenomena of wasted energy.
Does this, however, mean that all dissipation of heat, and every
waste of energy is "crime"? W. Ostwald may be right in saying
that language, law, commerce, state, culture, government and

other social phenomena are nothing but transformations of a rude
energy into a useful one. Does this, however, signify that each
case of such a transformation, studied by physical mechanics,
composes the phenomena of language, law, government, and so
on? Evidently not. If not, what is the difference between the
transformation of the energ}' of sun-heat, or in that of the
mechanical motion of wind and in these cases of cultural
phenomena? It may be that wealth and money are nothing but
concentrated useful energy. Does it follow from this that any
concentrated energy (for instance, the energv' of a volcano) is
money and wealth?
The above shows the other side of the logical inadequacy of the
criticised theories. They study social phenomena only as purely
physical manifestations. All that is specific in social facts, and all
that differentiates them from an inorganic substance, is factually
excluded from the study. Human beings are simply transformed
into a mere physical mass; facts of social life, human conduct,
heroism, crime, love, hatred, struggle, cooperation, organization,
ethics, religion, arts, literature, and so on,all these are
transformed into a mere "physical mass," and a study is made of
its transformation and its "motion." In this way all that IS specific
in social phenomena is lost, being passed over and left
34
without any analysis. This means that social physics and
energetics are useless, because they do not study social
phenomena as something specifically different from ''physical
mass" and *'its motion." They are useless also because human
beings, as a physical mass, are studied by physics, chemistry and
mechanics; and there is no reason for the existence of a social
physics and mechanics which would do the same.
This conclusion would remain valid even if it could be shown that

human beings and their interrelations are a mere combination of
electrons. Even in this case, the ''human" combination of
electrons would remain a specific combination, differing from any
combination in an inorganic or organic body, and necessitating a
separate study."''^ Thus the monism of the discussed theories
leads to a double fallacy: it disregards all the specific
characteristics in social phenomena; and, at the same time,
ascribes to general physical phenomena some of the
characteristics which do not belong to them, but rather, only to the
kingdom of man and social phenomena. This is the fundamental
shortcoming of these theories.
B. The above is well corroborated by the factual generalizations
given by social physicists, mechanists, and energetists. Take, for
instance, Carey's law of social gravitation. At first glance it
appears to be something valuable, but merely a superficial
analysis would show its complete fallacy at once. The factual
study of the growth and decay of cities does not corroborate the
statements. Cities do not "attract" the human molecules in direct
ratio to the mass or in the inverse ratio of the distance. Any
statistician who would predict the rate of growth (or of decrease in
the size) of a city on the basis of this law, would be doomed to
failure. The law does not at all explain why some places,
uninhabited before, become the abode of a rapidly growing city, at
one period; nor why this city stops growing and declines at
another period. In brief, the law is rather useless for an
explanation of the real facts of the concentration and dispersion of
population. It is evident also that Carey's other "identifications" of
the physical and social laws do not amount to anything
^^ See a detailed discussion of this in Sorokin, System of
Sociology, Vol. I, pp. 7-10.
35
beyond curious analogies whose scientific value is nil. They do

not, and cannot, explain anything in the real movement of social
processes.
Bechtereff's 'Maws" are nothing but a caricature of scientific law,
in which the meanings of the laws of physics and chemistry, as
well as of social facts, are disfigured. The conclusion must be
similar concerning the theories of Solvay, Ostwald, Haret,
Barcelo, Winiarsky, and others. So far as they only repeat the
statements of physics, mechanics, and chemistry, they represent
a useless and somewhat misleading duplication of the truths of
these scientific disciplines. As far as they try to identify physical
and mechanical laws with social ones, they give only fallacious
analogies which do not, and cannot, explain anything in the field
of ''social mechanics." To say that the "primary cause of the
movement of individuals is attraction," is to say something which
can either be proved or disproved. To say that the universal
phenomenon of gravitation assumes the forms of food and sex
attraction in the social field, is meaningless or fallacious analogy.
If the analogy were well founded, we would have to expect that
sex and food attraction would be in the direct ratio of the mass,
and in the inverse ratio of the distance (of food or sex). Obviously
there is no reason for such an absurd statement, and the analogy
is, therefore, baseless. To identify an equalitarian movement
(which is besides, depicted wrongly) with the phenomenon of
entropy, or the phenomenon of social differentiation with that of
thermodynamics, signifies no more than a curious and useless
analogy; an analogy which explains nothing in the phenomena of
equalization or differentiation in their appearance and change. Let
some one try to "explain" by means of this analogy either the
origin and development of a caste-regime, or the "democratic
movement" in any country at any time. Such an investigator will
see at once that Winiarsky's thermodynamic principles do not
work at all, giving no help to the understanding of these
processes and their development. Take any of the generalizations
of the school and try to apply them in an explanation of any social

phenomena. The results will be the same for they neither work
nor explain anything. A number of the representatives of the
school
36
36 CONTEMPORABY SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES
insist on a quantitative study of social phenomena, but not one of
them has produced a single quantitative formula, or given a
coefficient of correlation between two or more social processes. It
is true that they copied and put into their articles several formulas
of physical mechanics, but alas, they themselves do not know
how to apply them, nor how to use them in regard to social facts.
Since no unit for the measurement of "social forces" has been
found as yet, all these formulas are to be regarded as a mere
exercise in the copying of mechanical formulas, nothing more.
The fictitious character of all these formulas is shown by
Winiarsky himself. After all his sweeping statements and
formulas, when he comes to the problem of the measurement of
social phenomena, all that he can offer is a statistical study and
statistical comparison of various social phenomena, in spite of all
his principles and formulas of social mechanics. This is a
convincing manifestation of the inapplicability of these formulas
and principles.
Finally, let us take the behavior of individuals, A, B, C, D. Can we
explain the immense variety of their actions through the principle
of physical mechanics, through that of inertia, gravitation, or by
means of the principles of levers of the first and of the second
orders, and so on? Do they help us to understand why A
becomes a hermit, B marries, C dies on a battlefield, D writes a
poem, and so on? Do these principles throw a light on the
religious, political, aesthetical, and other social phenomena? Can
they explain why the history of one people has developed in one
way, and that of another in quite a different manner? It is sufiicient

merely to put these questions in order to see that we are still very
far from being able to reduce social phenomena and their
mechanics to the -simple laws of physical mechanics. For this
reason we should be modest in our desire to make such a
reduction. We cannot set forth daring but Utopian pretensions.
Under the existing circumstances, such pretensions are rather
comical and childish.^^
The above is sufficient to show the fallacies of the school. In spite
of its tempting character, it has not produced anything really
scientific, after the social physics of the seventeenth century. Only
in an indirect way has it served social science, especially through
" SoROKiN, ibid., p. 8.
37
the social physics of the seventeenth century. This service has
consisted in the school's insistence on the quantitative and causal
study of the social facts; and in its premature, but suggestive
pretensions to view the social processes ''mechanically." This has
influenced social science and facilitated quantitative and causal
studies of social phenomena. Apart from this service,
contemporary social mechanics, physics, and energetics do not
amount to anything conspicuously valuable. Only a further and a
great progress of social science may give a real basis for future
social mechanics, but it will probably be radically different from
the present ''social mechanics" as a mere transfer of the
conception and laws of physical mechanics into the field of social
phenomena.
6. ViLFREDO PaRETO ^^ AND OtHERS
PARETO'S CONCEPTION OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF A
SPECIAL SCIENCE TO SOCIOLOGY
Earlier than Winiarsky and many other representatives of social

mechanics, Pareto, following the works of Gossen, Walras,
Jevons, Cournot, and Edgeworth, laid down his theory of a "pure
economics," or other pure social science, which corresponds to
"rational mechanics" and of its relationship to sociology.
In rational mechanics, two kinds of motions are studied; the real
and the virtual. The former are those which really take place; the
second are those which are to follow under certain circumstances,
indicated in a hypothesis, which will help us to understand the
characteristics of the real motions. ... A study of the real
movements would be almost exclusively descriptive; while a study
of the virtual movements would be essentially theoretical. The
former may be synthetic; the latter, analytic. The human intellect
cannot fruitfully study various phenomena at the same time; we
must consider them one after another. From this follows an
absolute necessity for isolating, more or less arbitrarily, the
various parts of a phenomenon and studying them separately in
order that they may later be re-united into one bunch to obtain a
synthetic concept of a real phenomenon. . . . Pure political
economy corresponds to rational mechanics.
Like it, pure political economy has to sim])lify the complex
^* Born in Paris, in 1848, of Italian parents. Died in 1923.
Professor of Economics and vSociolopjy at the University of
Lausanne, Switzerland. See Pareto's biography in Pantaleoni, M.,
"In occasione della morta di Pareto," Giomale degli Econimisti,
Nos. 1-2, 1924.
38
reality and to take the simplest isolated conditions and the
simplest homo-ceconomiciis (the virtual economic phenomena) to
make their analytical study possible. In such a study, human

beings must be regarded as mere hedonistic molecules, as in
rational mechanics the complex solid bodies are regarded as
mere material points. When such a study is made there comes
the synthetic stage in which all the analytical data of pure
economics and of other pure sciences are to be united to explain
the real and complex social phenomena. Though man always
remains homo-ooconomicus, he is in reality, something much
more complex than a hedonistic molecule. We must take into
consideration his affections, instincts, prejudices and so on. In
order to explain the real complex economic phenomena, we must
take into consideration all the important factors which we
disregard in our ''pure economics," but which in reality exist and
influence ''pure economic phenomena." The one science which
uses the conclusions of pure economics and of other pure social
sciences, making a synthesis of their data, is sociology. Thus, as
pure economics begins to take more and more into consideration
all the important human traits, and proceeds its synthetic way, it
begins to turn more and more into sociology, as the synthetic
science of a real man and of real social phenomena.^^
The same is true in regard to any special pure science. This has
been exactly the way in which Pareto, from a "pure economist"
became a sociologist. Like the methods of rational mechanics,
those of pure economics are essentially mathematical.
Mathematical or functional also are the methods of synthetic
social science, as the science which studies mutual dependence
of various social phenomena. (See more about this point.) This
gives an idea about Pareto's "pure economics" and of other "pure
social sciences"; and of their relation to sociology. These ideas
were brilliantly realized by Pareto in his treatises on economics.^^
^^ Pareto, V., "II compito della sociologia fra le scienze sociali,"
Rivista Italiana di sociologia, July, 1897; "I problemi della
sociologia," ihid., 1899; "Un applicazione di teorie sociologiche,"
ihid., 1900; Trate de sociologie generate, Vol. II, Paris, 1919,

2009-2024.
^ See Pareto, V., Cours d'economie politique, 1896-97,
Lausanne; Les syst^mes socialistes, Paris, 1902-3; Manuale di
economia politica, Milano, 1906; and a long series of Pareto's
articles published m the leading Italian, French, and Swiss
economic and sociological Journals.
39
They gave him a well-deserved fame and the leadership in the
field of mathematical economics, greatly influencing Winiarsky
and other partisans of the mechanistic school in sociology. In this
way, Pareto became the originator of this school in contemporary
sociology, so I shall discuss his theory in this chapter. I do not
mean to suggest by this, however, that Pareto's sociology is in
any way similar to the primitive ''social mechanics" criticized
above. Pareto was too original and too serious a thinker to satisfy
himself with the above somewhat childish ''mechanical
analogies." Proceeding from purely analytical economics to a
more and more synthetic study of the real (complex) social
phenomena, he remained a "mechanisticist" only as far as the
"mechanistic method" means, according to K. Pearson, the most
accurate and the shortest description of a studied phenomenon.
In all other respects Pareto's sociology has very little in common
with the above "mechanistic theories." A summary of Pareto's
sociological conceptions is given in his two large volumes,
Trattato di sociologia gcnerale, which was published in Italian in
1915-16, (translated into French in 1917-19) ; and in his Les
systemes socialistes, which two are the most important of all his
sociological works. Trattato is not a textbook. It has nothing in
common with the usual type of "The Principles," "The
Foundations," and the "General Sociologies." Pareto's treatise is
the product of an original and outstanding scientific mind. It has
been said to be as original and important as Vico's and Machiavelli's treatises.^^ If such an estimation may be accepted, the
outstanding value of Pareto's works is beyond doubt. Beyond
doubt also is Pareto's great infiuence on Italian and French
economic and sociological thought, and also on political thought
" vSee R. Michels' quoted paper about Italian sociology and
Pareto's works in Kolner Vierteljahrshefte ftir Soziologie, JulyAugust, 1924; the same in Revue intern, de Sociologie, 1924, pp.
518-530; Bousquet, G. H., "V. Pareto," Revue intern, de
Sociologie, 1924, pp. 113-117; Bousquet, Grundriss der
Soziologie Paretos, 1926; Carli, F., "Paretos soziologisches
System und der Behaviorismus," Kolner Vierteljahrshefte ftir
Soziologie, IV. Jahrgang, 3 u. 4 Heft; GlNO Borgatta, L'Opera
sociologica e le feste guibilari di V. Pareto, Torino, 1917; Jubile du
V. Pareto, Lausanne, 1920, (publ. by the University of Lausanne,
where Pareto was professor); a special number of Giornale degli
Economisti, Nos. 1-2, 1924, dedicated to Pareto and composed of
the papers of R. Michels, M. Pantaleoni, E. Baronc, G. del
Vecchio, R. Benini, E. Ciccotti, and of other prominent economists
and sociologists.
40
and practice in Italy. As is known, the ideology of the Italian
Fascism has taken a great deal from the theories of Pareto. The
outstanding character of his theories is well witnessed also by
those socialist and anti-Fascist writers who have styled him the
"Karl Marx of Bourgeoisie." So much about Pareto's general
characteristics. Let us now turn to his Tratfato. Like almost all
writers about Pareto, I must give warning. His Tratfato is so poorly
written, and the material is so carelessly arranged, that in a brief
summary it is impossible to give any adequate idea of Pareto's
work.^- It must be read and studied in the original. Even the best
analysis will be only a shadow of the work itself.^^ All that I can do
here is to give such a shadow of the leading ideas of Pareto's
theory.
WHAT PARETO UNDERSTANDS BY SCIENTIFIC SOCIOLOGY
By scientific sociolog}' Pareto means a ''logico-experimental
science" based exclusively on the observation of and
experimentation with, the facts. No reasoning, no speculation, no
morali-zation, nothing which goes beyond the facts, or does not
describe their uniformities or qualities can compose an element or
a theory of logico-experimental sociology. In other wôrds, no a
priori element or principle is to enter in, or to be admitted to,
sociology. The propositions and statements of such a sociology
are nothing but a description of the facts and their uniformities. As
such, they never are absolute, but relative, being subject to
change as soon as new facts show their inaccuracy. The
categories of "necessity," "inevitability," "absolute truth," or
"absolute determinism," and so on, are out of such a science. Its
propositions are only more or less probable, being based on the
principle of,
^2 Bousquet rightly says: "Trattato est aussi mat redige que
possible. . . ' Uahondance des preuves experimentales nuit cL la
clarte de demonstration, les sujets sent abordes sans aucun
esprit de suite, et le lecteur ne comprend pas oil il z;a." Op. cit., p.
ii6. Comp. Barone, E., Giornale d. Economist', 1924, p. 22. There
is a short compendium of Pareto's Treatise by Farina; but even it
does not give an adequate idea of Pareto's work.
" In this respect Pareto's work reminds one of the works of
another outstanding sociologist and economist, Max Weber. In
spite of quite different starting points and terminology, the
methodological conclusions of both authors (in the field of
sociology) are very similar. Since the most important sociological
work of M. Weber concerns the problem of religion, it will be more
convenient to discuss his sociology in the chapters on the

sociology of religion.
41
and being measured according" to, the theory of probabiHty.
Nothing that is beyond observation or experimentation may
become the object of such a science. About such problems,
logico-experimental sociology can say nothing. No entity, no
absolute principle, no absolute value, no moral evaluation
nothing that lies beyond observation and experimental verification
may be come a component of a "logico-experimental sociology."
Up to this time, almost all sociological theories have not been
such logico-experimental propositions. To this or that degree they
have always been dogmatic, metaphysical, non-logicoexperimental, absolute and ''moralizing." They usually trespass
the boundaries of facts, observation, experimentation, and even
of logic. From this standpoint, August Comte's or Herbert
Spencer's ''sociologies" are almost as unscientific as those
theological and religious theories which they criticize. Under other
names, these and other sociologies, have introduced into their
theories the same "superfactual and super-experimental entities"
(moral evaluation, dogmatism, "religion of Progress and
Evolution," religion of "Positivism," and so on) which are nothing
but the super-observational and superfactual "entities" and
"absolutes" of the criticized religious doctrines, only slightly
changed verbally. Sociological theories of the "Religion of
Mankind," the "Religion of Solidarity," or of "Democracy"; the
concepts of "Progress," "Socialism," "Evolution," "Brotherhood,"
"Liberty," "Justice," "Equality," and so on; theories which preach
what ought to be and what ought not to be; theories which
evaluate what is good and what is bad; and various "laws** of
evolution and development,all such theories and propositions,
so abundantly scattered throughout contemporary social and
sociological thought, are as unscientific as any "theology,"

because they are nothing but a modification of it. Like it, they are
not based on facts or observation nor do they describe the
characteristics and uniformities of the facts, but dogmatically
command what ought to be, or postulate some entities which lie
beyond observation and experimentation.^"^
Such, in brief, is Pareto's conception of the logico-experimental
science of sociology. It is easy to see that this conception of
^ Sec Pareto, v., Traitc de sociologic gcnerale. Vol. I, pp. 1-64,
Paris, 1917.
42
science is similar to that of A. Cournot, E. Mach, R. Avenarius, H.
Poincare, A. Rey, P. Duhem, K. Pearson, A. Tschuproff, F.
Enriques, partly to that of H. Vaihinger, and M. Weber,^^ and to
that of some other prominent representatives and theorizers of
contemporary science. This does not mean that Pareto denies
any usefulness in the non-logico-experimental theories and
beliefs ; but on the contrary, he, more than anybody else, insists
on the fact that "the non-scientific" (or the non-logico-experimental
theories) are very often useful and necessary for the existence of
a society, while the logico-experimental theories may often be
socially harmful. In this way Pareto separates the categories of
Truth and Usefulness. If, nevertheless, he pitilessly expels all the
non-logico-experimental propositions from the field of science, he
does it only to avoid a mixture of science with other forms of
social thought.
QUANTITATIVE DESCRIPTION OF THE FUNCTIONAL
INTERDEPENDENCE OF SOCIAL PHENOMENA INSTEAD OF
ONE-SIDED CAUSATION
The next important part of Pareto's methodology is his criticism of

the concept of one-sided causation in its application to the study
of social phenomena. The concept of a "cause" and **efTect"
supposes a relationship of one-sided dependence between two or
more phenomena. Factually, such a relationship is almost never
given in the relationship of various social phenomena. As a rule
they are mutually dependent. If, for instance, the qualities of the
members of a society influence its social organization, the latter
also influences the former. For this reason, the conception of a
one-sided relationship of a cause and effect could not be applied
to a scientific study of social phenomena. When it is applied, it
shows the fallacy of either a "simplicist" theory or of a
"cinematographic" one. By the fallacy of a "simplicist theory," I
mean the following: Let us take a society. Its character and
equilibrium are composed of, and are dependent on, geo^ From a quite different standpoint Max Weber also comes to the
conclusion that sociological regularities are nothing but
"Erwartungschancen'' or typical probability-expectations. vSee
Weber, M., Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Grundriss der
Spzialokonomik, III. 1921-22, p. 14; Gesammelte Aufsdtze zur
Wissenschafts-lehre, 1922, pp. 420, 444 ff.
43
graphical environment; (A) economic situation; (B) political
constitution; (C) religion; (D) ethics and knowledge; (E) and so on.
All these variables mutually depend on, and mutually influence,
one another. Through this interaction they permanently change
the character of a society and its equilibrium. We have then a
mutual dependence of these "variables," and a dynamic
equilibrium of a society, which may pass permanently from one
state:
A, B, C, D, E to another
A', B', C, D', E'

A'', B'', C, D'', E'' and so on
Now a "simplicist" theorizer takes an element A, as a cause, and
tries to view B, C, D and E, as its ''effects." ^^ Some other
simplicists may take B, or C, or D, as a "cause" and try to view the
other elements as effects. In this way we receive, and we indeed
have, plenty of various contradictory theories which all represent
a simplicist type of sociological theory, (all of them being onesided theories which try to explain the whole social life through a
geographic, racial, economic, political, or any other factor). As a
result of such a procedure, the theory is inevitably one-sided; its
generalizations, inadequate; its diagnoses, false; and its formulas,
fallacious; to say nothing of the useless fights between various
simplicist theories which are caused.
The following is meant by the fallacy of a "cinematographic"
theory. The sociologists observe and describe the transition of A
into A', A" and so on; the transition of B into B', B" . . .; and of C
into C, C" . . . just as we are shown picture after picture in a
motion picture drama. This transition is described by these
cinematographic theories under the name of evolution. By this
description they limit their task, and think that every^ For instance, F. de Coiilanp:es says, "the domestic religion
taught man to appropriate land and guaranteed his rights of
property." Pareto shows how fallacious is this statement, and how
the concept of a cause (instead of a mutual dependence) is
responsible for the fallacy. Pareto, ibid., Vol. I, pp. 254-255. In the
same way he gives a series of similar "causal theories" of August
Comte, Herbert Spencer, H. S. Maine, Duruy, J. S. Mill, and so
on, and convincingly shows their fallacious character due to the
same reason. Ibid., 256 ff. For the same reason he is right in
saying that the majority of various anthropological and
ethnographic "explanations" are defective.
44
thing in the way of a scientific study is completed. The fallacy of
such theories, even when their schemes of an "evolution" are
accurate (which is rare) is in their superficiality. They do not, and
cannot, give any generalization beyond a purely empirical,
^'historical description." They cannot supply us with ''formulas of
uniformities," and do not give any analysis of the phenomena.^^
In order to avoid either of these fallacies, sociology has to deal
with the concept of a functional relationship between social
phenomena instead of a one-sided causal relationship.
Conceptions of "cause" and "effect" must be superseded by those
of a "variable" and "function." In a purely methodological way it is
necessary in the beginning to isolate a definite "variable" which is
always present as a component of social phenomena and then to
study its "functional relationship" to the other phenomena B, C, D,
E. The same must be done in regard to the "other variables" B, C,
D, E. When this stage is finished, a series of the obtained
"formulas" of functional correlation should be introduced for the
study of the complex series of interdependent social phenomena.
A, B, C, D. . . .^^ In this synthetic stage of the study, our primary
attention should be given to those social relationships which are
relatively constant. We must observe their fluctuations in time and
space and the interdependence and correlation of these
oscillations. We must grasp the repeated uniformities in their
complex variation and change, describing them qualitatively, and
measuring them quantitatively. All that is unique, or quite
irregular, non-repeated, or "incidental," we must leave, at least for
a time, until we have at our disposal the formulas for the series of
the most important "uniformities" and their quantitative indices. De
minimis non curat praetor. In this way we will obtain a series of
"successive approximations" to the complex reality. Contrary to
those of the simplicist theorists, these "successive
approximations" will be about accurate.^^ They will also differ

from those of the cinematographic theories,
" Pareto, ihid., 2023. Comp. Barone, E., "L'opera di V. Pareto e
il pro-gresso della scienza," Giornale d. Economisti, 1924, pp. 2224.
'8 Comp. Weber, M., Gesammelte Aufsdtze zur
Religionssoziologie, Tubingen, 1922, Vol. I, pp. 21-22, 82, 183,
238, and passim.
" Compare with M. Weber's corresponding theory of the purpose
of sociological generalization. See further about M. Weber.
45
in that they will give us an insight into the functional relationship of
the phenomena and formulas of uniformities, and the indices of
correlations, which approximately describe the most fundamental
social processes. Thus these points of Pareto's methodology may
be summed up as follows:
A. A conception of mutual dependence instead of onesided dependence.
B. A conception of functional relationship instead of that
of cause-effect.
C. A study of the constant elements of a social system instead of its unique, incidental, and quite irregular components
D. A study of the uniformities and correlations in the
fluctuation (in space and time) of these constant elements.
E. A quantitative measurement of the uniformities, their

fluctuation, and their correlation, instead of a purely qualitative
description.
F. Following this method, we will obtain a series of
formulas which represent a successive approximation
to the extremely complex social reality and its
dynamics."^*^
* Again, it is easy to see that these methodological propositions
are practically identical with those of H. Poincare, E. Mach,
Duhem, K. Pearson, and other noted methodologists of science.
They are also in complete agreement with a quite recent trend in
the interpretation of causal relation, determinism, and so on in
natural sciences. These concepts are more and more losing their
metaphysical flavor of "inevitableness" and "necessity," being
transformed into the theories of functional relations, which are
based on the principles of probability. In accordance with Pareto's
principles also is the recent development of the quantitative
studies of social phenomena, of mathematical statistics, and of
the mathematical theory of correlation (including partial
correlation), and a
"Pareto, op. fit., Vol. I, pp. XIII-XVI; 96, 99, 138, 254-255, 267,
and passim; Vol. II, 1731-1732, 1767, 1861, 2061, 2080, 20882104, 2336, and passim. Pareto's criticism of the "causal" theories
of the most prominent authorities is highly instructive.
46
trend to perfection in the mathematical theories of variables, and

so on.
Now let us see briefly how this plan has been carried on by
Pareto. His subsequent propositions, backed by a long and
elaborate inductive analysis of the facts and mathematical
formulas, may be outlined here only schematically. Those who
are anxious to study Pareto's corroborations should turn to his
work, where nearly two thousand pages are filled by
corresponding proofs.
pareto's concept of society
Some sociologists depict society as an organism; some others, as
a mere totality of individuals, while still others use the term
mechanism. Accordingly, we have sociological organicists,
realists, nominalists, and mechanisticists. Pareto remains rather
out of all these schools. For him an existing social group is a mere
"social system" which, as long as it exists, is in a state of
equilibrium; that is, in a state in which the forces which try to
disrupt the social system are successfully counterbalanced by the
integrating forces. Following the path of other social physicists,
Pareto, for the sake of simplifying the study, views society as a
system of human molecules which are in a complex mutual
relationship."^^
pareto's theory of factors
The concrete forms of a social system are many and various.
Then what are the factors responsible for a certain form of it? "A
form of society is determined by all the elements which influence
it: the form in its turn reacting on these elements." All these
elements, or factors, may be divided into three classes: "(i) soil,
climate, flora, fauna, geologic conditions and so on; (2) other
elements exterior to the given society at a given time; such as
other societies which are exterior to a given society
^^ Pareto, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 1306-1316, 2060 ff. Notice here
Pareto's mathematical formula of social equilibrium. Not very
different from Pareto's concept of social equilibrium is that of F.
Carli. "Social equilibrium," says Carli, "is a totality of the internal
rhythms (between the elements of a social system) and the
intemo-external, which develop in a non-contradictory maimer. In
other words it is a totality of the correlated internal and internoextemal variations which go on either being constant or varying in
a uniform manner." Carli, P., L'Equilibno delle Nazioni, Bologna,
1920, p. 34.
47
spacially, and the consequences of the preceding stages of the
society exterior to its given stage in time;" (3) the inner elements
of a social system; such as race, the character of the residues
and feelings, interests, ideologies and other qualities of the
human molecules which compose a given social system."^^
This shows that in this respect, Pareto is a pluralist. These
elements, as a rule, are mutually dependent. 'In order to explain
completely a given social form, it would be necessary to know all
these numerous elements quantitatively; their effects, their
combinations, their correlations." Unfortunately, at the present
time such a knowledge is impossible. In order to make it possible
we will have to simplify the situation, to take only some of the
more important elements, disregarding, at least for a time, the
less important ones. Only when each of these important elements
and their combinations has been studied thoroughly and
quantitatively will a complete sociological synthesis be possible.
Meanwhile, wê must satisfy ourselves with a simplified study of
the social system and of the most important factors of its
equilibrium."^^
THE ELEMENTS OR FACTORS STUDIED BY PARETO
Of the above numerous factors or elements, Pareto studies

thoroughly some specific ones, namely: (i) ''residues" (reminiscent
of Allport's "prepotent reflexes," or psychiatrists' "complexes") ; (2)
"derivations" (speech-reactions, ideologies) ; (3) economic
factors; (4) heterogeneity of human beings and social groups; (5)
social mobiHty and circulation of eHtes. It is understood that
Pareto does not think that these elements exhaust all the
important factors responsible for the form of a social system.
Many other factors are important but these are not studied by
Pareto for the reason that a thorough study of even the above five
elements is exceedingly complex and difficult. Other sociologists
will have to make a careful and quantitative study of additional
factors. This explains the character of Pareto's "Treatise in
Sociology." It is a kind of monographic study of the above
mentioned five elements in a social system. In other words,
'2 Pareto, op. cit., Vol. II, 2060. ''^ Ibid., 2061-2066.
48
Pareto simplifies methodologically a real social system, assuming
that it is composed only of these five elements; and in this way
tries to construct a rough theory which is to be an approximate
image of a real and much more complex social system. Having no
space here to follow Pareto's long and painstaking analysis of the
forms, the correlations, and combinations, the fluctuations, the
indices, and the effects of each of these five elements, all that I
can do is to give only dogmatically some of his principal
conclusions.
PARETO'S CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING THE RESIDUES
AND
DERIVATIONS
I. Among other elements, the equilibrium of a social system

depends upon the characteristics of its human molecules,
particularly on their forms of behavior, or their actions. Human
actions depend greatly on the character of their "drives.'' Among
these ''drives," the especially important are those which are
relatively constant. Pareto calls them ''residues." His residue is
not an instinct, nor is it exactly a "sentiment." It is one of the
relatively constant "drives" existing among the members of any
society, regardless of the question as to whether their constancy
is due to instinct or to something else. "Residues" are related to
what Allport styles "prepotent reflexes," L. Petrajitzky, "emotions,"
and what many psychologists style "complexes," as "an inferiority
complex," or what A. L. Lowell calls "dispositions." In the final
analysis they are based on instincts, but contrary to them, their
manifestation is not "rigid," but varies greatly, assuming the most
different, even opposite, forms. For instance, the sexual residue,
contrary to the sex-instinct, may manifest itself not only in the
actions of copulation (the proper form of satisfaction and
manifestation of the sex-instinct), but also in sexual asceticism, in
the mutilation of the sex-organs, and in the ascetic slandering of
sex-appetite and sexual life. The same may be said of other
"residues" in their interrelation to instincts."^"^ "The residues are
the manifestation of instincts and sentiments as the
''* See Pareto's detailed analysis of the residues in the quoted
work, Vol. I, Chap. VI, 842 ff; Vol. II, Chap. XI.
49
devation of mercury in a thermometer is the manifestation of a
rise in the temperature." "^^
There are six principal classes of residues, each of which is
divided into a series of subclasses. The classes are as follows: (i)
Residues of Combinations: These are the drives to make physical
and mental combinations of various things generally, of opposite
things, of like with like, of rare things with exceptional events, and
so on; (2) Residues of the Persistence of Aggregates: The drives
to keep the persistence of man's relations to other men and to
places; of the living to the dead; and the persistence of
abstractions, of symbols, of personified concepts, and so on; (3)
Residues {or Needs) of the Manifestation of Sentiments Through
Exterior Acts: Religious exaltation, political agitation, and so on;
(4) Residues in Regard to Sociability: Drives which compose
particular societies and factions; imposing a uniformity on the
members of an aggregate, such as neo-phobia, pity, cruelty,
asceticism, drive for popularity, inferiority and superiority
complexes, and so on; (5) Residues of the Integrity of Personality:
Drives which preserve one's personality against alteration, the
drive for equality, and so on; (6) Sexual Residues?^
On first approach, this classification may appear very
incongruous, and yet, when one studies its reasons, and its
analysis, it loses a great deal of this incongruity. These residues
are found in any society and, in this sense, they are constant
elements of any social system. However, their distribution among
various individuals and groups is not identical. There are
individuals (and groups) with greatly developed residues of
Combinations, but with few weak residues of the Persistence of
the Aggregate; and there are individuals and groups with the
opposite distribution. Within the same society, in the course of
time, and through various circumstances, the distribution of the
residues among its human molecules may be greatly changed.
When this happens, the social system changes its form.
2. The character of the residues determines the character of
'' Ibid., 875.
^5 Ibid., 888. See 889-1396, and 1687-2059, devoted to
an analysis of these residues.
50
human actions. They are to some extent a manifestation of the
residues. Among human beings, this manifestation assumes two
principal forms: actions not followed by speech-reactions or by
conscious subjective processes such as instinctive aad automatic
actions, (Scheme: A, [residue] leads to B, [act]) ; and actions
followed by speech-reactions and ideologies, or conscientious
psychical processes, theories, motivations, justifications,
representations of purposes, intentions, ''beautification," and other
explicit and implicit speech-reactions. The scheme is : A (residue)
leads simultaneously to jB (act)
\C (speech-reactions). All these speech-reactions and ideologies,
Pareto calls "derivations." This leads to his ''sociology of ideas
and ideologies," or to a ''sociology of human speech-reactions."
3. Some authors have properly remarked that, in this respect,
Pareto is near to K. Marx. Like Marx, he does not assign much
importance to "derivations" or "ideologies." For him they are but a
manifestation of the residues. The residues are "the father of
ideologies." The "derivations" are a kind of weathercock which
turns according to the direction of the wind of the residues. Their
influence is not nil, but it is much less than many think. They are
much more variable and flexible than the residues. The same
residue may give an origin to, or may be veiled under, different
"derivations," and vice versa. Sometimes various residues may be
"wrapped" up in similar "derivations." The following examples may
illustrate this. A residue in the form of the horror of manslaughter
is manifested in the following derivations :
"Don't kill because you will go to hell." "Don't kill because it is
forbidden by God." "Don't kill because it is immoral."
"Don't kill because it is inhuman, or against Law, Progress, and

Justice." "Don't kill!"
These derivations are only "veils" which hide the real agent
hindering the act of killing, which is the corresponding residue.
51
According to the circumstances, the residue may give origin to
these and to many other ''ideologies." In spite of many
differences, all the ideologies are practically nothing but various
"dresses" for the same residue.
The speech-reactions of an orthodox Catholic who does not admit
religious tolerance, and those of an ardent communist who
violently assails ''intolerance," are quite different. Their residues
are, however, the same; a drive to impose on all others their own
standard of conduct and beliefs. The speech-reactions of many
ascetics in regard to sex are the most critical, but the very fact
that they talk so much about sex, and so bitterly assail it, is an
indication that the residue of these "derivations" is the same as
that of the "obscene speech-reactions" of a profligate person.
4. Since action and derivations are so dependent on the residues,
there follows from this a series of very important conclusions
concerning the residues and dynamics of ideologies. First,
residues often contradict each other within the same man. Hence,
our behavior and our actions are, in greater part, also selfcontradictory and illogical. Defining "logical actions" as those in
which the intended subjective purpose of an action coincides with
its objective result, Pareto, more than any one else, shows that a
greater part of our actions are non-logical. Carried on by a
complex play of the residues, we perform an immense number of
actions which are non-logical, or in which the subjective purpose
of the action (ideology) happens to be quite different from its
objective result. Only in the field of logico-experimental behavior,
in the field of scientific performances, do they coincide. Apart from

it, and in but a few other cases, human behavior is essentially
non-logical and contradictory, because our residues are often
mutually contradictory. Our actions are inconsistent from a logical
standpoint because our residues are in a dynamic state, wherein
the dominant residue at a given moment may be quickly
succeeded by another dift'erent one. Under the influence of the
former, we behave ourselves in one way; under the influence of
the latter, in quite a different manner. In brief, Pareto's analysis of
the correlation between the dynamics of the residue and that of
action, and conclusions concerning the non-logical actions of
52
human beings, represent, possibly, an unsurpassed analysis of
human behavior.^^
5. With still greater reason, the above may be said of Paieto's
theory concerning the nature of the derivations (ideologies). Since
the relationship of the residues is so complex and often
contradictory, it is to be expected that human derivations
(ideologies and speeches) are rarely logical and accurate from a
logico-experimental standpoint. An immensely greater part of
them, including the political, religious, sociological, economic, and
whatnot ^'theories" are non-logical, inconsistent, selfcontradictory, or pseudo-scientific. They do not describe
accurately the studied facts, but represent a mere ^'motivation,"
''justification," "beau-tification," "rationalization," "moralization," or
"idealization" of a kind of behavior to which we are driven by our
residues. The residues changing, our "pseudo-scientific" theories
change also. One residue giving way to another opposite one, our
theory "A is B," gives way to that of "A is non-B." Hence, the logic
of human reasoning in the majority of the cases is far from being
logical. An ideology is accepted or non-accepted in the majority of
cases, not so much because it is true or false, but because of its

agreement or disagreement with our residues. This explains the
influence of newspaper propaganda, of fiery speeches, and of all
kinds of utterances which influence our emotions and sentiments.
Instead of scientific proof, they use the authority of purely verbal
pseudo-proofs, which appeal to our proclivities. In spite of this,
such derivations are often even more convincing than scientific
proofs, if the derivations are in agreement with the dominant
residues. Hence, if we wish to change the opinions and ideologies
of a man or a group, the best way is to change their residues. The
residues being changed or destroyed, the corresponding
derivations (ideologies) will also be changed {Ibid., Ch. XI). From
this standpoint, the sociology of Comte with its ideals (derivations)
of Positivism, Progress, and Religion of Mankind, is as
unscientific as the rudest fetishistic behef. The theories of
Progress, Solidarity, Democracy, Justice;,
'' Pareto, op. cit.y Chap. II. Compare Lowell, A. L., Public Opinion
in War and Peace, passim and Chaps. I-III. President Lowell in
his special analysis comes to conclusions very similar to Pareto's
statements.
53
Socialism, Nationalism, Patriotism, Internationalism, and so forth,
are the same non-logical derivations, only differing in form from
primitive magical and religious beliefs which they assail. Almost
all the ardent fighters of prejudices and superstitions are but a
variety of the same superstitions and similar to the dogmatic
minds whom they fight. Considering consecutively all of the most
prominent contemporary social thinkers, like Comte, Spencer, H.
Sumner Maine, not to mention a legion of various ''ideologists,"
Pareto convincingly shows the inconsistency, self-contradiction,
fallacy, and illogicity of their statements, while he indicates the
residues responsible for this ''pseudo-scientism." More than
anyone else, he has shown the ''pseudo-scientific nature" of the

"Gods (concepts) of Progress," "Evolution," "Democracy,"
"Solidarity," "Justice," "Law," "Natural Rights," "Morals," and so
on. For him these "scientific" concepts and theories are as
fallacious as any of the rudest superstitions. They are the same
non-logical derivations, only "dressed" according to the fashion of
the day. That is the whole difference. Therefore, like some of the
behaviorists, Pareto views "derivations" as "minor reactions" in
our behavior. He indicates the impossibility of basing any
scientific conclusion about a man, group, or epoch on the
corresponding speech-reactions only. For him they are only a kind
of very misleading thermometer indicating what residues are
behind them.
The above is sufficient to give an idea as to why Pareto does not
pay much attention to the "derivations." A long part of his work is
devoted to a study of the fluctuations of the derivations in
correlation with the fluctuation of the residues. Although the
residues fluctuate also, the tempo and the amplitude of their
fluctuation is much slower and limited than that of the derivations.
They are especially variable and changeable. Further, Pareto
shows that, in spite of the difference of the derivations in their
concrete forms among various people and times, the principal
classes of residues wrapped in the ideologies are relatively
constant. To a superficial observer, there is an immense
difference between a savage who deifies his fetish or king, and an
atheistic socialist of the present time; and yet both of them have
the same residue of "deification." The only difference is
54
that the savage deifies some fetish and, for a corroboration of his
behef, makes reference to a ''magic code"; while an atheist deifies
K. Marx, Lenin, or Rousseau, and for corroboration of his
statement quotes Marx's ''Capital," Rousseau's "Discourse," or

what not. In the past the residue of obedience was manifested
principally in a subordination to the kings, priests, and nobility.
Now these are slandered, but the residue remains and manifests
itself in an obedience to the demagogues, leaders of labor unions,
captains of industry, and so forth. The "dresses" are different, but
the residue is the same. The residue for imposing uniformity on
the members of a society has been manifested in the past in
religious intolerance, in a persecution of attacks on private
property, divorces, short skirts, and so on. Now we are tolerant in
this respect, but instead we have an intolerance toward drinking
(prohibition), and toward any criticism of the actions of reformers
and the followers of the "Religion of Humanity," "Progress," and
so on. Derivations have changed, but the residues remain. The
above conception of Pareto does not mean, however, that all
these derivations are absolutely inefficient or socially harmful.
They have some efficiency, though not so great as many think.
Further, in opposition to all those who think that every truth is
useful, while every superstition is harmful, Pareto stresses the
point that the real situation is different. Many prejudices
(derivations) have happened to be useful in keeping the integrity
of a social system: while many truths have facilitated its
disintegration. In other words, a derivation (myth, legend, ardent
belief, or superstition which beautifies the reality, inspiring
enthusiasm) may be useful for a group; and, on the other hand, a
naked truth may often be disastrous. In this point Pareto comes to
conclusions similar to those of Machiavelli, J. Frazer, G. Le Bon,
G. Sorel "^^ and others. In their own way, superstitions and
illusions are as vital for a society as the logico-experimental
truths. The above gives the most general outline of Pareto's
leading ideas in this respect. Briefly summarized, the material in
the book con-
" See, for instance, Frazer, J. G., Psyche's Task, Lond., 1913;
Sorel, G. Reflection on Violence, pp. 133 ff, N. Y. 1912; Sorel's
theory of the usefulness of myths.
55
sists of painstaking analyses of the influence of the residues on
derivations; of the residues on residues; the influence of
environment on the residues; of the derivations on derivations; of
the derivations on the residues; and the fluctuation and diffusion
of both the residues and the derivations. I am compelled to omit
this material because of lack of space.
6. Among other points of Pareto's theory of residues there should
be mentioned his statement that the above six classes of residues
are distributed unequally among various individuals, social
classes, and social groups. There are individuals and groups with
many and strong residues of the first class (the Residues of
Combinations) ; and there are other individuals and groups with
numerous and strong residues of the second class (of the
Persistence of Aggregates). The same is true in regard to the
other classes of the residues. This is important in the sense that
the character of the predominant residue shapes the human
personality of an individual or a group greatly. It puts a
conspicuous stamp on them, and determines to a great extent
either the behavior of an individual, or the character of the social
organization of a group. Among these classes of residues, some
of the especially important are those of the first and the second
class. On their bases Pareto outlines his hypothesis of two
principal social types of individuals: that of the speculators and
that of the rentiers. To the first type belong all those who have
strong and numerous residues of combination. They are the
combiners, entrepreneurs, and machinators, who are always
contemplating some new combination (financial and business
schemes, inventions, political and diplomatic reconstructions, or
something else). Whatever the field of their combinations is they

always have a new combination. In this respect they are
reformers and reconstructers. They do not have psychological
conservatism. Often they are unmoral and dishonest, being too
plastic in all respects. The rentiers are those whose predominant
residue is that of the persistence of the aggregate. For this
reason, they psychologically represent the type of the
conservative, those who do not care for innovations or for new
combinations; but who try to save, preserve, and maintain that
which already exists. They are the people with a strong sense of
dutv, with a narrow but
56
determined will, and with decisiveness in their actions. They may
be found among the ''narrow-minded," determined leaders of any
movement. They are rigid in their behavior and often fanatical.
In this sense, these are the eternal types found in any society.
When the first type, or the speculators, is predominant in a
government (common among democratic and plutocratic
governments), the upper classes show an ability for combination.
Through this power, they temporarily promote the economic
welfare of a society. They successfully deceive the governed
masses through various humanitarian and democratic
machinations, promises, and so on. Naturally they are corrupted.
The corruption and machination sooner or later bring disastrous
results, w^hich causes the upper classes to be eventually
superseded by the opposite type, or the rentiers. In this way, the
alternation of the types has happened many times in the history of
various countries, and is going on at this time. According to the
author, the majority of any pre-war democratic governments is
composed of the plutocratic parliamentary machinators or
corrupted ''speculators." They have an ability for combination but
at the same time they are so corrupted, and become so softhearted and ^'humanitarian," that they are superseded by people
of the type of rentiers (regardless of whether such a substitution is
good or bad)-"^^ Events seem to have considerably corroborated
Pareto's expectation.^^
PARETO'S CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING OTHER ELEMENTS
IN THE FORM OF A SOCIAL SYSTEM
In a less detailed way, Pareto also studies other important
elements of the factors of social equilibrium: the economic factors
or interests, the heterogeneity of human beings, and the social
stratification and circulation of the elites.
Economic Interests. We can scarcely question that ''individuals
and groups are pushed by instinct and reason to appropriate
useful or agreeable material values, and to seek for honors
^' See Chap. XIII, where an analysis is made of some
experimental studies of personality types analogous to the types
of Pareto.
57
and esteem," or in other words, that they have "interests." The
totaHty of such interests plays a considerable part in determining
social equilibrium. Their complex reality cannot be explained
completely by economics, but requires a synthetic sociological
study. On the other hand, sociology cannot explain the complex
social reality, unless it takes into consideration the propositions of
pure economics as a special science, which studies them in an
isolated way, and under simplified conditions. The economic
interpretation of history is right so far as it insists on the important
role of economic factors in social phenomena. But it is wrong in
so far as it tries to explain them only through this factor, or makes
it a ''cause," while other factors are made mere ''effects." To this
extent the theory is a mere variety of the above simplicist theory.

(See also the chapter upon the Economic School.)
Social Heterogeneity. The next important and constant element
or factor in a social system is the heterogeneity of the individuals.
It is again an eternal fact and an unquestioned one. Physically,
morally, and intellectually, individuals are heterogeneous. From
this heterogeneity, the phenomena of social stratification and
social inequality originate. These also are eternal and constant
elements of any social system. In connection with this part of his
theory, Pareto develops his sharp criticism of the theories of
equality, democracy, self-government, and so on. All
corresponding ideologies are mere derivations not corresponding
to the facts at all. There never has been any social or political
system in which equality or real democracy has been realised.
What is styled democracy is rather plutocracy; the control of the
governed people principally through deceit, machination, and
combination, and by demagogues, capitalists, hypocrites, and
cynical persons. Another important type of government is that of
rude coercion, which controls through the application of physical
compulsion. One may be as good or bad as another. Whatever
devices are used, the basic fact of the heterogeneity of individuals
will produce social inequality and stratification. In ideologies there
may be used such epithets as democracy, equality, and other
high-sounding phrases. They cannot, however, annul the facts of
stratification exhibited in all societies and groups.
58
Circulation of the Elites. The existence of social stratification
means that in every society there are, roughly speaking, two
principal strata: the lower and the upper classes. The distribution
of the residues among them is different, and they differ in many
other respects. Since there is a stratification, there must be also a
circulation or shifting of individuals from the lower to the upper

classes, and from the upper to the lower classes. Its
intensiveness varies from society to society and from time to time,
but, in some degree, it exists even in a caste society. One of its
permanent causes is that any existing aristocracy is, sooner or
later, doomed to disappear. ''History is a cemetery of the
aristocracies." The vacuum created by a dying out of the
aristocracy must be filled; and the filling is accomplished through
the climbing of the fitted members of the lower classes to the
upper social positions. In this way within every society goes on a
constant process of circulation of the elites. Studying some of its
details, Pareto shows the principal methods through which
aristocracy or plutocracy tries to keep its position. Such methods
are: extermination, imprisonment, bribery, corruption, and the
elevation of the possible and dangerous leaders from the lower
classes. Here again this "K. Marx of Bourgeoisie" sets forth
theories similar to those of the most radical revolutionary
syndicalists and anarchists. On the other hand, contrary to the
''softhearted ideologists of a liberal humanitarianism," he claims
that a "liberal" opinion about the inefficiency of physical and cruel
measures for the maintenance of the privileged aristocratic
positions is wrong. Together with Sorel, he states that by the
proper application of a vigorous force and cruel coercion,
aristocracy can maintain and prolong its existence; and that,
contrary to popular opinion, such cruel aristocracies have existed
for a longer time than the meek "humanitarian aristocracies." For
this reason, Pareto prophesies the downfall of the present
parliamentary, soft-hearted, and pacifist plutocracies of the
democratic countries; and the ascent of a new, rough, virile, and
militaristic aristocracy from the lower classes.^^ Such a cycle has
happened many times and will happen again in the future.
81 This has been realized by Fascism, which offered to Pareto a
place among its ideological leaders.
59
Having outlined these constant elements of a social system,
Pareto proceeds to correlate them with each other, with the
residues, the derivations, and with a series of other
phenomena.^
PARETO'S CYCLICAL CONCEPTION OF SOCIAL CHANGE
Studying the oscillations of various phenomena, Pareto gives a
series of cyclical theories for various social processes. A ''linear
conception" of social change remains strange to him. He shows
the fallacies of all ''historical tendencies," "historical laws of
evolution," and of "linear theories of the stages of progress." What
is factually given in history is only the fluctuations and oscillations
of various lengths of time, and of various velocities. The existence
of any perpetual "linear" evolution of a society or social institutions
has not been proved.
Such, in brief, is a simplified skeleton of the principal ideas of
Pareto's sociology. As I have mentioned, this can give only a
remote idea of Pareto's book. Its value lies, perhaps, not so much
in the character of his general theory, as in a series of research
monographs, whose combination it represents. An abundance of
mathematical formulas, diagrams, and a long series of historical
and factual corroborations, plus a poor arrangement of the
materials, makes an adequate summary of the work in a brief
form exceedingly difficult. Nevertheless, some idea of it has
probably been given in the above.
7. CRITICISM
In the opinion of the writer, the leading ideas of Pareto's sociology
are to be recognized as sound and promising. Though almost all
of these ideas were set forth before Pareto, he has succeeded in
developing and systematizing them. His conception of sociology
in its relationship to special social sciences is much better than a

great many other corresponding theories. His theory of the mutual
dependence of various social phenomena, and of functional and
quantitative methods of their study, is in agreement with the
present tendency in natural and social sciences. His analysis of
human behavior, of the role of the residues and
Pareto, op. cit.. Chaus. XII-XIIL
60
derivations, and of the non-logical "logic" of human actions, is
again likely to be true. His somewhat sharp and ''ironical"
utterances concerning the non-scientific character of a great
many ''sociological" theories are to be recognized as valid. His
idea of successive approximations, and of the necessity for
concen. trating our attention on relatively constant elements of the
social system, appears valuable also to me. Finally, his theory of
the heterogeneity of human individuals, of social stratification, of
the circulation of the elites, and his criticism of the "sweet"
ideologies of Progress, Democracy, Solidarity, and so on have
been corroborated and developed by many other authors. Part of
this has been done independently, and part under Pareto's
influence.^^
Side by side vîth these valuable characteristics, Pareto's theories
have some serious shortcomings. In the first place, his concept of
the residue remains somewhat unclearly defined, and,
^ The theory of the heterogeneity of individuals and groups, as we
shall see further, has been developed by a great many biologists
and sociologists of the racial and anthropological school
(Gobineau, F. Galton, H. Chamberlain, K. Pearson, O. Ammon, V.
de Lapouge and all the eugenists and hereditarists. See the
chapter about the Racial and Anthropological School). The same

authors, and many others, developed the above ideas of the
social circulation of the elites. Under Pareto's influence, the
theories of circulation and of social equilibrium were developed by
M. Kolabinska, La circulation des elites en France^ Lausanne,
1912; Sensini, G., "Teoria deU'equilibrio di composizione delle
classi sociali," Rivista Italiana di Sociologia, Sept., Oct., 1913.
See also Sensini, La teoria delta Rendita and BovEN, P., Les
applications mathematique a Veconomie politique, Lausanne,
1912; Carli, F., op. cit. Finally, the writer in his study of social
mobility, found many of Pareto's ideas suggestive. See Sorokin,
Social Mobility. See there other references concerning social
circulation and stratification. Theories similar to Pareto's leading
ideas about democracy, solidarity, inevitability of social
stratification, the plutocratic and oligarchic character of a
democratic or equalitarian r<5gime; the role of violence in history,
the dying out of aristocracy, and so on; some earlier, some later,
some independently, and some under the influence of Pareto
have been developed by a series of prominent authors. See
Danilevsky, and Leontieff, op. cit., Le Bon, G., The Crowd,
especially his Psychology of Socialism; MoscA, G., Elementi di
scienza politica, 1895; OsTROGORSKY, M., La democratic et les
parties politiques, Paris, 1912; Michels, R., Sociologia del partito
politico moderno (transl. into French, English, German); Maine,
Henry S., Popular Government, Lond., 1896; Sorel, G.,
Reflections on Violence; Kropotkin, P., A Rebel's Speeches
(Rechi buntovtschika), Russ., 1919, passim; the works of
theorizers of the revolutionary syndicalism like Lagardelle, and
others; Bryce, J., especially his Modern Democracies, N. Y., 192
1; Lowell, A. L., Public Opinion in War and Peace; Lippmann, W.,
Public Opinion, N. Y., 1922; and especially his Phantom-Public,
1925. As to Pareto's theory of the cyclical concept of social
processes, see the paragraph about Cyclical Conception in this
book.
61
in its essence, it is '"subjective," in the sense that it is taken as a
kind of an inner ''drive" (sentiment, instinct) which could not be
objectively studied and measured. Like many other psychologists,
Pareto "puts" these "residues" into a man, and later on deduces
from them whatever he likes. For this reason, all the objections
applied to similar psychological interpretations (see the chapter
about the Psychological School) as a variety of "animistic
conceptions," ^* must be applied to Pareto's method and theory. It
is true that Pareto went much further in such a study than almost
all psychologists, and yet he could not completely avoid the
inadequacy of such a method. From this it follows that such inner
"drives" are almost impossible to study objectively and
quantitatively. In spite of Pareto's inclination to such a quantitative
study, he did not factually give a real quantitative investigation of
his residues. This explains also why Pareto's classification of the
residues appears to be considerably arbitrary and questionable,
naturally influencing many of his deductions and conclusions in
the same way.
In the second place, it is hard for me to discriminate his "residues"
from his "interests," as economic factors. The boundary line
between them is very dark and poorly drawn. For this reason it
becomes difficult to determine just exactly what is the degree of
influence exerted by each of these factors in determining social
equilibrium.
In the third place, Pareto himself many times stresses the fact
that the same residue may be wrapped into the most different
derivations, and that, for this reason, it is always very uncertain
exactly what residue is the source of a certain derivation. This
very fact makes questionable Pareto's many reductions of the

certain derivations to the certain residues. His conclusions may
and may not be true. Because of this we are often at sea, and
do not know the real relations of the residues with the derivations.
** A primitive man puts into, or behind the given phenomena,
various "spirits," and through their activities explains all concrete
phenomena, beginning with the thunderstorm and ending with
birth, death, and other conspicuous facts in human life. The
psychologists, instead of the old-fashioned "spirits" or "mysterious
supernatural powers," put into man "emotions," "wishes," "ideas,"
"residues" and what not; and through their influence try to
interpret human and social phenomena as a "manifestation" of
their activity. It is easy to see that the procedure in both cases, is
essentially the same,animistic. The only difference is in that of
the terminology.
62
62 CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGICAL I'HEORIES
In the fourth place, Pareto's theory of social circulation is too
general and inadequate. It needs many corrections and much
development.
These remarks show the most important weak points of Pareto's
theory. However, they do not annul his valuable contributions to
the methodology of social science, to the sociology of human
speech-reactions and ideologies, or to the whole concept of social
phenomena. His work is possibly the best continuation of the plan
of social physics developed by the thinkers of the seventeenth
century. Pareto tries to carry on this plan, throwing aside its weak
points and promoting what is valuable in this magnificent
contemplation. If the other contemporary mechanistic and ener-
getistic theories mentioned above have factually added very little

to the theories of the seventeenth century, in Pareto's works they
reappear again with all their brilliancy and fascination. Pareto's
studies show that, properly taken, the social physics of the
seventeenth century is not a mere dream of a bold human mind,
but may be developed into a real scientific sociology which will
probably not be able to disentangle all the "mysteries" of human
behavior and human history, but may clarify, to some degree, the
more important of them.
A series of other mentioned studies which proceed along the lines
of Pareto's principles, and which have already given some
valuable results, seem to warrant such an expectation, and
stimulate the cultivating of "the mechanistic and quantitative
investigations of social systems," as has been outlined by Pareto.
63
CHAPTER II FREDERIC LE PLAY'S SCHOOL
The name of Frederic Le Play deserves to be put among the few
names of the most prominent masters of social science. He and
his pupils have created a really scientific method of the study and
analysis of social phenomena; they elaborated one of the best
systems of social science; and, finally, they formulated several
important sociological generalizations. In all these contributions
Le Play and his continuators have displayed a conspicuous
scientific insight, a brilliant talent for scientific analysis and
synthesis, and an originality of thought. As a result, they compose
a real school in sociology with very definite methods and
principles.
I. BIOGRAPHICAL DATA AND HISTORY OF THE SCHOOL
Pierre Frederic Guillaumme Le Play was born April nth, 1806, in a
French village between the port Honfleur and the forest of
Brotonne. Llis father, who died in 1811 when Frederic was still a
child, held an unimportant position in the revenue service. His
mother was a woman of strong character with profound religious
convictions. The early years of Le Play were spent in a village
under conditions of hardship and need. From 1811 to 1815, he
stayed in Paris in the family of his father's sister. Here the boy
received his first intellectual education. In 1815 Le Play had to
return to his native village, where he stayed the next seven years
attending the College du Havre. In 1825 he entered the Ecole
Polytechnique and in 1827, the Ecole des Mines. In 1829, he and
his friend, Jean Reynaud, made a scientific trip to Germany.
During the time of this study they walked about 4000 miles. He
graduated with a brilliant record from the School of Mines in 1832
and then became co-editor of the
64
Annales des mines; in 1835, the head of the Government
Committee on Mining Statistics; and in 1840, professor of
Metallurgy and sub-director of the School of Mines. During the
next few years, as a recognised authority in mining, he was
invited by different countries to direct the improvement and reorganization of the mining industry. One of these countries was
Russia, where he organized and directed a group of mines in the
Urals employing 45,000 men. These foreign positions gave him
an opportunity to visit and to study thoroughly all of the European
and some of the Asiatic countries. In 1855 he published his
famous Les otiT/riers eiiropcens, the result of his scientific study
for more than a score of years. In 1856 he founded ''The
International Society for Practical Studies in Social Economy."
Branches were established in many countries. Its activity was
manifested in the publication of many family monographs which
composed the series Les ouvriers des deux mondes. In 1864 he
published two volumes of La reforme sociale en France, and in

1870, L'organisation du travail. In 1867 he became a Senator in
the French Assembly. In 1872 he founded the ''Union of Social
Peace" to study social questions according to the methods of
natural science. In 1881 he began to publish La reforme sociale, a
fortnightly publication of joint scientific and practical interest. In
the same year he published his Constitution essen-tielle. His
death occurred in 1882.^ Outstanding characteristics of Le Play's
personality are: a great sincerity, a great honesty, a deep religious
feeling, and a mind well trained in natural sciences. The
outstanding characteristics of his environment are: his origin from
a humble family; his life among country people; the events of the
great French Revolution, and the revolutions of 1830, 1848, and
1870-71; and, finally, his extensive travelling throughout Europe
and Asia. The social upheavals and their disastrous results
stimulated his interest in a study of social phenomena and also
his desire to find a scientific method
^ For his biography see Herbertson, Dorothy, "Le Play and Social
Science," The Sociological Review, Vol. XII, pp. 36 fif., 108 ff; Vol.
XIII, pp. 46 ff; de Cur-ZON, Emm., Frederic Le Play, Paris, 1899;
Demolins, E., "Nos deux premiers maltres," Societe Intern, de
Science Sociale; I'Origine, le But, et VOrganisation de la Societe,
Brochure de propagande, Paris, Bureaux de la Science Sociale;
many data are given in the works of Le Play himself and in those
of his pupils.
65
to improve social conditions. His intense moral and religious
nature gave great sincerity to this desire. His talent and excellent
training in natural sciences made it easy for him to discover and
apply scientific methods to a study of social facts.
The work, begun by Le Play, attracted many pupils and
collaborators. After his death, they continued his work and
introduced some substantial improvements in his methods, as

well as in his statements and theories. Among these pupils and
collaborators, the most prominent were Henri de Tourville (18431903), Edmond Demolins (1852-1907), Robert Pinot, Paul de
Rousiers, Vidal de la Blache,although V. de la Blache does not
belong to Le Play's school, his works influenced to a considerable
degree the geographical part of the school's sociological
system, and many others. They founded the ''Societe
Internationale de Science Sociale," and its review. La science
sociale. This valuable scientific publication has included many
important sociological studies and monographs. Later on, a
portion of these studies was published in book form. Among these
publications probably the most important are : H. de Tourville, The
Grozvth of Modern Nations, (Engl, tr., N. Y., Longmans, Green &
Co., 1907) ; E. Demolins, Comment la route cree le type social,
two vols.; Anglo-Saxon Superiority: To What Is It Due? (Engl, tr.,
London, 1898), Les Frangais d'aujourd'hui; Ueducation nouvelle;
P. de Rousiers, La vie americaine; La question ouvriere en
Angleterre; and J. B. M. Vignes, La science sociale d'apres les
principes de Le Play, two vols., Paris, 1897. ^ short exposition of
the principles and methods of the school is given in a special
Brochure de propagande: Socicte Intern, de Science Sociale;
L'Origine, le But et I'Organisation de la Societe, Paris.^ Recently
the English Sociological Society has begun to study and to
promote the principles of the Le Play school.^ As a result we have
a great revival of interest in this school and new studies of a
similar nature. Although Le Play has now been dead almost half a
century his influence does not show any symptoms of weakening
or decay. It is still very vital and is likely to con2 One of the papers of this book, Di Rousiers, P., La science
sociale, is translated and pubHshed in the Annals of the American
Academy of Political atiA Social Science, Vol. IV, 1893-94, pp.
620-646.
3vSee The Sociological Review, Vols. XI.XII.XIH.

66
tinue so. Let us now turn to a study of the characteristics of this
school/
2. METHODS OF LE PLAY's SCHOOL
The contributions of Le Play's school to social science consist
first, in the creation of a definite method of analysis of social facts;
second, in the composition of a definite sociological system and
the formulation of a series of sociological generalizations; and,
third, in the setting forth of many practical propositions for
improvement of social conditions (applied sociology). Let us
briefly survey each of these contributions.
At the beginning of his social studies, Le Play realized that the
principal obstacle to the scientific study of social phenomena
consisted in the lack of a real scientific method which might be
used conveniently for the analysis of social phenomena. Before
the time of Le Play it was understood that social science must be
based upon the observation of social facts and their inductive
analysis. But it was uncertain how social phenomena should be
observed and what facts were the most important in the immense
amount of material. Le Play fully realized that in order to be able
to observe an enormous multitude and variety of social facts
scientifically, an investigator had to have a simple and definite unit
of social phenomena, whose study, like that of the atom in
physics and chemistry, or of a simple cell in biology, would give all
the essentials of the more complex social facts. Thus, the first
problem to be solved was the problem of an elementary and basic
social unit. The second problem consisted in finding a method for
the quantitative measurement of different components or
elements of the unit. The mathematical mind of Le Play

understood that without quantitative measurement the study was
doomed to be vague and uncertain, and the results of doubtful
value. The first of these problems was solved by taking the family
for the elementary and basic social unit; and the second, by using
the family budget as the quantitative expression of family life and,
correspondingly, a basis for a
* I do not give Le Play's predecessors. Being synthetical in its
character, Le Play's theory has to be regarded as a continuation
of the works of all social thinkers who contributed to all the
principal sociological schools. The names of these thinkers are
given in the subsequent chapters of this book.
67
quantitative analysis of social facts. The reasons for these
selections were numerous. The family is the simplest and the
most elementary form of society. In various forms it exists in all
societies and at all times because of the helplessness of the
newborn babies. The family is the group which takes care of
them. It is an institution which procures the means of subsistence
for its members. It is the first social environment which surrounds,
trains, and educates these new-born children. Through this
environment it shapes them as the members of a society. All of
the elementary social and political interrelations exist in the family.
It is the one group which exists among all peoples, and, indeed,
many peoples do not have any more complex social organization.
In short the family is the universal and simplest model of society
and contains all of its essential characteristics.^ On the other
hand, the family budget reflects the entire life, organization, and
functions of the family. By analyzing carefully all items of family
income and of its expenditures, we obtain a quantitative
expression of the whole family life, its organization and functions.^
Such were the starting points of the method of analysis of a social
system introduced by Le Play. This, however, was no more than

the starting point. Le Play fully understood that the organization
and functions of any family are conditioned by many factors. In
the first place, one of the fundamental functions of the family is
obtaining means of subsistence for its members; consequently
family organization is determined by the methods of obtaining the
means of subsistence ZL'ork. But these methods again are
determined by the environment in which the family lives, by place,
and primarily by geographical place, because the character of the
place determines the work through which the families obtain their
means of sub^ See in the Brochure de propagande, Demolins, E., "Comment
on analyse,'* PP- 74-77; PiNOT, R., "La classification dcs
espcces de la famille," passim; ViGNES, op. cit., Vol. I, Chaps. III; Le Play, Ouvriers europeens, Vol. I, passim; La reforme sociale
en France, 1866, Vol. I, Chap. IIL
" See Le Play, Ouvriers europeens, second edit., Vol. I, pp. 224228. "All the acts which constitute the life of a workingman's
family result more or less directly in an income or an outlay";
"observer possesses a complete knowledge of a family when he
has analysed all the items which are found on the debit and the
credit side of the domestic accounts and where he has obtained
an exact correspondence between the two tables."
68
sistence. Thus we have the famous formula of Le Play: Place,
Work, and People, {Family). In this way the social unit {family) is
connected with geographical environment and work. But that is
not all. In so-called compound societies there are many social
groups and institutions larger and more complex than the family. ]f
family type determines their character, they, in their turn, influence
the family type. Hence, it was necessary to continue the analysis

of the social system beyond the family institution and to proceed
to the analysis of neighborhood, county, province, state and other
larger social groups, within which the family exists. Thus, Le Play
connected the family with all the essential conditions which in
their totality compose the system of a given society. Beginning
with the family, his system of analysis embraced the geographical
location of the family and of a corresponding society; the work or
economic organization of the family and of a corresponding
society; and the whole social and political institutions of a given
society. In other words, almost all the essential factors and
constituents of a social group were included in this analysis. At
the same time, by an analysis of the family budget, he found a
very convenient method of quantitative analysis of corresponding
phenomena. Thus after long and systematic work, Le Play
elaborated his method of the study of a social system which he
emphasized in his ''Workingmen of Europe'* and which he used
for his famous family monographs published in this fundamental
work.'' There is no need to say that this pioneer work, done by Le
Play, found a great many followers. His system of analysis of
family budgets, with slight variations, is used by economists of the
present time. He, himself, used this method to make a number of
brilliant analyses of social systems. His own monographs about
various types of families and corresponding societies are still the
most accurate and unrivalled examples of studies of social
phenomena and types.
His followers, however, found that the method of Le Play had
some defects. In the first place, Le Play's scheme of analysis of
social systems was relatively inadequately developed in that part
which concerns the organizations and institutions which are
beyond, or larger and more complex than, the family. The
' See the nomenclature and its items in the volumes, Les ouvriers
europeens.
69
monographic method of Le Play ''did not grasp society as a
whole; it allowed facts of great importance to escape, so that a
conscientious disciple could perform his task with exactness and
yet fail to see the underlying causes of the prosperity or of the
wretchedness of the country where his observations were made."
In the second place, the family budget method "deals only with
phenomena which can be expressed in dollars and cents." Here
again are shortcomings even in regard to the study of the family
itself, because "it is not true that all the acts which constitute the
life of a family result ahvays, even indirectly, in an income or in an
outlay. For instance, the essential function of the family, the
education of the children, cannot be expressed in figures." The
same is true concerning the history and the origin of the family.
Further, "the budget never gives more than one of the elements
which should enter into a proper appreciation of them, that is the
money value. The others are overlooked." ^ Furthermore, Le Play,
in connection with the same quantitative method, emphasized the
procuring of means of subsistence as the primary function of the
family and somewhat underestimated the functions of the training
and education of its children. This led Le Play to an
overestimation of the methods of the transmission of property in
the family from father to children and, on this basis, led to an
unsatisfactory classification of fundamental types of families.^
These defects influenced his most prominent followers to revise,
modify and perfect his method. This work has been done by Henri
de Tourville, by Demolins, de Rousiers, Pinot and some others.
As a result we have the so-called La nomenclature de la science
sociale which preserves all the essential characteristics of the Le
Play method but in a modified and improved form. Let us glance
at this Nomenclature which represents a very careful and
systematic scheme for the analysis and study of social systems
and organizations. E. Demolins is correct in saying that "the

Nomenclature is an extraordinary accurate and convenient instru* DE Rousiers, P., "La science sociale," Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. IV, pp. 135-141.
" See Pinot, R., "La classification des especes de la famille
(^tablie par Le Play, est-elle exacte?" in Societs Intern, de
Science Sociale, Brochure de Propagande, pp. 44-^470
ment of social dissection. It supplies a kind of a sieve which
permits us to sift all elements of a social type and to classify them,
according to their qualities, within a series of twenty-five
divisions." ^^ In this Nomenclature the family is still the starting
point of the analysis, (social unit) but its characteristics, its
relations to its total environment and the environment itself are
grasped in such a systematic and exhaustive way that, having
studied a typical family or a group of families through all of the
twenty-five divisions, an investigator easily grasps the whole type
of a society, its organization, conditions, composition and factors.
The Nomenclature leads an investigator from the simplest to the
most complex phenomena. These twenty-five fundamental
divisions, each subdivided into many sub-divisions, are as follows:
I. Place of the Family (physical geography of family, or society):
Soil; sub-soil; configuration of surface; rivers, streams, distribution
of water; climate; plant environment, steppes, forests, and so on;
animal environment of the earth and the waters.
II. Work or Labor of the Family: i. Simple collection of the gifts of
the place (picking up of natural products, fishing, hunting); 2.
extraction of the necessary products (cultivation and agriculture,
mining, etc.); 3. fabrication: by hands, with the help of animal

energy, with that of wind, waterfalls, fire, coal and oil; 4.
transportation: through carriers, by boat, using steam energy,
electricity, etc.
III. Property of the Family: Composition of its values, forms of
possession, subvention and transmission; land property and its
character; property forms and institutions in the community.
IV. Movable Property: Cattle and animals; instruments and tools
of work; furniture; personal (slaves, etc.).
V. Salary and Wages: Their objects; amount; forms, etc.
VI. Savings: Objects; character; amount; forms.
VII. Family: Type: patriarchal, pseudo-patriarchal, particular-ist,
unstable; father, mother, children, their nimiber, apti1^ Demolins, E., "Comment on analyse et comment on classe les
types sociaux," in Societe Intern, de Science Sociale, Brochure
de Propagande, p. 76.
71
tudes; married children; emigrants from family; single; servants;
old members; sick and disabled members.
VIIL Standard of Living or Modes of Material Existence of Family:
Food; home; dress; hygiene; recreation.
IX. Phases of Family Existence: Origin of the father and the
mother; important events: births, education and training,
celebrations and festivities, enterprises, alliances and marriages,
establishment of heir, replacements and departures, adoptions,
donations and inheritances, etc.; perturbations: accidents and
sicknesses, retumings, deaths, unemplo}anents, debts, bad

conduct, condemnations and chastisements, public service, social
calamities and other perturbations.
X. Le Patronage (protection and bosses): Patriarch; foreman;
bosses; corporations.
XI. Commerce: Shopkeepers; merchants; commercial
substitutions.
XII. Intellectual Culture: Intellectual culture resulting from the
conditions of life; liberal arts and their agents: teacher, instructor,
physician, scholar, artist, man of letters, lawyer; corporations of
arts and professions.
XIII. Religion: Private cult; public religious cult; religious corporations; relations of dissenters.
XIV. Neighborhood: Next neighbor families; extended neighborhood; diversity and relations of neighborhood.
XV. Corporations: Corporations of communal interests;
corporations of social welfare.
XVI. The Parish: The parish divisions; parish property; parish
duties, authorities and control.
XVII. Unions of the Parishes: Their diversity; their property and
funds, services and duties, participants and agencies, authorities,
control and federation.
XVIII. The City: Its ecology and geography; its property, interests,
services, duties, participants, agencies and authorities, activity
and control.
XIX. Provincial Divisions
XX. The Province

72
XXL The State
XXII. The Expansion of the Society: Emigration; invasion;
colonization.
XXIII. Foreign Societies: Ways and avenues of contact;
emigration
and immigration; competition.
XXIV. History of the Society: Historical origin of the present situation; historical variation of the society; comparison with the
previous local societies.
XXV. Rank of the Society: Actual role of the society in the world;
reforms; the future of the society.^^
Such in brief is the Nomenclature, as a method of analysis and
synthesis of society. In its essence it combines all relevant factors
which affect social life and organization, and combines them in a
logical, systematic and causal way. The division place takes into
account what is known under ''geographic factors and
environment." Divisions II, III, IV, V, and VI take into account what
is known as ''economic factors." In this way place and labor
determine the type of a family. Divisions VII, VIII, IX, indicate all
the essential traits of family organization and functioning.
Beginning with division X we go beyond the family and, through
family relationships with the larger social bodies, enter the superfamily social environment: its institutions and groups. By
proceeding from the simple to the more complex groups, we
reach step by step the largest and finally the ultimate social body:
mankind. We must recognize that the Nomenclature takes into
consideration almost all essential factors of human behavior and
of social processes and organization. .Differing from the majority
of sociological systems it is free from one-sidedness. It has all
that is valuable in the statements of the geographical school in
sociology; it gives full attention to economic conditions; it pays
extraordinary attention to the family itself as a social factor; it
appreciates adequately the role of contact and of interaction; that
of religion, law, arts and sciences; the influence of the
composition and character of all social groups; and the role of
race and heredity. But that is not all. All divisions of the
Nomenclature are not mechanically combined in a haphazard
way, but, on the
" See Demolins, op. cit., Appendix; dE Rousiers, op. cit., pp. 63 f.
73
contrary, they show a remarkable logic and causal sequence.
This sequence does not decide which of the factors is of more
and which is of less importance, but it shows how and in what
way they condition each other. Place, especially in regard to the
simple societies, determines the methods of procuring the means
of subsistence labor, forms of property and other receipts of the
family; these conditions determine the type of family organization
and functioning; this determines the type of people who come out
of such family; and this, again, conditions the type of super-family
organizations and institutions. In a modified form, which takes into
consideration the history of a society of which the family is a unit,
the same sequence may be applied to a complex society. Finally,
like a botanical classification of plants, the Nomenclahire is at the
same time, a systematization of social groups based on a genetic
principle. ^^ In brief, the Nomenclature is really a great
contribution to the method of social science.
3. THE SOCIOLOGICAL SYSTEM AND THE PRINCIPAL

CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE LE PLAY SCHOOL
Using the above method numerous follow-ers of Le Play have
made many monographic analyses of the social systems of
different peoples. Unveiling the factors responsible for the
historical destiny and the character of the social organizations of a
given society, the analyses have yielded several important
sociological generalizations. Let us give samples of how these
investigators answer the problem: AVhy the historical destiny and
organization of a given society have been such as they are and
what factors are responsible for their character.
After this we shall enumerate the principal generalizations of the
school. As an example I will summarize Demolins' study of the
peo])les of the ste])pes. Hie first part of the analysis is a detailed
description of the climate and geographical conditions of the
steppes of Central Asia and Oriental Europe (analysis of place).
The principal product of this region is grass. Hence, "exclusive
presence of grass determines a uniform mode of labor:
'2 The p;enetic or evolutionary character of the Nomenclature is
especially stressed in the incHcated work of IVI, Vi^ncs, and in
Demolins, Comment la route crte le type social, \'ols. I, II, passim.
74
pastoral art." ^^ ''We find indeed in this part of the earth numerous
groups of shepherds." Of the animals, the most important here is
the horse. 'The steppes are exclusively well adapted to horses,
and it is the horse which adapts the steppes to man." "Without
horses the pastoral mode of life would be impossible." ^* In the
steppes horses are an exclusive means of transportation and
migration. Horses give the shepherds their principal food in the
form of "horse-milk," or koiiinys the food which is exclusively

pleasant, rich with all the important elements of nourishment, and
easy of preparation. For these and many other reasons the horse
plays an extraordinarily important role in the life of the pastoral
peoples.^^ Thus, through such a character of the steppes the
peoples who inhabit them can exist almost exclusively through a
mere collection of the gifts of nature without being obliged to
"cultivate" the necessities and to transform them in any
considerable proportion.
Fabrication in such groups is limited to the preparation of a few
objects of food, shelter, hygiene, and of recreation. The character
and qualities of these objects are also determined by the steppes.
In a like manner the forms and the technique of fabrication (labor)
are determined by the steppes. Food is prepared from milk and
meat only. Its preparation and provision do not demand either a
strenuous effort or the existence of special classes of butchers or
milkmen. The operations are easily conducted by single families.
The character of the dwelling is likewise determined by the same
factor. Nomadic life urges them to have dwellings which may be
taken down and moved in few minutes. Hence pastoral tents or
yourfas are made from the skins of the animals. Fuel and the few
objects of furniture have the same movable character adapted to
the mode of life as determined by geographical conditions. The
same may be said of cloth. The mode of life (out of doors) does
not demand any specific forms of recreation. There yet remains
the necessity for self-protection which is satisfied by the
fabrication of a few weapons. These are easily prepared within
each family.
13 Demolins, Comment la route cree le type social, Librairie de
Paris, Vol. I, p. 9. ^^ Ibid., p. II. 1^ See pp. 11-22.
75
Motor power necessary for all this is almost exclusively human

energy. The principal machine is the human hand. This does not
require any organization besides the family. It may be seen that
all the necessities may be produced within the family. This fact
makes any organization larger than a family unnecessary. Thus,
the steppes determine the character of labor and production and
put on them the stamp of production in a family-community.
The steppes put similar marks on the character of the property
and the family-type of the nomads. There is no reason for an
appropriation of the land. A nomad family has to move as soon as
grass in a given place is consumed; therefore ''for the nomads it is
more necessary to have a free passage and a free migration
throughout the steppes than an exclusive right of ownership of
limited portions of the land." ^^ ''As the grass grows
spontaneously and no labor is spent for its cultivation, it is natural
that the land remains common property; private property appears
only when land requires cultivation to yield the necessary
products. The necessity of this work is the origin of the institution
of private property." ^^ By determining the organization of work,
the steppes determine the character of common property among
the shepherds. Community of Labor and Property, in its turn, puts
a stamp of community or communism on the Family of the
steppes people. It is the patriarchal family with the father or the
patriarch at its head and with all children except married
daughters rallied around him. The patriarch exerts supreme
power over all members of the family. Everything, except
insignificant objects, is the common property of the family. In this
way, the type of patriarchal family has been produced on, and
through the steppes}^
The effects of such a patriarchal family on its young generation
are definite: Since everything is in common, since an individual is
only a kind of "a cell" in the family community and the family acts
as a whole in every kind of a transaction, it is natural that such a
family organization suppresses the individual initiative of its

children and incessantly trains them to rely not upon them*^ Demolins, Comment la route cree le type social, Librairie do
Paris, Vol. I, pp.
59 ff.
" Ibid., pp. 59 ff. " Ibid., p. 60-63.
76
76 CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGICAL THOERIES
selves but on the family, and on traditions and on customs
transmitted from generation to generation. The offspring of such a
family are naturally conservative; their attention is turned to the
past, not to the future; they are guided exclusively by the customs
and habits of their fathers and forefathers and not by their own
initiative.
The self-sufficiency of the family in the steppes makes
unnecessary any permanent aggregation or integration of families
into a larger social body, political group or economic organization.
Families of the steppes are situated side by side without any
permanent cohesion or integration into a larger unit. Among the
nomads of the steppes there does not exist any permanent state
or government. The only larger form of aggregation is the
grouping in the form of caravans, and this is very temporary. The
caravan is a superfamily under the personal and temporary
authority of the caravan leader or chief .^^ This authority appears
because of the necessity of a chief to guide the caravan, to keep
order without w^hich it is doomed to perish, and to establish good
relations with the populations along the way.^^ Under such
conditions the ''caravan is an armed troop which has a chief and
procures its own supplies." It may be turned into an army very
easily by an increase of its power, an efficient chief and the

presence of a country to be invaded. Hence, the great invasions
of Attila, Genghis Khan, Tamerlane, and those of China by the
nomadic Mongols and many others which originated in the
steppes represented nothing more than the great caravans of the
steppe nomads turned into an army. Formed from the whole
people including all women and children, able to flee easily in
case of defeat, and plundering the countries in their way, such
caravans exhibited great power. But the same conditions of
caravan organization explain why all empires established by such
invaders have been unstable and shortlived. With the death of
their talented leader, such empires quickly disintegrated because
of a lack of any other basis for their integration."^
13 Demolins, Comment la route cree le type social, Librarie de
Paris, Vol. I, Chap. III.
20 Ihid., pp. 72-76.
77
Such in brief is the analysis and explanation of the social system
of the steppe peoples. Beginning with place the author has shown
consecutively how the steppes created this social type. ''Steppes
determine the pastoral art practiced by Hs inhabitants,
communism (Comniunante) of labor and of property, the
patriarchal family, the limited character of fabrication and of
commerce, the character of arts, the public cult, public authorities
and so on." ^^ Each of these characteristics is conditioned by
others and finally by the character of the steppes.
Through peaceful migration and invasion these steppe peoples
spread throughout the world and at the same time spread the
principal characteristics of their social system, especially the
patriarchal type of family. One wave of these nomads moved to
the north and reached the area of the tundras. Being unable to
turn back they had to stay there under geographical conditions

(place) quite different from those of the steppe ^^ (much colder
climate, absence of horses, presence of reindeer, scarcity of food,
fishing and some hunting as the only sources of existence, and so
on).^^ This different environment caused a considerable
transformation in the social system of the steppe people now
settled on the tundras. The Eskimos and the Lapps illustrate this.
Their forefathers came from the steppes, but under new
conditions they and their offspring had to make a decided change.
Long ago a branch of the people of the tundras probably crossed
Bering Straits and came to America. Here, according to the
character of the area through which they had to pass and in which
they had to stay, (the way of the Savannas, the way of the Rocky
Mountains to the south, and the way of the lakes to the southeast)
they were transformed again and finally formed the principal types
of American Indians, the hunters of the prairies and the hunters of
the forests with their typical social institutions and types of
families. The conditions of the prairies with their bisons shaped
the organization of the new inhabitants into the clans of the
hunters (the Indians of the prairies). The patriarchal type of family
still survived, but it was somewhat weakened. Another
^ Ibid., p. 195.
23 Demolins, Comment la route cree le tyt>e social, Vol. I. (See
the causes of this,
pp. IT4ff.)
2- Ibid. (See the details, pp. 117 fl.)
78
type was produced by those who went and *'settled" in the region
of the Rocky Mountains (the Indians of the mountains). The third
type was formed by those who principally inhabited the region of
the Great Lakes (the Indians of the lakes-region). Finally, a
different and the most miserable type of society was formed by
those who were driven to the forests of South America (South
American Indians). Here, as well as in the forests of Central
Africa, the conditions of forest-life led to the dispersion of the
large clans, the reformation into small groups, and to a
substitution of the ''unstable'' family for the patriarchal type.
Hunting in the forests caused a change from the large patriarchal
family into a simple group composed of a hunter and his wife. The
children at early maturity left their parents in order to procure their
own means of subsistence because the forest-conditions did not
permit food for a large group of men living together. In this way a
type of the ''unstable" family was developeda type without long
history or any traditions; a type without any esteem of the young
generation for the old people and the patriarch. Under such
conditions it was impossible to inculcate into the young generation
either community of property, or the conservative traditionalism of
the patriarchal family. The forest hunting produced only isolated,
savage, beast-like individuals. Such, in brief, is the origin of the
''unstable'' type of family. As the patriarchal type was originated in
the Asiatic steppes, so the "unstable" type was produced by the
forests of South America and Africa.'^''
Especial attention has been given by the school to tracing the
origin, causes and history of the particularist type of family and of
the particularist type of society. This work was done principally by
Henri de Tourville. According to de Tourville, the formation of the
particularist type of man, family, and society was as follows: A
group of the patriarchal type, under the leadership of Odin,a
caravan leader and warrior,started from the region of Don, in
the southeastern part of present Russia, and moved to
Scandinavia. Here the peculiar environment of the western part of
Scandinavia gradually transformed them and their descendants

from the patriarchal into the particularist type.
^ Demolins, Comment la route cree le type social, Vol. I, Chap.
IV.
79
The fiords and the scarcity of fertile land in Norway forced them to
turn to fishing as the principal method of obtaining their means of
subsistence. As a means of transportation in the fiords boats were
developed which could carry husband and wife and perhaps a few
of the children. Having settled at a fiord, such a family had ''the
narrow and scattered pieces of land suitable for cultivation, the
perpendicular banks favorable to fishing, and sheltered waters
favorable to navigation in small boats." ^^ Such conditions did not
permit the children of these families to stay with their parents and
thus to form the large patriarchal type. A large family could not
obtain the necessary means of subsistence at the same place.
This forced the adult children to separate from their parents and
to go by boat to another place and to live independently. The
patriarchal family (and other social institutions of the patriarchal
type) were broken down under the pressure of the specific
geographical environment of the western slope of Scandinavia.
''Each adult son was obliged to look for some habitable nook in
the recesses of that rocky land, and to accustom himself to do
without the help zvhich is afforded by the association of
individuals, and to depend on that self-help which is acquired by
the personal dez'elopment of an estate.'' ~~ In this way the
environment developed a self-reliance, initiative, and
independence,the characteristics of the particularist type of
men, among the fishers and cultivators of Western
Scandinavia. Thus was shaped a new type of men, and a new,
particularist type of family, ''founded on the ability of the individual
to create a home for himself." 2'
As soon as this most important revolution in the type of men and

of family was accomplished, many modifications took place in the
sphere of public life and social institutions. First ^'public life was
abolished; private life, which was all-sufTicient to itself, triumphed
absolutely." "The small boat and seacoast fishing enabled each
individual emigrant to live alone, to do without a community, even
without a neighbor and a master." Further it
26 DE TouRViLLE, H., The Growth of Modern Nations, A History
of the Particularist Form of Society, p. 49, N. Y., 1907; see there a
detailed analysis of the geographical conditions of Scandinavia
and the history of the migration of Odin and the Odinids, Chaps. I,
II, III.
" Ibid., pp. 68-69; see all of Chap. IV.
2 Ibid., p. 70.
80
led to the substitution of direct ownership of the land (small farms
or estates) for the system of the patriarchal community.^^
Association with other men did not disappear, but, in place of the
enforced association of the patriarchal community, free social
organization was substituted and ''only where it was absolutely
necessary." This led to the establishment of contractual
associations, to the elections of leaders or public authorities, to
independence and to self-government, the conspicuous
characteristics of the particularist society. Different from the
society with an unstable family (created in the forests), the
fishermen and farmers of Scandinavia created associations.
Different from the patriarchal type of society, their associations
became voluntary, based entirely on covenant and agreement,
and in addition they were created only when and where they wxre
necessary and desirable. In this way the particularist type of

family created self-governing social and political bodies, with
elected authorities, restricted in power, instead of the forced,
autocratic and traditionalist authorities of a patriarchal society. In
brief, the particularist type of family led to what is now styled the
real democratic and free society.'^^ Thus, Scandinavia was that
''world laboratory where and only where the particularist type of
men, family and society was shaped and created." ^^ Such was
its origin.
After he has developed his thesis thus far, de Tourville further
traces the diffusion and historical destinies of the particularist type
of men and of social organization. Later some members of this
particularist society migrated and settled as agriculturists on the
plains of Saxony. They did not migrate in mass but purely as
individuals. On these Saxon plains they modified their social
organization somewhat, but the new organization was still
primarily of the particularist type.^^ From this center in the plains
of Saxony, the particularist type of society spread throughout all of
Europe. Some individuals known as the "Franks" migrated to the
west. At first they acted as agents and oflficials of the Roman
emperors, and of the Merovingian and Carlovingian
29 Ihid.y pp. 71-72.
30 IbU., pp. 74 ff. 21 Ibid., pp. 38-39. 32 Ihid., Chap. V.
81
kings. However, they soon acquired land and estates, settled
down and began to fight for their independence and for their particularist principles. In this struggle they were successful in coping
with the growing autocracy of the Merovingian and Car-lovingian
kings and warriors and obtained their independence and
immunity. In addition they helped to liberate other social classes
from the interference of the monarchical authorities, and
undermined the regime of military and patriarchal organization

introduced by Rome and later maintained by the Merovingians
and the Carlovingians. What is known as feudalism and its victory
in the ninth century was in essence nothing but the struggle and
the victory of the particularist over the patriarchal type of men.
The particularist Saxons and Franks defeated their antagonists
who were headed by the Merovingians and Carlovingians.^^ Thus
we have a very original and positive interpretation of feudalism.
The valuable achievements of feudalism in its period of growth,
according to de Tourville, were: a great decrease of militarism and
warfare; the emancipation of the serfs; the establishment and
expansion of liberty and self-government; a great progress in
agriculture; a harmony and solidarity of the social classes; an
extraordinary development of free association; an increase of
voluntary enterprises, and so on.^^ Later, owing to an unfortunate
combination of historical conditions, the particularist type of men,
family, and society were overpowered in Europe and replaced
partly by the patriarchal and partly by the unstable types.^^
Another stream of the particularist migrants from the Saxon plain
and Scandinavia went to England. Here they settled and step by
step established themselves in spite of many obstacles. The
particularist settlers gave the English social organization
particularist characteristics. In a rather peaceful way they
predominated over the Celts, and later on, in succession, over the
Angles, the Danes, and the Norman conquerors. In this way the
Saxons in England triumphed over all other populations of the
British Isles. They shaped English society according to the
particularist tradition and created its institutions and
Ibid., Chaps. VIII to XIII.
'< IHd., Chap. XII.
^ Ibid. (Sec analysis in Chap. XVIII and subsequent.)
82
history. Still later, a part of them emigrated from England to
America, Australia, New Zealand and elsewhere and created
these other great particularist societies."*' Such in brief is the
origin, development, expansion, and the history of the particularist
type of family and society.
In a similar way the members of this school have studied,
analyzed and explained the factors, the forces, the formation, and
the underlying characteristics of other types of societies and
social organizations.^^
The above gives an idea how the followers of the Le Play school
apply the Nomenclatiire for an analysis of a social system; how
they correlate one class of social phenomena with another; and
how they classify different types of societies, families and
institutions. They never deal with abstractions or pure speculation.
With the Nomenclature as a guide, they plunge into the dark and
incomprehensible sea of history and methodically, patiently, and
carefully try to unravel its riddles. One who reads their works may
disagree with their opinions, but he never feels that the
investigators were amusing themselves with mere verbosity. A
pulsation of intensive, systematic and original, vivid and
interesting scientific thought is felt on every page of the best
works of the school.
4. CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE SCHOOL TO SOCIAL SCIENCE
We can now enumerate briefly the principal contributions of this
school to social science. The_ first contribution is the method of
the school. It consists in viewing the family as the social unit; in a
quantitative approach to the study of social phenomena; and in
the creation of the Nomenclatiire as a guide for sociological
analysis. The second contribution consists of the family

monographs and of the studies of family budgets started by Le
Pla}! and his followers. The third contribution is represented by
generalizations concerning the influence of geographic
environment
^Îbid., Chaps. XIII-XVII, XXVIII-XXX; Demolins, Anglo-Saxon
Superiority: To What Is It Due?, pp. i-xl, London, 1898.
37 See Demolins, Comment la route cree le type social, Vols. I, II,
passim; Demolins, Les Franqais d'aujourd'hui, Vols. I, II; and all
volumes of La science sociale where many monographs have
been published; see also the bibliography given in Demolins,
Comment la route cree le type social.
83
on various sides of social life and institutions. It is certain (see
further, the Geographical School) that this influence was known
and studied long before Le Play and his school. The Le Play
school, for its part, increased our knowledge in this field, and
showed very clearly the influence, the correlation, and the
avenues of influence of place on social processes and
organization. The general standpoint of the school in this respect
is well illustrated by the following quotation :
On this planet, there exists an infinite variety of populations; what
cause created this variety ? The common answer is: race. But the
racial factor does not explain anything because we have, as yet,
to explain what produces racial variety itself. Race is not the
cause but the result. The primary and decisive cause of the
diversity of peoples and races is tJie road which has been
follozved by the peoples. It is the road (environment) which
created race and social type. It has not been an indififerent matter
for a people which road they followed: that of the Grand Asiatic
Steppes, or of the Tundras of Siberia, or the American Savannas
or African Forests, (or the Arabian Deserts and so on).

Unconsciously and fatally these roads fashioned either the TartarMongol type, Eskimos-Lapps, the Red-Skinned, or the Negro. . .
In Europe the Scandinavian type, the Anglo-Saxon, the French,
the German, the Greek, the Italian, and the Spanish are also the
result of the roads through which their ancestors passed before
arrival at the present habitat. Modify one or another of these
roads and through that you will change the social type and race.^^
This led the school to formulate many correlations between place
and dififerent characteristics of social organization. Among them
the most important are:
A. Correlations between place and the forms of labor, such as:
Steppe and shepherdship Tundras and fishing and hunting Sea
coast and fishing Forest and hunting Plain and agriculture
B. Correlations between place and the forms of Property, such as;
Steppe and common property of the family
8 Demolins, Comment la route cree le type social, Vol. I,
Preface.
84
Tundras and common property of the family Fiords and individual
property
C. Correlations between place and the Type of Family, such as:
Steppe and patriarchal family Tundras and weakened patriarchal
family Forest and unstable family Fiords and particularist family
D. Correlations between place and Superfamily Institutions and
Associations:
Steppe and the caravans and invasions Fiords and contractual
associations, and so on
E. Correlations between place and many social processes and
phenomena, such as: migration, forms of arts and religion, wars, and
so on ^^
In general the school has contributed to the study of the influence
of geographical environment on social type probably no less than
any other group of social geographers.
The fourth contribution of the school consists in an elucidation of
the interdependence of various sides of a social type as indicated
in the Nomenclatitre. Examples are the correlations established
between the forms of Labor and that of Property ;^^ between the
forms of Property and the types of Family; between the Family
types and the types of Superfamily organization, and so on.
The fifth, and probably the most important contribution of the
school, consists in its classification of the fundamental types of
the family, in an elucidation of their origin, in the description of the
social functions of the family, and finally in an exhibition
3^ See the correlations in the above quoted works of Le Play, de
Tourville, Demolins, de Rousiers, Pinot.
^^ Examples: Private property grows parallel to an increase of
labor necessary for production or cultivation of the necessities. It
is almost absent among the pastoral nomads, who live on through
a simple collection of the gifts of nature and do not invest any
special labor for cultivation of the soil. A family occupies a place
only for a short moment and, after a consumption of its grass,
moves to a new one. Among the semi-nomad people, like
Bashkirs, who begin to cultivate land, "the duration of labor

increases. This is accompanied by prolongation of the
appropriation of the land and by a progress of the institution of
private property." Later on, among more complex types of society,
it is necessary to invest a greater and greater amount of labor to
get the means of subsistence; the simple collection of the gifts of
nature is more and more superseded by the necessity of their
fabrication. Correspondingly, the institution of individual property
grows more and more. See Demolins, Comment, Vol. II, pp. 2128.
85
of the family's enormous importance for the whole social
organization and historical destiny of a group.
I have already outlined the origin and the characteristics of the
three fundamental types of family. Let us discuss in greater detail
other family problems. According to the school, the principal
social functions of the family are: the production of human beings,
the securing of means of subsistence for its members; and
especially the social and economic education of the young
generation. These functions have been performed by all types of
family regardless of its concrete form. In this sense the family has
been and is the primary, the most important, and the most
effective social institution.^^ ''Every day society is submitted to a
terrible invasion: within it a multitude of small barbarians are born.
They would quickly overthrow the whole social order and all the
institutions of society, if they were not well disciplined and
educated. This education is made absolutely necessary and
difficult by the fact that a new-born child is un-social." He does not
know the laws of society and the necessary forms of conduct
which make social life possible. He does not inherit such
tendencies. He even refuses to follow them spontaneously. He
does not know how to get the means of subsistence. He does not
wish to enter any social group and to conform to its rules. Hence,
the necessity for his education, training, and instruction without
which he can neither adapt himself to social life nor help make
social life and the continuity of the social group possible. ''This
education is the fundamental function of the Family. No other
institution can substitute for it in this respect.''^The family has been the first and the most important factory in
which biological human beings have been transformed into social
individuals. It is the sculptor which shapes racial traits out of
"human clay" and gives this clay its most decisive and desirable
characteristics. The family education determines the type of social
organization."*^
*^ See PiNOT, R., op. cit., passim.
Ibid., p. 58.
3 Compare Cooley, Ch. H., Social Organizatioti, Chap. III. See
further chapter about Sociologistic School and recent studies of
the correlations between family characteristics and the traits of its
members.
86
''Every family brings up its children according to the conditions
and necessities of the place and the group among which it exists."
According to the character of education which the family gives to
its young generation, it is possible to distinguish three or four
fundamental types of families. They are as follows :
The Patriarchal Family. '*It moulds the young generation so
that the children remain together in peace under the authority of
the head of the family, causes them to sacrifice all their individual
efforts for the Family-community and to depend entirely on this
family organization. Within it the individual is annihilated and

completely absorbed by the community." ^^ "This type of family is
common among the less progressive populations of the East.
There, children do not rely on themselves for their establishment,
but on the family community, which will keep them or welcome
them back if per chance they have left home and failed. Under
these conditions little personal instruction is needed, and only a
minimum amount of instruction is given, the family, sometimes
helped by the priest, is sufficient to impart it." "^^ The societies
with this type of family are conservative, stagnant, and retarded.
A modification of this type of family is the Quasi-Patriarchal type
or stock-family (faiisse famille-soiiche) whose members
sometimes may go away, but permanently keep their contact with
the paternal family, send it all their money, and sacrifice
everything for it. They even become celibates if it is necessary
and sooner or later usually return back to it. Individual initiative is
developed a little more in such a family than in a pure patriarchal
type; nevertheless, in essence it has all the characteristics of the
patriarchal type."^^'
The second principal type is the unstable family. 'Tt does not fit its
young generation for anything special; neither does it unfit them
for anything general. It brings up its children without imparting
respect for authority and traditions, as does the patriarchal family,
and at the same time, it does not fit them for originality, or for the
independent production of new ideas, as does the particularist
type of family. Within such a family, the quality of subordination,
as well as of initiative, are equally
** PiNOT, op. cit., 63.
*^ Demolins, Anglo-Saxon Superiority, p. 77.
*^ PiNOT, op. cit., p. 63.
87
absent, and the individual who in reahty has not received any
education or training and who is not capable of doing anything,
becomes a prey of States and Governments."^^ The societies
which have this type of family represent ''A Communistic State
Formation." There the large public community takes the place of
the dissolved family community; here the young people rely
principally on the State for establishment in life, such as through
the many appointments in the army or the different services which
the State distributes. Most of the nations of Western Europe,
notably France and Germany, belong to this type. To obtain these
appointments, examinations have to be passed. In order to kegp
away the bulk of the applicants, the examinations are made stiffer
and more difficult." In such a society, the official bureaucracy
rules, the interference of the Government is great, and its
machinery is centralized. Prussian military and bureaucratic
society and, its natural development, the State socialistic
organization, is the natural form of a society with such a type of a
family."*^
The third type is the Particularist Family. ''It enables its young
people to manage their own business or affairs independently and
to establish themselves in a definite field of activity. It develops a
great deal of individual initiative. Thanks to it, the value of the
individual is highly appreciated. The individual is the organizer
and master of all private and public groupings in this type of a
society. Here we have the triumph of the individual over the
state.^^ The Scandinavian and the English-speaking nations are
the best examples of this type of family and society. Here "the
individual prevails over the community, private life over public life,
and in conseciuence, the useful profession over the liberal and
administrative professions." Here the individual relies neither on
the family nor on the state for his establishment. The state
disposes but few appointments, because public powers are not
centralized and only a very few officials are employed. Here the
individual relies principally on his own energy and resources to
succeed in an independent career. The chief aim of education (in
the family and outside of it) in such a
<^ PiNOT, op. cit., p. 64.
* Demolins, op. cit., p. 77.
*^ PiNOT, p. 63.
88
state of society, must therefore be to develop these individual
qualities and to form practical men.^^ Demolins and de Rousiers
have shown in detail the differences in training and education of
the young people in the family and the schools of Germany and
France as examples of a state communistic formation with an
unstable family at its bottom, and in the family and the schools of
England and America as examples of particularist societies with
the particularist type of family at its bottom.^^ In a particularist
family (of the Anglo-Saxon and the Scandinavian type) *'the
parents do not consider their children as property, nor that the
children are a mere continuation of themselves. They have no
greater anxiety than to hasten the emancipation of their children.
They treat their children from infancy as mature persons. Because
of this treatment they develop responsible and original
personalities. Parents educate their children to meet future
necessities. They also endeavour to increase, as much as
possible, the strength, energy, and physical development of their
children. The children are initiated very early into the practice of
material, everyday acts. As a rule, parents have their boys taught
some manual trade. There is little display of parental authority.
The boys know that their parents will not be responsible for their
situation in life." As a result out of such a family come strong and

energetic individuals who know what they want, are imbued with
corresponding knowledge and experience, and are accustomed to
have their rights and to take their responsibilities.^^ The system of
education outside of the family in a particularist society is only a
continuation of the principles of the family education. It is
permeated with the same characteristics and is quite different
from the school-system in the "Communistic State Type of
Societies" (in Germany and France ).^^
As a result of such an organization, 'young men, made physically
strong, accustomed to material facts, trained to rely on
themselves and to look upon life as a battle, bring a
superabundance of youthful strength to cope with the difficulties
of exist^0 Demolins, ibid., pp. XIII, 78-79.
^^ See Demolins, Anglo-Saxon Superiority, passim; de Rousiers,
La Vie Americaine, passim; de Tourville, op. cit., passim. ^2
Demolins, pp. 95 ff. ^^ See ibid., Chaps, l-lll.
89
ence; they enjoy these difficulties, expect them, and triumph over
them." Here Hes the secret of Anglo-Saxon superiority and
power. Here is the source of the miracles which have been
performed by this people.
Anglo-Saxon superiority! Although we do not all acknowledge it,
we all have to bear it, and we all dread it. We cannot go one step
in the world without coming across UAnglais. The Anglo-Saxon
has supplanted us (the French) in North America, in India, and in
Egypt. He rules America, by Canada and the United States;
Africa, by Egypt and the Cape; Asia, by India and Burmah; Austral
Asia, by Australia and New Zealand; Europe, and the whole
world, by his trade and industries and by his policy. The AngloSaxon is now at the head of the most active, the most
progressive, and the most overflowing civilization (Ibid., pp. xxviixxx). And now compare, and decide, and judge. I have tried to
show the hidden springs which enable that race to threaten and
invade the older and more decrepit societies (p. 103).
The above shows the correlation which exists between the type of
family and the whole social organization and its historical
destinies. As we have seen, the Le Play school has shown how
each of these types of family has originated, in what kind of
environment and under what conditions. The above also gives an
idea of the tremendous influence of the family on the whole social
organization and institutions. Various leaders of the school have
formulated many other correlations which cannot be given
here.''"*
As yet there has been no sociological school which shows the
functions, the classification, and the social importance of the
family as clearly as the Le Play school, with the exception of
Confucius and the Confucianist school in China. This school may
be paralleled with the Le Play school in an understanding of the
decisive influence of the family institution. But Confucianism
pleaded for the patriarchal family while the Le Play school pleads
for the particularist type.
The sixth contribution of the school consists in a series of studies
of an applied character in which it has tried to indicate
" See the quoted works. One of these correlations is that real
democracy and self-government are possible only among the
people of the particularist type with a particularist family.
90
many measures for the practical reconstruction of society. Among

these measures some have a specific character while some
others are general and applicable to all societies at all times. The
above theory of the particularist type of family may serve as an
example of the specific suggestions of the school. In it the school
sensed the highest of family and of social organization; and as a
result tried to propagate this form throughout the world, especially
in France. To achieve this purpose it endeavored to remodel the
imstable French family into the particularist type and to change
the system of French education. With this intention, Demolins and
others opened their own school, L'Ecole des Roches, in which
they organized the curriculum according to particularist
principles.^^ On the other hand, they severely criticized, and with
reason, the existing system of school education in France and
Germany. Conforming to the same particularist ideal, they
interpreted socialism as a mere modification of the patriarchal
social type, with all its negative traits, but lacking its positive
qualities.^^ For the same reason they opposed an expansion of
state interference at the cost of voluntary private activity and all
measures which lead to a decrease of individual initiative and
independence. In this respect their position is similar to that of H.
Spencer. On the other hand, conforming to the same particularist
ideal, they decisively opposed any artificial or hereditary
aristocracy. They demanded that all positions be opened to free
competition. They severely criticized absentee-owners of land,
saying that if landlords had lost their influence it was due to the
fact that they no longer performed their social duties.
Le Play's Universal Constitution of Mankind is an example of the
school's general applied sociology. In this work he endeavored to
discover inductively the conditions necessary for a prosperous
existence of any society. He summed up the principles which he
had previously developed in the works : La refonne social en
France and L'organisation dit travail. Here again Le Play reminds
us of Confucius. Both were conservative. Neither
^^ See Demolins, L'education nouvelle, Librairie de Paris, year is

not indicated. Anglo-Saxon Superiority, Part L
^^ See Demolins, Anglo-Saxon Superiority, pp. 236-277; Le
socialism devant la science sociale. These works are one of the
most original and thoughtful interpretations of socialism.
91
pretended to discover new principles but assumed that proper '
principles had already been discovered through the past
experience of peoples and generations. ''I am only a transmitter,
not a maker, believing in and loving the ancient," said Confucius.
Similarly, Le Play said, "Concerning the fundamental principles of
social science there is nothing to be invented; in this science the
new is but what has been forgotten." ^" He stressed the fact i that
neither his method of observation, nor his theories and principles,
nor finally his applied sociology were discovered by him; they had
already existed in the social sciences of long ago. This modesty is
really characteristic of Le Play. In regard to the conditions
necessary for the successful existence of a society he said:
Since the revelation of the Ten Commandments and their sublime
interpretation by Christ, the human mind has not discovered more
useful principles. Nations which practice these principles are
progressing and those which are not, declining. . . Solution of the
social problem does not require an invention of new principles.^^ .
. An innumerable number of the thinkers who have analyzed the
virtues and vices of man did not add anything new to the
decalogues of Moses and to the teachings of Christ. ^^
Correspondingly his system of social constitution is simple and
definite. Among the fundamental conditions necessary for the
prosperous existence of any society are: a sincere belief in God
and religion; the existence of the authority of the parents; the
existence of a sovereign government and of loyalty toward it; the
firm institution of private property; the practice of solidarity and

honesty in the interrelations of individuals and classes; mutual
help and cooperation and other principles found in the majority of
ethical and religious systems. In his works already mentioned ^'^
he analyzed each of these conditions, and showed why they were
necessary for the existence of a society and what should be the
details of organization of the religion, of the family, of labor, of
private property, of government and of other social
" See DE CuRZON, op. cit., pp. 3-5, 21-23, 44, 54 ff. " Le Play, La
paix sociale, p. 31. " Le Play, La reforme sociale, Vol. I, p. 12,
1866.
See ConstifuHon essenlHlc, passim; La reforme sociale en
France, passim; see also DE CuRZON, op. cif., passim.
92
institutions. On the basis of observation, he found that the above
conditions had been present in all societies in the periods of their
well-being, prosperity and happiness, and were absent in the
periods of decay, demoralization and disintegration. It is clear that
his plan of social reconstruction is opposed to those which are in
vogue at the present time. Instead of advocating class hatred, Le
Play pleaded for class solidarity; instead of atheism and
materialism, religion; instead of revolution, reform; instead of
egotism, altruism; instead of profit, sacrifice; instead of rights and
privileges, he stressed more duty; instead of destruction of the
existing institutions, their slow and careful remodeling. Such in
brief are the method, the principles, the contributions and the
reforms offered by Le Play and his continuators.
5. CRITICISM AND APPRECIATION
I have already given my appreciation of the school. Le Play

deserves to be put on the level with such masters of social
science as Comte and Spencer.^'^ The aggregate contribution to
sociology-of the Le Play school is scarcely less than that of any
other contemporary school of sociology.^~
However, side by side with its positive qualities it has several
serious shortcomings. In the first place, the Nomenclature and the
principles of the school can by no means embrace and solve all
problems of sociology. They cover only a part of the field. For
instance, they do not touch and do not explain such fundamental
social processes as wars, enrichment and impoverishment,
appearance and disintegration of religion, growth or decrease of
population, and social antagonisms. Equally they do not touch
and do not explain many problems of social organization. In brief,
the system of the Le Play school covers only a part and not the
whole of the field of sociology.
" S. H. Swinny has already expressed the same idea. See
Swinny, S. H., ^'Sociology; Its Successes and Its Failures," The
Sociological Review, Vol. XI, No. I, 1919, p. 3; see also Swinny,
"The Sociological Schools of Comte and Le Play," iHd., Vol. XIII,
No. 2, April, 1921.
^2 It is curious to note the opinion of P. Barth, who in the last
edition of his Die Philosophie der Geshichte als Soziologie styles
Le Play as a romantic and finds his system a mere theory of
"social economics from the standpoint of family-law." Barth, op.
cit., pp. 727-732, Leipzig, 1922. From a speculative social
philosopher, like Barth, such an appreciation is to be expected.
93
In the second place, though the school is free from a narrowminded dogmatism, nevertheless, some of its statements appear
to be somewhat one-sided. Take, for example, the statement of
Demolins concerning the factors of geographical environment and

race. If it is futile to try to explain varieties of peoples and social
types through the racial factor only and to ignore environment
agencies completely, it is equally futile to make the opposite
mistake, as the Le Play school partially does. The factor of race
and heredity is almost completely ignored by the school. Without
it we cannot explain why, for instance, some of the individuals of
the steppes of Central Asia started in one direction; some others,
another; and the rest remained there. How can we account for
such differences through place only? Further, the appearance of
the leaders of the caravans, as well as the other forms of social
differentiation and stratification, are also unaccountable through
the factor of environment alone because the leaders and the led,
the influential and the non-influential individuals were in the same
environment. More than that. We read in Demolins' book:
When we study the origin of culture we are first struck by the
appearance of two categories of family; on the one hand are the
foreseeing families, capable of working in view of remote effects;
on the other hand, there are families and individuals who are
capable of acting only under the pressure of immediate necessity
or in view of immediate satisfaction. In this way, there are formed
two distinct classes: the superior and the inferior. Thus appears
inequality among men. ^'^
It is evident that such social differentiation cannot be accounted
for by place because all of these families lived in the same
geographical conditions. Demolins does not try at all to explain
such a fact. It is highly probable this differentiation is due to
inherited and racial differences of individuals. So much
concerning this one-sidedness.^^ To the credit of the school,
however, it must be said that unlike many social geographers, it
does
" Demolins, Comment la route, Vol. II, pp. 12-13.
^See other "geogra[)hical" fallacies of the school in the chapter

about the Geographical School in sociology. The criticism of the
one-sided "geographism" given there also concerns the Le Play
school.
94
not pretend to make the factor of geographical environment
omnipotent : it recognizes that among more complex societies the
direct influence of geographic environment tends to decrease and
is superseded by other factors.^^
The next shortcoming of the school seems to consist in an
inadequate geographic explanation of the origin of different types
of family. Its theory may contain a considerable portion of truth.
But is it enough to say that the patriarchal family was produced by
steppes; the unstable, by forests; the particularist, by the fiords of
Western Scandinavia? Let us take for example the theory of the
origin of the particularist family in the fiords of Scandinavia.
According to the school, there and only there the particularist type
of family originated. Responsible geographical factors for such a
production were those conditions which forced the people of
Scandinavia to live in small separate families and to permit their
children to go away as soon as they matured. However, such
geographical circumstances existed in many other places. Also,
the forest conditions, which, according to the school, produced
the unstable family, were similar in some respects: they forced the
people to live in small separate families and to permit the adult
children to leave the parental family. Why did these conditions not
produce the particularist type of family? Therefore the explanation
of the origin of the particularist type through the geographical
conditions of the fiords is not sufficient and is not quite convincing.
Also the statement that this type was produced only in the fiords
sounds like an exclusively one-sided statement which is not
sufficiently corroborated. This insufficiency is still greater when we

are told that the descendants of Odin, who lived in the same
fiords, in some mysterious way were not transformed into the
particularist type, but preserved the militant type of warriors; and
for many centuries continued to supply military leaders for the
Danes, the Normans, the Franks, the Saxons, the Goths and so
on. If the geographical conditions of the fiords were responsible
for the transformation of the patriarchal type into the particularist,
then the descendants of Odin should have undergone the same
transformation. Since they did not change but remained what they
^ See Demolins, Comment la route, Vol. I, pp. 196-197.
95
were before coming to the fiords, then the geographical factors
evidently are not enough to explain the transformation. It may be
that the origin of the particularist type was due not only to the
fiords but to other factors as well. The same may be said of the
origin of other types of family and societies. Evidently this theory
of the school is still nothing but a tentative hypothesis. Even if we
grant that the environment theory of the Le Play school ^^ is
satisfactory in regard to the origin of the types of family and man,
we have a new problem concerning the destinies of each type.
Are the acquired characteristics of each type of men biologically
inherited or not? The school is silent on this point. Meanwhile
whether or not we admit the theory of an inheritance or of a noninheritance of such traits, in both cases the theories of the school
are unsatisfactory. If the ac-c[uired traits of men of each type are
not inherited, then it is incomprehensible, why, for instance, in
England, in spite of the identity of the environment, the
descendants of the Saxons have maintained throughout centuries
the particularist characteristics, while the descendants of the Celts
and the Danes and the Normans, who lived in the same place, did
not acquire the same particularist characteristics. (See de
Tourville, Chaps. XIII-XVII.) If the decisive factor is the

environment and the corresponding acquired traits are not
inherited, then all who have stayed in the same geographical
environment for many generations should have acquired similar
traits, regardless of the race. And yet, de Tourville, as well as
Demolins, stresses that up to this time in England the particularist
type is represented only by the descendants of the Saxons and
that the Celtic and other elements in the English population do not
belong to this type at all. It is clear that such a fact could not be
accounted for or reconciled with the statement that ''the road
creates a social type." If the corresponding traits are inherited,
then how is it possible that ''the inherited patriarchal type" could
be transformed into the particularist one, and how is it possible
that the particularist type of the early Eranks was transformed into
the "state-communistic type" while the descendants of the AngloSaxons did not undergo such a change? In the writings of the
^ See DE Tourville, op. rit., (xissim.
96
school we do not find any answer to these questions. They avoid
it. And therefore tlieir theory does not and cannot dissipate the
mystery of the origin and development of each of their principal
types.
The next weak point is the appreciation of different types and their
role. We have seen that the particularist type is destined to be
powerful and dominating and that in it lies the secret of the
expansion of the Anglo-Saxon domination. If this is so, then why
was this type conquered in Europe? Why could it not keep the
dominating position which, according to the school, it held during
the ninth and tenth centuries? Why was it overpowered by the
state-communist type? This diversity of the historical destinies of
the particularist type in Europe and in Scandinavia or in England

is not unveiled by the school at all. It forces us to an inference,
that the particularist type is not necessarily always the conqueror.
The school probably somewhat overestimates the power and the
strength of this type and underestimates the positive qualities of
other types. This is the more probable because history shows that
great and durable empires and brilliant civilizations have been
created by the peoples of ancient Egy-pt, Babylonia, Assyria,
Greece, Rome, China, India, and ancient Peru, who were
conspicuously the peoples of a state-communist or the patriarchal
type. And the history of France or Germany for the last century
does not show that the people of a state-communist type are
incapable either of creating the highest forms of civilization or of
being powerful in the struggle for existence. Take further the
Jewish people. Their family organization still has many
characteristics of the patriarchal type. And yet these people
display an extraordinary vitality and energ>\
Further, for the above reasons it is also possible to question
whether the school does not exaggerate the influence of familyorganization on the types of men, social institutions, and historical
destinies of a society. It seems to be probable that there is some
exaggeration in the statements of the school. It has not
demonstrated that men of each of its types are necessarily the
product of family education only and are not due to racial or
hereditary factors. The school's statements do not give definite
corroboration of its pretensions, and still remain on the level of
97
a probable but not proved hypothesis. If this is so, then the very
heart of the theory of the school that Anglo-Saxon superiority is
due to the particularist type of the Anglo-Saxon family, may also
be questioned. With the same probability one may contend that it
is due to the racial factor and that the particularist type itself is
nothing but a manifestation of corresponding innate qualities of

individuals or groups.
Thus we come to the conclusion that the theory of the school
contains only a part of the truth, and does not sustain all the
sweeping generalizations advanced. Many of its hypotheses still
remain only guesses. Finally, one may partially agree with the
system of applied sociology depicted by the school. But again, it
is not sufficient: granting that the Ten Commandments include all
the essential conditions necessary for the well-being of a society,
we see that they are not always obeyed, and are often
transgressed. At the present moment we see that the existing
religion is weakening and the attacks against property are
increasing. Under such conditions it is not sufficient to indicate the
Commandments in order to create a real applied sociology. Is it
not necessary to find some means of making these principles
effective? Is it not necessary to invent some measures which will
make people follow these Commandments? By this I want to say
that the applied program of the school is not sufficient and does
not remove the necessity for discovering scientific measures
which, at least, would make the Commandments efficient and
effective.
Such in brief are the principal shortcomings of the school. They
may be summed up as follows: First, the system and the program
of the school do not cover the whole field of social phenomena
and social problems; second, the school underestimates the
factor of heredity and race and overestimates the factor of
geographical environment; and third, many problems, analyzed by
the school, among them the origin of the types of family and the
correlation of the types with the social system and historical
destinies of a corresponding society, are not quite sufficiently
explained. Finally, the applied program is ineffective.
These shortcomings of the school should not prevent us from

recognizing its great contributions, its scientific character, its
98
originality, and its stimulating influence. At the present moment
when the particularist type of family and society is undergoing a
crisis and is menaced by another, especially the state-communist
type, the works of the school are especially valuable from the
theoretical, as well as from the practical standpoint.
99
CHAPTER III GEOGRAPHICAL SCHOOL
I. PREDECESSORS
Almost since the beginning of man's history it has been known
that the characteristics, behavior, social organization, social
processes, and historical destinies of a society depend upon the
geographical environment. In attempting to write the history of the
geographical school, one's difficulty consists not so much in
indicating the thinkers who have pointed out the influence of the
geographical environment as it does in indicating those w^ho
have not mentioned it. Lord Kame in 1788 wrote about ''the
endless number of writers who ascribe supreme efficacy to
climate." ^ The most ancient records of the thought of the East,
which have reached us, contain several statements of this kind.
The ancient astrological beliefs in their essence are nothing but
an embodiment of the idea that man's destinies are ruled by stars
and by other geographical conditions. The people's proverbs and
''weather lore" of the past are permeated by the same idea. They
contain many statements concerning the influence of various
geographical conditions on physical and psychical traits of men,
and on social and historical events. Hundreds of individual

thinkers, whose names and ideas are preserved in history, have
indicated in some form this or that effect of geographical factors.
The thinkers of ancient India and Persia; the priests and the
physicians of ancient Egypt; the astrologers of different countries;
the Jewish prophets; Confucius, Lao-Tse, Mencius, and other
sages of ancient China; Hippocrates, Plato, Aristotle, Thucydides,
Xenophon, Herodotus, Strabo, Polybius, Eratosthenes, Varro, Vitruvius,Vegetius, Paul the Deacon, Servius, Cicero, Florus,
Sallus-tius, Lucretius, Seneca, and almost all the prominent
philosophers, historians, poets, and writers of ancient Greece and
Rome; many of the Church Tîthers, like St. Augustine, and
Tertullian; many
^ See Lord Kame, Sketches of the History of Man, 4 vols., 1788.
100
mediaeval thinkers, like Giovanni Villani, St. Thomas Aquinas,
Michelangelo, Machiavelli, Ibn-Khaldun and Jean Bodin; all these
and many others have mentioned the conditioning role of various
geographical factors. Later on, the effects of geographical
agencies were stressed by Richard Mead, John Arbuthnot,
Bernhardus Varenius, Sir John Chardin, J. B. Vico, Lord Kame,
W. Temple, Lenglet du Fresnoy, Turgot, Cuvier, Herder, and
Montesquieu. In the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries a
great multitude of historians, social philosophers, economists,
geographers, political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists and
ethnographers, biologists and men of medical science made
many contributions in this field. The names of Lamarck, Karl
Ritter, Arnold Henry Guyot, Johann Georg Kohl, Alexander von
Humboldt, K. E. von Baer, Oscar Peschel, H. T. Buckle, F. Le
Play, H. de Tourville, E. Demolin, L. Metchnikoff, P. Lavrov, Mackinder, A. Kirchoff, F. Ratzel, Ch. Comte, P. Mougeolle, A. Mat-
teuzzi, E. Reclus; and finally, the names of P. Vidal de la Blache,

Jean Bruhnes, C. Vallaux, E. Huntington, E. G. Dexter, E. Ch.
Semple, Morcelli, Lehman, Shyten, H. L. Moore, and Beveridge,
are a very few representatives of a great multitude of people who
have tried to emphasize various effects of geographical conditions
on man's behavior and psychology, and on social organization,
social processes and the historical destinies of a group.^
As a result of the work of this multitude of authors there scarcely
is any physical or psychical trait in man, any characteristic in the
social organization of a group, any social process or historical
event, which has not been accounted for through geographical
factors by this or that partizan of this school. Distribution of the
population on the surface of the earth, the density of population,
racial differences, the character of economic, polit2 See the history of the geographical school in the works: Koller,
A. H., The Theory of Environment, The Collegiate Press, 1918;
Thomas, F., The Environmental Basis of Society, 1925; Barnes,
H. E., The New History and the Social Studies, Chap. II, N. Y.
1925; Barth, P., Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Soziologie,
1922, pp. 544-555; see the literature and the references in
Vallaux, C, La mer, Paris, 1908, appendix "Bibliographic." All
these and many similar works, however, are far from being
exhaustive. They are incomplete even in regard to the thinkers of
the Western countries and they completely ignore the Eastern
thinkers and writers of the present, as well as of the past. The
best first-hand source, for theories of the ancient East, is the
series of fifty volumes of ''The Sacred Books of the East"
published under the editorship of F. M. Miiller.
101
ical, and social organization, the progress and decay of nations,
the character of rehgious ideas and beHefs, the forms of the
family and .of marriage, heahh, fertihty, intelHgence, crimes,
suicide, cultural achievements, the number of men of genius, the

traits of literature, poetry, and civilization, the movement of
economic and social life, in brief, almost all social phenomena
have been attributed to geographical influences. At the beginning
of a study of these theories one is impressed by their brilliancy
and originality; continuing the study one is perplexed and
bewildered by their contradiction and vagueness; and finally he is
lost in the sea of these theories not knowing what in them is valid,
and what is wrong or doubtful. This explains why the primary
need in this field at the present moment consists not so much in a
formulation of a new geographical theory or of a new ''correlation" between geographical factors and social phenomena as in a
most rigorous analysis and shifting of what is valid and what is
childish in these numerous hypotheses.
Such a shifting is the purpose of this chapter. The lack of space
does not permit me to make the shifting quite exhaustive. For this
reason I have to omit all purely speculative ''geographical
theories" and concentrate my attention only on those which are
factual and more mature from the scientific point of view. The
results of their scrutiny, however, may be applied, with still greater
reasons, to all the less elaborated, the less scientific or more
metaphysical ''geographical conjectures, hypotheses and
generalizations."
2. DEFINITION OF GEOGRAPHICAL FACTORS
In order to avoid vagueness in our analysis of the influence of
geographical environment, we must state that by this concept we
mean all cosmic conditions and phenomena which exist
independent of man's activity, which are not created by man, and
which change and vary through their own spontaneity,
independent of man's existence and activity. In other words, if we
take the total environment of a man or that of a social group, and
subtract from it all environmental agencies directly or indirectly
created or changed through man's existence and activity, we will

have left approximately what is known as geographical
102
environment. "Natural" climate, temperature, soil, relief of surface,
distribution of water and water courses, natural flora and fauna,
natural changes of seasons and geophysical processes, the
phenomena of gravitation, storms, earthquakes, sea-currents and
so on, as far as they exist and change regardless of man's
existence and activity, are examples of geographical agencies in
the above sense of the word. On the other hand, all phenomena
and conditions, whose existence and variation are direct or
indirect results of man's existence and activity, compose the
agencies of anthropo-social, but not geographical, environment.
Cultivated fields, forests and gardens, artificial channels, artificial
modification of natural relief of the surface of the earth, or artificial
climate, and soil and sub-soil, all such phenomena are excluded
from the geographical or ''natural" agencies in the proper sense of
the word.
Now let us turn to our analysis of the correlations established
between geographical agencies and social phenomena.
3. FUNDAMENTAL PROPOSITIONS CONCERNING THE
CHARACTER OF CONDITIONING OF SOCIAL PHENOMENA
BY GEOGRAPHICAL
FACTORS
There is no doubt that the totality of geographic conditions
determines, to some extent, human behavior, social organization
"ind social processes. But what is the nature of this conditioning?
Is it direct or indirect? Is it rigid and inflexible? Is it possible to
formulate definite and general correlations of geographic

conditions with social phenomena? In order not to be lost in the
sea of complex geographic influences, let us formulate at once
some fundamental propositions which outline the nature of these
influences and which will guide us in our analysis. These
propositions are as follows:
I. The conditioning role of geographical agencies (B) may be
direct and indirect: direct when they directly determine a definite
series of social phenomena (A) according to the formula: A=f (B);
indirect when they condition a definite series of social
phenomena, not because they influence them directly, but
because they influence some other phenomena (C) or (D) which
in their turn condition the series A. In this case the formula of
103
indirect conditioning is: C = f (B); therefore A = f (C). If A were not
dependent on C, then the geographical factors would not have
conditioned A at all. It is clear that indirect conditioning may
consist sometimes of a long series of links of functional relations :
B may condition C; C, the phenomena D; D, that of E; and only E
may condition A. It is evident that, other conditions being equal,
the longer is such a series of indirect relations and the more
numerous are the middle members (C, D, E, F,) of such a series
between A and B, the more remote becomes their interrelation
and the less definite is the correlation between A and B. In such
cases the geographical agencies may exert some influence, but it
becomes so strongly neutralized and modified by interference of
the "middle agencies" between A and B, that the correlation
between them becomes intangible, or entirely indefinite. Since it is
intangible, and unable to be described in a definite formula, it is
practically equal to an absence of such correlation. In analyzing
the conditioning role of geographical agencies we must always
discriminate between its direct and indirect forms.
2. According to the aboz/e, the conditioning influence of

geographical agencies is not equally rigid and direct in regard to
different categories of social phenomena. While some of them
exhibit a close and noticeable direct correlation with geographical
agencies, some others do not show such a correlation at all. In
this respect the hypothesis of J. Bruhnes, which in essence is
identical with the Le Play school's Nomenclature series, appears
to me as relatively valid. He states that those forms of human
activity and corresponding social phenomena which pertain to the
satisfaction of the primary necessities of man, such as
alimentation, shelter for sleep, clothing and a few others, are in a
more direct relation with geographical conditions than other
human activities and social phenomena which are of different
character. Correspondingly, he indicates six series of social
phenomena where the correlation with geographic agencies is
closer than in other fields of social facts. These six series are:
human habitation (inhabited areas, the character of houses and
constructions), the direction and the character of roads, cultivation
of plants and breeding of animals, exnloitation of minerals and
devastation in
104
plant and animal life. All that lies beyond these ''six essential
facts," such as forms of family and of political and social
organization, the character of religions, the character of laws, of
literature, of science, etc., exhibit less, if any, correlation with
geographical factors.^ In its essentials this hypothesis seems to
be valid.
3. In the field of social phenomena where the correlation is
noticeable it rarely has a rigid character. The determinism of
geographical factors as far as we can grasp is almost always
relative, J. Bruhnes expresses the same idea in the following way:
''Between the facts of the physical order there are sometimes

relations of causality; between facts of human geography
(geographical conditions and social phenomena) there are usually
only relations of connection. To force, so to speak, the bond
which connects phenomena with each other is scientifically false;
and there will be great need of the spirit of criticism which will
enable one to see clearly the many cases where connection is
accidental and not causal." ^
This non-rigidity or relativity of geographical conditioning
manifests itself in many forms. First, though in many cases
geographical factors determine whether such and such social
phenomena (e.g., the mining industry or the fact of the
inhabitation of a definite area by men) may or may not take place
in a definite location; nevertheless, geographical possibility does
not mean that such a phenomenon really occurs in this location.
For instance, in spite of the rich natural resources of the place,
the mining industry may not exist there owing to lack of nongeographical factors. In this way, geographical conditioning in the
absolute form becomes null and void. It is not rigid. The same
relativity of geographical determinism exhibits itself in cases in
which geographical conditions determine that "such a
phenomenon may not take place at any given location" as, for
instance, cultivation of plants in a desert or in an extraordinarily
dry area. And yet, we know that due to artificial irrigation such
things happen. This means that the geographical impossibility of a
phe3 Bruhnes, J., Human Geography, Chaps. I-II, Rand McNally Co.,
N. Y Compare with the Le Play school Nomenclature.
* Bruhnes, J., Human Geography, p. 593; compare de la Blache,
P. V., Principles oj Human Geography, N. Y., 1926.
105
nomenon does not prevent it. This is another illustration of the

non-rigidity of geographical conditioning. Expectations based on
geographical conditions exclusively in many cases may not be
justified.
Second, the non-rigidity of geographical determinism shows itself
further in the possibility of many and various social forms zvithin
the same geographical area. Like an abode, geographical
conditions may, in a relative degree, determine whether the place
is suitable for human habitation or for the construction of a
building. But whether the corresponding society will assume the
forms of a primitive tribe, or those of a complex civilized society;
whether the building will be a primitive hut, or pyramid, or castle,
or palace of parliament, or commercial skyscraper; these things
are not determined by geographical agencies. Almost always a
large field of choice is left. What takes place depends not so
much on the geographical as upon the non-geographical factors.
The same idea is expressed by C. Vallaux in the words that "the
influence of geographical factors is negative but not positive; they
often may hinder a phenomenon but they do not determine what
will be." ^ y
4. From the above it follows that the formulation of definite and
general correlations between geographical and social phenomena
is greatly hindered by this non-rigidity and indirectness of
geographical determinism. It is still more strongly handicapped by
the neutralization of the effects of one geographical agency by
another, and by neutralization of the effects of all geographical
agencies by the non-geographical factors. And the more complex
are the forms of ciznliiâtion, the less noticeable, the less definite
and the less tangible is the correlation between geographical
conditions and social phenomena. This does not mean that in
such societies geographical agencies stop working, but that their
effects are more and more neutralized by other agencies.
Therefore, they become less tangible, less noticeable, and more
difficult to observe, grasp and generalize. For these reasons, it is

to be expected that the attempts to establish such correlations
may give at best only some tentative and very approximate
hypothesis which inay be applied to some societies ami times and
' Vallaux, C, Le sol el I'ctat, p. 106, Paris, 1911.
106
rarely may pretend to be valid in regard to all societies and all
times. Furthermore, it is to be expected that among many alleged
correlations many will be fallacious, not to mention those which,
being purely speculative, cannot pretend to be scientific at all.
Such, in brief, are the guiding principles and the general
conclusions concerning geographical theories. On the following
pages we shall see their validity. Let us now turn to the analysis of
the principal correlations which have been formulated by different
authors. We shall begin with the correlations in the field of
Bruhnes' ''essential facts" because they may be more definite and
conspicuous.
4. GEOGRAPHICAL CONDITIONS AND DISTRIBUTION OF
HUMAN POPULATION ON THE EARTH
The field of social phenomena wîere the influence of
geographical factors is to be expected, is in the location of human
population and its density. It seems evident that geographical
areas which, according to their climate, soil, relief of surface,
distribution of water, flora and fauna, are more convenient for
human habitation and for satisfaction of human primary
necessities, are to be more densely inhabited than the area less
convenient in this respect.
This proposition, however, is evident only in appearance because

which geographical conditions are ''convenient" yet remains to be
found. Besides, the conditions convenient for a primitive society
may be quite inconvenient for an industrial society; the
geographic environment convenient in one respect, e.g., in
climate, may be quite inconvenient in another respect, e.g., poor
in water, in minerals, in soils, etc. Therefore, this and similar
propositions of the geographers, at the very best, may claim only
a limited local and temporarysignificance. This may be seen
from the following discussion.
It is claimed that in spite of human migrations and the fluctuation
of the density of population of different areas "the general
distribution of the larger human masses seems subject to a fixity,
of course relative, and yet a fixity that is certain and surprising.
The Siberian tundras, the Saharan hamadas, or the
107
Amazon forest are almost devoid of men." ^ The same is true in
regard to arctic regions and other places of similar inconvenience.
A series of other data tend to show the same correlation. This
may be seen from the data on the following page.*^ Temperature,
amount of rainfall, altitude are the geographical agencies;
therefore, the correlation of these conditions with the density of
the population shown by the tables tends to testify in favor of the
influence of these factors on the distribution of the population on
the earth. However, on the other hand, a series of other facts
testify that the correlations shown by these data are in no way
universal and constant. We cannot say that everywhere the most
densely populated areas have a temperature of from 50 to 55
degrees, a rainfall of from 40 to 50 inches, and an altitude of
below 100 meters, as it is shown in these tables. Due to a
different combination of various geographical conditions, and
especially to the interference of the non-geographical factors, the
boundaries between the inhabited and uninhabited areas are

changing and the above points of optimum are very different for
different places, societies, and times. Many places uninhabited in
the past become inhabited at the present moment, and vice
versa, in spite of the absence of noticeable change in the
geographical environment of these places. Through irrigation
many deserts are transformed into inhabited areas. Through
activity of civilized men many uninhabited prairies, forests, and
similar places of America, Russia, and Asia are improved and
become the habitat of man. If, as we shall see further, Mougeolle's, S. C. GilFillan's, and Stefansson's theory of ''the Cold-ward
or the Northward Course of Civilization," ^ is very questionable,
nevertheless, it gives plenty of facts which show that great
uninhabited areas of the North in the course of time have become
inhabited densely, and have been transformed into centers of
civilization. These and a great many similar facts indicate that the
boundaries between the inhabited and uninhabited
^ Bruhnes, Human Geography, p. 47.
^ VON Mayr, G., Statistik und Gesellschaftslehre, B. II, 1897, p.
51. See other similar data in Bruhnes, op. cit., pp. 186 ff; Ratzel,
F., Anthropogeographie, 1891, Vol. II, p]). 210 ff.
^ vSee GilFillan, S. C., "The Coldward Course of Progress,"
Political Science Quarterly, 1920, pp. 393-410. Stefansson, The
Northward Course of Empire.
108
108 CONTEMPOR.\RY SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES
109
areas are moving; consequently, geographical determinism in this
respect is non-rigid and very relative. The same is true in regard
to the optimum point of altitude, temperature, and rainfall. While

for Europe, according to the above table, the most densely
populated zone of altitude is below lOO meters, and places above
1400 meters are almost uninhabited, for the tropical regions, and
for Abyssinia, Arabia, Central and South America, and for many
other places, the most densely populated zones of altitude are
above 1500 meters.^
Shifting of the most densely populated zones in the course of time
from one altitude to another, in spite of an absence of a
noticeable change in geographical conditions, is a still more
conspicuous and unquestionable illustration. P. Mougeolle even
formulated a general "law of altitude," according to which, with the
development of civilization, the most densely inhabited areas and
cities are descending from the zones of high altitude (mountains
and plateaus) to those of lower altitudes (plains).^^ Even though
this ''law," as a general formula, is questionable, the shifting of the
zones of density of population in regard to altitude is proved by
Mougeolle beyond a doubt. This illustration shows how relative
the geographical determinism is in this field; how different and
shifting are the geographical points of optimum in regard to the
distribution of the population of the earth; how ''local" and
"temporary" are all generalizations and correlations in this field;
and how impossible it is to construct the map of the density of the
population of different areas exclusively on the basis of the
geographical conditions.
What has been said concerning altitude may be said in regard to
"points of optimum" temperature and rainfall in their interrelations
with the density of population. They are also shifting in time and
space. They vary for diff'erent places, times, and societies. For
these reasons this analysis of the correlation between
geographical conditions and the density of the population seems
to corroborate completely the fundamental propositions stated
above.
' See the data in Bruhnes, Human Geography, pp. 186-196.

>See Mougeolle, P., Lcs prohlemes de I'histoire, pp. 97-106,
Paris, 1886; Mougeolle, P., Statique des civilisations, Paris, 1883,
passim.
110
no CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES
5. GEOGRAPHIC CONDITIONS AND THE CHARACTER OF
HUMAN DWELLINGS, ROADS AND MEANS OF
TRANSPORTATION
It is evident that the character of human habitations or houses
more than many other social phenomena must depend on
geographic conditions. In its material (wood, stone, brick, fur, etc.)
and in its form, shape, and architectural type, it is influenced by
geographic conditions. In the places rich with forests wooden
houses predominate, while where woods are scarce some other
materials must be used. The same is true of the architectural type
and shape, and the site of the dwelling. To some extent this
expectation is warranted by the facts. But again this extent is
rather moderate. In the opinion of one of the best ''human
geographers" it is estimated as follows: 'Tf geography is far from
explaining everything in the house, at least the human habitation
cannot be completely understood without an appeal to
geography." ^^ This estimate of geographical influences in this
field does not ascribe very much to them, and an innumerable
series of facts may be indicated to show that ''geographical
conditions are far from explaining everything in the house."
Places the most different in geographical respects often show
remarkable similarities in types of dwellings. A conspicuous
example of this is given by the United States of America, where
over an immense area with the most different climate and other
conditions, one sees practically similar types of houses in the
East and the West, in the North and the South. The variations in
houses in different parts of the country rarely surpass those

between different houses of the same city or neighborhood. On
the other hand, it is enough to compare the types of dwellings in
similar geographical conditions, e.g., those in the prairies of
America and in the prairies (steppes) of Russia, in the seashore
regions (e.g., New York, Trieste, Almeria or Algeria), to see the
greatest differences among them, in spite of a similarity of
geographic conditions. The same is true in regard to the primitive
peoples. "The Hopi and Navajo Indians have both occupied, for a
long period, the same part of northwestern Arizona. . . . Though
the
" Bruhnes, Human Geography, p. 94. See also Chap. III.
111
same building material is available," nevertheless, "the Hopi
construct the well-known terraced sandstone houses with a
rectangular cell as the architectural unit, while the Navajo dwell in
conical earth-covered huts." ^~ Add to this the changes in
dwellings of the same area in the course of time. Without any
noticeable change in the geographic conditions of the area, the
dominant type of dwelling, often within some thirty or forty years,
changes considerably.
It is useless to insist on these evident facts. They can only mean
that geographical determinism in this field is loose and relative. Its
effects sometimes may be completely obliterated by a play of
other factors. If the human habitation cannot be understood
completely without an appeal to geography, every attempt to
account for it by geography alone is hopeless and fallacious. All
that has been said of human habitation may be applied to the
direction and character of roads, and generally to the means of
transportation.^^
6. GEOGRAPHICAL CONDITIONS AND CLOTHING
This category of social phenomena also has a correlation with

geographical conditions, though less noticeable than that of
dwellings and roads. Clothing in the colder regions or seasons is
somewhat thicker and warmer than in warmer regions or seasons.
But this is almost the only way in which the influence of
geographical agencies manifests itself. Immensely numerous
differences and variations in the clothing of different societies,
groups, and times seem to be conditioned by other than
geographical agencies. The extravagances of fashion, the yearly
changes in men's and women's clothes, the different uniforms of
various social groups (soldiers, priests, monks, officials, and so
on), the different costumes of various peoples and especially
through historical times; these and thousands of similar
phenomena seem to have nothing to do with the geographical
factors. The indirect influences are slight and unnoticeable.
^2 LowiE, R. H., Culture and Ethnology, pp. 49-65, N. Y., 1917.
"vSee an able analysis in Bruhnes, op. cit., pp. no fT.; Vall.\ux, C,
La mer, Paris, 1908, passim.
112
7. GEOGRAPHICAL CONDITIONS AND FOOD AND DRINK
There is also some dependence between the flora and fauna of a
geographic environment and the quantity and the quahty of food
and drink of a society. The seashore people eat more fish than a
people who inhabit an area without waters rich with fish. A society
situated in a fruit-bearing area eats more fruit than those in areas
where the trees are absent or cannot be cultivated. Such
correlations may be found in many places. But these are neither
general, nor always noticeable. Even among relatively primitive
tribes it is easy to see that the principal forms of food are often
similar among tribes situated in essentially different environments,
and different among tribes of similar environments. Here are a

few cases of the many collected by F. P. Armitage.
Principal kinds of food and corresponding peoples
Rice: Oraons, S. Indians, Chinese, Koreans, Mundas, Japanese,
Looshais, N. Aragans, Tonkingese, Laosians, Siamese
Wheat, Millet or Oats, phis Cattle or Fish: Kabardians of the plain
and mountains, Armenians, Albanians, Tadjiks, Turkomans,
Norwegians, Finns, Livs, Kirghiians, Scots
Fish pins Flesh: Eskimos, Dogribs, Chinooks, Kootenayans,
Comanches, Blackfeet, Crows, Crees, Charruas, Macobys
Flesh plus Maize: Sioux, Pawnees, Ojibwas, Lenguas, Machicuys, Iroquois, Algonquin, Muskohogian, Concapah, Yakui,
Mohaves, Navajos, Yumas, Pimas, Papagos, Opatas, Mayas,
Mexicans, Tepehuans ^^
In each ''food-group" we see peoples who live in the most
different geographical environment. The same ''independence of
food" from geographical factor is still more conspicuous in
complex societies. In spite of the most different geographical
conditions of the United States of America food is substantially
the same. Furthermore, "the people of western Europe consume
large quantities of coffee, tea, and cocoa, w^hile cow's milk from
European mountain pastures is consumed by the inhabitants of
Shanghai and South Africa. Increased facilities of transporta'* Armitage, F. P., Diet and Race, pp. 30-32, London, 1922.
113
tion tend more and more to intermingle all human foods." On the
other hand, the food of different social classes dwelling in the
same geographical environment, in the same city, often differs,
quantitatively and qualitatively, much more than the food of

peoples living in the most different geographical conditions.
An idea of this difference is given by the following table, one of
many similar. In Russia the food of different classes of the
peasantry before the Revolution wâs as follows : ^^
If we take the quantity and the quality of food of different social
classes of the Russian society, the difference will be still greater.
The same is true of different classes of other societies.^^ The
difference in food of different social classes of the same society
cannot be accounted for through geographical conditions. The
same is true in regard to the differences between the food of the
Russian, the English, the Chinese and the American societies, as
a whole. The same may be said for ''trends" in food habits such
as in France, where in the period from 1840 to 1895 the
consumption of bread, wine and potatoes per head of the
population increased by 50 per cent; that of meat, cheese, and
cider, by 200 per cent; that of sugar and coffee by 400 per cent.^^
All such changes and differences and trends seem to have
nothing to
'* Klepikov, vS., Pitanie Russkago Krestianina, 1920, pp. 13 ff.
'^ See a great many data for different countries in Webb, A., The
New Dictionary of Statistics, pp. 156-165, 273-289, London, 1911;
Grotjahn, A., "Uber Wandlungen in d. Volksernahrung,"
Schmoller's Staats und Sozialwissenschafl-liche Forschungen,
Bd. XX, Heft. 2, Leipzig, 1920, pp. 58-64; Slosse et WaxWEILER, E., Rccherches sur le travail humain dans ['industry,
1910. Pervushin "Potreblcnie," in Granat's Encyclopedia, Vol. 33
(Russ.).
^^ D'AvENEL, G., Le mecanism de la vie moderne, p. 157, Paris,
1908.
114
do with geographic factors. Meanwhile, they compose the most
substantial phenomena in this field of geographical determinism.
8. GEOGRAPHICAL CONDITIONS AND ECONOMIC LIFE AND
ORGANIZATION
A. Geographical Conditions and IVealth. We have numerous
theories of the geographical conditioning of economic
phenomena. The first group of these theories tries to show that
geographic conditions have determined almost completely the
amount of wealth produced and owned by a society, especially
during the earlier stages of social life. "Of all the results which are
produced among a people by climate, (food) and soil, the
accumulation of wealth is the earliest, and in many respects the
most important . . . and the history of wealth in its earliest stages
will be found to depend entirely on soil and climate." ^^
Such is the essence of these theories in Buckle's formulation.
There is no doubt that there is a part truth in the statement. But
only a part. Even in regard to many primitive tribes the above
proposition is fallacious, not to speak of its fallacy in regard to
complex societies. In the first place the phenomenon of wealth
itself is not something static but something that varies strongly in
its nature, according to the social circumstances Which of the
products of a geographic environment become economically
valuable, depends not only on the nature of these products but
also on the character of a society. Oil, naphtha, even coal and
iron ore, or an abundance of water-falls have no economic value
for a society which does not know how to utilize them. A territory
rich with these products is very unfavorable for the accumulation
of wealth by a primitive tribe of hunters or tillers; and the same
territory is very favorable for the enrichment of a modern industrial
society. The same geographic environment may have great

economic value for a people who know how to exploit it; and it
may have no value for a people who do not have this knowledge,
and vice versa: quite different geographical regions may have
similar economic value for different peoples. This means that
there is no such thing as a
18 Buckle, H. T., Introduction to the History of Civilization of
England, new and revised edition by J. M. Robertson, pp. 24-28,
and Chap. II. London, N. Y.
115
geographic environment valuable in itself, under all
circumstances, for all societies, regardless of their character. For
these reasons Buckle's proposition needs a serious limitation. In
the second place, the assumption that all brilliant and wealthy
civilizations of earlier times have happened in an exclusively
''favorable" natural environment, is also questionable. The
geographical conditions of Sparta, or Athens, or even ancient
Egypt may be styled as *'rich" and fertile only in a very relative
sense. If there were no accommodations made by the inhabitants,
the natural environment of these societies is to be recognized as
rather ''poor." And yet, this did not hinder the production and
accumulation of great wealth. On the other hand, in spite of the
richness of the natural resources of America, its pre-European
inhabitants did not accumulate great wealth.^^ In the third place,
the assumption that primitive tribes who live within the same
geographical environment are equally wealthy is also not
accurate. Among other authors, R. H. Lowie and R. Thurnwald
have shown this in regard to the Hopi and the Navajo Indians, and
in regard to a series of other tribes.~^ In the fourth place, the
average per capita wealth of contemporary societies and
corresponding differences in this respect cannot be accounted for
through the hypothesis. The same is true in regard to the
fluctuations of impoverishment and prosperity during the course of

time within a population which lives in the same geographic
environment. The natural resources of Russia are scarcely poorer
than those of any other country; and yet, the per capita wealth of
its population is one of the lowest. The Indians and the Americans
inhabit the same territory; and yet the former were poor, the latter
were and are rich. Bruhnes gives a long series of facts which
show the accumulation of considerable wealth and economic
prosperity among populations in a very hostile natural
environment, and vice vcrsar^ These reasons are enough to show
the one-sidedness
^' See further the classical criticism of these theories given by
Gobineau. His objections are valid in essence up to this time.
Some of Buckle's fallacies in this respect are justly indicated and
checked by Robertson in his editorial remarks and footnotes in
the above edition of Buckle's book.
"See Lowie, R. H., Culture and FMinology, pp. 48 ff., N. Y., 1917;
Thurnwald, R., "Die Gestaltung der Wirtschaftsentwicklung aus
ihren Anfangen heraus," in Erinngeriingsgabe Jiir Max Weber,
Vol.1, pp. 273-336, Munich, 1923.
" See Bruhnes, op. ciL, Chap. VIII, and ]->]). 593 ff. See his
discussion.
116
of the theories under discussion. There is some truth in the
theories because, under given conditions of a society the
character of natural resources may facihtate or hinder an
accumulation of wealth, but this is only one factor among many,
and it is scarcely more important than many other nongeographical agencies.^^
B. Geographical Conditions and the Character of Industries of a

Society. A second series of the geographical theories tries to
show the existence of a close correlation between geographical
conditions and economic or industrial activities of a given society.
Practically every textbook in economic or industrial geography,
and almost every textbook in history, emphasizes the great
conditioning role of geographical factors in this respect.^^ Place
determines the method of obtaining the means of subsistence of a
society or the character of its economic activities. We have seen
how Le Play's formula shows the determining role of geographical
conditions. In a similar way it is traced by a crowd of historians
and economic geographers. It is evident that a society whose
territory does not include coal or other valuable minerals and
metals cannot be expected to develop the mining industry. It is
clear also that a territory with infertile soil cannot be expected to
produce a society whose principal industry is agriculture. This
means that there is some truth in all these theories. But again, the
correlation between geographic environment and the industrial
activities of a society is often overestimated. Though in many
cases it is tangible, in most of the others it is very loose and even
indefinite.
It is hard to agree with the claim of Demolins and other geog22 The fundamental source of the fallacies of the geographers is
their disregard of social environment and of hereditary differences
of human beings. In this respect Buckle's complete disregard of
inherent differences, expressed in his note on page 22, is typical
for many geographers. If a one-sided geographical theory of the
production of wealth is very defective, still more defective is a
geographical theory of the distribution of wealth, which is also
typically outhned by Buckle. It is so fallacious that it does not
need even to be criticized. See Buckle, op. cit., pp. 28 ff.
23 See as example Semple, Ellen Ch., American History and Its

Geographic Conditions, 1903; Semple, Inflicences of Geog.
Environment, 1911; Smith, J. R., Industrial and Commercial
Geography, 1913; Whitbeck, R. H., and Finch, V. C, Economic
Geography, 1924; Huntington, E., and Williams, F. E., Business
Geography, 1922; Whitbeck, R. H., Industrial Geography, 1924;
see other literature cited in these books.
117
raphers that a mere knowledge of the geographical conditions of
a given territory is sufficient to enable us to forecast the character
of the industries or the principal economic activities of the
population of such a territory. The conditions of the steppes of
Russia and American prairies is similar in many respects; and yet
the economic activities of the nomadic and half-nomadic
population of the Russian steppes and those of the American
prairies are different. The population of the mountains of
Switzerland, the Basques of the Pyrenees, and the Tibetans, live
in similar mountainous conditions; and yet the industries through
which they get their means of subsistence are different. The
Bushmen and the Herrero dwell in the same deserts, but hunting
is the basic industry of the former and cattle-breeding of the
latter.^* Many Indian tribes lived in areas where the soil was fertile
and very favorable for the development of agriculture; and yet it
almost did not exist at all among them. On the other hand, in the
Western Carpathians, which are much less favorable for the
development of agriculture, it is greatly developed and 88 per cent
of the ground is cultivated, while in the Eastern Carpathians
where land is more fertile, cultivation is less developed and only
13 per cent of the land is tilled.^'' On Majorca, especially on the
great western sierras of the island, in spite of the most
unfavorable conditions, the people "have accomplished and are
still accomplishing the miraculous feat of developing irrigated
gardens of their hitertas/' ^^ Post factum, we are prone to believe
historians when they say that ''the development of navigation by

the Phccnicians was due to the favorable sea-shore
environment." In fact these and a great many similar explanations
are misleading. In the case of the Phoenicians, the real situation
was as follows:
It will be difficult to find any less hospitable regions in the
Mediterranean than the little corner of the Syrian shore where are
situated the ports of Tyre and Sidon, famous in antiquity. The
situations are unfavorable in themselves, and very often a heavy
swell from the open sea makes it difficult to enter or to leave the
port, and yet,
2^ See Thurnvvald, R., Die Gestaltung der Wirtschajtsentwicklung
aus ihren An-fdngen heratcs, Munich, 1923.
2' Bruhnes, Human Geography, p. 525. ^ Ibid., p. 594.
118
the Phoenicians were a people of navigators and colonists. Why?
Because their commercial ingenuity made up for the unkindness
of nature. ^'^
The same is true of a great many other post factum geographical
interpretations of the industrial activities of different peoples given
in the courses of history. From the fact that the Greeks, or the
Phoenicians became navigators and developed a great maritime
commerce they concluded that the geographical position was
responsible for it.^^ In fact in these and in many other cases the
geographical environments were far from being favorable.
Besides plenty of peoples have lived in a much more favorable
environment for the development of navigation and failed to do
so.^^ Such discrepancies between geographical conditions and
the character of the industrial activities of a population are so

numerous that the above statement of the geographers loses its
general character and eventually means only indefinite
geographical determinism. The final proofs are those changes of
the industrial activities of a population which sometimes occur in a
short period of time. For instance, in the United States during the
last thirty years, the percentage of males engaged in agriculture
decreased from 50 to 35 of all males gainfully employed. This is a
very serious change in the industrial activities of the population.
Neither can it be accounted for through geographic conditions. In
essence they are now exactly the same as thirty years ago. The
following table shows the number of workers engaged in certain
specified occupations in the United States per million of the
population.^^
The table shows very serious changes in occupational activities of
the population within the period of seventy years. These changes
cannot be accounted for through geographical conditions.
27 Bruhnes, op. cit., p. 595; Dubois, Marcel, La crise maritime, p.
25.
28 See a more detailed analysis as to the extent of Greek
geographical environment which was favorable for maritime
navigation in Vallaux, La mer, paragraph 7.
29 See many facts in Bruhnes, op. cit., Chap. VIII, and pp. 594 ff.
See also Vallaux's criticism of corresponding geographical
theories of K. Ritter and F. Ratzel and the convincing and
abundant factual material given to show the inadequacy of all
one-sided geographical theories of this kind. Vallaux, C, La mer,
pp. 27 fT., and Chap. II; Vallaux, Le sol et I'etat, pp. 152 ff., and
passim.
30 Jones, M. Z., "Trend of Occupations in the Population,"
Monthly Labor Review, May, 1925.
119
GEOGRAPHICAL SCHOOL
119
According to Petrenz, in Leipzig, during the period from 1751 to
1890, 349 new occupations appeared and 115 of those previously
existing disappeared.^^ It is difficult to explain these changes by
the influence of geographical factors. These and thousands of
similar examples show that the industrial activities of a society
change, and sometimes radically, in the same geographical
environment. This is further proof of the one-sided-ness of
Demolins' claim, and the exaggerated character of the
corresponding geographical theories.
The geographical conditions of America or Russia within the next
two hundred years probably will change very little; and yet who
can foresee or predict what will be the principal industries of these
countries at that time? We probably would not be far from the
truth if we said they would be very different from the present. Any
new invention, any considerable change of the racial composition
of the population or of the social organization and interrelations of
a society with other societies calls forth serious and substantial
modifications of its industrial activities.^'
^' Petrenz, O., Die Entwicklung der Arheitsteilung in Leipziger
Gewerbem, p. 89, Leipzig, 1901.
^- Even the nature of geographical conditions is changed by
complex societies. The nature of the geographical conditions of
the United ^States is now, after great progress by science, quite
different from that before. What is now regarded as a very
favorable nature (rich with oil, coal, iron) in the past was regarded
as very infavorable. and vice versa.
120
In regard to complex society especially, there is no possibility of
any close correlation between physical environment and industrial
activities.
C. Geographical Conditions and Business Cycles and the Rhythm
of Economic Life. The third group of geographical theories
consists of those attempting to establish a correlation between
geographical conditions and the waves of prosperity and
impoverishment, business revivals and depressions. The theories
claim that the economic life of a society ultimately is determined
by geographical agencies. Plato often said that great
geographical processes like earthquakes or inundations were
responsible for the decay of prosperity and of the civilizations of
many societies. A great many other authors have stressed the
parallelism between dynamics in climate and economic cycles in
the life of different societies.
At the present time we have several studies of this kind. As
examples of such studies, we may mention the sun-spot theory of
business cycles of W. Stanley Jevons, published in 1875;^^ the
same theory slightly modified by H. Stanley Jevons; ^^ the theory
of W. H. Shaw, concerning the correlation between the periodicity
of wheat yields and climatic changes; ^^ Briickner's theory of the
correlation of climatic changes with the fluctuation of the
economic life of a society;^^' H. H. Clayton's theory of the
commercial panics in the United States and their correlation with
periods of deficient rainfall in the Ohio Valley; ^^ a similar theory
of W. H. Beveridge; ^'^ and finally the meteorological theory of
business cycles developed by E. Huntington (1876- Y^ and
33 Jevons, W. S., Investigations in Currency and Finance, 1884,
pp. 194-243.
3* Jevons, H. S., "The Causes of Unemployment," The

Contemporary Review, 1909, pp. 165-189.
3^ Shaw, W. N., "An Apparent Periodicity in the Yield of Wheat,"
etc.. Proceedings of the Royal Society, Series A, Vol. LXXVIII
(1906), pp. 69-76.
36 Bruckner, "Der Einfiuss d. Klimaschwankungen auf die
Ernteertrage und Getreidepreise in Europa," Geographische
Zeitschrift, Vol. I, 1895, pp. 39-51, 100-108.
37 Clayton, H. H., "The Influence of Rainfall on Commerce and
Politics," Popular Science Monthly, Dec, 1901.
38 Beveridge, W. H., "British Exports and the Barometer," The
Economic Journal, March, 1920; "Weather and Harvest Cycles,"
The Economic Journal, 1921, pp. 429-449121
especially by H. L. Moore (1869- ).'^^ There are several other
works of this kind but they need not be mentioned because they
add very little, if anything, to the data and the statements of the
works indicated. The theory of W. S. Jevons and partly that of H.
S. Jevons are now unsupportable in their concrete form.^^ All of
the other theories are similar in character. Because the most
elaborate and the most scientific appear to be those of Beveridge
and Moore, my analysis is therefore limited to a discussion of
these two authors and to a brief analysis of a somewhat different
hypothesis of Huntington.
The essence of Dr. H. L. Moore's elaborate theory is as follows:
The weather conditions represented by the rainfall in the central
part of the United States, and probably in other continental areas,
pass through cycles of approximately thirty-three years and eight
years in duration, causing like cycles in the yield per acre of the
crops; these cycles of crops constitute the natural, material

current which drags upon the surface the lagging, rhythmically
changing values and prices with which the economist is more
immediately concerned. '*According to his mathematical analysis, the correlation between
the fluctuation of crops and an index of the mean effective rainfall
in the Ohio Valley during the critical periods of the crops (JulyAugust) is r = .584.'*^ Having shown this correlation, Moore
proceeds to find a further correlation between the fluctuation of
the crops and the business cycle. His theory is as follows:
The rhythmically varying yield per acre of the crops is the cause
of economic cycles; when the yield increases, the volume of
trade, the activity of industry, and the amount of employment
increase; the demand for producers' goods rises; the demand
curves for agricultural commodities rise; with the ultimate result of
a rise of general
'*" Moore, H. L., Economic Cycles; Their Law and Cause, N. Y.,
1914; Generating Economic Cycles, N. Y,, 1923.
*^ W. C. Mitchell says this theory "scarcely affords a convincing
explanation of business cycles." Mitchell, Business Cycles, 1913,
p. 19.
*2 Moore, H. L., op. cit., p. 149.
^3 Moore, H. L., op. cit., p. 53.
122
prices. The contrary changes would follow upon a fall in the yield
per acre of the crops.
The theory is supported by the author's painstaking analysis of

the fluctuations of the business-barometer (measured through
pig-iron production) and those of crop production. The coefficient
of correlation between them is r = .7i8, with a lag in the cycles of
pig-iron production of one or two years. The coefficient of
correlation between the fluctuations of crops and the movement of
general prices is still higher (with a lag of about four years) : here
r=:.8oo.^^ Such is the essence of this theory.
Beveridge's theory of business cycles is similar to that of Moore.
The only differences are in the data, methods, and some of the
conclusions. The essentials of his theory and argumentation are
as follows: Wheat prices in western and central Europe, during
the period from 1500 to 1869, appear to show that in the
fluctuation of prices there is, a major periodicity of 30.6 years or
15 years one way and 15 the other, and a minor fluctuation of
15.2 or 15.4 years. With a lag of one year this periodicity
corresponds, in his opinion, to the periodicity in crops due to
fluctuations of the weather. Other factors influenced the
fluctuation of prices, but the most fundamental was the weather.
''The chart (of prices) must be accepted as essentially a reflection
of harvest success and harvest failure." In his first article he
claimed that the periodicity of 15.2 or 15.4 years in the fluctuation
of prices corresponded to a similar periodicity of weather
conditions due to sun spots. In his second paper, in answer to
some objections presented by the secretary of the Royal
Meteorological Society, W. W. Bryant, Beveridge gave a more
complex interpretation. He agreed that the periodicity of the sun
spots was not 15 but about II years. He admitted that ''a cycle of
15.3 years had not been found in any meteorological record."
However, he claimed that weather fluctuations showed
periodicities of 4.38 or 4.77, 8.34 years. Besides, there was the
periodicity of 4.37 years in rainfall. The period of 15.3 or of 30.6
years could be divided correspondingly into the periods of 4.38,
4.77, 8.34, 4.37 years which were similar to the fluctuations of
meteorological phenomena. In his further analysis he indicates

that besides the periodicities of
123
15 and 30 years in the movement of prices there were periods of
4.38, 5.11, 274, 371, 34.992, 48, 74-75. and 271 years.''^
Such are the essentials of Beveridge's theory. The meteorological
theories are similar to those of Moore and Beveridge, but less
elaborate and based on less data. The theory of Huntington is
somewhat different. He tries to establish the influence of climatic
conditions on economic life not so much through the medium of
harvests, conditioned by the weather, as through the medium of
the health of the population which is affected by climatic agencies.
His principal thesis is that climate and its fluctuations cause
fluctuations in health and the efficiency of physical and mental
work; fluctuations in health and in work efficiency lead to
corresponding fluctuations of business and economic conditions
of a society. He tries to corroborate this contention with many
data, among which the most important are those which show the
parallelism of the death rate and thb business depressions or
revivals in Connecticut, New York, Massachusetts and Chicago in
the period from 1870 to 1910. ''A high death rate (as an index of
health) regularly precedes hard times, while a low death rate
precedes prosperity. Health is a cause far more than an effect (of
business prosperity). Health in its turn is determined by the
weather." Such in brief is the essence of Huntington's theory."*^
Now let us briefly discuss to what extent the above theories are
valid. We will admit at the start that many dynamical processes in
the geographical environment of a society influence, and
sometimes very seriously, dynamics of economic life.
Earthquakes, like the recent one in Japan or many others, or the
dry-ing-u]) of an area, or its inundation, and similar natural
processes may disorganize or even imperil the economic life of a
society. However, such catastrophic changes in geographical

environment are relatively very rare and often of short duration.
Therefore in a long life of a society they do not count much in the
non-catastrophic fluctuations of economic processes.
In the second i)lace, it is scarcely possible to deny a conditioning
role to climatic and geographic agencies in determining the
^5 Beveridge, Weather and Harvest Cycles, passim.
" Huntington, E., World Pmcer and Evohition, pj). 29-31, and
Chaps. Ill, IV.
124
quantity and quality of harvest, and through it, especially in
agricultural countries, of fluctuations of the business cycle.
However, though human control in this field is still limited,
nevertheless, interference of the other non-geographical
agencies, like agricultural knowledge, human energy, care, and
so on, and also the expansion of trade and commerce, now and in
the past, have been limiting and neutralizing to a considerable
extent the effects of geographical influences. Besides, in any wide
area geographical factors rarely are identical; if favorable in one
place they are unfavorable in another, and in this wây they,
themselves, may neutralize their own effects to an extent which
renders them incapable of seriously influencing the w^hole
economic life of a society. Nevertheless, we must still recognize
to some extent the conditioning role of geographical factors in the
dynamics of economic life.
But'does this mean that this conditioning is so great and so
decisive that such phenomena as business cycles and
movements of prices must reflect it regularly, as the above
theories claim? Can we say that this correlation is so close that it

may be traced in the business cycles of an industrialized society?
It is hard to answer this question definitely. Nevertheless the
reasons for a negative answer are almost as strong as for a
positive one. The weakest points of theories such as those of
Beveridge are as follows : First, they claim that a definite
periodicity of weather conditions (or of sun spots) exists and with
this periodicity attempt to correlate corresponding fluctuations in
business. Even granting that such a periodicity exists, we are
somewhat embarrassed by its diversity as reported by different
authors of this school. According to Moore these periods are of 8
and t^t, years of length; according to Beveridge they are 4.37, 5.1,
11.12, 8.34, 15.3, 30.6 and other years of length; according to
Jevons, both W. S. and H. S., they are 10.44, 3-7^ 7 ^^^ i^ years;
according to W. N. Shaw, 2.75 and 3.67 years; according to
Bruckner, 35 years, and so on. This discordance in the length of
weather periodicities among the proponents of this theory of
economic cycles makes a definite, and more or less general,
periodicity in weather conditions somewhat uncertain and raises
the question as to whether the above periods are really existing or
have arisen as
125
a result of arithmetical and mathematical manipulations of the
authors.
Some of them, like Professor Moore, have obtained their periods
from a computation of a real amount of rainfall in the Ohio Valley
'^'^ but some others, like Beveridge, deduced the periodicity in
weather fluctuation from that of the fluctuation of wheat prices.
Besides, the lengths of the periods of Beveridge's theory are so
various and different that the very fact of their existence amounts
almost to an absence of any definite periodicity : to say that there
are periods of 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 11, 15 and so on years practically
means that there are no periods. Thus the first defect of all these
theories vitiates their starting point and suggests their tentative
and uncertain character. Their second defect results from the fact
that the periodicity of the sun spots or of weather fluctuations is
also uncertain. Though Sir Arthur Shuster's theory of the elevenyear periods of the sun spots is popular, nevertheless, this period
represents only an approximate average of various figures
ranging from 16 to 6 years between the maximum periods of the
sun spots in the years from 1750 to 1906.'*^ As any series of
figures may give some average, this eleven-year period is rather
fictitious and not a real periodicity of the sun-spot maximums.
Furthermore several other meteorologists have indicated the
existence of different periodicities of the sun spots and weather
fluctuations. This discordance of the meteorologists indicates the
uncertainty of the very fact of the existence of any periodicity in
these fields. And some of the prominent specialists in the field of
meteorology probably are not far from the truth when they deny
decidedly the existence of any definite periodicity in the fluctuation
of the sun spots or weather conditions. An example of this is the
paper ''Weather and Cyclical Fluctuations," by Walter W. Bryant,
honorary secretary of the Royal Meteorological Society. In his
criticism of Beveridge's theory he indicates that there is no
definite periodicity either in the sun spots, in the effects of the
tide-raising efficiency of the moon, or in the weather fluctuations.
*' Though even this is seriously questioned. See Wright, Ph. G.,
"Moore's Economic Cycles," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.
XXIX, pp. 631-641.
** The sun-spot maximums happened in the years: 1750, 1761,
1770, 1778, 1804, 1817, 1830, 1837, 1848, i860, 1871, 1883,
1893, 1906. The sun-spot minimum periods give a similar series.
126
"Accepting the barometer data I have examined those from 1873

to 1904 (for India and other places) and from 1873 to 1903 for
North America, each being a homogeneous series. The
barometer figures show no evidence of any period such as fifteen
and one-third years" (claimed definitely by Beveridge in his first
paper).
As to the periodicity of the sun spots, says Bryant, Professor
Kimura has analyzed them from 1750 to 1911, found their curve,
and made a prediction of their movement up to 1950. ''But the
actual figures disagreed with the prediction of the first year and
became worse and worse year by year." The conclusion of the
author is that in view of the absence of any definite periodicity in
meteorological conditions "it does not seem likely that the time
has yet come for long-range forecasting to become a practical
factor in the regulation of the world's food supply." ^^ The validity
of these objections has been recognized, partly explicitly and
partly implicitly, by Beveridge in his second paper. He is much
less decisive in his statement, and practically gives up his theory
of the fifteen years' periodicity in the fluctuation of weather
conditions. Instead, he indicates numerous different periodicities
in the fluctuation of prices, but fails to show corresponding periods
in the fluctuation of the weather. Finally, he concludes, ''There is
hardly any enterprize more deluding or more desperate than the
search for weather cycles. The gold we gather turns incessantly
to ashes, but the 15.3 year cycle seems to have the ring of true
metal." ^^
This is practically a confession to the invalidity of his own theory,
which is still more weakened because his prediction of an
exceptionally poor harvest for the years 1923, 1924, 1925 seems
not to have been corroborated."'^
*^ Bryant, W., "The Weather and CycHcal Fluctuations," The
Economic Review, 1921, pp. 46-49. See also Ward, R. de C,
Climate Considered Especially in Relation to Man, pp. 356 ff.,

Chap. XI, N Y., 1918. "The results of investigations of the sun
spot periodicity and of periodic oscillations of (climate) have not
been satisfactory. In some cases the relation to sun spot
periodicity is open to debate; in others the results are
contradictory." Such is a brief summary of the situation of the
problem. Ibid., pp. 356-357.
^ Beveridge, op. cit., p. 449.
*i Still more questionable are the attempts to correlate the periods
of the sun-spot maximums with revolutions and social upheavals
or psychical pandemics (theory of a Russian, Professor
Chijevsky, published in 1922); the sun spots with
127
This means that the corner stone of the meteorological theories of
business cycles, the existence of a definite periodicity in the sun
spots or in the weather fluctuations, is not certain at all. Naturally
still less vaHd is a theoretical scheme erected on such an
uncertain foundation. And the discordance of the theories about
the length of the periodicities is a further corroboration of this
uncertainty. Lack of correlation between business cycles and the
alleged cycles in weather conditions, as soon as they are
definitely proclaimed, is further evidence of the inconclusive
character of all these theories. To avoid such contradictions the
authors try, through division and subdivision of their periods, to
patch up their theories, but such efforts are far from being
successful. Some of them, again in disagreement with one
another, try to achieve the alleged parallelism of business and
weather fluctuations through the use of different lags such as one,
two, three, four or five years, according to the demands of the
theory. It is evident that such mathematical manipulations as the
subdivision of the alleged periodicities and the use of elastic
''lags" which shorten and lengthen according to the requirements
of the problem, can make correlations where none exist.

Furthermore, the data which are carefully analyzed, like those of
Professor Moore, are nevertheless too local to form a basis for
world-wide generalizations, and for the claim that "the
rhythmically varying yield per acre of the crops is the cause of
economic cycles." It may be one of the causes, but it certainly is
not tJie cause. Finally, the correlation of the years of business
revivals and depressions with the years of good and bad harvests
does not even support the idea of a mutual relationship between
business fluctuations and crops.
There are many cases in which increased yields accompanied
increased prosperity or in which ])oor crops and dei:)ressions
went together. But the correlation between volume of production
and business conditions is far less perfect for wheat than for
minerals (pig-iron and coal). The years of 1899 for America, 1895
for
epidemics (Sardeaux), with religious upheavals, and so on. This
skepticism, however, does not hinder one from welcoming the
newly organized French Society of Scientific Astrology, whose
])ur]Jose it is to study scientifically the problem of meteorological
influences on social life. Something valuable may come out of
such a study.
128
Britain, 1897 for France, and 1907 for Germany were the years of
poor crops and, at the same time, of prosperity for each of these
countries. The years of 1908 for America, 1902 for Britain, 1903
for France and 1902 for Germany were years of good crops, and
at the same time of business depression. Good crops tend to
bring prosperity (in an agricultural country) and poor crops
depression in the seasons which follow. But the numerous
exceptions to this rule show that other factors often overbalance

the effects of the harvests.
Besides, growth in production of wheat and pig-iron and coal is
also far from being parallel.^"
These considerations '*^ seem to be sufficient for the conclusions
that any close correlation between weather conditions and
economic fluctuations is not proved as yet; that the theories of the
parallel periodicities without lags still need to be proved; and that
even where the parallelism is found it is necessary to show further
that it is not incidental. Some influence of geographical factors in
the field of economic phenomena must be recognized, but it is so
complex and so strongly modified by other factors that it is very
''loose" (except in catastrophes) and is scarcely possible of
description in a definite mathematical formula.
Huntington's variety of the meteorological theories of business
fluctuations, we shall see further, exaggerates enormously the
influence of climate upon health and efficiency. Therefore, its
corner stone is not valid, not to mention many possible objections
to his method and data. His whole theory is still more
questionable than the above theories. A criticism of his correlation
between climate and health will be given further so that wê shall
not discuss his theory liere.^**
^2 Mitchell, W., Business Cycles, pp. 237-239, 452-453.
"See other objections to these theories in L'annee sociologique,
pp. 806-811, 1923-24, and in special studies of business cycles
and economic fluctuations. As an additional reason against the
correlation it may be mentioned that the correlation between sunspot number and tree growth which is expected to be much higher
than that between sun-spot number and economic conditions, is
only 4-0.1212. "The relationship is by no means so intimate as
many writers imply." Harris, J. Arthur, "The Correlation Between
Sun-Spot Number and Tree Growth," Monthly Weather Review,

Jan., 1926, 54: 13-14.
^* Sometimes the influence of meteorological conditions upon
business fluctuations is seen in the so-called "seasonal fluctuation
of business." Even such authors as A. Hansen, who seem to be
far from partisans of the meteorological theory of business cycles,
writes: "The seasonal fluctuations are those which are
129
Thus it seems that even in the field of economic phenomena,
where a greater and more direct influence of geographical
conditions is to be expected, it is neither so omnipotent as to
over-weigh the influence of other factors, nor so decisive as to be
manifest in rigid correlations, nor so general as to account for
differences in economic processes and organization within
different social groups and within the same group at different
times. If it is fallacious to deny any role to geographical factors in
this field, it is no less fallacious to overestimate the role as many
geographers and other scholars have done.
9. GEOGRAPHICAL ENVIRONMENT AND RACE
The position of many geographers on this question is expressed
typically by Buckle in the following statement:
I cordially subscribe to the remark of one of the greatest thinkers
of our time, who says of the supposed differences of race, *'Of all
due to the influence of the seasons, summer and winter, harvest
and seed time." I am afraid there is a curious substitution of the
meaning of words. There are some short-time fluctuations
("seasonal") and still they may be due to other than geographical
or meteorological conditions. From the fact of their existence it
does not follow at all that the responsible factors are
meteorological. Only when such short-time fluctuations within the

year show that they repeat regularly from year to year
approximately in the same climatic periods or in the same
months, is such a regularity evidence in favor of climatic factors.
Meanwhile, if not all, then at least a great number of such
"seasonal fluctuations" do not show any such regularity. For
instance, Hansen's data of railroad earnings show that the
months of maximum earnings in different years were quite
different: December, July, and October in 1902, April and July in
1903, February, November and December in 1904, December
and November in 1905; February and January in 1906, April and
May in 1907, November and December in 1908. This means that
they occur in different months in different years, and in periods of
quite different weather {e.g., in December and July) in the same
year. The same is true of the months of minimum earnings.
According to the simple rules of inductive logic such a "seasonal"
fluctuation is pretty definite testimony that fluctuations have
nothing to do with the seasons as climate or meteorological
phenomena; that the agencies responsible for fluctuations are to
be looked for somewhere else than in the field of climatic
conditions; and that, finally, the fluctuations are rather irregular to
be styled "seasonal" in the proper sense of the word. Other tables
and data given by Professor Hansen in his careful study,
invariably, and even more consjîcuously, show the above
irregular characteristics of the so-called "seasonal" fluctuations of
"investment composite," of "banking composite," and so on. See
Hansen, A. H., Cycles of Prosperity and Depression in the United
States, Great Britain and Germany, pp. 15-16, 19, 27, 31, 32-33,
42, 58-59, Madison, 1921. The above remarks apply to a great
many other economic and non-economic "seasonal fluctuations."
Apparently the "seasonal fluctuations" are simply "short-time"
fluctuations whose factors are to be found somewhere else than
in climatic or meteorological conditions.
130

the vulgar modes of escaping from the consideration of the efifect
of social and moral influences on the human mind, the most
vulgar is that of attributing the diversities of conduct and character
to inherent and natural differences" (Mill's Principles of Political
Economy, Vol. i, p. 390). Ordinary writers are constantly falling
into the error of assuming the existence of this difference. But
while such original distinctions of race are altogether hypothetical,
the discrepancies which are caused by differences of climate,
food, and soil are capable of a satisfactory explanation. ''''
After this Buckle proceeds to show how geographical agencies
have produced the most substantial differences among various
societies, in bodies, in minds, in social organization, and in
historical destinies. For him, as for many others, especially earlier
geographers, racial differences, either in a greater part or entirely,
have been due to differences in environment, and especially in
geographical conditions. In this extreme form the theory may
scarcely be sustained by any serious geographer of the present,
but in a somewhat milder form it is supported by a great many
partizans of this school. One of the best examples is Dr. Ellen
Churchill Semple's Influences of Geographic Environment, On the
Basis of Ratzel's System of Anthropo-Geography (N. Y., 1911). In
this volume a long series of physical characteristics of man are
attributed to the direct and indirect influences of geographic
environment (differentiation of human races under the influence of
different geographical environments, differences in stature, in
pigmentation, in thickness of skin, in the character of hair, in size
of chest, and so on).^^ Following many of her predecessors, and
especially Ritter and Ratzel, the author, in a somewhat milder
form, tries to show by several examples the validity of her
principal correlations. Many other authors in a more technical and
more competent, but in a narrower form, support the same thesis
of a correlation between geography and racial characteristics in
the zoological sense of the term. As examples of such theories I

may mention those of J. A. Allen,
^5 Buckle, H. T., Introduction to the History of Civilization in
England^ New and Revised Edition by J. M. Robertson, p. 22,
London, Routledge. ^6 See Semple, op. cit., Chap. II and passim.
131
W. Ridgeway, A. Keith, F. Boas, and others.^^ To what extent are
all these claims valid? Are they corroborated by the facts or are
they still in the stage of purely tentative hypotheses? Let us
discriminate briefly between the valid and invalid portions of these
claims. In the first place, the assumption of many of these authors
of the so-called monogenic theory of human origin and of a later
differentiation of mankind into different races under the influence
of different environments, is a mere guess. This, as well as th
opposite or polygenic hypothesis, is and probably will remain a
mere guess, which cannot be proved or disproved.^^ For this
reason this argument of the geographers and environmentalists in
favor of their theory cannot have any scientific value.^^
There is another point which greatly weakens the position of the
geographers in this field. Racial characteristics in a proper sense
of the word are those which are inherited. The assumption that
such characteristics may be altered by the geographic
environment and, being altered, become hereditary traits,
supposes the possibility of the inheritance of acquired traits. This,
as it is known, is a presumption which is still denied by the
majority of the biologists. Therefore the theory of the alteration of
racial traits through direct influences of geographic factors at the
very best is based on a very uncertain and questionable
foundation. Until the theory of inheritance of acquired traits is
proved we cannot admit the possibility of a modification of racial,
that is, of hereditary traits under the direct influence of geographic
conditions. Alteration of these traits through amalgamation and

similar factors, does not belong in the category of geographical
" See Allen, J. A., "The Influence of Physical Conditions in the
Genesis of the Species," Smithsonian Annual Report for 1905,
Wash., 1906; Ridgeway, W., "The Application of the Zoological
Laws to Man," Nature, Vol. LXXVIII, 1908; Keith, A., "On Certain
Factors Concerned in the Evolution of Human Races," Journal of
the Royal Anthropological Institute, Lond., 1916, Vol. XLVI; and
Keith, A., "La differenciation de Thumanite en types raciaux,"
Revue generate des sciences, Paris, 1919, 30"" annee. Dr.
Franz Boas has stressed, not so much the influence of geography
as environment in general and especially social environment upon
the bodily characteristics of man. See Boas, F., The Mind of
Primitive Man, 1911; Changes in Bodily Form of Descendants of
Immigrants, Wash., 1911.
^^ See Sergi, G., Le origine umane, Torino, 1913; Dixon, R. B.,
The Racial History of Man, pp. 503 ff.. New York, 1923.
''3 E. Ch. Semple, like many other environmentalists, writes
without any serious reason that "the unity of the human species is
clearly established."
\\
132
determinism and for this reason cannot be used as an argument
in favor of their theories.
In the third place, almost all serious theories which advocate the
possibility of the modification of racial characteristics through
geographical agencies recognize that this is possible only in a
long course of time; hundreds and thousands of years are
necessary for a given racial type to be considerably changed

under the direct influence of geographic factors.^^ If this is so it
means that geographic environment works so slowly that it is
practically of no significance as an explanation of racial
modifications in the course of the history of a population which
rarely goes back beyond two or three thousands of years. It is of
still less importance for an explanation of the biological changes
of a population and of its historical destinies for a shorter period of
time computed by tens of years. It is true that we have some very
valuable attempts to prove the possibility of a modification of
racial characteristics within a short period of time. Among such
attempts Professor Boas' study of the bodily changes in American
immigrants and R. M. Fleming's study are possibly the best. But
Dr. Franz Boas ascribes the modifying role not so much to the
geographic as to the social environment. Besides, his conclusions
have been met with such strong criticism on the part of the
prominent specialists, and their objections are so serious, that at
the very best the results of Boas' study are to be taken as
inconclusive.^^
6 See MoRSELLi, "Le razze umane e il sentimento di superiorita
etnica," Rivista Italiana di Sociologia, 1911, pp. 331 ff. "Racial
traits may change under permanent influence of environment, but
hundreds and even thousands of years are necessary for such a
transformation. I do not know any single case of transformation of
a race within one or two generations except the cases due to an
amalgamation. The environment of a race cannot modify quickly
its physical and psychical characteristics. As to the educational
factor, it is absurd to expect it can change a race in a short period
of time. It is true that we see at the present a rapid change of the
characteristics of a people, but scientific observation shows that
such changes are of a psycho-social, but not a racial nature." See
also Dixon, op. cit., pp. 479 fT., and passim; de Lapouge, V., Les
selections sociales, pp. 65 ff.
^^ See Boas, Franz, " Changes in Bodily Forms of Descendants

of Immigrants," Senate Documents, Vol. LXIV, Washington, 1911;
Miss R. M. Fleming's paper in Man, Vol. XXII, pp. 69-72. Among
critical analyses of these works see especially Sergi, G.,
"Influenza dell' ambiente sui caratteri fisici dell'uomo," Rivista
Italiana di sociologia, 1912, pp. 16-24; Fleure, H. J. and James, T.
C., "Geographical Distribution of Anthropological Types in Wales,"
Journal of the
133
In connection with the progress in the study of the role of glands,
especially the ductless glands, in the formation of man's body and
physiological processes, we have a series of attempts to explain
through the alteration of gland activity by geographic environment,
the changes in the racial characteristics of man. An example of
such attempts is the theory of Sir Arthur Keith.^-At the present
moment, there is no doubt that many body traits, stature, form of
cranium, weight, and so on, may be altered through modifications
of the structure and of the functions of glands and especially of
the ductless glands. But the point is that these glands, as a rule,
are influenced almost exclusively through chemical ingredients
consumed principally in the forms of food and drink (it is evident
that surgical or medical modification of glands did not play any
role in the past, and even now they are quite insignificant means
applying only to a very few individuals). This explains why a great
many geographers, even before the discovery of the role of
glands, pointed out that food was the most efficient geographical
agency in the modification of physical and mental traits of a racial
group.^^ I do not object to many facts of this kind, but
nevertheless serious reservations must be made against their use
as arguments in favor of the geographical hypothesis.*'"^
In the first place, not all kinds of food may be important in
Royal Anthropological Institute, pp. 37-42, Vol. XLVI, 1916;

Pearson, K. and TiPPETT, L. H. C, "On Stability of the Cephalic
Indices Within the Race," Biometrika, pp. 118-138, Vol. XVI,
1924. C. Gini indicated several shortcomings in the statistical
method used by F. Boas. General conclusions of the critics are
typically represented by the following statement of Pearson and
Tippett: "Dealing with a large amount of data, we are unable to
find any change of real significance in the cephalic indices for
school children from 5 to 20 years old. The cephalic index is
remarkably stable. Having regard to the fact that extraordinary
environmental differences in this country appear to make no
significant change in the shape of the head, it is very difficult to
accept Professor Boas' view that the child born to Jewish parents
in Europe differs in head shape from the child bom to the same
parents after their arrival in America. The cephalic index of the
Jews is much the same in the most diverse environment in
Europe, and we do not believe that anything but hybridization or
long selective action, can change the type."
^2 vSee his works already cited. However, he strongly stresses
the relative unchangeableness of racial traits.
^ See e.g., Buckle's discussion of the problem, op. cit., Chap. II,
passim; Semple, E., op. cit., Chap. II.
" See a further chapter about food as a social factor. See also the
quoted book of Armitage, though he exaggerates the effects of
food upon race.
134
this respect. Only food and drink which are lacking in definite
types of vitamines or contain definite ingredients may exert
noticeable effects on glands and through these on the anatomical
and physiological characteristics of the population. Such deficient

food is either a rare phenomenon (because the ordinary diet of
different peoples generally contains all the necessary ingredients)
or it is almost equally common among different racial groups and
for this reason, with few exceptions, cannot account for their
bodily and other differences.
In the second place, what is more important, the geographers put
food and drink among geographic agencies as though the food
and drink (alcohol, wine, beer, etc.) are entirely determined for
every society by its geographical conditions. We have seen that
even for a relatively primitive society such a correlation between
its geographic conditions and the character of its food is far from
being definite and rigid. In regard to more advanced and complex
societies this correlation is so insignificant that there is almost no
serious reason for such a claim. What and how much society eats
and drinks is determined not only and, in many cases, not so
much by the geographic, as by other factors. Therefore, to include
all the effects of the quantity and the quality of food and drink on
the population as the effects of geographic conditions is
fallacious. We must discount a great many cases of such
modifications of bodily traits through the agency of food as
arguments for geographic conditioning. If this is done, very few of
the modifications due to food may be classed as geographic
factors. For the same reason Keith's gland theory of the
modification of races cannot be used as corroborative evidence of
the geographic theory of race determination.
In the fourth place the geographic theory of race determination is
far from being corroborated by factual observation. If its claim of
rigid correlation between the kind of geographic environment and
the character of races were true, we should expect the existence
of correlations between stature, pigmentation, cephalic and nasal
indices and so on, on the one hand, and definite geographic
conditions, on the other. Corresponding studies and
measurements do not fulfill this expectation. For instance, the

studies of Mendes-Correa, D. N. Anoutchin, B. A. Gould, Broca,
135
Boudin, P. Topinard, R. Livi, J. Bertillon, G. Retzius, J. H. Baxter,
Ch. B. Davenport, A. G. Love, and of several others did not find
any correlation even between stature (a trait which is much more
dependent upon environment and especially upon food than
many real racial characteristics) and geographic environment or
latitude, or altitude, or longitude, or geological conditions, or flora
and fauna, or even the character of food and of other
geographical conditions of society.^^
The same is true in regard to the character and the length of the
feet and arms, the pigmentation, dolichocephaly and brachycephaly, and the color of hair and eyes and body. The attempts to
correlate these characteristics with a definite geographical
environment or its components have not yielded any positive
results. **Thus it is not sufficient to talk of environment in
explanation of evolution: it is necessary also to take into
consideration inner conditions of equilibrium of an organism and
organic correlations." ^^ Such results are unfavorable for the
validity of the geographic theories. The geographers, however,
may object that migrations and race-blending naturally led to a
disappearance of
^ See Gould, B. A., Investigations in the Military and
Anthropologic Statistics of American Soldiers, pp. 131-132, N. Y.,
1869; Mendes-Correa, A. A., "Le milieu geographique et la race,"
Scientia, 1921, 30: 371-80; see his data and references; see also
Mitchell, P., Le Darwinisme et la guerre, Paris, 1916, pp. 67 ff.; "it
is impossible to establish a correlation between pigmentation of
hair and eyes and an environmental factor of any kind," p. 69;
Anoutchin, D. N., Geographical Distribution of the Stature of the
Male Population of Russia (in Russia), St. Petersburg, 1889,
Retzius, G., and Furst, C. M., Anthrapologia, suecica, p. 60,

Stockholm, 1902; Livi, R., Antropometria militare, Vol. I., pp. 4849, Roma, 1896; Broca, "Recherches sur I'ethnologie de la
France," Memoirs de la Societe d' Anthropologic de Paris, 1866.
As a matter of fact not a single large anthropometric
measurement of the population of various countries has
discovered the discussed correlation or has accounted for the
distribution of various physical traits in the population through
geographic conditions. The same is true of the recent
measurement of the American Army. See Army Anthropology by
Charles B. Davenport and A. G. Love, Washington, 1921, passim.
^ Ibid., p. 380, "There is almost no reason to suppose that the
cephalic index is under a direct influence of an environment, it
appears to be a hereditary character of a race," concludes such a
prominent zoologist as P. Ch. Mitchell. See his Le Darwinisme et
la guerre, pp. 67 ff. Not convincing is also a recent attempt to
correlate man's nasal index with climatic conditions. The nasal
indices of various races which for thousands of years dwell in the
same climate remain different and the nasal index of the same
race whose members dwell in different climates remain
essentially the same. These facts make the correlation very
(jtiestionablc. Vide Thomson, A. and Bilxton, 1)., "Man's Nasal
Index in Relation to Certain Climatic Conditions," Journal of the
Royal Anthropological Institute, Vol. LllI, 1923.
136
the correlations between geographic conditions and racial
characteristics of a population at the present time. Through
migrations and blending, racial groups with definite
characteristics, shaped by their geographic environment in the
past, have been dispersed throughout the most different areas
and naturally do not exhibit any correlations. Unfortunately for the
geographers, such correlations are difficult to establish even for

the past. Whatever may be the basis of the race classification,
one fact seems to be certain; each racial type from ''immemorial
times" happens to have been dispersed and living in the most
different areas. If for instance we take the eight fundamental racial
types, according to the classification of Professor Dixon, each of
these types seems to have been distributed in the south and the
north, among the most different geographic conditions.^^ In other
words, we cannot find, even in the past, a period in which we
would certainly have had a principal racial type confined within a
definite uniform geographic environment. This means that even
for the past such correlation between geographic conditions and a
definite racial type seems not to have been found.^^ This makes
the validity of the theory still less convincing. Finally, we do not
have any single case in which we have observed a change of
racial characteristics under a different environment. The Nordic
w^hites have been living in tropical regions for generations, and
still remain white in spite of the different climate. They do not
show any sign of transformation in the direction of the black
races. ''We can observe no difference in skin color between the
American negro and his kinsman in Africa; the one is as black as
the
^^ See Dixon, op. cit., pa.;sim, and chapter, "General
Conclusions," pp. 475 ff. Instead of Dixon's classification we may
take others, and the wide geographic dispersion of all the
principal types remains the same. See for instance, Haddon, A. C,
The Races of Man; Sergi, G., Hominidae, 1911; Deniker, J., The
Races of Man, 1900.
^^ There are plenty of guesses concerning the place of origin of
many racial types and from which they spread. But these
hypotheses are mere guesses; they are contradictory; they also
show that each type has lived in the most different areas and
remained unchanged, in spite of quite different geographical
conditions (contrariwise it would have been impossible to saj^ that

the Proto-Negroid type inhabited Europe if the skulls and
skeletons found there were changed); finally, the theories which
admit hypothetically a modification of a type under the influence of
different environments (e.g., depigmentation of black race in the
region of Baltic sea) are mostly guesses and require time
computed by "millennia." See Dixon, op. cit., pp. 479 ff.
137
other, although the American negro is no longer living in tropics."
^^ All we have are changes of some non-hereditary or non-racial
traits. Such changes may take place under the direct influence of
geographic environment, but they have nothing to do with a direct
change of racial characteristics.
The above seems to be sufficient to show that the claims of the
geographers are greatly exaggerated; that in regard to a change
of real racial characteristics under the direct influence of
geographic environment, their theory is very questionable as yet
and not proved.
All that remains as relatively valid from these theories is as
follows : First, some somatic and physiological characteristics of a
population which are not hereditary may be changed under
different geographic conditions. Second, in the course of millennia
racial traits may be changed through geographic factors, but this
is not yet proved, and if it were proved, it can help very little in
deciphering the great changes in the biologic composition of the
population which have taken place in the historical eras and much
shorter periods of time. Third, many somatic changes, due to
environmental agencies, cannot be ascribed to geographical
agencies, but should be ascribed rather to other than geographic
factors. Fourth, geographic agencies seem to be able to influence
the racial composition of the population only indirectly through
natural selection. After they are changed, these conditions may
facilitate survival of one type of human beings and be favorable to

increased mortahty of another type.^^ In this indirect way, working
through the medium of selection, geographic factors seem to be
efficient. But even in this indirect way, in view of the fact that
social environment is more effective in many cases, the efficiency
of geographic factors working through selection may be easily
overestimated.
10. GEOGRAPHICAL CONDITIONS AND HEALTH
In the preceding paragraphs I touched the phenomena whose
dependence on geogrtiphical conditions is relatively the most
conspicuous. I have not denied this dependence but have shown
^^ Dixon, op. cit., p. 480.
' Sec the chapter, " Antliropo-Racial and Selectionist vScliool."
138
that the correlation is very loose and very relative and tends to be
obliterated in proceeding from the less to the more complex forms
of society. Let us now turn to the more complex phenomena of
human health, energy, behavior and psychology. In this field we
have hundreds of geographical theories which attempt to prove
the rigid dependence on geographical factors. Hundreds of pages
would be necessary to outline and to scrutinize the thousands of
"correlations" which have been formulated in this field. As a lack
of space does not permit such a task, I shall proceed in a different
way: I shall analyze the most elaborated ''geographical theories"
in this field and shall try to show to what extent they are valid. The
results of such an analysis, with still greater reason, may be
applied to all less elaborated ''geographical generalizations." As a
starting point for such an analysis I shall take the works of
Professor E. Huntington (1876- ), which are some of the best in

this field. If his principal ideas are very old, his corroborations and
discussions are new and more inductive and factual than those of
many of his predecessors. The analysis of these works, by the
way, will give us an opportunity to mention and to discuss the
results of many other studies in the field covered by Huntington.
In his principal sociological works: Civilicafion and Climate, World
Pozicr and Evolution and The Character of Races, Dr. Huntington
has tried to show that climate is one of the most important factors
influencing civilization. He tries to prove this by establishing a
series of correlations between climate and health; between
climate and energy and the efficiency of labor; between climate
and mental processes as : intelligence, genius, and willpower;
and, finally between climate and the character, growth, and decay
of civilizations. In order to determine to what extent his
fundamental idea of the conditioning of civilization by climate is
true, we must, at least very briefly, scrutinize the validity of his
minor correlations between climate and health, energy and other
mental processes.
Climate and Health. It is a very old idea that climate influences
human health. In its essence the validity of the idea can scarcely
be denied, especially in regard to extreme climates. But in this
g:eneral form it is vairue and meaningless. To become
139
more definite the theory must answer, at least, the following
questions : Does climate influence human health through
temperature, or through humidity, or through variability or through
some other elements? What is the optimum point of climate for
the most favorable human health in all respects ? Is such an
optimum point the same for all human beings or does it vary from
man to man, and from group to group?
Long before the work of Huntington a series of works were

published which tried to answer these questions on the bases of
statistical and experimental investigations."^ Some of these
authors have tried even to formulate some general laws. In regard
to the death rate, which Huntington takes as the index of health,
Moser formulated three ''laws" nearly a century ago: first, monthly
curves of the death rate and temperature go together, the
average and extreme points of both phenomena paralleling each
other; second, the lower average temperatures are accompanied
by the higher death rates, and vice versa; third, a rise of
temperature above normal in the winter reduces, and in the
summer, increases the death rate while a decrease of
temperature below normal in winter and in summer has
correspondingly opposite results.^^ Huntington does not add any
substantially new ideas to those of his predecessors except that
he supplies new data for the corroboration of the climatic
influences on health, and attempts to point out the most favorable
("the ideal") climate for all human beings at all times. This "ideal
climate" is that with an average temperature of about 64 F., of
about 80 humidity and a relatively variable one."^^ In this respect
he follows (in regard to temperature) the theory of Dexter.'^'* In
regard to the statistical data, supplied by Huntington, one must
'^ vSce, e.g., Moser, L., Die Gesetze der Lebensdauer, Berlin,
1839; Casper, J. L., "Der Einfluss der Witterung auf Gesimdheit
und Leben des Menschen" in Denk-wiirdigkeite zur medizinische
Statistik, Berlin, 1846; Gisi, W., Die Bevolkerungs-statistik der
Schweiz. Ridgen, Aarau, 1868; and Forry, The Climate of the U.
S. and its Endemic Influences, N. Y., 1842. See further the wellknown works in the statistics of population of G. von Mayr, fi.
Levasseur, J. E. Wappaus, H. Westergaard, Oettingen, A.
Newsholme and others where the fluctuations of death, birth, and
marriage rates according to seasons and temperature are
discussed and analyzed. See also their references.
'2 Moser, op. cit., pp. 242 ff.

"See World Power, pp. 71 ff., 85, 98-1)9; Civilization and Climate,
pjx 14-15.
^* vSee Dkxtkk, Weather Influences, j). 75, N. Y.. 1904.
140
confess that they compose an impressive series of figures and
curves w^hich appear very convincing. And yet, a more detailed
analysis of the data makes them much less conclusive. I would
have to go too far astray from my purpose, if I were to scrutinize
them one by one in detail. Instead of this I can only briefly indicate
the principal objections to the conclusive validity of Huntington's
results.
A. In the first place, although the death rate is one of the
important criteria of health, it by no means is unique and
adequate, especially when it is applied to countries of a different
character. For instance, Huntington, without hesitation, on the
bases of different mortality rates of different countries, concludes
that countries like Russia or Serbia have poorer health than many
European countries."^^ Meanwhile the question is much more
complex. Countries with high birth rates, as a general rule, have a
high death rate and those with low birth rates have low death
rates.'^^ High birth rate is a criterion of the vitality of a people no
less important than the death rate.^^ Historical examples like
Rome and Greece with their low birth rate at the period of decline,
testify that a low birth rate is likely to be a symptom of the
decreasing vitality of a people. Therefore, the countries, which
from the standpoint of death rate are very healthy, from the
standpoint of their birth rate may occupy an opposite rank. In the
second place, studies of death rates of different age groups in the
countries with low mortality rates like England, Germany, and

France, and in the countries with high mortality rates like Russia,
Hungary, and Bulgaria or Serbia, have shown that the age groups
above 30 and ^2 years in the
'^ See Huntington, The Character of Races, pp. 231 ff., Fig. no.
13, N. Y. 1924.
'^See recent figures in Yule, H. U., "The Growth of Population,"
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 1925, pp. 31-33. The
correlation between both rates is + .81, 1901-10, for 22 countries;
between their fluctuations, + .70 or + .75.
'^ For this reason it is comprehensible why the most prominent
statisticians use different formulas for measuring the "vitality" of
people. The principal of them are: D/\/B (Sundbarg); (D = death; B
= birth); B/D (Brown, Wernicke);
=r (R. Pearl, J. S. Sweeney); and DVB (Rubin). Though even
these formulas
are far from being an adequate "vital index," they undoubtedly are
better than Huntington's criterion. See Rubin, M., "A Measure of
Civilization," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Vol. LX,
1897; Pb:arl, R., "The Vitality of the People of America," American
Journal of Hygiene, 1921; Sweeney, J. S., The Natural Increase
of Mankind, Chap. I, Baltimore, 1926.
141
countries with high niortahty rates have mortaHty rates lower than
the same age groups in England, in spite of the more hygienic
conditions in this last country."^ This means, that even according
to Huntington's own criterion, these more mature age groups in
the countries with high mortality rates (due principally to an
abundant proportion of children) must be recognized as healthier
than the same age groups in the countries with low death rates
(due principally to a low birth rate and therefore to a low child
mortality). This also means that if we take as a criterion of health
the death rate of the younger age groups, the different countries
will rank one way; and if we take the death rates of the age
groups above thirty years, their ranks will be quite different, if not
opposite. In the third place, though the mortality rate of Russia is
much higher than that of Germany or France, yet its population,
on the basis of recent statistics, (before the Revolution) was
proved to be better and healthier than the population of practically
all other European countries with much lower mortality: in the
years from 1890 to 1894, out of 772,000 Russian recruits only 1.8
per cent were entirely unsuitable while in Germany this per cent
was 6.2; in Russia the proportion of suitable recruits was 35 per
cent higher than in Germany and in the majority of other
European countries, though the Russian requirements in regard
to health were somewhat higher than in those other European
countries."^^ This shows again how inadequate a criterion of
health is the general death rate. Its inadequacy becomes still
greater if we take into consideration that in Germany (and the
same phenomenon has been
'^ See vScHALLMAYER, W., "Eugeiiik, Lebenshaltung und
Auslese," Zeitschrif fiir Sozialwissenschnft, Bd. XI, Hefts 5-8,
1908; Prinzing, Fr., "Kulturelle Entwicklung und
Absterbeordnung," Archiv fur Rassen und Gesellschafts Bio-fogie,
Bd. 7, 1910, pp. 579-605; RiJDiN, E., Uber Zusammenhang
zwischen Geistes-krankheit und Kultur, ibid., pp. 722-748. See
also Macdonel, W. R., "On the Expectation of Life in Ancient
Rome," etc., Biometrika, Vol. IX, 1913.
" wSee ScHALLMAVER, o/). ctt.; Claassen, W., "Die
Abnehmende Kriegstiichtig-keit," etc., Archiv fiir Rassen und
Gesellschaft Biologie, Vol. VI, 1909, pp. 73-77; Claassen, W.,
"Die Einfluss von Fruchtbarkeit," etc., ibid., p\). 482-492; see also
his other pa])er, ibid., pp. 129-132. The reason for this
phenomenon is that, due to the high death rate among the
children, all weaklings are eliminated in Russia and only strong
people survive to the age of 21 and above, while in countries with
a low birth rate and a low mortality a much greater per cent of the
weaklings survive. This cxi:)lains the lower death rate of the age
groups above 30 years in the less civilized countries.
142
shown in other European countries), between the end of the
nineteenth century and the time of the World War the death rate
was decHning while the per cent of biologically defective people
among the population and recruits was rather increasing.^^ A
series of similar facts could be given, but the above show how
conditional and relative and inadequate is the criterion of health
chosen by Huntington.^^ For these reasons, at the very best,
Huntington's data show only the dependence of the death rate,
and not that of health, on climate.
B. Furthermore, many of Huntington's data on the fluctuation of
the death rate concern not the aggregate death rate but that from
influenza and pneumonia.^^' It is evident that deaths from
influenza and pneumonia are more dependent on the weather
than other forms of death; therefore it is rather fallacious to make
the movement of the death rate from pneumonia typical for that of
the aggregate death rate.^^
C. Furthermore Huntington treats the seasonal and yearly
movement of the death rate rather roughly:^* If there appears
even a remote parallelism between the fluctuations of the death
rate and temperature or humidity, he contends that the fluctuation
of the death rate is the result of that of climate. However we know
how doubtful such a method is. E. Durkheim in his analysis of the
factors of suicide has shown convincingly how unreliable such

conclusions are even in the field where the parallelism between
the fluctuations of climate and suicide is much more
80 See the figures in the papers of Claassen, Schallmayer, and
Prinzing. Also see, for England, Report Upon the Physical
Examination of Men of Military Age hy National Service Medical
Boards, London, Febr., 1920. In France this phenomenon is still
more conspicuous.
81 Later on we shall see how this inadequate health criterion of
Huntington makes many of his theories questionable. Among
them his attempt to explain the differences in death rates of
different countries through the influence of climate is especially
fallacious. See his The Character of Races, Figs. 12 and 13, pp.
231 ff.
8- See Huntington, Civilization and Climate, Chaps. VHI and IX,
New Haven,
1924. . .
83 The movement of deaths from influenza, pneumonia, and
tuberculosis is not identical with the monthly movement of all
causes. See Whipple, G. Ch., Vital Statistics, N. Y., 1923, Tables
58, 86, 92, 96, Fig. -^2, and others; Public Health Reports, Vol.
XXXVI, pp. 1498-1501.
8* In this respect I agree with Dr. Hexter who says that "he doubts
Dr. Huntington's method. Dr. Huntington has utilized the graphic
method of comparison. This method is liable to lead to false
conclusions." Hexter, M. B., Social Consequences of Business
Cycles, p. 169, 1925.
143
striking.'^^ A. Binet found that the appetite of pupils (in form of the
amount of bread consumed) varied ''seasonally." If he had
followed Huntington's method, he would have accounted for the
fluctuation through climatic factors. Fortunately Binet does not
follow this ''rough" method, and in the process of analysis he
shows that the responsible factor is not climate but intellectual
school work.^^' For serious reasons we may question the validity
of the causal connection between many curves of the death rate
and climatic factors which Huntington attempts by his "rough"
method. The fact that both curves in selected cases are parallel to
some extent is not sufficient to prove their interrelations are
causally or functionally connected. This is somewhat corroborated
by the data of Huntington himself. In the first place, several of his
curves intended to show the parallelism (positive or negative) of
fluctuations of the death rate and climate causes {e.g., Figure 7,
p. 62, in World Pozver and Climate), show such a "loose
parallelism" that only by considerable leniency is it possible to say
that the curves prove anything.
D. At the basis of Huntington's theory lies the questionable
presumption that short-time fluctuations of the death rate
("seasonal fluctuations") are due to climatic"seasonal"factors.
As I indicated above, such a presumption is not necessarily
correct. Only when these "seasonal" fluctuations parallel climatic
fluctuations, from year to year; when they rise or fall uniformly
with uniform fluctuations of temperature; and when identical
temperature movements at various times and in various countries
are followed by identical movements of the death rate; only then
is it possible to account for such "seasonal" fluctuations of the
death rate through meteorological factors. When such
characteristics are absent we have no reason to suppose that the
meteorological factors are responsible for such "seasonal"
fluctuations. Meanwhile the data concerning the "seasonal"
fluctuations of the death rate do not show the al)Ove
characteristics. All they show is the existence of short-time

fluctuations whose factors are to
^ See the classical criticism of such procedures in Durkheim, E.,
Le suicide, Chap. Ill, passim, Paris, 1912. See further his
discussion of the correlation between suicide and geographical
factors.
^ Binet, A., "Consommation du pain," L'annec psychologique,
1897, Vol. IV, pp. 337-355144
be yet explained. The meteorological factors alone can account
for very little of these fluctuations. Take, for instance, the months
of the maximum death rate within a year or a series of years. In
the same area they are different according to the various authors,
and different in different years, and fall at quite different seasons
with different meteorological conditions. For instance, according
to Huntington, such months for Massachusetts are February or
March; but according to Dr. Hexter, they are December and
March.^^ According to Professor Whipple, in New York in 1910,
the maximum months were March, April, and July; but in 1920,
February and March."^^ According to Dr. Falk, for the registration
area of the United States in 1919 the maximum month was
January.^^ This irregularity of the months of maximum death rate
only suggests that the death rate fluctuates within a year, but it
does not permit us to conclude that the fluctuation is ''seasonal"
and due to "meteorological factors." This suggestion is further
corroborated by the data for ''seasonal" fluctuations of the death
rates in various countries. If these fluctuations were due to
meteorological conditions wê should expect that the months of a
maximum death rate in the countries with a similar climate would
be the same or nearly so; while in the countries with quite
different climates they would be considerably different. Is such an

expectation corroborated by the data? I am afraid it is not. For
instance, the month of maximum death rate in the years from
1889-93 was January in Belgium, Prussia, Wurtemberg, Austria,
Sweden, Buenos Aires and Scotland. Note the same month in
countries wîth quite different climatic conditions. On the other
hand, in Furopean Russia it was August, in France, March; in
Bavaria, March; in Italy, February; in Saxony, August; in Bulgaria,
December; in Uruguay, December; and in Serbia, March. Note
again the difference in the month of maximum deaths between
Serbia and Bulgaria, or Bavaria and Saxony whose geographic
conditions are far more similar than, for example, the conditions of
Sweden and Buenos Aires. These data appear to marshal against
the meteorological theory. The same characteristics are shown by
the months of minimum death
8^ wSee Hexter, M. B., Social Consequences of Business Cycles,
pp. 55 ff., 1925.
88 Whipple, G. Ch., Vital Statistics, Tables 58, 86, 1923.
145
rate in these countries. June was such a month for Italy, Bulgaria
and Massachusetts; July, for France, Rumania and Serbia;
September, for Austria, Scotland, Norway, Sweden and Finland;
October, for Belgium, Prussia, Bavaria, Wurtemberg, European
Russia, Denmark, and Buenos Aires; November, for Saxony;
May, for Rhode Island and Uruguay.^^ This shows that the month
of the minimum death rate, e.g., October, was the same for
countries with the most different climate; and vice versa, countries
with a somewhat similar climate had different months of minimum
death rate. That is not all, however. The monthly death rates in
different years for the same country show that the curves are
different from year to year, and the months of maximum, as well
as of minimum death rate, shift: one year such a month is
January, another, February or March, or July or Decem-ber.'^^

Such shifting is difficult to account for through climatic factors. It
indicates that the ''seasonal" fluctuation is very irregular and
possibly many other factors must be considered. Further, if
climate were such a decisive factor in the ''seasonal" fluctuation of
the death rate we should expect that the death rate of the months
which are similar in climate would be somewhat similar, while the
months with quite different climatic conditions would be different.
The figures, however, do not fully corroborate this expectation. It
is certain that the climate of August and December in Italy differs
more than November and December, and yet the death rates of
August and December are almost identical while those of
November and December differ considerably. The death rate in
December and April in Wurtemberg is almost the same (1058 and
1056) in spite of a great contrast in climate, while the death rates
in December and November and December and January are
considerably different (1058 for December, 902 for November,
and 1141 for January), though climatic conditions of these months
are more similar than those of December and April.^- The
statistics of the "seasonal" fluctuation of the
' See VON Mayr, Statistik and Gesselschaftslehre, Vol. II, p."
212, Freiburg, 1897.
" Compare, e.g., "Seasonal Distribution of Mortality in
Massachusetts for 1910 and 1920," in Whipple, op. cit., pp. 266
and 358; they show a very considerable difference. The same is
true of almost any other country.
^2 VON Mayr, op. cil., p. 212. For Massachusetts, in 1910 the
death rates in July, A])ril, Fcbniary and January are practicâlly
equal, while those of Auj]:ust and September (103 and 98) or April
and May (107 and 97) differ grcitly in
146

death rate in every country show these ''miraculous" fluctuations:
evidently they do not agree with the climatic hypothesis. One
more fact is to be noted: The ''seasonal" fluctuations of the death
rate show that their "seasonal" curves are different for different
age groups: from o to i year, from lo to 20, from 30 to 40, and so
on. Each of the age groups of the same population has its own
months of maximum and of minimum death rate.^^ Further, there
are also conspicuous differences in the "seasonal" death curve for
different occupational, economic, sex, even religious classes.
These differences suggest still stronger that the so-called
"seasonal" fluctuation of the death rate is not "seasonal" at all in
the sense that it is conditioned by seasonal climate, but that it is
only an irregular fluctuation in time whose factors remain as yet to
be found. This brief discussion is enough to show that Dr.
Huntington simplifies the situation too much; that his hypothesis
cannot account for much of the real character of these "seasonal"
fluctuations; and that from these irregular fluctuations he infers
too rashly that climatic agencies are the most responsible
factors.^"^ E. Huntington further says that in regard to health
"humidity is of great importance" {World Power, p. 84). However,
the studies, statistical and experimental, of numerous other
authors,^^
spite of more similar weather in these months than in July,
January and April See Whipple, Table 36.
^3 See the figures for the age groups of Hessen, Oldenburg,
Lubeck, Baden and Berlin in von Mayr, op. cit., p. 213.
^^ There is no need to say that if these "seasonal" fluctuations
cannot be accounted for through climatic factors, still less can
they account for the trends in the curve of the death rate, e.g., a
decrease of death rate in the Western countries during the last
three decades; nor for the differences in the death rate among
different societies {e.g., why Slavic countries as Russia, Serbia,

and Bulgaria, have a death rate higher than a great many
Western countries); nor for the sudden extraordinary changes of
the death rate in the same society {e.g., a three- or four-fold
increase in the death rate of Russia in the years of 1919-1921);
nor for a difference in the death rate of various occupational,
economic, religious, national, and other social groups which live in
the same place and under the same climatic conditions. Since
any climatic explanation of these substantial facts of the death
rate is impossible, and since even the seasonal fluctuations
cannot be entirely accounted for through climatic factors, we must
conclude that Dr. Huntington has overestimated their importance
and that his correlations to that extent are questionable.
^5 See e.g., Stecher, L. Ida, The Effects of Humidity on
Nervousness and General Efficiency, N. Y., The Science Press,
1916. See the description of other experiments in this volume.
The experimental investigations of the New York State Ventilation
Commission did not find any noticeable effects of humidity upon
health; similar results came from the careful study of the
Committee on the
147
either did not find any noticeable effects of humidity on health or
on the death rate, or to the contrary, found the opposite effects
from those of Huntington. For these reasons the conclusions of
Huntington remain, at the best, inconclusive.
F. If we take the results of what Huntington styles ''a most
conclusive study of the general effects of the weather upon
health," they exhibit rather an embarrassing ''correlation." The
author took the monthly deaths from 1900 to 1915 inclusive in
rhirty-three cities of the United States with a population of over
100,000. These same sixteen months were divided into two
groups according to their temperature: the eight warmest and the
eight coldest, and the difference in the death rates of these two
groups was computed. The results are as follows :
The eight warmest Januaries in New York averaged 6.0 F.
warmer than eight coldest, and had fewer deaths by 0.6 per cent.
In February the excess of temperature in the eight warmest
months amounted to 6.5 and their death rate was 4.1 per cent
less than that of the cooler months. In March the corresponding
figures were 6.4 and 9.7 per cent; in April 3.8 and 4.5 per cent;
in May, on the contrary, an excess of 3.5 in temperature was
accompanied by a death rate 1.5 per cent greater in the warm
months than in the cool months, while in July, although the eight
warm months averaged only 2.8 above the eight cooler months
the excess in their death rate rose to 14.2 per cent.^^
I am inclined to think that these data prove either too much or too
little; on the one hand it is too much to have an increase of the
death rate by 30 or 14.2 per cent on account of differences in
Atmosphere and Man of the National Research Council of the U.
S., and of the Metropolitan and the New York Life Insurance
Companies. The results of those investigations which found some
effects (Greenberg, Besson, Huntington, W. E. Watt, Goldsbury,
P. W. and H. M. Smith) either concern a specific form of death
from diseases of the respiratory organs where the correlation is
likely to exist, or are discordant and often contradictory to each
other. See Huntington, Civilization and Climate, Chaps. VIII and
IX; Besson, L., "Relations entre les elements meteorologique et la
mortality," Annales des services techniques d'hygiene de la Ville
de Paris, 1921; Watt, W. E., Open Air, Chicago, 1910; Goldsbury,
P. W., "Humidity and Health," Boston Medical and Surgical
Journal, September, 1911.
^ Civilization and Climate, p. 205. In World Power Huntington
gives more detailed data for the months of March and July from
which it follows that "a difference of 7 F. in the average
temperature of July is accompanied by a difference of nearly 30

per cent in the number of deaths." World Power, pp. 60-61.
148
temperature of 7 F. or 2.8 F.; on the other hand it is too Httle
that in some months (Januaries) the difference of 6 F. produced
only 0.6 per cent difference in the death rate. It appears to one
who is not a speciaHst in mathematical methods that these
inconsistencies reduce the significance of the correlation. This
conclusion is still further corroborated by the fact that in some
cities storms, or a rise of temperature in the winter, were found to
be beneficial for health, while in other cities (Chicago, Denver,
Pittsburgh) this effect is absent; that some cities like New York
are "unusually regular in their responses to the weather" while in
other cities, like Cleveland and San Francisco, ''departures from
the normal (climate) produce relatively little effects."'-^^ Add to
this the fact that all these data are not absolute but are
''departures in percentages from the normals," and that "the
normals are the estimated numbers of deaths that each place
would have experienced per month in any given year if the
number of deaths changed regularly in response to the growth of
the city and the improvements in medical practice"; further, the
great difficulty in making such estimates objectively (the author
does not say how he measured "the growth of the city and
improvements in medical practice") and the inevitableness of
some degree of subjectivity in such complex estimations ; add
finally that the data were smoothed; when all this is considered
the significance of the data appear quite doubtful. If they prove
anything it is only that the death rate varies at different rates in
different months and in different cities and that very much of the
causes of such fluctuations yet remains to be found. These
objections are made on the bases of the data given in the book. If
now we make a comparison in space and time of the death-rate

variation of dift'erent places and times and seasons, we may
easily see that the results are very discordant and contradictory. It
is not possible to say that everywhere and for all time the death
rate is the lowest in the climate with a temperature of about 64
F., and with a considerable but not an excessive humidity, as
Huntington believes he has established.^* I believe that Dr.
Huntington has overestimated the significance of his results.
^^ Civilization and Climate, pp. 205 ff.
^^ Even the data on death rates in different seasons given by
Huntington show that the maximum death rate in New York City
falls not in the month whose
149
These brief remarks show that the greatest certainty in regard to
the influence of chniate upon death rate is that excessive
temperature, or humidity or storms are hkely to be harmful to
health and to increase the death rate. But the space between the
twô excessive points too warm or cold, too dry or humid, and so
on, is large, and the limits of excess seem to be different for
different peoples; besides, these factors may be neutralized by
the interference of different social factors. For these reasons,
even in regard to an excessive climate, there is a great deal of
uncertainty.^^ The attempts to prove a very much closer
correlation within the excessive limits between variations of
climatic agencies and the death rate, in spite of the abundant
material of Dr. E. Huntington, are inconclusive, not to mention the
fact that death rates are inadequate criteria of health. Let us now
pass to the second fundamental correlation which Huntington tries
to establish.
II. CLIMATE AND HUMAN ENERGY AND EFFICIENCY
The next fundamental correlation which Huntington attempts to

prove is that climatic agencies such as temperature, storminess,
humidity, and light have a strong influence on human energy and
average temperature deviates the greatest degree from 64 F. as
is the case for December, November, January and February, but
in other months (July); on the other hand, the minimum death rate
is not in June or August, whose average temperature is the
nearest to 64 F., but in November and October. Verification of
the theory of "the ideal climate" by the data of death rates of
different countries in different seasons does not furnish
corroboration of the theory of Huntington. The fact remains that
the death rate is not lowest in the months nearest this "ideal
climate" and is not the highest in the months which differ most
from this "ideal climate." Furthermore, the people do not seem to
choose their habitation in an agreement with the ideal climate of
Huntington. The table of the density of population in the United
States, according to the zones of average temperature, shows
that the most densely populated zones have an average
temperature from 45 to 55 F.; the next place belongs to the
zone with the temperature between 55 to 60 F.; only third place
is given to the zone with a temperature from 60 to 65, which
being the nearest to the ideal temperature of Huntington, ought to
be inhabited the most densely. See the table on page 108.
^^ Professor R. Ward cjuite correctly stresses the complex and
therefore indefinite character of the influences of climate upon
health. Numerous "studies (in this field) have often led to very
contradictory conclusions. Rules, previously determined as the
result of Careful investigation, often break down in a most
perplexing way." He also stresses the fact that many alleged
effects of climate on health arc in fact due to factors other than
climate. Sec W.\Ri), R,, op. cil.^ Chap. VII.
150

efficiency. He finds the best outside temperature for efficient
physical work is about 64 F. (about 70 at midday, and 55 at
night); for mental work it is about 38 or 40 F.; and that humidity
also influences the efficiency of work, excessive dryness or
dampness being harmful while a relative humidity of about 80 per
cent is a facilitating condition. Changes in climate (storms, wind,
temperature, and so on), when they are not too great, are
favorable; while too great changes or constant climatic conditions
are unfavorable. Light alone seems not to have an important
effect on efficiency. These are the principal conclusions obtained
by Huntington,^^^ and all are based on numerous data.^^^ Let us
glance at the validity of Huntington's correlations. His first
argument is that the efficiency of the farmer of the southern part
of the United States, measured by the amount of improved land
and the value of farm products, is less than that of the farmers of
the northern parts (Civilization and Climate^ p. 38 ff.). The
argument might be questioned; so many factors affect the amount
of improved land or the value of farm products that it is rather
strange how such a careful investigator as Dr. Huntington can
even use such data as a proof of the effects of climate on
efficiency. He has made a fundamental statistical fallacy in that he
tried to solve a problem of multiple correlation by the use of
inadequate methods of gross correlation. He has completely
ignored many principles of economics which deal with the
combinations of factors of production, of market price and
valuations of real property. A second factor is the neglect of
allowances for types of soil and drainage. Many of the farms in
the southern states (comparison A) are swampy land and this
affects the averages. A third neglected factor is that of rainfall.
Rainfall in the southern states, with its consequent erosion of the
lighter soils in the east as well as the heavier soils in the piedmont
and mountain territories, forbids the clearing of land in a great
many cases. If Professor Huntington knew the extreme difficulty
of even securing straight roads under the enormous erosion of

southern
ôSee World Power, pp. 71, 85 ff., 98-99, Chaps. V and VI;
Civilization and Climate, pp. 14-15, Chap. VI, and passim.
ii See also Buckle, H. T., Introduction to the History of Civilization
in England, Chap. II. Buckle and his predecessors developed
correlations similar to those of Huntington.
151
rains he would not cite the absence of cleared land as an
evidence of the effect of climate upon the energy of southerners.
A further factor is that of the type of farming connected with types
(chemical) of soils. Much of the area in the eastern parts of the
north furnish milk for the cities. The soil is heavy and possesses
sufficient lime for pastures. Farmers can use it for grazing and at
the same time it passes for cleared land under the census
classification. In the eastern parts of the south much of the soil is
acid and will not support the ordinary lime-requiring grasses.
Neither is it needed for grazing. His comparison B is mainly
between a portion of the great cornbelt and the forest regions of
the Lake States, on the one hand, and the mountain and southern
coastal plain states, on the other. Differences in climate and
farming systems affect the need for farm improvements and
building and machinery. To explain all these differences by the
effects of climate on energy is liable to be extremely fallacious.^^^
On page 39 Huntington gives figures which show that regardless
of any climatic changes the value of the total farm property of the
southerners has increased between 1900 and 1920 from 28 to 64
per cent in its per cent of the value of northern farms. Does this
not refute the validity of the climatic factor in this case? Between
1900 and 1920 the average value of the southern negroes' farms
increased almost twice (from 11 to 20 per cent), while that of the
northern negroes' increased from 59 to 74 only. Will climate
explain this? In this case I think that a plain real estate dealer may
supply us with a more scientific explanation of these contrasts in
the value of the southern and northern farms, and in their
changes and fluctuations, than the hypothesis of Dr.
Huntington.^^''^
^2 For a verification of these statements I am indebted to
Professor Carl Zimmerman.
^3 Using Himtington's method it is possible to claim that the
southern climate is more favorable for efficiency because, in the
periods from 1900 to 1920, the large cities situated along the line
from Superior to Galveston show a greater per cent of growth of
population the farther south the city. Mr. Frank Hayes kindly
supplied me with data which show the following i)er cents of
increase of population of these cities from 1900 to 1920: Superior
and Duluth, 65 per cent; St. Paul and MinncajDolis, 88 ])er cent;
Des Moines, Iowa, 104 i)er cent; Kansas City, 145; Dallas and
Fort Worth, 283; and Houston and Galveston, 123 per cent.
Following Huntington's method it is possible to infer that the
southern climate is more favorable to efificiency of work than the
northern climate. It is not necessary to add that such an inference
is as fallacious as those of Huntington.
152
Other corroborations given by the author in Chapters II and III of
his book appear of no more vahdity to me. They are either
statements based on quite incidental, fragmentary, and
questionable observations or data which testify against the
author's hypothesis (death rates in Panama and other cities,
sexual licentiousness of white men with tropical natives, and so
on). The data concerning the seasonal fluctuations, of efficiency
of work of factory operatives and students, and so on, which
Huntington gives in Chapters IV, V, and VI, of his Civilization and

Climate have an incomparably greater scientific significance.
However, even their significance is far from being convincing or
conclusive. My principal reasons for this statement are as follows:
In the first place, Huntington's "inductive" method is too ''rough."
He noticed that the efficiency of several hundred workers was low
in December and January; that it rose from February to June;
declined in July and August; and rose again and reached the
maximum in October and November. On the basis of this fact he
made a few dogmatic remarks that such fluctuations could not be
caused by other than climatic factors,and concludes that it must
be entirely due to climatic agencies. (See Chap. IV.) Such a
procedure is far from being inductive.^^'^ In the second place,
looking at the curves from different years and different factories
(Figures I and II, pp. 84, 93-94) I see only a remote parallelism
between them, and in some cases there is even no parallelism at
all {e.g., curves G and. H in Figure 8, p. 124). In the third place,
Huntington's curves testify against his fundamental statement that
the optimum point of temperature for physical work is about 64 F.
His Figure I shows that the maximum of efficiency of the
operatives for all years was in October and November when the
temperature was between 40 and 55 F. but not in June or
September when the average temperature was about 64 F. In
the fourth place, Huntington mentions only a very few
investigations of this kind. Meanwhile there exist considerable
numbers of such studies, including, among them, several carried
on
^"^ As an example of this "correlation" we may take the figures on
page 117 of his book. The difference in severity of heat between
1910 and 1912 is only two points (50 and 52); while the difference
in deficiency of work is 50 points. I am afraid that such proofs
prove too much.
153
with exclusive carefulness.^^'' Comparison of the results obtained

by these studies with those of Huntington, shows: There is no
uniformity in the influence of the seasons upon the efficiency of
working people; in some industries and factories efficiency
declines in the summer; and in others situated in similar climatic
conditions, it increases. For instance, the seasonal curve of an
output in five tin plate factories, studied by Dr. Vernon, is opposite
to Huntington; besides, the curves of each of the five factories are
considerably dissimilar.^^^ The same is true in regard to other
seasons.
It is rather fallacious to try to find a uniform influence of
temperature or of seasons upon all workers, of all ages, of both
sexes, and so on, as is done by Huntington. Careful analyses of
Bernays, Weber, Bienkowsky, Schmitz, Vernon, May, Smith, and
the Industrial Fatigue Research Board, show that different
categories of operatives in the same factory are reacting
differently to climate. In Bernay's study, for instance, the efficiency
of work of the male operatives under 40 years of age declines in
the spring, while that of the operatives above this age increases,
though generally the differences between the efficiencies of
different seasons are very slight. In a similar way, the efficiencies
of the male and female operatives, of the qualified and
unqualified, single and married, urban and rural-born, are affected
differently by spring. The same is true in regard to other
seasons.^^^ These works disclosed further the existence of a
much more conspicuous and more regular fluctuation of efficiency
of work within the hours of a working day, and within the days of a
week. To see in these, as well as in the ''seasonal" fluctuations,
the direct effects of climate, or to account for them principally
through climatic
^^ See for instance, Weber, Max, "Zur Psychophysik der
Industriellen Arbeit," Archiv fur Sozialwissenschaft, Bd. 28;
Bernays, IMarie, "Unter-suchungen uber die Schvvankungen der
Arbeitsintensitat," etc., in Schriften des Vereins filr Sozialpolitik,

Bd. 135, Dritter Teil, Leii)zig, 1912; Bernays, Marie, "Gladbacher
Spinnerei und Weberei" in the same Schriften, Bd. 133, Leipzig,
1910; vScHMiTZ, Wai.ter, "Regelung der Arbeitszeit und
Intensitat der Arbeit," in A rchiv fiir exacte Wirtschafliforschung,
Bd. 3, Heft 2; The Reports of Industrial Fatigue Board, Nos. 1-22;
Wilson, D. R., "On Some Recent Contributions to the Study of
Industrial Fatigue," Jcrurnal Royal Statistical Society, July, 1923.
See Vernon, "The Influence of Hours of Work and of
Ventilation on Output in Tinplate Manufacture," hidustrial Fatigue
Research Board, Report No. i.
'"^ Bernays, "Gladbacher vST)inncrei," ])p. 397 fT.; see here
figures and data. See also the al)ove works of M. WelxT and
others.
154
agencies or to ignore the non-climatic factors is impossible. In the
light of these results, the sweeping conclusions inferred by
Huntington from his data, can pretend in no way to be conclusive.
This conclusion is reinforced by the results of a series of
experimental studies of the influence of different climatic factors
upon several physiological processes and physical activities of
man. The net result of these various studies is discordant and
contradictory. For instance, the growth of weight of 1200
tubercular patients at Saranac Lake, given in Civilization and
Climate (Figure 2a, curve A), is opposite to the seasonal curve of
growth of weight of 130 boys in Copenhagen, studied by MallingHansen^^^ and that of several thousand children in Boston; the
results obtained by Dr. Winifred Hall and G. Stanley Hall,
concerning the same question, differ somewhat from the results of
both preceding studies.-^^^ Similar discordance came from the
results of the studies of fluctuations of muscular strength in

connection with the fluctuation of climatic agencies. Two
experimental studies of Schuyten yielded results considerably
different; ^^^ both of these results are different from Porter's and
from those obtained by Lehman and Pedersen; ^^^ and then all
are somewhat different (according to months) from the results
yielded by the study of A. H. Peaks and L. L. Kuhnes.^^^ Besides,
in Peaks' study two groups of the children tested have shown
seasonal fluctuations of strength not quite identical.^^^ The
experimental work of L. J. Stecher concerning the influence of
humidity on various muscular performances yielded no definite
results. ''We find no evidence that average performance (of hand
steadiness, aiming, tapping) are adversely affected by dryness."
^^^ Similarly no re1^ Malling-Hansen, Perioden im Gewicht der Kinder und in der
Sonnenwdrme^ Copenhagen, 1886, Fragment III, A and B;
Porter, W. T., "The Seasonal Variations in the Growth of Boston
School Children," American Journal of Physiology, May, 1920.
Huntington gives figures not seeing that they decidedly contradict
his curve of seasonal health. Compare Civilization and Climate,
pp. 154 and 158.
103 See Peaks, Arch. H., Periodic Variations in Efficiency,
Baltimore, 1921, p. 7.
"0 See Schuyten, M. C, "tJber Wachstum der Muskelkraft bei
Schulem wahrend des Schuljahres," Zeitschrift fiir Psychologie,
Bd. 23, p. loi and passim.
"1 Lehman, A. and Pedersen, R. N., ''Das Wetter und unsere
Arbeit," Archiv fiir gesamte Psychologie, Bd. X, 1907, passim, and
pp. 53-55-
112 Peaks, op. cit., passim and pp. 32, 91; Kuhnes, L. L.,
Variations in Muscular Energy, an unpublished thesis for Ph.D. at
N. Y. University, 1915.
113 See Peaks, op. cit., p. 32, Tables for A and B divisions.
155
suits of temperature (68, 75 and 85) on strength were found in
the experiments of the New York State Commission on
Ventilation. The authors' theories as to the character of the effects
of various climatic agencies are still more discordant. Besides, the
studies show that the fluctuations of the strength of people of
different ages and sex have a different and often an opposite
character in the same season and under the influence of the
same climatic change. Finally, when all these different curves of
the fluctuation of strength in different months are confronted with
the different curves of the fluctuation of efficiency of factory
operatives in the same months, they are far from being parallel or
coincident.
We shall not discuss the results of the studies of the fluctuations
of respiration or the amount of haemoglobin in the blood or of the
growth in stature at different seasons. The results are of the same
character as those of the fluctuations of strength and weight. Thus
we must conclude that Huntington has not proved the case for
''seasonal" curves of energy and that his theory of "the ideal
climate" (for physical efficiency) is also questionable.
12. CLIMATE AND MENTAL EFFICIENCY
Let us now analyze the validity of the theories of Huntington and
his predecessors concerning the influence of climatic agencies on
mental work. The essence of Huntington's theory about this is that
''mental work resembles physical but with interesting differences" :
the optimum outside temperature for mental work is about 39 F.
instead of 64 F.; further, "when the temperature falls greatly,

mental work seems to suffer more than physical, and declines as
much as when there is no change. It receives a little stimulus from
a slight warming of the air, but appears to be adversely affected
when the air becomes warm rapidly" (Civilisation and Climate, p.
142, also pp. 14-15).
The principal corroboration of this theory consists in the curve of
mental efficiency based on the marks received by 240 students in
mathematics at West Point in 1909-12; of 220 students in English
at Annapolis in 1912-13; and of 1300 students in mathematics at
Annapolis in 1907-13. The efficiency of typewriting of three
children and a few data taken from some other investiga156
tions are also included. The proof of the theory consists in the fact
that the curves of efficiency of the students fluctuate with seasons
and in a somewhat similar manner: they rise from September to
November, decline from November to December; rise again from
January or February to March or April, and then decline again.
(See Figures 3 and 8 in Civilisation and Climate, pp. 105, 124.)
From these data and from the curve which shows that the marks
are the highest in the days with a temperature of about 40 F.,
and some references to a few results obtained by other authors,
Fluntington concludes that his theory is proved, and besides, that
physical and mental efficiency are of a similar nature with the
exception of the differences mentioned above. This ''proof" is far
from convincing. Putting aside the question as to the validity of his
method of estimation of mental efficiency on the basis of marks,
especially when the marks are smoothed and somewhat modified
in different ways,on the basis of the data itself we are entitled to
make the following preliminary criticisms. In the first place, the
curves of seasonal efficiency of manual and mental work given in
his Figures 3 and 8 do not permit the contention that seasonal

fluctuations of both efficiencies are parallel. Beginning with the
temperature of 39 F., mental efficiency begins to decrease while
the physical efficiency increases up to 60 and 65 F. There is
little parallelism here. In the second place, the efficiency curves of
the wôrk of the students and of the three children, given in
Figure 8 (curves 9 and i), do not show any parallelism. Curve 9
shows that the optimum point of efficiency is not 39 but 67 F. In
the third place, this appears to be another pseudo-induction in
which a mere fluctuation of efficiency is attributed to climatic
causes without any serious attempt at a functional analysis of the
causes of the fluctuation. It is evident that marks of the students
depend on many non-climatic factors and that, at least, some
analysis of these factors should have been made. Now let us
consider the data outside of Huntington's book. Do they agree
with his conclusions? Are they similar? Is there any basis of
definite conclusions as to the influence of climatic agencies on
mental processes? Let us briefly survey the situation.
E. G. Dexter's studv of clerical errors and of the ability to
157
discriminate gave results different from those of Huntington: the
curve of clerical errors shows that they are the least numerous not
at 39 but at 58 F.; and only an excessive heat of above yy"^ F.
seems to be followed by an increase of errors. The curve
discrimination does not show any noticeable correlation with
fluctuations of temperature. Both mental processes showed quite
an opposite fluctuation in correlation with barometric conditions.
Low barometric readings are followed by few clerical errors but.
on the other hand, the rapidity of discrimination is high under high
barometrical conditions. His data concerning the influence of
humidity, wînds, and fair or clouded weather upon the curve of
clerical errors and discrimination differ from Huntington's and from
one another.^^^ The results of other studies of the dependence of

mental processes upon climatic agencies are different" and often
contradictory. Two studies of Schuyten concerning the influence
of seasons upon attention yielded discordant results, which are
also different from Huntington's curves.^^^ Lobsien's studies of
the seasonal fluctuation of primary memory have shown a
fluctuation in different seasons heterogeneous with all the above
curves.^^^ The Lehman and Pedersen study of the influence of
temperature, light, barometric pressure, and seasons upon mental
work of addition and on memory {Geddchtnisleistungen) found
that first, each of these agencies affects the efficiency of these
different psychical processes differently; second, that for addition
the optimum temperature is different for two individuals studied;
third, the optimum point for one is 44.6 F., (7 C.) and for another
is 50^^ F. (10 C). Both points are different from the optimum of
39 F. in the study of Huntington; and fourth, the movements of
the curves of addition and of temperature do not show any
resemblance to the seasonal fluctuations of Huntington's mental
efficiency curve. This study found results quite different from
Huntington's on the optimum temperature for mental
"' Dexter, E. G., op. cit., Figures 19, 20, 21, 22, 50; Chap. XIII.
"^ Schuyten, M. C, "Influence des variations de la temperature
atmos-pherique sur I'attention voluntaire des 616ves," Bulletin de
I'academie royal des sciences, de lettres de Belgiqiie, Vol. XXXII,
Brussels, 1906.
^'^ LoBSiEN, M., "Schwankungen cicr Psychische Kapazitat,"
Pedago. Psychologic, Bd. 5, 1902. LoBSiEN, M., "Experim.
Untcrsuchungen iiber Gedacht-nissenwicklung hei Schulkindern,"
Zeitschrift fiir Psychologic der Sinnesorgune,
Bd. 27. lOOI.
158

work.^^^ Further, Peaks' experimental study of memory has
shown that the seasonal fluctuation is different for two groups
studied. The fluctuations of both groups are far from being
identical with the curves of Huntington.^^^ On the other hand,
Hines's study of the efficiency of pupils in various temperature
conditions has shown that the optimum point of the classroom
temperature for mental work is between 65 and 70 F., and that
temperature at, and below 60 F., is very harmful to mental
work.^^^ Furthermore, contrary to Huntington's theory, the
experimental study of the influence of humidity on efficiency of
mental work, performed by Steelier, did not find any noticeable
effects.^^^ The experiments of Thorndike and McCall, Bass, and
the New York State Commission on Ventilation ^^^ find that
different conditions of the air in regard to temperature, humidity
and the degree of the carbon dioxide show no effect on mental
work, the rate of improvement of mental functions, accuracy of
judgment or upon the choice of alternatives. There is no use to
continue the enumeration of the results of other and similar
experimental and statistical studies. Later on I shall discuss some
of Huntington's other **proofs" of his claim. For the present, the
above gives a sufficient basis for the following conclusions: first,
various studies of the influence of climatic agencies upon mental
work have shown either no effects or effects which are very
discordant and contradictory ; second, these results are by no
means identical or similar to the principal statements of
Huntington; third, his own data are somewhat contradictory;
fourth, this discordance of results does not give any solid basis for
definite generalizations about the influence of climate upon
mental work; fifth, still less does it permit sweeping
generalizations concerning the decisive influence of
^18 Lehman and Pedersen, op. cit., pp. 94-104 and passim.
"9 Peaks, op. cit., Chap. III.

120 HiNES, L. N., "Effect of School Room Temperature on the
Work of Pupils," The Psychological Clinic, Vol. VIII, 1909.
^21 Stecher, op. cit., passim, and Chap. VIII.
122 Thorndike, E. L., Ventilation in Relation to Mental Work,
Teachers College, Columbia University Contributions to
Education, N. Y., 1916; Bass, "Experiment in School Room
Ventilation with Reduced Air Supply," Transactions American
Society Heat and Ventil. Engineers, 1913, Vol. XIX, p. 328;
Thorndike, RuGER, McCall, "The Effects of Outside Air and
Recirculated Air upon the Intellectual Achievement and
Improvements of School Pupils," School and Society, 1916, 3,
679.
159
climate upon the origin, progress, and decay of civilizations and
upon their character; and sixth, the conclusion about the influence
of climatic agencies upon mental functions has been inferred from
the mere existence of a fluctuation of these functions in different
periods of a year. Such an inference from the fact of fluctuation to
the climatic factors as causes is not valid. As there are regular
and more conspicuous monthly, weekly, and diurnal fluctuations
of mental efficiency which have very little to do with climatic
agencies,^^^ the existence of ''seasonal" fluctuations is not
necessarily due to climatic factors and cannot serve as evidence
in favor of their conditioning role. This is enough to prove that the
second fundamental premise of the sweeping sociological
generalizations of Huntington is not proved. The same, as we
have seen, may be said about his first fundamental premise
concerning the correlation of climate and health and efficiency of
physical work. Now before we proceed to an analysis of the
broadest sociological generalizations of Huntington and others in
this field, let us briefly discuss other, somewhat narrower, corre^

lations which students have attempted to establish between
geographical factors and various social phenomena. An analysis
of their validity will help greatly in the decision as to the validity of
the broadest generalizations.
13. CLIMATE AND SUICIDE
A series of investigators, such as De Guerry, Legoyt, A. Wagner,
L. Bodio, A. Leffingwell, Morselli, Krose, Gaedeken, Dexter, G.
von Mayr,^^^ to mention only a few, have shown that there is a
'23 About these diurnal, weekly and monthly fluctuations see
Peaks, Periodic Variations in Efficiency; the works of M. Bernays,
Max Weber, Stecher, Kuhnes; Lombard, W. P., "vSome
Influences Affecting the Power of Voluntary Muscular
Contraction," Journal of Physiology, Vol. XIII, 1892; Kraepelin, E.,
"Zur Hygiene dcr Arbeit," Zeitschrift fiir Psychiatrie, Vol. XXV,
1898; Christopher, W. S., Report on Child Study Investigations,
Chicago, 1898-9; Marsh, H. D., "The Diurnal Course of
Ef^ciency," Columbia University Contribution to Philosophy and
Psychology, Vol. XIV, 1906; and Gates, A., Diurnal Variations in
Memory and Association, Univ. of California Press, 1916.
^24 See de Guerry, Statistique morale de la France, Paris, 1835;
Wagner, A., Die Gesetzmassigkeit, etc., Vol. I, pp. 128 ff.,
Hamburg, 1864; Morselli, // suicido, Milan, 1879; Dexter, op. cit.,
Chaj). XI; von Mayr, Statistik und Gesellschaftslehre, Tubingen,
1917, pp. 281-291; Krose, H. A., Die Ursachen d<'r
Selbstmordhaufigkeit, pp. 4 ff., Freiburg, 1906; Miner, J. R.,
"wSuicide and i\. Relation to Climatic and Other Climatic Factors,"
American Journal of liygieh^, 1922; Jacqi art, C. J., Lc suicide, j).
99 ff., Bruxcllcs, 1908; Gaedeken, P.,
160

clearly cut and definite "seasonal" fluctuation of suicide in some
European and in some non-European countries. The maximum of
suicide in all European countries is in the summer. The maximum
is in June or May; the next place belongs to the spring; next one
to the fall, and the minimum comes in the winter.^^^ The studies
have disclosed also that there are weekly and diurnal periodicities
in the movement of suicide. Besides, they have shown that the
frequency of distribution of suicide in space also shows regularity:
in Europe, for instance, the average number of suicides,
according to the latitude, is as follows:
Number of Suicides Latitude per Million of Population
From 36 to 43 degrees of latitude 21. i
From 43 to 50 degrees of latitude 93-3
From 50 to 55 degrees of latitude 172.5
More than 55 degrees of latitude 88 . i ^ê
From these facts many of the investigators have inferred that the
movement of suicide is strongly and directly conditioned by
climatic factors. Some have laid it to fluctuations of temperature,
others to fluctuations of light and pressure, and others to a
combination of all these and other climatic agencies. Such
conclusions seem natural. And yet, more serious analyses of all
these phenomena, first by Durkheim, and later by Krose and
Jacquart, have shown that at the very best the influence of
climatic factors, if such an influence generally exists, is very
indirect and insignificant ; that the climatic hypothesis cannot
explain either the fluctuations or the suicide rate in the course of
time; in different countries and societies; or between city and
country districts; iimong the single, married and divorced; or
sudden increases or decreases in the same society; or even the

character of the diurnal, weekly, monthly and '"seasonal"
fluctuations of this phenomenon. Durkheim has shown that the
factor responsible for suicide is not climate but an increase or
decrease of the social
"Contribution statist, a la reaction des organisme," etc., Archive
d'anthrnpoloîe criminelle, Lyon et Paris, Vol. XXIX, 1909, pp. 81
ff.; and Leffingwell, A., Illegitimacy, London, 1892, pp. 21 ff. In
these works other literature and statistical data are referred to.
^25 By the way the suicide rate is also one of the criteria of
vitality. The seasonal fluctuation of this phenomenon is
considerably different from Huntington's curves of death rate or
reversed health rate.
161
isolation of the members of a society. He has convincingly
exhibited how this and some other social factors condition all the
above fluctuations of suicides, including also the ''seasonal" ones.
His hypothesis reconciles with the statistical data of suicides; his
analysis of the phenomenon is less mystical than the climatic
theory; and his theory gives a more plausible explanation of the
facts.^^^ Hence we must conclude that the correlation of suicides
and climatic conditions is not proved, as yet; and even if it exists,
which is questionable, it is not direct and primary.
14. CLIMATE AND INSANITY
Many authors, such as Leffingwell, Norbury, Huntington, Dexter,
Watt, and others have tried to establish a correlation between
climatic agencies and the fluctuations of insanity or of general
mental diseases.^"^ The principal basis of such a contention is
also the existence of ''seasonal" fluctuations in the number of
people who are admitted to asylums. Some of these authors
contend that the phenomena of insanity and suicide are closely

correlated. After Durkheim's study of suicides we must admit if
such a correlation exists, which is questionable, at any rate it is
pretty remote.^"^ Further, it is possible to contend, with a
reasonable degree of certainty, that, if climatic agencies condition
the movement of insanity, their role at any rate is not primary but
secondary. This inference follows from the fact that neither the
distribution of insanity among different societies, nor the fluctua'2" See the brilliant analysis of the climatic theories of suicide in
Durkheim, Le suicide, Chap. III. As I mentioned before, this case
especially illustrates how difficult it is to solve the problem of
"causation" of social phenomena; how easily one may make the
mistake of "post hoc ergo propter hoc," and how unscientific it is
to make an inference from the mere fact of the fluctuation of some
phenomena in time or space to the first and most conspicuous
condition as the "cause," in this case, to the climatic factors. See
also J. R. Miner's study which shows no influence of climate on
the fluctuation of suicides.
^28 See Leffingwell, op. cit., pp. 98 ff.; Norbury, F. P., "Seasonal
Curves in Mental Disorders," Medical Journal and Record, Vol.
CIX, 1924; Huntington, Civilization and Climate, pp. 155 ff., 225;
Dexter, op. cit., Chap. IX; Watt, Wm. E., Open Air, 1910.
'29 See Durkheim, op. cit.. Chap. I. While males have a higher
percentage of suicide, females are higher in insanity; while Jews
have a higher percentage o^ insanity than Protestants or Roman
Catholics, in regard to suicide the situation is reversed. The
seasonal curves are not quite parallel either. Evidently, if there
were a close correlation between these i)henomcna these and
many similar discordances could not have taken ])lace.
162
tions of the insanity curve from year to year within the same
society, nor the different rates of insanity in different classes,
sexes, rehgious and race groups of the same society and under
the same cHmatic conditions, can be accounted for through cHmatic factors. In other words, the most substantial differences and
changes in the insanity rate are the results of non-climatic factors.
The question as to w^hether climatic agencies play some
secondary role in the increase and decrease of the insanity rate is
less certain. As I have indicated, the only basis for a positive
answer to this question is the prevalence of ''seasonal"
fluctuations of insanity. Here, as well as in all ''seasonal"
fluctuations of social phenomena, the very fact of "seasonal"
fluctuations does not mean anything if it is not somewhat similar
from year to year. Without such a regularity it is meaningless.
Even if there is such a regularity, it does not necessarily mean
that it is caused by climatic factors. Now is there such a regularity
in the "seasonal" fluctuations of insanity, from year to year?
Furthermore is there a regularity in the sense that the seasonal
movement of the insanity curve in similar climatic conditions is
similar? As to the first question, the answer is that the regularity is
very relative: for instance, the monthly curve of the number of
lunatics admitted into asylums in Scotland during the years from
1865 to 1874, shows that from March to April the number of
lunatics decreased, while during the years from 1880 to 1887 it
increased in April; the fluctuations of the number of lunatics from
April to May is also opposite in both periods; the same differences
are true in regard to fluctuations from May to June, from June to
July, from August to September, and from September to
October.^^^ Likewise, the months of the maximum and the
minimum insanity rate shift from ]\Iarch to June and July in
different years within the same population and are different for
places of similar climatic conditions, and sometimes are the same
for places with quite different climates.^^^ This means that the
"seasonal" regularity of fluctuations of insanity rates is somewhat

irregular.
13 See Leffingwell, A., op. cit., Appendix, p. 157.
131 Compare the data in Dexter, op. cit., p. 170; Leffingwell, op.
cit., p. 157; Huntington, Civilization and Climate, p. 156;
Durkheim, op. cit., p. 89.
163
All that remains is that during one half of a year (and the months
which compose this half depend considerably upon the
investigator) the insanity rate is somewhat higher than in the other
half: for Europe and America we may say either the winter and
spring months have a rate somewhat higher than the summer and
fall months or that the spring and summer months are somewhat
higher than the fall and winter months. From these remarks one
may see how little remains of these ''seasonal" fluctuations of
insanity. Its correlation approaches close to a chance-fluctuation
because some probability always exists. Finally, if in these
"seasonal" fluctuations of the insanity rate something more than
mere chance exists, the partizans of the climatic factors must
show that, namely, the climatic and not other factors is
responsible, and why and how climatic agencies condition such
fluctuations. All we have in this respect are but discordant
guesses. In their attempts to explain the nature of climate, the
authors mention "irritating temperature," "exasperating dryness"
or "barometric pressure," "excessive humidity," "fatigue of nerves"
(which is something different from climate), or more honestly style
this unknown influence as "mysterious" (Leflingwell and many
others). No serious attempt to define what temperature or
degrees of light or dryness are favorable to insanity or to verify
these hypotheses inductively, is found in the works of "the climatists." We may conclude that the correlation between insanity
and climate is not proved as yet, and if in the corresponding
theories there is some truth, it cannot mean more than a slight

degree of partial correlation. Even this statement may be
questioned.
15. CLIMATE AND CRIME
All that has been said of the alleged influence of climate upon
suicide or insanity may be said also of its relationship to crime.
The existence of an influence is accepted by many criminologists
on the basis of "seasonal" fluctuations of crimes against property
and f)crs()ns. 11iese fluctuations, and the reverse character of the
"seasonal" fluctuation of the number of crimes against property
and those against persons, are regarded as suflicient
164
1()4 CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES
proof of the influence of climatic agencies upon crime/^- In regard
to this correlation it is possible to make the following statements:
First, the frequency and fluctuations of crimes (against property,
as well as against persons) in various countries and in various
parts of the same country, in urban and rural districts, and among
different social strata and groups (economic, occupational,
religious, racial, cultural, national), are such that, except in part,
they cannot be accounted for through the influence of climatic
conditions at all. This means, that at the best, climatic agencies
exert only secondary and indirect influences. The substantial traits
of the movement of crime are determined by other factors.
Second, the same may be said about fluctuations of crime within
the same or different societies in time, as from year to year.
Extraordinary increases or decreases of crime in a definite year or
in a series of years, as a rule, are due to other than climatic
agencies. Indirectly, in agricultural countries, climatic agencies,
through conditioning the crops, may play a considerable role but

only through poverty or prosperity. These are the direct causes
and not climatic factors.
Third, the above statements mean that the medium of climatic
agencies may play a part only in a limited field of ''seasonal"
fluctuation of crime. Even in this field their possible influence may
be indirect only in the sense that men become more or less
''criminal" not because the temperature is higher or the humidity is
lower or the sunlight is less bright, but because the direct factors
of criminality such as poor crops or out-of-doors social life are
partly influenced by climatic conditions. It may be that some forms
of crime, e.g., sexual crimes, are directly stimulated by climatic
factors, but even this is not proved conclusively.
Fourth, even in this limited sense the influence of climatic
132 The corresponding literature is immense. The correlation has
been emphasized in the works of A. Moreau de Jonnes, Ad.
Quetelet, Oettingen, Levasseur, Lombroso, E. Ferri, Leffingwell,
B. Foldes, H. Kurella, Lacassagne, Guerry, Jentsch,
Aschaffenburg, Dexter, P. Gaedeken, J. L. de Lanessan, and in
many general texts of criminology like M. Parmelee's Criminology,
and J. L. Gillin's Criminology and Penology, Chap. V., though
Gillin is rightly cautious in this respect. See the literature in von
Mayr, G., Statistik und Gesellschaftslehre, Bd. JII, i)p. 6I4--6I5;
and in the texts of Gillin and Parmelee. See the statistical data
especially in von Mayr's work, pp. 600-615.
165
agencies is still somewhat questionable. We are prone to find a
regularity where there is the slightest pretext: It is accepted as
proved that important and regular "seasonal" fluctuations of crime
exist. Meanwhile the real situation is considerably different. In the
first place, tables generalized too much mask the fact that the
movements of both crimes against property and persons are

different and often opposite in various places of similar climatic
conditions.^"^^ In the second place, the regularity of the
"seasonal" fluctuations of crime is somewhat exaggerated: it is
sufficient to look attentively at the monthly figures of crime against
property or persons from year to year to see that their movement
from month to month is far from being uniform in "ups" and
"downs" for different years. For instance, in Belgium, in 1910, the
number of crimes against persons in February was less than in
January, and in 1911, it was greater than in January. The same is
true in regard to other crimes, and other months, and other
countries.^^^ This means that the regularity of the "seasonal"
fluctuation of crime is far from being definite. This is also
corroborated by the fact that the months of maximum and of
minimum crime often shift from one to another in the same
country in different years; that they sometimes are different for the
countries of almost similar climatic conditions, and identical for the
countries of different climates; that in some southern countries the
"seasonal" curve of crime often has quite a different character
(not the opposite, which could be explained by differences in
temperature, but a very dissimilar character) ; and that in a more
detailed form different kinds of crimes against property, as well as
against persons, exhibit much more complex and much less
regular and uniform fluctuations than we are led to believe on the
basis of a few general and one-sided figures.^^^ These and many
other considerations are enough to
^^^ As only one out of many examples of this kind I may indicate
the seasonal curve of homicides in Seattle: The number of
homicides there has been the lowest in the warmest months
(May, June, July) and the highest in the coldest months,
(December, January, February). See Schmidt, C. F., "A Study of
Homicides in Seattle, 1914 to 1924," Social Forces, June, 1926,
p. 751.
^^* See the figures of Belgium in von Mayr, op. cit., p. 610.
'^^ These facts may be seen even in the figures that are given in
von Mayr's work, in spite of von Mayr's own theory, see pp. 609
ff.; a great many "climatic fallacies and pretensions" in an
interpretation of factors of crime have already been dissipated by
many criminologists, beginning with G. Tarde, and ending
166
show that the so-called regularity of the ''seasonal" fluctuations of
crime is a ''loose" statement. The factors are to be discovered yet.
Finally, if we try to find out why, how, and in what way climatic
agencies condition crimes our results are practically nothing but
indefinite dogmatic repetitions of contradictory allusions to the
"weakening" or "irritating" influence of temperature or air or
humidity or wind and so on. And often the same author on one
page ascribes an "irritating" character to one climatic condition,
while on another page of the work he lays it to quite different
climatic agencies (because there the movement of crime is
different and cannot be explained by the first reason).^^^ The
corresponding "explanations" are so vague that we do not know,
of temperature or humidity or barometric pressure, which
facilitates and which hinders crime. The situation remains almost
mysterious and hopeless. These remarks are enough to show
that if there exists any correlation between climatic agencies and
crime it is of secondary importance and still needs to bef tested.
Some indirect influence of these factors appears probable but it is
somewhat intangible. At any rate the principal fluctuations of
crime in space and time are not due to climatic factors.
l6. CLIMATE AND BIRTH, DEATH, AND MARRIAGE RATES
I shall not discuss at all the curious but rather fantastic

geographical theories in this field, like Jenkin's theory of a
correlation between Jupiter and the death rate, but I shall limit my
criticism to the more reasonable hypotheses. The preceding
conclusions may be applied as well to the fluctuations of death,
birth and marriage rates in space and in time and to the
"seasonal" fluctuations especially.^^^ An attentive study of the
corresponding
with the works of N. Colajanni, Bonger, van Kan, Gemet,
Charychov, and of many other criminologists of the so-called
sociological school. See van Kan, J., Les causes economiques de
la criminalite; Tarde, G., La criminalite comparee, and Penal
Philosophy; Colajanni, N., La sociologia criminale; Gernet, M.,
Crime and its Prevention, (Russ.) and Juvenile Delinquents,
(Russ.); Charychov, Factors of Crime (Russ.); Bonger, W. A.,
Criminality and Economic Conditions; Thomas, D., Social Aspects
of the Business Cycle, London, 1925.
1^ These traits may be seen even in the books of such modem
"climatists" as M. Parmelee; read attentively pages 43-53 of his
Criminology.
137 See the statistical data in Oettingen, A., Die Moralstatistik,
1882, chapters devoted to an analysis of death, birth and
marriage rates; Levasseur, E., La population Frangaise, Vol. II,
Paris, 1891; VON Mayr, G., Statistik und Gesell167
statistical data shows that the principal fluctuations in space and
time of the rates of these vital processes cannot be accounted for
through climatic factors. The same is true in regard to ''trends" in
these phenomena. Practically the only field where the influence of
climate may be admitted is that of the so-called ''seasonal"
fluctuations. But even here, as far as the complex Western
societies are concerned, the direct influence of climatic conditions

is very uncertain and questionable. The "seasonal" curves of
these processes are even less definite and regular than in many
of the processes discussed above. For instance, the birth rate or
correspondingly the number of conceptions has two high peaks :
the birth rate in February and March and in September and
October; the conception rate in January and December and in
May and July. These are in the most different climatic conditions.
The same is true in regard to the yearly periods of the minimum
conception and birth rates.^^'^ On the other hand, the "seasonal"
fluctuations of the birth rates of different social groups, for
instance, Protestants and Catholics, who live in the same area,
under the same climatic conditions, show considerable difference.
Such "seasonal" fluctuations of birth rates testify that they are
conditioned by factors different from climate. In the second place,
the "seasonal" fluctuation of these vital processes is far from
being regular and is therefore far from being "seasonal" in the
proper sense of the word. They seem to be mere fluctuations
whose causes are yet to be discovered. In the third place, in the
course of time these fluctuations become more and more
indefinite and less and less "seasonal." For these reasons it is
possible to contend that even the so-called "seasonal"
fluctuations of these processes do not definitely prove the direct
and important influence of.climatic factors. Among primitive tribes,
and among the non-domesticated animals, sexual life and
conceptions have a definite seasonal character. It is well known
that the non-domesticated animals have a definite period of
rutting. Only during such i)eriods do they perform and
physiologically can i)erform sexual functions. Westermarck,
Wagner,
schaftslehre, Vol. II; and the parts on the population statistics in
the works of Wappaus, H. Wcstergaard and others.
'^ Sec also Wurrt:, R. C, "The Human Pairing Seascjn in

America," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. XXXI1, i)p. 8()o<So5.
168
1()8 CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES
B. Spencer and Gillen, Oldfield, Bonwick, Mannhardt and many
other investigators have shown that among primitive peoples and
the forefathers of the Romans, the Greeks, and contemporary
European populations there has been and is a kind of a remnant
of this phenomenon of rutting manifested in the conspicuous intensiveness of sexual life at certain periods of the year/^^ But
even such a definite seasonal location of sexual life seems not to
have been due to climatic conditions directly but to other factors
and especially to the factor of alimentation. The two most
plausible hypotheses offered for an explanation of the rutting of
animals, the theory of Leuckart, and that of Westermarck, both
stress the role of food and only the indirect influence of climate as
a factor conditioning food-abundance. According to Leuckart, the
rutting period coincides wîth the period of the most abundant
food; according to Westermarck the rutting periods are those
when a species can procure the food and other necessities for
offspring at the moment of its birth. On the other hand the role of
the food-factor is accentuated by the fact that our domesticated
animals, who are put in a condition where their food is secured
throughout the whole year, mate also throughout a whole year.^^^ This shows that among animals even the direct factor of
"seasonal" fluctuations of conception and of sexual life is not so
much climate as food.^^^ Climatic conditions play only an indirect
role, as far as they condition the seasons of abundant and of
scarce food. For this reason it is comprehensible why the
''seasonal" fluctuations of conceptions and births among primitive
peoples are more definite
139 c^f.^-. Westermarck, E., History of Human Marriage, Chaps.

I, 11; Wagner, Ilandworterbuch der Physiologic, the article of
Leuckart, Bd. IV, \). 862; Gruen-ha(;en, Lchrbuch d. Physiologic,
1885-7, Bd. Ill, p. 528. Mannhardt, Walde imd Fcldkultc, BcrHn,
1875, Bd. I, Chap. V; Kharusin, Ethnography, Volume: Family arid
Kinship, (Russ.), ])]). 50 fT,; Oldfield, "The Aborigines of
Australia," Transactioyis of Ethnological Society, New Series, Vol.
Ill, p. 230; Bonwick, Daily Life and Origin of the Tasmanians, p.
178, Lond., 1870; Frazer, J. G., The Golden Bough, Vol. Ill, pp.
230 ff., Lond., 1890; Ellis, H., Studies in the Psychology of Sex,
Voh I, pp. 85 fif., Philadelphia, 1910.
" See Gageman, Physiology of Domesticated Animals, (Russ.)
1908, pp. 232-233; Heape, W., "The Sexual Season of
Mammals," Quarterly Journal Microsc. Science, Vol. LXIV, 1900,
p. 12; Marshall, F. H., Physiology of Reproduction, pp. 57 ff.,
Lond., 1910; Darwin, Ch., Variations of Animals and Plants under
Domestication, Vol. II, p. 90, Lond., 1885.
^^^ See reference below. See also the paper of A. Meyerson, in A
merican Review^ January-February, 1924, and Pell, C. E., The
Law of Births and Deaths, Lond., 1921. These writers discuss the
role of the food factor in fertility.
169
than among cultural peoples whose supply of food and other
necessities has become almost independent of seasons.^^~
This discussion is enough to show that at the best the role of
climatic factors in these vital processes is only indirect, and in
civilized societies it is so strongly neutralized by other non-climatic
factors that the influence of the climate becomes almost
intangible. It is impossible to establish the correlation between
climate and vital processes in any more definite form. This
statement applies also to the movement of the death, and

especially of the marriage rate within Western societies.^^^
''^ It is also questionable whether such phenomena as sexual
maturity among human beings is influenced by climate. Some
data which show that in tropical regions the age of menstruation is
lower (12.9 years) than in the cold regions (16.5 years) (according
to Engelman) are far from being general. In the United States, for
instance, no influence of climate upon menstruation has been
detected. Among the Eskimo the age is at about thirteen years,
which is almost as low as in the troj)ics. Furthermore, a series of
studies have shown that it is influenced by racial factors. In
Hungary it fluctuates from stock to stock such as from 13-14
among the Slavs to 16 or 17 among the Styrians. It is often lower
for the upper strata and higher for the lower classes. In America
such a correlation has been found. These and similar data make
us believe that if climate influences the sexual maturity age this
influence is far from direct, or definite or even tangible. vSee the
data in Engelman, G. J., "First Age of Menstruation in the North
American Continent," Transaction of American Gynecological
Society, 1901, pp. 87 fT.; Krieger, E., Die Menstruation, pp. 17
fT., 52 ff., Berlin, 1869; Kelly, H. A., Medical Gynecology, pp. 83
ff., Lond., 1912; Raseri, "Inchiesta della Societe Anthropol." in
Annali di Statistica, serie II, Vol. VI, 1881; Marro, A,, La Puberta,
Torino, 1900.
1^3 The above statements concerning the irregularity of the socalled seasonal fluctuations of death, marriage, and mortality
rates, and the impossibility of accounting for these fluctuations
mainly through climatic factors are also corroborated by a very
careful study of these processes by M. B. Hexter and D. S.
Thomas. Though Dr. Hcxtcr himself writes the following indefinite
statement: "much evidence exists to show that the birth-rate (and
marriage and mortality rates) is highly influenced by the seasons,
even among civilized men," nevertheless, his data bring out the
fallacies of so-called seasonal fluctuations, 'i'hc seasonal

movement of the birth rate of Boston from 1900 to 1921 shows
that the months of maximum are March, December and July, and
the months of minimum are A})ril, November and September. This
means that the maxima occur in the most different climatic
conditions. The same is true of the months of minimum. In
addition, November and December, which do not differ noticeably
in climatic conditions, exhibit the greatest contrast in regard to the
birth rate. If climatic conditions were responsible for a seasonal
fluctuation of birth rates we should expect that months which have
approximately siniilar climatic conditions would have similar birth
rates. Since this is not the case, according to all laws of inductive
logic, we cannot ex])lain the "seasonal" fluctuations through
climate. Further, monthly data for the years from 1900 to 1921
show that monthly fluctuations are considerably dissimilar from
year to year. The points of minimum and maximum shift from
month to month in different years. The same is true in regard to
tlic movement uf marriages, deaths, and divorces. This
170
17. GEOGRAPHIC CONDITIONS AND RELIGION, ART, AND
LITERATURE
It is to be expected that geographical environment will be in ?ome
way reflected in the products of the imaginative work of man, in
his arts, literature, music, painting, architecture, and beliefs. This
expectation, especially for relatively primitive and isolated groups
who have dwelt in the same geographical environment for a long
time, seems to be corroborated to some extent. However, this
extent is negligible. What seems to be proved is only that the art,
the literature, and the beliefs of a people are somewhat ''colored"
with the images, figures, and forms most often taken from the
geographical environment in which such a people live. Among
many writings of those who have spoken of such ''colorings" of

religious beliefs by the "colors" of the >ocal geographical
environment, the short paper of R. H. Whit-beck is possibly the
best. His paper shows that many peoples usually symbolize their
friendly gods by such geographic agencies as under the existing
conditions are beneficial to the society, while they picture
unfriendly gods by harmful geographic phenomena. The Satan of
Egypt was the Thyphon, that of India was Vritra, the serpent, and
the evil deities of ancient Norway were the frost giants or
mountains. Likewise, the ideas of different peoples concerning
paradise and hell show the same "coloration." Paradise for the
American Indian is a hunting ground abundant in game; for the
desert Arabian it is an oasis containing trees, streams of water
and an abundance of cool and refreshing shade; and for the
ancient Norse it is a warm and sunny place. On the other hand,
hell usually is depicted as a place in which are embodied the
geographical conditions from which the population suffers: cold in
the north, heat in the tropics, and so on. Whit-is enough to
suggest that these fluctuations are far from being "seasonal" in
the proper sense of the word and cannot be accounted for
through the influence of climate or other geographical factors. See
Hexter, M. B., Social Consequences of Business Cycles, passim,
and pp. 20 fT., 55 ff., 70 ff., Boston and N. Y., 1925. vSee also
Whipple, G. Ch., Vital Statistics, p. 306, N. Y., 1919, where
Professor Whipple gives the "seasonal" movement of the death
rate in 1910 which yields a "seasonal" curve of the death rate
different from the curve of Hexter. Dr. Falk's curve of the death
rate for the United vStates Registration Area in 191 9 shows a
somewhat different curve from that of Hexter and Whipple. See
Falk, I. S., Principles of Vital Statistics, 1923, p. 183.
171
beck indicates further that when peoples change their territory
and live in quite a different environment, their images of gods and
their other beliefs undergo a corresponding modification. For

instance when the Aryans entered India their chief deity was
Dyaus (sky), and Indra, the rain-giver, was of minor rank. Later
on, in view of the great importance of rain in India, the chief deity
became Indra while Dyaus was demoted to a second-rank god.
The same author and several others further show that many other
religious images and beliefs are colored in a similar way.^'*'^
Similar correlations may be observed in folklore, in songs, fairy
tales, poems and other literary products of different peoples
during the earlier stages of their history. The character of the
geographic environment which forms the background, the kinds of
trees, plants and animals which are depicted, and the general
scenery of the Thousand and One Nights or the Iliad and
Odyssey, or the Norse Edda, or the Hindu Mahahharata are quite
different from each other and each is marked by the
characteristics typical of the locality in which its creator lived.
Many authors have discussed such correlations. H. Taine tried to
explain the difference between the Flamand and the Florentine
schools of painters through differences in the geographic
conditions of Italy and the Netherlands. Eug. Veron, Aug.
Matteuzzi, Ch. Letourneau, Mme. de Stael and many others have
attempted to show similar correlations between geographic
conditions and architecture, painting, literature, music, etc.^'*''
The above correlation in ''coloration" of the products of art,
literature, and religion, is admitted. At the same time I must
^" vSee Whitbeck, R. H., "The Influence of Geographical
Environment upon Religious Belief," The Geographical Review,
Vol. V, 1918, pp. 316-324; see other references here. To the
credit of the author it must be said that he does not force his
correlation and frankly says that "many factors combine to mold a
people's religious beliefs. Geographical environment necessarily
is one of these, sometimes a conspicuous influence, and
sometimes perceptible only in minor ways." Ibid., ]). 317. See

similar theories and correlations in Mougeolle, Les prohlemes de I
histoire, ])]). 374 ff".; DuPUis, Origine de Ions les cultes, IX; the
paper of L. Drapeyron in Revue de geographie, i-cr partie, i-er
annee; Semple, E., op. cit., Chap. II; Peschel, O., 77?^ Races of
Man, pp. 314-318, N. Y., 1894.
1^^ vSee Taine, H., Philosophiede Vart, III; Vernon, Eug.,
L'esthetiqne; especially Matteuzzi, Aug., Les Jacteurs de
devolution des peuples, \)\). 52 ff., 211 ff., Paris, 1900;
Letourneau, Ch., L'evolution litteraire dans les diverses races
humaines^ Paris, 1894.
172
condition the statement by showing that even for a relatively early
stage, the correlation is far from being rigid and universal, and
that it is likely to become less and less tangible as we proceed to
later stages of more complex and more mobile societies; and
finally, that a great many geographers and authors have greatly
exaggerated the influence of geographic conditions in this field.
The validity of the first and the second propositions is proved by
the fact of the existence of similar or identical beliefs, symbols,
myths, legends, fairy tales, architectural types, music and so on
among peoples who inhabit very different areas and live under
different longitudes, latitudes, and altitudes. It is also true that
peoples who are in the same geographical conditions often have
quite different beliefs, tastes, and standards in art and literature.
Consider the areas of the expansion of Christianity, Buddhism,
Mohammedanism, Confucianism or any great religion. The
followers of each of the religions are found among different
geographic conditions and climates. This means, that in spite of
geographic differences, all have essentially similar beliefs. If there
are differences, they are due not so much to geographic as to
cultural dissimilarities of social groups. Take the dynamic history

of mythology: it shows that similar myths have expanded among
peoples w-ith unlike geographical conditions.^^^ The same is true
in regard to Gothic architectural style, or to Empire, or to
imitations of antique styles. Are not the compositions of
Beethoven, Grieg, Verdi, Rossini, Tschaikovsky or of any great
composer played in all latitudes and longitudes ? Is not the same
true in regard to the works of the great masters in poetry, painting,
literature and sculpture?
On the other hand, consider the population of the same place,
e.g., of a big city of the past or of the present. Do we not find the
people there with very different religious beliefs, aesthetic tastes,
and literary standards, in spite of the identity of their geographic
environment? Both of these categories of facts are so evident, so
certain, so common in the past and in the present, that there
scarcely is any need of further proof that the correlation we are
discussing is relative, loose and even imperceptible.
1''^ See e.g., Frazer, J. G., The Golden Bough, passim, and Part
IV. Adonis, Attis, Osiris, London, 1907; see also IvIackenzie, D.
A., Migration of Symbols, N. Y., 1926.
173
From these statements it is easy to see the fallacy in doctrines
such as the following: "Social institutions and religious ideas are
no less (than physical characteristics) the product of environment.
We might just as well ask the Ethiopian to change his skin as to
change radically his social and religious ideas. It has been shown
by experience that Christianity can make but little headway
amongst many peoples in Africa or Asia where on the other hand
Mohammedanism has made and is steadily making progress.
This is probably due to the fact that Mohammedanism is a religion
evolved ... in latitudes bordering on the aboriginal races of Africa
and Asia" (Ridgway). If the author had taken into consideration
the mere fact that Mohammedanism, as well as Christianity, has

spread among people who live in both warm and cold climates, in
plains and on mountains, under varying geographical conditions,
he would not make such rash generalizations. Further, if he had
taken into consideration that the culture complex of the peoples in
Asia was more congenial to the culture complex of
Mohammedanism, this additional reason would cause him to
refrain from making climate the main factor in the expansion of
Mohammedanism and Christianity. Furthermore, sometimes
populations change suddenly within a few years from one religion
into another, (spreading of Christianity within the Roman Empire
and its conquests in Gallia, Ireland, and Britain; its introduction
into Russia by the order of the government; similar expansions of
Buddhism, Mohammedanism, and so on) and sometimes, as
rapidly back into the previous one. Thus we have ample evidence
that great changes in religion have been taking place within the
same geographic habitat and without any changes in conditions.
This is sufficient to show that such changes in the religion of a
population are not correlated with geographic factors.
Here is another example of such fallacious reasoning: Abercromby found ^^" that the area of expansion of the Mohammedan
religion in Asia and in Africa coincided with the area in which the
mean annual rainfall was below ten inches. Hence he concluded
that the amount of rainfall was a vital factor in the ex"' See Abercrombv, John, Seas and Skies in Many Latitudes, pp.
42-43., Lond.; Ward, R. DeCoi'RCV, Cliwatc Considered
Especially in Relation to Man, pp. 258-259, N. Y., 1918.
174
pansion of Mohammedanism or Christianity. A study of the areas
of Mohammedanism in Europe and in Asia (India) shows the
fallacy of this theory. A correlation between deserts and

monotheism set forth by E. Renan is likewise invalid.
The next example of this bad logic is found in H. Taine. He
explained the difference between the Florentine and the Flemish
schools in painting by their geographical environment. When,
however, he found that two schools were similar in many
respects, he saved his theory by the statement that their
geographical environment was similar! He adjusted the facts to
meet the case.
Matteuzzi claimed that geographic differences in northern and
southern Europe manifested themselves in the fields of the
literature and music of these peoples. He claimed that northern
people had less imagination and fantasy, and less ability for
deductive generalizations than the southern people. On the other
hand, the southern people were more musical.^"^^ These and
other ''generalizations" of the author show a great deal of
imagination but are utterly fallacious from the standpoint of
science. It is only necessary to recall such imaginative and
fantastic creations of the northern peoples as the Finnish epic
Kalcvala; the series of Russian epical poems, fairy tales and
legends; Edda of the Norse; the epics connected with King Arthur;
the Nihehingenlied; or the epic about Roland, to see the fallacy of
the "generalization." It is necessary to forget the names of Bach,
Beethoven, Mozart, Chopin, Wagner, Rimsky-Korsakov, Grieg,
Brahms, Tschaikov-sky, Musorgsky, and thousands of other great
composers of the north to assert that the Italians are more
musical. It is possible to claim that southern Europeans have
greater powers of deduction and generalization ^^^ only after
forgetting such names as Descartes, Kant, Copernicus, Newton,
Darwin, Leibnitz, Pasteur, Claude Bernard, Lamarck,
Lobachevsky, H. Spencer, and others.
I could fill hundreds of pages with examples of such false

generalizations.^"'^ But there is scarcely any need of it. In their
"8 See Matteuzzi, op, cit., pp. 52 ff., 211 ff.
"9 See a sound criticism of these theories in Kovalevsky, M.,
Sovremennya Soziologi, St. Petersb., 1905, Chap. IX.
150 -ê have here the same unhappy use of the method of
"illustration" which Is a real plague in the social sciences. Instead
of a systematic verification of a
175
scientific value they are similar to the most unfortunate
correlations between climate and social phenomena made by
Montesquieu.^"'^ But what could be overlooked in the writings of
the great author of Tlic Spirit of the Law on account of the lack of
factual material in his time, cannot be excused in these modern
authors. Their theories may be interesting, sometimes even
suggestive, but unfortunately at the first scientific scrutiny they fall
like a house 'of cards.^'^~
l8. GEOGRAPHIC CONDITIONS AND SOCIAL AND POLITICAL
ORGANIZATION OF SOCIETY
We have seen that the Le Play school tried to explain the principal
types of the family through differences in the habitats of peoples.
Since Montesquieu, several writers, in a similar wây, have
accounted for such characteristics of the family as monogamy,
polygamy or polyandry through geographic environment. Several
authors, like Ritter and Ratzel and their followers, have gone
further and tried to account for the size of a body politic, the form
of its organization, its peaceful or military character, the optimism
or pessimism of the people, the progressiveness or
backwardness, the love for freedom or for subordination, and
hundreds of other characteristics, through these geographic

influences. Are these and many similar statements valid?
I have already indicated the shortcomings of the theory of the
origin of different types of families given by the Le Play school. It
may explain a part of the evolution of each type, but not very
much. Attempts to correlate forms of marriage and varieties
hypothesis, the authors use one or a few fragmentary cases
favorable to their conclusion and victoriously declare that it is
"proved." Such a method of proving is utterly anti-scientific in its
nature.
^^1 Montesquieu formulated a great many correlations between
geographic conditions and various social phenomena, slavery and
freedom, polygamy and polyandry, monarchy and republic,
Protestantism and Catholicism, and so on. At the present we
consider a great many of these correlations doubtful.
^" I have no desire to discuss here theories hke M. Miiller's theory
of the origin of religion and its evolution, in which he emphasizes
the r61e of geographic conditions, and especially of magnificent
natural phenomena, like thunderstorms, in the beginning of beliefs
in God, supernatural beings, and so on. This does not directly
concern my topic; besides it has been criticized by many authors,
such as E. Durkhcim, so my criticism is unnecessary. See
Durkheim, FAementary Forms of ReliîoiLs Life, N. Y., 1915,
chapters devoted to the criticism of M. Muller's and Revill's
theories of naturism.
176
176 CONTEMPOKiRY SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES
of the family with geographic environment have not been
successful. Try to correlate monogamy, polygamy, polyandry,
endogamy, exogamy, or duration of marriage with climate,

altitude, latitude, longitude or any component of geographic
environment. It becomes evident at once that such a correlation
does not exist. All these are found in vastly different geographic
conditions.^'^ The statement applies also to many other
characteristics of the family. One of the best authorities in the field
of family evolution, J. Mazzarella, after his study of the area of
diffusion and the causes of the matriarchate, the ambilian form of
marriage, polygamy, and so on, concludes: "These institutions do
not depend (directly or tangibly) on geographic causes because
they are found among peoples quite different from the standpoint
of geographic conditions" (from the arctic to the tropics, from the
islands to the mountains, from the deserts and plains to the forest
regions).^"*^ This becomes more evident when one takes into
consideration that in the same area, and sometimes in a period of
time too short for any serious change of geographic environment,
the family institution undergoes radical modifications. In the same
geographic area we often see family institutions of different types,
according to the population. The same family or marriage type
(polygamy or monogamy) is found in areas with great contrasts in
geography. Many geographers have attempted to establish other
correlations between geographic and social phenomena. Here are
several typical examples:
Correlation Number i: Geographic conditions determine the size
of a body politic and political, racial, national, and cultural
frontiers. Areas separated by mountains or seas have separate
political, racial, national, and cultural groups, zvhile populations
situated on large plains form a large body politic. The same
correlation is claimed in regard to race, language, and cidture.
153 See the catalogue of corresponding peoples in Westermarck,
E., The History of Human Marriage, Lond., 1921, Vol. II, Chaps.
XVIII, XIX, XX; Vol. Ill, Chaps. XXVII, XXVIII, XXIX, and passim.
Here again the authors usually "prove" their claims through the
method of "illustration." The most favorable illustration of

polyandry caused by geographical condition is Tibet. Even such
sociologists as Simmel use this "proof."
154 See the excellent studies of Mazzarella, J., Les types sociaux
et le droit, pp. 179-180, and passim, Paris, 1908; La Condizione
guiridica del marito nella famiglia matriarchate, Catania, 1899.
177
Selected illustrations are given to corroborate the statements.^''^
We shall test the proposition by looking at the contradictory facts
of the past, as well as of the present. Neither the Ural, nor the
Altai, nor the Himalaya, nor the Carpathian and other mountains
have hindered the Russian, the Chinese, the Austrian, the Swiss,
the American, or the British Imperial bodies politic from expanding
on both sides of the mountains or over the seas. In the past, the
Roman, Egyptian, Assyrian, Chinese, Turkish and Persian
Empires, as well as those of Alexander the Great and of Genghis
Khan have spread in a similar fashion. On the other hand, *'separate nationalities may exist within regions which seem to be
marked by physical nature for political unity" and ''the map of
Europe affords very few natural boundaries"; beyond a few cases
"there is hardly a mile of political frontier in Europe which is
natural in any valid sensethat is to say, a well marked physical
obstacle interposed between peoples differing in race and
language." ^''^ During a thousand years or even during a century \
geographic conditions remain practically the same while political
bodies and cultural areas usually change very considerably, even
1 radically. The absence of any correlation between the habitat of
the principal races and the geographic environment has been
shown. These fundamental series of facts show the fallacy of the
proposition. If a relationship exists, it is not rigid, perma-
1" See Ratzel, F., Politische Geographic, Chaps. XII to XV, 1903;
Semple, E., op. cit., Chap. II; George, H. B., The Relations of
Geography and History, pp. 11 ff., Chap. Ill, Oxford, 1901.
^*^ George, H., op. cit., pp. 66, 70. Here and in Chapter VI the
author considerably disproves his own statements given in
Chapters I and II. See a detailed analysis and the conclusion that
geographic conditions do not percej^tibly determine the size of a
body politic in Vallaix, Le sol et I'etaf, Chap. IV. Vallaux tries to
save something of this correlation by offering the following
modification: "The body politic docs not depend upon climate or
the relief of habitat, or the Iôssibility of expansion in s])ace, or
the ])osition. However, from the standpoint of the place where it
originates, it depends on the degree of the character of
(geographic) differentiation grouped within this place. There is a
p,ermanent tendency to form an autonomous state in the most
differentiated geographic areas; and activities of a state, formed in
such a region, urge it to exi)and towards the areas which are less
differentiated." Ibid., pp. 202 ff. This somewhat obscure
I)ro])osition is further complicated by an indefinite subdivision of
active and ]-assive geograi^hic differentiation and by a series of
subtle discriminations which are indefmitc and unconvincing. The
facts which are used to support the proposition arc so
contradictory and illogical that it cannot be accepted as proved.
Sec ibid., Chap. VI.
178
nent, or universal. It may be an indefinite shadow with a very
vague connection but surely not a tangible correlation.
Correlation Number 2: Ratzel's famous correlation between
geographical space and several social characteristics of large and
small political bodies is of a similar nature. The essence of this
theory is as follows : ^'''^ The population of the states with large

territories, because of the vastness of the abode, possesses a
spirit of expansion and militarism, an optimism and youthfulness,
and a psychology of growth. Within such social bodies there are
much less racial and social conflicts than in those with a small
territory. In the political units with small spaces (abodes) the
populations are more pessimistic, arrive earlier at a mature spirit
of nationalism, have a psychology marked by the spirit of locality,
are stagnant, and lack virility. Such is a part of Ratzel's theory of
space or Raum.^^^ Everybody who knows a little history may
easily see the fallacious character of the theory. It is hard to find
more optimism in the populations of Russia or China compared
with those of Switzerland or of the Netherlands. It is still harder to
believe that within such vast political bodies as China, the
previous Austria-Hungary, or Turkey, there has been less racial,
national, and social conflicts and struggles than in Denmark, or
Switzerland, or Norway. The small Balkan states have aspirations
for expansion and militarism at least as intense as those of large
bodies politic. In brief, the facts completely contradict this famous
theory.^''^
157 See Ratzel, Politische Geographie, Chaps. XII to XV.
15^ In a modified form the same theory is set forth by Simmel,
without mentioning the name of Ratzel. See Simmel, Soziologie,
Chap. IX, pp. 614-708.
159 See the detailed and careful criticism in Vallaux, Le sol et
I'Stat, Chap. V. There are plenty of other theories which try to
establish correlations between the character of geographic
environment and optimistic or pessimistic moods of societies. For
instance, Sir Archibald Geikie in his Scottish Reminiscences
claims that the grim character of the Scot is due to "the gloomy
valleys," cloudiness, and the inclement winter of Scotland. Draper
contends that differences in climate are responsible for
differences in moods of the populations of the northern and

southern states of the United States. Letourneau attempts to
explain the mysterious and melancholy character of the literature
of the peoples of northern Europe through their gloomy
geographic environment, long winters, long nights, vast forests
and so on. Such correlations are very numerous. There is no
need to say that they cannot be taken seriously. The very fact of a
predominant mood ascribed by the authors to a given population
is very questionable. They have not even tried to show why, for
instance, they think that the character of the Scots is more grim
than that of the Russians or the Chinese, or of any other people.
The real situation in this respect is probably much more complex:
the national character, being
179
Correlation Number j; Matteuzzi, probably better than any other
geographer, has tried to show how geographical conditions were
responsible for the political organization of ancient Eg>'pt,
Assyria, Persia, Greece, Rome and so on. Here is a sample of his
''explanations."
In Egypt, a centralized political despotism was due to the plains of
the Nile and the Nile's irregular overflows. Every district needed
water and tried to abduce it upon its territory. In this way many
conflicts between the districts arose and the weaker ones
sufl'ered.
In order to protect the rights of the weaker districts and to
coordinate the system of distribution of the water of the Nile
among the districts, Ancient Egypt had to create a political power
which would be able to control the matter- In this way the Nile
determined not only the physical but the political structure of
Egypt also.
Through the same factor he explains the appearance of castes in

Egypt. In a similar way, irregular overflowings of the Tigris and the
Euphrates were responsible for the centralization of power in the
hands of one despot in Assyria and Chaldea.
In Persia there are no rivers through which to explain the
unlimited Persian monarchy combined with the system of satraps.
Therefore Matteuzzi makes the Persian mountains responsible for
the Persian political system. In Phoenicia, the republican system
was due to the character of the seashore and mountains wiiich
facilitated an isolation of the parts. In Greece, the political
organization was due to the sea, the soil, and the mountains. As,
however, this combination is a mere repetition of the previous
geographic factors, so the author admits the influence of cultural
imitation in Greece. There is no need to continue the list of
Matteuzzi's explanations.^^'^ It is scarcely necessary to critigrim or melancholy in one respect, is likely to be very joyful in
other respects. If even the statements of a predominant character
of a people were true it would be necessary to prove that it is due
to the geographic environment and not to other factors. Such
attempts have never been made seriously. For these reasons all
such theories are journalistic speculations and nothing more.
160 Matteuzzi, Les Jacteurs de revolution des peuples, pp. 45 ff.,
and passim. Theories similar to Matteuzzi's are so common that
they may be found in the majority of the textbooks of sociology.
There they are given as something beyond doubt. The example of
the Nile as responsible for the creation of the Egyptian political
organization has become traditional "proof."
180
cize these theories. Matteuzzi's characteristics of the pohtical

regimes in many countries are inaccurate. For instance, his
'description of the Persian pohtical organization is erroneous;
several historians, and especially Pizzi, have drawn quite a
different picture of the political institutions of Persia compared
with that of Matteuzzi.^^^ This is also true of several other
countries. This fact alone makes Matteuzzi's conclusions
questionable. Further, the invalidity of the theory appears from the
fact that similar resultsdespotic political regimes in Eg}'pt,
Chaldea, and Persia,are ascribed to quite dififerent geographic
factors. In Egypt and Chaldea the political regimes were attributed
to fertile plains and overflowing rivers; and in Persia, to mountains
and deserts. The same applies to the republican regimes in
Phoenicia, Greece, and Rome. If the laws of inductive logic have
any value it is certain that Matteuzzi is not inductive. Furthermore,
a brief survey of history and geography shows that similar political
regimes, e.g., unlimited monarchies or republics, have existed
under various geographical conditions and vice versa. In the
same geographic environment we find the Samoans and the
Maoris with an aristocratic and feudal system and the Papuans
with scarcely any chiefs and with a system of communal partnership.^^^ The lack of the correlation becomes especially
conspicuous when we consider the evolution of a political regime
within the same geographical area. During the history of Athens,
Rome, or of any European country the political system has
changed several times while the geographic environment has
remained practically unchanged. These changes give ample proof
that the correlation between the two series of phenomena does
not exist in any important degree. Thus Matteuzzi's hypothesis
and hundreds of similar theories are doubtful.-^^'"^
Correlations Number 4 and 5.' Among other fashionable
geographic theories two hypotheses must be mentioned: one the
so-called Equatorial Drift, and the other the so-called Northward
Trend of Civilization. The essence of the theory of equatorial
*" See Pizzi, "Le instituzione politiche degl' Irani," Rivista Italiana
di Sociolo-gia, 1902, March-June.
^^2 See the facts in Thurnwald, R., op. cit.
1" See a detailed criticism of Matteuzzi's theory in Kovalevsky, M.,
Sov-retnennya Soziologi, Chap. IX.
181
drift is that peoples living at ease in the warm lowlands have been
overrun by hardier races bred in the more rigorous climates of
farther north or of higher altitudes.^^* Even the fact of the
existence of such a drift as far as it is a permanent and perpetual
tendency is doubtful. The only corroboration of this hypothesis is
a series of facts like the conquest of India by the Aryans, that of
China by the Mongols and Manchus, and of Greece and Rome by
the barbarians, or the southward movement of the Toltecs and the
Aztecs in Mexico, and the northward pressure of the Kaffirs and
the Patagonians. On the basis of such one-sided and fragmentary
data it is hardly possible to claim the existence of such a drift.
These facts may be confronted by more numerous instances of
peoples," who, though located in southern areas, have conquered
peoples of the north. The consolidation of the Sum-merian and
the Accadian Empires was started from the South (Ur, Lagash,
Uruk), and extended far north, up to the Mediterranean. The first
consolidation of Egypt was made from the south (with a center at
Hieraconpolis) and extended by conquests to the north. During
the second dynasty north or lower Egypt secured the upper hand,
but during the third dynasty southern Egypt was again victorious.
Later on, such victories of southern and northern Egypt with a
corresponding shifting of the metropolis (Memphis, Hieraconpolis,
Thebais) were repeated many times, not to mention conquests of
many northern peoples by the Egyptians. The conquest of Greece
and Rome by the northern barbarians is frequently used as an
argument. The records of history tell us of hundreds of conquests
and long dominations over these northern peoples by the Greeks

and the Romans. Is it not true also that the conquests of Athens
and Rome expanded not only toward the south but toward the
north ? Did not the Arabs conquer many peoples situated far
north of Mecca and Medina? Did not the struggles of southern
and northern China lead sometimes to the domination of the
south over the north? Did not the conquests of Genghis Khan, or
Tamerlane or the Turks extend over an enormous area to the
1*^^ Ward, R., Climate, p. 234-235; before Ward the theory was
set forth by many geographers, beginning (in modem times) with
Montesquieu; see Montesquieu, Spirit of Laws, Vol. I, pp. 238 ff.,
284 ff., Lond., 1894. vSce also Vallaux, Le sol et /' etat, pp. 41 ff.
182
north? Is not the same true even in regard to the great migration
of the peoples at the beginning of the Middle Ages when a wave
of the Asiatic peoples moved from the south to the north
subjugating and destroying all that lay in their way? In the history
of Europe, Spaniards have not been always beaten by the
northern Europeans. Military or cultural success has not always
belonged to the peoples situated on the north. I have recalled a
few of these elementary facts, which may be multiplied ad libitum,
only because they are forgotten by the partizans of the Equatorial
Drift theory. These show its fallacy.^^^
The theory of the northward course of civilization consists in a
claim that "the leadership in world civilization is inseparably linked
with climate and that with advance in culture it has beentransferred toward colder lands, and when extant culture has
declined, leadership usually has retreated southward," and ''that
the part of civilization's banner has led steadily northward while
culture was advancing and zncc versa/' ^^^' Corroboration of the
theory consists in a historical indication that ''civilization began in

Egypt and Summeria, hot countries, then the leadership
1^ A part of this same theory is the idea, widely accepted, that the
tropical and sub-tropical climates are responsible for the
production of an impotent, idle and non-virile type of people who
are as a result, destined to be dominated by the virile populations
bred in northern climates. To discuss the value of this theory we
must agree as to what is meant by the terms tropical and subtropical. When climatologists speak of these regions they refer to
the area 40 or 45 north latitude to 40 or 45 south latitude. This
includes most of the civilizations of ancient times, as well as
Japan and the southern portions of the United States. One who
knows a little history can hardly agree that these populations are
necessarily impotent. If they are non-virile at the present time and
have been conquered by northern peoples, this has not always
been so and may not continue in the future. Due to its great
numerical preponderance, the population of the more temperate
zones naturally could have conquered small social groups
situated in the tropics. Finally we see a very definite reawakening
and great increase in activity among various social groups in Asia,
India, Africa, Arabia, who have always been supposed to be
destitute of force and capacity. This is an additional repudiation of
the theory. In spite of its poiûlarity it is likely to be fallacious. For
a verification of these statements take the historical atlases of
these countries, see where they are situated, study the character
of their climate and environment, (for instance, in Ward, R.,
Climate, Chaps. I to VII) study their history and then what I have
said just now will be clear. About the reawakening of these
societies see Prince, A. E., "Europe and the Renaissance of
Islam," The Yale Review^ April, 1926; also history of Japan in the
19th century.
166 GiLFiLLAN, S. C, "The Coldward Course of Progress,"
Political Science Quarterly, Vol. XXXV, 1920, pp. 393, 399; see
also the book by Stefansson. Earlier, the theory, in a slightly

different form, was set forth by P. Mougeolle, \^ his Statique des
civilisations, 1883.
183
was assumed by Babylonia, Crete, Phoenicia, Assyria, etc.,
tending always toward the north. . . Four southward movements
may be noted, all of which coincide with declines of civilization.
Thus, on the break-up of the Roman Empire, civilization centered
in Carthage and Alexandria, as well as Constantinople, and
presently in Damascus and Bagdad; then gradually it moved
northward through the Middle Ages, passing the Roman high level
about 1350 and attaining regions colder than ever before. On the
diagram ... it is shown how the centers of civilization moved
further from the cities mentioned to Venice, Milan, Antwerp,
London, Paris, Berlin, New York, Chicago, Winnipeg, and Petrograd." Recently ''Scandinavia has shown great cultural activity,
as if preparing to lead the wôrld. Russia is rousing herself from a
sleep of ages. In 2000 the most virile architecture will perhaps be
found (not in Berlin but) in Detroit and Copenhagen, in 2100 in
Montreal, Christiania and Memel." The author further claims that
''also within each nation civilization has moved coldward in
progressing. The Greek civilization began in Crete and ended in
Constantinople. The leadership of Italy passed from Sicily through
Rome to Milan, and that of Spain from Cadiz to Madrid and
Barcelona." There are some exceptions but, according to the
author, they only prove the rule. Such is the essence and proof of
this clearly cut theory. The cause of all this is climate.
No doubt the theory is interesting and appealing, especially to the
peoples who live in the north and have not achieved world
leadership yet. However, one may doubt whether the time will
come when the Lapps and the Eskimos will lead the world.
Speaking seriously, the theory represents speculation backed by
a one-sided and a defective selection of historical facts. The only

true one in the theory is the statement that with the progress of
civilization and with the growth of population, the area inhabited
by men expands to the south and north, and many unfavorable
places, inaccessible for less cultural peoples, become inhabited.
Beyond this all three contentions of the theory are questionable.
There are no definite and clear criteria of the rank of a civilization
and of its progress and regress. Naturally such iâgueness makes
it possible for an author to arrange the regions
184
and the periods in any desirable form and hierarchy. Further^ the
use of the size of the leading cities as an adequate criterion of
civilization may be questioned. On this basis we cannot say
anything definite of the civilizations of Summeria, Accadia, ancient
Eg}'pt, or even Greece and Rome, because the data are either
lacking or are uncertain. Aside from these considerations, which
are enough to invalidate the theory, it is easy to prove the
defective character of its three claims.
In order to prove the contention that in a period of decline the
leadership of civilization shifts to the south, the author points to
the shifting of authority in Eg^pt from the Lower to the Middle or
from north to south. Meanwhile the historians of ancient Egypt say
that the period of Middle Eg^-pt with Thebae as the capital, and
especially during the eighteenth and nineteenth dynasties was the
climax of the Egyptian civilization rather than the period of its
decline. On the other hand, in the period of the decline of ancient
Egypt, its center shifted not to the south but to the north (Sa'is
and Alexandria). Still more fantastic is the author's distribution of
Summeria, Accadia, Babylonia, Chaldea and Bagdad from the
standpoint of their temperature, their comparative cultural level,
and the progress and regress of civilization. (See his diagram on
page 395.) His claim that *'on the break-up of the Roman Empire
civilization," the leadership shifted again to the south, to
Carthage, Alexandria, and Constantinople is almost as bad. In the
first place Constantinople has the same latitude as Rome and its
average temperature is colder by 4 F. In the second place, if
Carthage and several other African and Asiatic cities showed
some progression in the period of the decline of the Roman
Empire, a similar gain was shown by northern cities such as
Milan, Lyon, Trier, Ravenna, Tarraco and so on. They also
increased greatly and gained in size, population, wealth, splendor,
and cultural significance. In the history of Greece we find that the
period of the decline of Greek culture was followed by a shifting of
the political center of Greece not toward the south but rather
toward the north. It went from Sparta and Athens to Bceotia and
Macedonia. In these, as well as in many similar cases, we see
only a shifting of the center of culture or of political influence to
some other place
185
when an existing center begins to decline. Further, such cases as
the appearance of quite new cultures, the Arabic culture for
example, cannot be regarded as a progress or a regress in
comparison with the Roman culture 'because they are quite
heterogeneous.
The second doubtful contention of the author is that leadership in
civilization steadily shifts to the north in the course of history. This
theory is based principally upon the data of the nineteenth and the
twentieth centuries. Is it not true that even during this recent
period a series of new great powerslike Japan, Australia, Latin
America, and South Africa,have appeared? Is it not also true
that in America, during the last few decades, California has grown
more rapidly than the majority of the northern states? Finally do
we not see a re-awakening of the majority of the Asiatic and the
old African societies (China, India, Arabia, even Turkey), after

centuries of sleeping? These and many similar facts only indicate
that the centers of civilization are shifting in the course of time,
and that the areas of civilization are expanding with the
achievements of man. And that is all. If man began to pass over
both poles, he also began to fly, to conquer, and to settle tropical
forests, deserts, and other places uninhabited or slightly inhabited
before. Besides, it is rather useless to talk about the leadership in
civilization generally because of the vagueness of the concept. If
we take leadership in material technique it undoubtedly has
belonged, during the last two centuries, to the peoples of central
or northern Europe; but before that it belonged to the Arabian, the
Asiatic, the African, or possibly even to some American peoples.
In the field of religion, Europe never has been a leader; even
Christianity and Mohammedanism, not to mention Confucianism,
Buddhism, Hinduism, Tao-ism or Judaism, originated outside of
Europe. In the field of philosophy and ethics, or even arts Europe
scarcely has surpassed Asia and Egypt. I will not continue this
line of thought. This is rather sufficient to show the inadequate
character of the theory. All the facts given in corroboration may be
easily confronted with facts of an opposite kind.
The above analysis of the representative correlations between
geographical conditions and various phases of ])olitical and social
organization shows that there may be some connection between
186
them; but the relation is so indefinite that its existence may be
questioned seriously. An attentive scrutiny of these sweeping
geographical hypotheses shows more fallacies than scientifically
proved statements.
19. CLIMATE AND GENIUS AND THE EVOLUTION OF

CIVILIZATIONS
Among several theories dealing with this problem probably the
best is that of Dr. E. Huntington. P'or that reason I shall discuss
mainly his hypothesis. Objections to this theory apply more fully to
other, less elaborated generalizations.
Huntington's theory of the relationship between climate and
genius and the progress or the decay of civilizations is a logical
inference from his three minor hypotheses, namely: that climate is
a decisive factor in health; that it determines physical and mental
efficiency; and that climate continually changes in time. From
these premises he concludes that climate determines the growth
and decay of civilizations, its distribution on the earth, and the
historical destinies of nations. Since a civilization is the result of
the energy, efficiency, intelligence, and genius of the population,
and since these qualities are determined by climate, ergo: climate
is the factor in the progress or regress of civilizations.
If these three premises are valid, the conclusion is true and vice
versa. In the first part of this chapter I have attempted to show
that the first and second premises are far from being valid. The
author gives the third premise outstanding importance by saying
that "a large part of the reasoning of this book stands or falls with
the hypothesis of climatic pulsations in historic times." -^^^
Nevertheless this hypothesis is even more questionable than the
first two. A perusal of meteorological records shows that climate
has not changed to a very great extent in historical times.^^^ A
series of prominent specialists in climate say that ''popular (and
Huntington's) belief in climatic changes are untrustworthy."
Huntington's theory of the pulsation of climate is based on the
study of the ''big tree" rings in California. This method and the
deductions made from it about the pulsation of climate have been
^^^ Civilization and Climate, p. 7. 168 See Ward, R., op. cit.,
Chap. XL
187
challenged seriously by the specialists.^"^ In the third place, if we
grant that pulsation of climate in California is accurately reflected
in the ''big tree" rings, it does not follow that in other places of the
earth climate has been pulsating in the same way as in California.
Fourthly, Huntington's method of computing the character of
climatic changes and their exact periods in Ancient Greece or
Rome or in any other historical country, is pure speculation,
based on nothing. Besides, his own hypothesis is very elastic and
he modifies it according to the circumstances.^"^ This is sufficient
to show the great extent to which the third premise is
questionable and uncertain. Thus all three foundations upon
which Huntington has built the ponderous structure of his
sweeping generalizations are not sound. This fact is sufficient to
vitiate his conclusions and to make them extremely doubtful.
However, let us glance at the additional proofs and at some of the
details of his philosophy. The proofs are given in the form of maps
which show the distribution of climate on the earth and in Europe;
the distribution of health rates in Europe; the distribution of
civilization on the earth and in Europe; and the distribution of
eminent men in Europe. All these maps, according to Huntington,
show ''a remarkable similarity." Health is high in the countries
where the climate approaches the ideal suggested by Huntington;
civilization is high in the same countries and low in those with
poor climate and poor health; and the number of eminent men
parallels the distribution of climate and health. Further, in the past,
Rome and various other countries grew and made progress
during periods when their climate was near to the Huntington
''ideal," and declined when their climate changed unfavorably.
Shifting of the centers of civilization in the process of history has
paralleled the moving of favorable climatic zones. Thus everything
shows a remarkable confirmation of Huntington's hypothesis.

"Apparently climate influences health and energy, and these in
turn influence civilization." ^^^ The author thinks that the
hypothesis explains even a great many other characteristics of
169 Ibid., p. 350 ff.
1^ Compare e.g.. Civilization and Climate, Chap. XIV; World
Power and Evolution, Chap. VIII; The Character of Races, Fig. 15.
1^1 vSee Civilization and Climate, Chaps. X to XVIII; World
Power and Evolution^ Chaps. VIII to XIII; The Character of Races,
Ch. XV.
188
various peoples and their historical destinies. On this basis, Dr.
Huntington interprets the history of Greece, Rome, Turkey,
Germany and of many other countries.
Although these maps and generalizations are very interesting, I
fear that they are very questionable. We have already discussed
the validity of their basic premises. Since the correlations between
the *'ideal" climate and health and efficiency are not corroborated,
maps constructed on these bases are even more questionable.
The most questionable hypotheses of all are those drawn from
questionable maps based on still more questionable hypotheses.
Besides, what scientific value has a map (see Figs. 22, 43, 44, in
Civilization and Climate) where the zones of favorable or
unfavorable climate are such that half of Europe and threequarters of Asia are shown as having an identical climate (the
area extending from 25 to 70 of latitude and from 30 to 180 of
longitude) ? In fact, in this vast area, there are the most varied
types of climate; and many parts of it more closely approximate
the climate of unfavored zones than that of the favored regions.

This applies to each of the five climatic zones into which
Huntington divided the surface of the earth. It is possible to show
a ''remarkable similarity and coincidence" between anything and
any contention by using this method.
The other maps of the distribution of health, climate, and genius
are no better. I already have shown the inadequacy of death rates
as a criterion of the health of various countries. I also have shown
that even the correlation between "seasonal" fluctuations of death
rates and of climate has not been proved as yet. However, Dr.
Huntington is not embarrassed by all these complications. He
takes the death rates of various countries and puts them on the
map in such a way that vast areas with very different rates appear
identical, and vice versa. On the basis of this questionable
procedure he points out the "remarkable coincidence with other
maps." (See Maps nos. 10, 11, 12 and 13 in The Character of
Races.) It is still more remarkable that the author admits some
small "exceptions" to the rule such as the similarity of the climates
of Japan and Korea (which contradict in regard to health and to
rank of civilizations) ; or the relatively small number of eminent
men in Belgium which contradicts its favorable climate
189
and its place on the map of civilization. Another contradiction
appears in comparing the map of civilization, where the indices of
the civilizations of England and Scotland are lOO and 98, with the
map of the number of geniuses, where a decidedly reverse
relation is found. If it were possible to put all Russia (one-sixth of
the earth) in one climatic zone, and in one mortality or civilization
zone, then why pay any attention to the small ''exceptions"? Why
not make the maps identical so that the relationship appears
absolute? If large differences may be obliterated, why not all of
them?
However, there is more. Even if we grant that the maps are

accurate we may ask what are the proofs that differences in
health, civilization, and in production of genius are due to
variations in climate, as Dr. Huntington claims.^^^ There is no
proof except the map of climate inadequately constructed on a
questionable basis. If it were accurate the correlation would not
prove that the relationship were causal. Many other factors might
explain the relationship or coincidence.
Let us go further. Let us grant that all of the shortcomings of the
theory which we have already pointed out do not exist. Instead let
us ask what would have been the map of the distribution of
civilization, health, and genius in different countries, if Dr.
Huntington had taken the period of 100 or 200 B.C. instead of that
following A.D. 1600. We can say with certainty that the highest
index of civilization and the number of men of genius for that
period would have been the countries around the Mediterranean,
and in Asia. At present these countries have a very low index.
The countries around the Baltic Sea, England, and northern
Europe which now have the highest indices would then have had
the lowest index. The reason is simple. At that moment the
populations of central and northern Europe were barbarian while
those of Rome, Greece, northern Africa, China, India, and of
many other Asiatic regions were the brilliant civilizations. Even if
the maps were constructed for the period of 1840 the indices of
such countries as Japan would be cjuite different. The same
^^2 His claim is so stronj^ that he is certain that "the regions
around the North Sea would probably always excel eastern and
southern Iîropc" in production of men of genius because of their
different climates. The Character of Races, p. 233.
190
can be said of numerous other phenomena which Huntington tries

to explain through his chmatic hypothesis. Why, for instance, do
various countries, which remain in the same geographic
environment, make rapid progress and outdistance peoples that
were once superior to them and then afterwards decline
themselves? Sometimes such transformations happen in
relatively short periods such as one or two centuries.
Dr. Huntington meets these contradictions by his hypothesis of
the shifting of climatic zones and of the pulsation of climate. This
theory, as we have pointed out, is not recognized as proved by
the climatologists. I have tried to find climatic changes during the
last fourteen hundred years in the area of England and northern
and southern Europe, which would explain the waning role of the
southern peoples and the increasing role of those of the north. I
did not find any satisfactory answer. Furthermore, in Japan during
the period from 1845 to 1890 there was no noticeable change in
climate; and yet during this period the country changed from a
poorly known and backward barbarian society into a world
empire. The Japanese indices of health, civilization, and genius
have changed considerably since 1845. ^^^^ reader who tries to
find an answer to this question in the works of Huntington
(including the joint work with Fisher, on Climatic Changes, New
Haven, 1922) seeks in vain. Grant that climatic zones shift in
historical periods. It is further necessary to show that their shifting
and the changes in the leadership in civilization have been
parallel; that any country in which the climate moves away from
Huntington's ideal decays; that any country in which climate
moves closer to the ideal progresses; and that all these
processes occur exactly in the same periods. Only when these
parallelisms are shown may the hypothesis approach validity.
Such a proof is not found in Huntington's works. Here is a sample
of his climatic interpretation of Rome's decay.
From 450 to 250 B.C. the climate (of Rome) was probably
decidedly more stimulating than in any part of Italy today. . . That
period ended in a great decline in rainfall and storminess. Then by
220 or 210 it had apparently fallen to about the present level. For
a hundred years nearly the same conditions prevailed, and for a
191
century and a half the dimate returned to a condition as favorable
as in 240 B.C.^^^
A reader of these lines may think Dr. Huntington has at his
disposal there the detailed record of the Aleteorological Bureau of
Ancient Rome, or at least some certain historical records which
permit a definite characterization of the climatic changes.
Unfortunately, the reader is wrong. Dr. Huntington does not have
such meteorological records because they do not exist; nor has
he a single line of proof from the historical testimony of the
contemporaries ; nor even a quotation from some reliable
historian of Rome. The quotations he gives from Dr. \\\
Simkhovich concern only the character of the soil; and, besides,
Simkhovich's theory of the exhaustion of the soil is objected to by
more competent historians of Rome.^'^ All that Dr. Huntington has
are the data concerning the growth of "the big tree rings" in
California, on which he constructs a diagram of climatic pulsation
in historic times. This task and the climatic deductions based on it
are challenged by the climatologists. On the basis of this very
hypothetical diagram which cannot give even the approximate
rainfall, or fluctuations of temperature and storminess for
California, alone. Dr. Huntington, after considerably modifying the
diagram, (see it on page 188, IT arid Power,) drew detailed
conclusions concerning Roman climate with an apparent
accuracy for periods as short as ten years. The accuracy of his
weather predictions may be envied by many meteorologists trying
to predict changes in contemporary weather. It is obvious that Dr.
Huntington's theory of the pulsation of climate in Rome, in its

essence, is nothing but a mere speculation adapted to the course
of Roman history. The periods of the growth of Rome are
characterized as the periods of good climate and z'ice irrsa. He
does not deduce the character of historical processes from the
established climatic data; but, on the contrary, deduces climatic
data from the character of the historical processes. He concludes
''there is a remarkable i)arallelism" between climatic and historical
])ulsa-tions. Further, if changes of climate took place in Rome, it
173 w^Qfid Power and Evolution, pp. 190 and 192.
'^^ Sec RosTovvTZEFF, M., Tlw Social and Economic History oj
the Roman Empire, ]). 495 .'ind (Miap. X'lII, Oxford, \i)2().
192
would be necessary to show that these changes were so great as
to call forth the decay of Rome, and that they were much greater
than the differences between the climates of England, Japan and
Scandinavia. liuntington recognizes the climate of these places as
invigorating and facilitating to the progress of civilization. Nothing
of such a test has been done by Huntington. And it could not be
done.
If these tests are not sufficient others might be used. For instance,
it would be much more accurate to test the correlation of climate
and genius by taking the exact place of birth of men of genius
given in studies by Ellis, Odin, or of E. L. Clarke, J. McKeen
Cattell, J. Philiptschenko, F. Maas, C. Castle, Charles H. Cooley,
S. Nearing, S. Fisher, myself and others. In all of these studies
the necessary data concerning birthplaces and the time of birth of
these men are given. By obtaining the necessary climatic data,
correlations could be made which would easily test the climatic

hypothesis.
I shall give but one more argument. We know well that different
social classes living in the same climate produce different
proportions of men of genius.^*'' We know also that the number of
outstanding men in the same country from decade to decade or
from century to century, or from region to region fluctuates; for
instance there is the conspicuous increase of the proportion of the
leading American scientists and captains of industry coming from
the Middle and the Far West during the last two or three decades;
these and hundreds of similar facts can hardly be reconciled with
Huntington's theory.
We shall go no further. There may be some correlation between
genius and civilization and climate but most of it remains to be
discovered. Dr. Huntington's work in spite of the talent and energy
he displays, cannot be recognized as conclusive.
The same conclusions apply to many other theories of this kind.
We shall leave them without analysis.^"^ May I add in conclu^^^ See a number of these studies in my book, Social Mobility,
Chap. XII. "^ I have not given any analysis of such books as
Kelsey, C, The Physical Basis of Society, Teggart, F. J., The
Processes of History, New Haven, 1918, or Mackinder, H. J.,
Democratic Ideals and Reality, Lond., 1919, or Shaler, N. S., Man
and the Earth, and several other books simply because they,
being too general, do not add anything new either to the
geographical theory or to its criticism. Recently published, G^.
Taylor's Environment and Race is even more speculative than
Huntington's works.
193
sion, that in spite of the fact that I have been very severe with Dr.
Huntington in the preceding pages, I have the greatest respect for
him and for his valuable attempts to build sociological theory on a
sound objective basis. We must credit the school with many
interesting and suggestive theories; and with several correlations,
which are, at least, partly true. Any analysis of social phenomena,
which does not take into consideration geographical factors, is
incomplete. We are grateful to the school for these valuable
contributions. This, however, does not oblige us to accept its
fallacious theories, its fictitious correlations, or finally, its
overestima-tion of the role of geographical environment. We must
separate the wheat from the chaff. After this ''sifting" is made the
remainder enters the storehouse of sociological principles.
194
CHAPTER IV
BIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF SOCIAL PHENOMENA
Bto-Organismic School
i. principal types of biological theories in sociology
The human being is an organism and, as such, is subject to what
are known as biological laws. This is the reason why many
theories of both the past and the present have tried to interpret
social phenomena as a variety of life phenomena. The
extraordinary progress of biology during the last seventy years
has given an additional impetus to biological interpretations in
sociology. Hence, the contemporary biological theories in social
science. These are numerous and vary in their concrete forms,
but nevertheless, it is possible to group them in a relatively few
fundamental classes. The principal concepts of the postDarwinian biology are: organism, heredity, selection, variation,
adaptation, struggle for existence, and the inherited drives
(reflexes, instincts, unconditioned responses) of an organism.

Correspondingly we have: i. The Bio-Organismic Interpretation of
Social Phenomena; 2. The Anthropo-Racial School, which
interprets social phenomena in the terms of heredity, selection,
and variation through selection; 3. The Darwinian School of the
Struggle for Existence, which emphasizes the role of this factor;
and 4. The Instinctivist School, which views human behavior and
social processes as a manifestation of various inherited or
instinctive drives. Besides these, there are many ''mixed" theories,
which in their analysis of social facts, combine biological factors
with the non-biological ones. These may be classed among the
biological, as well as among the other sections of sociology. For
the sake of convenience in this section, we shall discuss only the
first three schools. The "instinctivist" sociological theories will be
analyzed in the section of psychological sociology. The reason
195
for this is that they have been discussed principally by
psychologists and are closely interwoven with other psychological
interpretations. As to the ''mixed" theories, they will be scattered
throughout various sections of the book. Only one of these mixed
theoriesthat of the Demographic School is to be put within the
biological section. It will be understood, however, that such an
arrangement is purely conventional and a mere matter of
convenience for the sake of orientation in the field of numerous
sociological theories. What is important is the proper analysis of
the theories rather than their placing within this or that
conventional section. Let us now turn to the principal biological
schools in contemporary sociology.
2. BIO-ORGANISMIC SCHOOL AND ITS RELATION TO OTHER
ORGANIC
THEORIES
The first principal school of biological sociology is represented by

the bio-organismic theories. The term '*bio-organismic" needs
some explanation. Among the fundamental conceptions of society
it is possible to discriminate four principal types: first, the
mcclianistic conception of society, as a kind of a machine system;
second, the nominalistic or atomistic conception which sees in
society nothing but individuals, and does not recognize in it any
superindividual reality; third, an organic conception, which views
society as a living unity, recognizing its superindividual reality, its
"natural" origin and spontaneous existence; fourth, a functional
conception which does not care at all whether society is a
mechanism or organism, natural or artificial, but which tries to
view it as a system of interrelated individuals (synthesis of the
sociological realism and nominalism). This system does not
provide any reality beyond that of its members, but at the same
time, it is difiêrent from that reality of the same individuals in their
mutual isolation. The functional conception tries to ascertain the
forms, the character, the uniformities (functional analysis) in
fluctuation, variation, evolution of the relationships of the
individuals who compose a social system, of the relationships of
the groups of a system, and the relationships of one social system
to other social systems.
Among these four conceptions, the organic has been the most
196
popular. Its characteristics belong to practically all varieties of the
organic theory of a society. These varieties may be divided into
three principal subclasses : i. Philosophical Organicism, which
contends only that society is a living unity, that it has superindividual reality, that it lives according to ''natural" laws, and that it
originated spontaneously. Philosophical organicism is often not
concerned at all by any comparison of society with a biological
organism, or with a "psychological entity" like "collective soul,"

"public opinion," "social mind" or anything of the sort. It has
significance mostly as a conception opposite to the atomistic or
nominalistic and mechanistic conceptions of society. Contrary to
the former, it recognizes the super- or transindividual reality of
society; and in opposition to the latter, it refuses to view society as
an inanimate mechanism controlled only by exterior forces, and
especially as an artificial mechanism created by man in the way of
social contract or intentional volition. 2. The second form of the
organic conception of a society is represented by Psycho-Social
Organicism. Psycho-social organic theories have the above
general characteristics of philosophical organicism. Sometimes
the boundary line between them is almost intangible and
philosophical organicism imperceptibly passes into a psychosocial organicism.^ But the less "refined" psycho-social theories of
organicism often go further. To the characteristics of philosophical
organicism they add the contentions that society is a
superindividual organism of ideas, representations, minds, and
volitions; that the social mind, or social volition, or social "self," or
"social opinion" exists as a reality sui generis beyond the reality of
minds, volitions, opinions and representations of its members;
and that in this same sense society is a kind of spiritual
personalitya real social or group mind. Correspondingly in these
theories there is often given a psychological personification of the
social group, together with many analogies between the individual
and the social mind. The theories represent a type of the psychosocial interpretation
Âs an example of such a "refined" organic theory which stands
somewhere between the philosophical and the psycho-social
organicism, the conception of Th. Litt, developed in his Individuum
und Gemeinschaft, Leipzig-Berlin, 1919, may serve. See passim
and pp. 6-7, 12, 17-18, 29-30, 102-105. Still more "refined" is C.
Gini's "New Organicism" brilliantly set forth in his "// neo-
organicismo,'' Catania, 1927. Practically it is almost identical with

the functional conception of society.
197
of sociological realism. They are represented by the Sociologistic
School. (See the chapter about this school.) 3. The third
fundamental variety of the organic interpretations of society is
given by Bio-Organisniic Theories of Society. Sharing all the
principles of the philosophical organicism, biological organicism
claims that society is nothing but a specific variety of biological
organism. In its nature, functioning, origin, development,
variation,in brief, in its whole life-process, it exhibits the
characteristics similar to those of any organism, is subject to the
same biological laws; and like an organism, it has not only
psychosocial, but physical reality. In their essence these theories
represent an extreme type of sociological realism. We must not
mix the bio-organismic theories with philosophical and psychosocial organic conceptions of society. They differ greatly from
each other. The above shows also that while bio-organismic
theories belong to the biological school in sociology, the other
branches of the organic conception do not. In this chapter I am
going to discuss only the bio-organismic theories. Psycho-social
organicism will be discussed in the chapter on the sociologistic
school. Philosophical organicism does not need a special
discussion in sociology: its place is in philosophical treatises.
3. PREDECESSORS
Various samples of the above three types of the organic
conception of society are as old as are the most ancient sources
of social thought known to us. The comparison of a society,
particularly of a state in its social classes, institutions, and social
processes, with an organism, especially with man or with his body
and soul, or with the parts of his body and bodily processes, may
be found in the ancient Hindu, Chinese, Greek, and Roman
philosophical and social thought. Here are samples. In the ancient

Sacred Books of India, four principal castes are depicted as
created from the mouth, the arms, the thighs, and the feet of the
Lord.- 11ie king's power is jMctured as composed of eternal
particles of Indra, of the Wind, of the Sun. and so on.'*^ Punish- See, for example, "Laws of Mann," Sacred Books of tlir F.ast,
Vol. XXV, I: 31, examj)le, Oxford, 1886. 'Ibid., VI: 4.
198
menl is compared with the son of the Lord and with a creature
''with a black hue and red eyes." ^ Social initiation is regarded as
the second birth,^ and so forth. In the works of Plato, organic
analogies are rather common. ''In the individuals there are the
same principles and habits which there are in the State: (i) spirit of
passion, typical of the Northern peoples, (2) love of knowledge
and wisdom, typical of the Greeks; and love of money, typical of
the Phoenicians.'* Similar analogies in the properties of a body
and society are numerous in Plato's works.^ The same is true of
Aristotle. In his "Politics" we find comparisons of the soul and the
body with the upper and the lower classes; of the reason's control
over affections, of the master's control over slaves; of the
harmony within man with that within a body politic, and so forth. In
the famous Agrippa's Fable, the analogies are pushed to their
limit. In works of Cicero, Seneca, Florus, T. Livy, and other
Roman and Greek historians, comparisons of the life-cycle of a
man with that of a society, which, like man, passes through
childhood, maturity, and old age; of the birth and death of both,
and so on, are again very numerous. They sometimes are
carefully developed into a systematic theory. (See the chapter
about cyclical conception of social change.) Side by side with this,
we find "the natural origin" of a society, its development according
to the laws of nature, especially according to the same laws which
govern a development of an organism; the superindividual reality

of a society, and its "organic" character; all indicated by various
ancient Hindu, Chinese, Greek and Roman writers."^
The history of mediaeval thought shows that, in spite of its
predominant nominalism, "under the influence of the allegories of
the Bible and the patterns set forth by Greek and Roman writers,
the comparison of mankind and social groups to an ani^lUd., VII: 25, 14.
^ Ibid., II: 148, 169-170.
Plato, The Republic, tr. by Jowett, N. Y., 1874, pp. 435-436,
462, 557 and others.
' See the survey and the "organic" citations from Aristotle, Cicero,
Livy, Seneca, St. Paul and others in von Krieken, A. Th., Ueber
die sogennante or-ganische Staatstheorie, Leipzig, 1873; pp. 1926, Towne, E. T., Die Auffassung der Gesellschaft als
Organismus, pp. 15-24, Halle, 1903; Barker, E., The Political
Thought of Plato and Aristotle, pp. 127, 138-139, 276-281, N. Y.,
1906.
199
mate body was generally adopted and stressed." ^ This reminds
one of the organic analogies used by writers in the dispute
between the secular and the ecclesiastical powers; of John
Salisbury's The Folicraticus; of the works of Nicolas of Cues, and
of other thinkers of the Middle Ages, including even such rather
nominalistic philosophers as Saint Thomas Aquinas. Further
theories of Machiavelli, Campanella, Guicciardini and others,
claimed that the State, like a man, passes through the cycles of
childhood, maturity, and old age, and that, like an organism, it
experiences the periods of vigor and sickness.^
Later on, in spite of the social physicism of the theories of the

seventeenth century, and the atomistic and individualistic
character of the theories of the eighteenth century, organic
analogies and various organic conceptions continued to be used
even by the social physicists and individualists. The difference
between these theories and a real organicism is principally that
the mechanists of the seventeenth century compared society and
state with ''artificial man." Pascal's famous comparison of society
with a man; Hobbes' Leviathan, with its detailed organismic
analogies; and similar comparisons used by Fortescue, Althusius,
G. Grotius, J. Bodin and others may be contrasted with the
physiocratic conception of the economic organization of a society
as a ''natural, living unity," but they are all samples of the organic
conceptions of that time.^^ The end of the eighteenth and the
beginning of the nineteenth centuries were marked by a
conspicuous reaction of social thought against the atomistic,
individualistic, and mechanistic conceptions of the preceding
period. This reaction assumed the form of a revival of various
organic interpretations. Contractual theories of society, theories of
its artificial nature, and sociological atomism theories all lost
credit. Their place was
^ VON Gierke, Otto, Political Theories oj the Middle Age, tr. by F.
Maitland, Cambridge, 1900, notes, pp. 103-104, 112, 122 ff.
See for this period, von Gierke, op. cit., passim; von Krieken,
op. cit.; TowNEY, op. cit.; GuMPLOWicz, L., Geschichtt' der
Staatstheorien, Part II, Innsbruck, 1926; Janet, P., Ilistoire dc la
science politique, Paris, 1887; Dunning, W., Political Theories,
Ancient and Mediccval, N. Y., 1902.
^'^ See about this period, Coker, F. W., Organismic Theories of
the State, pp. 14-16, N. Y., 1910; Dunning, W., Political Theories
frofn Luther to Montesquieu, N. Y., 1913; Janet, op. cit.; Denis,
"Die Physiokratische Schule und die erste Darstelhing der
Wirtschaftsgcscllschaft als Organismus," Zcitschrift fiir Wirtschaftsges<hirhfr, VI, 1S97.

200
occupied by the theories of De Bonald, J. de Maistre, E. Burke,
Adam Miiller, Herder, Lessing, Fichte, I. Kant, Shelhng, H. Leo,
Hegel, and of others, in which various characteristics of organic
conception were laid down.^^
Since that time, the three above types of organic conceptions,
philosophic, socio-psychological, and biological, have been again
and again laid down by a great many authors. K. C. Krause, H.
Ahrens, F. J. Schmitthenner, G. Waitz, F. A. Trendelenbourg,
Saint-Simon, Auguste Comte, J. v. Gorres, C. Th. Welcker, F. and
Th. Rohmer, K. Volgraff, F. J. Stahl, and to a certain extent
Lorenz v. Stein, A. Lasson, Otto Gierke, K. S. Zacharia, C. Frantz,
J. K. Bluntschli, and finally H. Spencer, have, in this or that way,
developed various organic interpretations of state, society, and
social phenomena.^^ The great progress of biology and the
theory of evolution in the second half of the nineteenth century
gave an especially strong impetus to the development of the bioorganismic theories in sociology. In this way we come to the
contemporary bio-organismic interpretations of social
phenomena. Let us turn to them.
4. CONTEMPORARY BIO-ORGANISMIC THEORIES IN
SOCIOLOGY
The most prominent representatives of this current of sociological
thought are: P. Lilienfeld, (a Russian of German stock, 18291903),^^ A. Schaffle (a German professor and statesman, 18311903),^^ R. Worms, (a French professor, permanent secre-
11 Concerning that period see Coker, op. cit., pp. 16-31;

Moulinee, H., De Bonald, Paris, 1915; de Maistre, J.,
"Considerations sur la France," "Soirees de Saint-Petersbourg," in
his Oeuvres complete, Lyon, 1891-2, Vols. I-V; Merriam, C. E.,
History of the Theory of Sovereignty since Rousseau, N. Y., 1900;
Michel, H., L'idee de Vetat, Paris, 1898; Burke, E., "Reflections on
the Revolution in France," in Works, Bohn's ed.. Vol. II; Salomon,
G., "Die Organische vStaats-und Gesellschaftslehre," in Worms,
R., Die Soziologie, pp. 111-124, Karlsruhe, 1926.
1-About this period see Coker, op. cit., pp. 31-139. See there the
works of these authors and other references. vSee also Haff, K.,
Institutionen der Per-sonlichkeitslehre und des
Korperschaftsrechts, 1918; Moulinee, op. cit., Kaufmann, Uber
den Begriff des Organismus in der Staatslehre des 19
Jahrhunderts, Heidelberg, 1908.
13 Principal works of P. Lilienfeld are: Gedanken ilher die
Socialwissenschaft der Zukunft, 5 vols., Mitau, 1873-81, Berlin,
1901; La pathologic sociale, Paris, 1896; Zur Verteidigung der
Organischen Methode in der Soziologie, Berlin, 1898; "La
methode graphique," and "L'evolution des formes politiques" in
Annales de I'institut. intern, de sociologie, 1896.
!* The most important work in this respect is Schaffle's Bau und
Leben des socialen Korpers, 1875-6, 3rd ed., 1896, 2 vols
201
tary of the International Institute of Sociology and editor of the
Revue international de sociologie, 1869-1926) ^^ and J. Novicow
(a Russian, 1849-1912)/^ To these names a series of others may
be added who, in a somewhat milder form, have professed the
same bio-organismic principles. Such a one is A. Fouillee (a
prominent French philosopher, psychologist, and sociologist,
1838-1912) who tried to reconcile the organismic and the
contractual theories in the form of an interpretation of a society as

"a contractual organism." ^^ More recently there appeared a
series of works which continued to maintain all the essential
principles of the bio-organismic interpretation. Such, for instance,
are the works of La Ferriere,^^ Kjellen/^ M. Roberts,^^ and of
several others.-^
In view of the considerable similarity of the basic principles of all
these authors, of the well-known character of their theories, and
of the questionable value of their conclusions to the science of
sociology, we may survey all these theories summarily, without a
special analysis of the interpretations of each. Proceeding in this
way, we may sum up their basic principles in the following
manner: First, the society or social group is a special kind of an
organism in a biological sense of the word. Second, being an
organism, society resembles, in its essential characteristics, the
constitution and the functions of a biological organism. Third, as
an organism, society is subjected to the same biological laws as
those by which a biological organism functions and lives. Fourth,
sociology is a science which is to be based primarily upon
15 For Worms' orKanicism, the most enlightening works of
Worms arc: Or-oanisme et societe, 1896; Philosophie des
sciences sociales, 3 vols., Paris, 1903-7, 2nd cd., 1913-20; La
sociologie, sa nature, son contenue, ses attaches, Paris, 1921.
i^ Of Novicow's works the important in this respect are:
Conscience et volonte sociale, Paris, 1897; Les luttes entre
societes humaines et leur phases successives, Paris, 1896; La
theorie organique des societes, defense de I'organicisme, Paris,
1899; La critique de Darwinism sociale, Paris, 1910.
1^ Of the numerous works of Fouillee, see his La science sociale
contemporainey 1880, 4th cd., Paris, 1904.
1* See La Ferri^re, La hi du progres en biologie et en sociologie,

1915, Paris; see also his "L'organisme sociale," Revue
international de sociologie, 1915, Nos. 5-6.
1^ See KjELLf':N, Der Staat als Lebensform, 1917.
2 See Roberts, M., Malignancy and Evolution, Lond., 1926.
21 Besides the sociologists, several biologists have set forth a
bio-organismic theory. See IIertwic, O., Die Lchre vom
Organismus und ihre Bezichung zur Socialwissenschajt, Berlin,
1H99; Allgniicim' Biologic, jcna, 1900.
202
biology. Such are the essential characteristics of the bio-organismic conception of society.
''What is a society?" asked Spencer, and answers: ''Society is an
organism." After this he indicates that the social and the biological
organisms are similar in the following important respects: both
have phenomena of growth; in the process of growth both exhibit
differentiation in structure and functions; in both there exists an
interdependence of their parts; both are composed of units (cells
and individuals) ; destruction of an organism or of a society does
not always mean the destruction of the units of which they are
composed; both have a special sustaining (alimentary) system, a
special distributive system (vascular and circulatory system in an
organism and arteries of commerce in a society) and a special
regulating system (nervous system in an organism and
governmental system in a society). Side by side with these
similarities there are, however, three important dissimilarities.
First, an organism is symmetrical while society is asymmetrical;
second, an organism is a concrete aggregate while society is a
discrete one; third, in an organism, consciousness is concentrated

in the nervous system, while in a society it is diffused throughout
the whole aggregate so that society does not have a special
social sensorium."^ Following this plan, H. Spencer analyzes in
detail society's characteristics, functions, systems, and
processes.
P. Lilienfeld's views are as follows: "Human society, like natural
organisms, is a real entity (ein reales Wesen). It is nothing but a
continuation of Nature, a higher manifestation of the same forces
which lie at the basis of all natural phenomena." Representing "a
system of mutual relationship and interaction of human beings," it
has the same characteristics as a biological organism in its
functions of multiplication, growth, differentiation, sickness, death,
regeneration, integration of parts, cohesion, purposivity,
spirituality, structural perfectibility and the storing or capitalization
of energy. In these characteristics the biological and the
'^Spencer, H., The Principles of .Sociology, Vol I, Pari II, N. Y.,
1910; The Inductions oj Sociology, passim, and pp. 447-462.
203
social organisms are similar, and both differ from an inorganic
body.-'
"The "biological organism is a united mass of a living substance
which is capable of preserving itself under certain exterior
conditions." The same is true in regard to an ants' hill and to
human society. Using M. Verworn's classification of organisms,
Lilienfeld indicates that there are five principal classes: the cell,
tissue (complex of cells), organ (complex of tissues), person
(complex of organs), and state or society (complex of persons).
Thus society is only the highesc form of an organism. Like an
organism it is a living unity, absorbing the ingredients of its
environment, and having the process of metabolism. Its
individuals are as dependent on the whole society as a cell in an

organism; and like it, society has its nervous system and its
reflexes. Within it, besides its members, there is a material
substance which corresponds to the ''intercellular substance or
space" in an organism. The principal difference between a social
and a biological organism is that society is somewhat less
integrated than an organism.^'' But, again, in this respect there
are three degrees of organisms: plants which lack an ability to
move in their parts and in their whole; animal organisms which
have an ability to move as a whole; and social organisms, which
can move in their whole, as well as in their parts (individuals).
Thus, this difference means only that the social organism is the
highest class of organism, and nothing more.^^ Some have raised
the objection that in an organism the cells cannot move freely, or
belong at the same time to several organisms, or even shift from
one organism to another; while in a society individuals can move,
can belong to several societies, and can shift from one society to
another. To this, Lilienfeld answers that a greater mobility of
individuals in an organism means only that it is an organism of a
higher class. Wandering cells are also in an organism, some of
them passing even from one organ to another (spermatozoids).
Another objection is that, contrary to an organism, society does
not exhibit the phases of birth and death. Lilienfeld meets this by
" Lilienfeld, Die Menschliche Gesellschaft ah realer Organismus,
Vol. I, pp. i, 34 ff., 58-68, Mitau, 1873,
2* Lilienfeld, Zur Vertidigung, pj). 9-12, 15, 21 and passim. "^ La
pathologic sociale, Ch. I, and pp. 307 ff.
204
indicating that, like an organism, one society often gives birth to
another, and that societies may die. The objection that society
differs from an organism in that it is asymmetrical, the author

meets by a statement that social hierarchy is a specific kind of a
symmetry in the social body. The objection that an individual has
a ''self" and a specific integrated consciousness, while a society
does not, is met by an indication that individual consciousness or
self is also mosaical, and that it represents an ever-changing
process similar to the public mind and the governmental activity in
a society. Other objections and analogies ascribed to the
organismic theories are declared by Lilienfeld childish. They
belong not to the organismic theory, but to its critics, who unfairly
ridicule the theory and ascribe to it the analogies which do not
belong to it.^^ The general conclusion of Lilienfeld is that ''nihil est
in societate quod non priiis fiierit in natiira." Sociology is to be
based on biology and has to apply all its laws to the scientific
interpretation of social phenomena. Without the organismic
principles a scientific sociology is impossible, and Sociologus
nemo, nisi hiologus?'^
The theory of Schafifle is moderate, especially in the second
edition of his work, where he even stresses conspicuously the
difference between a society and organism; but it is still bioorganismic in its realization. The leading principles of his
sociology are similar to the above; for his ''social morphology" is
characteristic of Schafffe's fivefold classification of "social
tissues," which are homological to corresponding tissues in an
organism. Such social phenomena as the army, police, clothing,
roofs, safes and fortresses are nothing but "a protective social
tissue," which corresponds to the epidermal tissue of animals.
Various technical and practical social arrangements are as
nothing but the muscular social tissues which correspond either to
the cross-striped-voluntary or to the smooth-involuntary-muscles
of an organism. Educational and intellectual institutions of a
society correspond to the nervous system.^^ Having studied the
26 Zur Vertidigung, pp. 48-57.
27 Ibid.^ pp. 9, 31, 56-57; La pathologie sociale, Chap. I; Die

Menschliche Gesell-schajt, pp. 398-399.
28 See wScHAFFLE, Bau und Lehen des socialen Korpers, 1896,
Vol. I, Books II-IV, pp. 111-175, and passim.
205
tissues, he proceeds to study the social organs made up of these
social tissues. Schaffle studies the state from this organismic
standpoint.
More conspicuous is the biological organicism in the theory of J.
Novicow. Like Lilienfeld, in spite of a crushing criticism of the
theory at the International Congress of Sociologists, he still insists
that the criticism did not set forth any destructive objection against
bio-organicism as a theory, which claims that the laws of biology
are ''equally applicable to cells, to aggregates of cells, to plants or
animals, and to the aggregates of individuals styled society."
''Since society is composed of living creatures, it can be but a
living creature." He further answers the principal objections set
forth against the organismic theories. In an organism, as well as
in a society, the struggle goes on not only with heterogeneous
bodies, but between various parts of each of them also. The
difference between the concreteness of an organism and of a
society is very relative because our conception of space is very
subjective. To a creature millions of times less than a man, a
man's body would appear as a whole continent with oceans,
seas, mountains and so on. That is, it would appear quite a
discrete thing. On the other hand, to a creature millions of times
greater than man, many societies would appear quite a concrete
body. Finally, spacial discreteness or concreteness is not
important for an organism; what is important is the functional
interaction and interdependence of its parts, regardless of their
spacial nearness. From this standpoint, interdependence of
England and New Zealand is no less than the parts of an
organism. Furthermore, he ridicules the objection that the

members of a society can live autonomically while there has not
been any isolated foot which would go and live alone. "A sprout of
a plant may be transplanted, but a man's head could not be
'ingrafted' into another body. Does this mean that man is not an
organism ?" asks Novicow.^"^
He further proceeds to develop his theory of social volition and
consciousness, as they exist apart from individual volitions and
consciousness. Contrary to the other organicists who see the
^^ Conscience et volontc sociales, pp. 1-9. Sec also his paper in
Annalcs de Vinstitut intern, de sociologie, Vol. IV.
206
organ of such social sensorium in government, Novicow sees it in
the eHte of a society, in its intellectual aristocracy. The members
of such an elite are ''real, sensitive cells of a society," they are
"real starters" (le veritable moteiir) of all social actions. Through
their production of ideas and sentiments they (like receptors in the
nervous system) transmit the stimuli to "the effectors"
(government, etc.), and in this way perform the role of a social
nervous system. "Every social action is carried on through
persuasion. This persuasion is a volition v^hich originates in the
brain of an elite and is transmitted to other brains." Such, in brief,
is the organ and the mechanism of social consciousness and
social volition.^^
R. Worms, in his monograph: Society and Organism, showed
himself an extreme bio-organicist. Later on, however, he
recognized many shortcomings of the extreme organismic
theories,'"^^ though the fundamentals of bio-organismic
conception he supported throughout his life. He states that in
origin, structure, and functions, society is analogous to organism.

His analysis of the similarities and the dissimilarities of society
and organism he sums up in the following way: "We must
conclude," he says, "that though there exist unquestionable
differences between the societies and the organisms, they are not
so important as to separate them radically from each other." ^^
It is practically useless to continue a detailed survey of the
character and the contents of a great many other bio-organismic
works. It is enough to say that in the way of analogies there has
been displayed a real ingenuity in inventing the most startling
comparisons, which try to define even the sex of various social
organisms (for instance Bluntschli thought that the state is a
masculine organism while the Church is a feminine one),^^ and in
finding the social homologues to the heart, circulation of blood,
stomach, lungs, arms, hair, head, and what not. At the same
30 Conscience et volonte sociales, pp. 43-44, 5i ff-, 69-74, 97102, 137 and passim.
31 See his acknowledgment of this in Worms' Philosophie des
sciences sociales, Vol. I, 1913, pp. 47-48; also his Les principes
biologiques de revolution sociale, Paris, 1910.
32 Philosophie des sciences sociales, p. 55. See Chap. III.
33 See Bluntschli, J. K., Lehre vom modernen Staat, Vol. I, p. 23,
Stuttgart, 1875; Gesammelte kleine Schrijten, p. 284, Nordlingen,
1879. Generally speaking, Bluntschli's work is perhaps one of the
most logical and conspicuous examples of bio-organismic
theories.
207
time, in regard to ^'bio-organicism," the theories vary from an
extreme biologism to a mild, rather bio-psychological,
interpretation of society, including even such conceptions as

Fouillee's *'contractual organism." Let us now discuss briefly to
what extent these theories may be recognized as valuable from
the scientific standpoint.^"^
5. CRITICISM
In bio-organismic theories we must strongly discriminate between
two different classes of statements. The first class is composed of
the statements that sociology has to be based on biology; that the
principles of biology are to be taken into consideration in an
interpretation of social phenomena; that human society is not
entirely an artificial creation; and that it represents a kind of a
living unity different from a mere sum of the isolated individuals.
These principles could scarcely be questioned. They are valid.
They are shared, moreover, not only by the bio-organismic
school, but by a great many other sociological schools. In this
sense they do not com])ose a monopoly of the bio-organismic
theories, or their specific characteristics.
Quite different should be our conclusion in regard to the second
set of the bio-organismic conceptions. This set is composed of the
conclusions inferred from the above general principles. Since
^ In view of the enormous amount of literature devoted to the
criticism of the bio-organismic theories, there is no necessity to
make my criticism detailed. Of this literature, see Annates de
Vinst. intern, de sociol., Vol. IV, which contains the papers of
Lilienfeld and Novicow as the proponents of the bio-organismic
theories; and the papers of G. Tarde, L. Stein, and other critics of
bio-organicism. See also the quoted papers of Coker, Salomon,
and others. In addition vide GiDDiNGS, P., Principles of
Sociology^ Book IV, Chap. IV, N. Y., 1896; Barth, P., op. cit.f pp.
306-424; DuPRAT, Science sociale el democratie, 1900, pp. 59,
68 ff.; Haff, K., "Kritik der Genossenschaftstheorie," Jahrbuch fiir
Soziologie, B. II, pp. 277-299; Barnes, H. E., "Representative
Biological Theories of Society," Sociol. Review, Vol. XVII, 1925;

Litt, Th., Individuum und Gemeinschaft, 1924; GuMFLOWicz, L.,
Gesch. d. Staatstheorien, pp. 396 ff.; Willoughby, The Nature of
the State, pp. 32-38, N. Y., 1896; Lerov-Beaulieu, Uctat moderne
et ses func' lions, Paris, 1890, Book I, Chap. IV; Kistiakowski, B.,
Gesellschaft und EinzeU wesen, Berlin, 1899; Steinmetz, R., "Die
organische sozialphilosophie," Zeit-schrift Jilr Sozialwiss., 1898;
Small, A., and Vincent, Introduction to the Study oj Society, 1894;
Pattkn, S., "The Failure of Biological Sociology," Annates of the
Amer. Acad. Potit. Social Sciences^ Vol. IV, 1896; Mikhailovsky,
N. K., What Is Progress?, (Russ.), Farwinism and Social
Sciences, Analogical Method in Social Sciences, in Works of
Mikhailovsky, Russ., Vol. I; Kareeff, N., Introduction to 'he Study
of Sociology, Russ., Chap. I\', 1907.
208
biological laws are applicable to human beings, they conclude
that all human society is an organism. Since human society like
any organism is composed of living individuals, they infer that
society ought to be similar to an organism in society's structure,
organs, and functions. Hence, the analogies of the school. These
propositions compose their specific characteristics. By it, the
school differs from many others which share the statements of the
above first class, but refuse to accept the conclusions of the
second class. It is true that the bio-organismic sociologists, being
confronted with severe criticism, have many times stressed the
point that their organismic analogies do not compose an important
part of their theories, being, in fact, nothing but an illustration of
their principles, a mere facon de parler, no more.^''^ And yet,
contrary to these declarations, they have continued to use these
analogies over and over, filling with them hundreds of pages of
their works, and to use them as the principal argument of their
contentions. Besides, if we take off these analogies and the

identification of society with an organism from these theories,
there remains very little in them. Their originality and specific
nature disappear; and, through that, disappears the school itself.
In this case it dissolves among a great many other theories which
in various ways profess the first set of the principles. For these
reasons, the second set of the statements is to be taken as the
^ For instance H. Spencer emphatically protested against an
interpretation of his analogies in any other than an "illustrative"
sense. "I have used the analogies elaborated, but as a scaffolding
to help in building up a coherent body of sociological inductions.
Now let us drop this alleged parallelism between individual
organization and social organization. Let us take away the
scaffolding: the inductions will stand by themselves." . . . "This
emphatic repudiation of the belief that there is any special
analogy between the social organism and the human organism, I
have a motive for making" (in view of a misrepresentation of
Spencer's conceptions). See Spencer, H., The Principles of
Sociology, Vol. I, N. Y., 1910, p. 270, and the foot-note on p. 592.
See also pp. 214-223. Even such an extreme organicist as P.
Lilienfeld no less emphatically protests against various comical
analogies and their unfair interpretation. See his Zur Verteidigung
der organischen Methode in Soziologie, pp. 22-28, Berlin, 1898;
the same is true of J. Novicow. See Novicow^ Conscience et
volonte sociale, Paris, 1897; on page 9, he writes: "Certainly
social organisms are entirely different from biological organisms. .
. There is no morphological resemblance between them. It is
childish to try to estabhsh any similarity of this kind." A. Schaffle,
in the second edition of his "Ban und Leben des Sozialen
Korpers," 1881, p. VIII, dropped the analogies of the first edition
to avoid their misinterpretation. A similar thing was done by R.
Worms. See Worms, Philosophic des sciences sociales. Vol. I,
pp. 47-52, Paris, 1913; Soziologie, German tr., 1926, p. 37. The
same is true of other prominent organicists in sociology.
209
"differentia specifica" of the bio-organismic theories. They stand
and fall with these principles. If they are true, the school remains;
if they are wrong, the school falls down.
It is easy to show the fallacy of these principles. Since man is an
organism, the laws of biology are applicable to him, but from this it
does not follow at all that human society is a biological organism.
The rules of arithmetical addition or multiplication are equally
applicable to an arithmetical computation of men, cattle, stones,
and what not. Does it follow from that that man is a cow, or that a
cow is a stone, or that all these objects are identical ? The laws of
mechanics or chemistry are equally applicable to man, stone, or
plant. Does it follow from this that a man, a plant, and a stone are
the same things? In a similar way, from the supposition that the
laws of biology are applicable to man, it does not follow at all that
man is a cow, or a plant, and still less is it possible to infer that the
human society is an organism. In other words, the applicability of
some rules or formulas of uniformities (laws) to various objects,
does not mean an identity of the nature of these objects.
We may agree also that human society is composed of a living
substance, that is, of human beings. But it is fallacious to infer
from this that human societies are but biological organisms. In the
final analysis, either a stone, an animal, a plant, or a man is
composed of atoms or electrons. Does this mean that stones,
plants, animals, and men are identical things, and can be
identified with one another in their structure, organs, or functions;
or that they could be interpreted with the same principles in their
composition and activity? We may agree that human society is a
kind of a unity in which its members are interdependent upon
each other. It is, however, fallacious to conclude from this that
human society is an organism, because an organism is also a
kind of unity. The solar system, an automobile, a plant, an animal,
a river, or a man, all represent a kind of a unity with

interdependent parts. Does it follow from this that human society
is the same unity as the solar system, a car, a plant, a river; or
that all these objects are identical ?
As a unity, human society may disintegrate, the human being may
die, a stone may be broken into pieces, or a river may dry
210
up. In all these cases, each of these unities disappears. Is it
possible to infer from this that the various processes of the
disappearance of each unity are identical, and that for this reason
the corresponding phenomena (objects) are identical also?
Evidently not. Meanwhile, the bio-organismic analogies of a
similarity of the organismic processes with the social (though both
show the phenomena of growth, sickness, multiplication,
differentiation and so on) represent just such a reasoning and
such an inference. If a logician needs an excellent illustration of a
fallacy in analogical reasoning, he cannot have a better example
than the bio-organismic analogical methods. The above is enough
to make clear their "organic" fallacy. It is needless to make a
detailed criticism of their organic analogies. Their weakness has
been ridiculed and criticized more than enough. There is no need
to repeat these well based objections.
One point, howêver, is to be mentioned. This is the practical
inferences made by various bio-organicists from their bioorganismic premises. Some of them used their analogies as an
argument in favor of monarchy, administrative centralization,
absolutism, or socialism, as a form of the greatest integration of
social organism {e.g., Bluntschli). Some others, for instance
Spencer, used them to support decentralization, individualism,
liberalism, and a restriction of governmental interference. This
shows, in the first place, the vagueness of logical content of these

bio-organismic principles, which, being the same, permit persons
to make quite opposite inferences. It shows also the unscientific
nature of these ''applied" inferences. In their essence, they are
nothing but Pareto's ''derivations," "ideologies" which are intended
not so much to describe the reality, as it is, as to supply a
"justification," "beautification," or "motivation" of the various
"appetites," "aspirations," and "desires" (residues) of their
authors. Being such, they are neither scientific, nor non-scientific,
but extra-scientific and outside the path of science.^^
^ The modern variety of such ideologies is given in the form of
various theories of solidarity; beginning with Fouillee's
"contractual organism" and ending with L. Bourgeois' "solidarity,"
O. Spann's "universaHsmus," Th. Litt's "Lebens einheit," the
nationaUstic "patriotism," socialistic "collectivism," the ideologies
of the Catholico-monarchical movement, represented by Uaction
frangaise, Fascism's theories of syndicalism, and so on. All these
"ideologies" are based on an "organic" conception of a society,
either in its ])hilosophical, or psycho211
As to the practical value of the bio-organismic analogies, they
may have some ''pedagogical" worth in supplying ''concrete
images" which help to visualize the abstract and complex
"structure" of a social system, but this value is limited. Besides,
through the misuse of analogies, their value is greatly
overweighted by their scientific fallacies. Therefore, G. Tarde's
severe conclusion about the bio-organismic theories seems to be
right in essence.
The conception of social organism has been somewhat useful
only
sociologistic, or bio-organismic forms. From the theoretical

premises of these organic doctrines, each of these ideologies
infers an applied political program to be carried on, and a series
of practical social, political, and moral propositions This "what
ought to be done" is outHned by each of these ideological
movements according to the tastes, desires, and inclinations of
their authors. Each of them, however, tries to "base," or to "justify"
and to "prove" his practical program with the organic principles.
After the above, it must be clear that all these different
"ideologies" are nothing but "derivations" in Pareto's sense, and
all of them are unscientific, which does not hinder their being
socially useful or harmful, because scientific truth and social
usefulness or harmfulness are in different categories, and are far
from being always coincident. Samples of these "ideologies" are
given in the following works: Maurras, Ch., Romanticisme et
revolutions, Paris, 1912; Delafosse, J., Theorie de I'ordre, 1901;
Cottin, P., Positivisme et anarchy, 1908. These "ideologies"
represent "the monarchical, clerical, or traditionalist aspirations"
embodied in the group of L'action frangaise. Ideology of Fascism
represents also a variety of this type. See also the quoted work of
Moulinê, which shows well its connections with various organic
doctrines. The group of the "humanitarian," "liberal," the
"positivistic" and the somewhat "pinkish" "ideologies" of solidarity,
based also on organic premises, is well represented by Fouillee's
"contractual organism" (which reminds one of "wooden iron") in
his quoted work and in his La propriete sociale et democratie
(1884) and Elements sociologiques de la morale, 1905; by
Bourgeois, L., La solidarite, 1897; Essai d'une philosophie de la
solidarite, 1902; by Bougl6, C, Le solidarisme, 1907; Hauriou, M.,
La science sociale traditionelle; by Gide, Ch., Essai d'une
philosophie de la solidarite, 1902. In America, corresponding
"practical ideologies" are inserted into the "psycho-organic"
sociological treatises, and a great many textbooks in sociology
and social sciences, which "preach" the doctrine of solidarity with
the help of "organic"principally psycho-organic doctrines.
Corresponding Syndicalist, Communist, and Socialist ideologies

of solidarity, based also on a variety of the organic doctrines, may
be found in abundance in the works of K. Marx, and the Marxian
socialists; in the works of "the humanitarian socialists" like the
Fabian socialists in England; and in the journalistic works of
authors like H. G. Wells, and this type of "ideologists;" others in
the works of ideologists of revolutionary syndicalism, like
Lagardelle, Sorel, G. Griffuhels, Berth, and so on. Finally, the
ideologies of the contemporary "Guild-Socialism" are to be
mentioned also, as a conspicuous example of these "applied
doctrines" based on one of the organic conceptions of a society.
All these theories are, in their greater part, neither scientific, nor
non-scientific, but extra-scientific ideologies lying outside of
science. This statement concerns all such ideologies regardless
as to whether they are based on "philosophical," "bio-organismic"
or "psycho-sociologistic" organicism.
212
for naturalists to whom it suggested the cell-theory, physical
division of labor, and other clear and important ideas. But if it is
useful to sociologize biology, it is harmful to biologize sociology. .
. Bio-organicism is not only fallacious, but it is dangerous. If I do
not see its contributions, I do excellently see fallacies which it
supports. The fallacy of a creation of a sociological ontology, of
the building up of various metaphysical entities, as real things, or
of the permanent use of terms like "social principle," "the soul of a
crowd" and other vague concepts of a biological metaphysics; this
is, possibly, the worst kind of all metaphysics. ^"^
As a matter of fact, all these analogies and comparisons have
added little, if anything, valuable toward an understanding of
social phenomena. They have not disclosed any new correlation,
any new uniformity, or any new formula of a factual relationship of
various elements of a social system. For these reasons we must

refuse to follow the bio-organismic school in this respect.
Dropping this part of bio-organicism, we have derived from it a
series of statements of the first type mentioned above. As was
stated, these are likely to be valid, but they are not a monopoly of
this school. We may say that society represents a kind of system,
or a kind of unity, but this is not identical to the unity of an
organism.^^ We may say that the social group is a reality
3^ Tarde, G., "La thôrie organique des societes," Annates institut
international de sociologie, Vol. IV, pp. 238-239. Not without
reason also Duprat ironically says of the bio-organismic theories:
'*Mentalisez d'abord un organism; remplacez la cellule purement
biologique, qui n'est qu'une abstraction, par une synthase
d'atomes psychiques ou de monades; superposez a la vie la
conscience; puis socialisez ce que vous venez de mentalisez
ainsi; donnez a chaque element psycho-physiologique une
tendance a la vie en commun, a I'association, donnez a
I'aggregat un gouvernemeiit, une sorte de monarchic avec I'dme,
dont la sensibilite, Vintelligence, la volonte seront les ministres. . .
. Qu'y aura done gagne la science? Ne resultera-t-il pas une plus
grande obscurite encore de ces analogies parfois forcees?
Duprat, op. cit., pp. 59, 68-69.
2^ Whether we style the unity of a social system "mechanical," or
"organic," or "psychic," it is a matter of terminology and is not
important in itself. What is important is how we describe its
characteristics and the functional relations which we may discover
among various components of a social system, and between the
social system and its environment. From this functional
standpoint, the only important thing is accuracy in the description
of the properties and components of a social system and of their
functional relationship and regularities. If this task is performed
properly, the adjectives "mechanical," "organismic," and "psychic"
add very little to our knowledge of social phenomena. If the task is
not performed at all, the adjectives are likely to be useless and

misleading. In this case they may give only a purely superficial
and terminological knowledge of the phenomena and, owing to a
vague meaning of the words, "mechanical,"
213
of a sui generis different from that of its members taken in a state
of mutual isolation. But society does not exist independently, and
we must not forget the reality of interacting individuals who
compose a given social system. We may say that the laws of
biology are to be taken into consideration in an interpretation of
social phenomena; but this does not mean that a social system is
a biological organism. We may agree that a social system is
shaped and controlled not entirely by the forces exterior to it; but
this is true in regard to any unity, whether it is a ''mechanical," an
organic, or a social one. We may agree that society is not an
artificial system created intentionally by man; but this is true of the
solar system, of organisms, and of a great many other "organic,"
"mechanical," and "psychic" unities, which have come into an
existence spontaneously. It is true that social institutions are a
product of a great many forces and of a long series of trials and
errors, and should not be regarded as something purely
"incidental," which may be easily changed at once; but this again
is true of a great many other non-social unities.
After this consideration of the characteristics of the bio-organismic school, let us turn to some of the special theories which
directly or indirectly are connected with it, and which try to apply
its fundamental principles to an interpretation of a series of
important social phenomena. Among such theories the most
important are those which try to interpret the phenomena of social
differentiation, of social adaptation, and of the social struggle for
life. Let us glance at them.
"organic" and so on, they arc likely to lead to a scries of

misconceptions, not to mention an endless and sterile dispute
originated by such a vague meaning of the words. For this
reason, I think that a scientific study of the phenomena should
concentrate its attention on the above factual analysis and
description of a social system, and should pay less attention to
the business of word-polishing; using "mechanical," "organic,"
"psycho-social," "atomistic," "uni-versalistic" and so on.
Unfortunately, a great many sociologists have been busy
principally with this word-jwlishing. Even in the quite recent
sociological studies of O. Spann, Th. Litt, C. Brinkmann, A.
Vierkandt, K. Breysig, W. Sauer, and others, too much space has
been devoted to the "word-polishing," and too little to factual
analysis of the phenomena and their functional relations. I regard
this as a heritage of the j)hilosophical stage of sociology which is
to be passed over, and the sooner it is left behind, the better.
214
6. BIOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION
H. Spencer, Karl Baer, Ernst Haeckel and other biologists
indicated that the perfection of an organism varies directly as the
degree of its complexity, differentiation, and integration. The
greater the differentiation between the organs and the
morphological structure of an organism, the greater the division of
functions between its organs, causing its parts to be integrated
that much more closely with a corresponding loss in their
autonomy; the more perfect an organism is, the higher place it
occupies in the evolutionary 'ladder of life," and the more
advanced it is in the evolutionary process. Such is the biological
criterion of the perfectibility of an organism, given in Spencer's
formula of evolution or progress, which we find in Baer's and
Haeckel's classification of organisms.^^ This formula naturally
called forth a series of sociological theories whose business was

to answer the problem as to whether or not the formula could be
applied to societies. If society is a biological organism, the formula
should be applicable to it. In this case, the more a society is
differentiated and integrated, the more it is centralized, the less
freedom its members have, and the greater is the division of
social labor; the more perfect and progressive and advanced the
society should be, and 7.nce versa. In a disguised or explicit, a
rough or a mild form, such conclusions have really been made,
especially in regard to social differentiation and integration as the
criteria of social progress. Examples of this are given in H.
Spencer's works and in those of a ''psycho-social" organicist, E.
Durkheim, wherein there are many other theories. In their
classification of social types and their place in the evolutionary
series, in their formula of progress, and in their estimation of the
role of the social division of labor, both of these authors did
practically nothing but apply the above criteria of a perfect
organism to society. According to them social evolution and
progress consisted essentially in an increase of social
differentiation and
3^ See H. Spencer's formula of evolution or progress in his First
Principles^ p. 396, N. Y. 1895; its application to social
phenomena in Spencer's essay about Progress, and in his
Principles of Sociology, Vol. I, Part II, Chaps. X-XII, and passim.
See Haeckel, E., Prinzipien der Generellen Morphologic, 1906,
pp. 106 ff.
215
integration; in an increase of social division of labor; and in a
transition from the state of ''an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity
to a definite coherent heterogeneity." ^^
On the part of the "individualists," such inferences naturally called
forth a bitter criticism of the organismic theories, as well as of their
political and practical conclusions. The best samples of such

theories are given in the works of A. Lalande, N. K. Mik-hailovsky,
L. Winiarsky, G. Palante, G. Tarde, P. Lavroff,"^^ N. Kareef, to
mention only a few names.
In the first place, these authors, and among them especially N. K.
Mikhailovsky and A. Lalande, have shown that the very terms,
"more perfect" and "less perfect" in an application to organisms
are not permissible because the terms are the judgments of
evaluation and as such, they cannot be used in objective biologic
science.
^^ See indicated chapter in the works of H. Spencer. See
Durkheim, E., Les regies de la methode sociologiques, Paris,
1904, pages devoted to an outline of social morphology and to a
classification of social types; see also his De la division du travail
social, Paris, 1893, passim. See about Durkheim's sociology the
chapter "Sociologistic School" in this book. It is necessary to note,
however, that in other parts of Spencer's works, especially in his
theory of the militant and industrial type of society, in his criticism
of socialism, governmental interference, and "State-Slavery,"
Spencer, like many other social thinkers, radically changes his
attitude and practically drops his formula of evolution, as well as
his bio-organismic theory. If the formula of evolution and progress
is valid, and if society is an organism, the greater social
centralization, governmental regulation, and social division of
labor, while the lesser is individual autonomy, the more perfect
and progressive the society is to be. Such in fact are Spencer's
statements developed in the first volume of his Principles of
Sociology, in his essay about Progress, and in his First Principles.
But when he begins to discuss the above problems, he quite
illogically changes his attitude and develops the theories radically
contradictory to the basic principles of his bio-organic theory and
his formula of evolution or progress. Similar inconsistencies are
found in the theories of Durkheim, too. I do not mention here a
series of much more extreme political inferences drawn from the

above biological criteria of perfection of organism, and intended to
justify political absolutism, centralization, caste-system and so on,
on the basis of these criteria. The works of the bio-organicists of
the past and of the mentioned contemporary political ideologists
(Alaurras, Delafosse, P. Cottin, ideologists of the Fascism, of
Syndicalism, Socialism and Communism) give various types of
similar inferences and "justification." They are rich also with the
inconsistencies of their "ideologies" and their basic I)rinciple$.
*^ See Lalande, A., La dissolution opposee d revolutions dans les
sciences physiques et morales, Paris, 1899; Palante, G., Combat
pour I'individu, Paris, 1904; Antinomies entre I'individu et societe,
Paris, 1913; Winiarksy, L., "Essai d'une nouvclle interpretation de
ph6nom6nes sociologiques," Revue socialiste, 1896;
Mikhailovsky, N. K., What is Progress? Darwinism ajid Social
Sciences, Struggle for Individuality, in his Works, Russ.; see
about Mikhailovsky's, Kareef's and Lavroff's theories in Hecker,
J., Russiati Sociology, pp. 85-204, N. Y., 1916.
216
Biology may classify and describe the species and the
characteristics of the organisms, and may show their genealogies,
but it cannot evaluate them and range them as ''more and less
perfect." Such an evaluation would be nothing but an introduction
of anthropomorphism and a subjective concept of perfection into
biology. In the second place, they indicated that Spencer's
explanation of the objective science of evolution (the instability of
the homogeneous) is inadequate; for it is not the homogeneous
which is unstable, but, on the contrary, the heterogeneous. In the
third place, they indicated that, from the standpoint of vitality and
immortality, the most vital and really immortal organisms are not
those which are differentiated and complex, but the simplest
ones. Contrary to fragile and mortal complex organisms, they are

ineradicable, the most vital, imperishable, and immortal. This has
been indicated by the authors to show the subjectivity of the
above criteria of biological perfection. In the fourth place, the
authors indicated that society is not a biological organism;
therefore, if the biological formula of perfection were even valid, it
could not be applied to society. In the fifth place, they stressed
that the social application of the formula made by Spencer is also
wrong. Properly used, it has to be applied not to society, but to an
individual. In this case it would mean that the more differentiated
the organs and the functions of an individual are, the greater is
the division of labor among his organs; and the more perfect he
is, the more many-sided is his personality. Such are the
characteristics of the men of genius; such are the properties of a
really Great Man, and such are the indispensable conditions for
human happiness and for the progress of human beings.
Consequently, the more perfect society is that which gives the
greatest opportunity for a realization of such an ideal of
individualism. Spencer's, Durkheim's, and other organicists'
differentiated and integrated theories of society do not give any
chance to develop the individual. If society progresses in its
differentiation and integration, ''what happens at the same time to
the actual individual,the member of society? Does he
experience the same process of development as the type of
organic process?" Thvis asks Mikhailovsky and answers, "No,"
217
While society becomes more and more dififerentiated and
heterogeneous, the individuala member of itproceeds the
opposite way of transformation: he becomes more and more
onesided, homogeneous, narrovvminded and specialised. Such a
''progress" of society tends to turn an individual into a "mere digit
of the foot" of the society. Understand, then, that in such a
progress the individual regresses. If we contemplate only this
aspect of the matter, society is the worst enemy of man. for it

strives to transform the individual into a mere organ of itself.
From this standpoint what Spencer and Durkheim regard as
social progress (an increase of social differentiation), is to be
styled rather social regress.
In the homogeneous mass of primitive society the individuals
were heterogeneous. . . . They were complete bearers of their
culture; they were manysided personalities. . . . But with the
transition of society from the homogeneous to heterogeneous,
there began the destruction of this full personality of individuals
and its transition from the heterogeneous to homogeneous."*'Thus, if the formula of perfection vvêre applicable, it would have
to be applied to an individual, but not to a society. Being applied
to an individual, it gives quite a different evaluation of an
undifferentiated and differentiated society, of the division of labor,
of specialization and so on, than does the evaluation given by
Spencer, Durkheim, and other bio- and psycho-sociological
organicists.
Such, in brief, are these twô principal streams of sociological
thought originated by, or under the influence of, the biological
formula of the perfection of an organism in its application to the
phenomena of social differentiation.
7. CRITICAL REMARKS
The above criticism of the bio-organismic school makes
unnecessary a detailed criticism of the application of the principle
of physiological differentiation to a society. Since we recognized
the fallacious character of the principles of the bio-organismic
*2 MiKHAiLOVSKY, Works, Vol. I, pp. 29 ff., 149 ff., 461 fT., 573
and passim, St. Petcrshourp:, 1896; Winiarskv, op. cit., pp. 309-
310, 312 ff.; see also the mentioned works of Palante, Lalandc,
and others,
218
school and the impossibiHty of identifying society and organisms
it follows that the formula of the biological perfection of an
organism could not be transported into sociology and applied to a
society. If it were applicable to this field at all it had to be applied
rather to the individuals than to a group. In this respect Mikhailovsky, Winiarsky and other critics of the theory seem to be
right. Besides, as some of them mentioned, the category of a
''more perfect" and a "less perfect" organism is a subjective
evaluation, but not a statement of a matter of fact. For this reason,
these terms and others like ''superior and inferior" organisms are
illegal within the field of biology itself. In a similar way, there is no
possibility of identifying the concepts of "evolution," which is a
"colorless" concept in the sense of evaluation, and means only a
development of the phenomenon in the course of time (and
space) regardless as to whether it tends to a better or to a worse
condition. Scientifically illegal is also the concept of "progress,"
which is a finalist and evaluative term. For this reason, Spencer's
and similar identifications of these two terms are to be regarded
as fallacious. If even social evolution had really consisted in an
increase of social differentiation and integration, this would not
have meant that such a process is necessarily progress.^^ More
of the above objections of the anti-organicists indicate other weak
points of the discussed analogy. Properly taken, it represents
nothing but "an ideology" in which some data of biology are taken
to justify some subjective aspirations of the authors. As such they
are outside of science, and the fewer of their number found in
sociology, the better it will be for the science.
^3 See SoROKiN, "The Category of 'Ought to Be' in Social

Science," Juridichesky Vestnik, 1917, Russ.; "Fundamental
Problems of Progress," Novyija Idei v soziologii, Vol. Ill, Russ.; "Is
Any Normative Science Possible?" in Sorokin, Crime and
Punishment, 1914, Introduction, Russ.
219
CHAPTER V
ANTHROPO-RACIAL, SELECTIONIST, AND HEREDITARIST
SCHOOL
Under this school I am going to discuss the principal theories
which give an exclusive importance to the factor of race, heredity
and selection in determining human behavior, the social
processes, organization, and the historical destiny of a social
system. The theories compose a second branch of the biological
school of sociology.
I. PREDECESSORS
The factors of race, selection, and of heredity were known long
ago. In The Sacred Books of the East we find many statements
which stress their role. In the practices of ancient societies,
''blood," "race," and ''selection" were given an exclusive
importance, determining the social status, both of individuals and
of groups. The ancient social stratification of castes and classes,
of the aristocracy and slaves, of the plebeians and the patricians,
and of the noble and the humble, was based principally on "blood"
and "race." Accordingly, ancient societies practiced very
extensively what is now styled "eugenics." Following are a few of
the many examples found in the source literature of these
societies.
In the Sacred Books of India we find the theory that the different
castes were created out of different parts of the body of Brahma,
and that they are innately different; consequently, any mixture of
blood, or cross-marriage, or even any contact of the members of
different races is the greatest crime, and the social status of every
individual is entirely determined by the "blood" of his parents.
There are also a great many purely eugenic prescriptions aimed
to keep the purity of the blood, to facilitate the procreation of the
best elements in the population, and to check
220
that of the unhealthy.-^ In other words, eugenics was well known
and widely practiced in ancient societies.
'Twice-born men (of the higher castes) who, in their folly, wed
wives of the low caste, soon degrade their families and their
children to the state of Sudras." ''He who weds a Siadra woman
becomes an outcast" (with whom any contact becomes
impossible). "A Brahmana who takes a Sudra wife to his bed will
(after death) sink into hell; if he begets a child by her he will lose
the rank of a Brahmana" (be automatically excluded from the
upper caste). The manes and the gods will not eat the offerings of
that man. "For him who drinks the moisture of a Sudra's lips, who
is tainted by her breath, and who begets a son by her, no
expiation is prescribed." (Such a sin is unforgivable.) Further, it is
prescribed that one should avoid taking a wife from the families in
which no male children are born, where there are hemorrhoids,
phthisis, weakness of digestion, epilepsy, leprosy; when a maiden
has red eyes, and so on. "In the blameless marriages, blameless
children are born to men; in the blameable marriages, blameable
offspring. One should avoid the blameable marriages." ^ Such are
a few of the many eugenic prescriptions long ago practiced in
ancient India.
In the Bible also we find many endogamic rules aimed to preserve

the. purity of blood or race among the Jews.
A bastard shall not enter into the assembly of Jehovah; even to
the tenth generations shall none of his enter into the assembly of
Jehovah.^
Ye shall not give your daughters unto their [Gentile] sons, nor
take their daughters for your sons, or for yourselves.*
Transgression of this is styled by Ezra as "mingling of the holy
seeds with the people of the land," and is strongly prohibited."''
In the Odyssey and Iliad there are also many places which stress
the importance of blood purity:
1 See Laws of Manu, Chaps. I, II, III, IV; Apastamha, Prasna I, II;
Gautama, Chap. X; Nardda, XII; The Institutes of Vishnu, II, III, in
The Sacred Books of the East.
2 Laws of Manu, II, 6-42. See other indicated Sacred Books of
India.
3 Deuteronomy, xxiii :2.
^ Nehemiah, xiii:25; also xiii:3, where it is said that "they
separated from Israel all the mixed multitude."
^ Ezra, ix :2. See also Deuteronomy, vii 13; Exodus, xxxiv : 16.
221
ANTHROPO-RACIAL, SELECTIONIST, HEREDITARIST 221
Taste ye food and be glad and thereafter we will ask what men ye
are; for the blood of your parents is not lost in you but ye are of
the line of men that are sceptred kings, the fosterlings of Zeus; for
no churl could beget sons like you.
Such are the words addressed to the strangers exclusively on the

basis of their appearance.^ As to the great thinkers of Greece,
like Plato and Aristotle, they quite clearly realized the innate
inequality of men, and consequently, of races. Plato's guardians
are to be selected from men who are naturally suitable for this
class, while the members of other classes are composed of the
people naturally fit for their lower social standing/ Aristotle
stresses the fact that there are inborn slaves and inborn
masters.^ The same may be said of a great many ancient
thinkers. Everywhere the factors of ''blood," "race," ''heredity" and
"selection" were known, were taken into consideration, and were
put into practice in various efficient forms.
Since that time up to the nineteenth century, there have been few
prominent social thinkers who have not, in some way, touched
these problems. "All through the history of political theory we have
seen distinctions of race presented as the causes of and sufficient
explanations of distinctions in institutions and power." ^ At the end
of the eighteenth, and at the beginning of the nineteenth
centuries, a series of philologists, historians, and social
thinkers,Sir William Jones, F. Schlegel, T. Young, J. G. Rhode,
6 Odyssey IV, 60. Cf. I, 222, 411; Iliad, XIV, 126.
' Plato, The Republic, tr. by Jowett, pp. 191-198, N. Y. 1874.
8 "It is from natural causes that some beings command and
others obey: for a being who is endowed with a mind capable of
reflection and forethought is by nature the superior and governor,
whereas he whose excellence is merely corporeal is formed to be
a slave; whence it follows that the different state of master and
slave is equally advantageous to both." On account of the same
natural or innate difference, "it is as proper for the Greeks to
govern the barbarians, as if a barbarian and a slave were by
nature one."Aristotle, Politics, tr. by W. Ellis, Dutton Co., Chap.
II, Chap. XIII and passim.
' Dunning, W., A History of Political Theory from Rousseau to

Spencer, p. 311, N. Y., 1920. See a history of these theories in
the works: Schallmayer, W., Vererbung und Auslese in
Lebenslauf der Vblker, 2nd ed., pp. 142 ff.; SiMAR, Th., ^tude
critique stir la formation de la doctrine des races au X VII* siecle
et son expansion au XIX'' siecle, Bruxelles, 1922; Hankins, F. H.,
The Racial Basis of Civilization, Part I, N. Y., 1926. See also the
works about Gobineau and Chamberlain, indicated further, which
contain a historical review of their predecessors. However, all
these works give either a quite fragmentary survey or mix the
racial theories with those which emphasize nationality, patriotism,
or superiority of a yêople, regardless of their race.
222
J. V. Klaproth, A. Kuhn, J. Grimm, F. A. Pott, F. Miiller, and many
others, started the theory of Aryanism, and later on, of
Teutonism and Nordicism. Though some of them understood that
the Aryans were a Hnguistic group, nevertheless they often mixed
the Aryan people with the Aryan race, and in this way facihtated
an appearance of a purely racial interpretation of history. The
most famous and the most influential among such theories
happened to be the racial theory of Gobineau. His work could be
regarded as the corner stone of numerous similar theories set
forth after him/^ Among relatively recent theories which compose
the anthropo-racial school in sociology, the most important are: i.
The racial theories of Gobineau and Chamberlain;
2. The "hereditarist" school of Francis Galton and K. Pearson;
3. The selectionist theories of V. de Lapouge and Otto Ammon.
Besides these, there are many other monographs which
emphasize the principles set forth by these authors. They will be
mentioned further. We shall begin our survey with these three
groups of theories. After that we shall briefly mention other works

of the school, trying to see which of their generalizations are valid,
and which are not.
2. HISTORICO-PHILOSOPHICAL BRANCH OF THE SCHOOL
Arthur de Gobineau ^^ (1816-1882).Count Gobineau's racial
interpretation of history is given in the four volumes of his Essai
stir rinegalite des races humaines (Paris, 1853, i^55)-^^ The
essentials of his theory are as follows: For a starting point,
10 It is rather curious to read the statement of K. Pearson that
before Darwin there was no possibiUty of either an organic
conception of society, or a proper understanding of the role of
heredity, race-struggle, and selection. There is no doubt that all
these factors were understood well, and if one compares many
sociological statements of Gobineau with those of Pearson, he
will see a great similarity between them, in spite of the fact that
Gobineau's work was published before Darwin's and Galton's
works.
" About Gobineau, his life, his theory, and predecessors, see
Lange, M., Le Comte A . de Gobineau, Strassburg, 1924; Hone,
J. M., "Arthur, Count of Gobineau, Race Mystic," Contemp. Rev.,
1913, pp. 94-103; Dreyfus, R., La vie ei les propheties du Comte
de Gobineau, Paris, 1905; Selliere, E., Le Comte de Gobineau,
Paris, 1903; ScHEMANN, L., Gobineau, eine Biographie, 2 vols.
Strassburg, 1913-16; Hankins, op, cit., Chaps. II, III.
12 There is an English translation of the first volume of
Gobineau's work by A. Collins, The Inequality of Human Races,
N. Y., 1914.
223
Gobineau takes the problem of the development and decay of

societies. What are the causes of such phenomena? What factors
determine either an upward movement of society and civilization
or their decay? With a great erudition for his time, he takes the
existing hypotheses one after another and shows their
inadequacy. Having characterized society in a manner "more or
less perfect from the political, and quite complete from the social
point of view, as a union of men who live under the direction of
similar ideas and who have identical instincts," ^^ Gobineau
shows that neither religious fanaticism, nor corruption and
licentiousness, nor luxury leads necessarily to decay, as many
authors thought. The Aztec Empire was religiously fanatical and
was accustomed even to sacrifice human beings to their gods; yet
this did not lead to its decay, but rather facilitated a long historical
existence of this society. The upper classes of Greece, Rome,
Persia, Venice, Genoa, England, and Russia lived in luxury for
many centuries, yet this did not lead to their decay. The same
may be said of corruption. The earliest ascending stages of
ancient Rome, Sparta, and many other societies were far from
being virtuous and honest. The early Romans were cruel and
pitiless; the Spartans and Phcjenicians used to rob, plunder, rape,
and lie. They exhibited the greatest corruption; yet this did not
hinder these societies from rising and prospering. 'Tt is not in
virtue that we find the cause of their vigour at the earliest stages
of their history." On the other hand, in the period of decay, many
societies exhibit an increase of humanitarianism, softening of
mores, a decrease of cruelty, corruption, and brutality, and yet
this does not stop their decay. Finally, throughout the history of
France and other countries there has been much fluctuation in the
amount of corruption, with nothing showing a drift toward decay in
the more corrupt periods. For these reasons it is evident that
corruption cannot account for decay. Similarly, religious decay is
not a sufficient cause to explain it. Persia, Tyre, Carthage and
Judea fell down when their religion was very intensive. Even in
Greece and Rome, religion, especially among the masses of the
population, was quite strong in the period of decay. These and

"Gobineau, Essai sur rincgalite des races hurnainrs, Vol. I, pp. 1112.
224
similar inductions show that ''it is impossible to explain a people's
ruin through their irreligion." ^"^
Neither do the merits of a government influence the historical
longevity of societies. Bad governments may be classified as
those which are foreign, and those which are imposed by foreign,
degenerate, and class-selfish governments. China had, for
thousands of years, a foreign (the Mongol) government, and yet,
in spite of this fact, China exists and has often shown great social
progress. England was conquered by the foreign Normans, and
yet this did not ruin England. Furthermore, we know that societies
with a degenerated, or class-selfish government have continued
to exist in spite of these conditions. These, and similar historical
inductions testify that national decay cannot be accounted for
through the character of the government.^^ In this way Gobineau
shows the insuf^ciency of all these theories. This does not mean
that he does not attribute any influence to these factors. He does,
but only as to their facilitating the condition brought about. These
phenomena may lead to decay only when they are a
manifestation of some deeper cause.
After clearing the ground, Gobineau offers his own theory. It
consists of the statement that the fundamental factor of the
progress or decay of a society is the racial factor.
Going from one induction to another I came to the conclusion chat
ethnical (racial) problems dominate all other problems of history. It
is the key to them; and inequality of races is sufficient to explain

the entire enchainment of the destinies of peoples. ^^
Understanding by the decay or degeneration of a nation the fact
''that the people do not have as much inner valour as they had
before," the cause of such a degeneration is that "the people do
not have the same blood in their veins any more because through
successive cross-marriages, its value has been changed, and
they have not been able to preserve the race of their founders."
Correspondingly, "a people and their civilization dies out when the
people's fundamental racial constitution is changed or engulfed
among other races to the degree that it ceases to exert the
necessary influence." As soon as such conditions are given, the
mortal
225
hour of a society and of its civilization is struck.^' The purity of a
race, if the race is talented, is the condition absolutely necessary
for preventing the decay of the society and of its civilization. Such
a people is potentially immortal. If they are conquered by an
invader, they, like the Chinese under the Mongols, or the Hindus
under the Englishmen, can avoid decay, can preserve their
civilization, and, sooner or later, will restore their independence.
On the other hand, racial mixture leads to degeneration, even
though the society has the most brilliant culture created by its
ancestors. So it happened with the Greeks and the Romans. They
could not maintain the purity of their race in the later stages of
their history, and therefore, in spite of a wonderful culture they
decayed. ^^
This leads Gobineau to his second proposition about the
inequality of human races. They are unequal. There are the
superior and the inferior races. The former are capable of
progress; the latter are hopeless. Civilization and culture have

been created by the superior races exclusively, and each type of
culture is nothing but a manifestation of racial qualities. To
corroborate this statement, Gobineau gives a long series of
proofs. The inequality of races is proved by the fact that up to the
present time there are many races, which in spite of many
thousand years of existence still remain at the most primitive
stages of culture. They have not been able to create anything
valuable, or to progress in spite of the different environments in
which they have been existing. Their creative sterility is due to
their racial inferiority rather than to the environmental factors.
"The majority of races are forever incapable of being civilized"
and "no environmental agency can fertilize their organic sterility."
Such is the statement of the author. This naturally leads him to a
criticism of various theories which have tried to account for racial
differences and differences in cultural development through
environmental factors, especially through their geographic
environment. "The progress or stagnation of a people does not
depend upon geographic conditions," says Gobineau. Partizans
of this theory used to say that people placed in a favorable
geographic environment progress, while the people who stay
among unfavorable geographic conditions are
'^ I hid., pp. 39-40, '"* Ihid.f p. 53.226
stagnant. The author states that history does not corroborate such
a theory. The environment of America was very favorable, and yet
the aboriginal races of America, except three races of South
America, could not create any great civilization, but remained in
the primitive stages. On the other hand, the environment of Egypt,
or Athens, or Sparta, or Assyria, was far from being favorable. It
was poor and unfertile until artificial irrigation and other measures
were created. And yet, in spite of the unfavorable conditions,

these races, thanks to their inner genius, modified their natural
environment, and created brilliant civilizations. The same
independence of culture from the environment is shown by the
fact that we find the progressive peoples under the most different
geographical environments. The same is true in regard to
stagnant races. Finally, the absence of any close correlation
between the character of the races and that of geographic
environment is witnessed by the fact that, in the same
environment in one period there exists a brilliant civilization, and
in another period, it disappears, being superseded by a stagnant
and incapable people. If geographic conditions were responsible
for the progress or stagnation of a people, such things could not
take place. Going in this inductive way and giving one fact after
another, Gobineau skilfully shows that "geographical theories"
cannot give any satisfactory explanation of the racial and cultural
differences of peoples.^^
The next criticism of the author is directed against the theories
which try to account, for Ihe differences of various peoples by
social environment, that is, through the character of the social
and political institutions. Gobineau indicates that these theories I
are wrong also. In the first place, because institutions and laws I
themselves are only manifestations of racial traits, not their i
causes. They are created by the people according to their inner
qualities, but the people do not create these qualities. The
institutions do not fall from the heaven as something ready-made.
Neither do they exist before the existence of the peoples with their
inner qualities. When laws or institutions, quite heterogeneous to
the racial instincts of a people, are compulsorily introduced by a
foreign nation, or by a conqueror, or by a radical reformer, they
^'^ Gobineau, Essai sur Vinegalite, Chap. VI.
227
usually do not have any success, but remain on paper,

representing a mere decoration. Sometimes, when a race cannot
resist such innovations, it dies, like many primitive people who
have been unable to adapt themselves to such a heterogeneous
culture. Even a pure imitation of a foreign culture or institutions is
possible only when, in the veins of an imitating race, there is a
part of the blood of the people whom they imitate. The negroes of
America ' can imitate some superficial cultural traits of the white
race only because in their veins there is already a considerable
part of the white blood. The author gives again a long series of
facts of this kind, and concludes that the discussed theories
cannot give any satisfactory explanation of the differences
brought about in various peoples through the social
environment.^^ From this viewpoint he analyzes in a detailed form
the role of religion, and especially the role of Christianity, in order
to show that even this environmental factor cannot explain the
differences of various peoples. Though Christianity is accepted by
different peoples, teaching them all the same ideas, nevertheless
it is forced to leave the institutions of these peoples untouched in
their essence. The Eskimo Christian remains Eskimo; the
Chinese Christian remains Chinese; the South American native
remains what he was; and all these different Christians remain
different from one another in spite of the identity of their religion.
This shows that unless religion is a direct manifestation of racial
instincts (in which case it cannot be universal and cosmopolitan) it
cannot change the racial qualities and explain the differences of
the races."^
After this critical part, Gobineau outlines his theory of the origin,
inequality, and social role of the racial factor. The three volumes
of his work are practically devoted to the development of this
theory. Jts essence is as follows: Besides the above argu- \
ments, the fact of racial inequality is corroborated by, and is par- I
tially due to, the probable heterogeneous origin of different races.
In this way, he was one of the first authors who set forth the
theory of the heterogeneous origin of different races,the theory

stressed later on by Gumplowicz and many anthropologists. Since
different races sprang from different sources, it is natural that they
are, and nnist be, diff'erent, especially in the early stages 20 Ibid.,
Chap. V. ^'i Ibid., Chap. VII.
228
2^8 CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES
of their history, when they were purer than they now are. In spite
of a long course of history, and a great mixture of blood, even
now the races are still different anatomically, physiologically, and
psychologically. Such differences are permanent and could not be
obliterated by any environmental factors. Only cross-marriage or
mixture of blood may change racial characteristics. At the
beginning of human history there existed three pure, principal
races : the white, the yellow, and the black. All other racial
varieties have been nothing but a mixture of these fundamental
races. Of them the most talented and creative was the white race,
especially its Aryan branch. In its pure form this race has
performed real miracles. It has been practically the creator of all
the ten principal civilizations known in the history of mankind. Six
of them, namely,the Hindu, the Egyptian, the Assyrian, the
Greek, the Roman, and the Teuton civilizations, were created by
the Aryans, who represent the highest branch of the white race.
The remaining four civilizations, the Chinese, Mexican,
Peruvian, and Maya, were founded and created by other
branches of the white race, mixed with outside races. This white
race expanded and conquered other races, but, at the same time,
amalgamated with them. From this amalgamation came different
racial groups and corresponding civilizations, but the more the
amalgamation progressed the more the white race lost its
precious qualities, and the more its various branches (like the
Greek or the Roman) degenerated. At the time of Jesus Christ the
first and the most brilliant part of the history of mankind had been
completed. At that time the amalgamation of races had already
reached a considerable proportion. Since this period, and up to
the present time, it has been progressing, with some fluctuations.
The result of such race-blending is a tendency to decay, which
has been shown in the history of the last few centuries. It
expresses itself in many forms, and one of these is the progress
of egalitarian ideas, democratic movements, and the blending of
cultures, which, however, does not show anything of that
brightness and genius which stamped the previous great
civilizations created by relatively pure races. The future prospects
drawn by Gobineau are naturally not very hopeful, blood229
mixture having already progressed so far that the process can
scarcely be stopped, it is likely to progress more and more.
After the age of the gods, when the Aryan race was absolutely
pure; and the age of heroes when race-blending was slight in
form and number, it began, during the age of nobles, to slowly
progress. After this age, race-mixture advanced rapidly . . .
towards a great confusion of all racial elements and through
numerous inter-racial marriages.
The result of such a progress will be a greater and greater
similarity of human beings on the one hand, and on the other an
increasing mediocrity of men's physical constitutions, of their
beauty, and of their mind. Here we have the real triumph of
mediocrity, since in this sorrowful inheritance (of race
amalgamation) everybody must participate in equal proportion
and there is no reason to expect that one would have a better fate
than another. Like the Polynesians, all men shall be similar to one
another,in their stature, in their traits, and in their habits.
Human herds, no longer nations, weighed down by a mournful

somnolence, will henceforth be benumbed in their nullity, like
buffaloes ruminating in the stagnant meres of the Pontine
marshes.
This means the death of society and the end of the whole human
civilization."
Such is the scheme and skeleton of the work of Gobineau.
Written brilliantly, with the charm of an excellent stylist, the
fascination of an original thinker, and marked by clearness aixi
logicity of ideas, and finally, by unusual erudition, the book made,
and makes up to this time, a strong impression. It gave a great
impetus to many other racial theories, which will be mentioned
later. Postponing my criticism of Gobineau's theory here, I shall
mention only that which is an appreciation of the theory. The
chapters of the book devoted to the criticism of different
environmental theories are still valid in their essential objections
to the environmentalism, and are quite fresh even at the present
moment. Houston Stewart Chamberlain (1855-1926).Among
the works which are similar to that of Gobineau in their method
and character, a conspicuous place belongs to the work of II. S.
Cham-Îbid.. Vol. IV, pp. 318-359; Vol. I, Chaps. X. XI, XVI.
230
berlain : The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century}^ The son of
Admiral William Charles Chamberlain, born in 1855, the author
received an entirely foreign (principally German) education. He
travelled a great deal, and published several works such as Notes
sur Lohengrin, and Das Drama Richard Wagners. However, his
fame has been due to The Foundations of the Nineteenth
Century. In this historico-philosophical work, Chamberlain puts
and answers the problem: What are the foundations or the
sources of the civilization of the nineteenth century? The essence

of this answer is as follows: Contemporary civilization is
composed of four principal sources, namely, the contributions of
the Greek civilization, of the Roman, of the Jewish, and of the
Teuton. From the Greeks we received poetry, art and philosophy;
from the Romans, law, statecraft, order, the idea of citizenship,
and the sanctity of the family and of property; while the Jews gave
us the elements of Judaism, and indirectly, of Christianity, besides
other good and bad legacies and influences which the Jews have
exerted since the moment of their entrance into Western history.
On the basis of these legacies the Teutons,the term by which
Chamberlain understands the Germans, the Celts, the Slavs, and
all the races of northern Europe from which the people of modern
Europe and of the United States of America have sprung,have
shaped and created the Western civilization of the nineteenth
century.^^ Each of these fundamental elements has been the
work of the racial genius of the above groups. Their specific
talents and contributions have been nothing but a manifestation of
their racial qualities. This leads Chamberlain to his theory of the
racial factor.
The human races are, in reality, as different from one another in
character, qualities, and above all, in the degree of their individual
capacities, as greyhound, bulldog, poodle and Newfoundland dog.
Has not every genuine race its glorious, incomparable
physiognomy? How could Hellenic art have arisen without
Hellenes? . . . Nothing
23 It appeared in German under the title: Grundlagen des
Neunzehnten Jahr-hundert, in 1899. I use its English translation
by John Lees, London, John Lane Co., 1911. About Chamberlain
see Selliere, E., H. S. Chamberlain, de plus recent philosophe du
pangermanisme mystique, Paris, 1917; Hankins, op. cit.y pp. 64
fif.
231
is so convincing as the consciousness of the possession of Race.
The man who belongs to a distinct, pure race, never loses the
sense of it. The guardian angel of his lineage is ever at his side,
supporting him where he loses his foothold, warning him where
he is in danger of going astray, comi)elling ol)edience, and forcing
him to undertakings which, deeming them impossible, he would
never have dared to attempt. Race lifts a man above himself: it
endows him with extraordinaryI might almost say
supernaturalpowers. It is a fact of direct experience that the
quality of the race is of vital importance. ^^
The author proceeds further to show that the various races are
different; that there are the superior and the inferior races; and
that their difference is due not to environment, but is innate. The
most superior race is the white,particularly the Aryan race, to
which in the past belonged the Greeks and the Romans, and at
the present, the Teutons in the above indicated sense of the
word. In these respects Chamberlain's theory is similar to that of
Gobineau. Only in regard to the pure races does he differ from the
French author. As we know, Gobineau regarded any mixture of
the blood of a noble, pure race as its contamination. According to
Chamberlain,
This supposition rests upon total ignorance of the ]:)hysiological
importance of what we have to understand by "race." A noble
race does not fall from i feaven, it becomes noble gradually, and
this gradual process can begin anew at any moment. ^^
Not only the Jewish, but the Aryan, and the Teutonic races, all
emerged at the beginning from a fortunate mixture of different
races. Such fortunate mixtures may take place in the future also.
Therefore this future need not be necessarily as pessimistic as it
was depicted by Gobineau."^ The principal conditions necessary

to create a noble race through mixture are as follow^s: First, *'the
presence of excellent racial material. Where there is nothing, the
king has no right." Second, an inbreeding.
Such races as the Greeks, the Romans, the Franks, the
Swabians, the Italians, the S]xuiiar(ls in the period of their
splendour, the
2^^ IhuL, Vol. I, J)]). 261-262, 269-271 r/ srq. Sec also j). 317 et
scq. '^ Ibid., Vol. r p. 263. -'7 /hid., p. 263.
232
Moors, the English, and such abnormal phenomena as the Aryan
Indians and the Jews,only spring from continued inbreeding.
They arise and they pass away before our eyes. Inbreeding
means the producing of descendants in the circle of the related
tribesmen, with the avoidance of all foreign mixture of blood.
Third, "artificial selection": that is, the elimination or hindering of
the procreation of the inferior part of a race and the facilitation of
that of the superior individuals. Fourth, the crossing of blood with
other homogeneous racial groups. Fifth, ''only quitf^ definite,
limited mixture of blood contributes towards the ennoblement of a
race, or, it may be, the origin of a new one." ^^ All known powerful
and noble races sprang up under the operation of these five
conditions.
Having given these principles. Chamberlain proceeds to his
detailed analysis of the race and the contributions of the Greeks
and the Romans. Beginning with the period of ''The Chaos," at the
beginning of the Middle Ages, he traces the origin and
appearance of the Teutonic race; and the origin and entering of
the Jews into Western history. On the one hand, the author
admires the Jews for their preservation of racial purity, seeing in it
the source of the increasing power of the Jews. On the other
hand, like Gobineau and many others, he stresses their
pernicious influence on our civilization. They remain always "the
aliens among all peoples." With the help of the princes and the
nobles who need their money, the Jews have always been the
cruel exploiters and merciless destroyers of all nations.
The Indo-European, moved by ideal motives, opened the gates in
friendship: the Jew rushed in like an enemy, stormed all positions
and planted the flag of his, to us, alien nature I will not say on
the ruins, but on the breaches of our genuine individuality.
Wherever the Jews are admitted to power, they abuse it.-^
Owing to the humanitarianism, generosity, and disregard of the
racial problem on the part of the Indo-Europeans for the last
centuries, the influence of the Jews has been increasing and our
time may be styled "The Jewish Age."
28 Ibid., pp. 276-289.
" Ibid., pp. 330, 345, and the whole of Chap. V.
233
ANTHROPO-RACIAL, SELECTIONIST, HEREDITARIST 23S
The Teutons, representing a fortunate mixture of different Aryan
races, are the real creators of the civihzation of the nineteenth
century. Tall, fair, long-headed, they have been the bearers of
courageous, energetic, inventive minds, and especially also of
loyalty and freedom. ''Freedom and loyalty are the two roots of the
Germanic nature." ^*^ Having assimilated the heritage of the past
civilizations, they have created the new, splendid, beautiful, and
great civilization of ours.^^ Luther. Immanuel Kant, Newton,
Charlemagne, Shakespeare, Dante, Nelson, Montesquieu, R.

Wagner, and practically all the great leaders of the Middle Ages
and of the new period have been Teutons. In the previous
centuries the Teutons struggled and mastered all the other halfbreeds and the Jews. At the present moment, the struggle
between the Teutons and the Jews and other non-Teutons is
being continued.
No arguing about ''humanity" can alter the fact of the struggle.
Where the struggle is not waged with cannon-balls, it goes on
silently in the heart of society by marriages, by the annihilation of
distances which further intercourse, by the varying powers of
resistance in the different types of mankind, by the shifting of
wealth, by the birth of new influences and the disappearance of
others, and by many other motive powers. But this struggle, silent
though it be, is above all others a struggle for life and death. ^Such is in essence this racial philosophy of history. His book
touches many other important problems, and gives many
interesting theories and interpretations, but we shall pass them
by, because they do not have a direct relation to the racial theory
in sociology.
3. THE KACIAL-ANTIIROPOMETRICAL BRANCH OF THE
SCHOOL
Before mentioning other works which have stressed the racial
factor principally on the basis of historical evidences, let us turn to
that branch of the school which has emphasized the importance
of the race factor, principally on the basis of the data of
anthropometry. The leading roles in this field have been played by
the works of a French anthropologist and biologist, G. Vasher de
Lapouge, and by a German anthropologist, Otto Amnion, not to
234

mention other names. Their works have given a great impetus to
the racial school, which tries to base its contentions on a new
foundation, that is, on the data of anthropometry and biology.
Through their works, the conception of the superior and the
inferior races has become somewhat more definite. Let us briefly
outline the essentials of their works.
G. V. de Lapouge.^^ Of his numerous researches, the most
important are summed up in his three books, the conclusions of
which are now given: Les selections sociales (Paris, 1896),
UAryen, son role social (Paris, 1899) and Race et milieu social
(Paris, 1909). In spite of the one-sidedness of these works, they
belong to the type of books which are stamped by originality,
independence of opinion, and erudition. From the sociological
standpoint, the more interesting is the first book. It is opened with
a discussion of Darwinism in social sciences. In regard to race,
the author's starting point is that any population or any individual
has in its veins the blood of numerous and various races. The
number of the ancestors of every man, if they are traced back to
the time of Jesus Christ, is no less than 18,014,S^2>^ZZ2>yZ?>2>y?)ZZ' I^ ^^ go further back, the number
rapidly increases to an unthinkable figure. This means that there
is no pure race in the absolute sense of the word.^^ This,
however, does not mean that there do not exist different races in
a relative sense of the word. Many crossings are purely incidental
and cannot alter seriously either the purity of a race or its
dominant characteristics. This is ascertained by the existence of
races with different bodily, psychical, and physiological
characteristics.^'' The population of Europe consists of three
principal races, the word *'race" being taken in its zoological
sense. The first race is Homo Europaeiis, or the Aryan race. Its
characteristics are a tall stature (about im. 70), conspicuously
dolichocephalic index, 76 and below, and blondness.

Corresponding psychological traits are as follows:
A dolichocephal has great wishes and incessantly works to satisfy
33 Concerning his works see Kovalevsky, M., Contemporary
Sociologists^ Chap. VIII; Hankins, op. cit., Chap. V., and works
indicated further. 3^ Les selections sociales^ pp. 3-4. ^ Ibid., pp.
4-8.
235
them. He is capable rather of gaining than of preserving wealth.
Being audacious in his temperament, he dares everything, and
through this audacity achieves an incomparable success. He
fights for the sake of fighting without a back-thought of profit. The
whole earth is his own and the whole planet is his country. His
intelligence may vary from dullness to genius. There is nothing
that he does not dare to think or desire, and desire for him means
to realize it at once. Progress is his most intense need. In religion
he is a Protestant. In politics he demands from the State only the
respect of his activity, and tends rather to rise himself, than to
oppress others.^*''
The second principal race is the Homo Alpinus. His
characteristics include a stature of from im. 60 to im. 65, and a
cephalic index of 85 and above. Pigmentation is brown or even
lighter. This is a typical man of the brachycephalic race:
He is frugal, laborious, remarkably prudent, and does not leave
anything to chance. Not lacking in courage, yet he does not have
a militant proclivity. He loves land and especially his native place.
Being rarely a nullity, at the same time he rarely rises to a level of
talent. His mental vistas are limited and he patiently works to
realize his moderate purposes. He is a man of tradition and

common sense. He does not like progress. He adores uniformity.
In religion he prefers to be a Roman Catholic; in politics he craves
for State protection and interference, and for equality and
levelling. He sees excellently his personal interests, and partly
those of his family, but the interests of the whole country are
beyond his mental perspective. ^^
The third race is Homo Contractus, or Mediterranean. He has a
low stature, dark color, and a cephalic index of about 78. He
represents something midway between the two above races.
According to his characteristics he must be ranked below even
Homo AlpinusP
Such are the principal racial types of the European population, the
most important racial characteristics of which are the cephalic
index and pigmentation. The combination of these bodily traits is
connected with corresponding psychical and mental
characteristics. This correlation is so close that the author says:
The strength of a character depends upon the length of cranium
and brain. When the cranium is less than 0.19, the race lacks
energy.
^ Ibid., pp. I3-I4 ^^ Ibid., pj). 17-18. ^^ Ibid., pp. 23-28.
236
Such is the case with the brachycephahc race, which is
characterized by insufficiency of individuahty and initiative.
Intellectual power, on the contrary, seems to be correlated with
the breadth of the anterior part of the brain. Certain
dolichocephals whose cephalic index is too low seem to be
incapable of rising above barbarism. I do not know any superior
people whose cephalic index would be below 74. An interval of a

dozen units separates this limit of sufficient intelligence and
maximal energy from that where the energy is insufficient. ^^
Having given these racial characteristics, Lapouge proceeds to
show that practically all important achievements of culture have
been made by the Homo Eiiropaeiis, the Nordic, or the Aryan
race. They have been the leaders in every creative activity, and
otherwise the dominant race. Within the same society the upper
classes are composed predominantly of this race, while the lower
classes are composed of the other two races or their mixture.
There are racial differences, not only among various societies, but
among various social classes of the same society, too.
Correspondingly, the progress or regress of a society is
determined principally by changes in the racial composition of its
population. If the Nordic racial elements increase among it,
society progresses, but if, on the contrary, its proportion
decreases,if, in other words, the cephalic index of the
population becomes less and less dolichocephalic, this will result
in a social regress and decay of the society.^^ These
generalizations are corroborated by various and different
anthropometrical data. They are intended to show that the
cephalic index of the ancient aristocracy (and partly even of the
contemporary one) has been lowêr (more dolichocephalic) than
that of the lower social classes; that a more progressive city
population has a more dolichocephalic index than that of a more
backward country population; that in Greece and in Rome,
parallel to the development of decay, the cephalic index of the
population had been rising; that among contemporary societies,
the most progressive have been those, in which, as in England
and the United States of America, the population has been rich in
the Nordic elements; that in France and in other countries during
the last few centuries, a decrease of
237

the Nordic elements in the population has been accompanied by
the process of decay; and so on. (See the Social selections and
VAryen, passim.) On the basis of these data of anthropometry,
Lapouge comes to conclusions similar to those of Gobineau about
the role of the racial factor in the evolution of a country and a
civilization.
Having formulated these conclusions, the author asked how these
changes in the racial composition of a population could have
happened. What factors are responsible for them? Why is it that a
dolichocephalic race could not and cannot keep its own proportion
within many societies ? The answer to these questions leads us
to the second, and from my point of view, to the more valuable
part of the theory of Lapouge,that is, his theory of social
selection.
Changes in the population are possible either through the direct
influence of environmental agencies which may modify, step by
step, the bodily and mental traits of a population; or through
selection,that is, through a progressive decrease of certain
racial elements and a progressive multiplication of other racial
(hereditary) types in the population. The first way does not lead
directly to a change of the racial (hereditary) type, but it may lead
to it in a long period of time. The other way may change the racial
(hereditary) composition of the population very efficiently, and in a
relatively short period of time. In order to show this, the author
analyzes the principal environmental agencies. He takes
education and tries to show that its efficiency in this respect is
very limited. It cannot change the race and the inherited traits of
the population. It cannot make out of an innately stupid man, a
talented one; out of an inborn idiot, an averagely intelligent man;
or out of mediocrity, a genius. The best that education can do is to
raise the mental level of mediocrity a little. But even in this respect
its possibilities are limited. The importance of heredity is shown in

the fact that education does not diminish the differences between
individuals, but rather increases them. If a mediocre talent gains
something by education, hereditary talent gains still more, so that
after the education, the difference between the former and the
latter increases, but does not decrease. Education, furthermore, is
incapable of changing the tempera238
ment, the character, and the moral traits of people. This is
witnessed by the fact that, in spite of a great increase of schools
and educational institutions, the number of crimes has not
diminished, but has rather increased. The cranial capacity also
has not increased, but rather decreased during the last few
decades. Finally, the results of education are not inherited;
therefore, its fruits cannot be transmitted and fixed into posterity.
These considerations must show that the educational factor is
very limited in its efficiency to transform the race of a people.
More efficient is the influence of climate, as an environmental
agency. Important also are the modifying agencies of food,
alcohol, intermarriage, and some other environmental agencies in
the alteration of the racial type of the population. Taken
independently of selection, however, they would require hundreds
of years to perform a noticeable change in the racial type of a
people. For this reason their direct efficiency is limited. If it is
somewhat greater, this is due to the indirect influence exerted
through the channels of selection.''^ ^The most important, rapid,
and efficient way of changing the racial composition of a
population is not by the direct influence of environment, but by a
selection which will lead to a survival and multiplication of one
racial type, and to the extermination of another type. Through
selection, the proportions of different racial types in a population
may be changed greatly, and within relatively a few generations. If

we imagine two different families, one producing four surviving
children in each generation and the other only three offspring,
then in the course of about three hundred years, the total
population will be 93 per cent the offspring of the first family, and
7 per cent that of the second.'*^ This shows how rapidly the factor
of selection works, and how efficient it is in changing the racial
composition of a population. The degeneration or improvement of
society has been due not so much to the direct influence of
environment as to the factor of selection.
This leads to Lapouge's analysis of selection. He accepts
Darwin's theory of natural selection and the evolution of
organisms through the play of this factor, or through the
elimination of the unfit and survival of the fittest. Among human
beings,
239
however, he beHeves natural selection gives more and more
place to social selection, natural environment being gradually
superseded by social milieu. Therefore, natural selection is
transformed into a social one, that is, the selection which goes on
under the influence not so much of natural, as of social
environment."*^ In the subsequent parts of his book, Lapouge
analyzes the principal forms and effects of social selection within
the past and especially in the present societies. As natural
selection may be progressive and regressive, so may social
selection lead to a degeneration or to a betterment of the racial
(hereditary) composition of the population. Its dominant effects,
however, are negative within present societies.
The first fundamental form of social selection is military, or the
selection caused by war. Contrary to general opinion, Lapouge
contends that wars do not decrease, but increase with the

progress of civilization. Man is more warlike than any animal and
contemporary man is more warlike than prehistoric man. With the
exception of primitive times, war carries away the best racial
elements of the population,the healthiest, the strongest, the
bravest, and the most audacious dolichocephals,in much
greater proportion than the inferior and the brachycephalic
population. It facilitates the elimination of the belligerent Aryans
and the survival of the Alpine or the Mediterranean races. In this
military way the Aryans of ancient Greece and Rome, and the
Nordic nobility of Gallia and of the Middle Ages perished to a
great extent. As the Nordics are more belligerent and
independent, they have been the greatest sufferers from war.
Hence, if the fertility of these racial elements does not
compensate for the losses of war, or should their propagation be
retarded in comparison with that of other races, war leads to
degeneration, that is, an extermination of the Aryan race in a
society.'*"*
The second form of social selection is political, performed under
the influence of political factors and political struggles. Its results
are also negative. Through revolution and civil strife, this selection
facilitates an extermination of the best part of the ])opulation
among both the aristocracy and the people. Again, the Nordics,
who usually happen to be in both struggling factions,
Ibid., Chap. VI. ^4 //^j^^ pp 207 el scq.
240
perish in a greater proportion than do the other racial groups. To
this factor is greatly due the extermination of the Aryan
aristocracy in ancient Greece and Rome, in the French
Revolution, and in other similar cases. Further, in the past, but
more especially in the present, political conditions have facilitated

the social promotion of nullities, servile people, machinators, and
politicians, while they have suppressed, especially in
democracies, the social promotion of independent and creative
minds. Through the political strife of parties, the chances of
survival and procreation of such people are handicapped.
Machinators, demagogues, politicians, who rarely belong to the
best and creative type of men, greatly profit through this form of
selection, while the best people, keeping themselves out of
politics, rather suffer from such conditions.^^*
The third form of social selection is religions, which is due to the
religious conditions. Religion leads directly to selection through
the institution of celibacy required by several religions; and
indirectly, through various religious institutions. In many religions
the priests and the clergy must be celibate. This means that they
cannot leave, at least legally, any posterity. As has been proved
many times, church officials recruited from various social strata
are usually superior physically, morally, and mentally to other
people. Celibacy of this superior group prevents it from leaving
superior posterity. In this way, celibacy impoverishes the fund of
the superior racial elements of a population and facilitates its
racial degeneration. From this standpoint, Mohammedanism with
its polygamy is more eugenic than Christianity, especially, the
Roman Catholic denomination. Religion leads to the same
disgenic result through religious persecution, wars, and
inquisition; and through the prohibition of sexual freedom, by
favoring asceticism, its prohibition of marriages with those who
have a dift'erent religion, and so on.'*^
The fourth form of social selection is moral, due to moral
obligations and rules of conduct. It is closely connected with
religious selection. It manifests itself in such phenomena as the
repression and chastisement of sexual liberty, as the demands of
decency, and as opposition to bodily nakedness, resulting in our

Ihid., pp. 243 et seq. "^ Ibid., pp. 263 et seq.
241
covering ourselves with unhygienic clothes which hinder free
breathing, bar the beneficial influence of the sun and fresh air,
and facilitate tuberculosis and other sicknesses. In addition,
through philanthropy and its propaganda, moral rules facilitate the
survival of the weak and the procreation of the inferior. In such
ways morals contribute a great deal to negative social selection.^^
The next form of social selection is juridical, being performed by
law and law machinery. It operates through criminal law and the
punishment of offenders by execution, imprisonment, banishment,
ostracizing, and torture. Many of these offenders are political and
this form of selection especially, often has negative effects,
because its victims many times include people of superior
character. Juridical selection operates further through civil law
and its machinery, forbidding consanguineous marriages between
relatives, and punishing bigamy and polygamy. Civil law prevents
talented people from keeping purity of blood, and procreating
more intensively, while it facilitates such disgenic institutions as
prostitution.'*^
The sixth form of social selection is economic, due to the struggle
for material necessities. For the best racial elements its results
are disastrous also, because the superior people do not care
much about money-making, and, as a result, the successful
money-makers are rarely superior men. Enrichment is often the
result of luck, or dishonesty, or cupidity, or machinations and
manipulations. Within present societies the ''machinators,"
especially the Jews, concentrate wealth. Through wealth they rise
to the top of the social pyramid, and procreate themselves, while
the mentally and morally superior individuals must limit their

posterity to meet their own conditions. Many of them do not marry
at all. In this way these precious racial elements are lost and the
racial fund of a society is impoverished. Marriages dictated by
economic reasons lead to the same result when a racially
superior, but poor individual takes a rich, but racially inferior man
or woman as his mate. In this and in similar ways the present
"plutocratic" regime facilitates the procreation of the inferior and
hinders that of tht superior ])eople. A regime based on wealth is
the worst enemy of racial progress."*^ '' Ibid., Chap. XI. " Ibid.,
Chap. Xir. " Ibid., Chap. XIII.
242
The seventh form of social selection is occupational, called forth
by occupational differentiation of the population. Its effects are
again negative. Vital statistics show that the more qualified
occupational groups have a lower fecundity than the semi-skilled
and the unskilled groups. As the people engaged in the qualified
occupations are more dolichocephalic than the people in unskilled
occupations, this means that occupational selection facilitates the
procreation of brachycephals and handicaps that of
dolichocephals. It leads to the same racial degeneration to which
lead other forms of social selection.^^
The next form of social selection is performed by urban and rural
differentiation. Growth of the cities and industrialization calls forth
a permanent migration of the country population to the cities. The
rural migrants are dominantly more dolichocephalic than those
who remain in the country. The migrants, as a rule, are more
energetic, enterprising, talented, and superior, than those wiio
remain in the country. Cities permanently drain the best elements
of the country population, and having drawn them from the
country, they make them relatively sterile, either through city vice
and sickness, or through their own voluntary restriction of fertility

for the sake of social promotion. In this way urban selection
diminishes the chances for the procreation of a relatively superior
and more dolichocephalic people.
Such, according to Lapouge, are the principal forms of social
selections and their factors. I have only outlined, schematically,
what Lapouge brilliantly develops on many pages, full of
statistical, historical, and psychological data. (The result of all
these selections is negative. They lead to an extermination of the
Aryan elements within present societies, followed by their racial
degeneration and ultimate decay. Excepting in Anglo-Saxon
countries, where the Aryans are still in abundance, this race is
already in the minority. Even among the upper classes they have
been supplanted by a new brachycephalic aristocracy,
representing the posterity of saloon-keepers, money-makers, and
other racially inferior elements who promoted themselves owing
to negative social selections. The triumph of mediocrity,
demagogy, machinations, and the inability to create new, real
values and to achieve
243
a real progress form the characteristics of our time and our
culture. These are nothing but the symptoms of the beginning
decay of Western civilization. Only in the Anglo-Saxon countries
is the situation any better, and even there the condition is
temporary, because, under present social conditions, the Aryans
are doomed to extermination.
The above leads the author to his criticism of the Utopia of
progress, and to the formulation of his law of the quicker
destruction of the more perfect racial elements.^^ The concept of
progress is a mere Utopia. Astronomy, paleontology, biology, and
history testify against it. Astronomy tells us that the sun is

becoming colder and that when it becomes cold, life on the earth,
and consequently, the continuation of human history, will become
impossible. Paleontology witnesses that in the course of the
evolution of life many perfect species have perished, being unable
to adapt themselves to the environment which much more
primitive species have survived. Biology proves that selection
may go on in regressive, as well as in progressive directions.
History testifies that many a brilliant civilization has perished and
many peoples, after a period of progress, have decayed.''^ All
these undeniable facts show the chimerical character of the belief
in progress, or of a perpetual betterment of mankind in the course
of time. They also indicate that the more perfect organisms are
liable to perish more easily than the less perfect or more primitive
species. The social selection and elimination of the superior racial
elements in a population, in favor of the inferior races, is only a
particular form of this general phenomenon of the easier
destruction of the more perfect forms in favor of the less perfect.
The Aryan race has created almost all that is valuable in culture
and civilization. Almost the whole of human progress is due to it;
but these achievements and this progress have cost very much.
They are now being paid for, and the price demanded is the
destruction of this creative race itself. Now this process is
approaching its end. The Aryan race has been rapidly
disappearing and at the present moment it composes only a small
fraction of the whole human population. Through some special
eugenic measures, namely, the creation of a natural aristocracy
according to '1 Ibid., Chap. XV. " Ibid., pp. 443 et seq.
244
the innate qualities of individuals, and through its inbreeding, its
greater procreation and organization in a new dominant racial
caste, it would be possible to slow the process of racial

degeneration, but there is not much hope of realizing these
measures, and, even at best, they would only serve to postpone,
but not to avert, the elimination of the Aryans.
Such is the essence of the principal work of Lapouge. In his
UAryen and Le race et milieu social, as well as in his numerous
researches, he did not add anything substantially new to the
principles given in Les selections sociales. In L'Aryen, Lapouge
skillfully summed up the principal ''laws" elaborated by himself
and his collaborators. These laws will be given later on, after the
characteristics of the theories of Otto Amnion and George Hansen
have been disposed of.
Otfo Amnion. The second founder of the *'Antliropo-soci-ology"
is a prominent German anthropologist. Otto Amnion. His works
began to appear almost at the same time as those of Lapouge. At
the beginning they worked independent of each other, but
somewhat later they came across the works of each other, and,
after that, they began to cooperate in a popularization of their
similar theories. Ammon began his scientific work with an
anthropometric measurement of the recruits of the Grand Duchy
of Baden in 1886.^^ These measurements have shown that the
percentage of dolichocephals among the recruits of the cities
(Heidelberg, Karlsruhe, Mannheim and so on) was much higher
than among the recruits of the country, while the per cent of the
brachycephals was in reverse proportion. This result was quite
unexpected for Ammon himself, and he did not know at that
moment whether it was due to the direct influence of the city
environment or to a special selection of the city population. As a
naturalist he thought he should test both possible theories, and he
undertook such a test. He began by making further very careful
anthropometric measurements of the students of the gymnasiums
(high schools) and the recruits of Karlsruhe and Fri-
^3 Its results were published by Ammon in his Anthropologische

Untersuchungen der Wehrpflichtigen in Baden, Hamburg, Richter,
1890. A short resume of the evolution of the theories of Ammon in
connection with the works of Lapouge is given by Ammon in his
paper, "Histoire d'une idee. L'Anthroposociologie," in Revue
international de sociologie, Vol. VI, 1898, pp. 145-181.
245
burg, with strong separation of the people measured according to
their, and their parents', social position and according to their
country or city origin. The results showed that the per cent of
dolichocephals was again higher in the city population than in that
of the country; that it was higher among those who migrated from
the country than among those who remained sedentary; and that
the upper social classes were more dolichocephalic than the
lower ones.^^ These facts, being unaccountable through direct f
influence of the city environment, could be explained only through
admission of selection. Amnion's explanation consists in the
admission that the dolichocephals dominate among those who
migrate from the country to the city. In other words,
dolichocephals are more migratory than the brachycephals. This
accounts for the predominance of the dolichocephalic type in city
population composed of such dolichocephalic migrants, as
compared with the country population. This form of selection is
facilitated by an additional one which goes on in the cities,
namely, by the fact that the brachycephals die out in the cities
more rapidly than the dolichocephals, and that the dolichocephals
climb up the social ladder in the cities more successfully than the
brachycephals. The results obtained by these measurements may
be accounted for by the hypothesis of selection. In this inductive
way Amnion came to conclusions similar to those of Lapouge and
George Hansen.^^
In his Die drei Bevolkerungsstiifen (first edition in 1889) George

Hansen tried to show that the population of cities could not keep
its biological balance if there were not a permanent influx of the
country migrants to them. Their population would otherwise die
out within two or three generations. Since this is not the case the
cause must be the migration of the country people to the cities.
The cities are incessantly draining the surplus and the best
elements of the country population. The country migrants, having
come to the city, usually enter the middle social strata; part of
them climb up further. Having climbed, they become sterile, and
die out, another part then dropping into the class of the proletariat.
Thus, contrary to K. Marx's theory
" The detailed results of this study were published by Ammon in
his book, Die Natilrliche Auslese heim Menshen, Jena, 1893, G.
Fischer. " See Ammon, Ilistoirc d'une idee, pp. 152-157.
246
there are not three, but only two principal social classes: the class
of the agriculturists (farmers, landowners, peasants) and the class
of the city proletariat; for the city middle and upper classes
represent only a temporary transitional stage, of passage of the
country migrants from the class of the agriculturists to that of the
proletariat. Eventually the city drains all the valuable elements of
the country population, and then a decay of the corresponding
society becomes imminent.
Hansen's and Lapouge's theories helped Ammon to understand
the general significance of the data disclosed by the above
observations. Such was the way of Ammon's coming to
conclusions similar to those of Lapouge and, later on, of his
becoming one of the most prominent leaders of this school.
Although agreeing substantially with the principles of Lapouge's
theory, Ammon, nevertheless, stressed some points of difference.

This was due in the first place to a greater accuracy and
cautiousness of Ammon than of Lapouge. Contrary to Lapouge he
indicated that even if dominance of the dolichocephals in the city
population and in the upper classes is certain, the same cannot
be said about pigmentation. Dolichocephals need not necessarily
be blond in order to make a success in the city, and the same
may be said of the dolichocephalic migrants from the country to
the city. Further, contrary to Gobineau and partly to Lapouge,
Ammon admits that a slight mixture of bracliycephalic blood in the
dolichocephals may be a rather favorable condition for scientific
and similar activities. Contrary to Hansen, Ammon statistically
showed that Hansen's time limit of two generations, within which
the city population without an infiux of the country migrants would
disappear, is too short. Again, he indicated that the country
migrants, having come to the city, enter not the middle classes, as
Hansen thought, but from three-quarters to four-fifths of them
enter the proletariat class at the beginning. Only during the next
generations do their offspring gradually climb up, and climbing,
become less and less prolific. He stressed also that within present
cities, the brachycephalic population dies out more rapidly than
the dolichocephalic type, though finally, the dolichocephals are to
die out also.^^
^ Ammon, Histoire d'une idee, pp. 156-157.
247
Going gradually from a special type of research to more general
problems Ammon published in 1895 his general sociological
theory in the book: Die Gesellschaftsordming nnd Hire nati'irlichen Grmidlagen -(Social Order and its Natural Foundations)."'^
The essential points of this partly theoretical, partly propagandist
book, are as follows: The principal defect of the existing
sociological theories, Ammon says, has been their purely

economic approach to social problems. The human being is, in
the first place, an organism with certain qualities, and human
society is a biological phenomenon in its essence; therefore, the
biological approach to an interpretation of social phenomena
seems to be necessary. This biological approach is provided by
the principles of Darwin's theory. Heredity, variability, struggle for
life, natural selection, and survival of the fittest, furnish the
principles of Darwinism, which ought to be applied for an
interpretation of social life also ( 1-9). They explain that social
life appears only among such species as those for which social
existence is useful from the standpoint of survival, among w^hich
are human beings. They show further that human beings are
unequal from physical, mental, and moral viewpoints. This
inequality is due mainly to the factor of heredity. Genius, talent,
and any specific ability is primarily a result of heredity. Every
society being in need of men of genius for its success in the
struggle for existence, and men of genius being rare, it is in the
interests of society to facilitate their production. To be successful
in the struggle for existence, society must approach a type
wherein all its members would be appointed to such positions as
would be the most suitable for their abilities. Social order and
social institutions, which make such a social distribution of its
members, are not something incidental, but represent a wonderful
machinery created in the course of generations to carry on
successfully the struggle for existence ( lo-ii). Reminding us of
these principles, Ammon proceeds to interpret fundamental social
phenomena from this standpoint. His interpretation leads him to
an exclusively high appreciation of the existing social order and its
wonderful character. Since human beings are naturally unequal, it
is only natural that there should " I give quotations according to its
third edition, Jena, 1900, G. Fisher.
248

be no social equality. Since men of genius and leaders are
necessary for the existence of any society, it is only reasonable
that societies should have created many institutions whose
purpose has been to facilitate their production. This* purpose has
been achieved on a large scale through the creation of a social
stratification of the population into the upper and the lower
classes, and in the prohibition or avoidance of interclass
marriages. Thus, social stratification is completely justified from
the biological standpoint. Since the best social order is that in
which every member is put in such a position and to such work as
corresponds to his innate ability, in every society there must exist
special machinery which tests the individuals, sifts them, and
appoints them to a suitable place and social stratum. Such a
mechanism really exists. It functions in the form of schools which
sift the incapable from the capable, hinder the incapable's social
climbing, and facilitate the social promotion of the capable.
Further, such a mechanism functions in the form of different
religious, occupational, or institutional test examinations, and
other handicaps which it is necessary to overcome before a
relatively high social position may be occupied. Those who are
talented successfully will pass such obstacles and climb up; those
who are stupid will fail, and must remain in a relatively low social
position. Police, criminal justice, and punishment are further forms
of this machinery which is designed to exterminate the moral and
social failures, and through this to perform a social selection. This
social selection is only a particular form of natural selection, and it
is inevitable, in view of the inequality of individuals ( 13-14). It is
useful for a society because it permits the shifting of the capable
from the incapal^le and because it places everybody socially
according to his quality. Its natural result is the existence of social
strata and social inequality. Such is their origin and their
justification. Amnion indicates other reasons for the organization
of social strata (23 et scq.). One of them is to facilitate the
inbreeding of the natural aristocracy by the hindering of crossmarriages, and, in this way, to increase the chances for the
production of men of genius. The second useful effect of the
separation of the upper and the lower classes is that it permits
talented children of the aristocracv to avoid the vices and evils
249
of the lowest classes, while at the same time putting some
obstacles in the way of easy climbing from the lower classes to
the upper. Interclass barriers hinder the infiltration of incapable
climbers into the upper strata while the capable can overcome
these handicaps. The third benefit of such a stratification is that,
thanks to the privileges of the upper classes, they have the
material comfort absolutely necessary for a successful
performance of the intellectual work of these classes. Better food,
air, and other comforts are necessary for the right performance of
the responsible social functions of the upper classes, while the
same conditions are not so necessary for a successful
performance of the unskilled work of the lower classes. The fourth
benefit is that the privileges of the upper classes are efficient
incentives for talented people among the lower classes to exert
their talents to climb up to the upper strata. From such exertion,
individuals and the whole society are greatly benefited. From the
above it is clear that, in the opinion of Ammon, social stratification
and unequal distribution of wealth are quite beneficial, useful,
necessary, and therefore entirely justified. He indicates that the
distribution of income and intelligence in a society are closely
correlated, and that the one form of inequality is but a
manifestation of the other. Summing up this part, Ammon
stresses that all in all the existing social order is extraordinarily
fine, and much better than any ''rational" system invented by
anybody.
This analysis leads Ammon to the second part of his book. Here
he indicates that at the basis of social stratification lies the racial
differences of individuals. Using some historical and anthropometrical data, he contends that the upper strata have been
composed of the Aryans, while the lower social classes have
been principally brachycephalic (S 27 et seq.). Here he gives the
conclusions which I have already mentioned, which are the
theories of migration from the country to the city; the dying-out
process of the upper strata; the filling of their places by the
climbers from the lower classes; the decrease of the fertility of the
offspring of these climbers in the following generations; the
process of their dying out; their replacement by the new climbers;
and so on. In this way a permanent migration from the city to the
country, and a permanent circulation from the bottom to the top of
a society
250
is constantly going on. The principal resource from which have
been recruited the future climbers has been the class of
peasantry. Thanks to the existence of barriers, only the talented
upstarts may climb up successfully; and besides, as a general
rule, they can climb only gradually, during the time of several
generations. This is again beneficial to society. Up to this point, as
we may see, the theory of Amnion is very optimistic,he finds the
existing social order almost perfect. Does this mean that his
prospects concerning the future are also optimistic? Ammon
indicates that, unfortunately, the proportion of Aryans has been
decreasing. At the end of the nineteenth century in Baden they
were already only 1.45 per cent of the total population (p. 132). At
the most they can now only be found in the upper classes of
society. In the opinion of Ammon such a fact is an additional
reason to do everything possible to preserve this superior race
from disappearance. According to Ammon the future is not very

hopeful, and he agrees in essence with the law of decay given by
Lapouge. On the other hand, he states that as long as the
peasant class has a high fertility, there will be a possibility of filling
the vacant places left by a dying-out aristocracy from the talented
and severely selected country migrants and their offspring.
These are the essential points of Amnion's book. Its second part
is devoted to rather political and propagandist purposes, in which
Amnion strongly criticizes socialism, egalitarianism, and other
similar theories and institutions. We need not enter into these
details.
Laws of Lapouge-Amnion. The best summary of these theories
is a list of the laws which their authors claim as the scientific
contribution and in which they try to sum up their principal
generalizations. In Lapouge's formulation these laws run as
follows :^^
I. Law of Wealth-Distribution. In a country with a mixed AryanAlpine population, the wealth increases in reverse relation to the
cephalic index. (This means that the more dolichocephalic is the
population of a class or a region of the country, the greater is the
wealth held by these groups, and znce versa.)
58 See Lapouge, L'Aryen, pp. 412 et seq. See also Closson, C.
C, "La hierarchic des races europeennes," Revue international de
sociologie, 1898, pp. 416-430.
251
2. Law of Altitudes. In the regions where the Nordic race coexists
with the Alpine race, the Nordic race locaHzes in the lowest
altitudes (in the plains but not in the mountainous regions).
3. Law of Distribution of the Cities. The most important cities are

almost always situated in the region inhabited by the
dolichocephals, and in the least brachycephalic parts of the
brachy-cephalic regions.
4. Law of Urban Index. The cephalic index of an urban population
is lower than that of the country population around the city.
5. Law of Emigration. In a population which is going to dissociate
it is the least brachycephalic elements which emigrate.
6. Law of Cross-Marriages (Loi des formariages). The cephalic
index of the offspring of those parents who have different regions
of origin is less high than the average index of the population of
these regions. This means that the less brachycephalic elements
of a population are more inclined to migrate and marry mates
outside of their region.
7. Law of the Concentration of the Dolichocephals. In the regions
where the brachycephalic type exists, it tends to concentrate in
the country, while the dolichocephals tend more to the city.
8. Lazv of Urban Elimination. Urban life tends to perform a
selection in favor of the dolichocephals, and destroys or
eliminates the most brachycephalic elements.
9. Law of Stratification. The cephalic index decreases as we
proceed from the lower to the upper social classes of the same
locality. The average stature and the proportion of the high
statures increase as we proceed from the lower to the higher
strata.
10. Lazv of the Intellectuals. The cranium of the intellectuals is
more developed in all its directions, and especially in its breadth,
than is that of a common people.
11. Law of the Increase of Index. Since prehistoric times the

cephalic index has tended to increase constantly and everywhere.
By this statement of the "laws" we will conclude our discussion of
the characteristics of these theories
252
4. BIOMETRIC BRANCH OF THE SCHOOL
The third principal branch of the anthropo-racial school is
represented by the biometrical school, the ideas of which are set
forth principally in the works of Sir Francis Galton and continued
by Karl Pearson and his followers. Having started its studies with
an investigation of individual differences among men, this branch
has concentrated its attention on the study of heredity. These
studies resulted in many generalizations of a purely sociological
character, similar to the fundamental conclusions of other
branches of the school.
Sir Francis Galton (1822-1911).Among other scientists, a
famous Belgian statistician, Adolph Ouetelet ^^ and Charles
Darwin had especially great influence upon Galton and his works.
To Quetelet he is indebted for an application, and the perfection
of a quantitative study of individual differences and phenomena of
heredity and talent. To Darwin he is indebted for many general
principles applied by Galton in his theories of selection and
variation. The principal works of Galton which are important from
the sociological standpoint are: Hereditary Genius (first ed. in
1869. I use the edition of 1892, London) ; English Men of Science
(1874); Inquiries into Human Faculty and Its Development (1883);
Natural Inheritance (1889) and Noteworthy Families written in
conjunction with E. Schuster (1906).
Various and different as were the problems studied by Galton, he

stressed, none the less, in all his works, several fundamental
ideas already set forth in his early work, Hereditary Genius. These
ideas may possibly be summed up in the following way:
1. Human individuals are different in their bodily, as well as in
their psychological characteristics. They vary in stature, weight,
pigmentation, health, energy, sensitivity, power of hearing, mental
imagery, gregariousness, intelligence, ability, and so on. Contrary
to the popular idea of the equality of men, they are found to be
unequal.
2. Physical, as well as mental, characteristics are distributed
5^ See Quetelet, A., Sur Vhomme et le developpement de ses
facultes, un essaide physique sociale, 2 vols., Paris, 1835;
Anthropometrie ou measure des differentes facultes de Vhomme,
Bruxelles, 1870.
253
according to a typical curve of frequency distribution among the
individuals of the same society. From the standpoint of
intelligence, for instance, one million individuals graded according
to their intelligence from the highest genius to the most stupid,
both below and above the average, into mental classes separated
by equal intervals, will give approximately the following figures:
Grades of Natural Ability Separated by
Equal Intervals Number in Each Million
Below Average Above Average of the Same Age
a A 256,791 or I in 4
b B 162,279 or I in 6
c C 63,563 or I in i6
d D 15,696 or I in 64
e E 2,423 or I in 413
f F 233 or I in 4,300
g G 14 or I in 79,000 X (all grades below g) X (all grades above
G) i or i in i, 000, 000
On either side of average 500, 000
Total, both sides i ,000,000
More than half of each million is contained in the two mediocre
classes a and A; the four mediocre classes, a, b, A, B, contain
more than four-fifths, and six mediocre classes more than
nineteen-twentieths of the entire population. Thus the rarity of
commanding ability, and the vast abundance of mediocrity is no
accident; but follows of necessity, from the very nature of these
things. ^^
3. Individual differences are due to two principal factors,
environment and heredity, but of these two factors, the factor of
heredity is far more important. The standpoint of Galton may be
seen from the following quotations:
I acknowledge freely the great power of education and social
influences in developing the active power of mind, just as I
acknowledge the effect of use in developing the muscles of a
blacksmith's arm, and no further. Let the blacksmith labor as he
will, he will fmd there are certain feats beyond his power.*'^
A man's natural abilities are derived by inheritance, under exactly
the same limitations as are the form and ])hysical features of the
whole organic world."-
'^ Galton, F., Hereditary Genius, pp. 30-31, London, 1892.

" Ibid., pp. 12 et seq,
^2 Ibid., j)p. I et seq.; Noteworthy Families, j)p. xx et seq. ^
254
4. The bulk of Galton's studies has been devoted to proving the
decisive importance of the factor of heredity. In various ways he
indefatigably tried to show this. The principal evidences given by
him are as follows:
(a) The study of men of genius shows that talent and ability are
inherited. Hence, ''able fathers produce able children in a much
larger proportion than the generality." Galton's study of English
men of science, of men of genius, and of Fellows of the Royal
Society has shown that the families which have two or more
eminent men produce more famous men of genius than the
families with only one eminent man; and that ''the nearer kinsmen
of the eminent are far more rich in ability than the more remote."
In other words, we have "a rapid diminution in the frequency of
noteworthiness as the distance of kinship increases."
Correspondingly, "the expectation of noteworthiness in a kinsman
of a noteworthy person is greater in the following proportion than
in one who has no such kinsman: if he be a father, 24 times as
great; if a brother, 31 times; if a grandfather, 12 times; if an uncle,
14 times; if a male first cousin, 7 times; if a great-greatgrandfather
on the paternal line, 3 and a half times." ^^
(b) Specific ability, like that of a mathematician, musician, eminent
judge, or of a statesman is commonly inherited.
(c) Environment cannot create a genius out of a mediocre man;

and, on the other hand, unfortunate environment is usually
overcome by a man of talent or genius.
It is a fact, that a number of men rise before they are middleaged, from the humbler ranks of life to worldly position in which it
is of no importance to their future career just how their youth has
been passed.
At that age they have usually overcome all hindrances, and have
reached the position of those who were born into more fortunate
conditions. As a result, such men of genius, though born in
humble families, by the time of their maturity are in an equally
fortunate position as those who were born amidst comforts. For
instance, "the hindrances of English social life are not effectual in
repressing high ability. The number of eminent men in Eng*^ Hereditary Genius, pp. 53 et seq., 102 et seq.; Noteworthy
Families, pp. xli et seq.
255
land is as great as in other countries, (e.g., in the United States)
where fewer hindrances exist." ''Social hindrances cannot impede
men of high ability from becoming eminent." ''I feel convinced that
no man can achieve a very high reputation without being gifted
with very high ability." (Hereditary Genius, pp. S4et seq.)
(d) A study of twins made by Galton has shown that similar
nurture of the twins does not make them similar when the twins
are biologically unlike, and that the dissimilarity of their training
scarcely affects the similarity when they are biologically alike.
There is no escape from the conclusion that nature prevails
enormously over nurture when the differences of nurture do not
exceed what is commonly found among persons of the same rank

of society and in the same country.^^
(e) The secondary importance of environment is demonstrated
also by the fact that the same objective environment is seen and
perceived differently by people with different inheritance,
stimulating them to quite different reactions, emotions, and
interests. Furthermore, different environments often produce
similar types of personality with great similarity in achievement,
and "c'ice versa, for from very similar environments often come
quite different types of personalities with entirely different
characteristics.
Such is the principal series of facts and statements which led
Galton to the conclusion that the factor of heredity is more
important than that of environment.
5. Having shown the differences among individuals, Galton
applies the same principle to groups and races. In his works he
indicated that the upper and the lower strata of a society are not
equal in regard to ability; that the upper strata have produced
more men of genius and talent than the lower strata; and that
such a difference is due not so nuich to dift'erent environment as
to heredity. Races are also une(iual. If we judge their ability
according to the number of the men of genius produced per a
definite number of population, then it is clear that the ancient
Greeks in Athens, especially in the period from 530 to 430 B.C.,
produced one genius of the first class per about 4,822 or even per
*"* Inquiries into Ilumnn Fiuulty, \>\). i^^-ij."^.
256
3,214 population, while in England, this number of population per

genius is much higher. As to the negroes, they have not been
able to produce any man of genius in their whole history.^^
6. From the above it follows that the historical destinies of a
society are primarily determined by the changes in the hereditary
qualities of its population, or in other words, through selection.
Environmental changes taken separately have only secondary
importance, and are rather the result than the cause of the
changes in the hereditary qualities of the population. In this way
Galton laid down the theory of selection and of racial factors
which greatly influenced Ammon, Lapouge and other partizans of
the anthropometrical school. Furthermore, Galton's works have
given a great impulse to eugenics as a method of social
reorganization based on the correct direction of the changes in
the hereditary qualities of the population through selection and
selectional agencies. It consists in the facilitation of the
procreation and the fertility of the best biologically, mentally,
and morally, and in hindering the procreation of the socially
inadequate and of the biologically and mentally inferior. Galton's
work in this field has found a great many followers, and at the
present moment eugenics is already becoming an important
method of social reconstruction and social politics.
Such, in brief, are Galton's important contributions to the
sociological viewpoint. Being the inferences from the factual
material quantitatively studied, they have exerted a great
influence on biologists, psychologists, and sociologists. Galton's
work has been continued by many a prominent scientist and
scholar, among whom an especially conspicuous place is
occupied by Karl Pearson and his collaborators.
Karl Pearson (1857- ) ^^^^ ^^^^ great contribution of Karl
Pearson consists in his perfecting the quantitative method for
studying social, psychological, and biological phenomena. He was
also one of the most prominent creators of the mathematical

theory of correlation. This has been worked out in his series of
biometric studies.^'^ We do not need to enter here into their
^ Hereditary Genius, pp. 325-337.
^ See Pearson, Mathematical Contributions to the Theory of
Evolution, Series from I to XVIII, published in Biometric
Laboratory Publications, and in the Proceedings of the Royal
Society, and in Biometrika.
257
analysis. Their great value is recognized by all specialists and is
beyond question.
The second category of Pearson's and his followers' contributions
consists in a series of mathematical studies of the phenomena of
variation and heredity in man. To Pearson's group, probably more
than to any other, we are indebted for a quantitative study of
these problems. The result of these researches has been to show
"that man varies; that these variations, favorable or unfavorable,
are inherited, and that they are selected." ^''
We not only know that man varies, but the extent of that variation
in both man and woman has been measured by the Biometric
School in nearly two hundred cases. The variability within any
single local race of man amounts to from 4 or 5 to 15 or 20 per
cent of the absolute value of the character.^'^
As to the inheritance of these variations, ''there is not the slightest
doubt. They are not mere somatic fluctuations, but correspond to
real germinal differences."
These studies have shown that members of the same stock

inherit not only the physical, but the psychological and
pathological characteristics also. This is shown by the
resemblance between the parent and his children, and by that
among the siblings. The coefficient of correlation in man's
inherited physique is almost the same as that in other species.
The following tables give the essential results of the studies of
inheritance in man, obtained by Pearson and his collaborators:
David Heron, Ethel M. Elderton, Edgar Schuster, Amy Barrington,
E. Nettleship, C. H. Usher, Julia Bell, Charles Goring, S. J. Perry,
E. G. Pope, E. C. Snow, Lee and others.
Table II gives the coefficients of the correlation in the inheritance
of pathological characteristics.
Table III gives the results of the studies of inheritance of psychical
characteristics.
These tables show the principal results obtained by Pearson's
school in its study of inheritance. The coefficients of correlation
testify that physical, pathological, and psychical characters are in"'^ Pearson, K., The Scope and Importance to the State of the
Science of Natiofial Eugenics, 2nd ed., p. 26, London, 1909. ^'^
Ibid., p. 26.
258
Table I. Inheritance of Physique in Man and other Species ^^
Parental Inheritance in Different Species
Ibid., pp. 27-29.
259

Table III. Resemblance of Siblings
Character
Boy and Girl
Vivacity
Assertiveness
Introspection. . . .
Popularity
Conscientiousness,
Temper
Ability
Handwriting
Mean
49 52 63 49 63 51 44 .48
52
Inheritance of Ability, Male and Male
Parental from .49 to .58 according to the groups studied
Fraternal from .52 to .56 according to the groups studied
herited. In this way the school confirmed the principal statements
of Galton.
Not mentioning other important contributions of Pearson and his

school, those which lie somewhat far from the field of
sociology,let us proceed to the sociological conclusions which
have been inferred by Pearson from these and other biometrical
studies. They have been laid down in his half-popular pamphlets
and books, such as the quoted The Scope and Importance to the
State of the Science of National Eugenics, The Function of
Science in the Modern State, National Life from the Standpoint of
Science, Social Problems: Their Treatment, Past, Present, and
Future, Eugenics and Public Health, partly The Grammar of
Science and some other works, not to mention Pearson's special
researches.
In their essential points, the sociological teachings and practical
advices of Pearson are identical to those of Gobineau and
Chamberlain, Lapouge, Ammon and Galton. The primary
sociological principles of Pearson's school are as follows: First,
''the biological factors are dominant in the evolution of mankind;
these, and these alone, can throw Hght on the rise and fall of
nations, ' Ibid., pp. 29-32.
260
on racial progress and national degeneracy." ^^ Man's evolution,
like that of animals, is an evolution by natural selection. It
is based upon four factors: (a) that characters are variable, (b)
that characters are inherited, (c) that there is a selective deathrate, i.e., that individuals possessing characters or combinations
of characters in a higher or less degree than other individuals die,
on the whole, sooner or later than the latter, (d) That those
individuals who die early leave fewer offspring than those who die
late. "^^
From these principles it follows that changes in a racial stock of a

population through selection furnish the most important factor in
the rise or fall of a nation. If selection proceeds in favor of survival
and multiplication of the best stocks, the nation progresses; if its
direction is opposite, it decays. This is true in regard to the
progress of a definite society, as well as to the whole of mankind.
If you have once realized the force of heredity, you will see in
natural selectionthe choice of the more physically and mentally
fit to be the parents of the next generationa most beneficent
provision for the progress of all the forms of life. Nurture and
education may immensely aid the social machine, but they will not
in themselves reduce the tendency toward the production of bad
stock. Conscious or unconscious selection can alone bring that
about.
What I have said about bad stock seems to me to hold for the
lower races of man. How many centuries, how many thousands of
years, have the Kaffir or the negro held large districts in Africa
undisturbed by the white man? Yet their intertribal struggles have
not yet produced a civilization in the least comparable with the
Aryan. Educate and nurture them as you will, I do not believe that
you will succeed in modifying the stock. History shows me one
way, and one way only, in which a high state of civilization has
been produced, namely, in the struggle of race with race, and the
survival of the physically and mentally fitter race.
This superiority of the Aryan race justifies, according to Pearson,
that the white man "should go and completely drive out the
inferior race." From the same standpoint cross-marriage between
different races is not desirable because through it, ''if the bad
'1 Scope and Importance of Science, p. 38.
'2 The Function of Science in the Modern State, 2d. ed., p. 3,
Cambridge, 1919.
261
ANTHEOPO-RACIAL, SELECTIONIST, HEREDITARIST 261
stock be raised, the good is lowered." '^^ The struggle for
existence goes on not only among individuals, but among groups
and races also.
The dependence of progress on the survival of the fitter race
gives the struggle for existence its redeeming features; it is the
fiery crucible out of which comes the finer metal.
You may hope for a time when the sword shall be turned into the
ploughshare, when the white man and the dark shall share the
soil between them, and each till it as he lists. But, believe me,
when that day comes mankind will no longer progress; there will
be nothing to check the fertility of inferior stock; the relentless law
of heredity will not be controlled and guided by natural selection.
Man will stagnate; and unless he ceases to multiply, catastrophe
will come again. ^"^
For this reason, Pearson views pessimistically a decline in the
fertility of the civilized nations (p. 29) ; still more pessimistically he
regards the differential fertility of present society, where the better
social classes physically and mentally reproduce themselves in a
much less degree than the inferior stocks. (See the statistical
summary of these studies of Pearson's school in his Scope and
Importance of the Science, pp. 36-37.) He considers this fact as
the greatest danger confronting the progress of contemporary
society.
The above outlines Pearson's sociological position. More
specifically I will mention that he, like Ammon, views positively the
existence of different social strata.
Let there be a ladder from class to class, and occupation to

occupation, but let it not be a very easy ladder to climb; great
ability (as Faraday) will get up, and that is all that is socially
advantageous. The gradation of the body social is not a mere
historical anomaly; it is largely the result of long continued
selection, economically differentiating the community into classes
roughly fitted to certain types of work.
Accordingly, he suggests that education must be different for
different individuals and groups, corresponding to their inner
ability.*^^
'3 Peakson, K., National Life from the Staridpoint of Science, 2d.
ed., pp. 20-24. '* Ibid., pp. 26-27. ^^ The Function of Science ])p.
9-12.
262
I will not outline the other ideas of Pearson, for the above is
sufficient to make his general sociological standpoint clear. We
see that, in essence, they are very similar to the ideas given by
the former representatives of this school, in spite of their different
approach to the social problem.
5. OTHER ANTHROPO-RACIAL, HEREDITARIST, AND
SELECTIONIST INTERPRETATIONS OF SOCIAL PHENOMENA
Besides the above theories, there are a great many other works
which sustain the same or similar principles in an interpretation of
various social phenomena. Among them the first group is
composed of a series of works whose purpose is to show the
inequality ', of races, the supremacy of the white race, and
especially of certain \ of its varieties, such as the ''Teutonic," or
the ''Nordic" or the *'Anglo-Saxon" race. Representing in its bulk a
mere modification and popularization of the principles laid down

by the above authors, with a few exceptions, these works do not
amount to much in their scientific value, and are mostly a kind of
an intentional or unintentional propaganda literature. They have
all the faults of the works of the preceding authors without their
positive qualities. Their "superior" race is often made to
correspond with a certain nationality or nation, and this superior
"race-nation" is decided mainly by the nationality of the
corresponding author. Accordingly, we have "the Teutonic," "the
Anglo-Saxon," "the Celtic," "the Latin," and "the Jewish" theories
of bio-social superiority of races or nations. The works of M.
Grant, L. Stoddart, S. R. Humphrey, L. Woltmann, Wilser, Otto
Hauser, J. L. Reimer, J. W. Burgess, A. Schultz, J. A. Cramb, W.
S. Sadler, Ch. W. Gould, C. S. Burr, and partly even in some of
the works of W. MacDougall, F. K. Giinther, and F. Lenz are found
samples of this kind of literature.^^
7 See Grant, M., The Passing of the Great Race, 1916, (a
fallacious vulgarization of the works of Gobineau, Lapouge,
Ammon, Galton, and Pearson, without mentioning these names);
Stoddard, L., Racial Realities in Europe; The Rising Tide of
Colour, 1920; Humphrey, S. R., Mankind, Racial Values and the
Racial Prospect, N. Y., 1917; Woltmann, L., Politische
Anthropologie, Leipzig, 1903; Die Germanen i.d. Renaissance,
1905; Wilser, Rassen und Volker, 1912; Hauser, O., Dsr Blonde
Mensch, Weimar, 1921; Reimer, J. L., Ein Pangermanisches
Deutsch-land; Burgess, J. W., Political Science and Comparative
Constitutional Law, Boston, 1890, (with the exception of the
discussed trait, the work is very valuable in many other respects);
Schultz, A., Race or Mongrel, 1908; Sadler, W. S.,
263
The second category of such works deals principally with the

various forms of social selection, with their results, and with the
changes in the racial composition of a population as a factor of
various social phenomena, such as the progress and decay of
society and civilization. The works of this group are much more
scientific, and, in the majority of the cases, are very valuable.
Such are the works of P. Fahlbeck, S. J. Holmes, G. Sensini, C.
Gini, Otto Seeck, W. Schallmayer, T. Frank, P. Jacoby, A. de
Candolle, W. Bateson, E. Huntington, and partly of P. Sorokin, D.
S. Jordan, V. Kellog, F. A. Woods, and many others."^^
The third category of these works tries to establish a correlation
between the various physical traits of a man and his moral,
intellectual, temperamental, and socio-psychical traits. Side by
side with this, many works of this group try to correlate the many
bodily, vital and mental characteristics of social groups and
classes, together with their social positions and historical roles. In
spite of several fallacies and hasty generalizations made in some
of these works, they are, as a whole, very valuable, especially
when they relate a series of special studies in this field. The
writings of this group are too extensive to be enumerated here. A
more or less complete bibliography of them may be found in my
book, Social Mobility (Chaps. X-XII, and passim). Part of it will be
indicated further in my criticism of the anthropo-racial
Long Heads and Round Heads, 1918; Gould, Ch. W., America, a
Family Matter, 1922; Burr, C. S., America's Race Heritage, 1922;
Cramb, J. A., The Origins and Destiny of Imperial Britain, London,
1915; McDougall, W., Is America Safe for Democracy? 1921,
(there are several valuable and sound points, but the
characteristic of the Nordic and other races is far from being
scientific); Gunther, F. K., Rassenkunde des Deutschen Volkes,
1924, a very valuable work, but in the discussed point is rather
questionable. The same is to be said of F. Lenz's valuable theory
in E. Baur, E. Fisher, F. Lenz, Grundriss der menschlichen
Erblich-keitslehre und Rassenhygiene, 2 vols., Miinchen, 1923;

and of A. Basler's Ein-filhrung in die Rassen u. Gesellschafts
Physiologic, Stuttgart, 1925.
" Fahlbeck, P., "La decadence et la chute des peuples," Bulletin
de Vlnstitut International de Statistigue, Vol. XV, pp. 367-389; Der
Adel Schivedens, Jena, 1903; Sensini, G., "Teoria dell' equilibrio
di composizione delle classi sociaH," Rivista Ilaliana di
Sociologia, 1913; Gini, C., I fattori demografici dell' evoluzione
delle nazioni, Torino, 1912; Seeck, O., Geschichte des Untergang
der antiken Welt, 3rd ed., Berhn, 1910, all volumes; Frank, T.,
"Race Mixture in the Roman Empire," American Historical
Review, Vol. XXI, pp. 705 ff.; Holmes, S. J., The Trend of Races,
N. Y., 1921; Schallmayer, W., op. cit.; Jacoby, P., Etudes sur la
selection chez I'homme, 2nd cd., Paris, 1904; Bateson, W.,
Biological Fact and the Structure of Society, I>ond., 1912;
Huntington, E., The Character of Races, N. Y., 1924; Ser(.i, G.,
La degcnerazioni umanc, Milano, 1889; ^^ Candolle. A.,
264
school. Here it is sufficient to mention merely a few names out of
the great many who have made contributions in this field: C.
Lombroso, and his followers, Ch. Goring, W. Healy, F. A. Woods,
A. Niceforo, J. Bertillon, J. Beddoe, M. Muffang, E. M. Elderton,
Pagliani, R. Livi, P. Ricardi, Pfitzner, Collignon, Topi-nard, Broca,
Manouvrier, A. Hrdlicka, Chalumeau, Oloriz, Anou-chin, B.
A.Gould, H. P. Bowdich, Talko-Hryncewitz, Ch. Roberts, J. F.
Tocher, W. Porter, E. A. Doll, H. Goddard, Ch. Davenport, H.
Ellis, F. Maas, E. B. Gowin, C. Rose, B. T. Baldwin, L. M. Terman,
Samosch, E. Schlesinger, J. E. Young, J. G. Frazer, A. Vierkandt,
P. Descamps, E. Mum ford, Matiegka, Spitzka, F. G. Parsons,
Shuster, A. MacDonald, Durand de Gross, A. Con-stantin, A.
Binet, Deniker, Bushan, S. D. Porteus, J. Draseke, W. Todd, E.
Rietz, R. Pearl, McK. Cattell, E. L. Clarke, W. Z. Ripley, P.

Tarnowsky, W. Clarke, A. E. Wiggam, A. Ploetz, P. Sorokin, W. R.
Macdonel, A. Odin, J. Philiptschenko, W. Ogle, C. Novocelsky, C.
Ballod, P. Mombert, L. Hersch, Fr. Prinzing, Korosi, E. Levasseur,
A. Oettingen, G. v. Mayr, H. Westergaard, J. Wappaus, L. Dublin,
L. March, F. Savorgnan, N. Humphreys, Dr. Farr, E. Wellman, W.
Claassen, R. Thurnwald, Kozcinsky, W. MacDougall, and a great
many other investigators have contributed to an elucidation of the
problem,as to whether there is a correlation between the bodily
and the mental traits, between specific racial and intellectual
qualities, between the social position of an individual, or of a
group; and their physical, mental, and moral equipment. Also,
whether a leading, or privileged group is composed of a selected
people, or whether they represent a mere conglomeration of
people, who 'încidentally," and ''thanks to a mere good luck,"
have succeeded in climbing up and enjoying their privileges."*^
The fourth category of works deals principally with the role of
heredity in man's nature and behavior, and in the various social
processes. Stressing their role, the theories try to interpret, in
Histoire des sciences et des savants, Geneve, 1885; Sorokin, P.,
Social Mobilityt Parts III, IV; Wood, F. A., Mental and Moral
Heredity in Royalty, 1906; The Influence of Monarchs, 1913, and
D, S. Jordan's and V. Kellog's works indicated further. Many of
these works are discussed in the subsequent chapters of this
book.
^ See the works of these, and some further references of other
authors, and their analysis, in my Social Mobility, Chaps. X-XII.
265
the light of the factor of heredity, a series of social processes. In
this respect the group continues the studies of Galton, Pearson,
and partly of Lapouge and Amnion. This type of literature is
immense. The list of the works and their authors would be liable
to occupy several dozens of pages. A legion of the biologists,
psychologists, and sociologists compose it. Many of the above
authors belong to this group also. Besides the names mentioned,
I shall indicate here only a few names like E. Thorndike, A. Ploetz,
R. M. Yerkes, Ch. Richet, P. Popenoe, R. H. Johnson, G. Poyer,
and so on. The majority of the eugenists and of the investigators
of human heredity have contributed to the achievements of this
group.'^
The fifth group is composed of historical works devoted to the
problem of the Aryan race, and of the works in physical
anthropology dealing with races and their history. As
representative works of this group may be mentioned those of I.
Taylor, S. Reinach, H. Peake, V. G. Childe, W. Ridgway, H. H.
Bender, G. Kossina, and J. de Morgan on the one hand; ^^ on the
other, the anthropological works of P. Topinard, Morselli, G. Sergi,
A. C. Haddon, R. A. Dixon, W. Z. Ripley, H. J. Fleure, A. Keith,
Deniker, and of many other physical anthropologists.^^ Such are
the principal groups of works which discuss the problems
stressed by the leaders of the anthropo-social, the hereditarist,
and the selectionist schools in sociology.
After this survey, let us now pass to an analysis of that which
^^ See the bibliography in Holmes, S. J., The Trend oj the Race,
in P. Popenoe and R. Johnson, Applied Eugenics, N. Y., 1918,
and in Holmes' special book of bibliography in eugenics.
vSee 'J'aylor, I., The Origin of the Aryans, London, 1890;
Reinach, S., L'origine des Aryens, Paris, 1892; Peake, H., The
Bronze Age and the Celtic World, London, 1922; Childe, V. G.,
The Aryans, N. Y., 1926; Ridgeway, W., The Early Age of Greece,
Cambridge, 1901; Zaborovski, M. S., Les peuples Aryens, 1908;
Bender, H. H., The Home of the Indo-Europeans, Princeton,
1922; Kossina, G., Die Indogermanen, Wiirzburg, 1921; de
Morgan, J., Prehistoric Man, N. Y., 1925. See about other works
in Hankins, op. cit., Chaps. H, HI, IV.
" Dixon, R. A., The Racial History of Man, N. Y., 1923; Ripley, W.
Z., The Races of Europe; Topinard, P., Anthropology, Eng. tr.,
1878; Martin, R., Lehr-buch des Anthropologie, Jena, 1914; Keith,
A., Man, N. Y., 1913; Anthropologie, in Hinneberg's Die Culture
der Gegenwart, Vol. V, Leipzig, 1923; Fleure, H., The Peoples of
Europe, Lond., 1922; Haddon, A. C, The Races of Man, N. Y.,
1925; Ser(;i, G., Le origine umane, Torino, 1913; Morselli,
Antropologin gen-crale, Torino, 1910.
266
in the principles of the school is true, and also that which is a
fallacy or guess.
6. CRITICISM OF THE SCHOOL
Let us take the principal statements of the school one by one and
consider to what extent they are accurate.
1. Hypothesis of the Polygenic Origin of Human Races. One of
the bases for the theory of Gobineau, and of some other partizans
of the school, is that different human races sprang from different
sources and have different origins. This heterogeneity of origin is
supposedly responsible for the relative superiority and inferiority
of the races. Is the hypothesis true? We can answer only this: that
the theory, as well as its opposite hypothesis of the monogenic
origin of human races, is still nothing but a guess. We do not have
any definite and decisive proof of the accuracy of either of these
hypotheses.^^ For this reason, the argument of Gobineau, as well
as the opposite arguments of his opponents, cannot have any
conclusive value.
2. Hypothesis of the Aryan Race. We have seen that almost all

partizans of the school contend that the most superior race is the
Aryan branch of the white race. Is this theory valid? Are the
characteristics of this race definite? Are its origin and evolution,
and the statement that all civilizations have been created by this
race sufficiently proved? As we have seen, the Aryan race
hypothesis has passed through two stages. In the writings of
Gobineau the term is used rather indefinitely, without any attempt
to outline its bodily or zoological characteristics. Only in the works
of Lapouge and other anthropometrists do we find an attempt to
indicate its zoological or bodily traits. Accordingly the discussion
of the hypothesis must be divided into two parts. Let us first take
the Aryan race as it appears in the writings of Gobineau and his
predecessors. The origin of the Aryan race hypothesis is due to
the works of the linguists who, since the formulation of William
Jones's theory, have discovered that the Sanscrit language was
the source of the European and a few
*2 See Sergi, G., Le origine umane, Torino, 1913; Morselli,
Antropologia generate, Torino, 1910; Sergi, G., Hominidae,
Torino, 1911; Topinard, Anthropology, London, 1878; Haddon, A.
C., The Races of Man, N. Y., 1925; Dixon, R. B., The Racial
History of Man, pp. 503 ff., N. Y., 1923.
267
other languages; and that the Greek, the Latin, and the European
languages are related to one another. This fact led to the
conclusion that all peoples who speak the ''Aryan" languages
compose different branches of the same race. Such an origin for
the hypothesis of the Aryan race at once shows its weak point; for
the fact that many individuals or social groups speak the same
language does not necessitate that all of them must belong to the
same racial group, in a zoological sense of the term, ''race." At
the present time peoples of very divergent racial stock speak

English ; while the peoples of one race may speak different
languages. So it was in the past; and, therefore, it is impossible
from the fact of a community or similarity of language to infer the
community or identity of race. This is exactly what was done by
the early "Aryanists." ^^ In the second place, it is not known
exactly where the Aryan race originated, nor what has been the
area and the route of its migration. The Aryanists themselves
differ in this respect greatly. All that is offered in this field is a
mere hypothesis. As yet no unanimity is reached by their
historians. In the third place, the theory that all, or at least the
majority of the great civilizations,, have been created by the
Aryans is found to be still more hypothetical. Since the zoological
traits of the Aryan race were not defined in early writings, their
authors did not have any certain basis for saying that the ancient
Egyptians, or the Assyrians, or the Greeks, or the Romans were
Aryans in a zoological sense. Even in the linguistic sense, these
peoples differed widely from one another; but granting that they
had been alike in this respect, this would not have given any
reason for concluding that they were near racially. These
considerations are enough to show that the Aryan race
hypothesis, in its early stage, was a mere guess which might, and
might not, have been true; and on which it is impossible to build
any valid scientific theory.
3. The Nordic, or Homo-Euro pens, Hypothesis of Lapouge
^ vSee the details in Houz6, E., UAryen et I'anthroposociologie,
pp. 1-33, Bruxel-les, 1906; Reinach, Salomon, Uorigine des
Aryens: histoire d'une controverse, Paris, Leroux, 1892; Taylor, I.,
The Origin of the Aryans, London, 1890; Peake, H., The Bronze
Age and the Celtic World, London, 1922; quoted works of V. g'
Childe, M. wS. Zaborovsky, H. H. Bender, G. Kossina, J. de
Morgan. A good survey of the hypotheses is given in Hankins, op.
cit., Chap. IL
268
and Amnion, and the Lapouge-Ammon Lazus. In the works of
Lapouge and Amnion, the Aryan race hypothesis became more
definite. As we have seen, Lapouge's race of Homo Europeus is
tall, blond, and dolichocephalic. With these traits Lapouge
correlated mental and moral superiority in connection with which
he formulated the above ''laws of Lapouge-Ammon." Now, to what
extent is this theory warranted by the facts, and of what validity
are the above 'laws" ? Since we have here more clearly-cut
statements, it is easier to analyze them definitely than it was in
the former case. Whatever may be the origin of this racial type,^"*
the facts do not seem to corroborate the essentials of Lapouge's
hypothesis, and the same is true of many of his "laws." In the first
place, contrary to the conception of Lapouge and Ammon,
dolichocephaly does not seem to be necessarily correlated with
mental and intellectual superiority, extraordinary energy, or
initiative and talent. The Australians, the Eskimos, the New
Caledonians, the Hottentots, the Kaffirs, the Negroes of western
Africa and some other primitive people have the most
conspicuous dolichocephalic index (from yi to 75) ^^ and yet they
are very primitive and have not shown any signs of mental
superiority. Lapouge, confronted with this fact, tried to offset its
significance by the statement that
I have never said or thought that the superiority of the homoEuropaeus is due to their mere dolichocephaly, but it is possible
to claim that there is a general correlation between
dolichocephaly and the greatest amount of impulsive activity.
Within any specific race, its more dolichocephalic elements are
dominant. In Mexico, in Java, and among the negroes, the
dolichocephalic elements occupy the higher social strata, while
the brachycephalic elements compose the bulk of the population
of the lower social classes. All dominant races are

dolichocephalic. ^^
This latter statement is somewhat self-contradictory, but, ignor84 In the terminology and classification of Professor Dixon, this
type is near the Dixon Caspian type. See Dixon's theory of the
origin of different races, of their migration and distribution on the
earth. Dixon, R., The Racial History of Man, N. Y., 1923, passim,
and especially the chapter, "General conclusions."
^ TOPINARD, Anthropology, pp. 240-242.
86 Lapouge, L'Aryen, p. 395. Compare this with other statements
of Lapouge in Social Selections, pp. 40, 78-79, 410 and seq.
269
ing this, is it true that within each race its dominant classes are
composed principally of dolichocephals ? Is it true among the
leaders, the upper classes, or the prominent men of each race,
that the proportion of the dolichocephals is much greater than
among the lower classes and the common people? These
questions must be answered rather negatively, since neither
Lapouge nor any other Aryanist has given a satisfactory proof of
this contention.
In spite of the common belief that the aristocracy of Europe has
been composed of the dolichocephalic type, and that the higher
social classes have been predominantly longheaded, this opinion
may be seriously questioned.^^ First, the data concerning the
past are very scarce and uncertain. Second, we certainly know
that several prominent king& of the past, e.g., Tiberius, and some
other Roman emperors were rather broadheaded. If it is more or
less certain that the earliest prehistoric population of Europe,
especially its lowêst strata, was extremely longheaded,^^ we still

do not have any reliable facts on which to base an opinion that
the aristocracy and the leaders of that time were still more
dolichocephalic. The data given by Lapouge ^^ and by some
others concerning the Greek, Roman, and mediaeval aristocracy
is extremely scarce and too uncertain to be a reliable basis for a
more or less certain generalization. A few skulls, whose bearers
and, consequently, whose social position, is unknown; and a few
references to pictures and statues, with which it is possible to
compare the opposite type of pictures and statues, furnish
practically all the evidence upon which is based the hypothesis of
the longheaded aristocracy of ancient times.^^ All that we have,
as
^^ The recent attempt by B. vS. Bramwell to prove it gives only a
mass of incidental and self-contradictory data which cannot prove
anything and which, as we shall see further, are disproved by the
facts. See Bramwell, B. S., "Observations on Racial
Characteristics in England," The Eugenic Review, October, 1923.
The same must be said about H. Onslow's "Fair and Dark," The
Eugenic Review, 1920-21, pp. 212-217, 480-491. Similar
statements of McDougall and W. Ripley are also dogmatic. It is
curious to note that K. Pearson in his earlier work set forth an
opposite hypothesis of the superiority of brachycephals. See his
The Cluinces of Death, pp. 290-292, London, 1897.
88 See Ripley, W. Z., The Races of Europe, 1910, pp. 456-465.
8 Lapouge, op. cit., pp. 40 fT., 410 fT.
' See the reasonable, critical remarks in Houze, E., L'Aryen et
Tanthropo-sociologi^, Travaux de I'lnst. de Sociologie; and in
Kovalesky, M., Contemporary Sociologists, (Russian) Chap. VIII;
Hankins, op. cit., passim; Pearson, ibid., p. 290.
270

proof of the hypothesis of the longheadedness of the higher
classes, is the different group measurements of the contemporary
populations of Europe. It is true that much of the data obtained by
Ammon and Lapouge and several other anthropologists seems to
corroborate it; but other data, supplied partially by the same and
other authors, contradict it. We must conclude then that the
hypothesis is, at best, still uncertain and not proved. This may be
seen from the following representative figures:
Niceforo ^^ in his measurement of well-to-do and poor children
found that in both groups there were both types, and that in this
respect there was no significant difference.
In 594 of the most gifted children of California ''various types of
cephalic indices are found, but the majority of the children are of
the mesocephalic type." Cephalic indices are as follows:
Age Boys Girls
7 81 83
8 86 82
9 8i 79
lo 8i 8o
II 8o 8o
12 80 8o
13 80 79
14 79 80
15 80 81
From this it is seen that the most gifted children of America

(with I.Q. 151.33) are far from being dolichocephalic in their
total.^2
Data given by Dr. Parsons show that the cranial index of the
higher social groups of the English population is by no means
more dolichocephalic than that of the criminals or the general
population. This is seen from the following figures (See table on
page 271).^^ Besides, the index of the British population since the
eighteenth century has become more and more brachycephalic,
and yet we cannot say that during the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries the English people became stagnant and less
progressive than they had been before.
^^ Niceforo, A., Les classes pauvres, pp. 43-44, Paris, 1905. 2
Terman, L., Genetic Studies of Genius, 1925, Vol. I, Table 35, pp.
148, 170. 33 Parsons, F. G., "The Cephalic Index of the British
Isles," Man, February, 1922, pp. 19-23271
Social Groups
British criminals
Population of the 19th century
Higher and educated groups (intellectuals, professors and
students of Oxford, Cambridge, King's College, Royal Engineers,
and so on)
Cephalic Index
78.5
74 9-77 5
77.6-81.9
Measurements of American children by A. MacDonald show that
''longheadedness increases in children as ability decreases. A
high percentage of dolichocephaly seems to be concomitant with
mental dullness."'*^^
Furthermore, the data obtained by Dr. Rose, in spite of his own
desire to corroborate the dolichocephalic myth, are quite
contradictory and do not show any definite correlation. This is
observable in the table on p. 272.^^
These representative data, taken from many figures given by
Rose, show that if there is any correlation between higher social
position and dolichocephaly, it is so indefinite, and is contradicted
by so many exceptions, that we are entitled to disregard it as
being non-existent.
The measurements of the children of Liverpool by Muffang; of the
skulls of the Polish nobility, educated groups, and common
people by Talko-Hryncewitz; of Spanish students and people by
Oloriz; of Belgian murderers by Heger and Dallemagne; of various
classes in Italy by Livi; and other similar measurements do not
show any evidence of this alleged dolichocephaly of the upper
classes in Europe.^^
These results, followed by Lapouge's own acknowledgment that
"the necessary data about the cephalic index of the different
" MacDonald, A., Man and Abnormal Man, 1905, p. 19.
3^ Rose, C, "Beitrage zur Europaischen Rassenkunde," Archiv fiir
Rassen-und Gesellschafts Biologic, 1905, pp. 760, 769-792.
Recently J. R. Musselman and G. E. Harmon also did not find any
correlation between the cephalic index and mental agility. See
their papers in Biometrika, Vol. XVIII, 1926, pp. 195-206, and 207220. The mean coefficient of the correlation between cephalic
index and intelligence is .061. Pearson, K., "Relationship of Mind
and Body," Annals of Eugenics, p. 383, Vol. I., 1926.
^^ See data and references in my Social Mobility, Chap. X.
272
Social Groups
Infantry Regiment in Bautzen
Staff officers
The chief lieutenants
Lieutenants
Volunteers
Under-officers
Soldiers
Konig-Ulanen Regiment in Hanover
Officers
Under-officers
Soldiers
Liebgarde Cavalry Regiment in Stokholm
Officers
Under-officers
Soldiers
Recruits in Copenhagen
The sons of the farmer-owners
The sons of agricultural laborers
Recruits in Schwarzbourg
The sons of the farmer-owners
The sons of agricultural laborers
The Pupils of the Real Schools in Dresden
10 years old:
All
From the nobility
11 years old:
All
From the nobility
22 years old:
All
From the nobility
Technische Hochschule in Dresden
Full professors
Associate and assistant professors

Instructors
Students
Recruits generally
The Pupils of Elementary Schools in Dresden
Very superior
Superior
Average
Inferior
273
social and occupational groups are lacking," are enough to
warrant the statement that the dolichocephalic hypothesis is still a
mere belief, and nothing more.
The theories in regard to pigmentation are no better supported.
We have seen that, according to Lapouge, the second
characteristic of the Aryan or Nordic race is its blondness. Like
doHcho-cephaly, it is supposed to be correlated with energy,
talent, and other superior mental qualities. Accordingly, the
partizans of the Aryan or the Nordic race contend that the upper
classes of the Western societies and their leaders are more blond
than the lower classes and common people. In a recent paper H.
Onslow and B. S. Bramwell repeat that "the ruling class has
always been fair complexioned"; that the word ''fair" means ''bright
and blond"; and that blondness is a characteristic of mental and
social superiority.^^ To what extent is this contention true? So far
as the collected data show, it is entirely baseless. Let us consider

the pigmentation of the upper and lower social classes, putting
aside the guesses about the color of past aristocracy, or the quite
incidental references to the pigmentation of the few historical
prominent men (which may be confronted by no less numerous
opposite examples) and let us take to factual evidence. The study
of Niceforo gives the results in this respect in the table on page
274.^^ The data contradict completely the criticized theory. The
poor children have a higher per cent of fairness than have the
wealthy.
Livi found that in Italy, among the poor, mountainous population
and the peasants the per cent of light-colored persons was
considerably higher than among the city population and the
wealthier parts of Italy.^'-^ K. Pearson, having studied 1000
Cambridge graduates and 5000 school children, did not find any
correlation between pigmentation and intelligence.^^'^ On the
other
^ Onslow, H., "Fair and Dark," The Eugenic Review, Vol. XII, pp.
212-217; Bramwell, B. S., "Observations on Racial Characteristics
in England," The Eugenic Review, 1923, pp. 480-491. Even such
an opponent of the exaggerated racial theory as Ripley, admits
also the correctness of this theory. See his The Races of Europe,
pp. 469, 548-550.
^^ Niceforo, op. cit., pp. 50-51.
'9 Livi, R., report in Bull, de I'Inst. Intern, de Statist., Vol. VIII, pp.
89-92.
'" Pearson, K., "On the Relationship of Intelligence," Biomctrika.
Vol. V, p. 1.3^^. Mean r = .o8, Autmls of hjigcnics, Vol. I. \). 3S3.
274

hand, J. Jorger found that among the descendants and the
members of such criminal and feeble-minded families as the Zero,
there have been light-, as well as dark-colored people.^^^ J. F.
Tocher, also, in a careful study of the criminals and feeble-minded
in Scotland, did not find any difference in pigmentation between
the inmates of prisons or asylums and the common population,
with the exception that the insane exhibited a slight tendency to
be lighter-eyed and darker-haired than the sane population.^^^ A
study of the old Americans by Dr. Ales Hrdlicka showed further
that the common opinion in regard to the supposed blondness of
the old Americans is also fallacious. About 50 per cent of them
are midway between the blond and dark-haired. One-fourth of the
males have dark or dark-brown hair, and only one out of sixteen
males and one out of 14.5 females are blond-haired.^^^ Omitting
here other similar studies with the same results,^^^ we find in the
study of men of genius that, from the standpoint of pigmentation,
neither do they support the criticized theory. Of
1^ Jorger, J., "Die Familie Zero," Archiv fiir Rassen und
Gesellschafts Biologie, 1905, pp. 494-554^2 Tocher, "The Anthropometrical Characteristics of the Inmates
of Asylums in Scotland," Biometrika, Vol. V, p. 347.
i3 Hrdlicka, A., "Physical Anthropology of the Old Americans,"
American Journal of Physical Anthropology, 1922, No. 2, pp. 140141.
104 By H. G. Kenagy, N. D. Hirsh, Carret, Constantin and others.
See Laird, D. A., The Psychology of Selecting Men, 1925, pp.
127-31; Hirsh, N. D. M., "A Study of Natio-Racial Mental
Differences," Genetic Psychology Monographs, May and July,
1926, Chap. VHI; Constantin, A., Le role sociol. de la guerre, pp.
36-39, Paris, 1907.
275
such more or less systematic studies, I know only one, that of
H. Ellis. The results obtained by this man in his study of British
men of genius are as follows:
Of 424 British men of genius,
71 were unpigmented (light). 99 were light medium. 54 were
doubtful medium. 85 were dark medium. 115 were dark fully.^^^
These figures refute the alleged blondness of British geniuses.
More detailed data given by H. Ellis further confirm my criticism.
Taking 100 as the index of the mean fairness, all indexes above
100 as the indication of a greater blondness, and all figures below
100 as the indication of an increasing darkness, we have the
following table : ^^^
Categories of British Men of Genius
Political reformers and agitators
Sailors
Men of science
Soldiers
Artists
Poets
Royal family
Lawyers
Created peers and their sons. . .

Statesmen
Men and women of letters
Hereditary aristocracy
Divines
Men of genius of low birth
Explorers
Actors and actresses
This shows, first, that the royal family is very far from being
^^ Ellis, H., A Study of British Genius, pp. 209-210.
^^ Ibid., pp. 209-216; Ellis, H., "The Comparative Ability of the
Fair and Dark," Monthly Review, August, 1901.
276
276 CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGICAL IHEORIES
at the top of the list; second, that the pigmentation of the
hereditary aristocracy is dark, and much darker, than that of the
created peers who came out from the middle classes; third, that
the statesmen and explorersthe men of energywere dark.
These facts refute completely the one-sided interpretation of this
table which was given by H. Onslow. The figures do not give any
confirmation of the ''blond theory" and its variations. The above is
enough to show that this theory, in spite of its popularity, has no
scientific basis.^^^
Besides these anthropometric data, historical evidence seems to

testify against the criticized theory, for the Nordic races of Europe
were the latest to develop civilization.
Civilization was more precocious in the South of the European
continent than in the North, and, of all the people of Europe, it
was the population of North Europe and of the Baltic sea coast
which remained the most retarded in regard to intellectual culture.
Therefore it is absurd to pretend that the Nordics were
responsible for the creation and promotion of culture in the
remotest past. On the contrary, their invasions ever3rwhere
caused either stagnation or regress of development.
The cultivation of plants, the domestication of animals, and the
use of bronze and metals were all developed long ago, since the
neolithic epoch. The same is true in regard to many other
fundamental inventions and discoveries in technique and religion,
in mores, and in social institutions.^^^ For these reasons, it is
impossible to pretend that the blond, tall and dolichocephalic
Aryans have alone been the conquerors, the aristocracy, and the
bearers of mental superiority and progress.
On the other hand, Lapouge seems to underestimate the role and
the achievements of the brachycephalic Alpine racial type. Nearer
to the truth seems to be Dixon's statement that, 'Tf in the history
of the race as a whole, the Mediterranean and Caspian
(Lapouge's Nordic race) peoples have played a great part, that of
the Alpines seems hardly less impressive; and there is not a little
reason to believe that only where these types have met and
mingled have the highest achievements been attained."
Accordion See other data in my Social Mobility, Chap. X, N. Y.,
1927. i* Houz6, op. cit., pp. 31-33; see first part of the book,
passim.
277
ANTHROPO-RACIAL, SELECTIONIST, HEREDITARIST m

ing to the author just such a blending took place when the
Babylonian civilization rose to its climax; and when the Greek and
the Roman, the Chinese and the Italian attained great
achievements. Though these statements are rather guesses,
nevertheless they appear to be nearer to the facts than Lapouge's
one-sided theory. *To no one race or type (among the Nordic,
Mediterranean and the Alpine races) can the palm be assigned,
but rather i:o the product of the blending of those types which
seem the most gifted,the Mediterranean, Caspian and the
Alpine." ^^^
If this fundamental contention of the criticized theory fails, then
many inferences from it, such as the theory of degeneration due
to an increase of the cephalic index; such as the explanation of
the decay of ancient Rome and Greece through the substitution of
the brachycephals for the dolichocephals; such as the negative
appreciation of the brachycephalic aristocracy of the democratic
societies; and such as the alleged superiority of the blonds; all
these popular inferences must fall down also, like a row of
dominoes when the first one has been pushed over.
4. Other Ammon-Laponge Laws. Let us now briefly touch the
validity of other laws indicated above. As for the Law of WealthDistribution, the above data have shown that it is not warranted by
the facts, since there is no evidence that the wealthy classes are
more dolichocephalic than the poor ones.^^^
The Lazvs of Altitudes and of Distribution of the Cities are, at their
best, illustrative only of local phenomena, and in no way can
pretend to be general formulas applied to all places and times.
The Law of Urban Index, according to which the population of the
cities is more dolichocephalic than that of the surrounding
country, is again quite a local phenomenon which cannot pretend
to any degree of generality. If in some cities of Germany and

France the population of the city happens to be more
dolichocephalic, in other cities of the same and of many other
countries (England, Italy, Belgium, Spain, Egypt, Grand Duchy of
Lux" Dixon, op. cit., pp. 514-516.
" This "law" by the way is in sharp contradiction with other
statements of Lapouge where he slanders the present moneyaristocracy as pseudo-aristocracy, as prosperous brachycephals,
who, like a plague, devastate and impede the existence and
procreation of the dolichocephals. See Selections sociales, Chap.
XIII, passim.
278
emburg, and so on) the situation is the reverse.^^^ In this respect
the formula of R. Livi is more correct.^^- He states that the cities
attract their migrants from places far distant, rather than near at
hand; and that therefore, where the population surrounding a city
is of the dolichocephalic type, the city population will be more
brachycephalic, and vice versa. This shows the fallacy of the
discussed law and that of the supposition of "the Law of
Migration," according to which the dolichocephals are for some
mysterious reason more migratory than the brachycephals. The
same is true concerning pigmentation. The city population is not
more blonde, but rather, darker, than the country population. The
above refutes also "the Law of Concentration of the
Dolichocephals and the Law of Stratification." As to the "Law of
Urban Elimination," it is not proved either. The data in its favor are
very scarce. Besides, this law introduced by Ammon contradicts
other statements of Lapouge, given by him in the chapter
concerning Urban Selection. Here he contends that the present
urban selection is very unfavorable to the procreation of the

dolichocephals.-^^^
Finally, as to the ''law of a more rapid destruction of the more
perfect species/' formulated by Lapouge as a universal law,^^* I
wonder, if this law were true, how any evolution of species from
the protozoa to Homo Sapiens, could have taken place. It is even
incomprehensible how, under such a law, "the Aryan race" could
have appeared. If this law is permanent and eternal, it seems that
such things could not have happened. If they happen, this means
that the law is wrong, or rather, that it is not a law at all.
1^^ See Craig, F. J., "Anthropometry of Modem Egyptian,"
Biometrika, Vol. VIII, pp. 72-77; Ripley, op. cit., pp. 555-559;
Wissler, C, "Distribution of Stature in the U. S.," Scientific
Monthly, 1924, pp. 129-144; Houz6, op. cit., pp. 95 et seq.;
Beddoe, J., "Sur I'histoire de I'index cephaHque dans les lies
Britan-niques," UAnthropologic, 1894, pp. 513-529, 658-673;
Pearson, K., The Chances of Death, p. 290; Livi, R.,
Anthropometria militare. Vol. I, pp. 86-91; Retzius, G., and
FiJRST, op. cit., Chap. IV.
1^2 Livi, R., "La distribuzione geografica dei charatteri
anthropologic! in Italia," Rivista Italiana di Sociologia, II, 1898,
fasc. IV; Houze, E., Les indices cephaliques des Flamands et des
Wallons, Bruxelles, Magden, 1882; Vander-KiNDERE, L.,
Nouvelles recherches sur Vethnologie de la Belgique, (concerning
pigmentation), Bruxelles, Vander Auwera, 1879.
"3 Selections sociales, pp. 407-409 and passim.
"* Selections sociales, pp. 456 seq.
279
This cursory analysis shows that httle remains of these "laws." My

criticism does not mean that the authors did not rightly observe
the facts from which they inferred their "laws," but that they gave
to their partial and local results a universal character, making their
generalizations much broader than their material logically and
scientifically permitted. Hence the fictitious character of their
"laws." These remarks are enough to show the fallacies of the
Aryan race hypothesis, and all the conclusions which have been
made from it.
7. VALID PRINCIPLES OF THE SCHOOL
A. Does the above criticism mean that there is nothing valuable in
the theories of the school? Does it mean that any theory of racial
or individual differences is quite wrong? Shall we proclaim that all
individuals and races are similar and equal? Shall we deny any
importance to the factor of heredity and selection, and try to
explain everything through environment? I do not think that such
an attempt would be any better than the one-sidedness of the
racial school. In other words, I think that side by side with the
shortcomings of this school, there are valid statements in its
theories.
In the first place, the school seems to be right in emphasizing the
innate differences between races, social classes, and
individuals.^^*' Whatever characteristic we take for the
classification of the races,color, cranial capacity, cephalic
indices, nasal index, hair, stature, or what notwe find different
varieties among mankind.^^^ The same is true in regard to
individuals and social classes within the same race. Individuals of
the same race are never identical. Social classes of the same
society differ considerably in their physical, vital, and mental
characteristics. As
"'^ The terms, "superiority" and "inferiority" are subjective and

their use by the school, as well as by many other scientists and
scholars, is misleading,
"^ See any classification of races according to one or several of
these traits, e.g., the classification of Topinard, or of Haddon into
Ulotrichi, Cymotrichi, Leiotrichi with the further subclasses, or that
of Morcclli or Sergi, or the classifications of Dixon and Deniker.
See Haddon, A. C, The Races of Alan, pp. 1-36; MoRSELLi, "Le
razzc umane e il sentimento di superiorita ethica," Rivista Italiana
di Sociologia, 1911, pp. 325 et seq.; Sergi, Ilominidae, 1911;
Deniker, J., The Races of Man, 1900, Chaps. I-III; Dixon, R. B.,
The Racial History of Man, 1923.
280
a general rule, the upper classes, compared with the lower ones,
have a greater stature, a greater weight, greater size of head, or
cranial capacity, or weight of brain. Vitally, they have a longer
duration of life, lower mortality, and generally, better health.^^"
This does not mean that each member of the upper class exhibits
these characteristics when compared with any member of the
lower class; it means only that such results are obtained w^hen
wê compare the upper classes as a whole with the lower ones
as a whole. Accordingly, differences amount to nothing but those
of statistical averages, which does not prevent the existence of a
great deal of overlapping, and cases where the member of an
upper class may happen to have a lower stature, smaller cranial
capacity, and poorer health than a member of the lower classes.
The same is true in regard to the racial differences in the physical
and the vital, as well as in the intellectual characteristics. If a part
of these and other differences of various races and various social
classes are due, no doubt, to differences in their environment, it
seems to be certain that another part of them is due to the factor

of innate heterogeneity or heredity, or to a selected group.^^^
B. In the second place, the school is right in its emphasis on
mental and psychological traits, for individuals, the upper and the
lower classes and various racial groups, as groups, exhibit
considerable differences. In regard to individuals, the existence of
differences in native intelligence, *'will-power," sensitivity,
temperament, emotionality and so on, can scarcely be
questioned. It is manifested by common observation, by mental
tests, by differences in achievements, by experiments, and by
many other means. Individuals may range from idiocity to genius
of the first degree; from the highly temperamental to the temperamentalless; from a man with great will power and resourcefulness
to a man who is continually wavering. The same is true in regard
to other psychical traits. The different social strata of the same
society exhibit also in their averages considerable differences in
intelligence, and in some other traits. Whether we take the
"'' See the data and the literature in my Social Mobility, Chaps. X,
XI, XII. "* See an analysis of the problem in Social Mobility, Chap.
XIII, et seq., passim.
281
number (absolute and relative per thousand of population in each
class) of men of genius yielded by the upper and the lower
classes in England, Russia, Germany, the United States of
America, and France, the proportion given by the upper classes is
many times higher than that given by the lower classes, especially
by common labor. If we take the data of mental testing and the
corresponding I. Q., the results are similar. The I. Q. of both the
children and the adults of the upper classes is generally higher
than that of the children and the adults of the lower classes. There
are overlappings, but they do not disprove the general rule. This
means that the mental and social distribution of individuals is
positively correlated. I shall give here only a few representative
data which show this.
Among present European societies, the most ''fertile" social group
in the production of the men of genius seems to have been the
royal families. The same families are at the apex of the social
pyramid. Investigations of F. Adams Woods have shown that for
about 800 individuals in this class, we have about 25 geniuses.
'The royal bred, considered as a unit, is superior to any other one
family, be it that of noble or commoner." ^^^ Granting that the
data of Dr. Woods are greatly exaggerated, we still have a more
abundant crop of men of genius from the royal families, than has
been produced by any other social group. H. Ellis' study of the
most prominent British men of genius has shown that the English
upper and professional classes (composing only 4.46 per cent of
the population) have produced 63 per cent of the men of genius,
while the labor, artisan and industrial classes, composing about
84 per cent of the population, have produced only 11.7 per cent of
the greatest leaders of Great Britain. Especially low is the
percentage of British men of genius produced by common labor
and artisans,2.5 per cent from 74.28 of the total population. The
figures include all British men of genius since the beginning of the
history of England up to the twentieth century. During the
nineteenth century, according to
"5 Woods, Frederick A., Mental and Moral Heredity in Royalty, p.
301, N. Y.. 1906. See also his The Influence of Monarchs, Chap.
XVII, N. Y., 1913. See also SOROKIN, P., "iMonarchs and
Rulers," Social Forces, 1925-6.
282
A. H. H. MacLean's Study of 2500 Eminent British Men of the

nineteenth century, the share of aristocracy during this period
rather increased (26 per cent of all leaders, instead of 18.5 per
cent) ; the share of the professions increased also (49 per cent
instead of 44.5 per cent) ; while the share of the labor class and
the artisans decreased, in spite of an increased literacy and
greater educational facilities for the lower classes in the
nineteenth century.^-^ According to the more detailed study of F.
A. Woods, during the first quarter of the nineteenth century, the
artisans and labor class produced only 7.2 per cent of the men of
genius in England, instead of 11.7 per cent as during the
preceding centuries; and during the second quarter of the
nineteenth century, only 4.2 per cent.^^^ Thus, in spite of an
increase of educational facilities, the great mass of the British
population was, and still is, more than ever before, sterile in the
production of geniuses. Similar results were yielded by Galton's
study of 107 of the most prominent British scientists of the
nineteenth century.^^'" Similar results have been obtained in
France regarding all the prominent French men of letters. The
corresponding figures obtained by Odin in his careful study show
the following number of prominent men in their ratio to the same
number of the population of various classes. The nobility (159)
produced two and one-half times more literary geniuses in France
than did the high magis-trature (62) ; six and one-half times more
than the liberal professions (24) ; twenty-three times more than
the bourgeoisie (7) and two hundred times more than the labor
classes (.8)!^^^ Classified according to different periods, the
percentage of literary genius produced by different classes is
shown in the following table.
The decrease of the share of nobility in 1775-1800 is a result of its
extermination in the French Revolution. Nevertheless, in the
period of from 1800 to 1825 it shows again an increase of fertility
in the production of genius. Similar results were
120 Ellis, H., op. ciL, pp. 80 ff.

121 Woods, F. A., "The Conification of Social Groups," Eugenics,
Genetics and the Family, Vol. I, pp. 312-328, Baltimore, 1923.
122 Galton, F., English Men of Science, p. 16, Appleton, N. Y.,
1875.
"3 Odin, A., Genese des grands hommes, Vol. II, Table XXXII;
Vol. I, p. 541, Paris, 1895.
283
obtained by de Candolle in his study of the illustrious men of
124
science.
Dr. Fritz Maas studied 4421 of the most prominent German men
of genius in various fields of activity (writers, poets, painters,
composers, scientists, scholars, artists, pedagogues, statesmen,
captains of industry and finance, military men, and so on) who
were born after 1700 and died before 1910. His study shows that
the higher classes (nobility, professions, and the wealthy class of
the big manufacturers and merchants), who have composed less
than 20 per cent of the total population, produced 83.2 per cent of
the men of genius; while the lower labor classes, which composed
more than 80 per cent of the total population, have yielded only
16.8 per cent of the German leaders. Especially small has been
the relative share of the proletariat, in spite of the rather large size
of this class in the second half of the nineteenth, and at the
beginning of the twentieth century. The percentage of the men of
genius coming out of this class has been only 0.3 per cent. Again,
in spite of the increase in educational facilities for the lower
classes during the nineteenth century, these classes do not show

any marked increase in their productivity of geniuses. This is seen
from the following data: ^^^^
^24 DE Candolle, A., Histoire des sciences et des savants, pp.
272-274, 279, G6n^ve, Bale, 1885.
126 Maas, Fritz, "Ueber die Herkunftsbedingungen der Geistigen
Fiirher," Archiv fiir Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 1916, pp.
144-186.
284
284 CONl'EMl'ORARY SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES
Social Classes from which the Men of Genius Came
Nobility
High magistrature and professions Bourgeoisie (commercial
class). . . Labor classes
Per Cent of Genius from Each Class in the Specified Historical
Periods According to the Year of Birth
1700-1789
19.2 53-3 153 II.9
1789-181)
14.2
55-8 16.4 13-6
I818-1860
II .0 60.0 16.4 12.4
According to the data of Professor J. McK. Cattell, the share of

different classes from which the leading American men of science
came, and the proportion of these classes in the total population
of the U. S., were as follows:
The majority of the leading scientists came from the upper and
middle classes and not a single one was produced by the group
of domestic servants or by the class of day laborers.^^^
Dr. S. Visher studied the occupation of the fathers of 18,400 of
the prominent Americans from Who's Who with the following
results: ^^^
^^ Cattell, J. McKeen, American Men of Science, 3d. ed., 1921,
pp. 783-784.
127 Visher, Stephen S., "A Study of the Type of the Place of Birth
and of the Occupation of Fathers of Subjects of Sketches in
Who's Who in America," The American Journal of Sociology, p.
553, March, 1925.
285
vSocial Classes
Laborers, unskilled
Laborers, skilled and semi-skilled
Fanners
Businessmen
Professions (except clergy)
Clergy
Persons in Each Class per Notable
75,000
2,470
1,100
124
70
32
Notable Men per
10,000 Persons in
Each Class
0.013
49.
80.
142.
315.
Dr. E. L. Clarke, in his study of 1000 of the most prominent
American men of letters, came to the following results: ^"^
Again the same picture: a numerically insignificant part of the total
populationthe professional and commercial classes produced
more than 60 per cent of all prominent men of letters in the United
States.
My study of 476 American captains of industry and finance

showed thai 79.8 per cent of these leaders were produced by the
commercial and professional classes; 15.6 per cent by farmers;
and only 4.6 per cent by the skilled and unskilled labor class.^^^
Here again, the share of the labor class in the production of the
geniuses of industry and finance is not increasing but decreasing.
^28 Clarke, Edwin L., American Men of Letters, Columbia Univ.
Studies, Vol. LXXII, 1916, pp. 74-76.
'29 SoROKiN, "American Millionaires," Social Forces, 1925, pp.
635-636,
286
Similar results were obtained by Ch. H. Cooley. Dr. Cooley's
study of 71 of the most prominent poets, philosophers, and
historians of all times and countries has shown that 45 of them
came from the upper and upper middle classes, 24 from the lower
middle class, and only 2 from the labor classes/^^ Dr. L. Ter-man
quite recently came to a similar conclusion. The brightest children,
(with an average I. Q. of 151.33) studied by Terman and his
collaborators happened to come from the following social groups:
Per Cent of Quota of Each Occupational Group Among Fathers of
Gifted Children
Professional.. Public service Commercial.. Industrial. . .
,003
137 128
35
In the industrial group only one man gives his occupation as

"laborer" which is 0.2 per cent of our fathers as compared with
15.0 per cent of the total population classified as laborers in the
census report. ^^^
Jur. Philiptschenko's study of the contemporary Russian scien"<> Cooley, Ch. H., "Genius, Fame and the Comparison of
Races," Annals of American Academy, Vol. IX, p. 15, May, 1897.
"1 Terman, L., Genetic Study of Genius, Vol. I, pp. 60 ff.
287
tists, scholars and representatives of the arts and Hterature gave
the following results : ^^^
" Including the landlords and gentry. '> Only the landlords and
gentry. Including peasants.
The labor classes (agricultural and labor) compose even in
contemporary Russia more than 90 per cent of the population;
and yet they yielded quite an insignificant percentage of the
scientists and scholars, artists, literary men and so on. This
percentage is still less among the great men of science.
I will not give other data obtained by different investigators in
different countries.^^^ They only confirm the above results.
Passing from the bottom of a social pyramid to its apex we see a
systematic increase of the number of men of geniusan
absolute, as well as a relative increase.
Similar results have been obtained by the intelligence testing of
various social groups. The general conclusion suggested by
"2 Philiptschenko, Bulletin of The Bureau of Eugenics (Russ.),

Bull. No. I, pp. 11-12, 28; No. 2, pp. 11-12; No. 3, ]). 35. 33 Sec
SoROKiN, P., Social Mobility, Chap. XIL
288
numerous intelligence tests is that the higher social classes are
more intelligent than the lower ones. Of many data of this kind, I
will mention here only a few which are representative. Other
figures may be found in the sources indicated in footnotes and in
my Social Mobility.
In the first place, we have the results of the intelligence tests
given the U. S. Army. The L Q. of various social groups obtained
by this study is as follows : ^^"^
These data show a rather close correlation between social status
and intelligence. Unskilled and semi-skilled laborers have a very
inferior and low average intelligence; skilled labor groups are
principally in the group of "high average" intelligence; superior
and very superior intelligences are found only in the high
professional and high business classes. On the other hand, it is
necessary to mention that the testing disclosed a considerable
overlapping in the intelligence of different social groups. This,
however, does not disprove the indicated fact of the existence of
superior intelligence in the higher social strata and inferior
intelligence in the lower strata.^^^
"* Memoirs of the National Academy of Science, Vol. XV, Wash.,
1921, pp. 821 ff., Chap. XVIL See also Yerkes, R. M., "Eugenic
Bearing of Measurement of Intelligence," The Eug. Review, pp.
234 fl., January, 1923. See here the instructive figures and
diagrams.
135 See the details concerning the results of the U. S. Army

mental test in the works indicated; see also Goddard, H. H.,
Human Efficiency and Levels of Intelligence, 1920, pp. 1-30;
PiNTNER, R., Intelligence Testing, passim and chapter, "The
Soldier and the Employees," and works indicated below.
289
Other proof of the superior intelligence of the higher social
classes is given by the results of intelligence testing of the
children of different social classes. At the present moment we
have very numerous studies of this kind, and their results are
almost unanimous in essence. The children of the professional
and well-to-do classes, as a general rule, show a much superior
intelligence than the children of the labor classes. The following
figures may be taken as representative: According to the study of
Dr. Terman, the median I. Q. for the children of the semi-skilled
and unskilled labor classes has been 82.5 while the median I. O.
for the children of the professional and high business classes has
been 112.5. The percentage of superior children with I. Q. 135140 has been among the studied group, in the professional class,
53; in semi-professional, 37; in skilled labor, 10; and in the
semiskilled and unskilled, o.^^^
The I. Q.'s of 13,000 children, at the age of 11 and 12 years,
studied by J. F. Duff and Godfrey H. Thomson in England, have
been as follows (according to the occupation of their fathers) :
Occupational Groups
Professional
Managers
Higher commercial class
Army, navy, police, postmen. .. .

Shopkeeping class
Engineers
Foremen
Building trades
Metal workers, shipbuilders
Miscellaneous industrial workers
Mines, quarrymen
Agricultural classes
Laborers
I.Q.
112. 2 iio.o 109.3
105-5 105. o 102.9 102.7 102.0 100.9 100.6
97.6 97.6
96.0
While of 597 children from the professions and higher com
"fi Terman, L. M., The Intelligence of School Children, 1919, pp.
56 ff., 188 ff.; see also Terman, "New Approach to Study of
Genius," Psychological Review, 1922, pp. 310-318
290
mercial classes, 471 were above the average mental level and
only 126 below the average; among 1214 children from the low
grade occupations (laborers), 746 were below and only 468 were
above the average mental level.^^"^
Similar results have been obtained by C. Burt, H. B. English, Miss
A. H. Arlitt, A. W. Kornhauser, Douglas Waples, G. Sylvester
Counts, W. H. Gilby and K. Pearson, L. Isserlis, W. Stern, Holley,
S. Z. Pressey and R. Ralston, J. M. Bridges and L. E. Coler, W. F.
Book, M. E. Haggerty and H. B. Nash, and others.-^^^ It is
needless to multiply the examples. We need merely to say that in
the United States, Germany, England, and France almost all child
mental tests have given similar results.^^^
The next proof of the correlation of social standing and intel137 Duff, J, F., and Thomson, G. H., "The Social and Geographic
Distribution of Intelligence in Northumberland," British Journal of
Psychology, pp. 192-198, Oct., 1923.
138 Bridges, J. M., and Coler, L. E., "The Relation of Intelligence
to Social Status," Psychological Review, XXIV, pp. 1-31; Book, W.
F., The Intelligence of High School Seniors, Chap. X, N. Y., 1922;
Pressey, S. Z., and Ralston, R., "The Relation of General
Intelligence of the Children to the Occupation of their Fathers,"
Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. Ill, No. 4.; Haggerty, M. E.,
and Nash, Harry B., "Mental Capacity of Children and Paternal
Occupation," The Journal of Educat. Psychology, December,
1924, pp. 563-572. See other facts in the indicated books of
Terman and Pintner. See also MacDougall, W., "The Correlation
between Native AbiHty and Social Status," Eugenics in Race and
State, Vol. II, pp. 373-376, Baltimore, 1921; English, H. B.,
"Mental Capacity of School Children Correlated with Social
Status," Yale Psychological Studies, 1917, Psychological Review
Monograph, Vol. XXIII, No. 3; Arlitt. A. H., "Summary of Results of
Testing 342 Children," Psychological Bulletin, Feb., 1921;
Kornhauser, A. W., "The Economic Standing of Parents and the

Intelligence of their Children," Journal of Educat. Psychology, Vol.
IX; Counts, G. S., The Selective Character of American
Secondary School, The U. of Chicago Educ. Monographs, No. 19,
May, 1922, pp. 36-37 and passim; Waples, D., "Indexing the
Quahfications of Different Social Groups for an Academic
Curriculum," The School Review, 1924, pp. 537-546; Gilby, W. H.,
and Pearson, K., "On the Significance of the Teacher's
Appreciation of General Intelligence," Biometrika, Vol. VIII, pp. 94108; Holley, Ch. E., The Relationship between Persistence in
School and Home Conditions, U. of Chicago Press, 1916, passim;
Isserlis, L., "The Relation between Home Conditions and the
Intelligence of School Children," London, 1923, Publications of
the Medical Research Committee of the Privy Council; Yates, "A
Study of some H. S. Seniors of Super Intelligence, " Journal of
Educ. Research, Monos. No. 2; Stern, W., Die Intellegenz der
Kinder und Jiigendlichen, Barth, Leipzig; Hart, H., "Occupational
Differential Fecundity," Scientific Monthly, Vol. XIX, p. 531;
Dexter, E., "Relation between Occupation of Parents and
Intelligence of Children," School and Society, Vol. XVII (1923), pp.
612-616; Murdoch, K., "A Study of Differences Found Between
Races in Intellect and Morality," School and Society, Vol. XXII,
1925* No. 568-569.
^3^ See other data in my Social Mobility.
291
lectual level is given by mental tests of the intelligence of the
adults of different social standing. They also yielded results
similar to the above. (See Social Mobility, Chap. XII.)
As to an interpretation of these results, opinions differ;
nevertheless, even those among the investigators who are
inclined to account for these differences through the factor of

environment, do not deny completely the role of heredity and
selection. An attentive study of the data makes it reasonably
certain that the differences are due to environment, as well as to
heredity. At any rate, the series of facts could, in no way, be
accounted for through the environmental agencies alone.^^^ This
means that the school's contention about the selected character
of each of these classes has a great deal of truth. On the other
hand, if it is fallacious to deny the role of heredity and selection in
the creation of these differences, it is equally wrong to deny the
role of environment in this field. The school seems to
underestimate somewhat the importance of the environmental
factor, and needs to be corrected in this point.
C. The school seems to be right also in its claim that racial groups
are different physically and mentally. In regard to the existence of
physical differences among various races, there is scarcely any
doubt. The divergency of opinions concerns not the existence of
these differences, but their significance as a basis for race
classification and its history. Whatever the classification may be,
the existence of different zoological racial types cannot be
questioned. As an example of one of the best classifications of
races, I give the following table of Professor Dixon.^^^ That there
are mental differences among races seems also to be definitely
established; whether due to environment or to heredity, we find
considerable mental differences between the principal racial (not
national) groups. Their existence is witnessed in the first place by
the quite different part which has been played by the various
races in the history of mankind, and in their cultural
achievements. Though almost all of these types have been given
an opportunity to create the complex forms of civilization, and
MO See Social Mobility, Chap. XIII.
*" Dixon, op. cit., p. 500; see here description of each of these
types.
292
Character of the Eight Primary Racial Types
Types
Proto-Australoid Proto-Negroid.. . Mediterranean. .
Caspian
Mongoloid
Palae-Alpine
Ural
Alpine
Prognatism
Moderate
Moderate
None
None
Moderate
Moderate
None
None
Cranial CapacitySmall
Small
Large
Large
Medium
Medium
Largest
Largest
an almost unlimited span of time, nevertheless the role of the
Proto-Australoid and Proto-Negroid races has been very modest
in this respect, while the role of the Caspian, the Alpine and the
Mediterranean races has been extraordinarily great. They have
been the leaders in the creation of a complex form of culture.
They have been the conquerors and subjugators of almost all the
other races, driving them out, and spreading themselves
throughout the world. The essence of Gobineau's deduction in
this respect seems to be true. Professor Dixon says that ''there is
a difference between the fundamental human types in quality, in
intellectual capacity, in moral fibre, and in all that makes or has
made any people great. This I believe to be true, despite what
293
ANTHROPO-RACIAL, SELECTIONIST, HEREDITARIST 29f5
advocates of the uniformity of man may say." ^"*" No partizan of a

belief in the uniformity of all races can disregard the discussed
differences in the historical role and in the cultural achievements
of different races. They used to say that this was due to different
racial environments, but we have already seen that it is
impossible to give exclusive importance to geographical
environment in this respect. In the second place, the geographical
environment of almost all of the races has been different, because
each racial type has been spread over the vast areas of the earth
with very different geographical conditions. In the third place,
nobody has shown as yet that the natural environment of the
Caspian or the Alpine races has been more favorable than that of
the Proto-Negroids or Proto-Australoids. If the social environment
of various races has happened to be different, this difference did
not fall from heaven, but has been due to the fact that some of
them have been able to create a complex social environment,
while others have not been able to do so.
The difference in the cultural contributions and in the historical
roles played by different races is excellently corroborated by, and
is in perfect agreement with, the experimental studies of race
mentality and psychology. The more perfect the technique of such
a study becomes, the more clear and unquestionable become the
mental differences among different races. Fortunately science has
already passed the speculative stage in this field, and has entered
the stage of factual study, which has led to many interesting
results. I have just mentioned that the historical role of the ProtoNegroids and the Proto-Australoids has been very mediocre,
that their contributions to what we style complex culture and
civilization have been very moderate. Is this testimony of history
corroborated by mental tests ? I should say that the verification
has been complete. So far as I know, all studies of the
comparative intelligence of the contemporary negro and white
races (the Caspian, the Mediterranean, the Alpine, and even in
their blends with the yellow race) have unanimously shown that
the I. O. of the blacks, or even of the Indians is lower than
"2 Dixon, op. cit., p. 518, see passim. The term "great" is
evaluative. Whether the creation of complex forms of civilization is
a good or a bad, a great or negative achievement, the fact of a
different rdle for various races remains, regardless ol any
evaluation.
294
that of the white or the yellow. It is true that the difference is not
so great as the school claims, and it is also true that there are
individual exceptions, but they by no means disprove the rule.
Below are a few representative figures of many available at the
present time: ^^^
Median of Mental Ages by Occupation
General Intelligence of the White and the Negro Draft.
Percentages Making the Grade
"3 Memoirs of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol. XV., pp.
796, 707, Wash., 1921. Grades D ,D, C ,C, C + ,B,A
indicate a passing from the lowest I. Q. border-line and dull
to the highest bright and brilHant.
144 Ferguson, G. O., The Intelligence of Negroes, Virginia School
and Society, 1919, Vol. IX, pp. 721-726; "The Mental Status of the
American Negro," Scientific Monthly, Vol. XII, p. 533, June, 1921.
145 Trabue, M. R., "The Intelligence of Negro Recruits," Natural
History, 1919, Vol. XIX, pp. 680-685.
146 Yerkes, R. M., "Psychological Examination in the U. S.

Army," Memoirs National Academy, Wash., Vol. XV, 1921.
147 Pintner, R., and Keller, R., "IntelHgence Testing of Foreign
Children," Journal of Educational Psychology, 1922, Vol. XII, pp.
214-222.
"^Thorndike, E. L., "Intelligence Scores of Colored Pupils," School
and Society, 1923, Vol. XVIII, pp. 563-570.
149 Mitchell, I., Rosanoff, I. R., and A. J., "A Study of Association
in Negro Children," Psychological Review, 1919, Vol. XXVI, pp.
354-35915 HiRSH, N. D., "A Study of Nation-Racial Mental Differences,"
Genetic Psychology Monographs, 1926, May-July, p. 287.
151 Peterson, J., "Comparison of White and Negro Children in
Multiple Choice in Learning," Proceedings Amer. Psychol. Assn.,
1921, pp. 97-98; "The Comparative Abilities of White and Negro
Children," Comparative Psychology Monographs, 1923, No. 5.
295
Investigators
Ferguson ^^'
Trabuci^*,
Yerkes i*
Pintneri47* Keller
Thorndike ^^s'
Mitchell "9 Rosanoff. .

Hirsh^s"*.
Peterson 15'*
* For footnotes preceding page.
Race
Mulattoes Negroes White draft
Negroes
Negroes (U. S. Army) Whites
Negroes Whites
Negroes Whites
Negroes
Whites
Negroes Whites
Negroes
Whites
Number of Cases
2288
155
8244
71 249
349 2653
Year
1919
1919
[921
300 300
449 5055
315 311
1922
1923
1919
[926
1921
Results
Negroes inferior men tally-to the whites. Among mulattoes, the
superior are those having the greatest percentage of white blood.
Whites are superior to the negroes.
Negro mental age 10.4 years; that of the whites 13.1 years. The
percentage of the very inferior among the negroes is higher, while
the very superior are much scarcer.
Negro I. Q. 95-
.88; white I. Q.
4 per cent of the negroes reach the median of the whites.
Percentage of negroes with a superior I. Q. is very small,
compared with the whites.
The negro is far behind the white mental age.
Negro I. Q., 84.6; all whites of different stocks, with the exception
of the Portuguese, have higher I. Q., from 85.3 to 102.8.
80-95 per cent of the whites surpass the intelligence of the
negroes. The greater the proportion of white blood in a negro, the
higher is his mental score.
296
Investigators
Race
Number of Cases
Year
Results
McFadden
Dashielli^2
Brigham ^^^
Sunne ^^^
Pressey-Teter ^^s...
Arlittise
Derrick ^"
Schwegler-Winn^^^
Murdock ^^^
Pyleieo
Negroes Whites
Negroes Whites
(U.S. Army)
Negroes Whites
Negroes Whites
Negroes Whites
Negro and white college students
Negro
Negro White
Negro
11 11
III2
5834
187 1022
58
225
1923
[923
1923
I919
I92I
52 (N.) 1920 75 (W.)
1920
1920
^925
Whites have stronger per-sonaHty. Only 15.4 per cent of the
negroes exceed the median of the whites.
Results similar to those of Yerkes.
Mental age of negro \-\yi years below whites.
Negro's mental age two years behind that of the white's.
Negro's I. Q., 83; white's, 106. Besides, the I.Q. in negroes
decreases with age and rapidly falls below that of the whites.
Negro's I. Q., 103; white's, 112.
Negro's I. Q., 89; white's, 103.
White 85 per cent better than the negro.
Negro scores in comparison with white scores taken as 100, are:

in Manthan *s meter test, 78; in substitution, 44; in rote memory,
68.5; and in logical memory, 80.3.
^" McFadden and Dashiell, J. F., "Racial Differences as Measured
by the Dawney Will-Temp. Ind. Test," Journal oj Applied
Psychology, 1922, Vol. VII,
PP- 30-53.
1^3 Brigham, C. C, A Study of American Intelligence, Princeton,
1923.
15^ Sunne, D., "A Comparison of WhitQ and Negro Children,"
School and Society, 1924, Vol. XIX, pp. 469-472.
297
For the sake of brevity, instead of giving the detailed
characteristic of the results of these studies, I have tabulated their
principal results, with the methods employed in testing, referring
to the indicated studies for the details.
There is no use to continue this list.^^^ The above shows that
practically without any exception, in spite of the different methods
used in the studies, the results were unanimous. They all showthat the I. Q. of the negro is comparatively lower than that of the
white race. They are in perfect agreement with the historical data
indicated above. If we take the number of men of genius yielded
by a race as a criterion of its mentality, the results will also be
unfavorable for the negro race, for it has been rather sterile in this
respect. Finally, it is worthy of notice that the studies of Ferguson,
E. B. Renter, and of some others, have shown that the greater the
infusion of white blood into the negro, the higher is his intelligence
quotient. We have here, as well as in Hunter's study of the
Indians, a partial corroboration of Go-bineau's statement that the

negro and other ''inferior" races show intellectual ability only in
proportion to their percentage of white blood.
This perfect agreement of all these tests: the historico-cultural, the
mental; the absence of geniuses, especially of the highest rank;
^55 Pressey, S. Z., and Teter, G. P., "A Comparison of Colored
and White Children, etc.," Journal Applied Psychology, 1919, Vol.
Ill, pp. 277-282.
1^6 Arlitt, a. H., "The Relation of Intelligence to Age in Negro
Children," Proc. 30th Ann. Meet. Am. Psy. Assn., 1921, 14; "The
Need of Caution in Establishing Race Norms," Journal Applied
Psychology, 1921, Vol. V, pp. 179-183.
1" Derrick, S. M., "A Comparative Study of Seventy-Five White
and Fifty-Two Colored College Students," Journal Applied
Psychology, 1920, Vol. IV, pp. 316-329.
1^8 ScHWEGLER, R. A., and Winn, E., "A Comparative Study of
the Intelligence of White and Colored Children," Journal
Educational Research, 1920, Vol. II, pp. 838-848.
159MURDOCK, M., "Study of Race Differences in N. Y. City,"
School and Society, 1920, Vol. XI, pp. 147-150; "A Study of
Mental Differences that are Due to Race," Proc. of 32d Ann.
Meet, of Am. Psych. Assn., 1923, pp. 108-109.
160 p^xE, W. H., Nature and Development of Learning Capacity,
p. 93, Baltimore, 1925.
'^1 See also Odum, H. W., Social and Mental Traits of the Negro,
(shows that the per cent of feeble-minded among negroes is
higher than among whites); Term AN, L., Genetic Studies of
Genius, 1925, Vol. I, pp. 56-57; Strong, A. C, "Three Hundred
Forty White and Colored Children," Ped. Sent., Vol. XX, pp. 485-
515; Reuter, E. B., "The Superiority of the Mulatto," American

Jourtid* Sociology, 1917, Vol. XXIII, i)p. 83-106.
298
and the "superiority" of the mulattoes, seems to indicate strongly
(especially together with the further data concerning other races)
that the cause of such a difference in the negro is due not only,
and possibly not so much to environment, as to heredity.^^^ For a
corroboration of their thesis, the partizans of one-sided environmentalism have been able to give nothing but speculation and
reasoning. This evidently is too little to make their position valid.
From the standpoints of cultural achievements, the results of
mental tests, the number of geniuses produced, and the
''superiority" of half-breed Indians over full-blood Indians, the red
race makes a somewhat better showing than the negro, but one
which is, nevertheless, "inferior" to that of the whites. The results
of these four tests are again in complete agreement with one
another. It is enough to give merely the results of the mental tests,
because of the lack of Indian cultural achievements, their
backwardness, and their very low number of geniuses (if any).
From the same standpoint, it is interesting to take such racial
varieties as the Chinese, Japanese, and the Hindus of the higher
and the lower caste, and to ascertain to what extent the data of
the historico-cultural achievements agree with the gradings of the
mental tests. We know that these peoples have, in the past, and
^^2 References to environment are not convincing because if, in
the present and past in America the environment of the negro has
been less favorable, in Africa they had as many chances in the
long course of history to create complex forms of culture as the
white race had elsewhere and yet nothing has been created.
Further, none of the environmentalists has shown that in this long

course of race history the geographical environment of the negro
has been less favorable than that of the white race. Finally, in
several of the mentioned experimental studies, the economic,
occupational, and social status of the white and the negro has
been taken into consideration; and attempts have been made to
study the white and the negro in the same status and environment
(studies of Arlitt, Hirsch and others), but the result has been the
same. The negro has been "inferior" when compared with the
white in the majority of the studied mental functions. Finally, the
environment of either the Russian peasantry before the
annihilation of serfdom, or of the mediaeval serfs, or of the
Roman and the Greek slaves was probably not any better, if
indeed it was not worse than the environment of the American
negro before 1861 or at the present moment. Yet these slaves
and serfs of the white race, in spite of their environment, yielded a
considerable number of geniuses of the first degree, not to
mention the eminent people of a smaller caliber. Meanwhile,
excepting, perhaps, a few heavyweight champions and eminent
singers, the American negroes have not up to this time produced
a single genius of great caliber. These considerations and facts
seem to point at the factor of heredity, without which all these
phenomena cannot be accounted for.
299
163 Garth, T. R., "Racial Differences in Mental Fatigue," Journal
Applied Psychology, 1919, pp. 235-244; "White, Indian, and
Negro Work Curves," Journal Applied Psychology, 1920, pp. 1425; "A Review of Racial Psychology," Psychological Bulletin,
1925, pp. 355-357.
1" Hunter, W. S., and Sommermier, E., "The Relation of Degree

of Indian Blood to Score on the Otis Int. Test," Psychological
Bulletin, 1921, Vol. XVIII, PP.91--92.
300
partly, even in the present, created a few of the most brilliant
civilizations. In their political and military history they have created
world empires. They have yielded a considerable number of the
great geniuses in different fields of mental and social activity. For
this reason if this test and the mental tests are adequate, we must
expect that their intelligence would be almost as high as that of
the white race of which they are a blended variety. Results of the
mental tests seem to corroborate this expectation.^^^ The study
of Pyle, and the investigations of K. Murdoch, Wol-cott, K. T.
Yeung, Symonds, and Porteus ^^^ have shown that their
intelligence is either as high as the intelligence of the American
and Anglo-Saxon whites, or is only a little lower, which may
sometimes be explained by negatively selected groups of these
peoples. They have also been found very high in the tests of
morality, and sometimes in school marks. In this case also, we
find then that the tests are in agreement. Agreeing with the test of
cultural and historical achievement are also the results of the
mental tests of the Brahman (high) and the Panchama (lowest)
castes in India, who belong to different racial types. The scoring
of the Brahman children is only a little lower than that of the
American white children of the same age, while the scoring of the
Panchama children is considerably lower than that of both these
groups. Besides, the Panchama children (as the negro children in
some studies) "show no increase in the speed of their
performance after the age of twelve. . . They have attained their
^^ Studies in the physical anthropology of these peoples have
shown also that, from the standpoint of cranial capacity, these
peoples rank as high as the white peoples. For this reason, many
prominent anthropologists and eugenists give them a very high
qualification. See Schallmayer, W., Vererbung und Auslese^
1910, Chap. XI; Porteus, S. D., and Babcock, M., Temperament
and Race, Part IV, 1926.
1" See Murdoch, K., "A Study of the Differences Found between
Races in Intellect and in Morality," School and Soc, Vol. XXII,
Nos. 568-569, 1925; Symonds, P. M., "The Intelligence of the
Chinese in Hawaii," School and Society, Vol. LXXXIX, p. 442,
1924; WoLCOTT, C. D., "The Intelligence of Chinese Students,"
School and Society, 1920, Vol. XI, pp. 474-480; Waugh, K. T., "A
Comparison of Oriental and American Student Intelligence,"
Psychological Bulletin, 1921, Vol. XVIII; Yeung, K. T., "The
Intelligence of Chinese Children," Journal of Applied Psychology,
1922, Vol. V, pp. 267-274; Young, Kimball, "Mental Differences in
Certain Immigrant Groups," Univ. of Oregon Public, 1922, Vol. I;
see also Terman, Genetic Sttidies of Genius, Vol. I, pp. 56-57.
301
full mental growth at this age," while the American and Brahman
children continue to show an intelligence growth after this/^^
Finally, as to the so-called European nationalities or stocks, it is
evident that they (as far as they are taken on the basis of their
languages,Anglo-Saxons, Germans, Swedes, Italians, and so
on) do not represent racial groups in the zoological sense of the
word. Within the same nationality we find different varieties of the
white race; and vice versa. The same racial variety is spread
among various national groups. Therefore, it is comprehensible
that the results of the mental tests of these nationalities might be
expected to be somewhat contradictory, showing differences that
are not so great. These results could be easily accounted for,
because all the principal varieties of the white race,-the Nordic,

the Alpine, and the Mediterranean in their cultural history have
shown brilliancy and have never been so widely separated as the
white and the black races. These expectations are considerably
corroborated by the mental tests. The relative place of different
European nationalities shifts from study to study, and the relative
ranks of each nation are not identical with the ranks of other
nationalities in different studies.^^^
The only conclusion which it seems possible to make from the
above and similar studies is that the mentality of various races,
and especially that of the white and the black races (as far as it
may be judged by the tests given), is different. I do not say that
one race is superior while another is inferior. Such an evaluation
is subjective. But I do say that in the discussed respect, their
''scores" are different. It is probable that in some other respects
the blacks may score somewhat higher than the whites. But such
a fact, if it is shown, would mean only that their difference is still
greater and more many-sided. This means that the school is right
as far as it maintains these differences in
^^^ See Herrick, D. S., "A Comparison of Brahman and
Panchama Children in South India," etc., Journal of Applied
Psychology, 1921, Vol. V, pp. 252-260. See also Waugh, K. T.,
op. cit.; Porteus, and Babcock, op. cit., Parts V, VI.
^^^ See the above quoted works. Besides, see the studies of
Brown, G. L., "Intelligence as Related to Nationality," Journal of
Educational Research, 1922, Vol. V, pp. 324-327; Feingold, G. a.,
"Intelligence of the First Generation of Immigrant Groups," Journal
of Educational Psychology, 1924, Vol. XV^ pp. 65-83; PiNTNER,
R., Intelligence Testing, N. Y., 1923; Young, K., "Intelligence
Tests of Certain Immigrant Groui)s," Scientific Monthly, 1922.
302

various racial types, but that it is wrong in its exaggeration of
them. As we have seen, they are considerably less conspicuous
than the school contends. The difference between the upper and
the lower classes of the same race is rather greater than that
even of the white and the black races. The school is wrong also in
so far as it finds in these differences the characteristics of
*'superi-ority" and ''inferiority." In view of the subjectivity of these
terms, it is possible to contend, with an equal right, that, for
instance, an ability to abstain from the creation of a complex
civilization is a trait of "superiority," while such a creation is a
symptom of ''perversion." From the standpoint of such criteria, the
negro race would be "superior," while the white race would be
"inferior." If we drop such evaluations, the above racial differences
are as indicative of "superiority" as are the opposite ones.
The task of a science is not to evaluate, but to find the facts in
this case to find out whether or not the races are different, and, if
they are, exactly what these differences are. The above survey
answers the problem positively and shows the nature of the
dissimilarities. This is all which is relevant from a scientific
viewpoint.^^^ Evaluations are to be left to the subjective taste of
everyone. So much for this point.
D. Further, as I have already mentioned, the school is at least
partly right in its contention that these differences are due, not
^^ In spite of a commendable cautiousness several careful
authors, like E. B. Reuter, in his valuable study, go to the opposite
extreme and beyond the facts known when they state that "all
scholars accept as a provisional but fairly well-founded working
hypothesis the position that the various races and peoples of the
world are essentially equal in mental ability and capacity for
civilization." Reuter, E, B., The American Race Problem, A Study
of the Negro, pp. 95-96, 429. This statement is quite fallacious
from the factual standpoint: the majority of the specialists do not

recognize that "the various races and peoples of the world are
essentially equal in mental ability and capacity for civilization."
The statements contradict even the author's own statements that
"there is a very considerable body of apparently unbiased
scientific opinion on the side of Negro inferiority. And there are no
competent students of racial matters who dogmatically assert an
absolute racial mental equality." Ibid., p. 92. This statement is
much nearer to the truth than the preceding one of the same
author. Putting aside "superiority" and "inferiority" as subjective
evaluative terms, the problem of bodily and mental differences in
various races, on the basis of the facts known, can be answered
positively. Several recent studies, like that of Porteus and
Babcock, as well as new devices to test chemically the reaction of
the blood of various races to a certain reagent, make this
statement still more certain.
303
only to direct environmental conditions, but also to the factor of
heredity. That this factor plays a part in this respect may scarcely
be questioned by any serious investigator of facts. There is no
possibility of accounting for these differences through the
influence of environmental agencies alone. From this standpoint,
all the shortcomings of such theories as are indicated by
Gobineau are valid. (See above. See also Chap. III.) The
following categories of facts are especially unaccountable through
environmental agencies. First, in the same environment, some
racial groups have created complex forms of culture, while others
have not succeeded in doing it, and have remained in the simple
forms of culture. Second, some racial groups have been able to
create complex forms of civilization in the most different
geographical environments, while others have remained
stationary in various geographical conditions. Third, men of

genius, and, partly, the idiots are unaccountable through
environment alone. Fourth, men who came out of similar
environments have achieved different things. Fifth, there are
failures who have come out of the most favorable environment,
and men of genius who have come out of the most unfavorable
conditions. Sixth, there is a lack of increase in the number of men
of genius from the proletarian class in the nineteenth and the
twentieth centuries in spite of the increase of educational facilities.
These, and other similar facts, may be accounted for only through
the admission of the factor of heredity,^"^^ through the
fortunate and unfortunate combination of the genes of the
parents. This does not mean that the direct influence of the
environmental agencies, such as food, climate, occupation,
education, and so on, do not play their part; but, in order that they
may change directly the really racial or hereditary qualities of an
individual or a group, it is necessary that a very long period of
time should elapse.
The totality of physical and mental traits by which various races of
man differ from each other is not unchangeable . . . but hundreds
and thousands of years are always necessary for such a
transformation says Morselli.
^^^ See an analysis of the problem in my Social Mobility, Chap.
XIII.
304
I do not know of any case of racial transformation within one or
two generations, unless it has been made through crossmarriage. The environment of a race cannot quickly change its
physical and mental qualities. As for education, it is absurd to
expect this to change the racial traits of a group within one or two
generations. It is true that, at the present moment, it seems that

the qualities of a people are changing often and easily; but
scientific investigation shows that such changes belong to the
history of a nation or people as psycho-social phenomena, rather
than to the category of the racial thanges.^"Âs far as the school insists on the important influence of heredity
it is right, and, in this respect, it represents a good counterbalance against the one-sidedness of the exaggerated
environmental school. But as far as some of the representatives
of the school try to underestimate, or even to ignore, the influence
of environment, they make the same mistake as the excessive
environmentalists. There have been several attempts made to
express quantitatively the relative importance of environment and
heredity,^^^ but they seem to remain somewhat subjective, and
therefore inconclusive. Putting them aside, we may say with a
reasonable degree of certainty that the factor of heredity plays an
important part in determining the traits and behavior of individuals
and groups. Thus far the contention of the school and its studies
represent a contribution to the science, and deserve our
appreciation.
E. The school is right also in ascribing a great importance to
selection, and in giving significance to the racial changes of a
population in explanation of the social phenomena and historical
destinies of a cultured people. The school exaggerates somewhat
the significance of these factors, but there seems to be no doubt
172 MoRSELLi, Le razze humane, pp. 331-332, 341 et seq. Dr.
Franz Boas has tried to show that under the direct influence of
environmental agencies, it is possible to change the racial traits of
a group very quickly, but his interesting results are subject to very
serious criticism, and cannot be taken as conclusive. See Boas,
F., "Changes in Bodily Form of the Descendants of Immigrants,"
Senate Documents, Vol. LXIV, Washington, 1911. See criticism in
the works of G. Sergi, K. Pearson, C. Gini and others indicated in

the chapter, "Geographical School."
1" See, for instance, Professor Starc#, Educational Psychology.
305
that selection through differential fertility, mortality, and crossmarriages may efficiently, and in a relatively short time, change
the racial stock of a population. Such a change may exert a
tangible influence on social organization and social processes. If
the changes consist in a survival of the ''best," they may facilitate
the progress of the society; if they are opposite, they may be one
of the factors of a decay. We have a series of studies which rather
convincingly show that the processes of a decay are usually
accompanied by a change in the racial composition of the
population. The best studied case of this type is the decay of
Rome and Greece. All competent historians agree that Rome's
population in the later period was different from that of the earlier
period, and that the progeny of the earlier Roman aristocracy had
already disappeared at the time of the first century, A.D. T. Frank
has shown this convincingly. Otto Seeck made clear the
''extermination of the best" in the war and revolution of Rome.
Hence their conclusion that this racial change had to be one of
the factors of Rome's decay.
What lay behind and constantly reacted upon Rome's
disintegration was, after all, to a considerable extent, the fact that
the people who built Rome had given way to a different race. The
lack of energy and enterprise, the failure of foresight and common
sense, the weakening of moral and political stamina,all were
concomitant with the gradual diminution of the stock, which,
during the earlier days, had displayed these qualities.^'''^
Even if it is questionable to explain Rome's decay only through

this factor,^^^ it is probable that it has played a part in Rome's
disintegration. At least, such an admission is no less probable
than its denial, it is probable also that the contemporary form of
differential fertility and low birth rate in Western societies will exert
some negative influences on their social life in the future. A lower
procreation of the upper and the professional classes means a
relative or absolute decrease of their progeny in
"^ Frank, T., "Race mixture in the Roman Empire," American
Historical Review, Vol. XXI, p. 705; see also Seeck, Otto,
Geschichte d. Untergan^ d. Antik. Welte, passim, and all volumes;
Pareto, op. cit.. Vol. II, pp. 1694 ff.; Fahlbeck, P., La decadance,
passim; Sensini, G., op. cit.
"^ See RosTOVTZEFF, op. cit., i)p. 485 ff., where the objections
against such a theory arc given.
306
the future population. As far as their quaHties are due to heredity
also, this means an impoverishment of the racial fund of these
societies. A low birth rate, accompanied by a low mortality, means
an elimination or weakening of the factor of natural selection; in
other words, a survival of the weaklings who would be eliminated
under the condition of high mortality which accompanies a high
birth rate. Under such conditions, the population of such a society
is likely to be composed more and more of the progeny of the
weaklings and less ''superior" people. The racial fund of the
people being changed, their history is likely to be changed also.
These conclusions seem to be corroborated by a series of facts.
In the first place, Rome's and Greece's decay went on parallel to
the extinction of their aristocratic stocks, and a fall in their birth
rate. In the second place, the long existing aristocracies, (the
most durable among them being the Brahman aristocracy in

India) have always been fertile, reproducing themselves in no less
a degree than the lower classes. In the third place, long existing
societies, like the Chinese, Indian, or Jewish have always been
fertile too. In the fourth place, a series of studies in the mortality
rate of age groups below 32 years and above; both in civilized
countries like Germany, France, and England, which have low
birth and child-mortality rates, and in less civilized countries with
higher birth and child-mortality rates, like the Balkans, Hungary,
and Russia; such studies have shown that in the last named
countries, the mortality rates of the age groups above 32 years of
age is not higher, but rather lower than that of the same age
groups in more civilized countries. Such a thing could be
explained only by an admission that the weaklings in the less
civilized countries are eliminated through high mortality,^"^^ and
that those who survive to a greater age than 32 are relatively
strong people. For this reason, in spite of the less hygienic
conditions, they show less mortality than the corresponding age
groups within the more civilized and hygienic countries.
i'^^ See about the selective character of death rate Snow, E. C,
The Intensity of Natural Selection in Man, London, 1911; K.
Pearson's paper in Biometrika, Vol. I, pp. 50-89; A. Ploetz's paper
in Archiv fiir Rassen und Gesellschafts Biologie, Vol. VI, pp. 3343, 1909; PoPENOE, P., and Johnson, R., Applied Eugenics.
Chap. VI, 1922.
307
Finally, medical investigations of the recruits of Germany,
England, and France for the last few decades, have shown that
the percentage of the biologically defective among them is not
lower, but rather, higher than among the recruits of Russia, and
that this percentage has been increasing in spite of an
improvement in the standard of living in these countries at the end

of the nineteenth, and in the beginning of the twentieth centuries.
Such somewhat ''unexpected" results testify rather in favor of the
above negative "selection," due to low birth and child-mortality
rates, and a still lower procreation of the ''best" stocks. An
improving environment does not seem even to compensate for
that which the societies lose through the selection and
impoverishment of their racial fund.^^*^ These, and many other
facts, make the school's conclusions in this field (minus their onesidedness) probable, though they still remain in need of being
tested.
F, As to Lapouge's theory of social selections, their forms and
effects,it must be considerably corrected in details. He stressed
too much the negative effects of the military, religious, legal, and
other forms of social selection, overlooking entirely their positive
effects. For instance, in the next chapter we shall see that the
effects of military selection are much more complex and manysided than Lapouge thought. The same is true in regard to other
forms of social selection. Lapouge's central idea being valid, his
one-sided and simplicist characteristics remain to be seriously
corrected. ^^^
G. Ammon's and Pearson's conception of various social
institutions as a kind of "sieve" which tests, sifts, selects, and
distributes the members of a society according to their qualities,
and their interpretation of class differentiation in essence seems
to be valid. The writer's study of the problem led to a similar con^^^ See a more extensive discussion of this problem and its
literature in my Social Mobility, Chaps. XX-XXII.
^'* Still more correction is needed by G. Hansen's theory of the
migration from the country to the city. We know now that not all
rural migrants enter city positions higher than the native-born.
Further, the city population, since the end of the nineteenth
century, has considerably improved its biological balance. It is

also not quite certain that the best people always migrate from the
country to the city, and that those remaining in the country are
"inferior." See the literature and details in my Social Mobility.
308
elusion. (See Social Mobility, passim, and Chapters VII-IX.)
However, this sound kernel of theory is overgrown in the works of
Ammon and Pearson by a series of "hasty" exaggerations of a
"propaganda" character. They are to be discarded.
H. Gobineau's, Lapouge's, and many eugenists' theories of an
inevitable harm in race blending seems to be one-sided also. The
problem is by no means solved. The numerous data obtained are
very contradictory. Hypothetically, the most probable solution of
the problem seems to be as follows : The blending of blood
between certain racial groups is likely to be beneficial, while that
between other races seems to be harmful. On the other hand,
inbreeding when the stock is good and not contaminated is likely
to be beneficial, while, when the stock is poor or contaminated, it
produces degeneration. Such is the answer which is possibly
nearest to the truth. However, we still know very little of just
exactly what are the conditions and races whose blending will be
fortunate or unfortunate.^^^
8. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
Space does not permit me to continue an analysis of the other
statements of the school. On the basis of the above, we must
conclude that it has been one of the most important and valuable
schools in sociology. Rejecting its exaggerations and fallacies, we
can be but grateful for its many contributions to our knowledge.
Even the school's one-sidedness has been useful in
counterbalancing the one-sidedness of the excessive

environmentalists. Freed from their exaggerations, both schools
complete each other excellently, and give "an aggregate key" *to
an understanding of a great deal of the mystery of human
behavior and social processes.
1" See Dunn, L. C, "A Biological View of Race Mixture,"
Publications of American Sociological Society, Vol. XIX, pp. 4756; Reuter, E. B., "The Hybrid as a Social Type," ibid., pp. 59-68;
Linton, R., "An Anthropological View of Race Mixture," ibid., pp.
69-77; Mjoen, J. A., "Harmonic and Disharmonic RaceCrossings," Eugenics in Race and State, pp. 40-61, Baltimore,
1923; Hoffman, F. L., "Race Amalgamation in Hawaii," ibid., pp.
90-108; Savorgnan, F., "Nuzialita e Fecundita delle Case
Sovrane," Metron, Vol. IH, No. 2, 1924; East, E. M., and Jones, D.
J., In-breeding and Out-breeding, Philad., 1919; Hankins, op. cit.,
Chaps. VH, VHL See there other references.
309
CHAPTER VI
SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE "STRUGGLE FOR
EXISTENCE" AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF WAR
I. General Characterization of the Branch
I F T H E biological conceptions of organism, heredity, variation,
and selection have inspired the series of sociological theories
discussed above, the same must be said of what Darwin styled
the ''struggle for existence" and ''adaptation." Though the theories
of the "struggle for existence," "survival of the fittest" and of
"adaptation" were set forth long before Darwin,^ nevertheless his
hypothesis has greatly influenced the sociological thought of the
post-Darwinian period, and has been one of the principal factors
in causing the appearance of numerous divergent theories
interpreting the struggle for existence within human societies.

These theories are either a mere application of the "biological
law" of
^ Conflict, opposition, and struggle were long ago declared a
fundamental law of the universe, of life, and of man's existence;
and the source of all change and progress. Even the theory of the
"survival of the fittest" was outlined not later than the fifth century
B.C. Heraclitus' "All is incessantly changing," and "War is the
father of all things"; Empedocles' theory of the struggle for life and
survival of the fittest; Seneca's "vivere militare est"; the Roman
"militia est vita hominis," show that. There is also the "ZendAvesta's" fundamental principle that "the history of the world is the
history of conflict" (of the opposite forces of good and evil); that
"there is a war in nature, because it contains the powers that work
for good and the powers that work for evil"; and that their struggle
is permanent and omnipresent ("The Zend-Avesta," the Sacred
Book of the East. Vol. IV, Oxford, 1880, pp. LVI-LVII, and
passim). The dualism of the good and evil forces, with their
attendant struggle is given in a great many ancient religions.
Since that time, the philosophy of conflict and of struggle, whether
in an application to the whole universe, or to the kingdom of lifephenomena, or to the history of man, has been running
throughout the history of the social and philosophical thought of
various peoples and societies. In the nineteenth century a great
impetus to the idea was given by H. Spencer and especially by
Charles Darwin. See a survey of the historical development of the
theory of evolution in OsBORN, H. F., From the Greeks to Darwin,
N. Y., 1908. See also the very brief account of H. H. Newman in
his Readings in Evolution, Genetics, and Eugenics, Chap. II;
Judd, J. W., The Coming of Evolution, Cambridge, 1911; Spiller,
G., "Charles Darwin and the Theory of Evolution," Sociological
Review, April, 1926; DE QuATREFAGES, A., Darwin et ses
precurseurs franqais, Paris, Alcan; Perrier, E., La philosophie
zoologique avant Darwin, Paris, Alcan; Nasmith, G., Social

Progress and the Darwinian Theory, Chap. I, N. Y., 1916.
310
the struggle for existence to human society, or its variation. For
this reason, the majority of them may be regarded as a branch of
biological sociology. The purpose of this chapter is briefly to
survey and analyze these theories, especially the various
''sociologies of war."
Contemporary literature on "struggle sociology" is enormous.
However, an incomparably greater part of it does not have any
scientific value, being nothing but purely emotional and
speculative ''ideologies." Therefore this part may be dismissed
without any analysis. What remains is well represented by a
series of relatively few fundamental works, whose survey may be
sufficiently representative to give an idea of the situation of
sociological knowledge in this field. Before we analyze these
theories, we shall "clear the ground" of a series of vague
conceptions, which make a clear analysis impossible.
2. Uncertainty of the Meaning of "The Struggle for Existence'' in
Biological and Sociological Literature
As is generally known, Darwin took the idea of a struggle for
existence from Malthus. Introducing it, he was aware of a
vagueness in its meaning.
1 should premise that I use this term in a large and metaphorical
sense including dependence of one being on another, and
including (which is more important) not only the life of the
individual, but success in leaving progeny.
He further gives a series of examples of the struggle for

existence, which give to the term a meaning almost identical with
that of the "reaction of protection and preservation," a meaning far
broader than a mere "extermination or elimination" of other
organisms.
In these several senses, which pass into each other, I use for
convenience sake the general term of "Struggle for Existence." ^
This shows that Darwin practically left his conception of the
struggle for existence undefined. In his work he uses the term in
two different senses. The first is a broad one, which includes
311
all the phenomena of the ''dependence of one being upon
another" (hospitable and inimical), and all the protective reactions
such as mutual aid, sociality, cooperation, and so on. The second
is a narrower sense, which principally means the inimical,
antagonistic, and ''struggling reactions." This divergency of the
meanings and the somewhat interchangeable use of both of them
has considerably vitiated even Darwin's theory.
In the works of the biologists and sociologists, the defect has
grown enormously. In the first place, each of them interprets the
meaning of the struggle for existence in his own way. There are
authors who talk of the struggle for existence among atoms,
planets, stars, and molecules, not to mention the struggle of
organisms, human beings, and societies.^ Some other authors
use the term only in an application to living beings, but by the
"struggle for existence" they understand not only inimical,
antagonistic, or exterminating reactions; but mutual aid, solidarity,
struggle for individuality and domination, cooperation, and so
forth,that is, practically all the reactions of an organism.^ Finally
there are the authorsthough many of the above mentioned
writers do the same toowho use the term in a narrow sense of
the word, understanding by it only the antagonistic, and especially

the injurious reactions occasioned by the extermination of one
being by another. If to this anarchical use of the term in scientific
works we add the incomparably worse anarchy in its journalistic
and occasional usage, we cannot'but agree with the ironical
remarks of a prominent French biologist in regard to the factor of
"struggle for existence."
Owing to a careless use of the term, "Struggle for Existence," a
crowd of the superficial followers of Darwinism began to ascribe a
magical power to the words. They are used now as the term
"affinity" was once used, in all cases when it was necessary to
get out of a difficulty. Society men, especially journalists who talk
of all
3 See for instance Novicow, J., Les luttes entre socictes
humaines et leur phases successives, pp. 1-50, Paris, 1896;
Tarde, G., L'opposition universelle, Paris, 1897.
* See for instance Thompson, J. A., Darwinism and Human Life,
p. 91, N, Y., 1917; GiDDiNGS, F,, Studies in the Theory of Human
Society, N. Y., 1922; Bagehot, W., Physics and Politics, N. Y., pp.
24, 50-52, 212-213, N. Y., 1884; Nicolai, G. F., Die Biologic des
Krieges, Vol. I, Chap. II, Zurich, 1919. (There is an English
translation.)
312
this without serious training and knowledge, philosophers,
metaphysicians, men who fetishize words, even some of the
scientists, think that all problems are solved as soon as they have
succeeded in indicating, especially in English, the factor of the
''Struggle for Existence." Struggle for Existence! Nothing can
resist that ''Open sesame" which is supposed to unravel for us all

the secrets of biology and sociology.^
If our discussion is going to be more or less fruitful, we shall have
to omit all theories of a "struggle for existence" among atoms,
planets, and so on. Let them be discussed by philosophers or by
anyone else, but we are concerned only with human beings. We
shall also have to omit all theories which give a very broad
meaning to the struggle for existence, regarding as its varieties,
mutual aid, cooperation, sociality, and what not. Such a broad
interpretation of the struggle for existence makes the term
practically meaningless; in this case it is possible, with equal right,
to style all these phenomena as ''A Life Protection" or "Help for
Existence" or "Cooperation for Existence." It is an elementary
scientific rule to style similar things with similar terms, and
dissimilar things with different terms. The term, "struggle for
existence," meaning the extermination of the other fellow, is so
different from "struggle for existence" in the form of mutual aid
with this fellow, that it is utterly impossible to cover them by, or
identify them through, the same term. Moreover, if we should do
that, it would be evidently impossible to find any clear and definite
correlations between such a broad, indefinite, and selfcontradictory factor, and some other phenomena. These reasons
are sufficient for dismissing all such vague and "meaninglessly
broad" biological and sociological theories. Let them be discussed
by
* GlARD, Facteurs primaires de revolution, Paris, Librarie
Croville-Morant, pp. xi-xii. Partly for similar reasons, such a
prominent zoologist as P. Charles Mitchell, a member of the
Royal Society, and the secretary of the London Zoological
Society, after his careful analysis of the problem as to whether the
generalization of the struggle for existence could be regarded a
scientific law answers: "It is rather ridiculous to claim that the
natural selection and struggle for existence can demand a right to
be considered as a scientific law. The pretension that 'the law of

nature to which all other natural laws could be reduced is the law
of struggle' is quite fallacious. It is not a law but only an
intensively discussed hypothesis." Mitchell, Le Darwinisme et la
guerre; French translation, p. 29, Paris, 1916. The book was
pubHshed in English in 1915, but at the present moment it is not
available to me.
313
those who Hke to wander in the wilderness of high-sounding, but
vague and meaningless, phraseology.
This means that we are going to deal only with those theories of
the struggle for existence which use it in the narrow sense of
antagonism, conflict, and war among human beings. But even
with such limitations, not all these theories are worthy of being
surveyed or discussed. A great many of them represent nothing
but superficial ''ideologies" or an inadequate generalization,
without any serious proof or any systematic analysis of the facts.
These may be dismissed also. For this reason such "theories"
and ''statements" as: "The history of all hitherto existing society is
the history of class struggle" (Marx-Engels) ; or "The law of
struggle is an universal law" (Novicow) ; or "The struggle for
existence is a law inherent in humanity as in all living beings" (E.
Ferri) ; or "The law of struggle is a fundamental law of nature"
(Bernhardi) ; and similar "figurative and meaningless
generalizations," may be dismissed without any analysis.^ The
reason is that such statements, being incidental, do not give
much; they mean something pretty indefinite, and they are
obviously one-sided.
There is no doubt that, side by side with the phenomena of the
struggle for existence, there exist the phenomena of mutual aid,
cooperation, or solidarity. The studies of P. Kropotkin, W.
Bagehot, and of many others, have made this clear."^ These
phenomena, although opposite to the struggle for existence, are

as general in the human and the animal world as the relations of
antagonism and war. For this reason, all theories which try to
make the struggle for existence into a unique or primary factor of
social evolution are obviously fallacious. Similarly, the same may
be said of other "theories" of a like nature. After the above
"clearing of the field" from pseudo-scientific "rubbish," let us turn
to the sociological studies of war-phenomena, as the acutest form
of the struggle for existence among human beings.
^ Marx, Karl and Engels, F., Communist Manifesto, Kcrr Edition,
pp. 12-13, Chicago, 1913; Noviccw, op. cit., pp. 1-12; Ferri, E.,
Socialism and Positive Science, p. 25, London, 1909.
'See Kropotkin, P., Mutual Aid, London, 1902, passim; Bagehot,
op. cit., passim; Mitchell, op. cit., passim.
314
3. Forms of the Struggle for Existence, and Their Modification in
the Course of Human History
J. Novicow's Les luftes entre societes hiimaines et leiirs phases
sticcessives, M. Vaccaro's La lutte pour rSxistence et ses effets
dans Vhitmanite, and Vaccaro's Les bases sociologiques du droit
et de Vetat may possibly serve as representative theories in this
field. At any rate, their statements, which are shared by a great
many sociologists, furnish a convenient starting point for a
discussion of the problem.
The essentials of Novicow's theory are as follows: Eternal
struggle is a universal and everlasting law. Such a struggle goes
on among atoms, organisms, human beings, societies, and
among all kinds of units. Among animals the struggle for
existence assumes two principal forms: elimination and

absorption. However, even among them are found traces of the
milder economic and mental competition. The result of the
struggle is an elimination of the less fit, and a survival of those
who are better adapted to the existing conditions. Experience and
knowledge have played a great part in the successful struggle
among animals. Those organisms which displayed this quality in
the greater degree have had greater chances to survive. Through
an elimination of the unfit the struggle leads to a better and better
adaptation. Its progress means a greater happiness. In the course
of time this progress of adaptation, especially among human
beings, becomes more and more rapid. In fact, "progress itself is
nothing but an acceleration of adaptation." ^ Turning to the forms
and evolution of the struggle for existence among human beings,
Novicow distinguishes at least four principal types. Their
character and evolution may be seen from the following
abbreviated scheme.^ This scheme shows that there are many
forms of the struggle for existence in human society. According to
the author, in the course of time the ruder forms of struggle are
superseded by milder ones. The physiological struggle has now
almost disappeared, while the form tends to become more and
more intellectual. War is more and more being superseded by
mental and intellectual competition. Besides, as time goes on, the
transforma315
THE SOCIOLOGY OF WAR
315
The Principal Forms of the Struggle for Existence and Their
Evolution
Forms of the
Struggle for
Existence
I. Physiological
2. Economic
3. Political
4. Intellectual
Elimination, extermination, obtaining food
Acquisition of the means of subsistence, and wealth; their
accumulation, appropriation, etc.; economic wars
Obtaining various economic privileges through political means;
political domination, with the purpose of profiting from it in various
ways. The principal method is by the infliction of various
punishments, by threatening execution, and so on. Political wars
Struggle for an intellectual domination, for a victory of a rehg-ion,
ideology, dogma, civilization, culture. Methods: propaganda,
various methods of assimilation, training, criticism, intellectual
persecution, and so on
Forms of Manifestation
Cannibalism, killing, murder, war for the sake of obtaining food
and elimination of the enemy
Brigandage,economic competition, and various forms of
compulsion, with the direct purpose of robbing an enemy
Usurpation, en slaving, serfdom, spoliation, annexation, conquest
Religious wars, revolutionary wars; intolerance, intellectual

struggle, competition and so on
tion goes on at an accelerated rate. War, in a physiological sense,
will disappear entirely in the future. Struggle will not disappear,
but it will assume the forms of intellectual competition exclusively,
without any bloodshed or extermination of fellow-men. The
following quotation from another work of Novicow recapitulates
his theory :
The apologists of war are quite riglit in this, that struggle is life.
316
Struggle is the action of the environment upon the organism and
the reaction of the organism upon the environment, therefore a
perpetual combat. . . . Without struggle and antagonisms societies
would indeed fall into a state of somnolency, of most dangerous
lethargy. That is perfectly true, but the great mistake consists in
considering war the sole form in which humanity's struggle
manifests itself. . . . Besides the physiological struggle, humanity
has economic^ political, and intellectual struggles, which do not
exist among animals. It may even be stated that the physiological
struggle, the dominant form in the animal kingdom, has ended
among men, since they no longer eat one another.
Criticizing Ratzenhofer's and Gumplowicz's theories he continues
:
No grim fatality obliges us to massacre one another eternally like
wild beasts. . . . The Darwinian law in no wise prevents the whole
of humanity from joining in a federation in which peace will reign.
Within the federation of humanity the same will take place as
takes place within each state. Here struggle has by no means
disappeared but goes on under the form of economic competition,

lawyers' briefs, judges' sentences, votes, party organizations,
parliamentary discussions, meetings, lectures, sermons, schools,
scientific associations, congresses, pamphlets, books,
newspapers, magazines,in short, by spoken and written
propaganda. And we must not suppose that these methods have
been preferred to bloodshed because men have become better.
Idylls play no part in this question. These methods have been
preferred because they were found to be the most effective,
therefore the quickest and easiest. . . . All the methods of struggle
just enumerated are constantly employed in normal times among
381,000,000 of English subjects inhabiting 25,000,000 of square
kilometers. They could be equally well employed by
1,480,000,000 men inhabiting 135,000,000 square kilometers.
Then the federation of the entire globe would be achieved.^^
Such are the essentials of Novicow's theory.
10 Novicow, War and its Alleged Benefits, translated by T.
Seltzer, pp. 102-103, 113, 119, 125, N. Y., 1911. The French
original edition was published in 1894, under the title, La guerre et
ses pretendue hienfaits. In his later work, La critique du
Darwinism social, Paris, 1910, Novicow makes some statements
which are somewhat contradictory to the above theory, which will
be indicated further. He published, further, a special monograph
devoted to an analysis of the possibility and character of a
federation of Europe, La federation de VEurope, Paris, 1901.
317
Vaccaro's (1854- ) sociological theory of adaptation and the
struggle for existence is drawn up along similar lines. Adaptation,
in his opinion, is the final law to which all other biological and
sociological laws could be reduced. Using Spencer's formula of
life as an incessant adaptation of the inner relations to the outer,
Vaccaro says that the essence of life is adaptation, and that
adaptation consists of incessant efforts to establish an equilibrium

between organism and environment. From this it follows that the
more complex and dynamic the environment, the more complex
and plastic the organisms will be; otherwise they would perish.^^
Combining Darwinian and Lamarckian principles, he discusses
the evolution of organisms from this standpoint, the problems of
heredity, and so on.^^
Passing to man, he indicates that man's adaptation, compared
with that of other animals, is more dynamic and complex,
consisting not only, and not so much, in the modification of an
organism, as in a modification and creation of the means of
adaptation outside of his organism (tools, instruments, weapons,
and other "artificial organs").^^ To adapt himself to his
environment, man has had to struggle with cosmic forces injurious
to him, with animal and plant organisms, and with fellowmen. The
creation of various instruments to exterminate, annul, or modify
the injurious effects of heat, gravitation, cold, and other cosmic
forces, is nothing but an adaptation to a cosmic environment. The
extermination of harmful organisms, cultivation of plants, and the
domestication of animals, is again an adaptation to organic
environment.^^ One of the most difficult tasks of adaptation has
been that of man to man within a group, and of one society to
another. This leads us to Vaccaro's theory of the struggle for
existence among human beings, and of its evolution. Among
other forms of adaptation among human beings, there has always
been a form of the struggle for existence. In order to survive,
human beings have had to adapt themselves to one another
within a society, and to adapt one society to another. At the
earliest stages this task was achieved with great difficulty and
through the rudest methods: through a pitiless elimination of the
"Vaccaro, M,, Les bases sociologiqties, pp. I-XX, Chap. I, Paris,
1898. lUd, Chaps. I-II. 13 /^v/.^ Chap. III. Ibid., Chap. IV.
318
weaker members of a group or of its ''dissenters," and through a
still more pitiless war and extermination of a weaker group by a
stronger one. Vaccaro gives numerous facts to show that inner or
exterior "war" at these stages was most bloody, inexorable, and
permanent. Wars were incessant, and the conquered group was
exterminated entirely. There was no pity for any member of a
conquered group. The struggle was for absolute extermination.^^
Later on, however, this inexorability of the struggle gradually
decreased. The factors of this quantitative and qualitative
decrease of the inner and outer struggle for existence were:
enlargement of the size of the groups and a decrease of their
number, which made chances of inter-group conflicts less
numerous; an increase in the size of the groups, which made it
more difficult to start the social machinery for war at any moment,
as was possible when the groups were small. Under such
conditions wars have become less profitable; and an increase of
social contacts, commerce, and similar factors has also
contributed to this effect. For these, and similar reasons, the intraand inter-group struggle for existence has been becoming less
and less rude quantitatively and qualitatively.-^^ In inter-group
struggle this mitigation first manifested itself in the increased
numbers of the members of a conquered group who were spared
and permitted to live. At the beginning only some of the children
were spared; later, women; then, all the non-dangerous members;
and later still, the majority of the members of such a group.
Instead of exterminating them, they were exchanged, turned into
slaves, sold, and exploited in various ways. In this way the circle
of pacified population has been expanding more and more.
Furthermore, the treatment of the spared conquered people has
been becoming more and more humane, until it has reached the
present situation in which, as soon as the war is over, the
conquered have almost as many rights as the conquerors,^"^

Thus, quantitatively and qualitatively, the inter-group struggle
warhas
^5 Ihid., Chap. V. See also Vaccaro, M., La lotta per Vesistenza e
suoi effetti nell'humanita, Rome, 1886, French translation, Paris,
1892. For an evolution of the intra-group struggle for existence
(crimes and punishment) see his Genets e funzione delle leggi
penali, Rome, 1889.
1^ Les bases, Chap. VI. Other works passim.
" Ibid., Chaps. VI-VIII.
319
THE SOCIOLOGY OF WAR S19
been dying out, and intei-group adaptation has been gradually
progressing.
Similar has been the trend in the evolution of intra-group struggle.
At the earliest stages, the treatment of offenders against the
members of a group was pitiless. Bloody revenge, expulsion,
duels, and similar measures of elimination and extermination
were the rule. Later on, these measures have also become more
and more humane, until they have reached the present
''penological" policy, in which the element of cruelty and torturing
of an offender is reduced to a minimum, and tends to disappear
completely.^^
If now we glance at the struggle between the conquerors and the
conquered forcibly subjected to the control of the conquerors, its
evolution shows the same tendency. The conquerors used to
become the privileged or governing stratum of the conquered
society. Their interrelations at the beginning were those of a sharp
antagonism in which the aristocracy, through a severe coercion
and cruelty, forced the conquered or the lower classes to obey its
despotic domination. The government was necessarily a military
dictatorship of the conquerors over the conquered. As the mutual
adaptation of both the classes grew, coercion and cruel
despotism began giving way to milder forms of social control. The
place of military despotism was taken by a theocratic government
considerably milder than the former regime; then the place of
theocracy was superseded by a still milder aristocratic regime;
and its place, in time, by a democratic regime in which the
differences between the conquerors and the conquered, between
the governing and the governed classes, have been practically
obliterated. Instead of an outside government, we have selfgovernment; instead of a compulsory and tyrannical control, selfcontrol, based on the will of the people and free from bloodshed
and despotism. Thus in this field the tendency has been the same
as that in other fields of the inter- and intra-group struggle for
existence. All of them taken together show that the bloody forms
of the struggle have been dying out in the course of time.
Adaptation has been progressing, as a finer and more "/W(/,
Chap. IX.
320
humane technique has been superseding the bloodier and ruder
one. All this indicates that war, punishment, extermination, and
elimination of human beings by their fellowmen will disappear in
the future, and a mobile and harmonious adaptation will be
established.^^
Such is the skeleton of Vaccaro's theory. Each of his statements
is supported by rich ethnographical, historical, and political
materials. This, in addition to the harmonious and well-rounded
character of the whole theory, greatly increases the convincing
power of Vaccaro's conclusions.
It is scarcely necessary to say that the above conclusions of

Novicow and Vaccaro are shared in their essentials by a great
number of sociologists, economists, moralists, political thinkers,
and historians; not to mention an immense number of journalists,
publicists, preachers, politicians, pacifists, and others. They think
that the outlined disappearance of war and the bloody forms of
the struggle for existence within human societies is inevitable. G.
Tarde, M. Kovalevsky, E. Ferri, G. de Molinari, G. Ferrero, N. M.
Butler, G. Nicolai, W. H. Taft, R. S. Bourne, S. C. Mitchell, L.
Petrajitzky, W. G. Sumner, A. G. Keller, the entire body of the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the enthusiasts of
the League of Nations, various societies for the promotion of
peace, and so on, may all be quoted as examples of the many
people who believe this.^^
" Ihid., Chaps. X-XII.
^^ G. Tarde claims that the stage of opposition or conflict between
the two subsequent,old and the new"adaptations" tends to
become shorter and shorter, and less and less cruel as time goes
on. See Tarde, Social Laws, pp. 105 and passim, 110-113, 132133, N. Y., 1899. He was one of the earhest theorists who
classified the phenomena of opposition into three principal forms:
war, competition, and polemics,the classification commonly
accepted now, but sometimes wrongly attributed to Simmel.
Kovalevsky, M., Contemporary Sociologists, pp. 164 ff.; Ferri, E.,
Socialism and Positive Science, pp. 24-25, and passim; De
Molinari, G., Grandeur et decadence de la guerre, Paris, Alcan,
1898; Sumner, W. G., and Keller, A. G., The Science of Society,
Vol. I, 1927, pp. 16, 62 ff., 390 ff.; Ferrero, G., // militarismo, 1898;
Nicolai, G., op. cit.; Petra-jiTZSKY, L., "Kvoprosou o sozialnom
ideale," Juridich. vestnik, 1913, Vol. II, p. 34; see the statements
of N. M. Butler, W. H. Taft, R. Bourne, S. C. Mitchell, in Woods, F.
A., Is War Diminishing? Boston, 1915, Introduction. A similar
opinion was held by the writer in his book. Crime and Punishment,
1914, pp. 317-385, (Russian) and in his "The Trends in Evolution

of Punishment," (Russian) in Novyija idei v pravovedenii, Vol. II.
321
CRITICISM
Can we say that the essentials of the above theories are
scientifically proved and accurate? I am afraid not. They are very
sympathetic, and therefore tempt belief; but a serious scientific
scrutiny shows their fallacies.
In the first place, it is not true that among animals the struggle for
existence assumes only the forms of elimination, extermination,
and devouring of other organisms. We cannot say this of the
majority of plants, or of many of the non-carnivorous animals.
Besides, as a series of biologists have shown, the victory in the
struggle for existence has not necessarily belonged to the most
voracious beasts. Very often it has been obtained by those
species which have been less cruel and voracious.^^
Furthermore, Kropotkin and many other investigators have shown
that mutual aid is in no way restricted to human societies. It is
quite common among animals. We cannot even say that the
higher the place occupied by species on the "ladder of life" the
less voracious they are. Such an assumption is quite false.
Moreover, there is some truth in the ironical remark of Montaigne
that "war is a specific characteristic of the human species"; and in
a no less ironical epigram of Shaftesbury that Hobbes' famous
''homo homini lupus est'' is an insult to wolves, because they are
less rapacious and cruel toward one another than is man toward
man. These facts are sufficient to show the fallacy of Novicow's
statement that, as we proceed from the lower to the higher
animals, and from the animals to man, ''the physiological struggle
for existence" tends to disappear. The facts do not support such a
pleasant ''generalization" at all.^" Now, considering man, can we
say that the above scheme of the evolution of the inter- and intra-
group struggle for existence is accurate? I am afraid it is not. In

his later book, Novicow himself indicates that, at the beginning of
his history, man was "a fruit-eater" and not "a flesh21 See the corresponding facts in Mitchell, op. cit., Chap. II.
22 It is curious to note that in his later book, in the heat of his
criticism of sociological Darwinism, Novicow himself indicates that
among animals, war, as a struggle of one group with another, is
extremely rare, as is also an individual "physiological" struggle
among the members of the same species. War is a conspicuous
trait of human society. See Novicow, La critique de Darwinisme
social, pp. 43, 47-48, 61, 153.
322
eater," and that man's strong herd-instinct made a peaceful fellow
out of him. Only when the development of man's intellect broke
the power of this instinct, did war appear in human history.^^ All
this is but a speculation; but yet it shows Novicow's contradiction
of his own statement that, in the course of human history, the
struggle for existence has been perpetually decreasing, passing
from the physiological to the intellectual form. Turning from this
speculation to the facts, can we say that primitive man was more
rapacious, bloodthirsty, and warlike than civilized man, as we are
told by Novicow, Vaccaro, Sumner, Keller, and even by S. R.
Steinmetz,^* not to mention a crowd of incompetent assert-ers? If
the facts, as far as they are known, do not permit us to answer the
question negatively, still less do they permit us to \ answer it
positively. Now we certainly know that a "savage" is 1 in no way
similar to a cruel, bloodthirsty, and voracious beast, as he has
been often depicted.^^ The passage from the lowest hunters to
the highest agricultural groups among the simple peoples is
certainly great. If the criticized theory were right we would have to
expect that war would be less known to, and the treatment of the
vanquished more humane among, the high agricultural peoples
than among the lowest hunters. Facts, however, do not support
this expectation. The following table, in which the results of a
study of 298 simple peoples are summarized, shows this. Only in
nine cases has ''no war" been found, and these instances have
not been taken from among the high agricultural peoples, but from
among the lower hunters and the lower agricultural peoples. This
leads the authors of the study to the conclusion that ^'organized
war rather develops with the advance of
23 Novicow, ibid., pp. 50, 53, 207. A similar speculation is
repeated by Nicolai in his superficial Die Biologie des Krieges,
Vol. I, pp. 29-32. Nicolai practically follows Novicow's work.
24 As we shall see, Dr. Steinmetz very vigorously claims that war
will not disappear in human history, and he is one of the most
prominent scientific defenders of war. Nevertheless, he also
states that "war is the usual business" of primitive tribes; that "die
Wilden, wahrscheinlich nach der alleersten Stufe, hludthurstig
waren und ihre Kriege in der grausamsten Weise mil
ungeheueren Verlusten an Menschen fuhren." Steinmetz, Die
Philosophie des Krieges, pp. 55-57 I90 Leipzig, 1907.
25 See Westermarck, E., The Origin and Development of Moral
Ideas, Vol. I, pp. 334 fif., Chaps. XIV, XV, XVI, London, 1906.
323
THE SOCIOLOGY OF WAR
323
industry and of social organization in general." ^^ The table is as
follows:
Number of Cases of Each Form of Treatment for the Vanquished

Among Each
Class of People "
The table probably contains a larger number of the simple
peoples studied from this standpoint than any other study.
Therefore it is less fragmentary and incidental than many other
studies of primitive peoples based on one-sidedly few cases.
Being such, contrary to Vaccaro's and Novicow's theory, it does
not show any noticeable quantitative or qualitative decrease of
war as we pass from the stage of the lowest hunters to that of the
highest agricultural peoples.
If we turn to historical peoples, the discussed theories occupy
26 HoBHOUSE, L., Wheeler, G. and Ginsberg, M., The Material
Culture and Social Institutions oj the Simpler Peoples, p. 228,
London, 1915.
324
no better position. At the present moment we have at least two
more or less systematic attempts to find out whether or not war
has been decreasing among the European peoples during the last
nine centuries. As a basis for deciding this problem the authors
observed the number of years in each century spent by a country
in war and in peace. One of them added to this the data which
show what per cent of the fighting force (army) perished in all the
principal wars of these centuries. The principal results of their
study are as follows: ^^
Number of Years Spent in War in Each Specified Century in Each
Specified
Country
(The upper Hne of figures are those of F. A. Woods; the lower
one, of Bodart.)
Country
England
France
Austria, and the Hapsburg
Austria-Hungary
Russia
Turkey
Spain
Poland
Denmark
Holland
Prussia of the Hohenzollems Sweden
iiooI200
54 36.5
1201-1300
36 49
1301-1400
65
43
1401-1500
57
52.5
1501-1600
54-5 60.5
75-5
78.5 80.5
73
55 32.5
50-5
1601-1700
43-5 146.5
164
73-5
77
57-5
89
82
68
30.5 62.5
58.5 50
1701-1800
55-5
50-5
52
48.5
59
49-5
23
48.5
22.5
12
29-5
31
29-5
1801-1900
53-5
35
74
13.5
25 53 39.5 53-5
15 14.5 13 6.5
32'
with colonial wars * without colonial wars
These figures show that only in regard to small countries whose
total population composes an insignificant part of the European
population, would it be possible to talk of the diminishing of war.
The data concerning large countries does not give any valid
2 Woods, F. A., Is War Diminishing? pp. 34, 39, 43, 53, 64, 67,
73, 78, 85, 91; Bodart, G., Losses of Life in Modern Wars, pp. 4,
75-78, Oxford, 1916. By the way, it is curious to note that the
Hohenzollern Prussia, which in speeches used to be slandered as
the very embodiment of militarism, was objectively the least
militaristic of all large countries. This is a good illustration of a
discrepancy between what is the objective truth, and what is
subjective "public opinion."
325
basis for such a conclusion. If to this we add the appropriate
consideration of F. A. Woods, concerning the long cycles in the
movement of war; and finally the data of the twentieth century, we
cannot but agree with Dr. Woods' conclusion that the "lines [in his
valuable diagrams] for England, France, and Russia would never
suggest that militarism is ceasing"; and that all the data can, at
best, ''do no more than throw a moderate amount of probability in

favor of declining war years." '^
If we take the per cent of losses for the belligerent armies in the
wars of the seventeenth, the eighteenth, and the nineteenth
centuries, we cannot see any tendency toward a decrease.
Meanwhile, the size of the armies has been increasing not only in
an absolute | number, but probably even in proportion to the
population. During the last war we saw that almost the entire
population of nations was turned into an army. If, therefore, the
per cent of the losses of the contemporary armies is no less than
that of the armies of the past, this strongly suggests that, contrary
to many authors, among them Steinmetz, there is no definite
decrease in the number of war victims. Numerous and detailed
tables given by Bodart of the losses in all the principal battles of
the above three centuries, computed as a per cent of the total
strength of the fighting armies, do not show even the slightest
tendency toward a decrease of these losses.^^ These data seem
sufficient to show that the / /
25 Ibid., pp. 29-30. J. de Maistre was the first who made such a
tentative computation, and he came to the conckision that "la
guerre est Vetat hahituel du genre humain dans un certain sens;
c'est-d-dire, que le sang humai?i doit couler sa?is interruption sur
le globe, ici oil la; et que la paix, pour chaque nation, n'est qu'un
repit." "Considerations sur la France," Oeuvres, Vol. I, pp. 28 ff.
G. Valbert, on the basis of the computation of the Moscow
Gazette says that "from the year 1496 B.C. to A.D. 1861, in 3,358
years, there were 227 years of peace and 3,130 years of war, or
thirteen years of war to every year of peace. Within the last three
centuries there have been 286 wars in Europe." He adds further
that "From the year 1500 B.C. to A.D. i860 more than 8,000
treaties of peace, which were meant to remain in force forever,
were concluded. The average time they remained in force was
two years." Valbert, G., in the Revue des Deux Mondes, April,
1894, p. 692. Having these facts in view, the Honorable George

Peel in his The Future of England, p. 169, said that for fifteen
centuries, since the full adoption oi Christianity by the continent of
Europe, peace has been preached, and for these fifteen centuries
the history of Europe has been nothing but "a tale of blood and
slaughter."
^ Here again the popular writers have imposed upon the public
quite a wrong picture of the militarism and enormous armies of
past centuries, especially of the middle ages. The real situation
was ver\' different. The armies of the past, .being mercenaries
and ])rofessional fighters, were as a rulf. very small, soraetimea
326
^26 CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES
alleged disappearance of war is hard to prove by the actual data.
Vaccaro's and Novicow's "tendencies" have been rather more a
matter of imagination than an accurate description of the reality.^^
As to the qualitative decrease of the cruelties of war, the criticized
theories seem to be very doubtful also. Of course, some may
believe the extermination of an enemy through machine guns,
poisonous gas, crushing by tanks, big cannon shells, and other
''scientific" methods more humane than that by arrow, or club, or
spear; but this is a matter of personal taste. In the opinion of the
author there is no substantial difference which would permit one
to talk of a ''progressive humanizing of war" in the course of time.
The last war experience has shown also that in the twentieth
century, women, children, and civil populations were often
exterminated just as, according to Vaccaro, they were
exterminated in the remotest past.^^
These indications are possibly sufficient to show the illusionary
character of the discussed theories. I am afraid the deeper we dig
into the facts, the more conspicuous their fallacies are going to
appear.^^ They are nothing but "derivations," in which the deamounting to a few dozen, or hundreds, or to a few thousand
men. The figures for the Austrian, and other armies in the battles
of the seventeenth, the eighteenth, and the nineteenth centuries
are given in Bodart's study. Looking through these figures one
sees how systematically the fighting armies have been increasing
from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries. It is probable
that the increase is greater than the increase of the population for
the same period. See Bodart, op. cit.f passim.
3^ As I mentioned in my youthful work, I myself held the same
belief; but a more careful study of the facts has made me change
my opinion.
32 If one takes the colonial wars of the European countries in the
years of 1923-26, one will have a still more conspicuous example
of the falseness of the alleged disappearance of war cruelties.
Whole cities in Syria, Morocco, India, Afghanistan, etc., were
shelled. Women, children, and the whole population were
exterminated. A wonderful "humanizing of war," indeed!
33 As a contrast to these theories we have the opposite ones
whose authors try earnestly to show that, with a progress of
civilization, the cruelties and the severity of the struggle have not
been decreasing, but increasing. One of the most interesting
treatises of this kind was published by A. N. Engelgardt in his
book: Progress as the Evolution of Cruelty (Russian). The author
collected an enormous amount of material from the histories of
the past and the present wars, and of the colonization of the
natives by the European nations, to prove his principal thesis. If
this thesis cannot be accepted (it is also one-sided) the work at
least shows the fallacy of the opposite opinion. As is known, B.
Kidd, in studying the theories, ideologies, beliefs, and tendencies
of the second half of the nineteenth century, also came to the
conclusion that the West was becoming incomparably more

brutal, warlike, and rapacious than it had been before. During this
period there "was a recrudescence of the pagan doctrine of the
327
sirable trend is substituted for the real one. So much for this point.
Now, as to the forms of the ''struggle for existence/' or the forms
of antagonistic relationship among human beings, they are
numerous. Their classification depends upon the purpose of the
study. The majority of the existing classifications represent a
variety of Tarde's threefold classification :war, competition, and
polemics, which approximates Novicow's four forms of struggle.^*
Such are the classifications of G. Simmel, of L. v. Wiese, R. Park,
and E. Burgess, E. A. Ross, and of some others.^^ There is no
doubt that such a classification embraces only one aspect of the
problem, and that it is only one out of many possible
classifications. In the first place, it is possible to classify all
antagonisms according to their specific characteristics. They may
be, for example, conscientious and unconscientious; one-sided,
as when they include only the antagonism between wolves and
sheep; or they may be mutual, where both parties menace each
other; absolute, where one party tends to exterminate another
physically; or relative, where extermination is not necessarily an
objective, but where subjugation, exploitation, domination, and
competition of various kinds enters. In the second place,
according to ''the diagnostic symptoms' or "manifestations of
antagonistic attitudes" (forms) there are antagonistic relations:
war, physical fight, competition, opposition, polemics, compulsion,
coercion, and a series of inimical relationships. According to the
antagonizing units there are antagonisms between individuals and
betzveen groups. According to the nature of the antagonizing
units there are antagonisms between states, nationalities, races,
religious groups, political parties, sex groups, social classes,

occupational,
omnipotence of force," a return to the religion of force, cruelty,
slaughter, and so on. Kidd's conclusions are also one-sided, but
again they stress the one-sided-ness of the opposite opinions.
See Kidd, B., The Science of Power, Chaps. I-III, N. Y., 1918.
2^ Tarde, Social Laws, pj). 110 ff.
^ See further the chai)ter about the formal school. Competition,
opposition, and conflict,such are the principal forms in
antagonistic relationship, according to L. V. Wiese, R. Park, and
E. Burgess, who discriminate between competition (interaction
without social contact) and conflict (interaction with social
contact), which, in its turn, is divided into war and other forms of
conflict. E. A. Ross enumerates a scries of opposite forms; sec
Ross, E. A., Principles of Sociology, 1923, Chai)s. XI-XIX
328
economic, ideological groups, and so on.^^ This brief
enumeration shows the possibiHty of a divergent classification of
human antagonisms. Which of these many possible
classifications is to be used depends upon the purpose of the
study.
4. Social Functions and the Effects of War and Struggle
How little the phenomena of war and struggle have been studied,
and how inadequate is our knowledge in this field, is
conspicuously shown by the existence of two opposite types of
sociological theory about social functions and the effects of war.
According to one type of theory, war and struggle have been the
principal factors of human progress and have exerted a series of
most beneficial effects.^^ According to the other type of theory,

war is ''hell" and has exerted only the most disastrous influences
on various sides of social life.^^ Both types of opinion are
supported by prominent social thinkers, and the dispute between
them continues to go on up to this day. Let us glance somewhat
closer at the arguments of both parties. Their polemics and
arguments are usually carried on in the form of "evaluating"
judgments of
^^ Compare with J. Delevsky's classification of antagonisms given
in his elaborate study: Social Antagonisms and Class Struggle in
History, (Russian), St. Petersburg, 1910. See other classifications
of antagonisms in Sorokin, System of Sociology, Vol. I, pp. 207211; Park, R., and Burgess, E., Introduction^ Chaps. VIII-IX;
Savorgnan, F., "Les antagonismes sociaux," Scientia, 1914, I-VII,
pp. 138-146. See also Annates de I'Institut International de
Sociologie, Vol. XI, devoted to the problem of social antagonism,
and composed of the papers of prominent sociologists; Carver, T.
N., Essays in Social Justice, pp. 93-97, Cambridge, 1915.
3' The representative theories of this type are given by J. de
Maistre, who is regarded as the father of such theories in the
nineteenth century. See his "Considerations sur la France,"
(1790), Chap. Ill; "Les vSoirees de St. Petersbourg," septieme
entretien, in Oeuvres, Vols. I, V; Steinmetz, S. P., Die Philosophic
des Krieges; Constantin, A., Le role sociologique de la guerre,
Paris, 1907; Proudhon, La guerre et la paix; Jahns, M., Ueber
Krieg, Frieden und Kultur, Berlin, 1893; G. Valbert's paper
published in the Revue des deux mondes, April, 1894; GuMPLOwicz, Ratzenhofer, Sombart, W., Krieg und Kapitalismus,
Miinchen, 1913. Vaccaro's, and some others belong also to this
group of works as far as they explain the origin of the state, social
organization, and other social institutions through war and
struggle. G. LeBon, L. Ward, and E. Renan, not mentioning such
apologists of war as F. Nietzsche, Bemhardi and others, belong

partly to this group, too.
3* The representative works of this type are: the quoted works of
Novicow, Nicolai, N. Mikhailovsky, Kropotkin, Molinari, Ferrero,
Mitchell, B. Kidd, Lapouge, and the works of O. Seeck, V.
Kellogg, D. S. Jordan, Nasmith, and of many others quoted
further, not to mention a legion of pacifist pamphlets and
publications.
329
"good" or "bad," "beneficial" or "harmful"; and the "desirable" or
"undesirable" influences of war. Such a method inevitably
introduces into the theories a series of non-scientific conceptions.
They, in their turn, facilitate a misunderstanding between the
parties, and very often shift the dispute from the field of a
description of the facts as they are, into the field of moral
evaluation and speculative reasoning. In order to avoid such an
unscientific procedure, I shall split the problem into its important
sub-problems, and, in this way, present a brief summary of what
is known in this field, what is proved, and what is still uncertain.^^
A. war's selection
Concerning the character of war selection there are two opposite
theories. According to one the selection of war is negative;
according to the other it is either neutral or positive. The first
theory was brilliantly developed by H. Spencer, partly by Darwin,
and by V. de Lapouge (see the chapter about the Racial School)
and more recently by a series of authors such as J. Novicow,
Nicolai, O. Seeck, D. S. Jordan, V. Kellogg, Charles Gide, and
many others. The argument of this group runs as follows: Armies,
as a general rule, are composed of the "best blood" of the
population,the healthiest, because the unhealthy and the
physically defective are not taken into an army; the most efiicient
age groups, because the old and children are not recruited; the
more honest, because criminals are not permitted to enlist in an
army; and the brightest people mentally, because the mentally
defective or feebleminded are excluded from an army. Through
such a selection the army is somewhat superior physically,
morally, and mentally to the common population of the country.
During a war, it is the army which suffers losses; the civil
population either does not sufifer at all, or has incomparably fewer
losses. This means that war exterminates the "best blood" of a
nation in a far greater proportion than its "poorer blood." This
means that war facilitates a survival of the unfit. Exterminating the
best blood, at the age at which the reproductive capacity of the
^^ A very rich collection of war facts for future studies in this field
is g;ivcn in the works of Von Bloch, Der Kricg, several volumes;
and Encyklopddic der Krie^swissetischdftcn, several volumes;
and BiiRNDT, ()., Die Zahl nn Kricg, i<^).
330
SSO CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES
soldiers is far from being exhausted, war exterminates the best
progenitors of the future generations,the bearers of the best
racial qualities. It favors a propagation of the poorer blood and in
this way it is a factor of negative selection and of racial
degeneration. Vaccaro stressed another form of this. In a long
series of facts he has shown that, especially in the past, the
conquerors aimed always to exterminate in the first place the
strongest, the most courageous, the most intelligent, or the
leaders of the opposite party. The Roman rule: parcere subjectes
ct dehellare siiperhos (spare the submissive and demolish the
proud men) has been a general rule of almost all wars. Such was
the policy of the Spartans in regard to the strong Helots; of the
Dorians in regard to conquered native peoples; of the Aryans in
India; of the Romans in regard to many peoples conquered by
them. The same is true in regard to civil strifes, where each

victorious party pitilessly exterminates the leaders of the opposite
group; and when success passes from party to party we have, as
it was in Rome and Greece, a series of exterminations of the
leading men of all parties by one another. ''Since the submissive,
to the exclusion of the brave-and upright men, beget children, the
traits of baseness and servility become fixed in the race." In this
way military selection has exterminated millions of the best
individuals, and through that has facilitated a procreation of the
poorer elements of the population,of the innate slaves and
submissive peoples.'*^
Other negative influences of war and militarism on racial and
biological composition of the population may be added. They
make a great many wounded soldiers physically defective. They
facilitate various epidemics and sicknesses, and undermine the
health of the soldiers and population. What is more important,
militarism, even in time of peace, is responsible for a very high
per cent of venereal diseases, especially of syphilis, among the
soldiers. Through this it directly contributes to the degeneration of
the nation. Further, war exterminates the officers of an army in a
greater proportion than the soldiers. Officers being superior to the
soldiers, this means that war again works negatively. Such
331
are the principal considerations of those who maintain that
selection through international, civil, or any kind of war, is
negative.*^
As the incidence of the death from the wounds and disease of war
falls not at random on the general population, but on a specially
selected part of it, namely, its sturdy young and middle-aged men,
and men often not alone of especial physical fitness, but of
unusual boldness and loyalty of spirit, and as these deaths may in
times of severe and protracted wars be very considerable in
number and take a heavy toll for several or many successive

years from this particular part of the population, thus lessening
materially the share which it would otherwise take in the
reproduction of the population, it would seem to be inevitable, in
the light of the knowledge of the reality of race-modification by
selection, that serious wars should lead to a racial deterioration in
the population concerned. ^^
Such is one of these formulas.
Some of the authors went so far in an evaluation of the negative
selection of war that they made it responsible for the decay of
nations. Such, for instance, is O. Seeck's theory. According to it
the principal factor of the decay of Rome and Greece was an
extermination of the best blood of the nations through bloody wars
and civil strifes.^^ The theory is repeated eloquently by D. S.
Jordan.^^ Later, he and H. E. Jordan illustrated it through a study
of the effects of the Civil War on Virginia.^^
The arguments of the opposite theory, which maintains that war
selection is either neutral or even positive I shall use for aiding my
criticism of the theory just outlined. Can we say
^1 See Novicow, War and Its Alleged Benefits, Chap. IV; Nicolai,
op. cit., Vol. I, Chap. 3; Nasmith, G., op. cit., p. 379; Jordan, D. S.,
The Human Harvest^ Boston, 1907; Jordan, D. S., and H. E.,
War's Aftermath, Boston, 1914; Gide, Charles, "La reconstitution
de la population frangaise," Revue international de sociologie,
1916; Darwin, L., "On the Stat. Enquiries Needed after the War in
Connection With Eugenics," Journal of Royal Statistical Society,
March, 1916; Otlet, p., Les prohlemes intern, et la guerre, 1916;
Kellogg, V., Military Selection and Race Deterioration, in Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace Publications, Oxford, 1916;
also "Eugenics and Militarism" in Problems in Eugeiiics, 1912, pp.
220-231; vSoROKiN, P., "The Effects of War on Social Life," in
EkonO' mist (Russian) Pctrograd, 1922, No. 2; Sociology of

Revolution, Chap. XI.
''2 Kellogg, Military Selection and Race Deterioration, pi). 197198.
"^ See Seeck, O., Geschichte des Unterganges der antiken Welt,
3d. ed., Berlin, 1910, Vol. I, Chap. 3, and throughout six volumes.
*^ See Jordan, The Human Harvest, pp. 28 ff.
*^ War's Aftermath, pj). 22 ff.
332
that the theory of negative selection is sufficiently proved? In the
opinion of the writer, there seems to be a considerable portion of
truth in the theory. Nevertheless, some of its propositions are
questionable, and some others need to be tested further.
In the first place, even if negative selection takes place in presentday warfare, the same cannot be said certainly about warfare in
the past. In the present warfare, which is carried on with
poisonous gas, shells, bombs and so on, physical
resourcefulness, courage, dexterity, intelligence, and cunning
may not give any preference to the survival of the stronger men of
an army. Shells, gas, and bullets exterminate them as easily as
the weak soldiers. In wars of past history the situation was
different. It is likely that the strong, skilled, dexterous, and clever
fighter had then a greater chance than a weak soldier to go out of
a battle alive. The reason is that in a fight with arrows, spears,
lances, and so on, such a strong man could much better protect
himself than a weak fighter.^^' Furthermore, because of
starvation, lack of necessities, and other sufferings common in
such wars, only those who could endure all this could survive,
while the weak had to perish. Moreover, the stronger heroes

seem to have had much greater chances for procreation (because
of greater success among women, through polygamy, through the
right of the stronger, through raping, and so on) than the coward,
the weakling, and the physically and mentally defective. Even the
facts indicated by Vaccaro are not quite general. The leading
group very often obtained its life and freedom by means of
concessions, ransom, and other values given to the conquerors at
the cost of the masses ruled by such leaders. These
considerations show how complex is the problem, and how
difficult it is to find the real effects of war selection.
A number of authors indicate that, even at the present time, war's
selection is far from being such as it is depicted above.
Also in modern warfare cunning and resourcefulness count for a
great deal. It seems highly probable that more than ever before,
superiority in intelligence is a great asset among fighting men.
46 Compare Ross, E. A., Principles of Sociology, pp. 386-387;
Bushee, F. A., Principles of Sociology, pp. 124-125.
333
Even in the present trenches,
the best shots are kilHng more peoples than the poor shots are . .
. and the best shots will be themselves least often struck. . . So it
is with other forms of killing. . . It is highly improbable that
superiority in handling modern weapons is not correlated with
general mental superiority. If it be admitted that intelligence is a
factor at all, then the more intelligent must themselves tend to
escape, from the mere fact that they tend to do more killing.
Furthermore, even in modern wars
the great mortality is really of advantage to the race, because,

within the army itself, those who can survive hardship and
disease must be by nature stronger than those who succumb. . .
In whatever light we may view all these difficult questions, the
great fact remains that somehow man has evolved, and he has
fought, presumably, half of the time. If warfare is so deleterious it
may be asked: How did he get where he is? We have thus seen
how difficult and complicated is the philosophy of war. Yet most
writers have been content to take one side or the other of the
issue, so that we have scarcely begun to have a science of the
subject.*^
C. Gini and F. Savorgnan add to these considerations a new one.
If, in regard to men, war's negative selection is true, its harm is
compensated for through the positive selection of females due to
war. Owing to the extermination of the males, the number of men
decreases; and, because of this, the ''supply" of females
increases. Not all of them can now have a chance to be married
and have children. Thanks to a ''dearth" of males, only the
relatively better females are now married. The poorest among
them, who could have married had the war not taken place, now
remain outside the "procreators" of the future generations. Thus,
negative selection among males is compensated for by positive
selection among females, because in determining the qualities of
the offspring, the female parent counts as much as the male
parent.**^
^^ Woods, F. A., op. ciL, pp. 23-27. Compare Holmes, S. J.,
Studies in Evolution and Eugenics, N. Y., 1923; Sumner, W. G.,
War and Otiier Essays, 1911; PoPENOE, P., and Johnson, R. H.,
op. ciL, Chap. XVI.
"* Gini, C, "The War from the Eugenic Point of View," in Eugenics
in Race and State, pp. 430 ff., Baltimore, 1921; Savorgnan, F.,
"La gcrra e Teugenica," Scientia, June, 1926.
334
Dr. Steinmetz states generally that the losses and the negative
selection of war are greatly exaggerated. On the basis of the
losses of the Franco-Prussian War, he tries to show that they are
less than the normal fluctuation of the mortality rate from year to
year. Under such conditions it is impossible to talk about the
deterioration of a race through war.'*^ Besides, in modern wars
about three-fourths of the losses are due to epidemics and only
about one-fourth to warfare. This means that the stronger men
survive while the weaker die. Other authors indicate that statistics
and facts do not corroborate the statements of the opposite
theory. If negative effects were noticed by Villerme and B. de
Chateauneuf,^^ in contrast to their findings R. Livi did not find any
trace of such deleterious effects on the Italian soldiers born in the
years of war and after them.''^ To the same conclusion came
Colignon in his study of the French recruits of 1892 from
Dordogne who were born in the year of war and revolution.^^ A
similar conclusion was reached by O. Ammon in his study of the
Badenese recruits of the early nineties. F. Savorgnan found that
the per cent of the still-born children and the death rate of the
babies did not increase, and the weight of the newborn babies did
not decrease in the years from 1914 to 1919 in comparison with
the years from 1906 to 1914.^^ On the other hand, Claassen and
some others have found that the per cent of defective recruits in
Germany has been systematically increasing from 1902 to 1913,
though the period from 1879 to 1892 and later was the period of
peace in the history of Germany.^^ This means that a degeneracy
in the vitality of a population may take place in the most peaceful
times. These factual studies make
*^ Philosophie des Krieges, pp. 71 ff.
^"Villerme, L., "Memoire sur la taille de rhomme en France," in

Annales d'hygiene publique, I" serie, t. I, pp. 351-399, 1829; de
Chateauneuf, B., Essai sur la mortalite, ibid., I" serie, t. X, pp.
239-316, 1833.
^^ Livi, R., Antropometria militare, Vol. II, pp. 89 ff., Rome, 1905.
52 Colignon, R., "Anthropologie de la France," Dordogne,
Memoirs de Societe de Anthropologie de Paris, serie III, t. I, 1894.
53 Ammon, O., Zur Anthropologie der Badener^ 1899, Jena;
Savorgnan, F., op. cit., pp. 419-428.
^ Claassen, W., "Die Abnehmende Kriegstiichtigkeit in Deutschen
Reich," Arch. f. Rassen und Gesellschajts-Biologie, Vol. VI, 1909,
pp. 73-77; Vol. VIII, 1911, p. 786; Vol. X, 1913, p. 584. Similar
results were found in France and in England before the War and
during the War in regard to the recruits born and brought up in the
period of peace.
335
the discussed theory still more questionable. Moreover, Steinmetz
brings out two reasons in the endeavor to show that even if war
selection is in some degree negative, this harm is far
counterbalanced by war's positive effects. Following the opinion
of Plutarch, Polybius, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Vico, and of many
others, he claims that the peacetime selection is negative also. It
leads to vice, loss of virility, and to a survival of the people who
are far from being the best blood of the nation. ''Peaceful
competition leads to a regressive selection," too. This claim is not
entirely denied even by those who, like Mallock, Jentsch, Ferri,
Ploetz, Woltmann and others, insist upon the negative character
of war selection.^''' Therefore it is questionable which of these two
negative selections (of war and of peacetime) is more harmful and
regressive.
War that shatters her slain,

And peace that grinds them as grain.
What, however, is especially important is that war is an instrument
in the selection of the groups,a selection whose importance is
far greater than that of the selection of individuals. Like K.
Pearson, Steinmetz contends that among men there is not only a
struggle among individuals going on, but among groups also.
Which of the two groups is better, more resourceful, more
intelligent, and therefore more entitled to survive, could not be
decided without war. War is the instrument of group-selection. It is
the only test serving this purpose, and the test which is adequate
because it tests at once all forces of the belligerent groups: their
])hysical power, their intelligence, their sociality, and their
morality. The victory is the result of a mobilization of all the forces
of a nation. ''The conqueror is always he who shall fatally
conquer" on the basis of the superiority of all his forces. Without
war such a group selection would be impossible. ''Sans guerre,
tout le mond deviendrait ruse, diir et Idche comme les Juifs
^ Steinmetz, "La guerre, moyen de selection collective," in
Constantin, A., Le role sociologie de la guerre, \)\). 268 ff. See
above about Lapouge's social selections theory. See Mallock, W.
H., Aristocracy and Evolution, London, 1898; Jentsch,
Socialauslese, 1898; Woltmann, L., Die Darivinische Theorie und
Socialismus, 1899; Haycraf-t, Darwinism and Race Progress,
1896.
336
d'aiijoiird'hiiif' ^^ Compared with this positive group selection, the
negative results of individual selection through war become quite
insignificant.
The above shows that the character of war selection is much

more complex than it is usually supposed to be. On the basis of
what we now know about it, it is impossible to agree either with
the ''cursers" or the ''praisers" of war selection. The truth seems to
lie somewhere between these two one-sided theories.
B. war's effects on the health of the population
Somewhat more certain seems to be war's influence on the health
of a population, especially when the war is long and strenuous.
The disorganization of economic conditions, and the increase of
hardships make the satisfaction of primary necessities more
difficult; and, in connection with this, tends to increase various
epidemics, ailments, and sicknesses. In regard to venereal
diseases the increase seems to be certain.^''' In regard to
epidemics of plague, influenza, cholera, typhus, etc., especially in
the past, ( their increase could not be questioned. A great many
mediaeval wars were followed by various epidemics. The same
seems to be true even in regard to modern wars, including the
World War,^^ though the modern sanitary and hygienic measures
have considerably decreased the chances for, and the severity of,
epidemics. Less certain is the war influence on nervous or mental
diseases. Several studies have found an increase and credited it
to war,^^ but the data have always been fragmentary and
incomplete. Where war hardships are great, a decrease in the
weight of new^6 Steinmetz, La Guerre, pp. 241, 251, Chap. Ill; also "Les
selections individu-elles ou corollaires," in Annates de I Institut
International de Sociologies Vol. IV, 1898.
" See Kellogg, op. cit. Tuberculosis increased in the years of the
World War, but after its end decreased again. Handhuch d.
sozialen Hygiene, Vol. Ill, pp. 200-207, Berlin, 1926.
58 It is enough to mention the post-war influenza which swept

throughout all belligerent (and neighboring) countries.
5^ See, for instance, Oettingen, Moralstatistik, 1881, p. 68;
Gorovoi-Shaltan, "Mental Diseases Under the Existing
Conditions," (Russian), the Journal of Psychology, Neurology,
and Experimental Psychology, (Russian), 1922, pp. 34 ff.;
OsiPOFF, "Mental Diseases in Petrograd," in Izvestia of the
Health-Commissariat, 1919, Nos. 7-12 (Russian); Soecknick,
Anna, "Kriegseinfluss auf jugendhche Psychopathen," Archiv fiir
Psychiatrie, Jahrgang 24, Bd. 70, pp. 172-186. See there other
references.
337
born babies, an increase in the per cent of still-born children, and
an increase of various deformities and ailments due to the
abnormal conditions are probable. But again this is likely to be
only one side of the complex picture. There may be several
opposite influences which, however, scarcely counterbalance the
above effects. From the standpoint of the future of the race, these
negative influences, with the exception of venereal diseases, are
scarcely important. Eliminating possibly the weakest elements of
a population, they may be even beneficial from the standpoint of
racial selection. But again, all these statements are still to be
tested, and now represent only more or less probable
hypotheses.
C. INFLUENCE OF WAR ON VITAL PROCESSES
In this field the effects of war, at least of modern wars, are more
certain. They are as follows: With the beginning of war, the death
rate of the whole population of a belligerent country begins to go
up, and rises until the end of the war. After its termination it
abruptly goes down, and sometimes falls below that of the prewar level; but within one, two, or three years after the termination,
it returns to pre-war level and assumes the prewar trend of

movement. The marriage rate falls at the beginning of a war,
continuing this movement until the end, when it suddenly jumps
up to the pre-war level, as a result of the many marriages which
were postponed because of the war. Within one or two years,
however, it returns to the pre-war level, and resumes its pre-war
trend. In a somewhat similar way the divorce rate fluctuates. The
birth rate begins to fall nine months after the beginning of war,
and goes on decreasing up to nine months after its termination,
when it jumps up above the pre-war level, as a result of the great
increase of marriages in the post-war years; but within one or two
years it returns to its pre-war level, assuming its pre-war trend. In
details this scheme varies from country to country, and from war
to war; but, in essentials, such was the fluctuation of the vital
processes in the belligerent countries in the cases of the World
War, the Prussian-Danish War, 1864; the Prussian-Austrian War,
1866; the Napoleonic Wars; the Crimean War; the FrancoPrussian War, 1870-71 ; the Russian338
Turkish War, 1877-78; the Serbian-Bulgarian War, 1885; the
Balkan War, 1912-13; the Russian-Japanese War, 1904-5; the
Civil War of the United States; and some others.^^
D. INFLUENCE OF WAR ON ECONOMIC PHENOMENA
In this field the principal effects of war are: a waste of wealth (in
the form of capital and human material) and an extraordinary
shifting of it from society to society, and from group to group
within the same society. As does any large enterprise, war
requires a great mobilization of wealth. Furthermore, war destroys
cities, factories, and other economic values. In this sense it may
be regarded as a waste. If we agree to estimate an adult
individual at 32,000 francs (as is done by some economists) then

a loss of 20,000,000 individuals in war means a loss of
640,000,000,000 francs. In brief, the wasteful character of war
may scarcely be questioned.^^ The next general effect of war is
an extensive redistribution of wealth among societies, and among
the groups and individuals of the same society. It is manifest in
the shifting of the wealth of a conquered group to the conquerors;
from the belligerent countries to neutral ones; in the economic
ruin of some groups in favor of others of the same society; and in
an impoverishment of the masses and an attendant enrichment of
some individuals. In brief, war always is an important factor in the
shifting or displacement of wealth
60 See the figures in my "The Influence of War," in Ekonomist,
No. i, 1922, Petrograd, Russia; Sorokin, "Influence of the World
War upon Divorces," Journal Applied Sociology, 1925, No. 2;
Wolfe, A. B., "Economic Conditions and the Birth Rate after the
War," Journal of Political Economy, June, 191 7; NovosELSKY, S.
A., "War and Movement of Vital Processes," (Russian),
Ohschestvenny Vrach, Jan., 191 5; Nixon, S. W., "War and
National Vital Statistics," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society,
June, 1916. See other data in the well-known works of G. v. Mayr,
Levasseur, and Cauderlier. Less certain is the fact, accepted by
some statisticians, {e.g., by Oettingen) that in the postwar years
there is an extraordinarily high proportion in the births of males,
as a compensation for the males exterminated in war. In the last
war such a phenomenon was not noticed.
^^ The purely economic literature in this field is enormous. About
the general economic effects of war see Nicolai, op. cit.. Vol. I,
Chap. IV;Novicow, War, Chap. V; Boag, H., "Human Capital and
the Cost of the War," Journal Royal Statistical Society, Jan.,
1916; Otlet, P., op. cit., pp. 26 ff.; Bogart, E. L., Cost of the War;
Robinson, E. Van D., "War and Economics," in Carver's Sociology
and Social Progress, Chap. IX.
339
from group to group, and from man to man.^^ However, it must be
noticed that the economic losses and destructions caused by war
are often restored within an extraordinarily short time. The
explanations of this fact vary, but the truth is that it seems to have
happened many times.
Furthermore, the unusual stimulation of the inventive power of a
nation for the sake of military victory has often facilitated the
invention of a new method or the improvement of the old methods
of wealth production. In this way it has indirectly contributed
something toward economic progress and has, sometimes, at
least partly compensated for its economic damages.^^
E. WAR AS A MEANS OF EXPANSION FOR SOLIDARITY AND
PEACE
That war stimulates animosity and the most inimical feelings
among the enemies during the time of war is evident. Less
evident however, is the other side of the problem; the fact that war
has been a powerful instrument in the process of expanding
groups into larger and larger peace areas. Yet even in the past it
was said: ''si vis paean para helium" (if you want peace, prepare
for war). Many ancient authors understood this function of war.
More recently R. Jhering, in his brilliant essay ^"^ has shown that
''the objective of Law is Peace, but the road to it is War." At the
present moment it seems to be certain that without war and
compulsion this process of the unification of numerous and
inimical groups into larger and larger pacified societies would
have scarcely been possible. War and other means of coercion
have been instrumental in this respect. Through them it has been
possible to make the conquerors and the conquered into one
group, to keep them together, to establish an intensive contact
between them, to ''level" their differences, and, after several
generations of living together, to make out of them one social
group in which previous differences and animosities are

obliterated. At the pres2 See the data and literature in Sorokin, Social Mobility, Chap.
XVIII; Lewinson (Morus), R., Die Umschichtung der Europaischen
Vermogen, BerHn, 1925; ScHiFF, W., "Die Agrargesetzgebung
der Europaischen Staaten vor und nach dem Kriege," Archiv fiir
Sozialwis sense haft, 1925, pp. 469-529; White, E., "Income
Fluctuation of a Selected Group of Personal Returns," Journal oj
American Statistical Association, Vol. XVII, pp. 61-81.
^3 See about that, Sombart, W., Krieg und Kapitalisnius,
Miinchen, 1913.
" See Jhering, R., The Struggle for Law, translated by J. Lalor,
Chicago, 1879.
340
ent moment this role of war seems to be certain, and is
recognized by a great many investigators.^'"^
F. THE MORAL EFFECTS OF WAR
Concerning this problem, opinions vary from the most positive
apology for war to its most positive damnation. Let us briefly
survey what in these opposite theories is more or less certain,
and what is a speculation.
War, Brutalization and Corruption.
Neither circumstances, nor human beings become better in the
time of peace; it is from war, which may become more rare, that
we must expect progress. . . From a biological standpoint,
aggressiveness has been a condition necessary for progress.
Without it man could not emerge from his animal state, because
he would be exterminated by other species. Without war an
upward movement within humanity would not be possible,
because any means of finding out which social group is superior
and which is inferior would be absent. A long or eternal peace
would make man an exclusively egotistical creature, without
virility, courage, altruism, or bravery. Such a man would be
entirely effeminated, and corrupted to the very heart of his nature.
Degeneration, effeminacy, idleness, corruption,such would be
the results of an eternal peace. Such are the arguments of the
defenders of the beneficial effects of war on man's conduct and
behavior.^^
War, an appeal to brute force, is always a degradation, a descent
into the animalism that demoralizes the victors, as well as the
vanquished. . . Bloodshed produces international hatred, and
international hatred produces the most baleful evils. . . War is the
most
^ See Steinmetz, Philos. des Krieges, pp. 27 ff.; Sorokin, Crime
and Punishment, pp. 216-247; GiDDiNGS, F., Democracy and
Empire, 1901, pp. 354 ff.; Keller, A. G., Through War to Peace, N.
Y., 1918; Vincent, G. E., "The Rivalry of Social Groups," American
Journal of Sociology, Vol. XVI, pp. 471-484; Case, C., Outlines of
Introductory Sociology, Chap. XXX, N. Y., 1924; Sumner, W. G.,
War and Other Essays, New Haven, 1911; Gumplowicz, L., Der
Rassenkampf, Innsbruck, 1883, (see about Gumplowicz the
chapter on the Sociologistic School); Vaccaro, Les bases, passim;
Bushee, op. cit., pp. 130 ff. See, however, the opposite opinions
of several writers in Nasmith, Chaps. III-VI; Todd, A. J., Theories
of Social Progress, Chap. XIX.
^ Steinmetz, La guerre, p. 288, Chap. I,
341
Active cause of our backwardness and mental stagnation. . . It

brutalizes a man; strips him of all really human ethics, turns him
into a beast, and entirely demoralizes him.
Such is the opposite opinion.^"^
I think that the mere contrasting of these opinions is sufficient to
show their mutual fallacies. Steinmetz is right in maintaining that
aggressiveness was necessary for man to survive and rise above
an animal level; but it scarcely follows from this that courage and
virility can be displayed only in the form of slaughtering other
men, that war does not have any brutalizing effects, or that in
peaceful cooperation no progress is possible. Novicow is right in
maintaining that war demoralizes human beings greatly, but one
fails to see how man really could survive by being quite paci-fistic
and non-aggressive. It is doubtful also that a safe and eternal
peace is always beneficial. Still more questionable is it that war
has not been instrumental in an increase of altruism and social
devotion within at least a fighting group.
In brief, both sides are one-sided in their sweeping statements,
and the truth again seems to lie somewhere between these
extremes.
Criminality and War. The influence of war on criminality
represents one of the bases for a judgment concerning its moral
effects. Does war favor or check criminality ? The answer is that
we do not know. There have been several statistical studies of the
problem; they have shown that, for instance, in Germany in the
years of 1866 (the Austria-Prussian War), of 1871 (FrancoPrussian War), in France in 1830 and 1871, the number of crimes
decreased abnormally.^^ On the other hand, there are some data
(principally concerning defeated countries) which show a sudden,
though quickly passing, increase of criminality in the years of
war.^*^ This suggests that there is probably no general rule, and
that the character of war effects depends greatly on
' Novicow, War, pp. 72, 74, Chap. VIII.

8* See VON Mayr, G., op. cit., Vol. Ill, pp. 947-949; Starke, W.,
Verhrechen und Verbrecher in Preussen, 1S54-78, Berlin, 1884,
pp. 63 ff.; Bijdragen tot de statistick van Nederland, N. V. No. 231;
Levasseur, E., La population franqaise. Vol. II, pp. 442-445;
Corne, a., "Essai sur la criminality," Journal des econo' mistes,
1868, (January).
3 Bqurnet, a., La criminalite en France et en Italie, 1884, pp. 42,
47, 114; SocQUET, J., Criminalite en France, 1884, p. 25.
342
many conditions such as: whether the war is successful; whether
it is carried on in the territory of the country, or in that of the
enemy; whether it is accompanied by a great economic
disorganization; whether it is popular among the people of the
nation, and so on. This is confirmed by F. Zahn's study which did
not find any uniform effect of the World War on the criminality of
various countries."^^ Furthermore, it is necessary to add that a
decrease of criminality in time of war may also be due to the fact
that many of the would-be criminals are enlisted in the army, and
there find a full opportunity to satisfy their ''criminal" proclivities in
the form of heroic military exploits. This consideration is
supported by the fact that in France and in Germany, as soon as
the war of 1870-71 was over, criminality began to go up again.^^
The above seems to be true of civil and revolutionary strifes also,
which are likely to be much worse in this respect than
international wars.*^^
Granting that the hypothesis is true that sometimes war is
followed by a decrease of criminality, Tarde seems to give an
excellent interpretation of the fact, when he says:
The efTect of militarism is to exhaust the criminal passions

scattered through every nation, to purify them in concentrating
them, and to justify them by making them serve to destroy one
another, under the superior form which they thus assume. After all
is said and done, war enlarges the sphere of peace, as crime
formerly used to enlarge the sphere of honesty. This is the irony
of historyj*
As to the influence of military service and discipline on the
criminality of the soldiers in time of peace, there seems to be no
reason to think that it is noticeably positive or negative. The
attempts to show a greater criminality of the soldiers as compared
with that of the common population are unreliable.^*
JVar and Social and Anti-Social Forms of Conduct. After all,
criminal actions are only a small fraction of the socially and mor' See Zahn, F. "Kriegskriminalitat," Schmollers Jahrbuch fiir
Gesetzgehung^ pp. 243-271, 47. Jahrgang, 1924.
^1 Tarde, G., Penal Philosophy, p. 422, Boston, 1912; Parmelee,
M., Criminology, pp. 99-102, N. Y., 1923.
^2 SoROKiN, p., The Sociology of Revolution, pp. 146-147, Chap.
IX.
'3 Tarde, Penal Philosophy, p. 422.
'* See LoMBROSO, C, Crime, Its Causes and Remedies, pp. 201202, Boston. 1911.
343
ally relevant actions. What is war's influence on the total group of
such forms of conduct? Here again the truth probably lies
somewhere between the apologies of the enthusiastic admirers of
war and the curses of the war-haters. The admirers claim that war
is an eflicient school of altruism, solidarity for death and life, and

of '*a cure by iron which strengthens humanity." '^ The war-haters
claim that war is the school of an exclusive egotism, bestiality,
servility, brutality, harshness, slaughter, and of all imaginable
mortal sins.*^^ Both of these extreme views cannot stand even a
quite superficial test. If the first opinion were true, the nations like
the Swiss, the Dutch, and the Belgian, (before 1914) which did
not have any war during two or three generations, would be the
most egotistical and corrupted. The reality does not corroborate
such an expectation. If the second opinion were true, the
belligerent nations, especially in a period of a long-time war,
would be the most anti-social and beast-like. The reality also does
not support such an opinion. The Romans in the fifth, the fourth,
and the third centuries B. C. were almost continually at war; while
the Greeks in the time of the Greek-Persian wars also were in an
incessant warfare, and yet we cannot say that the morals and
sociality within their own nations were weakened. On the contrary,
their inner-group sociality, morals, sacrifices for the sake of the
country, the relative purity of the mores, lack of corruption, and so
on, at that period were conspicuous. What is true of these groups
is true of many other groups and individuals. There are
"professional soldiers" who display all the harsh and ruflian
qualities of an anti-social creature; and there are soldiers who are
highly moral and social. There are cases in which war, especially
an unsuccessful one, has demoralized a society; and there are
cases of the opposite character. It is enough to confront the
opposing arguments to see their mutual fallacies. A really
scientific study must pass over emotional speculations, and get
busy with the facts to be able to say what kind of war, under
'^ See, for instance, the quoted works of Steinmetz and Valbert.
""^ See, for instance, Novicow's War, Chap. VIII; Nicolai, op. cit.,
Chaps. Ill, IV, passim; Nasmith, op. cit., Chap. IV; and almost all
pacifist publications, and many of the publications of the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, which represent nothing but

propaganda wrapped into pseudo-scientific dresses. Much nearer
to the truth are the views developed in Sumner-Keller, The
Science of Society, Vol. I, pp. 397 ff.
344
what conditions, when, and in what respect, facihtates man's antisociahzation and society's demoraHzation; when, under what
conditions, and what kind of war produces the opposite effects.
Such studies are almost lacking up to tliis time.
G. INFLUENCE OF WAR ON POLITICAL ORGANIZATION
Possibly the most important generalization in this field was set
forth by H. Spencer, in his theory of the militant and the industrial
type of society. The essentials of Spencer's theory are: first, that
war and militarism lead to an expansion of governmental control;
second, to its centralization; third, to its despotism; fourth, to an
increase of social stratification; and fifth, to a decrease of
autonomy and self-government of the people. In this way, war and
militarism tend to transform a nation into an army, and an army
into a nation. Peace tends to call forth the opposite results: a
decrease of governmental interference, an increase of the
people's liberty and self-government, a weakening of social and
political stratification, and decentralization. The reasons for such
effects of war are as follows: Other conditions being equal, in a
war the nation turned into an army and controlled by a powerful
government has more chances to conquer than a nation in which
everybody acts as he likes, and in which a strong control,
centralization, and coordination of the activities of its members is
lacking. Furthermore, military education, training, and discipline
inculcate the habit of unquestioning obedience in the "rank and
file," and that of control in the higher authorities. The very nature
of the army, for the sake of victory, requires such a hierarchical

and autocratic organization. Besides, the life in military barracks is
one in which soldiers are controlled by the higher authorities.
They do not have, and cannot have, a considerable amount of
freedom and self-control. All this tends to ingraft into a nation
which has many and long wars the habits of ''military discipline,"
obedience on the part of the subordinated, and a despotical
control on the part of the commanding authorities. This, in its turn,
contributes to the expansion, centralization, and despotic
character of governmental control. Such are the essential
processes tending to be brought about by war and militarism.
Being such, they, however, may assume various
345
"dresses"especially in the form of "ideologies" and "speechreactions"according to the circumstances. Sometimes they
have the appearance of a despotism of military leaders, kings,
and aristocratic dictators. But sometimes they assume the forms
of "socialism" and "communism," "dictatorship of proletariat" or
"nationalization." In spite of the difference in such "dresses," this
difference is quite superficial. Both types of "dresses" wrap
objective social processes of an identical nature. Both tend to
realize an expansion of governmental control, (in the form of a
"communist," "generals' " or kings' despotic government). Both
tend to make it unlimited (in the form of an emperor's autocracy or
of a despotic "dictatorship" of communist leaders) through the
universal control of "nationalized" industry and wealth; through the
limitation of private ownership, property, and initiative; through the
control and regulation of the behavior and relationships of the
people; both restrain the liberty of individuals up to the limit, and
turn the nation into the status of an army entirely controlled by its
authorities. The names are different in the two cases; the essence
is the same. Thus, according to Spencer, mili- [ tarism,
"communism" and "socialism" are brothers. The increase of the
former leads to the success of the latter, unless the tendency

toward the expansion of governmental control assumes the
"reactionary" form of an increase in the power of kings, lords, or
military rulers.^^ Such is the essence of Spencer's correlation of
militarism with the militant, and of peace with the industrial types
of political organization.
In its essentials, Spencer's generalization appears to me to be
valid."^^ The correlation between war and militarism, on the one
hand, and a trend toward expansion, and a despotic form of cen" See Spencer, The Principles of Sociology, Vol. I, 258-263;
Vol. II, 547-582; Vol. Ill, 840-853. Spencer even predicted a
coming temporary rise of socialism as a contemporary "dress" for
the eximnsion of governmental control due to militarism.
Spencer's theory, with some modifications, has been further
developed by W. G. Sumner in his War and Other Essays, New
Haven, 1911. It was brilliantly corroborated by R. Pohlmann, in his
Geschichte d. Antiken Kom-miinismus und Socialismus; by V.
Pareto in his excellent Les systcmes socialistes, and by a great
many other investigators of the problems of socialism, militarism,
despotism, and ^tatism.
'8 Steinmetz's criticism of it does not appear to be valid. See
Steinmetz, "Classification dcs types sociaux et catalogue des
peui:)les," L'annee sociologique, Vol. III.
346
tralization of governmental control (whether in a "reactionary" or
''communistic and socialistic" dress) on the other, seems to be
tangible indeed. This does not mean that it may not sometimes be
checked by the interference of a specific factor or that militarism is
the only factor of these phenomena. There certainly are other
factors, and among them an especially important role is played by

the impoverishment of a society. This, however, does not annul
the correlation so brilliantly outlined by Spencer.'^^ Besides the
past historical data, it has been conspicuously corroborated by
the last war, and by the post-war years. We have had an
extraordinary expansion of governmental control in all belligerent
countries. There has been a rise in the success of socialist and
communist parties which led in Russia, in Hungary, Bavaria, and
so on, to the ''Militant Communist Dictatorship" and to socialist
governments in many other countries. We have seen, further,
how, with the termination of the War and its postwar effects, and
with the pacification of societies, the success of these groups in
all these societies began to diminish. The despotic character of
the groups' policies, and their unlimited communism (in Russia)
began to become more and more moderate, until there remains
very little of it even in Russia, and even there, the capitalist
system, private property, and freedom of citizens and other
characteristics of an ''industrial" society, have been considerably
re-established through the hands of the communists themselves.
In brief, Spencer's generalization seems to be valid in its
essentials.
H. WAR, REVOLUTION, AND REFORM MOVEMENTS
Their interrelation has been studied little. Nevertheless, there
seems to be a tangible correlation between these two
phenomena,
' Such are the conclusions to which the writer has come in the
process of his own study of the social effects of militarism,
impoverishment, of the factors of an expansion of governmental
control, socialism, and communism. See Sorokin, The Effects of
War on Social Life, (Russian) passim; "Impoverishment and
Expansion of Governmental Control," American Journal of
Sociology, Sept., 1926; "Famine and Ideology," Ekonomist,
(Russian), No. 5, 1922, Petrograd; "War and Mihtarization or

Communization of Society," (Russian), Artelnoije Delo, Nos. I-IV,
1922, Petrograd; The Sociology of Revolution, Chaps. XIII-XV.
See also the indicated works of Sumner, Pohlmann, and Pareto.
347
especially between an unsuccessful war and revolution. Such a
war is in a great many cases followed by revolution (in 1917-18 in
Austria, Turkey, Hungary, Germany, Russia, Bulgaria, Greece,
and so on) ; in 1905 in Russia; in 1912 in Turkey; in 1870-71 in
France, and in a great many other cases in various countries
during the previous centuries. On the other hand, many
revolutions have led to wars.^^ Generally they tend to breed each
other. The reasons for this are quite comprehensible. An
unsuccessful war means that the society's organization could not
meet the test of war, and that it consequently needs a
reconstruction. Through its calamities it breeds a dissatisfaction in
the masses, and stirs them to revolt against the existing
conditions, especially against the political regime. Hence,
revolution as a result of a military defeat. On the other hand,
revolution itself tends to change so radically the existing
relationships within such a society and outside of it that it
endangers the most important interests of many social groups
within, and outside of, that society. Such an antagonism is likely
to result in civil or international war as the final method of solution
for such antagonisms.^^ Hence war as a result of revolution, and
their functional relationships. This correlation has been studied
very little, but its existence seems to be probable.
Even when there is no revolution after or during a war, it,
nevertheless, is followed by many a social reform and
reconstruction. War, especially a great or long war, inevitably
causes so many and so great changes, through the very fact of its
existence, that no society can go on without alterations of its
''social machinery" or regime. Whether these alterations are good

or bad is a matter of personal taste; but that they follow war, and
that war facilitates them can scarcely be doubted.
I. WAR AND SOCIAL MOBILITY
The above is corroborated in another form. The mobility of social
objects, vakies, and individuals in time of war and immediately
after, seems to become extraordinarily intensive. War is an
''accelerator" of the horizontal, as well as the vertical shifting
80 See SoROKiN, The Sociology of Rcvolutioji, pp. 336 ff.
8^ See an analysis of this problem in my Sociology of Revolution,
Chap. XVII.
348
of social objects and individuals from one social status to another.
Social climbing from the poor to the wealthy classes, from the
lower to the higher strata, from disfranchised to the privileged
groups; and the reverse process of a social sinking of individuals
and groups, is more intensive in time of war than in time of peace.
The same is true in regard to the shifting from occupation to
occupation, from one territorial community, political party, or
ideological group, to another. In this respect war plays the part of
a fire which makes the particles of water in a kettle boil and move
much faster. The same may be said of the vertical and horizontal
mobility of social objects and values, (mores, fashions, beliefs,
ideologies, opinions, tastes, and so on). They change and
circulate within a society, and among societies, much faster in
time of war than in time of peace. A quick and substantial
modification of the ''habits and mores'' of a society, and various
epidemics of ''phobies" in time of war and immediately after have
been many times observed, though they are only partial

manifestations of this general phenomenon.^^
J. WAR AND CHANGE OF OPINIONS, ATTITUDES, AND
DISPOSITIONS
The above intensification of the mobility of social objects through
war may be observed also in a sharp and quick change of
opinions (ideologies and speech-reactions) and attitudes of the
people with the beginning of war and after it. At the present
moment we have several excellent studies in this field, such as A.
L. Lowell's, W. Lippmann's, and some other works. President
Lowell well described this process:
When civilians enlist in time of war their change of attitude takes
place, not after long experience of army life and of battles, but
almost at once; and it is due to a new orientation, a recognition of
a different and paramount object, transcending in immediate
importance the former ones. It is the result, in short, of a radical
change in the focus of attention. . . . Moreover the change of
sentiment is not confined to the army. The men and women who
stay at home also assume a new attitude on the outbreak of a war
that requires a great national effort. They are often no less ready
than soldiers to restrict liberty. They do not shudder at reports of
the loss of thou82 See the data in Sorokin, Social Mobility, Chaps. XVII-XIX and
passim; and Lowell, A. L., op. cit.. Chaps. V-VII.
349
sands of lives of their fellow citizens in a victorious battle, as they
would at the loss of scores in an accident in time of peace. . . .
They delight to work and deny themselves comforts in a way that
they would otherwise think intolerable.^^
The increase of patriotism, and hatred toward the enemy,

readiness to underestimate his virtues and overestimate his
defects, a wîllingness to believe anything favorable to their own
country and unfavorable to the enemy,all these, and many
similar sudden changes of attitudes and disposition are usual in
time of any war supported by the nation. There is no need to
mention that the same fact may be observed in popular
ideologies. Many ideologies, aesthetic values, political and moral
opinions, literature, poetry, paintings, and so on,popular in time
of peace,become unpopular in time of war, and vice versa.
This intensive circulation of social values continues to exist in the
post-wâr years. They are marked by the changes in the way of
readjustment to the new peace conditions. During the first few
years after an armistice, society experiences an extraordinary
change in this direction. One of its conspicuous characteristics is
an increase in the unpopularity of many social values highly
estimated in time of war, and an increase in the popularity of the
values somewhat underestimated at that period.^*
Such, in general, is the powerful influence of war in this field.
K. THE INFLUENCE OF WAR ON SCIENCE AND ARTS
Here again the existing opinions are quite opposite. According to
the anti-militaristic writers, war's influence on intellectual progress
of all kinds is entirely negative. Inter anna silent niusae, was said
long ago. "To actualize continually the entire capacity of the
possible intellect" is possible only ''amidst the calm tranquillity of
peace" pleads Dante.^^
War is a selection for the worse, which destroys the more
cultivated and leaves the more barbarous. It has always held back
mental progress, and at this very day it increases mental
stagnation.
83 Lowell, A. L., op. cit., pp. 223-234. See the whole of Chap. V.
^ See in Lowell's work a concrete analysis of public opinion after
the war. Op. cit., Chaps. Vl-Vn.
^ Dante Alighieri, De Monarchia, translated by Aurelia Henry,
Boston, 1904, Chaps. II and III.
350
Such is a modern formula of the opinion.^^ Another opinion was
long ago formulated by J. de Maistre. Following Euripides and
Machiavelli, he says:
The best fruits of human nature, arts, sciences, great enterprises,
great conceptions, and virile virtues, prosper especially in time of
war. It is said that nations reach the peak of their grandeur only
after long and bloody wars. The climax of Greek civilization was
reached in the terrible epoch of the Peloponnesian War; the most
brilliant period of Augustus followed immediately after the Roman
civil wars and proscriptions. The French Genius was bred by the
wars of the League, and was polished by that of the Fronde. All
great men of the time of Queen Anne (1665-1714) were born
amidst a great political commotion. In brief, they say that blood is
a fertilizer of the plant which is called Genius. I wonder whether
they understood well when they say that ''arts are the friends of
peace.'' Anyhow it would be necessary at least to explain and to
clarify the statement because I do not see anything less pacifistic
than the periods of Alexander the Great and Pericles; that of
Augustus, Leo X, Francois I, Louis XIV and Queen Anne.^"^
These warring periods were marked by an extraordinary progress
of science, arts, and philosophies, and of all kinds of intellectual
achievement. A more modern formulation of the same idea is as
follows: "Unending peace would plunge all nations into a

dangerous lethargy." (Valbert, op. cit., p. 692.) "The certainty of
peace would, before the expiration of half a century, engender a
state of corruption, and decadence more destructive of men than
the worst wars" (Melchior de Vogiie).
It is easy to see the fallacies of either of these opinions. We know
for instance that Japan, before its reformation, enjoyed a period of
peace during almost three hundred years under the shogunate of
Tokugawa. And yet it did not corrupt it, nor did it render the
country incapable of making wonderful progress when necessity
came. Nations like Switzerland, Holland, Norway, and Sweden
have been enjoying peace during the last century; and yet their
proportional contribution to the arts and
8 Novicow, War, p. 59, Chap. VII; Nicolai, op. cit., Chaps. II-IV;
Nasmith, op. cit., Chaps. V-VII; Todd, op. cit., Chap. XIX.
7 DE Maistre, J., Oeuvres, Vol. I, pp. 36-37. See the whole of
Chapter III there.
351
sciences has not been less than that of many belHgerent
countries. We have also witnessed that the last war has
considerably checked, at least temporarily, scientific and
intellectual activities. There is no doubt also that war exterminates
many scientists and literary men. It puts many obstacles in the
way of creative intellectual activity. In brief, there is some truth in
the statements of the war critics, but not in all of them. If the
theory of de Maistre were quite wrong, the facts indicated by him
could not have taken place. However, they happened; and, more
than that, the correlation between the war periods and the
extraordinary number of the great men of genius born in such a
period, or immediately after it, seems to exist and is tangible in a
much larger number of cases than those which are mentioned by

de Maistre.^^
Furthermore, we have seen that nations have been spending
more time in war than in peace. If the influence of war were so
deleterious as depicted by its critics, an intellectual progress could
not possibly have taken place; but this happened. Furthermore, it
is rather obvious that intellect counts a great deal in war. At such
a time it is stimulated up to its limits in a specific direction. Its
achievements for the purposes of war have almost always been
used for quite peaceful purposes, and have contributed to
intellectual progress in general. By its strong stimulation,
excitement, and extraordinary conditions, the war situation has
been responsible for the enlargement of human knowledge. In
these and similar ways, war has exerted some beneficial effects
on the development of sciences and arts. If there had been no
war, we certainly would not have had either the Odyssey, Iliad,
MahahJiarata, Makbet, or a great many other poems, paintings,
sculptures, architectural beauties, songs, symphonies, verses,
and other works of art which have been inspired by war.^^ The
same is true of a great many inventions beginning with various
arms, and ending with aeroplanes, tanks, and poison gas.
This does not mean that we must close our eyes to the negative
effects of war; it means only that the war influence is exceed88 See some data in my Socuil Mobility, Chaps. XXI-XXII.
" See about this point, Leontieff, K., Visantism i Slavianstvo,
(Russian)..
352
ingly complex and cannot be accurately described by a simple

one-sided formula of its apologists or slanderers.
L. GENERAL CONCLUSION ABOUT THE EFFECTS OF WAR
The above survey shows that there is a series of correlations
between the war phenomena, taken as an independent variable,
and various aspects of social life taken as the dependent variable.
Some of these correlations are seemingly certain and more or
less studied. Some others, however, have been investigated little
as yet, and represent guesses rather than scientific propositions.
The authors have philosophized and moralized too much, and
have studied objectively the facts in this field too little. If
sociologists are going to promote our knowledge of war
phenomena, they will have to quit moralizing (there are too many
people who enjoy this business) and turn to a real study of the
phenomena. Otherwise we are doomed to remain in the kingdom
of half-truths.
5. War's Factors
In the above, war has been taken as an independent variable and
its ''functions" have been traced. Now we may ask what are its
factors or, in other words, what are the "variables" whose
''function" is war. What phenomena facilitate the appearance of
war and its increase, and what phenomena have the opposite
results ?
This part especially of the sociology of war, and of conflict, has
been little investigated. We have dozens of varied theories which
try to answer the question, yet the majority of them have scarcely
any scientific value. In the first place, we have a series of theories
whose answer consists in a mere reference to the "universal law
of struggle" or to the "law of the struggle for existence." It is
evident that such explanations do not contribute anything. We
may grant that such a universal law exists, but the point is why, in
a certain society at a certain period, there is no war; and why, in

the same society at another period, war breaks out, expands,
grows, and after some time, ends. The "universal law" does not
help at all in answering the problem. A second variety of theories
is represented by numerous "in353
stinctive" theorists. Their general trait is that they look for the
ultimate source of war in the field of instincts. Accordingly, we
have ''war instincts" and "patriotism instincts" as theories of war's
causes. The 'Svar instinct" is sometimes regarded as being
similar to the "fighting instinct," as in the writings of Nicolai,^^^ but
in other cases the two are regarded as something quite
different.^ Other authors indicate a "fighting instinct" or an
"instinct of pugnacity" as the source of war, (W. Mc-Dougall, H. R.
Marshall, P. Bovet, and E. A. Ross).-*- Some sociologists indicate
a "herd instinct" as indirectly responsible for the existence of war
(W. Trotter ).^^ Sociologists and psychologists, like Steinmetz, G.
T. W. Patrick, W. H. R. Rivers, W. A. White, and some others
indicate several varied instincts responsible for war, regarding it
either as an outcome or as a drive for "rejuvenation," stimulated
by a superabundance of the social bonds imposed by a social life
and various social rules which finally repress the source of life
itself; or as a form of relaxation from those conventional rules
which, through their drudgery, monotony, and repression, tend to
turn man into an automaton; or as an outlet for a satisfaction of
the innate drives of anger, wanderlust, the military spirit, courage,
the spirit of adventure, (Muf, ]Vagelust, Grmtsamkeit) and so
on.^"^ Some others have tried to connect war with hunger and the
impossibility of satisfying the primary necessities of man, or with
an increase in the number of obstacles before such a
satisfaction.^''
^^ See NicoLAi, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 20 ff.
91 Woods, F. A., op. cit., pp. 17 ff.

^ McDouGALL, W., Social Psychology, pp. 280 ff.; Marshall, H.
R., War and the Ideal of Peace, 1915, pp. 96 ff.; Ross, E. A.,
Principles, pp. 44-45; Bovet, P., The Fighting Instinct, N. Y., 1923.
93 Trotter, W., Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War, London,
1916.
9^ Steinmetz, Phil, des Krieges, pp. 233, 294; Patrick, G. T. W.,
"The Psychology of War," Popular Science Monthly, 1915, pp.
166-168; White, W. A., Thoughts of a Psychiatrist on the War and
After, 1919, pp. 75-87; Crile, G. M., A Mechanistic View of Peace
and War, 1916; Russell, B., Why Men Fight, 1917; Conway, M.,
The Crowd in Peace and War, 1916; Eltinge, B., Psychology of
War, 1915; Thorndike, E. L., Original Nature of Man, Chap. VI;
Watson, J. B., Psychology, Chap. VI; Park and Burgess,
Introduction, Chap. IX; Hall, G. S., "Some Relations between the
War and Psychology," American Journal Psychology, 1919; Le
Bon, G., The Psychology of the Great War, 1916; Rivers, W. H.
R., Instinct and Unconscious, Cambridge, 1921.
^^ SoROKiN, The Influence of Famine and Food Factor, Chaj).
VII; Bakeless, J., The Economic Causes of Modern War, N. Y.,
1921.
354
In brief, we have numerous and divergent ''instinct" theories of
war. Their kernel is probably true, but, unfortunately, the majority
of them again do not solve the problem satisfactorily. We may
grant that a fighting instinct, war instinct, or some other drive is
the source of war; but does this explain why a society is in a state
of war at a certain time, and in peace at another period, or why
one society is very belligerent, while another one is relatively

peaceful? If the source of war is a certain instinct or drive, it
should exist permanently. Granting this, there is still no
explanation that would make clear why at some periods it
manifests itself, while at others it is ineffective. In order that these
hypotheses might be satisfactory, they would have to explain from
the ''instinct" standpoint the real curve of war phenomena. They
must show why, for instance, a "fighting instinct" called forth war
in 1914 rather than in 1909; and why certain peoples participated
in this war while other nations remained out of it. Why was the
war terminated in 1918 rather than in 1915 or 1935 ? Why have
there been relatively peaceful periods in the history of a nation,
and other periods crowded with war? The majority of the
discussed theories do not even attempt to answer such questions.
For this reason their insufficiency is evident.
The same may be said of the majority of the other theories of war
factors, which see these factors in "dynastic interests," in
"religious heterogeneity," in "economic factors," in the "diplomatic
and political machinations," in a lust for domination, selfexpression, and what not. As far as such theories limit their
"explanations" by merely mentioning these factors, and by a few
considerations of their importance, they do not factually give any
valid theory. To hold such a theory they must explain when, why,
under what conditions, and in what way their factor is an efficient
cause of war; and why, under what conditions, and so on, it has
no such influence. In brief, such a theory must "interpret" the real
fluctuation of the war curve. It must take the facts of war and
correlate them with their factor, showing that it "fits" to the curve
of war. Otherwise, such a theory is of no use. Only a very few of
the existing theories make an attempt to perform such a factual
verification. Unfortunately,
355
a great many of such theories are defective too, sometimes even

more defective than many instinctive theories.^^
Here we may finish our analysis of what has been said above. So
much for the Darwinian school of the struggle for existence and its
interpretation.
The fourth important branch of biological sociology is represented
by the ''instinctivist interpretations" of social phenomena.
However, in view of the mixing of "instinctive forces" with other
psychological factors in such theories, it would be more
convenient to analyze them in the chapters devoted to the
psychological school in sociology.
6. General Conclusion About Biological Sociology
In spite of its many defects, taken as a whole, the school has
represented one of the most powerful currents of sociological
thought; has thrown light on many social phenomena; has given a
series of valuable correlations; and has shown many deep factors
which lie under the picturesque surface of the social ocean. For
these reasons it must be recognized as one of the most important
sociological schools. Whether we like it or not, it will exist. The
greater and more accurate are the findings of biology, the more
accurate are going to be the biological interpretations of social
phenomena, and the more powerful influence they are likely to
exert on sociological thought in the future. It is useless and
hopeless to try to shut the gates of sociology to an intrusion of
biological interpretations, as is urged by some "formal
sociologists" at the present time. Such an isolation will do no good
to sociology, while its harmful results are rather evident. An inÂs an example we may take E. Hovelaque's Deeper Causes of
the War, London, 1917. Trying to elucidate the causes of the
World War, he indicates purely "environmental" factors, such as
Prussia's preceding history, its militant character, its militant
leaders, "militant Prussian spirit," German philosophy, "belief in

superiority," miraculous influence of F. Nietzsche, Trcitschke,
Bemhardi, and so on. It is needless to say how utterly fallacious
the whole theory is. As a matter of fact, under the Hohenzollerns,
Prussia had a fewer number of war years than any other big
European country. (See the figures in this chapter.) It is'fallacious
to make only Prussia responsible for the war. It is certain also that
among the English, the French, the Russian thinkers, historians,
writers, and so on there has been a crowd of apologists for war,
struggle, patriotism, nationalism, "militant spirit," and all this sort
of thing. In brief, the whole theory represents a political pamphlet
much less satisfactory than the above "instinctivist" theories of
war.
356
crease of bad scholastics, useless word-polishing, and a sterile
terminological discussion, on the one hand; and on the other, a
backward ''self-made" or ''home-made" biology ad hoc fallacious
in its essence, are likely to be the effects of such an isolation. This
has happened in the past and it is probable in the future, if such a
"formal" claim is carried on. To avoid it, we must follow the
findings of biology, taking from them what is really scientific and
throwing away that which is "pseudo-scientific." Such is the
reasonable course which may be taken by the sociologists in
regard to the "biological interpretation" of social phenomena.
357
CHAPTER VII BIO-SOCIAL BRANCH: DEMOGRAPHIC
SCHOOL
Under this school I shall survey the theories which assume the
demographic factor to be a primary or important 'Variable," and
consequently attempt to interpret social phenomena as a function,

or resultant of this factor. By the demographic factor is meant the
increase or decrease of the size and density of a population. The
qualitative aspect of population will be omitted here since it has
been discussed in the chapter on the Racial School.
I. PREDECESSORS
The most ancient sources of social thought, and the oldest
practices of ancient societies, show that human beings were
aware, long ago, of the important role played by demographic
factors in the field of social phenomena. Both the quantitative and
the qualitative aspects of the population problem were
appreciated to some degree. As a result, certain social practices
arose. Their purpose was either to increase or to decrease the
size of the population and to improve its quality. The Biblical
admonition, "Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth" is a
typical illustration of a great many ancient ideas and practices
destined to increase the populationa condition believed
necessary for the continued existence and prosperity of a given
society. On the other hand, certain practices and mores, such as
obligatory celibacy, the killing of old people and babies,
prescribed abortion, etc., are found among many primitive
societies.^ These practices, whose objective was to check or to
decrease the population, indicate that many societies were
somehow aware of a danger of overpopulation. The statement in
Genesis which says that Abraham's and Lot's herdsmen and
cattle increased to such an extent
1 See Carr-Saunders, A. M., The Population Problem, Chaps. I,
VII, VIII, IX, Oxford, 1922; Rfajter, E. B., Population Problems,
Chap. Ill, Philadelphia, 1923; vStrangelani), C. E., Pre-Malthusian
Doctrines of Population, N. Y., 1908.
358

that ''the land was not able to bear them that they might dwell
together; for their substance was great, so that they could not
dwell together," and 'The Zend-Avesta's" theory of the periodical
over-population of the earth,^ are typical illustrations of the same
fact. With still greater reason it is possible to contend that ancient
peoples also understood the qualitative side of the population
problem. "Eugenics" is not an invention of the nineteenth century.
Thousands of years before our era, eugenics was widely
practiced in ancient Sparta and India, in China, and among the
Jews, to mention only a few societies.^
There is no need to say that, since the appearance of individual
social thinkers, a large number of them have paid attention to the
factor of population. In their statements they have proposed
practically all types of hypotheses which, in a more developed
form, constitute the leading contemporary theories of population.
Confucius, Mencius, Plato, Aristotle, Polybius, Seneca, Cicero,
Lucretius, St. Thomas Aquinas, the Church Fathers, Ibn-Khaldun, Campanella, Machiavelli, J. Bodin, Luther, Botero, Colbert,
W. Petty, Graunt, Justi, Sonnenfels, Zincke, the Cameralists, Ch.
Davenant, W. Temple, Holinshed, the Mercantilists, the
Physiocrats (Quesnay and others), Bruckner, C. Beccaria, A.
Young, F. Briganti, J. J. Rousseau, J. Steuart, Hume, Wallace,
Adam Smith, Price, Ortes,these are only a few names from a
long list of those who set forth various theories of population prior
2 Genesis, xin:6; "The Zend-Avesta," The Sacred Books of the
East, Vol. IV, Oxford, 1880, Farg. II: 9 ff. "The earth has become
full of flocks and herds of men and dogs . . . and there is no more
room for flocks, herds, and men." This led to the necessity of a
periodical enlargement of the earth by Yimia, "The Zend-Avesta"
was composed probably about A.D. 325, though its contents are
much older.
3 See the chapter about the Racial School; Roper, A. G., Ancient
Eugenics, Oxford, 1913; ScHALLMAYER, W., Vererbung und
Auslese, 2nd ed., pp. 142 ff.; SoROKiN, Social Mobility, Chap. IX.
I cannot agree with Carr-Saunders that "the problem of quality did
not arouse the same early interest" (as the problem of quantity),
op. cit., p. 18. Roper gives a quite sufficient proof that the
qualitative side of the problem, at least in the way of trial and
error, was understood as early as the quantitative side. A study of
The Sacred Books of the East, especially of India and China, and
the study of the practices of Sparta and other societies, does not
leave any doubt that the "eugenic" side of the problem was
understood in the past, perhaps even better than its quantitative
aspect. In the Laws of Manu, Brichaspat, Nardda, Gautama,
Institutes of Vishnu, and other books of ancient India, the
"eugenic" side of the problem is the leading idea of all their
contents.
359
to the time of Malthus (1766-1834).^ After Malthus' epoch-making
Essay on the Prmciple of Population (first edition in 1798), there
have been few prominent economists, sociologists, poHtical
scientists, psychologists, practical reformers, demographers,
statisticians, and eugenists who have not discussed the problem.^
It is not my purpose to survey all these theories. In many of them
the number and the density of population are viewed as an effect
of other variables, rather than as their cause. My purpose is to
take only such contemporary theories as interpret the social
processes as a function of the demographic factor. Taking the
principal theories of this type, we shall be able to cover the
fundamental generalizations formulated in this field at least.
2. ADOLPHE COSTE
There is scarcely any other sociological theory which allots to size
and density of population such importance as is done in the
theory of Adolphe Coste, a former president of the Statistical and

the Sociological Society of Paris. I shall begin my survey of the
demographic theories with that of Coste, not because his works
are especially valuable, or because he originated such a theory,
but because of his attempt to make the demographic factor a kind
of an all-sufficient key to account for important ''social processes."
The basic ideas of his theory were laid down before him by M.
Kovalevsky, whom he mentions as his predecessor, and the
originator of his theory,^ by A. Loria, Yves Guyot, P. Mougeolle,
and L. Winiarsky, whose works Coste did not know before the
publication of his books.^
* See Carr-Saunders, op. cit., Chap. I; Reuter, op. cit., Chaps. Ill,
IV; Strangeland, op. cit., passim; wSmall, A., The Cameralisls;
Haney, W. H., History of Economic Thought; Reynaud, La theorie
de la population en Italic dti XVI au XVIII siecle, Paris, Lyon,
1904.
^ The Hterature is enormous. See the principal theories in Reuter,
Chap. V; Thompson, W., Population; A Study in Malthusianism,
N. Y., 1915; the texts in economics by G. Schmoller, A. Alarshall,
F. Taussig, E. Seligman, R. Ely, or any other substantial text;
Leroy-Beaulieu, P., La question de la population, Paris, 1913; the
treatises on demography by A. Oettingen, G. von Mayr, E.
Levasseur, and others; Wolf, J,, Die Volkswirtschaft der
Gegenwart und Zuku?ift, 1912; Der Gehurtenruckgang, 1912;
Budge, Das Alalthus'sche Bevolkerungsgesetz und die
theoretische Nationaldkonomie der letztcn Jahrzehnte, 1912.
^ See Coste, A., Les principes d'une sociologie objective, ]). 107,
Paris, 1899.
' Coste, A., L'expcrience des pcuplcs ct Ics previsions qu'elle
autorise, }>p. III-IV, Paris, 1900.
360

The essentials of Coste's sociological theory are as follows: I.
There are two fundamental categories of historical facts: the
social and the ideological phenomena. By the ''social facts" Coste
means the phenomena of government, production, distribution
of economic or useful things, beliefs, and solidarity. By ''the
ideological" fact he means the phenomena of non-practical arts,
such as poetry, philosophy, various ideologies, including
theoretical and non-applied sciences which do not have useful or
utilitarian character. These two categories of phenomena must be
discriminated between very decisively. While the social
phenomena of government, production, belief, and solidarity are
closely correlated with one another in their fluctuation and
evolution, "the ideological" phenomena do not show any close
correlation with "the social phenomena." In other words, "sociality"
and "ideological mentality" are independent from one another.
Four categories of facts corroborate this statement, according to
Coste.
In the first place, the absence of a correlation between "the social
and the ideological phenomena" is shown by the fact that the
great "intellectuals" or creators of "the ideological values" have
not regularly appeared within the most powerful societies, as
would have been the case had there been a correlation between
the "sociality" and "ideological mentality." The ideologies of
Christianity, of Buddhism, and of Mohammedanism, appeared
among the peoples who were far from being powerful or
advanced. A small Greece produced the most wonderful poets,
philosophers, intellectuals, and artists. But this abundance of
ideological mentality did not much influence the sociality of
Greece. Certainly, it did not make it a strong society. The Romans
were much more ignorant and less cultured than the Greeks, the
Egyptians, or many other peoples; but they succeeded in
organizing a wonderful governmental, juridical, military, and social
machinery; and in this way, in spite of being poor in the

"ideological achievements," they rendered a greater service to the
progress of sociality than did the Greeks. In the fifteenth and the
sixteenth centuries Italy and France were incomparably superior,
in regard to "ideologies," to Germany, Holland, and England; but
these
361
BIO-SOCIAL BRANCH: DEMOGRAPHIC SCHOOL 361
countries were far superior in their commercial, governmental,
religious, and political organizations to France or Italy.
In the second place, the same absence of correlation is shown by
the fact that the great intellectuals have appeared in the epochs of
social progress, as well as in those of social decay. In the period
of decay in sociality they appear even more often than in the
period of political, economic, governmental, and religious wellbeing. This could not have happened if the two categories were
correlated. In Greece and Rome the most brilliant ''ideological"
period (of philosophy, arts, poetry, architecture, literature and so
on) was also the period of social disorganization and decay. We
see the same in Italy in the period of the Renaissance.
In the third place, the absence of the correlation is manifest in the
fact that the same race, the same epoch, and the same social
conditions give rise to the most different ideological geniuses;
and, vice versa, similar intellectuals appear under the most
different social conditions. The ''social" facts of each society are
stamped by its racial or national traits, w^hile the "ideological"
facts are cosmopolitan, international, and free from any marks of
the society in which they were originated. If the social and the
ideological phenomena were correlated, this could not have
happened.
In the fourth place, in the movement of the ideological

phenomena there is no continuity, permanent progress, nor
regularity. They appear and disappear whimsically, flourishing
and decaying, while in social phenomena there is continuity,
regularity, and mutual correlation.
Since the "ideological" facts are not influenced by the "social"
phenomena, the latter are independent of the former, too.
"Exterminate one or two dozen of the ideological Geniuses, and
theoretical science and the non-useful arts would disappear." But
this would not change the "social phenomena" at all. "The
ideological achievements," whether they be the Pythagorean
theory of numbers, Plato's theory of ideas, Epicurus' theory of
atoms, the monadology of Leibnitz, the Newtonian law of
gravitation, or the Lamarckian and Darwinian theory of evolution,
are not known to the masses, and have no ])ractical influence on
them. If these theories should disappear, this would not noticeably
in362
fluence the course of the ''social phenomena." They are quite
different from the social facts, which, besides being always useful,
are the result of mass-activity, and of common needs, mutual
suggestion, interstimulation, arid division of labor.^ The
ideological phenomena ere purely individual creations, and
remain a possession of the few only. All this shows their
difference and independence.
2. Since ''the social and the ideological facts" are quite different,
they must be studied by different sciences: the social facts by
sociology, and the ideological facts by "the ideology." This would
be a science somewhat similar to psychology but radically
changed. The physiological part should go into biology, and the
non-physiological part would be transformed, for the present, into

"ideology."^
3. Correspondingly, in the classification of science, sociology
must be put after biology, as was done by Comte, while ideology
must follow sociology.^^
4. Turning to the social facts,government, production, beliefs,
and solidarity,Coste finds that they follow a definite sequence of
five stages in their evolution, each stage being correlated with the
others. The essentials of his theory of social evolution are given in
the table on page 363.^^ Putting the amount and the
concentration of the population at the basis of the classification,
Coste gives the stages in the social evolution of the peoples who
passed by purely animal stages in the same table. From this
scheme it follows that in the development of the principal forms of
social phenomena there is a definite sequence; that these forms
are correlated with one another; and that there is a linear
historical tendency toward a progressive division of social
functions and an increase of free cooperation, at the cost of a
progressive decrease in inequality.
5. If we.ask now what factor is responsible for the above evo^ Principes, Chaps. II, XXII; L'experience, Chap. I.
^ Principes, Chaps. Ill, IV; Vexperience, Chap. II.
1'' Principes, Chap. V. Coste's classification of sciences is a
modified classification of August Comte; see p. 57.
" Ibid., Chaps. IX, XII, XIV. See the Table on pages 150-151;
Uexperience, Table on pp. 584-587. Practically the whole volume
of Coste's Uexperience des peuples is devoted to the description
of these five principal stages of social evolution.
363
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364
lution of social phenomena, the answer is : the growth of the
population and its density. Animal societies are stagnant because
they are limited numerically. Human societies are progressive
because they are ever increasing in their size and density. This
leads to an increase of interaction, to its intensification, to an
exchange of experience, and to its accumulation and transmission
from generation to generation. The first great organized societies
appeared where the concentration of the population (the valley of
the Nile, in Chaldea, in India, in China) was great. The first
brilliant civilizations emerged in Greece, Tyre, Athens, and
Carthage, for the same reason. The first great military unification
of societies by Babylon, Egypt, and Rome were made possible by
the same factor of abundance of population, and its integration
into compact social bodies. On the other hand, when the size and
the density of a population decreases, the progress of a
civilization stops, as happened after the depopulation of the
Roman Empire, and during the first centuries of the Middle Ages.
Omitting other arguments of Coste in favor of his hypothesis, we
may say that the
numerical increase of the members of a society is the primary

cause of its whole evolution. The increase of a unified population
leads to an increase of social differentiation, and to a division of
labor and of social aptitudes, facilitating the communication of
various parts of the society, and making possible a better and
more powerful coordination of the individual actions, and a more
and more accurate representation of the unity of natural laws.
Soil, climate, and race may, to some extent, facilitate and check
human aggregation, but they are not the primary factors of social
evolution.^^
6. Logically developing his idea, Coste finally tries to establish
''the sociometrika" to measure the relative power of different
societies. Since the mass and the density of a population are the
primary factors of sociality, the social powers of various societies
could be approximately measured through the number of its
population and its density measured by the concentration of the
population or the proportion of the population of the big and the
small cities, to the whole population of the society. Combining
^^ Principe s, pp. 95-103; êxperience, passim, and pp. 588 ff.
365
these criteria, Coste gives the following final index of the social
powerfulness of various nations : ^^
Table I
Table II
Power of the States (on the basis of the population at the end of
the nineteenth century)
States
A. Great States
Great Britain
Russia
Germany
France
U.S. A
Japan
Austria-Hungary
Italy
Turkey
Spain
Average for ten great states
B. Small States
Belgium
Holland
Sweden-Norway
Rumania
Portugal
Switzerland
Average for six small states.

Index of National
Power ^^ (France taken loo)
155 136 121 100 70 or 74
73
69 or 70
49
45 36
94
19 14 II
99
5
Sociality or Social Cohesion
Index of Sociality ^^
152 49 89
100
44 66 61 60 70 77
71
112
107 60 64 67 64
62
Since Social Power is equal to the size of the Population
multiplied by Sociality (density)Social Power = Population X
Socialityit follows that a nation's sociality is ecjual to its so^^ The methods of computation are somewhat different in
Principes and in L'experience. Correspondingly different are his
indices also. I give here the table from L'experience because,
according to Coste, it is more accurate. See Principes, Chap. XV;
L'experience, pp. 591 ff.
^* L'experience, pp. 602-603.
^^ Ibid., p. 606.
366
Social Power
cial power divided by the population : = Sociality.
^ ^ ^ ^ Population ^
Table II gives the indices of the sociality of various nations
computed according to this formula.
Such are the essentials of Coste's sociological theory.
Criticism. Taken as a whole, Coste's theory represents a
mixture of sociological objectivism and unbridled speculation;
correct observations and fantastic generalizations.
I. His discrimination of "the social and the ideological phenomena"
is vague and doubtful. One cannot understand why he puts some
beliefs, arts, and theories within the category of ''social facts,"
while some others are called ''ideological facts," ^^ or why the

same "ideologies" like Buddhism and Christianity sometimes
function as the "social", sometimes as the "ideological"
phenomena. The criterion of "practical usefulness" does not help,
because a great many purely abstract theories, like the majority of
the theories of physics and chemistry, are, according to Coste,
"ideological" phenomena. However, only a mentally blind man
could deny the great practical utility which has come out of such
abstract theories. On the other hand, a considerable number of
beliefs which Coste regards as "the social, useful phenomena"
seem to fail in showing their usefulness. It is also hard to see why
religion is put among the "social" while arts and
^^ Coste's attitude in this respect is shown by the following
quotation: "The Egyptians and the Babylonians knew how to build
enormous constructions and how to solve practical, difficult
problems long before algebra, geometry, and mechanics were
established. Hannon encircled Africa; Himilcon discovered Great
Britain; Columbus, Vasco de Gama, and Magellan crossed the
Atlantic, the Indian, and the Pacific Oceans before Copernicus,
Newton, and Kepler founded astronomy. The practical art of
navigation preceded the science of astronomy as the social
inventors preceded the 'ideological' ones. In the same way,
agriculture, cattle breeding, medicine, and surgery did not wait
until biology was founded by Bichat and Claude Bernard. Jenner
made his discovery of vaccination in 1776,a century before
Pasteur's microbiology found its explanation. . . It goes without
saying that science, after its establishment, reacts on useful
applications through the generalization of empirical inventions,
and the formulation of general laws. Ideology may be very useful
for a society, but it does not precede it, and does not control it at
all," Uexperience, p. 6. The table of multiplication and arithmetical
rules seems also to be "ideologies," according to Coste. His
fallacy is clear from the above. His so-called applied science is
nothing but a preceding and a less generalized stage of
knowledge confronting its later and more generalized stage. To

differentiate one from the other, as something quite different
qualitatively, is evidently fallacious.
367
sciences are placed among the ''ideological" facts. From the
standpoint of usefulness, science scarcely could be recognized as
less useful than religion. Further, if we take from religion its cult,
arts, ceremonies, architecture, paintings and music, I wonder how
much there would remain of religion and its useful efficiency.
More than that, if the ideological creations were really useless,
they could not have survived, as useless things. In the process of
elimination of values and activities, they would have been
eliminated long ago. Yet they still exist and do not show any
symptom of disappearance. There is scarcely any need to dwell
longer on this point. Coste's classification is unsupportable. His
estimation of science, and of a great many other ''useless" things
is fallacious. In brief, this part of his theory, and the discrimination
of sociology and ideology resulting from it, are erroneous. The
only sound point is Coste's insistence on the absence of a close
connection between "sociality" and "mentality." As a
counterbalance against the one-sidedness of the sociologistic
theory, which explains the whole mentality as a product of social
interaction or sociality, Coste's theory may be of service. But
again, he, like L. Winiarsky,^"^ falls into an opposite error. Both
^^ L. Winiarsky pretends that he was the first who indicated the
antagonism of sociality and mentahty. See L. Winiarsky's
"Reclamation au sujets des principes d'une sociologie objective
de M. A. Coste," La revue socialiste, Vol. XXXI, 1900, pp. 419421. In his interesting paper, "Essai d'une nouvelle interpretation
de phenomenes sociologiques," Revue socialiste, Vol. XXIV,
1896, pp. 308-328, 430-454, Winiarsky tried to show first, that, as
a biological type, those organisms are the most superior which
are the most differentiated and the most integrated; second, that
the social life, through division of labor, tends to decrease this
differentiated integrity of an organism, and to substitute a
onesided "professional" type for it; third, that through this it favors
the survival of narrow specialized types at the cost of the
universal, many-sided type; fourth, that, through this, social life
and social cohesion hinder the development of mentality,
intelligence, or intellectual genius. The most important
characteristic of a real genius is his universality, many-sidedness,
and all-embracing mind. These become more and more
impossible through social differentiation. Fifth, an ideal sociality
means an ideal mental stagnation, and leads to it. These
statements are supported by the fact that, among the animals,
those who live in societies are inferior to the varieties of the same
species which live an isolated life; that societies with a strong
social cohesion are mentally dull, while the societies with a less
strong social cohesion are su]oerior in intelligence; and that, in
the history of the same society, the periods of social
disorganization are marked by an extraordinary intellectual
achievement and an extraordinarily abundant number of
geniuses, while the periods of strong social order are marked by a
decrease in intellectual activity, organized "mob-psychology" and
by mental stagnation. From this, Winiarsky concludes that the
progress of social
368
authors are right as far as they contend that human intelUgenê
and mentality cannot be accounted for completely through social
conditions. They are right also in claiming that the correlation
between ''sociality" and "intelligence" is not close, and not always
positive. Sometimes ''progress of mind" and progress of "social
cohesion" are in conflict. Within these limits, their theory is
generally valid. It conspicuously shows the fallacies of the

sociologistic and the solidaristic schools, which insist upon a
complete parallelism in the development of mentality and
sociality, making the former a mere result of the latter. (See
chapter about the sociologistic school.) But both authors are
wrong as far as they regard mentality or "ideology" as something
quite independent from the "social" phenomena of Coste or the
"sociality" of Winiarsky. Even the fact of a greater intellectual
activity in the periods of social disorganization points to a
correlation between sociality and mentality, mentioned by
Winiarsky. As I tried to show elsewhere, it is easily explained
through social conditions. In addition, my study led to the
conclusion that there are also limits in this negative correlation.
Social disorganization which goes too far, leads to an intellectual
decay instead of
cohesion and gregariousness leads to a lowering individual
mentality, to a decrease in the number of geniuses, and to a kind
of mental sterility. Such are the essentials of his study, and they
are indeed similar to the theory of Coste. Winiarsky's claim that
he originated this theory, however, is not valid. Twenty years
before his paper came out, this same theory, only in a much
better form, was published by N. K. Mikhailovsky in his What is
Progress?, Darwinism and Social Sciences, Struggle for
Individuality, and other works. His name is not mentioned by
Winiarsky, but from the paper I conclude that Winiarsky is
probably a Pole, reads Polish, and may be even Russian. It is
probable that Winiarsky's theory was elaborated not without the
influence of Mikhailovsky, for even his terminology is practically
identical with that of Mikhailovsky. To this it is necessary to add
that the ineffectual role of ideologists and ideologies in Coste's
sense was indicated many centuries before by a great many
authors. It is enough for us to remember Machiavelli's
contemptuous estimation of ideologists and ideologies. More
recently the same opinion was held by Napoleon. Furthermore,
many thinkers, like Fustel de Coulanges, many times stated the

"striking inefficiency of ideas and theories for the betterment of
human existence." de Coulanges, F., Histoire des institutions
politiques de Vancienne France, Vol. I, p. 200. Finally, in its own
way, the same idea is maintained by the Marxian school of the
economic interpretation of history. These remarks are sufficient to
show that neither Coste, nor Winiarsky, nor anybody else among
the sociologists of the end of the nineteenth century, can claim
the privilege of originating the above, or practically any other
theory. They have only been developing that which was known
many centuries, even thousand of years, ago.
369
an intellectual blossoming.^^ This shows that the partial truth
which is in Coste's statement is practically submerged in the
greater fallacy of his sweeping generalization. Furthermore, if the
ideological phenomena are independent from the social
phenomena (and also from race, geographic environment,
climate, and soil), one wonders on what they are dependent.
Should we conclude that they represent a miracle? It would be a
waste of time if I were to array here the long series of other
objections against the discussed proposition.
2. As to Coste's theory of the stages of social evolution, we may
pass it without discussion. It represents a variety of ''the laws of
evolution" or "historical tendencies" which, after Comte's "law of
the three stages," became very fashionable. At the present
moment it may be enjoyed by freshmen only. Neither the
supposition of a similarity in the social evolution of various
peoples; nor the linear conception of evolution, consisting in a
definite sequence of certain "stages"; nor the optimistic, but quite
speculative prophecy of the future millennium toward which "the
evolution" is leading, have ever been proved, and they seem to
have lost their fascination for contemporary social thinkers. All

such theories have been nothing but a kind of metaphysics. (See
the chapter about the linear and cyclical conception of the social
process.)
3. It is curious to note that the fundamental point of Coste's
theorythe primacy of the factor of population growthremains
almost uncorroborated by Coste. He puts it flatly, gives a few of
the mentioned illustrations, and that is all. This naturally makes us
conclude that he has not proved the thesis. Such dogmatism
naturally entitles us to leave it without discussion, as a thesis
which has not been corroborated.
4. This may be done still more easily because Coste's "Sociometrika" shows conspicuously a fallacy in his theory. E. Levasseur rightly remarks that, according to Coste's criterion, the
^* See SoROKiN, Social Mobility, Chap. XXI. This, by the way,
once more shows the necessity of finding the Hmits and oi:)timum
point of sociological correlations. When an author fails to indicate
the limits to which a correlation goes, and flatly states that it is
positive or negative, and that with an increase of A its function B
will increase (or decrease), he is bound to make a fallacy,
because there arc few cases, if any, where a correlation goes
beyond all limits.
370
Shantung province in China, with an average density of
population of 221 should be much more civilized and powerful
than France, because France's average density is only 73. Such
a conclusion will scarcely be accepted by many.^^ I doubt also
whether there are many sensible people who would agree with
the indices of power and sociality of various nations given above.
The years following the publication of Coste's works and the

years of the World War seem to have disproved Coste's
tabulation. Such a ''pragmatic" test is one of the most certain
criteria of the validity or fallacy of ''an ideology." In this case it
testifies against Coste's theory.
Nevertheless, the above does not mean a complete denial of the
value of Coste's books. In spite of the fallacies, they are
suggestive and stimulating. Coste's one-sidedness is a good
antipoison against the one-sidedness of other theories. His
statements are always clear, and are not wrapped in the thick
cloak of abstract phraseology and conceptual definitions under
which many "thinkers" hide a lack of thought. Coste is a thinker,
and a good one, but, unfortunately, one-sided.
Let us now pass to other more mature, though less sweeping
theories which try to establish a correlation between the
demographic factors and other social phenomena.
3. SIZE AND DENSITY OF THE POPULATION AND VITAL
PROCESSES
Can the size and the density of a population be a factor in the
birth, death, and population-growth rates? Is there any correlation
between the first and the second series of phenomena? The
question has been answered positively by many a prominent
investigator. Let us notice in the first place the influence of the
mentioned demographic factors on the death rate.
Demographic Factors and the Death Rate. Already P. E. Verhulst. Dr. W. Farr, H. Westergaard, and several other
demographers, have indicated the existence of a positive
correlation between the density and the death rate of a given
population.^^
19 Levasseur, E., "La repartition de la race humaine," Bulletin de

VInstitut International de Statistique, Vol. XVIII, 2-e. livr., p. 62.
20 vSee Verhulst, P. E., "Recherches mathem. sur la loi
d'accroissement de la population," Nouveaux memoires de
I'Academie R. des Sciences de Bruxelles,
371
Later on, a series of investigators such as R. Pearl, T. H. C.
Stevenson, Reed, S. L. Parker, J. Brownlee, A. Drzwina and G.
Bohn, A. Bowley, and G. U. Yule have shown that there is at least
a tendency toward an increase in the death rate with an increase
in the density of the population, providing other conditions are
more or less constant.^^
The methods of obtaining these correlations, and of measuring
the density of the population, have varied greatly, beginning with
the experimental methods used in regard to Drosophila and some
other organisms (by Pearl, Parker, F. Bilski, K. Semper, Drzwina,
G. Bohn and others), and ending with various statistical methods
applied to a human population. If, in the experimental works with
Drosophila, the density could be measured accurately, and other
conditions could be controlled, the same could not be said of a
human population. To find an accurate criterion for the
measurement of its density is very difficult. This explains the
variety of methods used for this purpose. Some authors, like Dr.
Farr, measured the density by the number of persons per unit of
area, or (like Dr. Brownlee) by dividing the population of an
administrative district by its area. Some others, like T. T. S. de
Jastrzebsky, A. Bowley, and R. Pearl, measured it by the number
of persons per room or by the indices of ''crowding" and
''overcrowding." Some other investigators have measured the
density through the per capita wealth of the population. Whatever
the methods employed, the authors properly recognize that at

best they may give only an approximate index of the density of
population. I mention this to show how
T845, t. XVIII, pp. 1-38; "Deuxidme memoire sur la loi
d'accroissement de la population," iHd., t. XX, 1847, pp. 1-32;
Farr, W., Vital Statistics, Stanford, 1885, pp. 172 ff.; "Causes of
the high mortality in town districts," Fifth A7inual Report Registrar
General, of Births, Deaths, and Marriages in Englajid, 2nd ed., pp.
406-435; "EfTects of Density of Population on Health,"
Supplemc7it to the Thirty-fifth Annual Report of the Registrar
General, 1875, pp. XXIII-XXV; Westergaard, H., Die Lehre von
der Mortalitat und Morbiditdt, pp. 455 fT., Jena, 1901.
" Pearl, R., The Biology of Population Growth, passim and Chap.
VI, N. Y., 1925; Brownlee, J., "Density and Death-rate: Farr's law,"
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 1920, pp. 281-283;
Bowtêy, A., "Death-rates, Density, Population and Housing,"
Journal oj the Royal Statistical Society, 1923, pp. 516-539; Yule,
G. U., "The Growth of Population and the Factors which Control
It," ibid., 1925, pp. 23 ff.; Stevenson, T. H. E., "The Laws
Governing Population," ibid., 1925, pp. 67 ff.; see other
references in these works.
372
great are the difficulties to be overcome in obtaining a valid
association. To give an idea of the results obtained, I shall insert a
few figures. Here is the table obtained by the simplest statistical
method used by Dr. W. Farr: ^^
The density of the population increasing, the death rate increases
also.
Dr. Bowley's (1869- ) coefficients of the correlation between the

death rate and various indices of the density of the population in
England give an idea of the results obtained by a finer method of
statistical analysis. The coefficients of correlation of the standard
death rate for specified parts of England with a specified criterion
of density are as follows: ^^
^"^ Supplement to the Fifty-fifth Annual Report of Registrar
General, etc., 1895, p. xlvii.
23 BowLEY, op. cit., p. 522, Table I. In the table there are given
more detailed coefficients of correlation with "crowding" and
"overcrowding," indices of density, of the death rate and infant
mortality, and corresponding regression equations.
373
These, and the other studies mentioned, seem to suggest that a
positive association between the population density and death
rate exists. However, in spite of the considerable probability of
such a correlation, the corresponding data suggest that either the
association exists only within a definite range of density, beyond
which it becomes intangible; or the effect of the density is so weak
as to be overcome by the interference of other factors. There are
also the possibilities that the correlation is due not so much to
density, properly, as to poverty and similar factors, coexisting
usually with ''crowding" and ''overcrowding"; or that the sum total
of all these considerations is the cause. That the correlation may
exist only within definite range of the density, beyond which it
tends to disappear, is supported by Bowley's data concerning the
rural district of England {Ibid., p. 535). In the south of England and
Wales, the correlation of the death rate with the number of
persons per room is quite insignificant (0.05 and 0.16). That the
possible influence of the density on the death rate of the
population may easily be annulled by other factors, is shown by

the fact of an all-European decrease in the death rate, especially
since the second half of the nineteenth century, in spite of the
great increase in the density of the population in these
countries."* That these coefficients of correlation are a result not
only of density, but are perhaps even more due to poverty or to
sanitary and other conditions masked under the criterion of
density, is shown by the fact that the coefficients vary greatly in
different parts of England, though the conditions of density are
approximately similar. While the coefficient for London is high, it is
quite low for South England and the Black Country. This seems
improbable if there were no "other variables" operating under "the
density," as Professor Bowley himself and Dr. Greenwood
indicate.~^ These considerations explain why the above
correlation is often intangible. For instance,
" See the proper statement and the data in Yule, op. cit., pp. 2427. "The death-rate has persisted in falHng, in spite of the
increasing density of every country for which we have data. . . .
Other influences have been much more important than the
density of population." vSee also the remarks of Dr. Dudfield
concerning this. Ibid., pp. 540-541.
2* See op. cit., p. 535, Greenwood's remarks on p. 542, and A.
Watson's remark -m p. 544374
T. J. Le Blanc's study has shown that Farr's law does not hold in
regard to the urban and the rural population of the United
States.^^ From the above it seems reasonable to conclude that,
while the existence of a positive correlation between the density
and death rates is probable, we still do not know exactly how
close it is, nor what part of the coefficients is due to density, and
what to other factors acting under its cover. Dr. Greenwood says
rightly:
We can decide between the various explanations (of these
coefficients) only after doing more and more work of this kind, and
bringing other variables into the balance.-'^
Si:se and Density of the Population and Birth Rate. What has
been said of the association between the size and density of the
population and the death rate is true of that between the size and
the density of the population and the birth rate. A series of
prominent investigators have claimed that these phenomena are
negatively correlated. They maintain that an increasing density
and size in a population as such, regardless of a lack of
necessities, tend to decrease the fertility and birth rate. Recently
this theory has been set forth by Dr. R. Pearl (1879- ) in a series
of his, and his collaborators', works.^^ This conclusion has been
supported mainly by Dr. Pearl's experiments with Drosophila and
fowls. The fowls in this experiment were handled in flocks of 50,
100, and 150 each. The pens in which they were kept were
constructed in such a way that in the flocks of either 50 or 100
birds, there was an equal allotment of 4.8 square feet of floor
space per bird, and other conditions were also equal. Therefore, if
there happened to be a difference in the number of eggs laid in
each flock per bird, this would be due to the factor of the flock size
(50 and 100 birds) exclusively. In the flock of 150 birds there was
an allotment of 3.2 square feet of floor space per bird. If there
happened to be a difference in the number of eggs
26 See LeBlanc, T. J., "Density of Population and Mortality in the
United States," American Journal of Hygiene, Vol. IV, 1924, pp.
501-558.
27 Journal of Royal Statistical Society, 1925, p. 542. See further
Sir George H. Knibbs' sound statements in "The Laws of Growth
of a Population," Journal of Amer. Statistical Association, Vols.

XXI, XXII.
28 See Pearl, R., The Biology of Population Growth^ Chap. VI;
see there other references.
375
per bird in this flock, it would be due to the factor of the density
and size of the flock. The experiment was carried on during
several years. The results are as follows : Mean annual tgg
production for the years of 1904-07 is: for the 50-bird pen, 129.69
per bird; for the lOO-bird pen, 123.21; and for the 150-bird pen,
111.68. Thus the results show that the mere factor of the size of
the flocks influenced the fertility of the fowls negatively. The same
influence was shown as the density of the bird-population
increased, as shown by the difference in the number of eggs
produced in the 50, 100 and 150-bird pens.^^ Similar effects were
yielded by the experiments with Drosophila. Here also the ''rate of
reproduction varies inversely with density." ^^
Similar results were obtained by some other investigators in their
experiments with tadpoles (Bilski) ^^ and other organisms.
Dr. R. Pearl thinks that the same must be true in regard to human
population. However, the impossibility of obtaining an accurate
measurement of its density makes it exceedingly difficult to prove
the rule. Pearl made an attempt to verify the rule on the
population of 132 American cities through the correlation of the
birth rates, and the size and density of their populations.
Measuring the density in various ways, he has obtained but a very
slight correlation, the coefficient of the partial correlation between
birth rate and density (as measured by the number of persons per
acre) being .131 it .058. On this basis Dr. Pearl concludes that
in the studied urban population ''the real net correlation between
the birth rate and density is of the same character fundamentally
as that we have found in experimental populations of flies and

hens." The only difference is that among the human population,
the influence of density upon the birth rate seems to be less
marked than in the case of lower animals.^" Dr. Pearl foresees a
possible objection to his conclusion, in the well-known fact that
the density, measured by the number of persons per room, is
positively correlated with the birth rate. In many cities
" Ihid., pp. 141 ff.
^'^ Ibid., pp. 133 ff. Notice how the experiments were conducted;
and the tables and diagrams.
31 Bilski, F., "Uber den Einfluss dcs Lebensraumes auf das
Wachstum der Kaulquappen," Pfluger's Archiv. Bd. 188, pp. 254272.
^ Ibid., pp. 153-155376
the districts with a greater number of persons per dwelling show a
higher number of children per family, or per looo population, or
per married woman, than the districts with a less number of
persons per dwelling or room.^^ Correlating the number of
persons per dwelling with the birth rate, Pearl himself finds the
coefficient or correlation .456 =b .046, which is much higher than
his above coefficient, and with a meaning opposite to it. He,
however, declares this correlation false. In his opinion, it is due to
the physical and economic impossibility of obtaining a sufficient
surplus of dwelling houses for new babies. For this reason he
discards it as fictitious, as ''a mere mechanical consequence of
putting more new babies into a lot of containers comparatively
inflexible in respect of both number and size."^** In spite of this
explanation, the very fact that among the human population

Pearl's coefficient of negative correlation is low; that the method
of his measuring the density by the number of persons per acre is
very crude ^^ and scarcely more adequate than that of measuring
by the number of persons per room; that numerous studies (D.
Heron's, Snow's, Pearson's, Johnson's, and others) have shown a
greater fertility of the families living in crowded and overcrowded
dwellings than that of the families living in less crowded houses,
in view of these and similar facts, the problem of the influence of
density or size of the human population upon its birth rate, must
still be regarded as open. Even Pearl's study shows that the
influence at the best is on a borderline between the tangible and
the intangible.
Density of Population and Growth of Population. A natural
conclusion from the following studies of R. Pearl and others is that
the size and density of the population greatly determine the
rapidity of population growth. In other words, the rate of
^ Recently the same result was obtained by T. T. de Jastrzebsky,
"Changes in the Birth-Rate ... in London," Journal of Royal
Statistical Society, 1923, Tables I-IV, pp. 40-43. Grading the
population of London into 21 groups according to the number of
rooms per person (from .65 to 1.41 rooms per person) he shows
that fertility per 1000 married women, or standardized fertiHty, or
"effective" fertility, or crude birth rate goes down as we pass from
the more "crowded" or dense to the less crowded and dense
districts.
34 Pearl, op. cit., pp. 155-157^ See Bowley's appropriate criticism of this method in his quoted
paper, pp. 516-517. See Knibbs' sound criticism of Pearl's theory,
oi>. cit., passim.
377

population growth is a function of the size and density of the
population itself. This is the essence of the so-called ''logistic law
of growth of population." Since the birth rate decreases and the
death rate increases with an increase in the size and the density
of the population living in a limited area, the result is that, with an
increase in the size and the density of the population, its rate of
growth has to decrease. When, in a given limited area, the
population reaches a point of saturation, it becomes stagnant.
When a new invention or an êxpansion of the inhabited area
occurs, and results in less density, the growth of the population
may start again and follow the cycle passed through before. Such
is the essence of "the logistic theory" in its primitive form. It was
formulated at least seventy years ago by Verhulst (see his works).
Later on, this cycle was outlined by several investigators, among
them Dr. T. H. Stevenson (see his paper in Journal of Hygiene,
April, 1904) ; and finally it was rediscovered and perfected by R.
Pearl and his collaborators. In his own non-mathematical
formulation, the logistic law of population growth runs as follows:
Growth occurs in cycles. Within one and the same cycle, and in a
spacially limited area or universe, growth in the first half of the
cycle starts slowly, but the absolute increment per unit of time
increases steadily until the mid-point of the cycle is reached. After
that point the increment per unit of time becomes steadily smaller
until the end of the cycle. In a spacially limited universe the
amount of increase which occurs in any particular unit of time, at
any single cycle of growth, is proportional to two things, viz: (a)
the absolute size alrejidy attained at the beginning of the unit
interval under consideration, and (b) the amount still unused or
unexpended in the given universe or area of actual and potential
resources for the support of growth.
Under (b) should be included everything w^hich may change the

amount of necessities for a population, as for instance, inventions,
potential development of transportation, power resources, etc.
The law is valid only for a limited universe with a constant (b).
When there is a new invention increasing potential and factual
resources of the population, it breaks the limits of the universe
and gives a check to the cycle of the growth which would have
378
been followed had (b) remained constant. In other words, the law,
like many other scientific laws, is valid only under the indicated
circumstances.^^
R. Pearl, G. U. Yule (1871- ) and several other statisticians have
tried to compare the factual number and the factual rate of the
growth in England's population, the United States of America's,
France's, and of some other countries during the nineteenth and
the twentieth centuries, with the number and the rate of the
growth which had to be according to the mathematical formula of
the ^'logistic law." The results of the comparisons are very near to
one another.^^ On the basis of the same formula, they have made
a computation of the future growth of the population in various
countries, providing that (a) is well known and (b) remains
constant. Finally, guided by the same law, they try to explain the
movement of the population, especially the trend of the falling
birth rate, in the Western countries. The essence of this
explanation is as follows: During the nineteenth century the
population of Western countries rapidly increased, growing in size
and in density as it approached the limit of the population within
its area (''the point of inflexion" of the curve). Because of this
reason, its further growth would naturally be slower. This could be
attained either by an increase in the mortality, or by a decrease in
the birth rate, or by both ways. Thanks to the progress of science
and other factors, the mortality rate of Western countries has

been decreasing rather than increasing. As Dr. Yule remarks, "it
has behaved as an independent variable." ' Therefore, according
to the law, there should be a decrease in the birth rate. This is
what really has happened. Hence, the falling rate of births within
these societies itself behaves according to the logistic law and
once more corroborates its validity.^^
Such are the essentials of the logistic law of the growth of
population in which growth is regarded as a function of the size
^ Pearl, op. cit., p. 22. See chapters I-III. See also Yule, op. cit.,
passim.
37 See the tables in Pearl, op. cit., Chaps. I-VI; Studies in Human
Biology, passim, and pp. 567 ff.; Bowley, A., "Births and
Population in Great Britain," The Economic Journal, 1924, pp.
188-192; Woolston, H. B., "The Limits of American Population,"
Social Forces, Sept., 1925, pp. 5-16.
38 See Yule, op. cit., passim; Pearl, Studies in Human Biology,
passim; and The Biology of Population Growth, passim.
379
and the density of the population itself. Being in its essence a
better restatement of Malthus' laws, the logistic law is probably
one of the valuable scientific formulas discovered in this field after
Malthus. It has shown that among the factors controlling the
movement of population, the population size and density are to be
taken as one of the most important factors. The law helps us
greatly in an understanding of the complex processes of the
fluctuation of the death, birth, and growth rates of a population. In
brief, its scientific value is beyond doubt. This, however, does not
mean that the law is sufficient to account for all the fluctuations in
the growth of a population, or that it gives a certain basis for
predicting the future trend and size of a definite population, or that
it even quite satisfactorily explains the changes in the movement
of the vital processes. In the first place, the comparison of the
actual and the computed growth rates of the population in various
countries during the nineteenth century has shown, as Bowley
rightly says, considerable discrepancy, in each decade the
discrepancy being above one million. In the second place, as
Bowley says further, ''the justification for the logistic form is purely
empirical; we are asked to accept it because it does give results
which agree with the records of certain populations." But from this
standpoint there are several other formulas which suit the actual
population growth, as well as the logistic formula.^^ In the third
place, Dr. Stevenson ^^ seems to be right in indicating the fact of
a simultaneous downward trend of the birth rates in many
European countries whose populations are at very different
phases of their development, and are dissimilarly situated on their
various logistic tracks. Since, in spite of this difference, all these
countries have shown a similar downward movement in the birth
rate, this seems to be due to some other than ''the logistic"
factors. In the fourth place, since the law is valid only when at
least (b) is constant, any change of (b), whether it is a new
invention, or some extraordinary catastrophe, like a great war,
revolution, or epidemic similar to the Black Death of
3^ See Bowley's remarks in Journal Royal Statistical Society,
1925, pp. 76-80.
* See Stevenson's criticism in his quoted paper, ibid., 1925, pp.
69-75. See there also the critical remarks of Bevcridge and
Brownlee, who are inclined to explain the falling rate of birth
through the popularization of contraceptive means since 1870 or
i8Ho.
380
1348, or any other change in (b), calls forth a change of the limit
for the population, and in this way upsets the prediction of the
formula.*^ With these limitations, the scientific value of the law
must be recognized. It has helped us to find a proper
understanding of the correlation between the size and the density
of the population and the rate of its growth. However, its help is
much more moderate than its proponents assure us.
Such are the principal correlations of the demographic factors
with the vital processes as set forth by various investigators.
4. SIZE AND DENSITY OF POPULATION AND MIGRATION
As the density of a population increases, in order to subsist it
must either improve its methods for the production of necessities,
make their distribution more equal, get an additional means of
subsistence through the military plundering of other societies,
migrate to some other less populated countries, or, if these
outcomes fail to be realized, then the population must decrease
its birth rate or increase its death rate, in order to reduce its
density. We shall see further that an improvement of the
technique of production sometimes happens, but not always. We
have also seen that the eventual outcome is often found in the
checked increase of the population through a decrease of the
birth rate or an increase in the death rate (the logistic law). But,
again, this outcome does not always take place in a sufficient
degree. Sometimes a solution is found in the migration of a
surplus of the population to, or a military plundering of, other
countries. This explains the probable existence of a correlation
between the fluctuation in the density of the population, and
migration, or war phenomena. The existence of such a correlation
has been indicated by a series of investigators. In regard to
migration, the corresponding theories may be summed up as

follows:
First Proposition. In the history of the same society, the periods
of rapid increase in the density of population are followed by an
increase in emigration from the country, and by an inten^^ See this point in H. Woolston's quoted paper; see also L.
Ayres' cnticism of the law in the New Republic, Vol. XLV, pp. 223224, Jan. 13, 1926. See other weak points of the theory in Knibbs'
quoted paper; A. B. Wolfe's paper in the Quarterly Journal of
Economics, Vol. XLI; and E. Krummeich's paper in the Journal de
societe statist, de Paris, 1927.
381
sive colonization of other territories by the emigrants; while the
periods of stagnation, or of decrease in density, are followed by a
decrease of emigration from the country, and sometimes, even by
immigration to it from other places.
Second Proposition. As a general rule, migratory currents move
from the regions of a more rapidly increasing population (or
population with a greater effective fertility) to those of a less
rapidly increasing one."*^ Many migratory movements have been
going on following the lines of these propositions. The history of
the expansion of ancient Rome and Greece, and of their colonial
activity, shows that they seem to have been the most intensive in
the periods of a rapid increase in their population. A series of
corresponding phenomena of later periods also show something
similar. Even now the countries or the regions of emigration have
been the countries or the regions of a relatively intensive increase
of population, while the countries or the regions of immigration
have been either those of low effective fertility or low density of
population. Further, migration from the country to the city

corroborates considerably the second proposition because, as a
general rule, country population has been more ''fertile" than city
population. In brief, it is probable that the two phenomena are
somewhat correlated.
But again we must not exaggerate the correlation. From the
indicated reason that there are several outcomes (inventions, war,
migration, reduction of birth rate, and increase of a death rate) of
the conditions created by an increasing density of the population,
it follows that, instead of migration, some other outcome may take
place. Under such conditions, the increase of a peaceful migration
may not follow, and the correlation may not be realized. On the
other hand, migration may take place because of reasons
different from the demographic causes: so-called religious,
political, and other migrations. As a result, the actual curve of
migration coincides only in part with the one expected
*2 See, for instance, Gini, C, I fattori demo^rafici deW evoluzione
delle nazioni^ pp. 34 ff., Torino, 1912; Hansen, G., Die Drei
Bevolkerun^sstufen, passim, Miinchen, 1889; also see H addon,
A. C, The Wanderings of People, 1912, pp. 2 ff., N. Y.; Myres, J.
L., "The Causes of the Rise and Fall in the Population of the
Ancient World," Eugenic Revie^v, Vol. VII, 1915.
382
on the basis of the demographic situation. In other words, the
correlation is tangible, but not close.^^
5. DEMOGRAPHIC CONDITIONS AND WAR
Before Malthus, many authors indicated the demographic factor
as one of the principal causes of war. Malthus generalized the
theories into a ''law" where war functions as one of the effective

checks of population. Since that time, this idea has become quite
common in various formulations. ''The World War was essentially
an outgrowth of the pressing population problem which confronted
the nations of Europe ten years ago." ^^ Such is one of the
varieties of the idea. "The growth of population with the resulting
desire for economic expansion is a necessary cause of War" is
another formula of a correlation between the two phenomena.^^
A. Dix, A. Wirth, von Bernhardi,
*^ Contrary to the authors who overestimate the correlation, some
others, Hke Carr-Saunders, seem to me to underestimate it.
"Migration does not arise where a condition of overpopulation has
come about," he states. I regret to say that his whole discussion
of the problem is rather speculative; and that his vague theory of
ideas as the causes of migration is much more defective than
even the one-sided demographic theory of migration. From the
fact that migration alone could not be so effective as to eliminate
any possible surplus of the population due to a great potential
human fecundity, it does not follow that migration cannot alleviate
it to some extent. We certainly know a series of cases when
migration has done this task. Due to the fact of the great potential
fecundity of the human population, a migration of every hundred
of possible progenitors has helped considerably to check a rapid
increase in a given population. Carr-Saunders' indication that
migration is a rare phenomenon, which takes place only once in
centuries, is also incorrect. Any statistical census of migration
from country to country, or from one region of a country to
another, shows that the currents of migration are continual and
quite considerable, even in normal times. His indication that
overpopulated societies usually do not exhibit initiative and
energy, which are characteristics of the emigrants, and that overpopulated societies consequently could not originate migrants, is
also fallacious. Not every overpopulated society is marked in any
or all of its periods by "the absence of hope, and the spirit of
enterprise." Gini's, and Carli's opposite thesis that the greatest

spirit of enterprise and initiative usually coincides with the periods
of a rapid increase in population seems to be nearer to the reality
than Carr-Saunders' statement. On the other hand, such a rapidly
increasing society is likely to have a greater proportion of men
with initiative and energy, and more stimuli to facihtate emigration.
See Carr-Saunders, op. cit., pp. 291-304; GiNi, op. cit., pp. 34-37,
48-53, and passim. The data of the amount of permanent and
normal migration may be found in Sorokin, Social Mobility, Chap.
XVI.
^4 Dublin, L., "The Statistician and the Population Problem," in
Population Problems, p. 3.
"^ Cox, Harold, The Problem of Population, London, J. Cape Co.,
p. 72 and Chap. HI.
383
D. Frymann, W. G. Sumner and A. G. Keller, and scores of other
authors have made similar statements. Many authors have
elucidated the same correlation in a more detailed form. The
argument runs in essence within the Malthus theory. One group
explains the correlation through a lack of room under the sun,
caused by an increase of population. This leads to the necessity
for an expansion of room through war. Another group states that a
discrepancy between the population and its means of subsistence
tends to result in war.^^ A third group of authors offers a
somewhat more complex explanation. According to them, the
demographic factor of population growth is always a latent cause
of war, but as an actual cause it varies : ''the degree of latency of
this factor is in reverse proportion to the degree of the political
organization of a society." The more complex the latter is, the
more serious is the role of the economic factors and the less
actual is the role of the demographic factors."*^ Some others offer

a still more complex interpretation of the correlation: The periods
of rapid increase in a population are followed by an increase of
the imperialistic attitudes and psychology. This leads to an
increase in the tendency of expansion which in its turn facilitates
an outbreak of war. Such is the essence of this theory.^^ The
curves of the movement of the population and of the fluctuation of
the imperialistic psychology are parallel. ''That the substratum of
military movement is to be looked for in demographic
development, appears evident"; ^^ but the correlation consists,
especially in the World War, not so much in the form of a direct
causation of the War by an increase of the population, as it does
in a disruption of the equilibrium between the demographic, the
economic, the psychical, and the political
<6 Examples of these types may be found in the quoted books of
E. M. East, G. H. Knibbs, Novicow, Vaccaro; Keynes, J. M., The
Economic Consequences of the Peace, London, 1919, pp. 215
fT.; Rose, H., Origins of the War, Cambridge, 1914; NicoLAi, Die
Biologic des Krieges, 1919, pp. 34 ff.; Sumner, W., and Keller, A.,
The Science of Society, Vol. I, pp. 16, 42, 62 ff., 1927.
*^GlNi, C, "Fattori latenti delle guerre," Rivista Italiana di
Sociologia, Jan.-Feb., 1915.
4See Carli, F., op. cit., pp. 289-303, 391-410, 600-603; Maroi, L.,
/ Fattori demografici del conflitto Europeo, Roma, 1919, passim.
^9 Carli, op. ctt., p. 392. "Lo sviluppo niimerico delta popolazione
fti la causa primaria delle grande variante economiche e sociali
del secolo che precedettc la guerra motidiale." Ibid., p. 431.
384
variabkvS within many European societies. The disruption was

caused by a rapid increase of the European population in the
nineteenth century resulting in a disruption of the equilibrium
among many, especially in the Anglo-Latin and the German
societies.^^
Thus, whatever may be the explanation of the correlation, it
seems to be thought of as existing, by a great many thinkers.
However, some authors, for instance Carr-Saunders, are inclined
to think that overpopulation is not a cause of war.^^ Nevertheless
the existence of the correlation is probable. On the other hand, it
is necessary to recognize that the partizans of its existence have
not given any very satisfactory corroboration of their theories.
Even the works of Gini, Carli, and Maroi, which seem to be the
best in this field, are far from being convincing. They supply a
series of historical facts which show that the periods of rapid
population growth, and those of great demographic disturbances,
have been usually followed by an increase of war; ^^ but the
greater part of these facts are taken from the earliest periods of
Greece or Rome, whose population movement is practically
unknown. Therefore their statements are rather guesses than
factual corroborations. Other facts given from mediaeval history
are of the same kind, in that they give only a part of the truth. The
remaining part of the facts may be accurate, but, unfortunately,
they are contradicted by other no less ascertained facts. Can we
say that every decrease in the density of a population leads to a
decrease of war? Certainly not. The Black Death
^ Ibid.f Libro IV, passim. See also Maroi, passim.
^1 Carr-vSaunders, op. cit., pp. 305 ff. "The argument that war is
due to overpopulation falls to the ground," says he. However, he
practically does not give any arguments in favor of his theory. His
own theory of the causes of war, the instinct of pugnacity and
traditionsis entirely deficient because of the uncertainty of the
existence of such an instinct, and because of an absence of any

explanation why, if such an instinct even exists, it is manifested in
the form of war only from time to time. Why does the same
instinct lead at one time to fighting and war, and at another time to
peace? Carr-Saunders' theory does not answer the question at
all. His account of the role of tradition and of highly organized
government is so dark that the statements amount to nothing.
Finally, he himself recognizes the role of war in eliminating a part
of the population, and, in this way, he admits, contrary to his
above statement, the existence of a correlation between the
movement of the demographic processes and the war
phenomena. See pp. 304-307.
^2 See Gini, I fattori demogr. deV evoluz. delle nazioni, pp. 35 ff.,
48 ff.; Carli, op. cit., pp. 289-303, 391-410, 411-^05.
385
of 1348 diminished the population of Europe enormously (by
about one-third.) If the hypothesis were true, we ought to expect
that in subsequent decades war would decrease in Europe. Such
an expectation is far from being corroborated. According to F. A.
Woods' and A. Baltzly's study, the number of years devoted to
wars in France and England in the half century from 1350 to
1400, or in the century from 1350 to 1450, does not show any
decrease. The corresponding figures are as follows : ^^
This is one of the many cases where a sudden and enormous, or
a low and gradual decrease in the density of the population was
not followed by a decrease of war phenomena. With similar
reason we are entitled to say that not every rapid increase of the
population is followed by an increase of war. The population of
Europe increased rapidly, especially during the nineteenth
century. This would lead to an increase of war if the theory were
quite general and valid. The reality is rather different. The figures
in the table on page 386 may partly show this.* Though the
number of years of warfare is not quite an adequate measure of
the increase or decrease of war, nevertheless it is probably one of
the best possible criteria. The figures show that the above
century, in spite of its excessively rapid increase of the
population, had a quota of war years not higher than other
centuries. For other centuries also, the curves of the war years
and of the population increase or decrease in these countries do
not run parallel. These indications, which may be supported by
"Woods, F. A., and Baltzly, A., Is War Dimtnishiftg?, Boston and
N. Y., 1915, pp. 43, 53. " Ibid., pp. 34, 39, 43, 53, 78. See there
the figures for several other countries.
386
other data, are sufficient to support the claim that, if the
correlation exists, it is far from being close, and is much more
complex than it is supposed to be by its many partizans. Here
again the task of future study will be to promote an objective and
quantitative investigation which would show under what
conditions, and to what extent the correlation really exists (if it
does) between the discussed phenomena. Though the trend of
the studies has been drifting in this way, nevertheless it is still
necessary to take many steps in order to clarify the relationship
between demographic and war phenomena.
6. DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS AND REVOLUTION
A correlation of these two phenomena has been alluded to by
many thinkers of the past. At the present moment, a systematic
theory of their relationship has been laid down by F. Carli. The
essence of it is as follows: "The periods of intensive dynamics in
demographic processes are also the periods of enormous

psychical variations," revolutions, and inner crises.^^ Side by side
with the rapid increase or decrease of the population, an
important part is played in this respect by the differential increase
of various classes of the same society. The greater this
discrepancy is, and the greater the obstacles to an infiltration of
talented peoples from the lower classes into the upper ones, the
greater
387
are the chances of revolution and inner crisis. Such is the
essence of CarH's theory.
Is the theory accurate? I doubt it seriously. Not every increase in
population leads to revolution. It is enough for us to look at
Prussia, England, or Russia during the nineteenth century to see
that. During this period the increase of their populations,
especially that of Russia, was enormous, and yet these countries
did not have any revolution. On the other hand, the population of
France during the same period was almost stagnant. Its increase
was less than in any other European country; and yet this did not
hinder France from having at least three revolutions (1830, 1848,
1870-71) during that period. Again, the wave of revolutions and
disorders in ancient Greece or Rome took place not so much in
the periods of an increase of their population, as in the period of
the depopulation of these countries. It is easy to multiply similar
cases. They show that the increase or decrease of a population is
not correlated, at least directly, with revolution. A more serious
sign is noticeable in the differential increase of the upper and the
lower classes, and in the intensive-ness of the vertical circulation
of the individuals from the lower to the upper classes, and vice
versa. But even there the situation is much more complex than is
depicted by Carli. It is not true that the more free the access of the
individuals from the lower classes to the higher ones, the less are
the chances of revolution. I have dealt with this problem in my
Social Mobility ^^ and my conclusions, based on careful study of
the facts, are rather opposite. Mobile societies with an intensive
vertical circulation are no more stable than immobile ones, though
there is no general rule. The relatively closed aristocracies, when
they are in proper conditions, have a longer span of existence
than the open aristocracies. What is important is not so much the
closeness or openness of the door to the upper classes, as the
character of the aristocracy, and the conditions of its existence.
Carli's corroborations of his hypothesis are rather few and not
properly analyzed. It is only necessary to indicate that the
European societies of the nineteenth century were more mobile,
and their upper classes were more open, than many past
societies, or many " See SoROKiN, Social Mobility, Chap. XXII.
388
Eastern societies. This, however, did not prevent the European
societies from having a series of revolutions. Meanw^hile. in past
societies with hereditary aristocracy, especially in Eastern
societies, revolutions have been more rare than in the "open"
societies of Europe or of ancient Greece and Rome since their
aristocracy became relatively ''open." Not repeating here other
data given in my Social Mobility, I do not think Carli's theory is
correct. In it there is only one correct point: the degeneration of
the upper classes as a positive factor of revolution; but this is a
quite different factor from the demographic forces. It may take
place in an immobile, as well as in a mobile society, and with a
closed, as well as open aristocracy.^"^ For these reasons, Carli's
theory of the correlation between the discussed phenomena must
be judged as rather hasty.^^ The problem has not been studied
seriously. It is up to future sociologists to elucidate it.
7. DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS AND ECONOMIC PHENOMENA

Population Size and Density, and Technique of Production. M.
Kovalevsky (1851-1916), A. Coste, E. Durkheim, F. Ratzel, P.
MougeoUe, E. Levasseur, E. Dupreel, C. Gini, F. Carli, W.
Sumner and A. Keller, and others have tried to establish a
correlation between these two series of phenomena. According to
them, a growth of the population and its consequence, an
increase in its density, have been responsible for an improvement
in the technique of economic production and for a transition from
less intensive forms of production to the more intensive ones. An
increasing density makes the methods of production insufficient,
which were quite satisfactory for a less dense population. Hence,
the increasing pressure of this factor. It urges the invention of
more efficient methods of production, which will be fit to satisfy
the needs of an increased population. This leads to inventions
and through them, to a betterment of the technique of production.
On the other hand, an increased density of population means a
more intensive exchange of experience, which is likely
" See SoROKiN, The Sociology of Revolution, pp. 397-413.
68 With even greater reason, the same may be said of G.
Ferrari's interesting kheory developed in his Teoria dei periodi
politici, Milano, 1874.
389
BIO-SOCTAL BRANCH: DEMOGRAPHIC SCHOOL 389
to result in a more rapid accumulation of knowledge and mental
progress. In these ways, according to the theories,^^ societies
have passed from the stage of hunters and fishers and collectors
of natural products to that of agriculture and cattle-breeding; and
from the primitive methods of agriculture and hand-industry, to the
more perfect methods of machino-facture and agriculture. Thus,
contrary to the economic interpretation of history, the

demographic school is apt to regard the factor of production itself
as a function of the demographic factor.
The attempt to establish the above correlation has been made in
various ways. Libich, F. Ratzel, and E. Levasseur have indicated
that there is a correlation between the density of the population
and the technique of production, without, however, indicating
which of the two is the cause, and which is the effect. According
to Ratzel's computation, on looo square kilometers there exists
the followîng density of population under the specified technique
for procuring the means of subsistence:
Hunters and fishermen (in various regions and at various
stages) from 2 to 1770
Nomadic shepherds I770
Agricultural peoples (in various regions and at various
stages) from 1770 to 35, 000
The peoples with the most intensive agricultural technique. 177,
000
As to the density of the population with a highly developed
technique and commerce, as the contemporary industrial centers
show, it exceeds the last figure many times.^'^
M. Kovalevsky, (1851-1916) in a series of his historical and
sociological works ^^ based on a concrete study of economic
evolution, came to the conclusion that one of the "principal motors
of economic evolution has been the growth of the population."
According to his theory,
^^ See this argument in Carli, op. cit., pp. 145-183.
* See also Levasseur, E., "La repartition de la race humaine sur

le globe terrestre," Bulletin Institut Ivtern. Statistique, Vol. XVIII, 2"
livr., pp. 48-64; Carli, F., L'equilibrio delle nazioni secondo la
demografia applicata, Bologna, N. Zanichelli Co., 1919, pp. 96 ff.
^1 See Kovalevsky, M., Ohschinnoje semlevladenie (Communal
Possession of Land), Moscow, 1879, pp. 6-7 and passim; A Study
oj the Disintegration of Communal Land Possession in Waadt
Canton, Russ., 1876; "fivolution du r6gime economic," Le devenir
social, June, 1896; Dir Okonomishe EntivickJung Europas, Berlin,
1908 and later, all vohimes; in Russian the work began to be
published in 1898; Contemporary Sociologists, pp. 260 ff., 200 ff.
390
this factor has been responsible for the transition from a stage of
hunters and fishermen to agriculture, and from a primitive system
of agriculture to a more intensive one with corresponding changes
in the system of land ownership and land possession. . . To the
same factor is due the substitution of a manufacturing system of
production in industry for a domestic one; and that of the
machino-factur-ing system for a manufacturing one, with a
corresponding change in the division of labor, and in the
interrelations of capital and labor. . . Thus, the simple fact of the
growth of population called forth a division of labor, a social
differentiation into castes, orders, and classes, and the evolution
of the technique of production, as well as that of the economic
regime.^Such is the essence of Kovalevsky's theory, formulated and
factually corroborated by him considerably earlier than was done
by Coste, Durkheim, Mougeolle, or even by A. Loria.^^ Stressing
the importance of this factor, Kovalevsky, however, strongly
criticizes all those who would try to deny the existence and
importance of other factors. He is a pluralist of a very definite

type.^^ He makes a mockery of all those who ''try to regard
historical processes as a simple equation with one unknown." For
him the very problem of the principal factor is a pseudo-problem,
and wrongly set forth. In the future it must be put away.^^ As we
shall see, Durkheim came to the somewhat similar conclusion that
the process of the division of labor and economic evolution has
been due to the growth of the population. (See chapter about
Durkheim.)
Independently from Kovalevsky, A. Loria in his early work about
land rent developed a theory very similar to that of Kovalevsky.^^
Furthermore, P. Mougeolle and F. H. Giddings outlined a theory
which also gave an important role to the factor of growth
^2 Kovalevsky, Contemporary Sociologists, pp. 200-201.
^ See Loria's remark about priority in his // capitalismo e la
scienza, p. 251; Kovalevsky's answer, in Contemporary
Sociologists, p. 261.
" See SoROKiN, P., "Kovalevsky's Theory of Factors," In
Memoriam of M. Kovalevsky, Russ., Petrograd, 1917.
" Kovalevsky, Contemporary Sociologists, pp. vii ff.
^8 Kovalevsky elaborated his theory also independently from
Loria three years earlier. For this reason, Loria's allusion that
Kovalevsky only repeated his theory, is quite baseless.
391
and density of population.^^ Quite recently, E. Dupreel, with
Coste's one-sidedness and without Kovalevsky's reservations,
without mentioning his predecessors, said that "Social progress

and civilization is the fruit of the numerical increase of the
population." ^^ F. Carli, on his part, states that "the denser
population has more developed technique" and that "the nondensely populated societies have been poor in technical
inventions." ^^ There are other authors wiio have incidentally, or
in a detailed way, insisted on the importance of the factor of
population in the evolution of the technique of production. We
need not mention their names, because their statements add little
to the above.
Criticism. The above theories indicate two reasons why a
growth in the number and the density of a population leads to an
intensification of the technique of production: an intensification of
social interaction which results in a more intensive exchange by
experience, and an increase of need. This means that both
reasons are, so to speak, not inherent in the density and to the
number of the population. Only as far as an increase in the
density and number of the population is followed by an
intensification of interaction, and by an increase of the danger of
starvation, need the demographic factor lead to an improvement
of the technique of production. Now, can we say that an increase
of the population always and invariably gives an enrichment of
human knowledge, and an increased lack of necessities?
Sometimes it does, but sometimes it does not give these results.
In order that the first result may take place, it is necessary that the
corresponding qualify of interacting people be sufficiently high.
Thousands of idiots may be in the most intensive contact; and yet
probably only a Bedlam would result from it. Again, if an
increasing population has the complete possibility of satisfying its
needs through emigration, war, plundering its neighbors, etc.,
without an intensification of the technique of production, as was
the case in the past in regard to many tribes, a progress of the
technique of production may not follow. More than that, even the
pressure of
'See MouGEOLLE, P., Statique des ctvilizafions, Paris, 1883;

Giddings, F. H., Principles of Sociology.
'^ DupRÊL, E., "Les variations demo.e^raphiques et le progrcs,"
Revue dc I'ln-ititut de Sociologir, pp. 359-3H5, May, 1922.
" Carli, op. cil., p]). 147-149, Chap. V.
392
needs being increased, a betterment of the technique of
production may not follow, simply because new inventions do not
always come in proportion to the social need felt for them. Poor
health urgently needs an efficient remedy; yet it often lacks this
and the man dies. The same is true here. During thousands of
years, thousands of societies have experienced poverty, famines,
and other miseries; and yet the necessary inventions have not
been created to alleviate these miseries. In the majority of cases,
the outcome from overpopulation and misery has been found not
so much in a new invention, as in a death from starvation, in
infanticide, in military robbery of neighboring peoples, in
migration, in strife, war, abortion, and so on. Being unable to
invent, the people have "preferred" to die."^^
These considerations are enough to show that if there is a
correlation between an increase in the number and the density of
the population, and progress in the technique of the production of
the means of subsistence, it is not very close and perfect. If the
correlation were perfect, we should expect that the technique of
economic production would be higher and the inventions more
numerous when the number and the density of the population is
greater. The facts do not support the expectation. While, at the
end of the nineteenth century, the average density per one square
kilometer in Australian Victoria was 5 inhabitants; in New South
Wales, 1.4; in the United States, 8; in Canada, 0.3; in New

Zealand, 2; in Finland, 7; in Sweden, 12; in Norway, 6; in
Denmark, 55; in France, 71 ; in Switzerland, 71;at the same
time it was 182 in Bengal; in the northwestern provinces of British
India, 169; in India generally, 61; in China, from 60 to 94; in Italy,
96; and so on."^^ Evidently we have no reason for thinking that
the first group of countries with a small density of
' My study of the correlation between famine and the invention
of new sources of means for subsistence has shown that if, under
the influence of famine (and overpopulation), there has
sometimes been made a betterment of the methods for obtaining
and producing necessities, there has more often been an
increased mortality, while "preventive and repressive checks"
have taken place. If any increase of misery were followed by an
improvement in the production of economic necessities, the
peoples with the most numerous famines should have been the
most inventive. In reaUty, however, the facts do not support such
an expectation. A detailed analysis of this has been given in
chapter IV of my The Influence of Famine and the Food Factor.
?i VON Mayr, G., op. cit., Vol. II, p. 48; Levasseur, La repartition,
p. 52.
393
population has a more primitive system of technique, industry or
agriculture."^ Furthermore, if the discussed correlation were
close, within the history of the same country the technique of
economic production would make progress with every increase in
the density of its population. This expectation is corroborated to
some extent, "^^ but the exceptions are so numerous that the
correlation must be considered rather imperfect. Besides, the
correlation seems to go only to a definite limit; after it the law of
diminishing returns begins to operate, and tends to annul the
potential benefits of an increased pressure in the population. Here
are a few examples of the many possible. Kovalevsky himself

indicates that in England, in the period from the sixth to the
sixteenth century, there was not any noticeable improvement in
the technique of production, yet the population of England was
increasing during this period."^^ We cannot say that the
population of the Roman Empire was less dense in the second
century A.D. than in the third and in the second centuries B.C.,
yet the technique of production and invention in the second
century A.D., especially at its end, was rather inferior to that of the
preceding period. Moreover, it began to deteriorate more and
more, so that it eventually called forth a depopulation of at least
some parts of Italy.'^^ Read the economic history of China. In
spite of the many waves of increase and decrease in its
population, and in spite of its great density attained centuries ago,
its industrial and agricultural technique has remained practically at
the same stage which was attained centuries ago.'^ Tn brief, the
discussed cor'2 This shows that Carli's statement that industrial countries
regularly have a greater density of population than agricultural
coimtries is also extreme. We cannot say that "la coesistenza
delle due serie di fenomeni ha U7ia regularita di legge." Carli, op.
ciL, pp. 9 ff.
" See facts in Carli, op. cit., Chap. V.
^* Kovalevsky, Contemporary Sociologists, pp. 244-245.
^^ RosTOVTZEFF, The Social and Economic History of the
Roman Empire, pp. 166, 303-305; W. Simkhovitch goes even so
far as to say that the evolution of Ihe agricultural technique of
production in Rome represents a passage from an intensive to an
extensive system. In ancient periods 7 jugera of land was enough
to maintain a farmer's family. In the time of the Gracchi, 30 jugera
was necessary; in the time of Caisar, 66; in the time of Augustus,
400. vSuch a reverse movement, if Simkhovitch's conclusion is at
least partly valid, was going on in the period of an increasing

number and density of the Roman population. Simkhovitch, W.,
"Rome's Fall Reconsidered," Political Science Quarterly, 1916, p.
221.
'6 Sec Lee, M. P. H., The luonomic History <if China, passim, N.
Y., 1921.
394
S94 CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES
relation is tangible in many cases, but it has its limits '^'^ beyond
which no further increase of the population produces an
improvement of technique among many peoples; and it has so
many exceptions that the correlation cannot be regarded close or
regular. Finally, if the correlation were perfect, and there were no
limits beyond which it ceased to exist, there would be no danger
of overpopulation; and no discrepancy between the means of
subsistence and an increased population could occur. Each
increase in a population would secure new inventions and a
corresponding improvement of the technique of production, and,
in this way, the need would be met. It is necessary to disregard all
the facts of human history to be able to support such a view. An
innumerable number of famines, miseries, economic
impoverishments, migrations, and so on, show that in a great
many cases an increased population has not been followed by
such inventions and improvements; and that the outcome of
overpopulation has been found in less pleasant ways of reestablishing the equilibrium between the population and its means
of subsistence."^^ All Malthusian literature, and even the nonMalthusian theories of population, supply abundant material which
shows this."^^
'^ This is recognized also by Carli; op. cit., pp. 172, 177 ff.
'8 See the facts in Descamps, P., "Comment les conditions de vie
de sauvages influencent leur natalite," Revue de Vlnstitut de
Sociologie, Sept., 1922; Carr-Saunders, op. cit., Chaps. VII-XI.
'^ The theory of the optimum number of population, and the
possibility of deviating from this optimum by a too numerous
population, is not denied even by the opponents of Malthus.
Neither do they claim that each increase in the population will be
followed by a corresponding improvement in the technique of
production. They show conspicuously that in the past, as well as
in the present, the common method of re-establishment of "the
optimum number" has been not so much a betterment of the
technique, as in methods of increased mortality, decreased birth
rate, infanticide, abortion, and so on. About this, see the theory of
the optimum number of population, Cannan, E., A History of the
Theories of Production and Distribution, Chap. V, London, 1903;
Nicholson, J. Sh., PriU' ciples of Political Economy, Vol. I, pp. 163
ff., London, 1893; Carli, op. cit., pp. 98 ff.; Carr-Saunders, op. cit.,
pp. 199 ff.; Wolfe, A. B., "The Optimum Size of Population," in
Dublin's Population Problems, Boston, 1926; the quoted works of
Julius Wolf and Budge. As to the pro-Malthusian theories, they
show the above facts of overpopulation, the limited possibility for
an improvement in the methods of production, and other facts
where, in spite of an increased density of the population, the
needed improvement of technique has not followed. See
Thompson, W. S., op. cit., passim, and Chaps. IX-XI; East, E. M.,
Mankind at the Crossroads, 1923; Knibbs, G. H., "The Problems
of Population, Food vSup-ply, and Migration," Scientia, Vol. I, No.
XII, 1919; "The Mathematical Theory of Population" in Census of
the Commonwealth of Australia, 1917.
395
These considerations are sufficient to show that, even regardless

of the fact that the number and the density of the population itself
depend greatly on many factors, these demographic forces, taken
as 'Variables," seem to show some correlation with the change in
the technique of production; but the correlation is far from being
close, general, or unlimited. This means that the evolution of the
technique of production may be accounted for only in part through
the demographic factor. We cannot say that this factor alone is
always necessary or sufficient for producing inventions and
improvements in the technique of production.
Population, Size, and Density Correlated with the Forms of
Ozmiership and Possession. Such Russian investigators of the
forms of land property in Russia as M. Kovalevsky, A. Kauf-mann,
N. Organovsky, R. Kotcharovsky and others ^^ have found that
there is a correlation between the forms of landownership or land
possession, and the density of the population in various parts of
Russia. As we proceed from the less densely populated
southeastern part (Siberia and central Asiatic provinces) to the
more densely populated parts of central and northwestern Russia,
the form of community landownership (obschina) is more and
more superseded by private or individual landownership. The
explanation of the correlation lies in the fact that a greater density
in a population makes a more intensive agricultural production
necessary, and this is more possible under a regime of private
ownership and unhampered individual initiative, than under the
regime of community ownership with its redistribution of land, with
its inertia, and its limitation of private initiative and profit. This may
serve as an example of the correlation between the density of a
population and the forms of economic organization.
In Russia the correlation has been tangible, though it is far from
being perfect.^^ It seems to be even less tangible in other
countries, and at different times. I am a poor specialist in the
economic history of the forms of landownership; but in studying
^ vSee Kovalevsky, Obschinnoie semlevladenie; Kotcharovsky,

R., Russian Obschina (Russ.); Kaufmann, A., History of the
Russian Common Land Owner' ship, (Russ.).
*' It is interesting to note that in the years 1917-1926 the number
of persons in the territory of Soviet Russia decreased in
comijarison with that before 1917; and yet the forms of private
land possession were growing at the cost of the obschina form, in
s])ite of the communist regime.
396
the economic history of China and an alternation between the
community landownership (so-called Tsing Tien System) and
private landownership, I failed to find any definite correlation.
Alternation has been going on continually, but without any
correlation with fluctuation in the density of population.^^ The
same seems to be true in regard to the forms of landownership in
India, as far as they are known to us. During almost a thousand
years (from the fifth century B.C. to the third and fourth centuries
A.D.) the density of the Indian population probably underwent
considerable changes.. Nevertheless, the system of the common
possession of land seems to have dominated in all this period.^^
Likewise, in the long history of ancient Egypt, the density of the
population probably underwent considerable changes, but up to
the Ptolemaic period, ''there had been only two types of landed
proprietors in Egypt,the king and the gods." ^'^ I doubt also
whether, in the evolution of the forms of landownership in Rome,
there may be found any tangible correlation with the density of the
population, except perhaps in the last period of the Western
Roman Empire. Turning to our own times, we see in almost all
Western countries the same system of private landownership
dominating, in spite of the great difference in the density of their
populations, ranging from i to 2 inhabitants to more than 200 per
kilometer. If the correlation were close, such a thing could not

have taken place. On the other hand, countries like India or
China, in spite of a considerable density, have kept community
landownership alive, while in Norway, Sweden, Finland, New
Zealand and Australia, in spite of the small density of population,
community landownership is practically absent.^^ These
exceptions are suflficient to show that, even if the alleged
correlation exists, it is very imperfect and far from being general.
*2 See Lee, M. P. H., op. cit., passim; Chang, Chen Huan, The
Economic Principles of Confucius, pp. 119 ff., 332 ff., 497 ff., N.
Y., 1911. ^^ See The Cambridge History of India, Vol. I, N. Y.,
1922.
^ ROSTOVTZEFF, Op. cit., p. 262.
^ To this it may be added that the table of the forms of property
among the different hunting, pastoral, and agricultural peoples,
given in the chapter about the Economic School (see further) also
does not support the discussed correlation, in spite of the fact
that, passing from the lowest hunters to the highest agricultural
peoples, we pass from the societies with the lowest, to the
societies with the higher density of population.
397
I do not here have space to scrutinize the series of other
correlations between the density of the population and other
economic relationships claimed by the partizans of the
demographic school. To give an idea of their character I shall give
the following quotation from Kovalevsky, which sums up the
character of the correlated economic phenomena.
In the field of economic relationship, changes in the density of the

population have manifested themselves in the substitution of a
more efificient bondage labor for a less efficient slave labor, and
finally in that of free labor for a bondage labor system. The
liberation of slaves en masse, and the emancipation of peasants,
made at the beginning by individual feudal landlords, and later on
by the governments of the city-republics and of the nations, have
been possible only through the inevitable increase of rent due to
an increase of the population. . . Parallel to these changes in the
field of agriculture and land possession, corresponding changes
have been going on within the field of industry and commerce,
and in the field of organization of the industrial and commercial
classes. . . From the hands of the slaves and the serfs . . .
industry passes into the hands of the village artisans and the citymasters who, for the sake of mitigating competition, have
organized guilds and corporations. . . To this evolution of
industrial and commercial activity there corresponds a process of
differentiation between country-economy and city-economy, the
appearance of markets and fairs, the organization of cityeconomy and so on.^^
Such is a brief resume of the most important economic and social
effects of the growth of population, which have been shown by
Kovalevsky in eleven volumes of his Die Okonomische Entwickhiug Europas. From the quotation we see that the contended
correlations are highly important, and that the role ascribed to the
growth of the population is really great. I think that there is a part
truth in these contentions, but only a part, and that part defined
rather vaguely. A severe statistical, historical, and logical scrutiny
of these correlations would probably make many of them
questionable, some of them fallacious, and part of them, so to
speak, local. As I said, I do not have space to test these
contentions, but I am sure that such a testing would result in the
above
.'* Kovalevsky, Contemporary Sociologists, pp. 245-246.

398
conclusions. With a corresponding modification, this may probably
be said about other correlations in this field.
Demographic Factors Correlated with Economic Prosperity. In
this field the theories which have tried to formulate a series of
definite correlations between the progress of industry, commerce,
the standard of living, and economic well-being, on the one hand;
and an increase or decrease in the density of the population, on
the other, have been especially numerous. In the past, as well as
in the present, the theories have been rather opposite. According
to one group of theorists, represented by Malthus and the Malthusians, an increase in the density of a population tends to produce
overpopulation, and influences the well-being of the society
negatively. For this reason they view an increase of population
negatively, and at the present moment especially, favor birth
control, as a convenient means for checking population growth.
Usually such theories come principally from the countries with a
considerable density, and with a rapid increase in their
population.^^ Another group of these theories, more typical of the
past, and at the present moment supported principally in France,
which is now suffering from depopulation, maintains a rather
opposite view of the beneficial efTect of an increase of the
population on economic development and well-being of a
country.^^ Finally, the third group of theories take a middle
position, expressed in their somewhat vague conception of the
optimum number of a population for any given conditions.^^ When
the number and the density of a population is at this optimum
point, the economic influences of such a situation are the best
possible under the circumstances. When there is a deviation from
the optimum point in the form of over or under population, the

effects are negative.
Thus, all these theories explicitly or implicitly contend that
^' The indicated books of East, Thompson, Sumner-Keller (Vol. I,
pp. 42, 62 ff.), and J. Sweeney are examples of this type of
theory. See also Cox, H., The Problem of Population, London,
1922. The author even offers an organization of a "League of Low
Birth-Rate Nations," Chap. IIL
^^ Typical samples of these theories are given in the mentioned
book of P. Leroy-Beaulieu, and especially in Bertillon, J., La
depopulation de la France, Paris, 1911. In America there recently
appeared a current of thought pertaining also to this type of
theories. It is represented by L. Dublin's last works. See his paper
in Population Problems, 1926.
^^ The mentioned works of Carr-Saunders, A. B. Wolfe, Budge,
Nicholson and Cannan are varieties of this type.
399
there is a definite correlation between the discussed demographic
factors and the economic well-being of a society. Now, which of
these theories is correct? In the first place, the very fact of the
existence of such opposite theories makes one doubt the
accuracy of each of them. In the second place, historical and
statistical data do not entirely support any of the extreme types.
Indeed, it is possible to contend that in many cases, a decrease in
the number and the density of a population tends to raise its
economic well-being. For instance, according to E. Meyer, in
ancient Greece in the second century B.C., there was a
considerable depopulation, and, at the same time, an increase of
the material well-being of the decreased population.^^ F.

Curschman, in his study of the famines in the Middle Ages, states
also that often, after a great decrease of the population in
famished areas (through great mortality, decreased birth rate,
emigration from such districts, etc.), the well-being of those who
survived became considerably greater.^'^ D'Avenel, on the basis
of his classical study of property, incomes, wages, and prices in
France from 1200 to 1800, states also that the fluctuation of real
wages of the labor classes during six centuries was independent
of either the political regime, guilds, corporations and unions, or
prices; the movement of their well-being was entirely determined
by the law of supply and demand. Wages would rise in periods of
a decrease in population, and a consequent dearth of labor, and
they would go down in periods of a rapid increase in population,
with an abundant supply of labor. Only the interference of science
in the form of a new beneficial invention could sometimes
counterbalance the downward trend of real wages caused by
population growth."^^ M. Kovalevsky, on his part, has shown that
one of the results of the Black Plague of 1348, which decreased
the population of western Europe by about one-third, was a series
of economic and social benefits for the laboring and unfree
classes.^^
^" Meyer, E., "Die Bevolkerung des Altertums," Handwdrterhiich
d. Slaats-wissenschaften, 3d ed,, Vol. II.
81 Curschman, F., Ilungersndle in MittelaUer, ])]). 41-47, Leipzig,
1900.
82 d'Avenel, Vte. G., Decouvertes d'histoire sociale, ])p. 8, 148-9,
155, 209, 230, and passim, Paris, 1910.
83 See Kovalevsky, Die Okoncmische Rntwickhnig Europas, Vol.
V, Chaps. V-XII, Berlin, 1911. "According to the law of demand
and supply, labor wages had to increase in pro])ortion to the
decrease of the ])Oi)ulation, and this phenom-
400
In a similar way, many great devastations of the population in
China have been followed by a comparative improvement of the
material well-being of the surviving population.^* These, and other
similar facts seem to corroborate the accuracy of the proMalthusian theories; yet there are facts which show that decrease
of the population may have the opposite result. The first example
is given by the later period of Roman history. After the third
century A.D., the process of depopulation took place in Italy, and
in some other provinces of the Roman Empire. This, however,
was not followed by betterment, but by great aggravation of the
economic situation of Rome, and of the well-being of its
population.
Depopulation . . . became now the outstanding feature of the life
of the Empire. ... As a result, the general productivity of the
Empire constantly decreased. Larger and larger tracts of land ran
to waste. The exchange of goods became more and more
irregular. . . . Hence the frequent occurrence of famines, and the
decay of industry. No partial measures could counter this
progressive decay. ^^
Another example is given by contemporary France. As we know,
its population has been almost stagnant during the whole of the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. If the discussed theory were
right, we should expect that its population would be much better
economically than that of other European countries, whose
population has been rapidly increasing during that period. Such a
conclusion was indeed made by some authors.^^ Nevertheless,
quite competent French investigators indicate that the real
situation is quite different. Besides many non-economic
disastrous effects in the field of purely economic life, an
insignificant increase of the French population has caused the
following results: A slower rate of increase in national wealth than

in other countries with a more rapidly increasing population; and a
slower increase of salaries and well-being of the populationin
brief, brings
ena took place throughout all the countries of Western Europe
because the number of the population decreased," p. 274. ^^ See
Lee, M., op. cit., passim.
'5 ROSTOVTZEFF, M. J., Op. cit., pp. 424-425.
'6 Thompson, W. A., op. cit., pp. 156 ff.
401
results opposite to what should be expected. The following table
illustrates this.'*^^
Furthermore, if the theory were right, we could expect that
countries with a low density of population would have necessarily
greater economic well-being than countries with a higher density
of population. But again, the facts do not support such an
expectation. Within countries with relatively low density we find a
low standard (Russia) and a high standard of economic well-being
(United States of America, New Zealand, Australia). The same is
true in regard to other countries with a high density of population
(Belgium, England, on the one hand; and by contrast many
provinces of India and China on the other).
Without mentioning other similar cases, the above seems to
entitle us to conclude that an absolute or relative decrease in the
density of population is not always, nor everywhere, followed by a
positive influence on the economic well-being of a society. This
means, first, that the correlation between the two phenomena is
much more complex and less close than the partizans of this type
of theories assure us. Second, the fluctuation of prosperity or

impoverishment of a society cannot be accounted for through a
quantitative fluctuation of the number and the density of the
population alone. Third, the correlation has been studied
insufficiently. In order to make it clear, the partizans of these
theories must indicate under exactly what conditions, in what way,
and to what degree, a decrease in the density of population may
have
^^ OiNi, C, Ammontare e composizione dclla ricchezza dcllc
tiuzioni, p. 553, Torino, 1914. Sec also Blrtillon, La depopulation
dc la France, pp. 9-61.'
402
positive effects; and when, under what conditions, and beyond
what hmits it begins to exert a negative influence.
With a still greater reason, the above may be said of the opposite
type of theories, with their motto: "With every mouth God sends a
pair of hands," and, the greater the population, the better the
economic well-being of a society. I have already given some
considerations which show the inadequacy of such a theory.
Numerous computations of the demographers (R. Pearl, G. H.
Knibbs, E. M. East, J. Sweeney, and others) show that, under the
present rate of increase of population, if there are no miraculous
inventions within a few generations the earth will be overpopulated and a consequent lowering of the standard of living
may be expected.^^ History records too plainly the economic
misery of many ''overpopulated" countries to allow us to maintain
the thesis of the discussed optimistic theory. In a few cases, an
increase in the density of a population has been followed by a
rising economic well-being; but in still more numerous cases it
has had quite opposite effects. Therefore we must make the
same conclusion in regard to these theories which I made in

regard to the opposite hypotheses.
Thus we must conclude that the theories dealing with the
optimum number of the population are nearer to the truth. The
more a population deviates from the optimum number, either
above or under it, the more negative will be the influence on the
economic well-being. The nearer the number is to the optimum
number, the better will be the economic influence. But
unfortunately, just exactly what this "optimum number of the
population" is, the theories do not declare. Their answer is rather
a vicious logical circle: "The optimum number of the population is
the optimum number which varies for various times and
societies." ^^ Some other writers, like Carr-Saunders, go even so
far as to state that "There will, in fact, under any given
circumstances, always be an optimum number." ^^^ But,
according to the same author, it is
98 See Knibbs, G. H., The Mathematical Theory of Population, p.
453; East, E. M., op. cit., Chaps. IV, VI; Pearl, R., "The Population
Problem," Geographical Review, 1922, No. 4.
99 This is all that is given by the "optimum number" theory of
Cannan, Nicholson, Wolf, or some others.
i" Carr-Saunders, op. cit., p. 200 ff. See the proper critical
remarks against Saunders' "optimum number" in Wolfe, A. B., op.
cit., p. 68, note.
403
BIO-SOCL\L BRANCH: DEMOGRAPHIC SCHOOL 403
almost always broken by either over- or underpopulation. Thus,
even this group of theories is far from being satisfactory.
Summing up this brief analysis, we conclude that a correlation

seems to exist between the fluctuation of density in the population
of a given society and its economic well-being, but exactly what
this relationship is, we do not know as yet. It seems to be much
more complex and less close than the theories claim. It is the task
of the future to find out when, under what conditions, and to what
extent, an increase or decrease in the density of a population
facilitates an increase or decrease of its economic well-being; and
what the optimum number for a given society should be. At the
present moment, we still know very little in this field.
8. SIZE AND DENSITY OF POPULATION CORRELATED WITH
THE FORMS OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATION
We have several theories which try to show that the demographic
factors are responsible for the forms of social and political
organization. A priori, it is possible to foresee that the family and
marriage forms, and the political and social regimes will be
different when a territory the size of the United States has a
population of 10,000 and when the population amounts to
100,000,000 human beings. But exactly what the difference will
be, and what it would be when the contrast in size and in density
was not so enormous as in this case, remains an unsolved
problem. Let us take a few of the theories which try to clarify
some cases of this type.
Demographic Factors Correlated With Social Differentiation,
Stratification and Segregation. It is rather evident that the
differentiation of a population into urban and rural groups, into
various strata, classes, castes, and what not, depends
considerably on an increase in population. As its size and density
increase, the above forms of social differentiation progress also.
The first phenomenon is shown by the history of cities; the second
one, by a series of studies like Durkheim's study of the social
division of labor. Admitting the existence of a correlation, at the
same time it is necessary to indicate that it is not so close as to

have no exceptions or deviations. The size of the cities, as well as
the per cent of the urban and the rural population, only remotely
depends
404
upon the size of a country's population. This is shown by the fact
that among countries with a small population, there are countries
with both a low and a high per cent of urban population (for
instance, Belgium, Finland, Korea). They are both with and
without large cities. The same is true in regard to the countries
with a large population. (Compare China, Russia, and the United
States.) This means that the degree of a country's urbanization is
a function not only of, and possibly not so much of, demographic
factors, as of a series of other factors. The same is true in regard
to the character and the degree of labor division and social
differentiation. China is a more densely populated country, and
has a larger population than the United States; and yet the
technical division of labor in China is less developed than in
America, or in other countries with a lower density and a smaller
population. The same is true in regard to social differentiation.
There are big and densely populated societies with and without
the caste system (India, China, Russia, the United States of
America). There are densely populated societies with and without
nobility of birth (Belgium, many provinces of India, Germany). The
same is true in regard to small countries, and the countries with a
low density of population. These indications are sufficient for the
claim that the correlation between the discussed phenomena is
not perfect, knows many exceptions, and is less close than its
partizans assure us."^^^
Thus, even these fundamental forms of social organization,
stratification, and differentiation are only to some extent correlated
with the demographic factors. There is a still smaller probability of

finding a quite tangible correlation between the demographic
factors and other less fundamental characteristics of social
organization and institutions. Let us examine one or two examples
to see if this be true.
Demographic Factors Correlated zvith Family Organization.
One of the best theories of a correlation between the forms of
ii The above shows the one-sidedness of Coste's, Kovalevsky's,
.-Carh's, and Durkheim's theories which regard urbanization,
social division of labor, and social differentiation, as a function of
the size and the density of the population alone, or almost alone.
The table of the forms of government among the sim. plest
peoples given in the chapter about the economic school, (see
further) only supports what I have said above.
405
family and marriage, and demographic factors is set forth by J.
Mazzarella in his explanation of exogamy, polygamy, and of "the
ambilian" forms of marriage, characterised by the fact that the
husband enters the family of his wife, and assumes there a servile
and subordinated position. Mazzarella has shown that these
forms of marriage are typical of the lowest primitive peoples, and
that they are regularly followed by exogamy, polygamy, a
matrilinear system of descent, and by a lack of social stratification
in these primitive groups, (or by ''gentilisme," in his terminology).
What factors are responsible for such a type of family, marriage,
and social structure? Mazzarella's study leads to the conclusion
that neither the geographic, racial, political, economic, nor
religious factors can account for it directly, because the system is
found among peoples who are different in all these respects. His
analysis shows further that the discussed characteristics of family,
marriage, and social organization are found among the peoples

who (a) live in an area with unlimited potential economic
resources; (b) which, however, for their utilization, and
conservation require a great deal of human labor, especially the
labor of adult males; though (c) they are, as a rule, groups of
small size and not having a sufficient number of adult males
(underpopulation, according to the theory of ''the optimum ^
number"). Hence, Mazzarella's conclusion: ''Exogamy, polygamy,
and the ambilian forms of marriage are an indication of the
numerical weakness (underpopulation) of a social group, and a
manifestation of its need for increasing its population (especially
the adult males) through the adjunction of males of other social
aggregates." According to Mazzarella, this hypothesis is in
harmony with the facts, and explains many details of the ambilian
and the exogamic forms of family and marriage.^^-Thus, these
forms of family and social organization are in a close correlation
with the size and the density of the population, according to the
author. This means that they are in a considerable degree a
function of demographic variables. I must confess that, unlike a
great many works in ethnology, Mazzarella's works
*2 Mazzarella, J., Les types sociaux et le Droit, pj). 178 ff., 282312, Paris, 1908; Studi di etnologia gutridira, passim, Catania,
1903.
406
are free from hasty generalizations, from the ''method of
illustration" and from the carelessness in scientific analysis which
usually makes these works valueless scientifically. I am inclined
to think also that in Mazzarella's generalization there is something
scientifically valid. But, on the other hand, the generalization goes
too far. Hobhouse's, Wheeler's and Ginsberg's studies have
shown that polygamy, a high position for women, and matrilinear
descent, are found among peoples with different sizes of

population, with different forms of stratification, and with different
natural environments.^^^ Among the exogamic peoples, there are
several who live in a poor natural environment, who have a
patrilinear system of descent, and who practice various methods
of checking the increase of their population.^^^ These facts do not
agree with the hypothesis. On the other hand, we cannot say that
all peoples who have the wife enter the family of her husband and
become ''filiae loco'' to the head of the husband's family (pater
familias) or become entirely subordinated to her husband, (manus
mariti and marriages cum manii) live in a poor geographical
environment, or are not under the necessity of expending a great
deal of labor in obtaining their means of subsistence, or are
always overpopulated. Among the populations of Europe and
America in the nineteenth century, we have had societies with the
most diverse densities and sizes of population; but they have all
been essentially identical in the system of family and marriage. In
the history of the family and marriage relationships in Rome,
Greece, Europe, or the United States, the later stages, when the
density and the size of these societies was increasing, have not
caused a further enslaving of wife to husband nor an increase of
manus mariti, as would be expected according to the theory; but
rather, an emancipation of women and a weakening of the
authority of the husband. These contrasts are sufficient to show
the shortcomings of the theory, and its generalization.
^3 See the table in the chapter about the Economic School.
1^ Study from this standpoint the peoples with exogamy in
Westermarck's History of Human Marriage, the chapter about
exogamy. Study in Carr-Saunders, op, cit., Chaps. VII-XI, the
peoples among whom infanticide, abortion, drinking of various
decoctions, tabooing of sexual intercourse, postponement of
marriage,mutilations of genital organs, and other methods for
decreasing the growth of population are practiced.
407
9. DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS CORRELATED WITH FORMS OF
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS
In anthropological, historical, and sociological literature, there are
several theories which attempt to view various political regimes
(such as despotism, democracy, monarchism, or republicanism)
and various social institutions (like slavery, serfdom, free classes,
feudalism, "equal society" and so on) as a function mainly of size
and density of population. Accordingly, the principal changes in
these fields are accounted for through changes in demographic
conditions. The above theories of Coste and Kov-alevsky may
serve as examples of these hypotheses. Since I do not have
space here to analyze them, I can only say that if they are
scrutinized in the manner of my above analysis of Mazza-rella,
and other theories, not much validity would remain to these
hypotheses. The greater part of them are so vague in their
meaning that if only because of this vagueness, they must be put
out of science. Another part represented by Coste's theory of
social evolution (see above) may be very "sympathetic" and
"pleasant" for our wishes (it is not disagreeable to be drifting by a
*'law of social evolution" to an ideal paradise of perfect equality,
liberty, and fraternity) ; and yet they are nothing but a kind of new
"theology" in which the old-fashioned beneficial Providence is
superseded by the "law of beneficial evolution or progress." This
is the only difference between the old and this new theology.
Happy are those who can believe! But for those who look for a
seriously proved theory, Coste's "law" and hundreds of other
"sympathetic" theories, are nothing but scientific "rubbish"
contradicted at every step by stubborn facts. On what, for
instance, does he base his statement that, at "the stage of
Bourg," there was an absolutism of family and supremacy based
exclusively on birth? On fiction, no more. Only a little study of the

facts is necessary to see that the real situation is much more
complex and quite dififerent. On what is based his statement that
with an approach to the stage of federation there is also an
approach to the supremacy of intelligence and free associations?
On nothing, also, except wishes. If I were a believer in any linear
law of evolution, I would rather have reversed his theory,
408
and have tried to show that, in the primitive stages, inteUigence
and free association played a greater role than they are playing in
the last federative stage. But I am not a believer in either
principle; therefore I simply state that both "laws" are "pseudolaws." ^^^ In the history of a single country (especially of a longexisting society) study the alternation of monarchy and republic,
the increase and decrease of despotism, the introduction and
elimination of an elective system; and then confront these
changes with the fluctuations in the size and density of the
population, and the result will scarcely show any tangible
correlation. Investigate the distribution of various political regimes,
or of certain types of social institutions among various
contemporary societies; then compare these with the size and the
density of the population of these countries, and the result is
again likely to be nil. In brief, if there is a correlation between
demographic factors and the forms of social and political
organization (which is probable), it is so remote, so complex, and
so strongly masked by the interference of other factors, that we
must regard it as a potential or intangible, rather than as a factual
correlation. At any rate, only the future can establish it. The
existing theories, with perhaps a very few exceptions, do not
count much. As to these exceptions, I would mention only one
type of correlation which appears to me more or less valid. This is
the statement that, with an increase in size and density of the

population, its social differentiation, whatever may be its form, and
its technical division of labor, are likely to increase also. (See
Durkheim's theory analyzed further.) But, as we have seen, even
this broad correlation is far from being close, and the lines of both
processes do not always go parallel. The curve of social
differentiation often proceeds apart, sometimes even in the
opposite direction from the curve of density and size of
population, while their points of maximum and minimum, or points
of inflection in their cycles quite often do not coincide. In brief,
there is a tangible, but far from close correlation. With the
exception of this, I wonder whether there is any valid correlation
among the huni''^ vSee the facts in my Social Mobility, passim. vSee also
Fahlbeck, P. E., Die Klassen und die Gesellschaft, Jena, G.
Fischer, 1923.
409
dreds of ''pseudo-correlations" abundantly supplied by various
''sociological law-makers."
10. SIZE AND DENSITY OF POPULATION CORRELATED WITH
INVENTIONS AND MEN OF GENIUS
Discussing the correlation between demographic factors and the
progress of technical inventions, I indicated the principal reasons
for expecting that an increase in the density and size of the
population would favor an improvement in the technique of
production. For similar reasons, a considerable number of the
authors contend that increase in the density and the size of a
population tends to increase the progress of mental activity, and
the number of men of genius and talent. These theories have
been laid down by A. de Candolle, A. Coste, McKeen Cattell, S.

Fisher, P. Jacoby, A. Odin, G. R. Davies, F. Maas and others.^^^^
The principal inductive argument in favor of such a theory
consists in the statistical finding that cities produce a greater
quota of such men than the country; and the densely populated
areas more than the less densely populated ones. Here are a few
figures which may serve as examples of these findings. According
to S. Fisher, per every 10,000 population of the specified
categories in America, the following number of the notables
mentioned in Who's Who (1922-23) were born in these different
localities: farm population, i; village (up to 8000), 8.5; small city
(8000-50,000), 6.5; large city (50,000 and more), 6.0; suburb of
large city, 11.6.^^^ According to Davies, the coefficient of
correlation between the density of the population and the fertility
in prominent men of letters in America is: for 1850, +0.60; for
i860, +0.72 ; for 1870, +0.76.^^^ The findings of several
investigators
** See Cattell, J. McK., American Men of Science, 2d ed., pp.
555 ff., 568 ff.; the same, 3d ed., pp. 784 ff.; de Candolle, A.,
Htstoire des sciences et des savants, Geneve-Bale, 1885; Odl\,
A., Genese des grands honimcs, Paris, 1895; Maas, F., "Ueber
die Herkimftsbedingungen der Geistigen Fuhrer, Archiv jiir
Sozialwissenschaft, 1916, pp. 144-186; Fisher, S., "A Study of the
Type of the Place of Birth," etc., American Journal of Sociology,
March, 1925; Davies, G. R., "A Statistical Study of the Influence
of Environment," Quarterly Journal of the University of North
Dakota, Vol. IV, pp. 212-236; Jacoby, P., Etudes sur la selection
chcz I'homme, Paris, 1904; for other data and references see my
Social Mobility, Chap. XII.
10^ Fisher, op. cit., p. 552, Table I.
^ Davies, op. cit., j)]). 221 fT.
410
are similar in their essentials. Shall we conclude from this that the
greater the density, the greater will be the number of prominent
men produced ? Do these findings really prove that density, rather
than any other factor, is responsible for the higher number of
prominent men produced in the cities, and in the more densely
populated areas? A mere glance at the given figures will make
such a conclusion questionable. In the first place, we see that,
though the number of prominent men produced in the cities is
greater than in the open country, this number decreases as we
pass from the villages to the cities, and from them to the big cities.
The results obtained by Davies are similar. This contradicts the
statement that the number increases parallel with the increase of
the size and density. It also raises doubt as to whether density
really is the responsible factor. Perhaps it is only a concomitant
mask, under which quite a different factor operates. This
hypothesis is supported by a series of facts. If density vêre the
decisive factor, then the city proletariat would have to produce a
greater number of prominent men than the peasantry of the open
country. The facts collected by Maas and Fisher show that this
expectation is not warranted. The city proletariat in the past, as
well as in the nineteenth century, has been much less fertile in the
production of prominent men than the peasantry. Furthermore, if
the density of the population were the responsible factor, the
number of the men of genius produced per a definite number of
the population would have to increase along with an increase in
the density of Europe's population during the nineteenth century.
In spite of the great increase in density, and the great growth of
cities, the quota of great men produced at the end of the
nineteenth century seems not to have been greater. The same
fact in regard to the eminent men of science in America has been
indicated by McKeen Cattell. In the period from 1900 to 1910, the
big American cities considerably decreased their quota of these

men.^^^ Furthermore, if density were the responsible factor, the
districts of the cities with overcrowded dwellings would have to
produce a high quota of the men of genius. As a matter of fact,
they produce the smallest quota. The same conclusion is
obtained by a comparison of dif411
ferent countries according to their density, on the one hand, and
according to the number of men of genius and talent, per 10,000
or 1,000,000 population, on the other. Not all densely populated
countries top the list of those with the greatest number of
geniuses and men of talent produced. Finally, even if the number
of geniuses were increasing with an increase in the size of the
cities, and not all the least densely inhabited countries were at the
bottom of the list,^^^ (which is not true), this would not prove that
density is the responsible factor. This situation might have been
due to the selective character of city population, to the attraction
of all talented people to cities, and to the transmission of their
talents to their posterity born in the city. It may be due also to the
greater educational facilities of the big cities, and to other similar
conditions. These considerations are enough to contend that, if
density and talent are correlated, the correlation is loose.
What has been said of men of genius, may be said of inventions
in their correlation with the size and the density of population. By
making the interchange of ideas more intensive, a greater density
and size of population may facilitate a lucky combination of ideas,
resulting in new inventions. On the other hand, a greater density
facilitates a too tight social cohesion, a mob-mind, and passive
imitation of crowd-patterns; which rather hinders the development
of the initiative necessary for new inventions and original
achievements. For these reasons, it is quite understandable why
the stream of inventions does not always increase with an

increase in size and density of population; why many densely
populated countries (like China or India) have been stagnant,
tradition-bound, and poor in inventions during several centuries;
why many of the greatest inventions (''domestication'* of fire,
domestication of animals, language, grammar, agriculture, use of
metals, the first boat, first tools, machinery, utilization of wind,
creation of pottery, building of dwellings, invention of first moral,
juridical, and religious ideas, first mythology and poetry, and so
on) were made under conditions where density of
^'^ Compare for instance the list of densities of population of
different countries with Huntington's table of their rank of
civilization: Civilization and Climate, Chap. XI.
412
population was exclusively low and the size of the groups small;
why a great many inventors and creators have lived a relatively
isolated life; why men who spend their time in crowds, going from
one group to another, are rarely the men of an original mind; and
so on. In brief, density and size of population are, beyond some
degree, neither sufficient nor necessary conditions, for invention.
In cooperation with other factors they may sometimes facilitate
inventions, but no more. We must not overestimate their
significance and their correlation.
II. DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS CORRELATED WITH MORES
AND
CUSTOMS
J. Frazer, M. Kovalevsky, W. G. Sumner, H. Spencer, E.
Westermarck, E. Waxweiler, A. G. Keller ^^^ and many others
have shown that the folkways, mores, and customs of peoples are
not something incidental, but represent the result of a great many
trials and errors, or of the experiences of a great many individuals
during several generations. In other words, they are, to a great
extent, selected, and the most suitable under the existing
circumstances. If not in all, at least in a great many cases, such a
statement is likely to be true. For this reason it is probable that
those mores, folkways, and customs which pertain to the
practices connected with the phenomena of sexual intercourse,
conceptions, birth, marriage, death, and generally with the
phenomena of the regulation of the number of individuals, are to
be directly or indirectly correlated with demographic factors. In
groups which feel a pressure of population, or are overpopulated,
there must appear ''folkways" and ''mores'' whose purpose is to
check an increase of their population. In groups which are
underpopulated, there must appear ''folkways" and ''mores''
whose purpose is to facilitate an increase of their population.
Correspondingly, many practices, like infanticide, abortion,
polyandry, postponement of marriage, or the utilization of
contraceptive means, and
"1 See Frazer, J. G., Psyche's Task, London, 1913; Sumner, W.
G., Folkways, 1906; Westermarck, E., The Origin and
Development of the Moral Ideas, Vol. I, London, 1906;
Kovalevsky, M., Coutume contemporaine et loi ancienne, Paris,
1893; Waxweiler, E., "Avantpropos" in Bulletin mensuel of the
Sociological Institute of Solvay, 1910, No. i; Keller, A. G., Societal
Evolution, N. Y., 1915413
so on, are likely to be permitted or approved in ''overpopulated"
societies, while the opposite practices and mores, whose purpose
is to facilitate an increase of population, are likely to be approved
in "underpopulated" societies. In this way, the demographic

factors may stamp, to some extent, the character of the moral,
juridical, religious, and other forms of conduct pertaining to the
above phenomena. This expectation seems to be warranted to
some extent. Carr-Saunders has shown this in regard to the
simple peoples, as well as partly in regard to the more complex
societies. The ''population-politics" of France are rather opposite
to the projected measures in Japan or China. Increasing pressure
of the population of the European societies during the last few
decades has been followed by an expansion of the methods of
birth-control, and by factual and juridical legalization of their
propaganda. In brief, the character and transformation of folkways
in these fields seems to show some tangible correlation with the
demographic factors. They must be taken into consideration in an
elucidation of the problem of why the mores of a given society in
this field are such and such, and why they are transforming in
such and such direction. But, again, wê must not overstress the
role of the demographic factors even in this restricted field. Still
less tangible is their role in the field of the mores, which are only
remotely connected with the phenomena of population growth and
vital processes.
12. DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS CORRELATED WITH OTHER
IDEOLOGICAL PHENOMENA
Several authors, among them F. Carli and C. Bougie especially,
have tried to interpret a series of ideological phenomena in'the
light of the demographic factors. Let us briefly glance at their
theories.
Size and Density of the Population Correlated with the Evolution
of Language. Trying to prove a decisive role for the
demographic factors in a causation of the ideological and
psychical variations, Carli takes the evolution of language and the
character of religious ideas to corroborate his fundamental
proposition : "The denser a population, the bigger the size of the

group, and the more heterogeneous its individuals; the richer will
be
414
the amount of experience of the society, and the more intensive
its intellectual life." -^^^ This general proposition is corroborated,
in the first place, by the evolution of language. Carli's arguments
are as follows: 'The greater the density of a population, the
greater the number of the substantives (and the verbs) in the
language" because the experiences of the members of such a
society are more numerous and manifold, requiring a greater
number of words to express them than the experiences of a less
dense society. To this he adds that the curve of the evolution of a
language is parallel to that of an increase in the size and the
density of population: the Roman language quantitatively and
qualitatively reached its climax of development at about the first
century A.D., and, after that time, began to go down parallel to the
process of depopulation of Rome, so that it has almost
disappeared since the fifth century A.D.^^^
I am not in a position to say to what extent Carli's proposition is
true, but I can make the following statements: First, Carli's, and all
''sociologistic" theories of language (see the chapter about the
sociologistic school) are right as far as they contend that without
social contact and some density of the group, language and
grammatical rules could not appear and grow. I agree also that
when the population of a society is decreasing, it is likely to be
followed by a decrease in the area of diffusion of its language.
However, I doubt seriously that the number of substantives and
the verbs of a language is proportional to the density of a
population. For instance, the density of the population of Russia is
less than that of the majority of the European countries ;
nevertheless, the number of the substantives and the verbs of the

Russian language is certainly not less than that of any other
European language. I doubt also that the language of the denser
city population is richer, better, and more colorful than that of the
country population of the same society. I doubt again that the
imagination and fantasy of the city population or those of densely
populated industrial countries are richer than those of the country
population; or those of the people of more densely populated
industrial countries than those of the less densely populated
agricultural countries. I think also that the grammar of a
"2 Carli, op. cit., pp. 187 ff., 202 ff. "^ Ibid., pp. 202-205.
415
language was, in essence, created in the early stages of a group,
when its size and density were insignificant. Furthermore, I do not
see that the area of expansion of a language is in close proportion
to the density of a country's population. The density of the
population of Belgium, Holland, Bengal, or the northwestern
provinces of India is higher than that of Great Britain; and yet,
English is spoken in an area several times greater than the area
where the Dutch, the French, or the Indian dialects are spoken.
The density of Russia's population is lower than that of the
majority of the European societies; but Russian is spoken by a
number of people probably greater than the number speaking any
European language, with the exception of English. The
depopulation of ancient Greece began at about the end of the
fourth century B.C., and yet the area of the Greek language in the
third and second centuries B.C. was probably greater than it was
before. I also doubt a close correlation between an increase and
decrease of the population, and the qualitative progress and
regress of a language. The rate of increase in the Roman
population had already begun to go down at about 150 B.C.
However, only at the end of the second century A.D. did there
appear the first serious symptoms of decay in Roman literature
and literary style. The density of the population of England,
France, and Germany increased from 1820 to 1914. Yet one may
doubt whether the English, the French, or the German languages
and literature improved during this period, or are better now than
they were in the eighteenth, or at the beginning of the nineteenth,
centuries. The same is still more true in regard to music and many
forms of arts.
These examples, which may be increased greatly, seem sufficient
for raising a serious -question as to the validity of Carli's
proposition.
Size and Density of Population Correlated zvith Religion,
Mysticism and Fetishism. The psychology of a less densely
populated society tends to be more religious, more mystical, more
fetishistic, and less heterogeneous than the psychology of the
more densely populated societies. Such is the next correlation
which Carli tries to establish. The arguments given in favor of the
proposition consist in the following indications: The thinner
416
population of the country is more mystical and religious than the
population of a city. In the less densely populated societies, words
are given some mystical and sacred value, causing such societies
to be predominantly ''legend-making." With an increased density
of population, irreligiousness, positivism, heresies, individualism
of opinions, and heterogeneity, tend to increase.^^"* I am afraid
that in his proposition and arguments, Carli mixed quite a different
series of facts. The few and one-sidedly interpreted facts given by
Carli to corroborate his proposition may be confronted by a series
of opposite facts. For instance, China, and many provinces of
India are certainly more densely populated than America or many

countries of Europe. However, we cannot say that in China or
India there is less ''legend-making" or a greater variety and
heterogeneity of ideologies and various heresies, or less
mysticism, than in the less densely populated European
countries. It is doubtful also that the city population is less "mobminded" than the country population. The opposite is likely to be
more true. I doubt further that the city proletariat is less inclined to
"legend-making" than the country population. The difference is
rather in the kind of legend produced. The farmer makes a sort of
hero out of some Christian individual, while the proletarian is
doing the same out of some demagogue. The country people may
make a legend out of one individual; the city people, out of some
other one (out of Gloria Swansons, Val entinos, tennis stars,
boxing and football stars, some "chiromancer," ballet-girls,
Menckens, Bernard Shaws, Lenins, K. Marxs, J. J. Rousseaus,
Voltaires, and so on). Pareto (see the chapter about Pareto) has
shown that only the forms of superstitions and legends are
changing while their essence remains practically the same.
Instead of historical religion, the city population may have the
religion of "socialism," "communism," "anarchism," "liberalism,"
"nationalism," the "religion of progress," of "pacifism," of "reason"
or any other fashionable "ism." In spite of their pseudo-scientific
forms they are as unscientific, mystical, and superstitious as the
historical or traditional beliefs styled contemptuously by them as
"superstitions." The same may be said of the tendency to ascribe
to words some mystical and
417
magic significance. Here also the more and the less densely
populated societies, the city and the country, differ not in that one
group does a thing while another does not, but only in the forms
of doing it. In the country population there may be some words

given a sacred or magic influence; in the city population the same
is done in regard to some other words. ''Fetishization" of words,
as well as other phenomena, is an eternal fact. Its forms vary, but
its essence remains."'' That is all the difference.
For these reasons, I do not think Carli's correlations are valid.
There is still less reason to admit any correlation between the
character of religion (Buddhism, Christianity, Mohammedanism,
etc.), and demographic conditions, because each of such
religions has been spread among the large and the small, the
densely, and the non-densely populated societies.
Demographic Factors Correlated with Equalitarian Ideology and
Movements. An attempt to establish a correlation between
demographic and ideological phenomena is given by Professor C.
Bougie (1870- ) in his book, Les idces egalitaires}^^ The purpose
of the book is to answer the problem: What are the factors which
are responsible for the growth and diffusion of the ideologies of
equality, levelling, and democracy? The author's study leads to
the conclusion that such factors are size, density, heterogeneity,
and mobility of the population. An increase in these
characteristics of the population tends to facilitate the diffusion,
popularity, and power of ideologies of equality, and of democratic
political institutions. The principal corroborations of this
proposition are partly ''speculative," partly factual. The speculative
corroborations consist in some analogies with a complex
biological organism, and in a series of statements typical of the
sociologistic school. Some of these are, that with an increase in
the size of the population and its density, social differentiation
increases; that this frees an individual from a tight attachment to
the group, making him more individualistic and ''cosmopolitan" at
the same time; that such a transformation naturally undermines
the caste i)rinciple and facilitates an appreciation of the
"^ vSee SoROKiN, Sistema sociologii, Vol. I, pp. 177-193.

"" 2d ed., Paris, 1908; see also Bougl^:, C, La democratie devatit
la science, 3d ed., 1923.
418
hurtmn being generally, regardless of the group from which he
comes and to which he belongs; that a greater density of
population favors a greater intensiveness of mental interaction, in
this way undermining many group prejudices and superstitions;
and that an increase in the size and the density of the population
makes more intensive the contact of the men of various races,
classes, families, religions, and so on, helping to increase their
mutual understanding. Such are the principal speculative reasons
in favor of Bougie's theory. His factual corroborations are
essentially as follows: In the first place, he states that only twice ;
in the history of mankind has an extraordinary diffusion of the
ideologies of equality occurred,once in the later period of the '
Roman Empire (in the period of Christianity and Stoic phi-
losophy)and again in the modern period of European history,
opened by the great French Revolution. Analyzing the specific
conditions responsible for the great diffusion of the equalitarian
ideas at these periods. Bougie concludes that they consisted in
the above factors of large size, high density, heterogeneity, and
mobility of the population. The same conditions are given within
modern democratic societies. Further, Bougie indicates that, in
the Roman Empire, as the size, density, and heterogeneity of the
population were growing, the privileges of birth and order were
disappearing. The next proof is given in the indication that the
ideologies of freedom, democracy, and equality were originated
and developed in cities. To this is added the statement that the
countries with a greater density of population, like Lancashire,
where we have 707 inhabitants per square mile, are more
democratic and equalized than the countries with a low density of

population, like Russia. A series of other indications concerning
the less intensive dogmatism of the followers of universal
religions, compared with that of the followers of small religious
sects; the increase in the popularity of equalitarian ideologies and
institutions with an increase of social mobility and contact; and
some other considerations of this kind, close the series of
Bougie's interesting and suggestive corroborations.
Shall we recognize Bougie's theory as valid? I doubt it. Although
we may find several interesting ideas in the book, the main
contention of the author appears questionable to us. In the first
419
place, I cannot agree at all with the statement that a diffusion of
the equalitarian ideologies and institutions took place only twice in
the history of mankind. Omitting primitive societies for the
moment, I still wonder why the democracies of Athens, the Italian
mediaeval City-Republics, the forest cantons of mediaeval
Switzerland, the Buddhist revolution in India and in several other
countries of the East, the Republic of Geneva founded by Calvin,
the Lollards' and Levellers' movement in England, and the
Commonwealth of England, founded by the revolution of the
seventeenth century, the great equalitarian and communistic
movements in the history of Persia (Mazdack's revolution), in
ancient Egypt (social revolution described by Ipuwer), a series of
similar movements in the Arabian and the Mohammedan
caliphates, the series of the mediaeval equalitarians and
communists; and the socialist movements and revolutions
followed by a corresponding diffusion of the ideologies of equality,
and democratic, communistic, and socialistic institutions (the
Bohemian revolution of the fifteenth century, the foundation of the
communist state of Taborites, the communes of Thomas Miinzer,
of John of Leiden, the sects and movements of the Katarrs,

Patarens, the Lyon's Poor, the Arnold of the Breshia, the Ciompi,
and so on) ; and a hundred similar phenomena are not mentioned
by Bougie? Each of them, whether in their ideologies, practical
demands, reforms, or institutions created, has been at least as
radical in the recognition of the principle of equality as has
Christianity, or the Stoic philosophy, or as the Declaration of the
Rights of Man promulgated by the French Revolution. Even in
their practical effects, many of these movements have been at
least as efficient as Stoic philosophy and Christianity during the
first three or four centuries of their existence. In brief. Bougie's
very starting point is fallacious, and through its fallacy it naturally
spoils the majority of his conclusions. If the author had taken into
consideration at least the above equalitarian movements, their
ideologies, their reforms, and their diffusion, he evidently could
not have come to the conclusion that the equalitarian movement
is possible only in large, dense, mobile, and heterogeneous
societies, because the above movements have happened in the
large and the small, in densely and non-densely popu420
lated societies, and with both a homogeneous and heterogeneous
population.
Now let us ask whether or not it is true that the greater the size,
the density, and the heterogeneity of a society's population, the
less it will be stratified; and the more equalitarian, democratic, and
equal it will be. I am convinced that such a statement is fallacious.
A great many primitive groups have been of small size, density,
and heterogeneity of their population; yet they are less stratified,
and rather more self-governed than almost all the large and
densely populated societies with heterogeneous populations. In
simple societies, economic contrasts were less than in any
contemporary ''equalitarian" society. Occupational stratification

and differentiation were less also. Political privileges and
disfranchisements of their members were less conspicuous than
in any contemporary democratic society. These small groups did
not often have any hereditary government or aristocracy, or any
caste or class division. Their leaders were elected. They enjoyed
self-government. To many of them it was possible to apply what
Tacitus said of the ancient Teutons: ''Duces ex virtute legiint." ''De
minorihiis principes consultant, de maiori-hus omnes/' Mazzarella,
Hobhouse, Wheeler and Ginsberg, Lowie, and a series of other
investigators have shown this clearly.^^"^ This means that,
contrary to Bougie, ''the most equalitarian" organization is
obtained where the size, and the density, and the heterogeneity of
a population are the lowest. More than that, in my study I have
come to the conclusion that each time the size or the
heterogeneity of a society's population increases, social
stratification, or inequality, increases rather than decreases.^^^
Other conditions being equal, the groups with a smaller size and a
less heterogeneous population are liable to be less stratified and
more equalitarian than groups with a larger size and more
heterogeneous population. This seems to be much nearer the
truth than Bougie's proposition.
1" See Mazzarella, Les types sociaux, passim; Hobhouse,
Wheeler and Ginsberg, The Material Culture and Social
Institutions of the Simpler Peoples, pp. 50 ff. See the table given
in this book in the chapter about the economic school. See the
facts and other references in Sorokin, Social Mobility, Chaps.
1II~VI.
421
If further proof be needed it would be enough to compare existing
societies according to the size and the density of their population,
on the one hand, and the degree of democracy, self-government,

political and economic equality, on the other. This would soon
show that these two curves do not run parallel at all. China and
many Indian states are populated more densely, and have a size
much greater than Norway, or Sweden, or Denmark, or Finland,
or Canada, or New Zealand; and yet, according to Bougie's
criterion of equality, the former societies are much less
equalitarian than the latter. The density of the population of the
United States of America is much less than that of France, or
Italy, or Rumania, or Japan, not to mention many Asiatic
countries; yet nobody would say that the United States is nearer
to a caste regime, or is less democratic than any of these
countries. In Rome, mentioned by the author, the process of
equalizing its subjects in the form of an extension of the rights of
citizenship went on not only in the period of an increase in the
density of the Roman population, and during the enlargement of
the boundaries of the Empire, but continued for a long time after
the process of depopulation took place. (Caracalla's law was
granted in A.D. 212, while the birth rate had begun to fall already
at about 150 B.C.) I question also the validity of Bougie's
statement that cities with a more dense and heterogeneous
population are more "equalitarian" or ''democratic" than the
country. If we ask where, in the city or in the country, are the
greater inequalities of fortune, of privilege, of rank, and prestige,
the answer is: in the city. Therefore it is hard to think that this
case may testify in favor of the criticized theory. It is useless to
continue these contradictions. The conclusion which follows from
the above is clear: There is no definite correlation of the
equalitarian movement with either the size or the density or the
heterogeneity of a society's population. The illustrations given by
Bougie in favor of his theory may be confronted with facts which
testify against it.
Bougie's statements concerning the role of mobility are more valid
in this respect. Yes, mobility in some cases facilitates the
expansion of equalitarian ideology and institutions, but not

always, and not so much in the sense that it makes social
inequali422
ties or social stratification less conspicuous, or less great, as in
the sense that it substitutes some other basis for the social
distribution of individuals within the social pyramid for the basis of
birth or family status. The pyramid of social stratification or
inequalities in mobile societies may be as high, and often is even
higher, than in immobile societies (see my Social Mobility, Chaps.
III-VI). The above reasons are enough to warrant questioning
seriously the validity of Bougie's interesting theory. I think it, like
several other theories of the correlation of demographic factors
with ideological ones, is far from being valid.
13. DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS CORRELATED WITH THE
PROGRESS AND DECAY OF SOCIETIES
As almost all sociological schools have, the demographic school
also has its own theory of the evolution of societies, or the law of
their origin, progress, and decay. The best theory of this type is
formulated by Professor Corrado Gini ^^^ in his book / faftori
demografici delV evoluzionc delle nazioni. F. Carli also added
something of his own to the theory of Gini. Let us briefly outline
the essence of Gini's theory of the progress and decay of
societies.
The book opens with the statement that the decay of societies
has taken place many times in human history. This leads to the
problem of what the causes may be. After a criticism of several
other theories, Gini comes to the conclusion that the principal
cause of the evolution of a society is the demographic factor,
which in various ways leads to many changes in the quality of the

population, and in its economic, political, and cultural
organization. The theory starts with a statement that, independent
of immigration, emigration, war, and other catastrophic
phenomena, the play of demographic factors, in a relatively short
period, may change the biological characteristics of the population
in quite a normal way. This is due to the fact that each later
generation of a group represents the offspring of only a small
fraction of the previous generation. From two-fifths to two-thirds of
any
"^ Professor of Sociology at the University of Rome, president of
the Italian Statistical Institute, editor of Metron, author of many a
valuable work: // sesso dal punto di vista statistico, 1908;
Prohlemi sociologici della guerra, iq2I. etc.
423
previous generation die before marriage. Of the remaining part
who marry, not all leave any posterity. In this way, each
subsequent generation comes practically only from one-third to
one-eighth part of the previous generation. This shows that a
normal play of the demographic factors may, in a short period of
time, greatly change the racial or the biological composition of a
society. This is still more inevitable, since, as a rule, the
procreation of the upper classes is less than that of the lower
classes. Therefore, owing to this differential fertility, plus the
above play of the demographic factors, biologically a population
changes very rapidly. At the same time, the lower procreation of
the upper strata makes inevitable a permanent ascending current
of climbers from the lower to the upper classes to fill the
vacancies created by the lower fertility of the upper strata. They
are doomed to die out, and their places are more and more
occupied by newcomers from the lower strata. ''The land of the
conquered is the grave of the conquerors" is an expression of this

general phenomenon.^^'^
On the basis of these facts, Gini further formulates his ''parabola
of an evolution of the nations."
As the parabola of an organism's life has its reason in the
different activities of its metabolism, so, I think, may the curve of
the evolution of a people be correlated with the different stages of
the demographic metabolism between various social classes.^-^
After this, Gini outlines his parabola of the evolution of societies.
Jn essence, it is as follows:
Whether a society is founded by immigrants or by natives, at its
earlier stages there is no conspicuous social differentiation. Such
stages are marked by a high fertility of the population. (This is
valid in regard to the past societies, such as Crete, Troy,
Mycenae, Athens, Sparta, and others, and in regard to the
population of colonial America, Australia, Canada, New Zealand,
and so on.) As a result of it, the size and the density of the
population begin to grow. This results in an increase of social
differentiation within such a population and finally leads to the
appearance of differential fertility in its upper and lower classes.
At
424
the same time, the country becoming relatively overpopulated, a
surplus of its population must emigrate, either peacefully or by
means of war. Hence, intensive colonization and wars of
expansion mark this period in the growth of a society. As a rule,
those who are the most prolific, adventurous, and strong, are the
principal ones to emigrate from the country, and go away on
military enterprises. In the process of its expansion, society

mainly loses these elements. Psychologically this stage is marked
by great patriotic and nationalistic enthusiasm, by glorification of
colonization and war for the country, by considerable solidarity,
and a psychology of patriotic readiness to sacrifice individual
happiness and life for the nation.
Then, sooner or later, comes the next stage. Through emigration
and loss in wars of expansion, the society loses its most prolific,
boldest and the most adventurous elements. As a result, the
fertility of the society and the rate of increase of its population
begin to diminish. This is augmented the more because the
fertility of the already clearly separated upper classes has
decreased enormously. The offspring of the lower classes, which
also decrease their procreation, are more and more compelled to
fill the vacancies left in the upper classes by its lower and lower
l)rocreation. The population increase stops. The ascending
currents of social circulation from the lower to the upper classes
become more intensive. Many of the previous obstacles for such
a circulation are put away. Society becomes more ''democratic."
At the same time, thanks to the decline of population growth, and
to the exploitation of colonies and subjugated countries, the
economic well-being of the society rises. The standards of living
of all classes go upward, their comforts increase, their tastes and
desires become finer. The luxuries which could be found before
only among the upper groups are now longed for by all classes.
This leads to great progress in economic activity, and to the
appearance of arts, music, and literature; while industries prepare
on a large scale the objects of comforts and luxury. This is
naturally followed by great industrialization of the society, by the
growth of cities, by the development of commerce, and by
increasing migration of country population to cities. Thus comes
the period of commercial and industrial urban culture.
425

Politically, this is followed by a transformation of the society in the
direction of democratization; psychologically, by a transformation
of the previous prolific, adventurous, military, patriotic, and heroic
people into a nation of the ''small bourgeois" into the business
men who look for and long only for money, savings, and an
income. Economic prosperity facilitates, so to speak, an
"efifemination" of the society. The elimination from it of its most
prolific, adventurous, solidaristic, and patriotic elements in the
previous period, and the exploitation of the colonies,
accompanied by economic prosperity, make the society
"pacifistic." Military glory is now no longer in vogue, and neither is
nationalism. Vague pacifism and vague cosmopolitanism, side by
side with a "small bourgeois' ideology, take its place. Arts,
literature, poetry, and so on, begin to prosper. The society feels
itself happy, and is sure in its future. Like Cicero, w^ho lived
approximately at such a stage of the Roman Empire, it thinks that
"Rome will exist at least ten thousand years."
But, just as in the case of Rome, which existed only about five
hundred years after Cicero, and which at his time was entering
into the stage of its decline, the society does not see that it is also
at the beginning of the stage of its decay. Sooner or later the
preceding stage is superseded by a new one. The first symptom
of this decaying stage is manifested in the process of
depopulation in the rural parts of the nation. Owing to the great
decrease in actual fertility of the population, and to a great
migration of country people to the city, agriculture begins to
decline, a lack of labor hands in rural districts begins to be felt
more and more, many regions begin to be depopulated, and
much land is forsaken. A series of economic conditions
aggravates the situation of farmers and i)easants still more,
urging them still more to decrease their fertility. As a result, the
country decreases more and more its inflow into the cities, whose
fertility is still lower. The decrease of the country population, and

its economic impoverishment, lead to a decrease in the demands
for the objects of urban industry. The nation begins to produce
more than it can digest. This reacts negatively on the
development of industry, conimercc. and the economic situation
of citv people. Industrial crises of "overproduction" become
greater and more
426
numerous. As a result, there comes an aggravation of the
economic situation of the city laboring classes, and even in the
city population as a whole. This is still further aggravated because
the proportion of idle rentiers who live on the interest from their
capital, and the professional classes who do not produce material
values directly, is now much greater than it was before. Besides,
in order to protect itself and its colonies and dominions, the
government has to increase the taxes on a decreased population.
All this results in an increase of social crises, disorders, and riots
of the labor classes, who do not want to lower their standards of
living. The class-struggle becomes bitter and more pitiless. This,
in its turn, only contributes to the aggravation ot the situation. The
government, ideologists, and scientists try to cope with the
difficulties. Governmental interference expands enormously, [t
begins to control more and more the economic life of the society.
At that period a belief in the omnipotent role of science and the
intellectuals is especially conspicuous. In vain! The process of the
disorganization of the society continues to progress. Finally, either
''peacefully," or in a military way, the society reaches its last
stage,decay. Its history is finished, and from the scene of
history it is removed into its museum.-^^^
Such is Gini's parabola of the social evolution of a society,
interpreted in the light of demographic factors.
The next part of the book is devoted to a corroboration of the

scheme by a factual analysis of the history of Greece, Rome, and
several other societies, especially by an analysis of the present
situation in France, which, according to the author, already is in its
stage of decay (pp. 48-102). The majority of the European
societies are supposedly about in the same stage. The final
conclusion of Gini is that this parabola of social evolution is
unavoidable. The only escape from it is through emigration and
the founding of new colonies, by means of which it is possible to
continue in a modified form the history of the metropolis, or the
mother-country. ''Avviene nello sviluppo dei popiili come in quello
degli individiii: raggiunta la maturita, cessa Vesuheranza delle
manifestazioni vitali, si va a poco a poco chhtdendo il ciclo del'
esistenza; ad essi riapirne tin alfro. Cid molte volte aznjiene: 122
Ibid., pp. 34-47.
427
Such is the somewhat pessimistic conclusion of the author of the
paraboHc curve of the evolution of a society.
With a modification, but in essence similar to Gini's theory of the
decay of nations, is the theory of Carli, which is as follows : With
the decrease of the effective fertility of society, there comes a
decrease in the number of inventions, and in the nations' *'hope in
possibilities" (la fede nelle possibilita). This reacts unfavorably
upon the economic well-being of a society. All this is followed by a
transformation of its dominant psychology; the solidarity of its
members decreases, while individualism and economic egotism
increase; the ideal of the glory and the magnificent grandeur of
the nation is superseded by that of the savings account and the
hunt for money; while the ideal of military heroism is replaced by
that of pacifistic comfort. The upper classes degenerate more and
more, ceasing to resemble their predecessors.
Of the more detailed statements, it should be mentioned that,

according to Carli, the more closed the upper classes are, and the
greater are the barriers for the ascent of the newcomers from the
lower to the upper classes, the sooner the upper classes
degenerate, and through that, the sooner comes the degeneration
of the nation.^-^
Now what is to be said of the validity of these theories? At the
beginning, let us put aside the details of Carli's theory which are
far from being accurate. The longest aristocracy in the world,
which I know of, is the Brahmanic caste in India which, without
army, money, or even organization, has held its unquestionable
superiority during at least two thousand years, and is holding it
still. India continues to exist as a culture complex, while many
other countries have disappeared. Yet, the Brahman caste is
almost absolutely closed, at any rate more closed than any other
aristocracy known to me. More than that, I am inclined to think
that the closed aristocracies have been existing successfully for a
period at any rate not shorter than the open upper classes. The
Spartan aristocracy was more secluded than the Athenian one;
and yet the Spartan aristocracy, and Sparta, which was con^ Carli, op. cit., pp. 235-258, 362-368. Somewhat similar is G.
Rageot's theory of the symptoms of decay, developed in his book,
La natalitS, ses lots Sconomiques et psychologiques, Paris, 1918,
especially \)\). 12, 19, 152 and passim.
428
trolled by it, existed longer than the Athenian, with its more open
aristocracy. Rome's glorious period had a much more secluded
aristocracy of patricians and senators than did her decaying
period of the second and third centuries A.D., when her upper
classes were more open than before. Neither do we have any
serious reasons for thinking that the aristocracy of England during

the last thousand years, or during the last two centuries, has been
more open than that of France.^^^ For this reason, Carli's
reference to the different fates of England and France, as a proof
of his contention, is unconvincing. Furthermore, the history of the
secluded royal and old aristocratic families, when compared with
that of the families of the new ''aristocracy" which are less severe
in their intermarriages, shows that these old families have been
degenerating rather more slowly than the new ones. There is no
need to increase these examples. The statement of Carli is onesided. The openness or seclusion of an aristocracy seems to be
not so important as its character. If the aristocracy is biologically
sound, and if it keeps its "blood" from contamination through the
exclusion of all contaminating elements, (elimination of weaklings,
deficient children, deficient members, etc.), its seclusion and
inbreeding seems to go on without degeneration.^^^ If vigorous
measures are not taken to eliminate contaminating elements, then
inbreeding may very quickly lead to the aristocracy's decay. On
the other hand, if, in open upper classes, selection and recruiting
of newcomers proceed properly, then such an aristocracy may
successfully exist and rule for a long time. If the ''refreshing blood"
is picked up wrongly, and the newcomers represent something far
from superior, biologically and mentally,which may easily
happen if access to the upper classes is too easy,then such an
aristocracy is a pseudo-aristocracy; it is doomed to be incapable
and through its deficiency it may facilitate the ruin of the country.
Now let us turn to Gini's parabola of the evolution of nations. In
the first place, it cannot pretend to be universal. Like a great many
other theories of the progress and decay of societies, it is
124 See my Social Mobility, Chaps. VII, XV, XXII.
125 Compare Savorgnan, F., "Nuzialita e Fecondita delle Case

Sovrane," Metron, No. 2, 1923, p. 224; Pareto, V., Traite de
sociologie generale, Paris, 1919, pp. 1658 ff.
429
constructed principally on the basis of the history of Rome and
Greece. However, not all countries follow a similar ''parabola" in
their history. Take, for instance, China or India. These two
countries have already existed several thousands of years, and
yet they are still alive, showing at the present moment some signs
of a new awakening. The whole scheme of Gini is practically
inapplicable to their history. Perhaps this is due to the fact that
both countries seem to have always had a high procreation, and
their upper classes have probably not known differential fertility.
This, however, means that neither the fact of a decrease in the
fertility of a people in the course of its evolution, nor a lower
fertility of the upper classes is something universal and
unavoidable. Since they are not unavoidable and not universal,
the whole scheme of Gini, which is based upon these two
foundations, also becomes not universal and not inevitable for all
societies. The theory, at the best, may be applied only to some
peoples. Such is the first limitation of the theory. Furthermore, it
has several assumptions which are questionable, and which could
in no way be regarded as universal rules. For instance, can we
say that the first stages of a society are always marked by an
intensive procreation and a rapid increase of its population? In
some cases it is so; in some others, it is not. The group or the
society, on account of many factors, (they are indicated by CarrSaunders), may be almost in a stationary state for an indefinite
period of time. Then the stage of expansion, colonization, and
emigration, with all the consequences of these phenomena, may
not take place for such a people, and their history may go on
along quite different lines. Furthermore, granting that the first

stages of a society are marked by a rapid increase of its
population, can we say that emigration, colonization, and
expansion are the only possible results of such an
''overpopulation"? In the above we saw that they sometimes take
place, but sometimes not. The combination of circumstances may
be such as to make it impossible for the society either to colonize,
make a conquest, or conduct an emigration. Then there come
other means for checking the population surplus and growth; such
as famine, increase of the death rate, decrease of the ])irth rate,
abortion, and all the other means de-scril)ed by Carr-Saundcrs.
^J1iis means again that the subsequent
430
history of such a people will be different from Gini's parabola. Its
generality thus becomes less and less universal. Let us go
further. Is it true, for instance, that in the period of expansion of
such a society, the most prolific, bold, and energetic elements of
the population go away from the mother-country? Gini puts this
statement quite dogmatically. His only argument in favor of his
theory is that for the members of prolific families it is more difficult
to find a place within the mother-country than for the members of
the less prolific ones. But to this it may be objected that, since,
according to Gini himself, the emigrating elements are more
capable and energetic, they have more chances to find places
within the mother-country than the less capable people. For this
reason, we would expect that the emigrants are , a rather less
capable people than those who remain in the country. In brief, the
discussed assumption of Gini is not proved, and we know little
about its accuracy or inaccuracy. Therefore, all conclusions based
on this assumption become uncertain, and the whole theory
becomes something which may or may not be valid.
The next dogmatic assumption of the theory is an increase of

economic well-being in society due to the emigration of its prolific
members, and to the decrease of the effective fertility of the
society. In the above we have seen that not every relative
depopulation is necessarily followed by an increase of economic
well-being. Sometimes it happens, sometimes not. If this is so,
then, again, all later economic, political, and psychological
changes depicted as the results of such an increase of well-being,
might not happen, and the history of the society may follow quite
a different curve of evolution than that depicted by Gini. A series
of peoples have actually followed this curve, which differs much
from Gini's parabolic line of development.
Without mentioning any of the further assumptions, the above is
enough to show that Gini's scheme can in no way pretend to be a
more or less general formula for the evolution of society. In the
best case, it may be applied to some peoples. But, in view of the
above assumptions of Gini, even there it remains uncertain as to
what extent their decay is determined by demographic factors, as
indicated by the prominent Italian statistician and sociologist.
431
BIO-SOCIAL BRANCH. DEMOGRAPHIC SCHOOL 431
His generalizations are still more questionable in view of the facts
of the decay of many societies (Poland, Carthage, Bohemia, and
so on) due to purely military causes; that is, to conquest by other
peoples. In many other cases,Babylon, Assyria, Egypt, the
Arabian caliphates, Turkey, the empires of Genghis Khan,
Tamerlane, and other old countrieswe also do not find any
serious reason for admitting that their decay was caused by Gini's
demographic factors, or that it proceeded according to the line of
his parabola.
Thus we come to the conclusion that Gini's theory must be limited

greatly, and should be further tested even in those parts which
seem to be valid. With these reservations and -objections, it
appears to contain a modicum of truth for the peoples to whose
history it may be applied. One of its contributions is that it makes
it impossible to disregard the role of the demographic factors in
any scientific interpretation of the phenomena of the progress and
decay of nations. Its practical value is in its warning to nations to
be careful in their policy of birth-control and the reduction of their
population, if they want to have a long and glorious history.
Gini's central idea that the depopulation or decrease of effective
fertility is a factor of decay, seems to be near the truth, in spite of
the popularity of the opposite opinion at the present moment. His
arguments in favor of his statement may be backed by a series of
others which point to the same fact. Among these arguments
should be mentioned the following one: a low birth rate, and a low
mortality through the elimination of natural selection are likely to
lead to a survival of all the innate weaklings, and, through this, to
a contamination of the innate quality of the people.^"^ In this way
they facilitate an aggravation of not only the quantitative side of
the population problem, but its qualitative side also. This, in its
turn, greatly contributes to the factors of a people's decay, and
makes the attempt to stop this decay difficult.
14. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
The preceding survey shows that the demographic school in
sociology is one of the most developed. Numerous investigators
126 See my Social Mobility, Ch. XX.
432
have succeeded in showing the importance and efficiency of

demographic conditions in almost all fields of social phenomena.
If we cannot say that all these attempts have been successful, or
quite accurate, we have to admit that a considerable number of
them are likely to be accurate, at least in part; and some of them
are as near to reality as it is possible to arrive in the present stage
of social science. The school has thrown light on a series of social
phenomena. It has supplied us with a series of probable
correlations. For these reasons the school has as much right to its
existence as has any other sociological school. Putting away its
mistakes and one-sidednesses, we may gratefully take its
valuable contributions to the science of social phenomena.
433
CHAPTER VIII SOCIOLOGISTIC SCHOOL
I. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SCHOOL
A s I s well known, in August Comte's classification of sciences
into Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, Physiology, and Social
Physics, or Sociology,^ sociology is put immediately after physiology or biology. Psychology, as a science preceding sociology, is
omitted. This has called forth a serious criticism of Comte'f
classification by J. S. Mill, Herbert Spencer, and many others,
who have insisted on the necessity of putting psychology after
biology and before sociology, as its immediate basis. This has led
to the appearance in sociology of the psychological school which
tries to build sociology on psychology and to explain social
phenomena by means of the psychological, rather than to explain
psychological phenomena through the biological and sociological.
Further characteristics of this school are that the majority of its
partizans are inclined to interpret social phenomena as a
derivative from the activity of individuals rather than trying to
explain the individuals and their activity through social reality or
society.
In spite of this, Comte's classification has found its followers.

They think that in omitting psychology from his classification, he
was quite right. They maintain that sociology has to be built
immediately on biology, while psychology needs sociology as one
of its bases. According to their opinion psychological phenomena
need to be interpreted through sociological but not vice versa.
Society, or sociality is the psycho-social reality of siii generis
which exists apart, and is different from, that of the individuals
who compose a society.^ Sociological regularities are difTerent
from, and cannot be reduced to, the psychological. Such, in gen CoMTE, AuGUSTE, Positive Philosophy, tr. by Martincau, i)p.
44-46, 394-395, N. Y., 1855.
'See the chapter about Bio-Organismic School, 1.
434
*34 CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES
eral, are the lines of division between the so-called
''psychological" and "bio-sociological," or, simply, ''sociologistic"
schools, which were quite conspicuous a few decades ago, and
which, though much less definite now, are not yet entirely
obliterated. The above, together with the fact that among the
followers of ''the sociologistic school" there are very prominent
sociologists, and that they have contributed a great deal to the
science of sociology through a clarification of problems only
slightly touched by other schools, makes it appropriate to
separate this group from other schools, and to survey briefly the
works of its most prominent representatives. The very source and
essence of sociality, these sociologists see in the phenomena of
social interaction. Their investigations try to interpret social and
psychical phenomena as a derivative of various forms of
interaction. Their causal analysis consists essentially in a
correlating of studied phenomena with various conditions of living
together, or, in other words, with social conditions. Therefore all

the theories which explain a certain social or psychical fact
through its correlation with a certain social condition, are to be
regarded as a variety of the sociologistic school.
For the sake of clearness, we shall take, in the first place, the
most representative sociologistic theories which give a general
system of sociologistic interpretation. This being done, we shall
pass to the special theories which take a certain social condition
as a variable (religion, mores, family, economic condition, etc.,)
and try to show its effects, or iis functions in various fields of
social phenomena. In this way we shall be able to obtain a more
or less adequate idea of the school. As a typical example of the
general sociologistic theories we shall take: (a) the neo-positivistic school of E. De Roberty; and the theories of A. Espinas, J.
Izoulet, Draghicesco, Ch. H. Cooley and others; (b) the school of
E. Durkheim with his collaborators; (c) the theory of L.
Gumplowicz and of his followers; (d) the "Formal School."^
3 Among the earlier representatives of the contemporary
sociologistic school we have Henri C. Carey. In his Principles of
Social Science, Vol. I, 1858, he sets forth all the essentials of the
school, and Durkheim's theory of the division of labor. Here,
however, I do not give space to his theories because their
characteristics are given in the chapter on the Mechanistic
School. Similarly, the names of Lazarus and Steinthal are to be
included among the "originators of
435
Having analyzed these general systems of sociology, we shall
turn to the principal types of the special sociologistic theories and
briefly survey them. Such seems to me the best way to orientate
ourselves in the complex and vast field of contemporary
sociologistic interpretations. Now let us say a few words about the
predecessors of modern sociology.
2. PREDECESSORS
The ideas that man's mind, behavior and his other characteristics
depend upon social interaction, and society; that social
regularities are stii generis; that society is something different
from a mere sum of its individual members; and that there is a
correlation between the fundamental categories of social
phenomena and those of personality-traits; these ideas were all
known very long ago. The bulk of the old Indian philosophy and
ethics, (especially that of Buddhism,) is based upon the idea that
our '1" or *'Self," with its empirical properties, sufferings, and joys
is a product of social contact and exists as long as the contact
exists. '"Self," the Hindu writers declared, can only be overcome
by: "destruction of contact," ''separation," "isolation" or "giving up."
Contact is the cause of all sensation, producing the three kinds of
pain or pleasure. . . Destroy contact and sensation will end . . .
names and things will cease . . . knowledge and ignorance will
perish . . . and the constituents of individual life will die.
This is the way to "escape from self, or from 'I.' " ^ In modern
terminology this means that the very phenomenon of "I" or an
individual "Self" and its psychological qualities (desires, emotions,
ideas, etc.,) are the result of social contact and interaction.
Confucianism, as a system of applied sociology, is essentially a
socio-environmental theory.
the school." Although giving an enormous mass of materials,
they, however, did not construct a clearly cut system of sociology.
See Lazarus, M., and Steinthal, H., Zettschnfl fur
Volkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft, Vol. I, i860, pp. 1-73,
437-477; Vol. II, pp. 54-62, 393-453; Vol. Ill, 1865, pp. 1^4, 385486; Vol. XVII, 1887, pp. 233-264.
* "Life of Buddha by Asvaghosha Bodhisattva," in tJie Sacred
Books of the East, The Colonial Press, N. Y., pp. 369 ff. See also
"The Dhammapada," ibid., passim and Chaps. V-VI. See also

"The Upanishads," Tfte Sacred Books of the East, Vol. XV,
passim, Oxford, 1884.
436
By nature, men are nearly alike; by practice, they get to be. wide
apart. . . There are only the wise of the highest class, and the
stupid of the lowest class, who cannot be changed. . . When a
child is trained completely, his education is just as strong as his
nature; and when he practices anything perpetually, he will do it
naturally as a permanent habit.
The habits are inculcated by family and other social groups with
the help of ceremonies, music, poetry, imitation and other social
agencies. Hence, an exclusive importance is given by
Confucianism to ''filial piety," the "five relationships," rules of
propriety and to social environment generally. In this respect
Confucianism contains all the essentials of the modern
sociologistic theories, especially of the contemporary theory of
mores developed by W. G. Sumner, and "the family-sociology"
developed by Le Play's school and Ch. H. Cooley. Confucianism
also stresses that "the heart of a man who observes no rules of
propriety is the heart of a beast," which means that a man who is
not modified by social environment is but an animal.^
Plato's The Republic is permeated with similar ideas. His system
of a perfect state is based on selection, as well as on training,
through a corresponding modification of social environment. In
many places he draws a correlation between the character of the
state and the character of the individuals, saying: "As the State is,
so the individuals will be," and vice versa. Finally, he stresses the
idea that man outside of social control is but an animal.
As the government is, such will be the man. ... In the individuals
there are the same principles and habits which there are in the
State. . . . Governments vary as the character of men vary, and
there must be,as many of the one as there are of the other. Or
perhaps, you suppose that States are made of "oak and rock" and
not out of the human natures. ... If the Constitutions of States are
five, the dispositions of individual minds will also be five [and so
on].^
When the reasoning and tamping and ruling power is asleep, the
wild beast in our nature starts up and walks about, naked, and
there
5 See "Li-Ki," The Sacred Books of the East, Vols. XXVII passim,
and XXVIII, Book XVI, Hsio Ki.
437
is no conceivable folly or crime, however shameless or unnatural/
[which it may not commit].
Everybody knows Aristotle's saying that ''man is a social animal'*
and his 'Svithout law and justice (and society) man would be the
worst of all animals," ^ not to mention his developed theory of a
socio-enviroijmental determinism.
Later on there were few prominent social thinkers who did not
stress the determining influence of various social conditions. On
the other hand, we have already seen that an organic conception
of a society, as a reality of sui generis, appeared long ago. (See
chapter about bio-organismic theories.) This shows that the
school, like almost all contemporary sociological systems,
originated in the remote past. Since that time with variations the
principles of the school may be traced throughout the history of
social thought. Even the works of the eighteenth-century thinkers,
''individualistic" though they may be, stress none the less a
decisive determining power of social environment. The end of this

century and the beginning of the nineteenth century were marked
by a strong revival of the organic conceptions of society, by a
sharp criticism of individualism and nominalism, by a
reinstatement of the spontaneous evolution of social institutions
independent from individual wishes, and by the idea of the
theories of individual dependence upon society. The theories of J.
de Maistre, de Bonald, E. Burke, and many others (see the
chapter on the "Bio-Organismic School") furnish examples of the
dominant sociological conceptions of that period. In their
essentials they are conspicuously sociologistic.^ These wôrks
influenced Auguste Comte in his principal theories in this field,^^
and in his turn Comte greatly determined the corresponding ideas
of the contemporary representatives of this school. Let us now
turn to their works.
' Ibid., pp. 571 ff.
8 Aristotle, Politics, Book I, Chaps. I-III.
^ See DE Maistre, J,, "Considerations sur la France," **Les
soirees de Saint-Petersbourg," Le Pape, "L'etude sur la
souverainet(5," "Examen de la phi-losophie de Bacon," in
L'Oruvres completes de J. de Maistre, Lyon, 1891-1892, Vols. I,
IV, V; DE Bonald, L., "Theorie du pouvoire politique et religieux
dans les society civile," Du divorce, "Essai analitique sur les lois
naturelles," in his Oeuvres, Vols. I, II, III.
* See MouLiNliE, Henri, De Bonald, ]>]). 145 ff., Paris, 1915.
438
3. SOCIOLOGISTIC INTERPRETATIONS OF E. DE ROBERTY,

A. ESPI-NAS, J. IZOULET, D. DRAGHICESCO, CHARLES H.
COOLEY AND OTHERS
E. De Roberty (1843-1915), one of the earliest pioneers in
sociology, was born and reared in Russia. He published his
Sociology in Russian as early as 1876. Its French translation
appeared two or three years later (second edition in 1886).
Together with E. Littre and another prominent Russian thinker,
Vyrouboff, he became one of the principal interpreters of A.
Comte's positivism in a special journal founded by E. Littre for that
purpose: La philosophie positive. A disagreement with some of
Comte's theories, which he had already expressed in his "Sociologie," later led him to a formal rupture with positivism and to a
designation of his own theory by the name of ''Neopositiv-ism." ^^
He spent many years outside of Russia and gave various
sociological and philosophical courses at different foreign
universities. After 1909 he was a professor of the PsychoNeurological Institute in St. Petersbourg. In 1915 he was
murdered in his home in Tverskaia Province, Russia. He was the
author of many books in philosophy ^^ and sociology.^^ Of his
sociological works, the most important are A New Program of
Sociology (Paris, 1904), and Sociology of Action (Paris, 1908), in
which he sum.s up practically all the essentials of his theories.
The philosophical and didactic character of his reasoning,
together with a somewhat ''heavy style," have probably been
responsible for the fact that his name is much less known than
that of Durk-heim or Simmel, whose theories De Roberty set forth
earlier, and, in some respects more consistently. Among his own
predecessors, De Roberty mentions A. Comte, de Bonald,
Herbart, Cattaneo, G. de Vitry, and George Lewes.^'^ De
Roberty's sociological
" Besides in his books, the principal points of the disagreement

are indicated in De Roberty's special pamphlet: Pourquoi je ne
suis pas positiviste.
12 Uancienne et la nouvelle philosophie; Inconnaissahle; La
philosophies du siecle; Agnosticisme; La recherche de Vunite; A.
Comte et H. Spencer; F. Nietzsche; Les concepts de la raison et
les lois de Vuniverse.
^^ La sociologie; L'ethique; Le psychisme social; Les fondements
de I'ethique; Constitution de I'ethique; Nouveau programme de
sociologie; Sociologie de I'action.
" De Roberty, La Sociologie, chapter, "Questions connexes."
439
system composes something inseparable from his whole
philosophical system. Its essentials may be outlined as follows:
1. The world known to us and it may be known adequately,
contrary to the assertion of agnosticism is composed of three
fundamental forms of energy : the physico-chemical, or inorganic;
the vital, or organic; and the social, or superorganic.
2. Physico-chemical phenomena are the result, or manifestation,
of intra- and intermolecular interaction. Vital phenomena are the
m.anifestation of an intra- and intercell interaction. Social or
superorganic phenomena are the result of an intercerebral
interaction. Each subsequent class of phenomena represents a
specific complication of the preceding one.
3. The transition from one class to another is'gradual and only
relatively perceptible. This is true in regard to the boundary line
between the inorganic and the vital, as well as between the vital
and the superorganic phenomena. Besides the usual properties of
living substance, life phenomena are often characterized by the
presence of so-called elementary ''psychical" processes, such as

irritability, sensation, feelings, emotion and even by vague
concrete images and representations.
4. Contrary to these elementary ''psychical" phenomena, the very
essence of superorganic phenomena is "thought" and abstract
"knowledge" {connaissance). The highest forms of super-organic
phenomena are the abstract and true concepts, categories and
laws of science; generalizations of philosophy or religion; symbols
and images of arts; and the rational prescriptions of applied
thought, i.e., the rational theories of conduct (ethics). All these are
various modes of social "thought" or "knowledge"; being found
only among human beings, they are the very essence of
civilization. "Thought," or "knowledge" or "concepts" are
something entirely different from mere irritability, or sensation, or
concrete images. In other words, in their pure form the
superorganic phenomena are what are styled the highest forms of
psychical phenomena.^^ They are embodied as we shall see, in
the forms of scientific, philosophical, cxsthetic, and applied
^^ vSee De Roberty, Nouveau programme de sociologies Chaps.
I-IV, Paris, 1904; Sociologie de V act ion, Chaps. I-VI, Paris,
1908; La sociologie, chapter, "Questions connexes."
440
thought or knowledge, based upon scientific premises. They
compose a kingdom entirely different from vital phenomena. The
gap between them is no less than between vital and inorganic
phenomena. If this is so, then the problem arises, how have they
originated? What is the source of their appearance? Why are they
found among human beings only? These questions lead to the
most important part of De Roberty's theory, which is his ''biosocial hypothesis/'
5. Bio-Social Hypothesis. The factor responsible for the

appearance and growth of superorganic ''thought" or ''knowledge"
is the intercerebral, (intermental) interaction of biological
organisms. The source of "thought" is two-fold. On the one hand,
it is purely biological, in the form of vital factors which have
created the highest organisms, with such a developed nervous
system as is necessary for intercerebral interaction. On the other
hand, it is purely social the factor of interaction itself without
which "thought" in its scientific, philosophical, symbolical, and
practical forms could not appear, however high might be the
biological structure of an organism. The reasons for this last
statement are as follows: (A) Contrary to mere irritability or
sensation, "thought" cannot appear nor exist without language.
Similarly, language could not have appeared without a long and
permanent intercerebral interaction. Ergo: no thought could
appear without interaction. This is corroborated by the fact that
only among human beings do we find language and only among
them do we find "thought." Human beings, also, have always
been the most social animals. (B) Contrary to erroneous individual
images and representations, "thought" and "knowledge" represent
what is styled as "accurate" and "true" ideas. They are not an
embodiment of incidental and fragmentary individual experience,
but rather the incomparably richer collective experience of a
multitude of generations which has corrected, verified, enriched,
increased and completed the inadequate individual experiences.
A scientific, philosophical, or any other kind of thought can be
really accurate only after it is tested and found adequate by
collective experience. Of individual experience, we cannot say
anything until the experiences of other people have tested and
either proved or disproved it. This means that logically and
441
factually "thoughts," or superorganic phenomena, could not have
originated without interaction: it is their logical and factual
condition sine qua non. (C) Without the permanent interaction of

many generations of people, any accumulation of thought or, what
is the same, any growth of superorganic phenomena, any
development of civilization, any ''mental progress" would not have
been possible because, without interaction, any individual
experience, however right it might be, is doomed to extinction; for
it cannot be transmitted to any other man or to any later
generation. Under such conditions an accumulation of culture or
thought becomes impossible. Impossible also becomes the
appearance, existence, and growth of superorganic, or the
highest forms of ''psychical phenomena." (D) One of the
necessary conditions of a conscious psychical process is the
existence of various and changing stimuli. When they are few and
monotonous they lead to "a mental stupor" and to the
transformation of even a conscious process into an automatic or
unconscious one. If there had been only a natural environment,
such an environment would have been a very poor incentive for
the stimulation of mental processes in organisms because it is
rather monotonous, it changes slowly, and its variation is limited.
Once reached, an adaptation to such an environment would tend
to become more and more automatic and instinctive, and no
necessity for the development of thought would have been given.
Human beings, like many animals, would have become
"instinctive" creatures, without any "thought" or "mental life."
Since this did not happen it must have been due to the social life
of our human ancestors; to their intercerebral interaction; to their
interstimulation; and to their "social environment," which is
dynamic in its very nature. It is the permanent current of
increasingly new stimulation, which, incessantly changing, gives
no chance for the transformation of a habit into an instinct. On the
contrary, it breaks instincts and forces human beings to make
incessant efforts toward a new adaptation to their ever-changing
social environments, which are stimulating and awakening
conscious processes.
These reasons are sufficient to show that, besides the biological

factors, social interaction is a condition absolutely necessary for
the appearance and growth of "thought" or "mental processes."
442
This means that ''psychological phenomena" are the result, hut
not the cause of social interaction; therefore it is as wrong to try to
explain social phenomena through the psychological as it is
wrong to explain a cause through its effect. This means that
Auguste Comte was right in putting sociology immediately after
biology and in omitting psychology. Sociology is a fundamental
science of superorganic phenomena based on the data of biology,
including that of ''physiological psychology," which is biological
but not psychological science. Social phenomena are not to be
explained through psychological causes, but psychological
phenomena are to be explained through biological and social
factors. Such is the conclusion of De Roberty.
6. Psychology is not a generalizing, abstract science as is biology
and sociology, but is a descriptive and concrete science,^^ which
describes concrete psychological processes in an individual
psychological biography or in a definite group psychology of
a definite race, nation or sect explaining them th*-cugh an
application of the data of biology and sociology. Its position and
character are similar to those of geology. Geology is also a
descriptive and concrete science. It does nothing but describe the
specific geological characteristics and processes of a unique
concrete object the earth explaining them through an
application of the general laws of physical mechanics, physics,
chemistry, and biology. In this way, De Roberty draws a sharp
boundary line between sociology and psychology. The above
shows that De Roberty's insistence on an explanation of
psychological phenomena through biological and social factors is

not a trifling
16 De Roberty classifies all sciences under two principal heads:
(i) Abstract or generalizing sciences, which analyze the concrete
world of the inorganic; the organic or the superorganic
phenomena into their components, or elementary units, analyzing
the relationship of the units, and formulating the laws of
relationship. Such, for instance, are physics, chemistry, biology
and sociology. (2) Concrete or descriptive sciences, which study a
definite concrete object, for instance, the earth, a certain tree, a
certain animal, man or group. They describe their object in its
uniqueness and peculiarity, and, to explain its peculiar traits, they
have to apply the laws of at least two different abstract sciences.
Geology is one example of the concrete sciences. It has a specific
and unique object: the earth. In order to explain its history and its
geological characteristics, geology must apply the laws of
chemistry, physics, and even of biology.
De Roberty's classification is, in many respects, near to the
classification of sciences offered later on by H. Rikkert and W.
Windelbandt. See De Roberty, La Sociologies and A . Comte and
H. Spencer.
443
point, but something fundamental in his system. Such is the
essence of De Roberty's bio-social hypothesis and ''sociologism."
7. Almost simultaneously with those, similar conclusions were set
forth by A. Espinas in his valuable studies: Les societes animals,
1878; Les origines de la technologies 1898; and J^fre on ne pas
etre, 1901. Omitting here the outstanding contributions of Espinas
in the special fields of "animal sociology," and the origin and
factors of the evolution of technology, it is enough to say that his
special studies resulted in a series of conclusions very similar to
those of De Roberty. *'The individual is rather a product than an

author of a society," is one of Espinas' socio-logistic formulas. De
Roberty, Espinas, and later on, E. Durk-heim and his school,^"^
have laid down many other reasons against a psychological
interpretation of social facts, and a foundation of sociology on
psychology. They unanimously say that if the factor of social
interaction is disregarded, then we have to come to the theory of
"auto-genesis" of mind and thought, which is obviously
unscientific and amounts to a mysticism. In this case neither the
appearance, nor growth of mind, nor continuity and accumulation
of culture, becomes comprehensible.
8. Furthermore, under the influence of A. Espinas and E. De
Roberty, and E. Durkheim, J. Izoulet in his La cite moderne,^^
^^ Durkheim has formulated theories which are very similar in
their essence to those of De Roberty and Espinas, I even think
that Espinas' and De Roberty's formulas are clearer and better
than the corresponding formulas of Durkheim developed in his
"Representations individuelles et representations collectives,"
Revue de methaphisique et de morale, Vol. VI. S. Deploige in his
Le Conflict de la morale et de la sociologie, and Ch. E. Gehlke in
his Emile Durkheim's Contributions to Sociological Theory
indicate a series of the authors from whom Durkheim could take
several of his theories. Among these names I did not find either
the name of De Roberty or Espinas. Meanwhile, their theories are
probably nearer to those of Durkheim than the theories of Simmel,
Wundt, and other German and French authors indicated by
Deploige and Gehlke. "La Sociology,'' of De Roberty and **Les
societes animates'' of Espinas were published earlier than the
works of Durkheim. They could not have been unknown to him, as
we see from his mention of Espinas and De Roberty's names in
his works, and in his L'annee sociologique. These references are
not very complimentary for De Roberty, but such an attitude on
the part of Durkheim is scarcely justified by comparison of De
Roberty's and Durkheim's theories in the field of problems

outlined above. By the way it is necessary to note that in Gehlke's
work, the analogy between H. Bergson and Durkheim is
erroneous. Their theories are quite opposite.
*8 See Izoulet, J., La cite moderne, 5th ed., Paris, 1901: 7th ed..
1008, pp. 588-fx)o.
444
and especially D. Draghicesco in his Du role de Findiuidu,^^ have
each given a series of the more detailed corroborations of the biosocial hypothesis. In this respect, especially valuable is the book
of Draghicesco. He, probably more clearly than anyone else, has
shown the existence of a correlation between social and
psychological processes, the correlation in which psychological
processes are interpreted as a result of the social processes of
interaction. The essence of Draghicesco's argument runs as
follows : One of the necessary conditions of intelligence is an
existence of changing and different stimidi. Under monotonous
and constant stimuli even the conscious psychical processes tend
to turn into the unconscious and automatic. Geographic
environment being relatively unchangeable cannot facilitate a
progress of intelligence. Once achieved, adaptation to such an
environment transforms even a conscious activity into an
unconscious one. In the past this environment had to turn a
human being into an instinctive creature and in no way could
facilitate a development of his intelligence. If this happened, the
responsible factor was social interstimulation. Incessantly
changing and varying, it made necessary an incessant effort to a
new and conscious adaptation. Through that, it incessantly
stimulated development of human intelligence, weakened
instinctive and automatic responses, undermined the importance
of the factor of heredity, and made man plastic and mindful. Such
is the first reason why the origin and progress of human

intelligence has been due to social interstimulation. Man has lived
in the largest and the most complex societies and on account of
that he has become the most superior in intelligence in
comparison with other animals. The second reason is this: An
ability of discrimination or analysis is a fundamental function of
intelligence. This function is the more developed the more
complex is the world in which man lives. With an increase of an
environment's complexity man's ability for analysis must increase
also; contrariwise, he cannot adapt himself to his milieu.
Adaptation lacking, he is eliminated. The most complex
environment is the social one; and its complexity has been
increasing in the course of history because an increase of social
differentiation
^^ Draghicesco, D., Du role de Vindividu dans le determinisme
social, pp. 121 ff., Paris, 1906.
445
has been a fundamental social process. Ergo, a progress of an
analytical or discriminative ability of mind has been due to social
interstimidation and to progress of social differentiation. The
former has been but a reflection of the latter. The same is true of
the synthetic ability of mind as its second fundamental function. It
again is but a reflection of a fundamental social process of an
integration of small groups into larger and larger ones. This social
process has made necessary a parallel development of the
synthetic ability of mind. Otherwise, man again could not adapt
himself to the environment and had to perish. Thus we have a
complete parallelism of the progress of social differentiation and
that of the analytical function of mind; the progress of social
integration, and that of the synthetic ability of mind. These two
functions explained, the fundamental characteristics of a superior
intelligence are accounted for. Further, intellectual and cultural
progress has been made through inventions. Invention is a lucky

marriage of two or more existing ideas. The more intensive is the
exchange of ideas among the members of a society, the greater
are the chances of an invention. For this reason, social interaction
has been the source of intellectual progress, l^he same is true in
regard to an accumulation of knowledge and storing of cultural
values. Not being transmitted through biological heredity, cultural
values could not have been accumulated had there not been
social contact of individuals, groups, and successive generations.
Likewise, an integration of human personality, the very idea of
self, and the fundamental laws or logic could originate only in a
social environment. On the other hand, the facts of disintegration
of personality which are well known to psychiatrists are due
mainly to the same factor of social interaction ; to unexpected,
sudden, and great shocks, or a too brusque passage from one
social milieu to another."^
In a similar way, Draghicesco shows that neither memory, nor
association of ideas, not even any concept and abstract
generalization is explainable without the factor of social
interaction, and its fundamental forms and characteristics. The
psychical processes owe their existence to, and are but the
psychological reflection of, *the corresponding social
processes.~^ Following De
20 Draghicesco, D., op. cit., pp. 162-190. -^ Ibid., pp. 190-274.
446
Roberty, Durkheim and Simmel, he indicates that the individual
soul is but a microscopic reflection of the social world. If an
individual is a member of antagonistic groups, his psychology will
be full of conflicts and contradictions; if he is affiliated only with
solidary groups, his ''soul" will be ''solidary" also. An individual has
as many different ''selfs" as there are groups with which he is

afliHated.^^ From this standpoint even men of genius are nothing
but a product of social integration. They are the men who
happened to be posted at the point of cross-section or the focus
of the mental currents of society. Absorbing the dominant feelings
and attitudes of the masses, they combine and systematize them
and through them they exert their influence. An alleged irreducible
originality of men of genius is due also to the same fact of their
being at the points of the cross-section of ideas, feelings and
attitudes of the masses.^^ Such is Draghicesco's interpretation of
the bio-social theory."^
A few years before Draghicesco, and also partly under De
Roberty's and Durkheim's influence, J. Izoulet, professor of the
College de France, in his brilliantly written ''The Modern Society,"
substantiated in detail the bio-social hypothesis, and like
Draghicesco, showed that the factor of interaction and association
has been responsible for the evolution of organisms from the
lower to the higher ones, and for the origin and development of
"the social, scientific, industrial, ideal, and moral senses" in
man.^^ At the same time, G. Simmel and E. Durkheim in their
works and in their own way, developed a series of theories which
led to conclusions similar to the above; namely, that the social
processes of differentiation and integration are correlated with
psychological processes of discrimination and synthesis; that the
human mind is but a reflection of a social world and its
characteristics; that the logical categories of space, time,
causation,
22 Compare Sorokin, System of Sociology, Vol. II, Chap. VI; Park
and Burgess, op. cit., Chaps. II-III; Durkheim, "Le duaUsme de la
nature humaine," Scientia, Vol. XV, pp. 206-221.
23 md., pp. 295-335.
24 In his later book L'ideal createur, Paris, 1912, Draghicesco

tried to show that the greatest contributions to culture have been
made at these places and where and when interaction has been
most intensive and manifold. It has led to a cross-fertilization of
thought. In the same book he tries to show ideals as factors in
human behavior.
447
quality, quantity and abstract concepts, religious ideas, and moral
values originated and grew through the factor of social interaction;
and that they are essentially the reflections or embodiments, or
symbols of the society itself. (See also the chapters about
Durkheim and Simmel.) ~^ Somewhat later the above principles
of sociology were brilliantly restated by many authors in various
countries. Among their works a conspicuous place belongs to
those of Professor Charles H. Cooley, born in 1864.-"^ Starting
from a somewhat different point, Cooley comes to conclusions
similar to the outlined principles of sociology. Among his specific
contributions should be mentioned his illuminating theory of
primary and secondary social groups, and his analysis of the
family, playground, and neighborhood as especially important
among prim.ary groups.'^
Side by side with the treatises devoted to a general sociologistic
theory, numerous special studies have been published in which
certain ''psychological" phenomena have been interpreted in the
light of the sociologistic theory in detail. Of such studies, I shall
mention in the first place a series of works devoted to the
sociology of language ;^^ another such study has been made by
Professor E. Dupreel, who has tried to show that somewhat
vague ideas like those concerning justice, righteousness, and so
on, are but the reflections of certain social relationships, and are
due to social environment.^^ Recently Professor M. Halbwachs,
one of the most prominent followers of Durkheim, published a

special monograph devoted to a sociologistic interpretation of
26 Among Durkheim's works especially important in this respect
are: Le suicide, De la division du travail social, Representations
individuelles, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. In
Simmel's works the above parallelism of the social and mental
categories is especially conspicuous in his little book about
religion, with its central idea that the concept of God is but "a
translation of certain characteristics of society into a psychological
language." See the chapter about the formal school.
"See Cooley, Ch. H., Human Nature and the Social Order, ist ed.,
1902; Social Organization, ist ed., 1909; and Social Process,
1918.
^ vSee especially Social Organization, Chap. III.
29 Corresponding literature is enormous. wSee a good survey
and analysis of the theories in Pogodin, A., Language as a
Creation (Russ., lasyk kak Tvorchestvo, Charkov, 1913); de la
Grasserie, E., Etudes de psychologie et de sociologie linguistique,
Paris, 1909; Jordan, Leo, "Sprache und Gesellschaft," and
Vossler, K., "Die Grenzen dcr Sprachsoziologie," both papers in
the Erringerungsgahe fiir Max Wrher, 1923, Vol. T, ])p. 338-389;
see in these works other references.
30 DlPREEL, I^., La rapport soridlr, I'art III, Paris, 1912,
448
memory.^^ The author follows the method of Durkheim in his
interpretation of religion, and tries to show that there exists a
collective memory differing from the memory of an individual; that
''a social frame-work of memory" is an indispensable condition for
the existence of any individual memory; and that the character of

a social organization stamps the character of its member's
memory; the former being changed, the latter will change also.
The above shows that the principles of the sociologistic
interpretation of various psychical phenomena have appeared
almost simultaneously in various countries and have been
progressing in their application to an explanation of the simple, as
well as to the most complex psychical processes. After this
deviation, called forth by a desire to avoid a return to the
characteristics of other sociologistic treatises, let us turn our
attention back to the characteristics of other important points of
De Roberty's sociology.
9. Classification of Social Phenomena. The next important
feature of De Roberty's system is its classification of the superorganic or social phenomena. If, according to his definition,
superorganic phenomena are social thoughts or conscious
psychical phenomena, their classification should be that of the
fundamental forms of social thought.^"
31 Halbwachs, Maurice, Les cadres sociaux de la memoire, Paris,
1925.
32 It is necessary to bear definitely in mind that, according to De
Roberty, a concrete human behavior, or concrete historical and
social processes, are not pure social phenomena. In their
concrete forms they are cosmo-hio-social facts. Man is not only
an embodiment of the social, but also of the biological and
physico-chemical forces because he is an organism, and any
organism is a physico-chemical substance. For an explanation of
concrete human behavior or historical events, it is necessary to
apply all the data and laws of physico-chemical sciences, which is
done partly in the form of a study of cosmical or geographical
factors; all the data and laws of biological sciences being in the
form of a study of the biological factors of human behavior and
history; and finally, all the data of sociology must be appHed in

the form of a study of the social factors of these phenomena. This
explains that human behavior and history are social phenomena
only so far as they are a manifestation of social thought. This
explains also why, in his classification of purely social
phenomena, De Roberty logically classifies only the forms of
thought because other components of concrete human behavior
or human history are not social phenomena. This has not been
properly understood by some critics of De Roberty's system who
wrongly interpreted it as an attempt to explain through the factor
of intellect alone the whole of human history. Even P. Barth partly
falls into this error. As a matter of fact, De Roberty's system is
free from such one-sidedness. In his interpretation of the
449
SOCIOLOGISTIC SCHOOL
449
In their causal sequence they are as follows:
1. Analytical, hypothetical, non-dogmatic thought
2. Synthetic or a p o d e i c t i c a 1 thought
3. Symbolic o r aesthetic thought
4. Practical or applied thought which indicates on the basis of
knowledge what ought to be done to achieve a definite purpose
or Science
or Religion and philosophy
or Arts, and partly, love
All applied disciplines b e -ginning with ap-plied physical and

chemical disciplines, and ending with ethics, or the theory of
social conduct. Social Technology, i n the broadest sense of the
word
In causal sequence each preceding form of thought determines
the later one. The scientific thought of society, determines the
character of its philosophy or religion. This, in its turn, determines
the character of the aesthetic thought or arts of a society; while all
three forms of thought determine the character of the society's
applied thought: its technology, industry, agriculture, economic
and political organization, mores, customs, morals, ethics, and so
on, as far as they are created or performed consciously.^'*^
Since such is the causal sequence of the forms of thought, one of
its results is a law of lagging; the philosophy or religion of a
society lags behind its science; aesthetic thought lags behind its
religion; and applied thought lags behind all previous forms of
thousrht.^*
Each of the forms of thought differs from each other
qualitatively/'^"''
concrete processes of history and of human behavior, he insists
that they are the total result of all cosmical, biological and social
factors. In this point De Roberty is very near to E. C. Hayes who
also strongly separates "pure social phenomena" from the
concrete facts of history and human behavior.
2^ De Roberty, Nouveau programme, passim; Sociologie de
I'action, pp. 163-304.
^ La sociologie de I'action, j)p. 182 ff.
^ Compare De Roberty's conception of philosophy and science
with that of G. Simmcl; they are in many respects similar. See
Simmel: Hauptprohleme der Philosophic, Leipzig, 1911; De

Roberty, "Le problcme sociologique et le probldme
philosophique," Revue Philosphique No. 11, 1911. It is easy to
see also that De Roberty's classification is the reverse of the
Marxian classification of social factors. Here, the first factor is that
which is last in the Marxian theory and the least important, and
vice versa. Technology, or the forms of production
450
lo. Thought as Real Power, and Science as a Primary Social
Factor. As I indicated above, De Roberty does not belong to the
monistic sociologists who try to explain everything through one
factor. On the contrary, he is a pluralist. He regards the human
being, his behavior, and his historical processes as cosmo-biosocial phenomena determined by cosmo-hio-social factors. But as
far as human behavior and historical processes are social, {i.e.,
conscious and telic phenomena), they are determined by each of
the fundamental forms of social thought. Like electricity "thought,"
as the highest form of energy, is a real force. It ''moves"
locomotives and machinery; it works in our factories and shops; it
influences the behavior of human body-machinery, and manifests
itself in the movements of individuals and masses. In brief, being
the highest form of energy, thought is a great and real power,^^
whose function is to control and to dominate all other physicochemical and biological forms of energy. There are few
sociological systems, if any, which so strongly stress the general
power of ''thought," and probably there is none other which gives
the first place to analytical or scientific thought. We know that
Auguste Comte also attached great importance to ideas in
determining human behavior and historical processes. But in
Comte's system, as was rightly indicated by De Roberty,^^ the
as a variety of applied thought, is the primary factor in the Marxian

theory. Here it occupies the last place. See De Roberty's
interesting article about Marxism in Annates de VInstitute
International de Sociologie, Vol. VIII.
^ Here De Roberty's theory coincides with the conclusions
reached from a different standpoint by A, Fouillee in his
philosophy and psychology of idea-forces. According to Fouillee,
an idea is not a powerless representation only, but a real dynamic
force, which influences the behavior of individuals and masses.
"Everywhere the 'idea' appears as a power which contains in itself
the conditions for a change of consciousness and, thanks to a
correlation of psychical processes with cerebral movements, the
conditions for a change of cerebral processes themselves. . . .
Every concept, like that of 'My Country,' 'Humanity,' and
'Universe,' excites an infinity of perceptions which contain the
most powerful feelings and emotions. . . . 'My Country!'
'Humanity!' With these words they often carried and moved whole
armies and peoples. ..." Being social in their origin, "ideas
compose the collective force stored {emmagasinee) in an
individual; they have their own intellectual heredity which reacts
on biological heredity and often, through education, may direct,
and sometimes even dominate, it." Fouillee, A., Uevolutionisme
des idees-forces, Paris, 1906, pp. XCI-XCIII. In his introduction
Fouillee gives a concise summary of his theory of the idea-forces
extensively developed in his books: La psychologie des ideesforces; La morale des idees-forces: Elements sociologiques de la
morale, not to mention his other books.
^^ See his Pourquoi je ne suis pas positiviste.
451
greatest importance is given not so much to analytical or
scientific, as to synthetic or philosophical and religious thought.
They are the basis of Comte's law of the three stages: his
theological, metaphysical, and positive stages, which are based

on the character of the synthetic and apodeictic conception of the
world ascribed by Comte to each of its stages. This is one of the
shortcomings of positivism, according to De Roberty. Contrary to
Comte, De Roberty definitely gives first place to scientific or
analytical thought. Its character and progress determine the
character and progress of all the other forms of thought, and
through these, the comparative power of thought as a factor of
human history generally. If the analytical thought of a society is
poor qualitatively and quantitatively, primitive and poor will be its
religion, philosophy, arts, or applied technology. A ''real
revolutionary" is he who contributes to the progress of science.
The man who, for the first time, discovered that ''two and two are
four," was one of the greatest revolutionists. Only the progress of
science leads to an increase of the real freedom of man, and real
freedom is nothing but knowledge. Knowing the phenomena and
their relationship, we can command them to serve our needs. The
real liberators of men have not been the ignorant revolutionaries
or radicals, but only those who have really increased human
knowledge. Either Pasteur, Newton, Faraday or Lavoisier
increased the amount of human freedom incomparably more than
all revolutions and revolutionaries taken together. In the fields
where analytical thought achieves high perfection and accuracy,
as is now the case in the field of natural phenomena, its power is
manifested in a high efficiency of corresponding applied thought
and in a successful subjugation of the natural forces of steam,
electricity, and so on, to human purposes. Factories, locomotives,
cars, aeroplanes, radios, and all industrial technique are nothing
but a manifestation of the power of physico-chemical scientific
thought. Considerable also are the achievements of biological
sciences, with their consequent influence on human history and
behavior. Modern agriculture, medicine, sanitation and hygiene
are nothing but manifestations of the power of biological sciences.
The poorest are the achievements of social sciences. We still
know little about the nature
452
of superorganic phenomena. Naturally, their applied technology is
poor and insignificant, as is also their rational ethics, rational
organization of social and political institutions, and rational theory
of progress. Instead of a scientific technology in this field, there
are only numerous Utopian schemes, pseudo-scientific plans of
reconstruction, ignorant political propositions, and blind and
elementary movements of suffering masses led by blind or
dishonest demagogues. Until analytical thought in this field makes
a real progress, no efiFicient and rational applied technology is to
be expected there. All the high sounding phraseology of the
reformers is doomed to be a mere phraseology and nothing
more.^^ Such is the essence of this part of this theory.
II. Criticism. Let us now take the principal statements of the
sociologistic school and see to what extent they are valid.
A. The sociologistic theory is right in its contention that the factor
of social interaction is to be taken into consideration in an
explanation of the growth of the mind and the psychology of
human beings. It is also right in its attempt to establish the
correlation between social processes of interaction and
psychological processes; and in insisting on the social origin of
language, science,^'"^ concepts, logical categories, morals and
religion and other social values. If such an approach were made
as one among many possible approaches, I would not see any
valid reason for opposing it. But such is not the case. The theory
pretends to be exclusive. It declares that any other approach is
wrong. In so far it can scarcely be accepted. In the first place, let
us ask, is the factor of interaction a sufBcient explanation of the
origin of thought or of superorganic phenomena? I do not think so.
Among bees and ants and other animals we find permanent and
38 See Nouveau programme, passim; La sociologie de faction,

passim; Qu'est-ce que le progres? Qu'est-ce que le crime? Paris,
P. Ollendorff Co.
39 Recent experimental studies of E. V. Doran, E. A. Kirkpatrick,
G. M. Whipple, E. H. Babbit; G. C. Brandenburg, F. M. Geriach, L.
Gerlach, L. Terman, V. R. McClarchy, H. L. Neher, E. L.
Thomdike, G. C. Schweisinger and others have found a very high
correlationfrom + .39 to + .85between vocabulary and
intelHgence of individuals. As far as language and vocabulary
depend decisively on social contact the above correlation strongly
testifies in favor of the contention of the sociologistic school. See
a good summary of the mentioned studies and the Hterature in
Schweisinger, G. C., The Social-Ethical Significance oj
Vocabulary, N. Y. Teachers College, 1926, pp. 8-11 and passim.
453
complex interaction; yet it has not originated "thought" or anything
Hke it. Furthermore, in accordance with the theory, we should
expect that ''the mentality" of species living in societies and
continually interacting, would be higher than that of animals who
are not living in societies. Facts do not corroborate this
expectation. L. Morgan is right in declaring that we do not liave
any reason for saying that the non-social wasps are inferior
psychologically to the social wasps, or that a non-social tiger is
inferior to the social jackals, or that many non-social birds are
more stupid than social birds.'^^ If N. Mikhailovsky, G. Palante,
and L. Winiarsky are not quite right in their contention that ''living
together," sociality and social cohesion always lead to the ,
mental stagnation of a species, and that an individualistic and ,
isolated manner of living always stimulates a development of
mind, they give sufficient proof to show one-sidedness of the sociologistic theory. This means that the factor of interaction is not
sufficient to explain the miracle of the origin and growth of mind. It
is true that De Roberty and other prominent representatives of the

sociologistic school mention that before interaction can produce
its effects, it is necessary to have a cooperation of biological
factors in the form of a developed brain. This means, however,
that through biological factors in some way it is possible (even
without interaction) to produce as high a nervous system as that
of many animals who do not live in societies. If such a thing is
possible, does not this admit the possibility of the origin of a
relatively high nervous system and high mentality as the satellite,
independent of the factor of interaction? If this is admitted, then
social interaction is neither sufficient nor absolutely necessary for
the origin of inferior thought forms at least. For the highest forms it
is likely to be necessary, but will seldom be sufficient alone. Such
is the first limitation of the theory of social interaction as a
sufficient principle for an explanation of the
^ See Morgan, L., Animal Behavior, 1908, pp. 229 ff. See also
Parmelee, M., The Science of Human Behavior, N. Y., pp. 391 ff.;
Ammon, O., Die Gesellschaft-sordnung, Part I. These facts also
contradict another assum])tion that "sociality" is always useful for
all species, and that the more social they are the higher they are
in their structure, and the greater chances they have to survive.
This idea is especially strongly expressed by P. Kropotkin in his
Mutual Aid but it is not warranted by the facts.
454
origin and development of "thought" or superorganic
phenomena.^^
This conclusion is reinforced by the following considerations.
According to the theory, the more intensive, complex, and the
longer the interaction among human beings has been, the greater
viîll have been the progress of thought. Just exactly what is
meant by intensity and complexity of human interaction, the

school has not defined. If they consist in a direct, excited, and
manifold interstimulation, such conditions are given in mob and
crowd-interaction which are intensive, complex, and full of
excitement. And yet it is a mere platitude to say that a mob or
crowd's thought rarely produces anything really fine and superior
in the field of thought. Its psychology is stamped by what is
termed the *'mob-mind," which gives something quite opposite to
real thought. If the intensity and complexity of interaction are
measured by the density of the population, as some of the
representatives of the school say, then again, in the past and in
the present, the distribution of societies according to their cultural
standard and according to their density, does not show any close
correlation. Many regions of India and China are in the most
densely populated areas, and yet they are far from being at the
top of the cultural ladder. The density of population in the United
States is far from being the highest; yet the country occupies one
of the highest positions on the cultural ladder. The same is true in
historical perspective. If we try to correlate the cultural progress or
regress of a country with an increase or decrease of the density of
its population, we shall scarcely obtain any noticeable correlation.
(See the chapter about the Demographic School.) Further, a
continuation and prolongation of interaction does not necessarily
guarantee either progress of thought and culture or even the
maintenance of its previously achieved standard. In Rome after
the second century A.D.; in ancient India after the fourteenth
century A.D. (the end of the Cholas Empirethe climax of Hindu
culture) ; in China after
"1 C. Bougie, in his later work, rightly indicates that a "social
milieu" is not a unique creator of mind. See Bougle, Leqons de
sociologie sur revolution des valeurs, 1922, p. 193; see also
Duprat, I., "La psychosociologie en France," Archiv jilr Geschichte
d. Philosophie Mid Soziologie, B. XXX, heft 1-2; Paulhan, Fr., Les
transformations sociales des sentiments^ Paris, 1920.
455
the Ming dynasty; in ancient Egypt, after the eighteenth and the
nineteenth centuries; and in Greece, after the third century B.C.,
social interaction certainly continued to exist and sometimes
became more complex; yet historians assure us that since these
times the thought and the civilization of these countries has gone
down, and never has been able to reach the level which was
before achieved. Consequently, permanency and continuation of
social interaction is not a sufficient guarantee even for maintaining
au achieved level of thought. Further, there seem to be various
intensities and complexities of interaction. If some of their forms
are favorable for mental progress, some others seem to be
disastrous. An increasing number of mental diseases within our
complex and strenuous civilization shows this. With a reasonable
degree of certainty we can say that their increase is due, in a
considerable degree, to the intensity, complexity, and manifoldness of the social interstimulation of Western society.^" Finally the
results of experimental studies of the effects of social stimulation
on mental work also do not testify in favor of the criticized
hypothesis. From the qualitative standpoint performance of more
complex mental functions in a group of persons working together
is not better than the performance of the same functions by the
same persons when alone. If from the quantitative side, in
working together the output of work increases, the quality of the
work does not improve. It rather suffers when the more delicate
are the tested mental operations.^*^ Even quantitative
improvement takes place not always and is still questionable.^'^
^2 See my Social Mobility, Chap. XXI.
*3 See the data and the description of the experiments in the
following works: Gates, G. S., "The Effects of an Audience Upon
Performance," Journal Abnormal Psychology, Vol. XVIII, pp. 334344, 1923-24; Gates and Rissland, "The Effect of Encouragement
and of Discouragement Upon Performance," Journal Educational

Psychology, Vol. XIV, No. i; Laird, D. A. "Changes in Motor
Control and Individual Variations Under the Influence of Razzing,"
Journal Experimental Psychology, Vol. VI, No. 3; Travis, L. E.,
"The Effects of a Small Audience Upon Eye-Hand Coordination,"
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, Vol. XX, pp. 142146, 1925-26; Allport, P., Social Psychology, 1924, Chaps. XI, XII;
Mayer, A., "Einzel und Gesamtleistung dcs Schulkindes," Archiv
fiir Gesamte Psychologic, 1903; Meumann, E., Ilaus-und
Schularbeit, Leipzig, 1914; MoEDE, W., "Einzel-und
Gnippenarbeit," Praktische Psychologic, 1920-21.
** vSee Williamson, E. G., "AUport's Experiments in Social
Facilitation," Psychological Monographs, Vol. XXXV, No. 2, 1926,
])p. 138-143. M. vSkalct's and my cxt)eriniciiLs with the prc-school
children have shown that their work
456
Further, superior individuals, when alone, work rather better than
in a group under a social stimulation.^^ Such are the effects of
social stimulation on performance of very simple mental functions.
It is to be expected that the results found in the study of social
stimulation in a co-working group will be still more negative in the
performance of such a remarkable mental function as the
composition of Beethoven's Symphony, Newton's Prin-cipia,
Kant's Kritik der reinen Venninft, Lobachevsky's Geometry or any
other work of genius. These experimental results suggest again
that the problem is very complex. There probably are forms of
social stimulation highly beneficial for mental progress, and other
forms harmful for it.
These considerations are sufficient to prove the contentions that,
first, the factor of interaction is not sufficient to explain the origin
and development of thought; second, it is not sufficient for an

understanding of mental progress or regress; third, the discussed
theory has not inade an analysis of what is to he understood by
intensity, complexity, and duration of interaction, nor how they are
to he measured. For this reason, its propositions remain
somewhat vague and mincer tain. Fourth, even though they are
clarified, the facts do not corrohorate the expectations of the
theory. Such are its first shortcomings. The above does not deny
an importance to the factor of interaction; but it denies the
exaggeration of the role ascribed to it by the sociolo-gistic school.
It suggests also a need for more detailed studies in the field of
interaction to clarify when, where, and under what conditions
certain forms of interaction are the ''generators" of thought; and
when, where and what forms of interaction are rather the
obstacles for its progress. Vague and general formulas are not
sufficient now.
B. The second ohjection to the sociologistic theory is that its claim
of interpreting psychological phenomena as a mere function of
social processes and an individual as a mere ''reflection' of a
group is not justifiable as far as it pretends to he exclusive,
in groups is worse qualitatively and quantitatively, than when each
of them worked alone. The study will be pubHshed together with
my other experimental studies and that of my collaborators.
^^ vSee Allport's summary in Journal of Abnormal Psychology,
Vol. XVIII, pp.
341-344457
and as far as it pretends to explain all the phenomena of human
psychology, human thought, and human genius in terms of social
processes alone. But as one of the many possible interpretations,
the theory is certainly valuable. However, it claims more than this

by declaring fallacious any attempt to interpret psychical
phenomena from any other standpoint. This claim is to be
rejected. Methodologically, an attempt to correlate social
phenomena with the psychological characteristics of individuals in
such a way that social phenomena are viewed as ''functions,"
while certain psychological properties of individuals are taken as
"variables," is as logical as the opposite attempt of the sociologistic school. The same may be said of an interpretation of groupphenomena through the properties of the members of the group,
taken as variables. I do not see any methodological sin in the
attempts of G. Palante, J. M. Baldwin, G. Tarde, Ch. A. Ellwood,
W. McDougall, F. Allport, G. Le Bon, E. A. Ross, E. C. Hayes, or
any of the Freudian School,^^ who, in their ap^^ The position of these and many other sociologists in the
dispute between sociology and psychology, or "the group" and
"the individualistic" interpretations, varies, beginning with clearlycut psychologists and individualists of the type of G. Palante and
F. Allport, partly of G. Tarde and McDougall, and passing through
intermediary types like Ellwood, Baldwin, Ross, Hayes, Gid-dings,
and ending with the sociologists of the type of Cooley, whose
position practically coincides with that of the sociologistic school.
The first psychological branch starts with the instinctive or
acquired psychological characteristics of man, and views social
life and processes as the result and manifestation of these
psychological "variables." Many of the representatives of this
branch do not admit any "social entity" in the form of a "social
mind" or "social reality" apart and independent from individuals.
vSee Palante, G., Precis de sociologie, 26. cd., Paris, 1903;
Combat pour I'individu, 1904; Antinomies entre I'individu ct
socictc, 1912; Alli'ort, F., Social Psychology, Chap. I; Tarde, G.,
Eludes de psychologic sociale, \)]). 169-175, Paris, 1898; La
logique sociale, 3d ed,, pp. I fT.; Les lois de Vimitation, passim.
W. McDougall's An Introduction to Social Psychology is also an
exam])le of the interpretation of social processes as derivatives of

inherited and acquired ])roperties of man. Ch. A. Ellwood's and J.
M, Baldwin's position is somewhat intermediary and synthetic. In
his paper, "The Origin of Society," American Journal Sociology,
Vol. XV, pp. 394-404, Ellwood views social life and institutions as
an outcome of instincts; and interprets the "social" through the
"psychological." In chapter II of his The Psychology of Human
Society, N. Y., 1925, he jnits "mental evolution" before "social
evolution" as its basis. On the other hand, he stresses the
importance of inter-mental interaction as a necessary condition for
the development of mind and culture. Somewhat similar is the
position of J. M. Baldwin. He stresses the interdependence of the
social and the psychological, but at the same time claims that "the
sociologist is at every turn dependent upon the })sychologist to
inform him of the movements of the individual mind which
incorporate themselves in social institutions." His inter)^rotation uf
social life is a deduction of the latter
458
proach, have taken certain psychological characteristics of man
as variables and have tried to correlate certain social phenomena
as their functions. If some of the attempts of this kind are
defective the fault is not in the method of starting with properties
of an individual and passing from them to social phenomena; but
in some other mistakes which are outlined in the chapter on the
psychological school. These defects once overcome, the psychoindividualistic interpretation is as legitimate as the sociologistic,
and it has already given valuable results.*^ The
from the psychological characteristics of man. "Personal
individualism shows itself in social competition; personal
sympathy and morality in social solidarity; personal loyalty in civic
institutions," and so on. See Baldwin, J. M., The Individual and
Society, pp. 14-17 and passim, Boston, 1911. See also Social
and Ethical Interpretations, 1907, passim. Near to the conceptions
of these authors are the positions of E. C. Hayes, E. A. Ross, F.
S. Chapin, and E. S. Bogardus. In Hayes' Introduction, an
analysis of the inherited and acquired characteristics of man
precedes an analysis of the social activities and social life; while
psychology is declared standing in the same relation to sociology
as chemistry does to biology. On the other hand, the author does
not take an individual as a social unit but regards him as a
complex phenomenon. See Hayes, E. C, Introduction to the Study
of Sociology, 1920, pp. 354-361; "Classification of Social
Phenomena," ylmen'caw Journal Sociology, Vol. XVH, pp. 109-lio.
See Ross, E. A., Principles of Sociology, 1923, Chaps. IV, VIII, IX,
X; Bogardus, E., Fundamentals of Social Psychology, 1924, Part
I; Chapin, F. vS., An Introduction to the Study of Social Evolution,
1920, pp. 102 ff. F. H. Giddings' position in this respect seems to
be a little nearer to that of "sociologism." He says that
"considerable mental development is possible only to creatures
physically but not mentally separated" and that "acquaintance,
talk, and the consciousness of kind are the specific determiners of
(human) association." On the other hand, he is free from an
extremism of "sociologism." See Giddings, The Scientific Study of
Human Society, 1924, pp. 32-34; Studies in the Theory of Human
Society, 1922, Chap, XV and his definition of society, p. 202. Still
nearer to the sociologistic position is that of W. Wundt, Sumner
and Keller, Ch. H. Cooley, and O. Spann. Cooley's statements
like "self and society are twin-born," "social consciousness is
inseparable from self-consciousness," "a separate individual is an
abstraction unknown to experience, and so likewise is society
when regarded as something apart from the individual"; and his
conceptions of the "social mind" and the whole character of his
books separate him from the psychologists; but at the same time
it seems to me that he does not go as far as the sociologistic
school. See Cooley, Charles H., Social Organization, pp. 5-7,
Chaps. I-II, VI, N. Y., 1924; Human Nature and the Social Order,
pp. 35 ff., and passim; Wundt, Wilhelm, Volkerpsychologie, Vol. I,

pp. 1-6, 1900. Also sociologistic is Spann's "universalismus." See
Spann, O., Gesellschaftslehre, 1914, pp. 244-284; Sumner, W.,
and Keller, A., op. cit.. Vol. I, pp. 40 ff. See an able survey of
other theories in Davis, Michael M., Psychological Interpretations
of Society, pp. 15-83, N. Y., 1909.
^'The dispute between "sociologism" and "psychologism," or
between "the group" and "individualistic" interpretation of social
facts, appears to me both fruitless and baseless. Both of the
methods are admissible; when properly used both have shown
themselves workable; and either one may be used according to
the nature of the problem studied, the purpose of the study, and
the tech459
above does not deny the method and the valuable contributions of
the sociologistic school, but it denies its pretension for a
monopoly on interpretation.
C. The third objection to the school is that, contrary to its
assertion, it has failed to reduce successfully either logical
categories, concepts of science, genius, or inventions, to purely
social sources. Something in this way the school has achieved,
but far less than it claims. When we are told that the conception of
God, or the Sacred, or the Mana, or the Totem, is nothing but
hypostatized society itself, and that God's characteristics like
omnipotence, eternity, omnipresence, omniscience, omni-justice,
etc., are nothing but the corresponding characteristics of a society
as it appears to an individual, (Simmel, Durkheim), we may learn
something from the statements; but do they explain completely
the mystery of the conceptions of God or of "the Sacred" ? Do
they exhaust the limits of our ideas about such phenomena or
superphenomena ? I am afraid not. When we are told that the
categories of force, space, time, efficacy, kind, and so on, are
nothing but a reflection of the characteristics of society, we again

learn something from such explanations. But how pale they seem
when put face to face with the immensely complex reality of the
human logical and psychological kingdom! More than that, in spite
of widely diverging forms of society, we see that these
fundamental logical categories are essentially the same in the
minds of Confucius, Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas, Im-manuel
Kant, Newton, Pascal, Durkheim and Mendeleeff. This could not
be if they were a mere reflection of the characteristics of a
particular society, because the societies in which these men lived
are quite different. We may agree that a genius might be
interpreted as the focus of currents of social thought and the
spokesman of what in society already exists in a diffused form.
This may be true, but does it exhaust the mystery of genius?
nical conveniences of the investigator. The dispute reminds me of
that one as to whether egg produced hen or hen produced egg.
The sooner it is dropped, the better. In a similar way, I find rather
useless the dispute about the boundary line between sociology
and social psychology. There is no such line. Attempts to draw it
are either vague or purely conditional, stimulated mainly by
"departmental considerations." Comparisons of "social
psychology" and "sociology" by the same author show that under
different names there is given practically the same bulk of
theories and problems.
460
Does this explain why we have not a Mr. Smith, but a Sir Isaac
Newton; not a somebody else, but Napoleon, or Buddha, or
Mahomet, at the center of ''the foci"? The theory, in its somewhat
vague statement, does not answer our question at all. Neither
does it attempt to offer its partizans any prediction regarding who,
in the next five years, will become such "foci," and what will be
their characteristics; for, to be sure, they could not predict it. If A.

Coste, in his flat denial of any correlation between the social
jnilieti and the appearance of a genius in philosophy, morals, arts,
music, goes too far, he is right, nevertheless, when he claims that
the correlation is often loose and almost intangible. (See above,
the chapter on the demographic school.) As an argument in favor
of the criticized thesis, W. Ogburn sets forth a list of 148
inventions made independently by two or more persons."*^ But
the very fact that out of millions of inventions made only 148 have
been listed, and the fact that these 148 inventions were made by
the persons who lived in quite different societies and under
different conditions, testifies rather against than in favor of the
hypothesis. Further, it is probable that complexity and fluidity of
social environment somewhat weakens the factor of heredity; but
is it sound to say that heredity does not play any more an
important part ? Is it possible to contend that education makes all
human beings similar? Under conditions of similar environment
and training, are all individuals to be equally capable or incapable,
equally stupid or clever ? Is, it true that their equality is realized
more and more; and, in the future, will it be realized completely ?
Alas! Such an assumption is pure metaphysics, contradicted at
every turn by facts, by experiments, and by less speculative
biological, psychological, and educational researches. These
short statements allude to what I style as the failure of the school
to reduce psychological and logical phenomena, and the
peculiarities of individuals to their essential social sources. Some
part may be reduced to them, but there still remains a great bulk
which is irreducible.^^ The school boasts more than it can
accomplish.
*^ Ogburn, W., Social Change, pp. 90-102.
^^ One of the best and sharpest criticisms of the sociologistic
school has been given by G. Palante in his Les antinomies entre
I'individu et societe, passim. See also a sound criticism of

Durkheim's theories in Gehlke, Ch. E., op. cit., passim.
461
D. As to De Roberty's classification of social phenomena, it is
sound in many respects. It is logical; it embraces the principal
forms of social thought; it properly grasps their characteristics;
and it is good as a counterbalance to the opposite classification of
the economic interpreters of history. (See the chapter on the
economic school.) Through its emphasis on scientific thought as a
primary social factor, it indicates a factor whose importance may
scarcely be overestimated. The pages and the chapters devoted
in De Roberty's works to an analysis of this factor are really
brilliant. At the present moment we have numerous factual studies
of the role of science in social and historical processes, and there
is no need to say that these studies only confirm the theory of De
Roberty. Any attempt to disregard, or to give an insignificant role
to this factor, would scarcely be recognized at the present
moment. It is enough to remember a simple computation like that
of Professor Umoff, according to which the approximate amount
of energy now used in our factories is no less than 20 billion
horse-power. Translated into human labor, this means the work of
200 billion men doing purely physical work for ten hours a day.
By turning the whole of mankind into slaves who would do only
manual work and by stopping all other kinds of human activities,
we could not obtain even one hundredth part of that mechanical
work which is given to us by modern technique created by
chemical and physical science. . . . During millions of years,
nature has increased human population to one and a half billion,
while boisterous thought of physical science, during one and a
half centuries had created one hundred times greater number of
unanimated and unpaid workers who, (in the form of harnessed
energy) serve our needs.^^
Further, De Roberty's idea that any change in the field of science

calls forth a corresponding change in other fields of social thought
in religion, philosophy, arts, applied thought, human behavior
and historical processes,could scarcely be denied either. A
series of facts and corresponding researches shows that such a
^ Umoff, N. A., "Physical Sciences in Mankind's Service," Russ.,
Priroda, February, 1913.
462
correlation exists and is quite tangible.^^ We must admit also that
the law of lagging indicated by De Roberty is, to some extent,
likely to be true also. The principal shortcomings of this part of De
Roberty's theory, as well as that of other intellectual-ists, are two:
first, its pretension of exclusiveness; and second, its assumption
that the correlation between each preceding and each
subsequent form of thought is quite perfect. As I have mentioned
in the field of social phenomena, we rarely have onesided
dependence and one-sided causal relationship, but have,
factually, almost always the relations of the interdependence of
different factors. It is reasonable to take science as a "variable"
and to try to correlate it with other phenomena such as religion,
arts and economics, which are regarded methodologically as its
"functions." But it is also reasonable to take an "economic or any
other factor" as a "variable," and to regard all others, including
science, as its "functions." Since we deal with the phenomena of
interdependence and with the "functional relations" of various
components of social life, there is no objection to such a
procedure. For this reason, we must recognize the value of De
Roberty's classification while rejecting its pretension of monopoly.^^ As to the second shortcoming, the facts do not show
that De Roberty's perfect correlation is true. Here he becomes a
victim of his "intellectualism" and forgets that man is not only a

*'logical and rational animal" but, being a biological organism,
5^ See Little, A. D., The Fifth Estate, published by The Chemical
Foundation; Dannemann, Fr., Die Naturwissenschaften in ihren
Entwicklung und in ihrem Zusammenhange, Leipzig, 1923;
Neudeck, G., Geschichte der Technik, Stuttgart, 1923; Knowles,
L. C. a., The Industrial and Commercial Revolution in Great
Britain, London, 1922; Cunningham, W., The Growth of English
Industry and Commerce, Cambridge, 1907; Espinas, A., Les
origines de la technologie; Veblen, T., The Place of Science in
Modern Civilization, N. Y., 1919; Fiske, B. A., Invention: The
Master-Key to Progress; Marvin, F. S., (ed.), Science and
Civilization; Caldwell, O., and Slosson, E. E., Science Remaking
the World, N. Y., 1924; Cressy, E., Discoveries and Inventions of
the Twentieth Century; Tilden, W. A., Chemical Discovery and
Invention in the Twentieth Century, Button & Co.; Soddy, F.,
Science and Life, 1920; Flexner, S., Twenty-five Years of
Bacteriology, Science, 1920; DucLAUX, Pasteur, The History of a
Mind, Philadelphia, 1920; Andrews, B. R., Economics of the
Household, N. Y., 1923; Eddy, W. H., The Vitamine Manual,
Williams & Wilkins Co.; Buckle, T., op. cit., passim; Espinas, A.,
La philosophie sociale du XVIlie siecle et la revolution, Paris,
1898. These works show clearly how every scientific progress has
influenced various aspects of human thought, behavior, industry,
social, economic, moral, religious, and historical processes.
^2 This pretension vitiates almost all sociological theories.
463
he is also illogical and irrational. Owing to this illogicality,
especially stressed by Pareto (see the chapter about Pareto),
man often thinks very irrationally. His reasoning is almost always
disfigured by ''various biases," emotions, affections, and so on.
Often, when new scientific ideas contradict his interests or mental
attitudes, they are simply rejected without any influence on his

religion, aesthetics, and practice. lOften a new idea is reconciled
with the existing ideologies in the most illogical way without
changing these ideologies. Sometimes it is disfigured in such a
way that there remains very little of it. Such facts are quite
common in human behavior and in the mental history of mankind.
Crhis explains why it is that not every change in scientific thought
leads to a corresponding change in synthetic thought, or why it is
that not every change in the field of religion influences aesthetic
or practical thought. ^ Often such a change in a preceding form of
thought passes without exerting any influence on the subsequent
one. Sometimes such changes are suppressed and disappear, to
be discovered again centuries later. De Roberty's law of lagging is
a partial corroboration of this. Therefore, though De Roberty's
correlation is tangible, it is far from being close and perfect.
Such are the principal limitations and objections to this branch of
the sociologistic school. Outside of these defects, the remaining
part of its theories are to be recognized as valuable. Let us now
pass to Durkheim's variety of the school.
4. E. DURKHEIM AND HIS SCHOOL ^^
The second fundamental variety of the sociologistic school is
represented by E. Durkheim and his collaborators. Among con" Born in 1858 in France, died in 1917, professor of Social
Science at the University of Bordeaux; later professor of
Sociology and Education at the University of Paris. Founder and
editor-in-chief of Uannee sociologique. Author of numerous
articles and books, among which the most important are: De la
division du travail social, 1893; Les regies de la method
sociologique; Le suicide, 1897; Les formes elementaires de la vie
religieuse, 1912. About Durkheim there is considerable literature.
Besides the mentioned works of Gehlke and Deploige, see Barth,
P., op. cit., pp. 628-642; Branford, V., "Durkheim," Sociological
Review, 1918; Halbwachs, M., "La doctrine de E. Durkheim,"

Revue Philos-ophique, 1918; Barnes, H. E., "Durkheim's
Contribution to the Reconstruction of Political Theory," Political
Science Quarterly, 1920; BouGLE, C, "Die Philos. Tendenzen der
Soziologie E. Durkheim," Jahrbuch fur Soziologie, Vol. 11. 1026;
464
temporary sociologists, Durkheim has occupied one of the most
important places. In France only G. Tarde has possibly been as
influential as Durkheim. Besides several heterogeneous causes,
this has been due to the character of the sociological works of
Durkheim. He fortunately combined the ability of broad, logical,
and philosophical thought with the scrupulous and careful method
of a scientist. Every hypothesis formed by him is formulated on
the basis of patient study of the corresponding facts. After the
formulation, he carefully tries to verify it again through an
inductive study of the factual data. This has made his works quite
superior to the purely speculative philosophizing in social
sciences, as well as to the narrow, matter-of-fact descriptions of a
definite phenomenon. Hence the eminence of Durkheim.
General Characteristics of Durkheim's Sociology. The above
mentioned characteristics of the principles of the sociologistic
school are practically the same as those of Durkheim's sociology.
For this reason, there is no need to repeat them.'"*^
It is enough to indicate only briefly a few specific traits added by
Durkheim to the theories developed before him. In accordance
with the position of sociology he stresses that ''collective
consciousness specifically differs from individual consciousness";
that ''they are composed of different elements"; that "sociology is
not a corollary of psychology," and that "not in psychology, but in
the very nature of society, it is necessary to look for an
explanation of social life." '''^ In order to discriminate collective

consciousness from individual consciousness, and social fact
from purely psychological fact, Durkheim introduces two objective
criteria: exteriority and constraint. The psychical nature of social
phenomena separates them from purely biological phenomena.
The fact that collective representations exist outside of the
individual and come to his mind as something exterior in the
DuPRAT, G. L., "La psycho-sociologie en France," Archiv fur
Geschichte der Philosophic und Soziologie, Vol. XXX, heft 1-2;
Sorokin, P., "E. Durkheim's Theory of ReHgion," Russ., in Ne%u
Ideas in Sociology, Vol. II; Kovalevsky, M., op. cit., pp. 134-164;
SoREL, G., "Les theories de M. Durkheim," Le devenir social. Vol.
I, 1895; BouGLE, C, "Revue generale des theories recentes sur la
division du travail," Uannee sociologique, Vol. VI; Fauconnet, op.
cit.
^^ This side of Durkheim's theory is quite satisfactorily analyzed in
Gehlke's work on Durkheim.
^^ Durkheim, E., Regies de la methode sociologique, 1895, pp.
125-128.
465
form of various moral, religious, juridical and logical rules; and the
fact that they are endowed with a power of coercion, which allows
them to impose themselves upon an individual regardless of his
individual desires, these two characteristics indicate a
boundary line between social and purely psychological
phenomena.^^ This logically leads Durkheim to an admission of
the reality of the social mind; collective representations; and a
society independent and different from the reality of individual
minds, representations, and psychology.
Society is not at all the illogical or a-logical, incoherent and

fantastic being which it has too often been considered. Quite on
the contrary, the collective consciousness is the highest form of
the psychic life, since it is the consciousness of consciousness.
Being placed outside of and above individual and local
contingencies, it sees things only in their permanent and essential
aspects, which it crystallizes into communicable ideas. . . Society
sees farther and better, than individuals. ^'^
In this way, the criteria of the social facts of exteriority and
constraint lead Durkheim to a recognition of the existence of a
social mind independent from, and exterior to, individuals,a
peculiarity not so much stressed by De Roberty, but typical of a
great many of the representatives of sociologistic realism or
psycho-organicism.^^ Before going further, let us discuss briefly
to what extent this part of Durkheim's sociology is true. As far as it
means that the psychical phenomena undergo a change in the
process of social interaction and would become different if there
were no interaction of individuals; and as far as he states that the
regularity of social processes does not coincide with the regularity
which may be expected from the activities of iso^^ Les regies, Chap. I; Representations individuelles, passim; in
this point Durkheim's position is identical with Stammler's theor>'.
See Stammler, R., Wirtschaft und Recht nach der materialist
Geschichtsauffassung, 1896.
'^"^ Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, tr. by
Swain, p. 444 and passim.
^^ Besides Gumplowicz, Espinas, De Roberty and Durkheim,
similar in this respect is the attitude of the organic school, (see the
chapter about it); Gierke, Deutsche Privatrecht, Vol. I, p. 468,
1895; Posada, A., "Les soci^tes animales" in Annales de Vlnstitut.
Int. de Sociologie, Vol. Ill, p. 271; BooDiN, J. E., "The Existence of
Social Mind," Amer. Journal Sociology, July, 1913; Ferriere, La loi
du progres en biologic et sociologie, 1915, part III; Coste, A., Les

principes d'unc sociologie objective, pp. i fT., 26 fl., and of a great
many others.
466
lated individuals; the statement may scarcely be questioned. But
as far as it means an existence of mind or psychical phenomena
outside of the mind of individuals, and an existence of a society
independent from its individual members, the proposition could
scarcely be accepted. It creates a kind of fictitious entity. In this
case Tarde's criticism of Durkheim's realism seems to be valid. "I
confess," he says, ''that it is difficult for me to understand how,
after excluding the individuals, vê can have a society as a
remnant. If the students and the professors are excluded from a
university, I do not think there remains in it anything but the name.
Durkheim apparently tries to return us to the realism of the Middle
Ages." ^^ This is the more true because the difference between
social and individual regularities can be explained much more
simply, through the fact of neutralization of individual phenomena
in a mass of individual actions and reactions. In brief this side of
Durkheim's realism is scientifically wrong and ought to be
rejected, as it is nothing but unjustified mysticism. This also
concerns similar conceptions of the sociological realism of other
mentioned sociologists.
The criteria of exteriority and constraint as the characteristics of
social phenomena, may be useful in a study of some particular
problems, as, for instance, in a study of juridical and moral
phenomena. Nevertheless, when Durkheim says that only the
phenomena which are compulsive are social phenomena, he
unreasonably limits their field. Here, Tarde's criticism is again
valid. In this case, says Tarde, it seems that only the relationship
of the conqueror to the conquered, the facts of enslaving, and the
phenomena of compulsion would be social phenomena.

Meanwhile, all instances where there is free cooperation, like a
free conversion of a people into a new religion, free contractual
relations, free mutual aid, free solidarity, free imitation, free
learning and thousands of similar facts; all these are to be
excluded from the field of social facts. Such a conception of social
phenom5^ Tarde, G., La logique sociale, pp. i ff.; Etudes de psychologie
sociale, pp. 69-75, Paris, 1918. Recently F. Allport, in his Social
Psychology, gave a similar criticism of the sociological realism
generally. See also my System of Sociology, Vol. I, Chap. VI;
Duprat, G., Science sociale et democratic, 1900, pp. 59, 68-69;
LiTT, T., Individuum und Gemeinschaft, 1924, pp. 151 ff.; Haff, K.,
"Kritik der Genossenschaftstheorie," Jahrhuch filr Soziologie, B. II,
pp. 288 ff.
467
ena is evidently fallacious.^^ I think that Tarde's remarks are quite
valid.
Now let us pass to the special works of Durkheim. His real
contributions consist not so much in his general statements, like
the above, as in his factual studies and in the series of
correlations which he tried to establish, to support his
fundamental principles.
Durkheim's Analysis of Social Solidarity, its Causes, Forms and
Effects. This study was given in Durkheim's De la division de
travail social.^^ Under this somewhat misleading title, Durkheim
made a careful study of social solidarity, in which field he had
many predecessors. Plato, Aristotle, Comenius, W. Petty, A.
Ferguson, Adam Smith, Saint-Simon, and more recently, A.
Comte, H. Spencer, J. S. Mill, H. C. Carey and many other
economists outlined the essentials of Durkheim's theory. Six
years before Durkheim, Ferdinand Tonnies,^^ and three years

before, Georg Simmel,^^ set forth theories of social differentiation
almost identical with those of Durkheim. This, however, does not
mean that Durkheim did not show any originality, or that he did
not add anything new to what had been written by his
predecessors. The work contains many propositions based on a
careful analysis of factual material which we cannot find in the
earlier works. In the first part of the book Durkheim takes division
of labor as a 'Variable" and tries to correlate its forms and
variations with other social phenomena viewed as ''effects" or
''functions." The principal conclusions and correlations obtained
may be summed up in the following table, which shows what
socio-psychical phenomena are influenced by changes among
the variable. Such are the principal effects of the variation of labor
division, as a social factor, on different sides of social life and
psychology. From the above it follows that a series of
psychological changes are a mere "function" of the corresponding
^ Tarde, G., Etudes, pp. 69-75. The same may be said against
Stammler's :x)nception.
" See Bougl6, C, "Th^ries sur la division du travail," L'annee
sociologique, Vol. VI.
"ToNNiES, F., Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, Leipzig, 1887.
" SiMMEL, G., Ueber soziale Differenzierung, Leipzig, 1890.
468
With What Phenomena the Variable is Correlated, and How
Variable: Division of Labor
I. Lack of or a slight division of labor in a society is followed by the

specified effects in each of the specified fields of phenomena:
469
2. In the process of time, division of labor grows. 'J'his is an
historical trend. When division of labor becomes great, it
determines the following changes in the same fields of social
phenomena:
470
variation of labor division, as an objective social process. In this
way, Durkheim remains faithful to his sociologistic position. In the
second part of the book, the author, so to speak, re^ verses his
equation, and asks: What are the causes responsible for an
increase in the division of labor itself; or, in other words, what are
the variables of this phenomenon now viewed as a mere
''function"? The answer to this question is less elaborate, but,
nevertheless, it is clear that Durkheim remains faithful to the
position of ''sociologism." The usual answer that an increase in
the labor division is due to a psychological tendency to happiness
does not account for the fact at all. There is no reason for thinking
that, with an increase in the division of labor, happiness
increases. On the contrary, an increasing number of cases of
suicide, nervousness, and dissatisfaction within highly
differentiated societies, on the one hand; and on the other hand,
the well-proved fact of the happiness and satisfaction of primitive
peoples testifies that happiness tends to decrease with the
progress of labor division. Therefore, this, and similar
psychological hypotheses, cannot explain any progressive
increase of social differentiation. Its causes are to be looked for in
the objective social conditions themselves. One of the principal
factors has been the increase
471
in population, with its increasing density, or *'the dynamic and
moral density" of the morphological structure of a society. Such
an increase leads to an intensification of the struggle for life. If all
members of an increasing society would perform the same
functions, as for instance, if all would become tailors, they would
have less opportunity to procure the means of subsistence.
Competition is the sharpest among members of the same
occupation when there is a superabundance of membership.
When they follow different occupations, they may exist side by
side without an intensive struggle, and with greater opportunity to
obtain their means of subsistence. Hence, an increase in the
density of a population leads to an increase in the division of
labor; which result leads to the above effects in the social
processes, organization, and psychology of the individuals. Such,
in brief, is the skeleton of Durkheim's well rounded and
harmonious theory of forms, causes, and effects of social
solidarity. His ''sociologistic" position must be clear from the
above.
The same sociologistic principles permeate other monographic
studies of Durkheim. In his excellent investigation of suicide,^"* he
shows, in the first place, that the suicide movement cannot be
accounted for either through psychopathic factors, through race
and heredity, through geographical factors, or through imitation
and other purely psychological factors, or by poverty, or unhappy
love, or other personal motives. A careful analysis of the statistical
data contradicts all such hypotheses. After this, in a brilliant
manner, Durkheim shows that all the principal types of suicide
the egotistical, the altruistic and the anomiqueare due entirely
to social causes.
Egotistical suicide is due to an increase in the social isolation of
an individual or, what is the same, to a decrease in the intensity of
the social cohesion of a group. For this reason, the single and the
divorced give a higher per cent of suicide than the married people
because family bonds make the isolation of the married less
intensive. Roman Catholics, whose religion is more dogmatic and
integrates its members strongly, show a smaller percentage of
suicides than do Protestants or free-thinkers, who are removed
from such ties. For the same reason, the periods of social move" Le suicide, Paris, 1887. I quote the edition of 1912.
472
ment or war, when individuals go out of "their individual shells,"
decreasing their isolation and increasing their social cohesion, are
marked by a sudden decrease of suicide; while the ends of such
movements, when the individuals again confine themselves within
their "shells," are marked by a sudden increase in suicides.
Ajwmique suicide is due to a sudden shattering of the social
equilibrium and moral constitution of a society. Suicides after
economic crises and bankruptcies are examples of this type. The
usual explanation, that they are due to an increase of poverty, is
not valid, because there are plenty of poor people and classes
among whom suicide is almost unknown; and because suicide
increases not only when the disturbance of equilibrium leads to
impoverishment, but also when it leads to prosperity. The cause is
the mentioned increase of Fanomie so dale.
Altruistic suicide is due to an increased engulf ment of an
individual in a group when an individual is regarded only as a
member of a group, without much regard for his own personality
or individuality and when he is controlled completely by the group.
This engulf ment is psychologically expressed by the feeling of
duty in an individual to sacrifice himself for the group at any
moment when it is necessary; or when he may, through his

actions, disgrace the group. Among the members of primitive
groups, this psychology of engulfment and duty is expressed with
mechanistic solidarity; in an army, by a soldier; and in a definite
group with a strong esprit de corps, by its members (Livre II).
Thus, "the curve of suicide" "may be accounted for only
sociologically. It is the moral constitution of a society which at any
given moment fixes the number of suicides. For every society
there exists a collective force of a certain energy, which pushes
individuals to kill themselves. The movements which are
performed by such a person, and which, on the first approach,
may appear as a manifestation of their individual temperament, in
reality are nothing but the result and exterior manifestation of a
corresponding social constitution. Each society according to its
morphological structure and collective constitution has its own
collective proclivity to the act of suicide, and it is this collective
proclivity which determines individual proclivities to suicide, but
473
not contrariwise." Such is the final result of the study, which again
stresses ''the sociologistic" position of Durkheim.^^
Finally, in his book upon religion, Durkheim has given a very
penetrating analysis of the nature, sources, forms, efifects and
variations of religion from the same "sociologistic" standpoint.
After a destructive criticism of the common definition of religion,
such as a belief in God or in supernatural forces, he defines
religion as ''a unified system of belief and practices relative to
sacred things; that is to say, things set apart and forbidden
beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community
called a Church, all those who adhere to them." ^''*
Its essence is the division of all things and phenomena into two
kingdoms : the profane and the sacred. Its teachings urge the
members of a religion not to mix these two kingdoms because
mixing is a sin or religious sacrilege; and it teaches them to

approach the kingdom of the sacred or, when mixing does
happen, in order that they may annul its sinful results, it urges
them to perform religious purification, whatever its concrete form
may be. These functions and characteristics of religious
phenomena are manifested in thousands of forms: in a special
separation of the places for religious services from the places of
usual profane activities; in a prohibition to use such places for
everyday affairs; and in a separation of the time devoted to the
sacred from that devoted to the profane; hence arise holidays
when it is forbidden to do profane things, as is specified in the
fourth Commandment. The same essence of religion is exhibited
by religious ceremonies whose purpose is either to purify man
from sin, as is the case in confession; or, like the Eucharist and
baptism, to make a profane man a participant of the sacred; or,
like a consecration, to give him an additional portion of the
sacred. In the next part Durkheim criticizes the animistic and the
naturistic theory of the origin of religion. The first theory, which is
set forth by E. Tylor and H. Spencer, tries to explain the
appearance of religious belief through such bio-social factors as
dreams, visions of shadows, death, psychoses, and other biopsychological phenomena. The second theory, represented by M.
Miiller and others ascribes the
*^ Ihid., p. 336.
^ The Elementary Forms of fhe Religious Life, tr. by vSwain,
London, p. 47.
474
origin of religion to impressive cosmical phenomena, like
thunderstorms, lightning, earthquakes, the sun, the moon, rivers,
and so on, which primitive man cannot control, and which impress
him enormously. Durkheim convincingly shows the fallacies and

inadequacy of these theories.^^ Finally, after a careful and
painstaking analysis of the elementary forms of religious
phenomena, he sets forth his own theory,that the source of
religion is the society itself; that religious conceptions are nothing
but symbols of the characteristics of the society; that the sacred,
or God, is but a personified society; and that the substantial social
function of religion has consisted in the creation, reinforcement,
and maintenance of social solidarity. For this reason, religion has
played a great and beneficial role in history. In spite of the
temporary crisis of a certain religion, it will exist in some form as
long as social solidarity exists. Concrete forms of religion change
but its essence is eternal. In brief, Durkheim has given us a
harmonious sociologistic theory of religion.^^ Together with this,
he gives the sociologistic theory of knowledge generally. In the
words of Durkheim himself, the essence of his general
conclusions are as follows:
Religious representations are collective representations which
express collective realities; the rites are a manner of acting which
take rise in the midst of the assembled groups and which are
destined to excite, maintain, or recreate certain mental states in
these groups. . . The religious life is the concentrated expression
of the whole collective life. . . The idea of society is the soul of
religion. Religious forces are therefore human forces, moral
forces. . . Religion, far from ignoring the real society and making
abstraction of it, is in its image; it reflects all its aspects, even the
most vulgar and the most repulsive.
Similar to religious ideas and concepts, there are other general
concepts of the human mind, such as the concepts of time,
space, class, force, personality, efficiency, and so on; all of which
are due to the same social factors.
67 Ibid., Chaps. II-III.
68 As I shall show further, Durkheim had many predecessors who

expressed similar ideas. Among relatively recent writers, it is
enough to mention the names of J. de I^laistre, De Bonald, SaintSimon, A. Comte, B. Kidd, and especially, F. de Coulanges (see
his La cite antique), J. Frazer, and G. Simmel, who, in his small
pamphlet, Religion, gave the skeleton of Durkheim's theory.
475
Try to represent what the notion of time would be without the
processes by which we divide and measure it. . . This is
something nearly unthinkable! Now what is the origin of this
differentiation [of time into days, weeks, years]. It is not so much
our personal experience because it is not my time that is thus
arranged; it is time in general. . . That alone is enough to give us
a hint that such an arrangement ought to be collective. The
divisions into days, weeks, months, years, etc., corresponds to
the periodical recurrence of rites, feasts, and public ceremonies.
A calendar expresses the rhythm of the collective activities, while
at the same time its function is to assure their regularity.
It is the same thing with space. [Without its differentiation, space,
like time, is almost unthinkable, too.] But whence come these
divisions [of space] which are so essential? By themselves, they
are neither right nor left, up nor down, north nor south, etc. All
these distinctions evidently come from the fact that different
sympathetic values have been attributed to various regions.
[Besides, representations of space show their social origin. In
some groups in Australia] space is conceived in the form of an
immense circle because the camp of the tribe has a circular form;
and this special circle is divided exactly like the tribal circle.
Analogous proofs will be found presently in regard to the ideas of
class, force, personality and efficacy. It is even possible to ask if
the idea of contradiction does not also depend upon social
conditions. [Evidently] if men did not agree upon the essential
ideas, if they did not have the same conception of time, space,
cause, number, etc., all contact between their minds would be
impossible, and with that, all life together. Society could not
abandon its categories to the free choice of the individual without
abandoning itself.^''"^
Such, in brief, are the contributions of Durkheim and his sociologistic interpretation of social and psychical phenomena. As we
see, in essence his sociology coincides with that of De Roberty's
school. Leaving without discussion ^^ Durkheim's
The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, pp. 10-17, 419-21;
see the whole introduction and conclusion. See also Levi-Bruhl,
Les functions mentales dans les socicies inferieur, 1910; Hubert
et Mauss, Melanges d'histoire des religions; Levy-Bruhl, La moral
et la science des moeiirs, Paris, 1903. In these works of
Durkheim's coUaboiators are expressed the theories similar with
that of Durkheim.
^ A relatively good account of this side of Durkheim's ideology is
given in the mentioned works of Deploige, Bougie, Gehlke, and in
the mentioned paper of H. E. Barnes.
476
political and ethical ideas, which pertain to the field of practical
judgments, let us now turn to a brief criticism of the above
theories of Durkheim.
Criticism. The above criticism of the general principles of the
sociologistic school concerns Durkheim's sociology also.
Therefore there is no need to repeat it. We may say only that
Durkheim's monographic studies have shown clearly that purely
social factors in the form of social interaction, (morphology of
society, its organization, and its social processes) cannot be

ignored in an explanation of social and psychical phenomena.
Durkheim's works made this especially clear. But recognizing this
value of the sociologistic interpretation, shall we follow Durkheim
as far as to exclude all other interpretations? I think we shall not,
and Durkheim himself gives a sufficient reason for such a
conclusion. Take his explanation of the origin of the idea of the
sacred, of the concepts of time, of space, of efficiency, and so on.
He states that religious belief in the kingdom of the sacred was
caused by the alternation of periods of dispersion and of
gathering of primitive groups. In the period of dispersion they lead
a dull, monotonous, and tedious life; while in the period of
gathering, like the corrohorri of the Australians, they experience a
complete change of psychology in the form of great excitement,
joyful madness, feverish impulsiveness resulting from
interstimulation, drink, food, dances, and so on. Being unable to
account rationally for such a transformation of their feelings,
primitive men explained it through some impersonal sacred force
which entered their body and made them ''sacred" also. Is such a
theory sufficient? It is not. In the first place, the very fact of the
alternation of periods of dispersion and of gathering of a primitive
tribe is considerably controlled by climatic seasons : a tribe
disperses into parts during a season poor in natural products, and
gathers together in a season of natural abundance. This means
that, at least indirectly, these social processes are controlled by
geographical factors; if they were different, the social processes
would likewise be different, and through that, the psychical states
of the people. Other evidence we have in the facts that the totems
of tribes are local plants or animals; that the ideas of heaven and
hell, of good and evil gods, and so on, are
477
xnarked by the local color of geographic environment; that the
deification of the moon, the sun, the thunderstorm, and of other
cosmic phenomena is quite common; all these and a thousand

similar properties of religious representations indicate the role
played by cosmic environment in the origin and development of
such representations. It is improbable that the cosmic phenomena
could have failed to impress the minds of primitive peoples who
greatly depend upon cosmic forces, when they impress even the
mind of a cultured man. Furthermore, Durkheim and other
representatives of sociology, exaggerate the static character of
cosmic milieu. Still clearer is the role of this milieu in the origin
and development of the ideas of time, space, efficiency and so
on. If division of time into days, weeks, months and years,
expresses the rhythm of the collective activity, it even more
clearly expresses the rhythm of natural phenomena: the division
of time into days, months, years and seasons coincides with the
daily alternation of light and darkness; with the rhythm of the
moon's cycles; and with the sequence of the seasons and the
sun's yearly cycles. '^^ This is so evident that only a strong
preconception may hinder our seeing it. The same is true in
regard to space. The natural milieu is not something so formless
as to lack coordination wîth spacial location of events and things.
"Farther than this tree," "to the right of that hill," "below this
mountain," "up or down the river,"these spacial coordinations
are quite natural and practically known to all primitive peoples. No
less known to them is spacial orientation according to the position
of the sun, the stars, the moon, and thousands of other cosmic
phenomena. Their role in this respect is likely to be more
conspicuous than that of the forms of a tribal camp. This is also
corroborated by the fact of relatively uniform representations of
space and time in a great many social groups with the most
different political and social organization. If the hypothesis of
Durkheim were accurate, this could not have happened. These
indications are enough to see the one-sidedness of Durkheim's
sociology and the undeniable role of cosmic milieu in the origin
and shaping of religious representations, and of the ideas of time,
space, and other conceptual categories.
'1 See the facts in Nilsson, Martin, P., Primitive Time Reckoning,
Lund, 1920.
478
With still greater reason this may be said of the role of biological
factors in this respect. Take the character and purpose of the
fundamental religious rites among primitive, and even cultured
peoples. Is it not true that one of the principal rites among
primitive peoples is the rite for the multiplication of food and
means of subsistence? Is it not true that the same motive fills a
great many religious prayers beginning with the Christian: *'Give
us this day our daily bread"? Is it not true that a similar role is
played by the biological phenomenon of procreation and sex
interrelations? If these and similar biological phenomena had not
existed, fully half of the religious ideas, rites, prayers and so on
would not have appeared. Furthermore, did Durk-heim succeed in
showing that such biological phenomena as dreams, psychoses,
mental diseases, and so on, did not play any part in the origin and
shaping of the religious-animistic-representations? He did not.
What he has shown is only that they alone cannot account for
them. More than that, it is evident that if human beings had
possessed quite a different nervous system and biological
constitution, their ideas would have been quite different, or there
would have been no ideas. In order that social contact may play
its role, it is necessary that man have a biological constitution,
and, especially, a nervous system. Rats or sparrows may interact
as much as you please, and yet their interaction cannot yield
anything like religious representations or concepts. For this
reason it is utterly fallacious to ignore the role of biological forces,
as is done by Durkheim in his "sociologistic enthusiasm." C.
Bougie, one of the most eminent collaborators of Durkheim, had
to acknowledge that
there are two elements which cannot be accounted for through, or

created by, any collective enthusiasm: the nature of the things
and the nature of human mind. [It is true that social milieu plays
an important part in the mental development.] But he who says
development says germ. The most various experiences and
interactions could not have produced ideas and concepts known
to us if man, before such experiences, had not reacted in a
certain way predetermined by his nature. Is this nature itself also
an entirely social creation? Is such a precious intellectual
instrument as an arm a social gift also? . . . The forces born from
collective living always have
479
worked on a certain number of the forms given before their
interference. . . . You may prove that these forces have played a
modifying, facilitating, or hindering role; nevertheless, you cannot
prove they have been the only creative forcesJ^
These brief allusions are sufficient to show the fallacious onesidedness of Durkheim's sociology. So much for this point. The
above criticism is corroborated by Durkheim himself in his study
of the division of labor. Granting that his correlations of the
division of labor with other phenomena are correct,^^ what factors
^2 BouGLE, Legons de sociologie sur revolution des valeurs, p.
193, Paris, 1922.
'3 However, this admission is not quite justified. Some of the
correlations are very questionable. Some of the premises and
statements of Durkheim are fallacious. I cannot enter here into a
detailed criticism of all his mistakes. Instead of this, I shall simply
refer the reader to the quoted work of M. Kovalevsky,
Contemporary Sociologists, and to N. K. Michailovsky's article
about Durkheim's book on the division of labor, where is given, as
far as I know, the best factual criticism of Durkheim's theory of the
division of labor. Unfortunately these works are in Russian, and

are, therefore, not available to non-Russians, ("Rossica sunt, non
leguntur"). Here I can only enumerate some of his mistakes
without any corroboration of my statements. Durkheim's
assumption that law is rarely in conflict with ethics or morals is
questionable. His assumption that the less there is of the division
of labor, and the more homogeneous is the moral consciousness
of a group; the more repressive will be the law, and the more
abundant and cruel the punishments; is in no way a general
phenomenon. A variation of this idea is given by Durkheim in his
article: "Deux lois de revolution penale," L'annee sociologique,
Vol. IV, which is fallacious. See Sorokin, Crime and Punishment,
Russ., pp. 433 ff. His theory that the most ancient institution of
justice is the public meeting of the whole tribe, is also erroneous,
as is his theory that the primitive tribes knew only a communal
form of property. His claim that a great division of labor results in
an increase of freedom, independence, solidarity, hearty
cooperation, unvariable mental progress, and so on, is more than
questionable. A moderate but valid criticism of this, besides
Kovalevsky's and Michailovsky's works, is given in Bougie's
mentioned Revue general dei theories sur la division du travail,
pp. 90 fT. Durkheim's faith in the beneficial results of
governmental regulation and control of contractual relations
between capital and labor in forms which remind one of "the
Russian Communist System," or the mediaeval reglementation of
labor, is a mere faith which, having been disproved many times, is
disproved still more by the opposite result of the Russian
experiment. Durkheim's assumption that the struggle for life is
always stronger between the members of the same occupation
than between the members of different occu])ations, is again a
wrong generalization of a partial fact into a general law. He
forgets the other side of the phenomena, namely, the solidarity of
the members of the same occupation, which is so conspicuously
manifested in labor and occupational unions, in "class-struggles,"
where not the members of the same class, but those of different
classes fight each other, and so on. See Sorokin, System of

Sociology,-Vol. I, pp. 351 ff. Durkheim's theory does not give any
account as to how the solidarity of tribes not having division of
labor appeared. His claim that, with an increase of labor division,
the inheritance of social position and the caste-])rinciplc invariably
decrease, is not warranted by the facts. See Sorokin, Social
Mobility, Parts I and II. His similar assumption
480
have been responsible for the very fact of the modification of
labor's division itself? As soon as Durkheim puts this problem, he
has to recognize at once its dependence on the factor of
procreation and multiplication of the people,a factor essentially
biological. Increase of labor division is principally the result of an
increase of population. Such is his answer. Is this not an evident
proof that division of labor, or any other social factor is not selfsufficient, and can be taken as variable only methodologically? As
soon as we try to turn this conventional ''primacy" of a factor into
a substantial or dogmatic one, or to regard it as independent of
other factors, the insufficiency of such a method at once becomes
evident.'^'* Without continumg this chain of thought, the above is
enough to conclude that, although recognizing the claim of
"sociologism" for its interpretation of social phenomena, and its
valuable contributions to the science of sociology, we should
unhesitatingly reject its claim of scientific monopoly of
investigation. Let us now turn to the third branch of the
sociologistic school, represented by the works of L. Gumplowicz
and his followers.
5. L. GUMPLOWICZ,^"' F. OPPENHEIMER, AND OTHERS
The purely philosophical part of the theories of Gumplowicz which
are embodied in his series of ''the laws" of Causation,
that the role of heredity decreases with an increase of labor

division is questionable also. These are a few of the many
questionable assumptions and even plain blunders given in
Durkheim's book.
^^ This concerns also Durkheim's study of the factors of suicide. If
his study has made evident the role of the social factors in the
movement of suicide, it did not succeed in showing that all other
factors do not have any influence. Many fluctuations of the
suicide-curve are unaccountable through Durkheim's theory. On
the other hand, a series of investigators have shown quite a
tangible correlation of the suicide movement with other biological,
jjsychological, geographical, and social influences. See von Mayr,
G., oi). cit., Vol. Ill, pp. 258-405.
^^ Ludwig Gumplowicz, of Polish-Jewish stock, was born in 1838
and committed suicide in 1909. He was professor at the
University of Gratz in Austria. The principal works of Gumplowicz
are: Rasse und Staat, 1875; Allgemeines Staatsrecht, 1877; Der
Rassenkampf, 1883; Griindriss der Soziologie, 1885; Sozi-ologie
und Politik, 1892; Die soziologische Staatsidee, 1892; Geschichte
der Staats-theorien, 1905. About Gumplowicz see Zebrowski, B.,
L. Gumplowicz, Berlin, 1926; Salomon, G., Preface to the new
edition of Geschichte des Staatstheorien, 1926; KocKANOWSKi,
L., "Ludwig Gumplowicz," American Journal Sociology, Vol. XV;
Ward, L., L. Gumplowicz, ibid., Vol. XV; corresponding chapters in
Small, A., General Sociology; Jacobs, P. P., German Sociology,
N. Y., 1909; Barnes. H- E.. "The Struggle of Races and -Social
Groups," Journal of Race De481
Development, Periodicity, Complexity, Parallelism and so on,'^' I
shall leave entirely out of the discussion. As a logical analysis of
these fundamental principles of science, it is too elementary; and
as a sociological interpretation of these scientific categories, it is

somewhat out of date.
Giimplowicz's ''Sociologism/' Of the sociological characteristics
of Gumplowicz's theory, the most obvious is his ''sociolo-gism," in
the most conspicuous form. He declares that the chief concern of
sociology is not the individuals, but exclusively the groups; and
that individuals in themselves are nothing but the mere product of
a group. Two brief quotations are sufficient to show his position.
We contend that the real elements of a social process are not
separate individuals but social groups; in history we shall study
not the regularities of the behavior of individuals, but that of the
movements of groups.'^'^
The great error of individualistic psychology is the supposition that
man thinks. It leads to a continual search for the source of thought
in an individual, and for the reason why the individual thinks so
and not otherwise. ... A chain of errors: for it is not man himself
who thinks but his social community; the source of his thought is
in the social medium in which he lives. . . . Man's mind and
thought are the product of his social medium, of the social
element whence he arose, in which he lives.''^
Criticism. There is no need to continue these quotations: we are
already well acquainted with this kind of thought. What is to be
noted is that Gumplowicz's "sociologism" is much ruder and
rougher than that of the previous two branches. For this reason it
is still more objectionable. I wonder how^ one can understand a
group completely ignoring individuals. His declaration is identical
to that of a biologist who would declare that, in order to
velopment, Vol. IX; Barth, P., op. cit., pp. 266 ff.; Kovalevskv, M.,
op.cit., pp. 89-134; Ross, E., Foundations of Sociology, p. 4;
Todd, A. J., Theories of Social Progress, 1919, pp. 133 ff., 276 ff.
Furthermore, considerable attention is given to his works in a
great many of the sociological works of F. Oppenheimer, F.

Savorgnan, M. Vaccaro, Ratzenhofer, and others; Lichtenberger,
J., Development of Social Theory, pp. 436 ff.
^ See GuMPLOwicz, Outlines of Sociology, tr. by Moore, pp. 7682, N. Y., 1899.
'^ GuMPLOWicz, Der Rassenkampf, pp. 39-40, Innsbruck, 1883.
^8 Outlines of Sociology, pj). 156 ff.
482
study the structure and the function of a complex organism, a
biologist needs to study only tissues and not the cells; and that
the cells should be entirely eliminated from the study.*^^ The
biologists will scarcely give credit to such a contention. The
sociologists unfortunately, have given it.^^ I wish I could see also
how ''not a man, but a community thinks." Unfortunately I have
failed in this desire. All that I have seen is this: The decisions and
opinions enacted by a group of individuals are often different from
those of some of the individuals; and sometimes the opinion of
certain individuals prevails, while at other times, the ascendancy
is obtained by the opinion of other members. However, I never
have seen a ''community's thought." Moreover, I do not think
anybody has observed one. Gumplowicz's claim is either an
inaccurate fagon de parler, or a simple "blunder." ^^ So much for
this point.
Principles of Gumplowicz's Theory. Further principles of
Gumplowicz's theory are as follows : First, the theory of polygenesis, or the multiple origin of mankind developed by Gobineau thirty
years before Gumplowicz. Second, the assumption of an inherent
and deadly hatred in the relationship of one group to another,
resulting in an inevitable and deadly struggle between the groups

(Rassenkampf). Third, the assumption that ojily through such a
struggle has any enlargement of the social group, or any
consolidation of tzvo or more groups into one social body, been
possible. Fourth, the victorious group, having conquered its
victim, pitilessly exploits it, turning it into slaves or subjects.
" SoROKiN, System of Sociology, Vol. II, p. 14.
* I regret to say that L. Ward, A. Small, Kochanowsky, A. J. Todd
and others greatly overestimated the value of Gumplowicz's
theories. In this, as well as in several other cases. Small's and
Ward's thinking is rather loose and misleading. See correct
remark of P. Barth, op. cit., p. 270, note 4.
8^ The fallacy of Gumplowicz's "sociologism" is shown by his own
theories. Having excluded the individuals, he had to explain how
"the groups," or his "syngenetic hordes" have originated. His
explanation asserts that these groups are the union of individuals
bound together by the community of language, reHgion,
occupation, locality, consanguinity, and common interests. Der
Rassenkampf, chapter about Syngenism; Outlines of Sociology,
pp. 92 ff., 100. Such an explanation means, first, mixing the race
as a zoological type with social or ethnic groups; second, an
admission of individuals who were excluded before; and third, the
petitio principii. Gumplowicz says that there are inimical groups
because their language, religion, etc., are different. When we ask
how these differences in religion, language, etc., have arisen, he
answers: because there have been different groups.
Unfortunately sociology is rich in this kind of theory.
483
For the sake of successfully controlling them, it enacts laws, and
in this way we have: (i) the origin of the states as a union of the
victorious and the subjugated groups, in which the conquerors
become the privileged and governing body, while the conquered

become the exploited and disfranchized body; (2) the origin of law
as a totality of compulsory rules enacted by the governing group
for the sake of controlling and exploiting the subjugated group; (3)
the origin of social stratification and inequality causing the
conquerors to become the aristocracy, while the conquered
become the lower strata. The fifth principle is that in the course of
time differences between the conquerors and the conquered
decrease. The conquerors take over the language and the religion
of the conquered, and the gap between them is more and more
obliterated. In this way the group becomes more and more
solidified until, it subjugates, or is subjugated, by another group,
when the above process is repeated again. In the repetition of
such "ricorsi" we find an essential process of history. Such is a
concise summary of Gumplowicz's sociological theory. The above
set of hypotheses, or a part of them, have found several
supporters. Besides A. W. Small, L. F. Ward and Kochanowsky,^^
it is possible to name here Professor Franz Oppenheimer of the
University of Frankfurt, a.M., who in his valuable works ^^ has
followed the line of Gumplowicz's and Marx's sociology; F.
Savorgnan,^"^ though his later works have little in common with
Gumplowicz's speculation; G. Ratzenhofer,^'"' partially, and some
others.^^
Criticism. In regard to the above theory, our critical remarks
may be summed up as follows :
^2 For me it is rather impossible to see how Small and Ward
could have reconciled Gumplowicz's theories with their own,
because, logically, they contradict each other.
*3 See Oppenheimer, F., Der Staat, Frankfurt, a.M., 1908;
System der Sozio-ologie, Vol. I, Jena, 1923; Vol. II, 1926.
" See Savorgnan, F., Soziologische Fragmente, Innsbruck, 1909;
and partly Studl critici di sociologia, Modena, 1925.
^ Ratzenhofkr, G., Wesen und Zweck der Polilik, Leipzig, 1893;

Die Soziologische Erkenntnis, Leipzig, 1898; Soziologie, Leipzig,
1908.
^ Dr. G. Salomon mentions also Vaccaro among the partial
followers of Gumplowicz, but Vaccaro's theories are considerably
different from those of Gumplowicz and Vaccaro stressed his
disagreement explicitly in the introduction to his Les bases
sociologiqiics dti droit ct de I'etat.
484
1. The principles of the theory are not new. As we have seen,
(see the chapter on struggle for existence), the principle that
struggle is the source of all changes, including that of human
history, was proclaimed by Heraclitus, the Zend-Avesta, by the
oldest religions, by the Church Fathers, by Machiavelli, J. Bodin,
Thomas Hobbes, mentioning only a few examples from the past.
Among the many writers who much earlier and less one-sidedly
than Gumplowicz, indicated war as a source of social
stratification, we will name John Millars, and Simon Linguet.^^
After Darwin and Spencer, the social theories of the struggle for
existence (ideas similar to those of Gumplowicz) became so
numerous that it is rather useless to enumerate all the authors
and works.^^
2. As I have already indicated, the polygenesis theory of the origin
of mankind, which was reinstated by Gumplowicz, represents an
hypothesis which, cannot be proved or disproved.
3. Gumplowicz's assumption that the relationship of different
ethnic groups is always absolutely inimical, and that they are
always in the state of permanent warfare, greatly exaggerates the
situation. If it were so, the groups would have exterminated each
other, and the history of mankind would have been finished long
ago. Factual studies show that among primitive peoples, there are
groups which do not know war at all; that among those who have
war, it is by no means a permanent state; and that there is a
considerable number of tribes which set free, exchange, or adopt
the war prisoners.^^ On the other hand, there are well ascertained
facts of a quite peaceful relationship of primitive peoples toward
one another. As it was in the past, so it is in the present. War
certainly continues to exist among contemporary nations, but he
who would conclude from this that it is permanent among them
^^ Millars, J., Observations Concerning the Distinction of Ranks in
Society, London, 1771; Linguet, S. N., Theorie des lois civiles ou
principes fondamenteaux de la societe, London, 1767.
*^ See some of them in the mentioned Preface of G. Salomon to
the new edition of Gumplowicz's Geschichte der Staatstheorien,
Innsbruck, 1926; see above for the theories of the struggle for
existence.
^^ Out of 298 primitive peoples studied by Hobhouse, Wheeler
and Ginsberg, there were nine peoples who did not know war at
all. Among others, war was by no mean? a permanent state. Out
of 298 peoples, about 57 used to adopt, set free, or exchange
their prisoners. See Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg, The
Material Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples,
pp. 231 ff. See also Steinmetz, Philosophie des Krieges, 1907,
Chaps. I-III; Kovalevsky, op. cit., pp. 109 ff
485
or that their mutual attitude is always deadly inimical, would be
obviously wrong/^^
4. The contention is also incorrect that all consolidations of two or
more groups into a bigger one have been achieved only through
war. Many such consolidations have been really made through

war and compulsion, but many others have been achieved
without it. It is enough to mention the relatively peaceful
foundations of the Russian, the Roman, the Athenian, the Swiss,
the Iroquois, the American, and the Australian states. There are
many cases in ancient, mediaeval, and modern history where
some autonomous countries have freely adjoined some other
country, and in this way produced a consolidated body. There are
also several leagues and unions which have been composed in a
contractual way. Rightly also, M. Kovalevsky indicates that among
primitive groups, and at the early stages of present nations, many
such consolidations have taken place through the activity of
special mediators, namely, wise and esteemed men. This series
of facts is sufficient to show the one-sidedness of Gumplowicz's
conception.
5. It is also fallacious to claim that social stratification is due
exclusively to war, that all governments and aristocracies have
arisen exclusively in a military way, and that they invariably have
been composed of foreign conquerors, while the lower classes
have been composed of the conquered. In some cases the
situation has been such, but in other and more numerous cases, it
has been quite different and has had nothing to do with war. In my
Social Mobility (Chap. XIV), I have shown that social stratification
arises regardless of any war in any group of men living together,
be it a gang of children, a pioneer settlement, a society of
ascetics, a group of levellers, or what not. It is a close correlate of
any human association. We do not know any single
^ Here Gumplowicz makes the same mistakes as Marx in his
statement, "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history
of class struggle." A partial fact is reared into the universal; one
aspect of the whole historical process of group or classinterrelations is substituted for the whole process; some moments
of the time-process marked by struggle are taken for all moments
and, among them, the moments of peace and solidarity. Such is

"the logic" of this construction. It is as sound as the statement:
"The history of individual life is the history of eating." "Pars pro
loto," such is the fault in the terminology of the old logicians.
486
example where, in a group of men more or less permanently living
together, and having no war, social stratification did not exist.^^
Inherited differences between men and differences in
environment, regardless of any war, are responsible for the fact of
stratification. War only facilitates it. In cases where war has
established a new aristocracy of the conquerors, we have not had
the creation of an aristocracy where it did not exist before. Rather,
we have the mere substitution of a new aristocracy for the
previous one. This means that Gumplowicz's factor is neither
necessary nor even sufficient to account for the origin and
existence of stratification.
6. One-sided also is his assumption that the government and the
upper class have always been composed of the victorious
conquerors. In some cases it is so, but in numerous cases it is
not. Studies of primitive leadership, the origin of early kingship,
the history of social stratification, and the composition of upper
classes in different societies of the past and the present, all
contradict Gumplowicz's hypothesis. The first great leaders and
rulers of many old societies, (like Oknirabata of the Central
Australia tribes, Manco Ccapac and Mama Occllo among the
Incas, Moses among the Jews, Fu Hi among the Chinese and so
on), are depicted not as foreign conquerors, but as great native
inventors, teachers, judges, sages, and lawgivers. The same is
true of many a king in the early stages of civilization, and of the
''ruling class" of many a primitive tribe, or the ancient Teutons
{duces ex virtute sunt, says Tacitus).^^ Whether we take the
^1 Dr. F. Oppenheimer is wrong in supposing that pre-state

groups are not stratified, while state groups are stratified. Since
this premise is not vaHd, not vaHd becomes also his interesting
attempt to build on this difference the definition of the state. See
Oppenheimer, F., "Soziologie des Staates," Jahrbuch fiir Soziologie, B. II, pp. 85-87. The same mistake is made by J.
Mazzarella in his valuable Les types sociaux et le droit, p. 64 and
passim. He himself shows that in his "unstratified" {le gentilice)
group there are chiefs and the ruled, the servile and the
dominating classes.
^2 See the facts in Sorokin, Social Mobility, Parts I, II, III and
passim; Frazer, J. G., Lectures on the Early History of the
Kingship, London, 1905; Vierkandt, A., "Fuhrende Individuen bei
den Naturvolkern," Archiv fiir Sozwissenschaft, XI, 1908, pp. 542553, 623-639; KovALEVSKY, M., Sociology, (Russ.) 1910, Vol, II;
Contemporary Sociologists, pp. 112 ff.; Mumford, E., "The Origins
of Leadership," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. XII; Maunier,
R., "Vie r^ligieuse et vie economique," Revue Internal, de
sociologie, Dec, 1907, Jan., Febr., 1908; Lowie, R. H., Primitive
Society, 1920, Chap. IX; Descamps, P., "Le pouvoir publique
chez les sauvages," Revue internal, de sociologie, 1924;
487
class of priests, or rulers, or even military leaders in a great many
societies, we find that they have been composed of natives. Later
stages of the history of various peoples show the same picture. It
is needless to insist any longer on these facts. Here again we see
the same mistake: a partial fact is made universal; a particular
case is transformed into a general rule.
7. Finally, I wonder whether there is any competent investigator of
the history of law, judicial institutions, morals, mores, and
customs, who would agree with Gumplowicz that all these
''compulsory" rules of conduct have originated through and are
due to, war; and are consequently nothing but the rules of the
conquerors enacted for the sake of exploiting and controlling the
conquered subjects. Neither the comparative histories of law like
those of Brunner, Post, Mayer, Dargun, Kohler, Efimenko,
Thurnwald, B. Spencer and Gillen, M. Kovalevsky, Henry Sumner
Maine, Mazzarella, Steinmetz, Makarewicz, and so on; nor the
histories of moral ideas like those of Westermarck, Letourneau,
Frazer, Durkheim, Huvelin, Hubert, Mauss, H. Spencer, Hobhouse, W. G. Sumner, etc.; nor contemporary ethnography,
ethnology, or cultural anthropology, give a serious basis for such
a theory of the origin of law and compulsory forms of conduct. No
doubt in some cases Gumplowicz's factor has played some
facilitating role, but it is fallacious to contend that without it human
societies would never have had any law, or that all compulsory
rules of conduct have originated in the way traced by
Gumplowicz.
These indications are sufficient to show the fallacies of Gumplowicz's theories. However, Gumplowicz's works have not been
useless. Through his one-sidedness and exaggeration of the
above points, he has facilitated concentration of the attention of
investigators upon these phenomena. This has led to a series of
more careful studies, which have permitted us to judge more
accurately of the discussed facts. In this sense, Gumplowicz's
sociological works ^^ have served the science of sociology.
GoLDENWEiSER, A., Early Civilization. Thurnwald, R., "Soziale
Organization" in Zeitschrift f. vergleichende RechtswissenscJmft,
Vol. XXXVI, and a series of his valuable articles in Reallexikon dcr
Vorgeschichte.
^^ I estimate Guni])lowicz's studies in the history of social theories
much higher Here his works were really valuable.
488
CHAPTER IX
SOCIOLOGISTIC SCHOOL (Continued): THE FORMAL
SCHOOL AND A SYSTEMATICS OF SOCIAL
RELATIONSHIP
I. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SCHOOL AND ITS
LEADING REPRESENTATIVES
The fourth principal variety of the sociologistic school is the
formal. It maintains the fundamentals of the sociologistic school,
which are interaction and interrelations as the essence of social
phenomena, the superindividual conception of social reality, the
interpretation of an individual as a group product, group
interpretation of social phenomena, etc.; but in addition it stresses
that the proper object of sociology, as a specific science, is the
study of the forms of social interaction, or of social relationship, as
contrasted with its contents, as studied by other social sciences.
Its partizans, contrary to "encyclopedic" sociology, which treats
everything and represents a ''hodgepodge" of various problems,
try to build sociology as a specific and systematic science, with a
limited but quite definite field of study. In this field are the forms of
human relationships, or of socialization, regardless of any
concrete, historical society. Such a sociology is, in the first place,
an analytical science. In the second place, since it studies the
forms of social relationships, it can be more accurate than any
encyclopedic sociology. In the third place, compared to other
social sciences, it occupies approximately the same position
which physical mechanics, or especially mathematics, has in
regard to physical or technical sciences,the latter cannot exist
without the former. The better the mathematics or theory of social
relations, the greater will be their service to technical or other
social sciences.^
The school claims that it is new and much younger than the
1 vSee an able summary of the formal school in Vierkandt, A.,
Gesellschaftslehrr, pp. 1-19, Stuttgart, 1923.
489
"encyclopedic" sociology. F. Tonnies and G. Simmel ^ are
regarded as the founders of the school. Its history is computed
only by some thirty years. Leaving this claim v ithout discussion
for a moment, let us briefly outline the principles of the school as
they are given in the works of its most prominent representatives.
These representatives are: F. Tonnies, R. Stammler, G. Simmel,
G. Richard, L. von Wiese, A. Vierkandt, T. Litt, C. Bougie, partly
E. A. Ross in his last works, R. Park and E. Burgess, to mention
only a few names.
Possibly George Simmel's (1858-1918) conception of sociology is
the most characteristic of the school. It is as follows: In order to be
a really separate science, sociology, like other special sciences,
should have its own field of study which is not investigated by
other social sciences, or, what is the same thing, its own point of
view. The lack of such a special field for sociological study would
necessitate the barring of sociology as a special science. Now
what field or viewpoint is sociological ? From the standpoint of
content all fields of social phenomena such as the economic,
religious, linguistic, moral, historical, and other phenomena are
already studied by corresponding social sciences. In regard to
content, there is no room for sociology. The only field or viewpoint
which is not taken by other sciences is the field of the forms of
socialization, or the forms of human relationship. This field, or
viewpoint, is exactly what belongs to sociology, making of it an
independent and special science. In regard to other social
sciences, sociology has the same attitude as geometry has to
other natural sciences. Geometry studies the spatial forms of
physical objects but not their content. Sociology does the same in
regard to social phenomena. The same geometrical form, as a

ball, may be filled with different contents, and different
geometrical forms may also have the same physical content. The
content and form are quite separate phenomena, or viewpoints
toward phenomena. In a similar way, the same forms of human
relationship may have diff'erent social content; the same social
content may have different forms of social relationship. In other
words, in the field of human interrelations, form and content are
"^ Ibid., p. i; Spykman, N. J., The Social Theory of Ceorii Simmel,
pj). XIV, XV, 263 ff., Chica}j;o* 1925.
490
something quite different, and consequently each of them may be
the object of a special study. Each of the forms of human
interrelations (domination, subordination, competition, imitation,
division of labor, formation of parties, and many other forms of
relationship) are found in a civic group, in a religious community,
in a band of brigands, in a business organization, in a family, in a
school, and, in brief, in the most different social groups from the
standpoint of their content; and vice versa. Hence, the possibility
and even the necessity for the existence of sociology as a special
science whose aim is a description, classification, analysis, and
explanation of the forms of human relationship, the forms of
socialization, or even the forms of social organization rather than
their contents, which are now studied by other sciences.
Such, in brief, is Simmel's conception of sociology as a specific
social science.^
In his Soziologie, which incorporates his previous sociological
studies: Uher soziale Differenmeriing, Das Problem der Soziologie, Comment les formes sociales se maintiennent, and some
others,^ Simmel attempts to give an analysis, classification, and

interpretation of several forms of social relations, such as
isolation, contact, superordination, subordination, opposition,
persis3 Simmel, G., Soziologie, 1908, pp. 1-14, and passim. See also
Spykman, N. J., The Social Theory of Georg Simmel, 1925, Book
I, passim. The book is good from the standpoint of a summary of
vSimmel's theories. From the standpoint of a criticism and
estimation of Simmel's contribution it is rather elementary. About
Simmel's sociological works see Sorokin, P., Systema Soziologii,
Vol. I, pp. 25-35, 322 ff.; Barth, p., Die Philosophie der Geschichte
als Soziologie, 1922, pp. 149 fif.; Bernhard, E., "Simmel als
Soziologe und Sozialphilosoph," Die Tat, 1913-14, No. 10, pp.
1080-1086; Frischeisen-Kohler, M., "Simmel," Kantstudien, Vol.
XXIV; Kracauer, S., "Georg Simmel," Logos IX, 1920, pp. 307338; ScHMALENBACH, H., "Simmel," Sozialistische Monatshefte,
1919, pp. 283-288; a series of authors in La philosophie
allemande au XIXe siecle, Paris, 1912.
* Some of these works have been published in English. See "The
Problem of Sociology," Annals of the American Academy, of
Political and Social Science, Vol. VI, pp. 412-423; "Superiority
and Subordination as Subject Matter for Sociology," American
Journal of Sociology, Vol. II, pp. 167-189, 392-415; "The
Persistence of the Social Group," ihid., Vol. Ill, pp. 662-698, 82983^; Vol. iV, pp. 35-50; "The Number of Members as Determining
the Sociological Form of the Group," ihid., Vol. VIII, pp. 1-46, 158196; "The Sociology of Conflict," American Journal of Psychology,
Vol. IX, pp. 490-525, 672-689, 798-811; "Fashion," International
Quarterly, Vol. X, pp. 130-155; "A Contribution to the Sociology of
Religion," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. XI, pp. 359-376;
"The Sociology of Secrecy and the Secret Society," ihid., Vol. XI,
pp. 441-498; "How Society Is Possible," ibid,. Vol. XVI, pp. 372-
391. For a complete list of the works of Simmel see Spykman's

book, pp. 277 ff.
491
tence or continuity of social group, social differentiation,
integration, and some other forms.
F. Tonnies, (1855- ), professor of the University of Kiel, had
already published in 1887 his Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, in
which he laid down a conception of sociology which was in
essence similar to that which was later formulated by Simmel.^ In
this valuable work, Tonnies gave not only a mere outline of *'pure"
or ''formal sociology," but, by way of making a factual analysis of
the fundamental forms of social relationship, he demonstrated the
essential character of such a sociology. According to Tonnies
there are two fundamental forms of society or social relationship:
''Community" {Gemeinschaft) and "Society" {Gesellschaft). The
Gemeinschaft is a union of individuals with an "organic will,"
whose solidarity springs from the natural forces of consanguinity.
It is a product of nature, or a kind of natural organism. There is no
personal will. Individuals are only members of a general body with
a natural solidarity, harmonious interrelations, and an identity of
will because the individual will is suppressed by the community
will. As the result of such an "organic" solidarity, we have a
community of property, and a law which is nothing but a family
law. It is easy to see that Tonnies' Gemeinschaft is identical to
what Durk-heim later styled a "group with mechanical solidarity."
The Gesellschaft is a totality of individuals who enter interaction
according to their own individual will, {Kitrzville) for an
achievement of their own purposes. It is not a product of nature,
and is in no way a natural organism. It is rather an artificial
mechanism.^ This form is styled by Durkheim as a group based
on ^'organic solidarity." One cannot help thinking that Durkheim
intentionally gave to his social types names which were opposite
to those given by Tonnies. Further differences of both these forms

of society are as follows : '^
^ Spykman's sketch of the precursors of Simmel and of the state
of the pre-SimmeHan sociology is unsatisfactory. Being generally
wrong in his claim that the formal school is new (see further) and
making some mistakes in his characterization of the preSimmelian sociology, he is wrong also in his contention that
Simmel was the first who set forth the theory of the formal school.
Tonnies, F., Gejneinschaft und Gesellschaft, 3d. ed., ])p. 1-102
and passim, Berlin, 1920.
''Ibid., pp. 22, 42, 126, 148, 152, 157 and passim, 191.
492
49^ CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES
Gemeinschaft Gesellschaft
Common will Individual will
No individuality of members Individuality of members
Domination of the community Domination of the individual
interests interests
Belief Doctrine
Religion Public opinion
Mores and customs Fashion, fads, mode
Natural solidarity Contractual solidarity, commerce and exchange Common property Private property
Historically, the Gemeinschaft appeared earlier than the

Gesellschaft, because primitive groups, family, and tribes are
concrete examples of this form of society. In the course of time,
however, the Gemeinschaft began to disintegrate and
Gesellschaft appeared. It has been progressing at the cost of the
Gemeinschaft type. Man has been becoming less and less
attached to any community. Instead of it, in temporary and
contractual ways, he has been tending to become a member of
more and more numerous and larger groups. In this way history
goes from the community to the society, from ''the culture of the
people to the civilization of State." This process is irreversible.
Such, in brief, is Tonnies' theory, in many respects similar to what
later on was developed by Simmel in his Ueber sodale
Differenzierung, and by a Russian professor, B. Kistiakowski, in
his Gesellschaft mid Einzelwesen, 1899.
The next considerable contribution to the principles of the formal
school was made by R. Stammler in his Wirtschaft und Recht
nach der materialistischen Geschichtsaiiffassung (Leipzig, 1896),
where Stammler very conspicuously developed the difference
between the concepts of social form and social content and gave
a systematic theory of law as the form, and of ''economic
phenomena" {Wirtschaft) as the content of social relations.
Furthermore, G. Richard (i860- ), professor at the University of
Bordeaux, editor of the Revue internationale de so-ciologie and
previously a collaborator of Durkheim, but later a critic of several
points in Durkheim's theory, in his La so493
ciologie generale et les lois sociologiques (Paris, 1912) also
assumed a position especially near to Tonnies' sociological
conception. Richard states that the field of sociology is neither all
social phenomena, nor various phenomena of human behavior,
nor analogies between society and organism, nor any philosophy
of history, nor any '"encyclopedism." Its field is more limited and

more definite; namely, the ''relationship between Community and
Society, between the phenomena of cooperation and mental
interaction (society), and the phenomena 'communautaires' {Commiinity).'" ^ Accordingly, the greater part of Richard's work is
devoted to an analysis of the relationship between these two
forms in the course of history, and to the formulation of several
laws of their development similar to those given by Tonnies,
Simmel, and Durkheim. They indicate an historical tendency
toward a decrease of community-form and an increase of societyform in the course of time.^
Of the other prominent representatives of the school and their
works, it is necessary to mention Professor A. Vierkandt's (1867- )
Gesellschaftslehre (1923) and Professor L. von Wiese's
Allgemeine Soziologie (1924).^^ Vierkandt's course is built along
the line of the school, but is less ''formal" than the w'ork of L. von
Wiese. ''Allgemeine So::iologie als Lehre von den Beziehungen
und Bemehungsgebilden der Menschen'' by Professor Leopold
von Wiese (1876- ), may be regarded as the
8 Richard, G., La sociologie generale et les lois sociologiques, pp.
i8o, 227, 345-372, Paris, 1912.
^ The first law is that, in the course of history, the society-type
relations (economic, intellectual and so on) tend to expand
progressively and to extend finally over the whole of mankind in
the form of a world market, world religion, world intelligence, and
other intercourse. The second law is that the community-type of
social group tends to be more and more differentiated into a
series of "society-cype" interrelations. The third law is that the
community-type of a group has more chances of being preserved
as it becomes more isolated from intercourse with other groups.
This means that the development of a relationship between the
community and society-types is negatively correlated. See ibid.,

pp. 227-277 and passim.
^^ There is a considerable number of other sociologists who
belong to the same school; for instance, the majority of the
collaborators of the "Kolner Vicrtel-jahrshefte filr Soziologie." On
the formal position also stands C. Bougie, in his Qii'est-ce que la
sociologies, and Les sciences sociales en Allemagne; and T. Litt,
in his Individuum und Gesellschaft. See other names in Vierkandt,
A., "Die Uberwindung des Positivismus in der deutschen
Soziologie der Gegenwart," Jahrbuch Jilr Soziologie, B. II, and
voN WiEsii, L., Allgemeine Soziologie.
494
most systematic development of Simmel's conception of
sociology. The author acknowledges his indebtedness to Simmel,
E. Wax-weiler, E. A. Ross, and Max Weber; but it is evident that
Simmel's and Ross' influence on the book is far greater than that
of the other mentioned sociologists. Like Simmel, Dr. von Wiese
is trying to establish sociology as an independent science.
My aim was to shape sociology into a distinct science, definitely
separated from other sciences, firmly jointed, and consistently
systematized.^^
Like Simmel he thinks that the only way to attain this aim is by
conceiving sociology as the science of the forms of human
relations or, what is the same, the forms of social processes. The
book, in its essence, represents an attempt to give a systematic
classification of the forms of human relationship. At the back of
the book the reader finds a chart classifying human relations or
social processes. The essential features of the classification are
as follow^s. The author discriminates the relationship between
individuals from that between groups, which represent a kind of

crystallized formation of interindividual relations (Gebilden). Each
of these orders of relationships is divided into-classes: I.
Interindividual relations are classed into three principal forms I.
toward each other (contact, approach, adaptation, combination,
and union) ; 2. away from each other (competition, opposition,
and conflict) ; 3. mixed form, which is partly a relation toward, and
partly away from each other. II. Intergroup relations, or social
processes in a narrower sense of the word are classified into four
principal divisions: i. differentiating processes, like social
promotion and degradation, domination and subordination,
stratification, selection, and individualization; 2. integrating
processes Buch as uniformization, stabilization, crystallization,
and socialization ; 3. destructive processes like exploitation,
partial favoring, corruption, formalization, commercialization,
radicalization, spoliation; 4. modifying-constructive processes,
which embrace institutionalization, professionalization, and
liberation. Such are the substantial forms of social relationships or
social processes.
" VON WiESE, L., Allgemeine Soziologie, Teil I, Beziehungslehre,
Miinchen und Leipzig, 1924, p. VIII.
495
Each of the mentioned subdivisions in its turn is subdivided into
many sub-subclasses which, in their totahty, give about 650 forms
of human relationship/^ The book as a whole is a foundation,
motivation, and interpretation of this classification and of each
class, sub-class, and sub-subclass of human relations given in
the table. This is followed by some logical discussion and a
psychological interpretation of some of the classes, but they
compose the secondary matter of the book. From the above one
can see that Dr. L. von Wiese, more systematically than anybody
else, pushed the formal conception of sociology to its logical end.
In order to prevent a contamination of ''pure sociology" by the

''content" of social relations he cut all ties between social ''form"
and "content." He tries to compress an immensely complex world
of human relations into a classification based on formal logic. This
explains why von Wiese's book must be regarded as "a leading
expression of the present animus of post-Simmelism." ^^ For this
reason it may serve well to show the pluses and the minuses of
the formal school.
2. CRITICISM
Before discussing what is valid in the claims of the formal school,
let us indicate at once what is questionable. In the first place, the
school's claim that it is a new one is baseless. It is a very old
school, perhaps even older than any other school of social
science. In the second place, the fundamental discrimination
between form and content of social relationship is either
fallacious, or represents something on which it is impossible to
build sociology as a special science. In the third place, the claim
that forms of social relationship are not studied by other than
sociological disciplines, is not warranted by the facts. Thus far,
Simmel's attempt to build sociology as an autonomous science of
the forms of social relationship is not valid. In the fourth place,
Simmel and other "formalists" do not keep to their principles, but
transgress their own definition, contradict it, and often interpret
the same terms in quite different senses. In the fifth
12 See at the end of the book "Tafel der Menschlichen
Bezielumpen"; see Chapters I and II.
^3 A. Small's review of the book by L. von Wiese, in American
Journal oj Sociology, Vol. XXXI, p. 87.
496
place, even if the Simmelian concept of the forms of social

relations were true, this would not mean that sociology, as a
science of general characteristics of, and the correlation between,
social phenomena, could not, or should not, exist. The following
considerations will show the validity of these critical propositions:
^^* A. The claim that the forms of social relationship are not
studied by other sciences is not warranted by the facts. It is
sufficient to take the science of law in order to see that all
Simmel's, or Tonnies', or Vierkandt's, or Richard's, or von Wiese's
forms of social relationship have been studied in an excellent and
more precise way by the science of law. Is it not evident that such
*'forms" as ''domination" and "subordination" have been always a
fundamental object of so-called public, constitutional, or
administrative law? The very essence of the phenomena of
sovereignty, authority, prestige, power, government, ruling,
conflict, domination, subjection, subordination, obedience,
together with their forms, origin, and functions have always been
one of the fundamental objects of the science of law. And more
than that, the science of law, through the Roman jurisconsults,
has already given excellent, clear, and brilliant definitions of these
phenomena : Potesfas, Majcstas, Imperium, Dominus, Prin-ceps,
Dignitates, Suhjccti, etc. Any serious book on constitutional law
will show that these "forms" of social relationship are its principal
objects.^'' The same is true of the other forms of formal sociology.
If we take international law, we find that such forms of intergroup
relationships as contact, isolation, agreement, opposition, conflict,
war, and so on, are studied very attentively, and again more
clearly and more formally than is done by the partizans of the
formal school. Furthermore, such fundamental forms of social
relationship as obligation or duty, dependence,
1'* They were formulated already in my System of Sociology. See
Sorokin, Systema Soziologii, Vol. I, pp. 24-35, Petrograd, 1920.
15 See Petrajitzky, L., Introduction to the Science of Law, and

Theory of Law and State, Vols. I, II, St. Petersburg, 1907 and
1909 (Russian); Duguit, L., Droit constitutionel; Stammler, R.,
Theorie der Rechtswissenschaft, Halle, 1911; SoHM,
Systemaische Rechtswissenschaft, 1906; Ihering, R., Geist des
romischen Rechts, Vols. I, II, III; Mommsen, T., Romische
Staatsrecht, passim; Laski, H. J., Studies in the Problem of
Sovereignty, 1917; Sorokin, Theory of Law and State, 1919
(Russian); Kistiakowski, B., Social Sciences and Law, (Russian),
Moscow, 1915; Pokrovsky, T., Fundamental Problems of Civil
Law, (Russian), 1913.
497
contractual relations, stratification, exploitation, transgression,
spoliation, persistence, and continuity, show that all these forms
of social relationship have been studied, analyzed, described,
classified and compared by the civil, criminal, processual and
other branches of the science of law since immemorial times. All
this is so evident that there is no need to insist longer upon it.
What has been said about the science of law may be said of a
great many other sciences. They have also studied the forms of
social relationship. Take economics. Does it not study division of
labor and social differentiation?cooperation ai\d association?
the forms which Simmel styles ''Die Trene" and ''Dankhar-keit"?
or that of exploitation and spoliation?and a great many other
forms of social relations ? ^^ Dr. O. Spann is quite right in saying
that almost all the laws of economics are quite formal and
describe what Simmel styles the forms of relationships.^^ The
same is true in regard to political science, and practically in regard
to almost all social sciences. In brief, it is not easy to find a social
science which does not study the forms of social relationship in
the sense of the formal school, and from a standpoint which is
identical with, or similar to, the school's standpoint.
The above means that this claim of the school is not valid. If it is
not valid, then the attempt to build sociology on such a claim fails.
Since the "forms" are studied by other sciences, there is no room
for sociology as a science of the forms of human relationship.
B. The above explains why, in my opinion, the formal school is
very old. Its founders were neither Tonnies nor Simmel, as Dr.
Vierkandt claims;^'"* nor Kant, Hegel, Ilerbart, Ferguson, Fichte,
L. von Stein, Gneist, Jellinek, nor Spencer, as G. Richard
^5 To see this it is enough to take any serious course in
economics.
1^ O. Spann, rightly indicates that the theory of value describes
nothing but a specific form of Simmelian relationship. "Auch
andere national okonomische Gesetze erweisen sick als rein
formate. In Thilnens Gesetz der relativen Rationalitdt der
Landbausysteme and Hirer abnehmenden Intansitdt bei
wachsender Entfernung vom Marktorte sind rein 'formate'
Beziehiingen geschildert. . . . Es muss daher abgelehnt werden,
dass die formate Natur des Gegenstandes der von Simmel
angestrebten 'Soziotogie' alteineigen ware. Diese fehtt nirgends^
und der ganze Gesichtspunkt erweist sich daher als U7irichttg."
Spann, O., Kiirzgefasstes System der Gesettschaftstehre, pp. 1719, Leipzig, 1914.
'** Vierkandt, op. cit., ]>. 1.
498
indicates more rightly.^^ Its founders were all lawgivers who
formulated the first rules of social relations, and especially all
jurisconsults and theorizers of law. Beginning at least with
Confucius ^^ and the Roman jurisconsults, who so brilliant)v
formulated the principal forms of social relations, and ending with

the theorizers of law, all have been "formal sociologists." If they
are not regarded as the predecessors and the representatives of
the formal school, this is probably due only to the fact that their
works have been styled juridical but not sociological. In their
chara.cter, however, their works, even the very codes of law%
beginning with Corpus Juris Ciznlis of Justinian, and ending with
new codes of the civil, the constitutional, the criminal, and the
processual law (not to mention corresponding theories) are the
most brilliant samples of the formal analysis of human relationship
or of the forms of social interaction. Their formulas of Potest as,
Inipcrium, Majcstas, and Manus are incomparably better and
more formal than the forms of domination in the characteristics of
the contemporary formal school. Their formulas of commercium,
consensus, cessio, heneficium, various ohligationes, contractual
relations, dominium, proprietas, and possessio; their definitions of
the status libcrtatis, status civitatis, and capitis diminiitio; of
marriage, family, consanguinity, inheritance, and so on, represent
an "ideal formal sociology" which the formal sociologists may only
envy and try to approach as near as possible. The classification of
the social forms of either T5nnies, Simmel, Vierkandt, or von
Wiese, is but an incomplete and less formal enumeration of the
forms classified, defined, and analyzed in the codes and in the
theories of the law. Further, it will be shown that in the
classification of the forms of social relations the formal school
follows the path trodden by many "non-formal" sociologists.
Hence the conclusions: First, that the formal school is a very old
one. Second, all great jurisconsults and theorizers of
" Richard, G., op. cit., Chaps. I, IV.
2 It is enough to remember Confucius' theory of "the five
relationships" and their analysis in the Confucianist teaching to
see that a "formal sociology" and a good one existed six
centuries B.C. See Lt-Ki, Book I, pp. 62-63; Book VII, p. 3; Book
VIII, pp. I, 15; and Doctrine of the Mean, translated in J. Legge's

The Life and Teachings of Confucius, pp. 313 ff., London, 1895.
See also Poli-craticus by John of vSahsbury, Books V and VI,
where the relationship of domination and subordination is treated
in a perfectly formal way.
499
law have been its founders and representatives. Third, the
contemporary formal sociologists, contrary to their claim, are less
formal in their constructions than the mentioned jurists. Fourth, a
further purification of the principles and aspirations of the formal
school must lead it to a greater and greater approach to the works
of the theorizers of law, and to the codes of law which are nothing
but an ''ideal formal sociology." If the theories of the present
formal school do not coincide completely with the latter, this is
due, as we shall see, to the fact that the formal sociologists are
not consistent. They often transgress their own contention of
being "formal," and pour into their books a great deal of the
''content" of social phenomena.
The above leaves the school in a dilemma: either to be perfect
and consistent in its formality, thus becoming nothing but a variety
of the theories and codes of law; or to lose its "formality" and
become the kind of "encyclopedic" sociology which is criticized so
severely by the formalists. In its present stage, the school
represents a mixture of "formality" and "encyclopedism," and, like
any imperfect mixture of this kind, it has the shortcomings of both,
often without the superiorities of either of these types of sociology.
C. The school's concepts of form and content are somewhat
unsatisfactory also. Since at least the time of Aristotle,
philosophical concepts of form and content, or substance, have
been very common, and have been given different meanings.
Neither Simmel nor his followers, however, have taken care to
clarify these somewhat indefinite conceptions. Speaking of the
objects which have spatial characteristics these concepts may be

applied easily and properly; but how can they be applied to such
phenomena as power, authority, domination, subordination,
competition and other forms which do not have geometricallyspatial dimensions? Since they have not, it is then clear that to
make an analogy between a geometrical form, as a ball, which
may be filled by different content, and a social form which may be
filled by different content, is rather fallacious. Still more fallacious
is it to isolate the "social form" from its content (which in the field
of geometrically spatial objects is possible) and then to state that
"social forms can remain identical while their members
500
change.""^ We may fill a glass with wine, water, or sugar without
changing its form; but I cannot conceive of a social institution
whose ''form" would not change when its members, for instance,
Americans, were superseded by quite a new and heterogeneous
people, e.g., by Chinese or Bushmen. Even if the written
constitution of the institution remained untouched on paper,
nevertheless its form and organization would change, in direct
proportion to how dissimilar the new members were as compared
with the previous ones. Quite questionable also is the statement
that social "form" may exist independent of "content." Simmel
himself has shown that even such a "content-condition" as the
number of the members of a group decidedly influences the "form
of the group.'' These examples show how vague are the
terminology and analogies of the Simmelian school. In some
cases its followers use the concepts of form and content just in
this inadmissible "geometrico-spatial" sense. In some other
cases, however, they somewhat change their meaning, and use
them in the sense of Aristotelian logic, where form designates a
broader class of phenomena or concept, while content means a
subclass, or a concept which designates this subclass. In this

sense the class, and consequently the concept, "human beings,"
is a form of the subclasses and corresponding concepts, "man"
and "woman," which may function as "content" in regard to the
"human being" as a form. The same may be said of an
"organism," "plant," or "animal," where "organism" is a form for
"plant" and "animal" "content." ^" If such is the logical interrelation
of these concepts, then it is clear that they cannot be associated
with one another as something logically heterogeneous. With this
interpretation, Simmel's claim that sociology studies the forms of
social phe21 Simmel, "Comment les formes sociales se maintiennent,"
Uannee soci-oloîque, Vol. I. This theory of the persistence of the
social group is in its essence nothing but a somewhat shortened
and modified theory of the juridical existence of so-called juridical
personalities, which was many centuries ago brilliantly elaborated
by jurists and lawyers.
22 Dr. R. Stammler, like Simmel, always uses these terms in his
scientific works. On the discrimination of form and content is
based his discrimination of law as a form, and economic
processes as a content of social life. When, however, Stammler
has to define the concepts of form and content, he says that the
form means a broader, and the content, a narrower concept for a
classification of the same series of phenomena. In other words,
form is a genus; content is a subclass G^'the same genus. See
Stammler, R., Theorie der Rechtswissenschaft^ pp. 7 ff., Halle,
1911; also, Wirtschaft und Recht, passim.
501
nomena may mean only that, contrary to other social sciences,
sociology studies the most general characteristics of social
phenomena which belong to all specific forms of human
relationship, while other sciences study these specific
characteristics (content). This means that sociology is not a

science which studies the specific characteristics of social
phenomena, as Simmel claims, but a generalizing science, which
Simmel denies. Thus, we come to the conclusion that Simmel's
conceptions of form and content are either meaningless and
inapplicable to social phenomena; or that they lead to the
conception of sociology as a generalizing science, which
conception contradicts Simmel's pretensions of building sociology
as a specific science.^^
Furthermore, one who reads attentively the works of Simmel or of
the other ''formalists" can easily detect a permanent, sometimes
quite a strong alteration, in the meanings which they give to many
terms, and especially to those of form and content. On one page
we are told that the object-matter of sociology is the forms of
human relationship; a few lines or pages further on, we are
suddenly told that this object is the forms of socialization ! ^*
Nevertheless, these two concepts of the forms of human
relations, and the forms of socialization mean something quite
different. The forms of human relationship may mean not only the
forms of socialization, but those of desocialization also; not only
association, but dissociation; not only cooperation, but warfare,
also.""" If we define sociology as the science of the
23 Compare Spann, O., Kurzgefasstes System der
Gesellschaftslehre, pp. 9-19.
-'' See Simmel, Soziology, pp. 4 ff.; Grundfragen der Soziologie,
pp. 22 ff. It is curious to note that one of the recent propagandists
of Simmelianism in this country, being quite accurate in his
characterization of Simmel's theory, makes such a shifting of
meaning in the following way: "This concept of society as form, or
rather of the form of the socialization," etc. The author, like
Simmel, seems not to see that "forms of human relationship" and
the "forms of socialization" mean something quite different and by
"simple" or "rather" it is impossible to jump from one to another

and identify their meaning. See the whole of Book I, in Spykman's
quoted work where he, like Simmel, uses interchangeably these
two definitions.
^ E. A. Ross and E. Dupreel, who, independent of Simmel, have
very ably tried to outline the concept of sociology as a science of
human relations, and who give one of the best analyses of human
relations, are free from this quaternio terminorum of Simmel and
the Simmclian school. See Ross, E. A., Principles of Sociology,
Part III; Duprkel, E., Le rapport social, Essai stir rohjcl et la
melhode de la sociologie, Paris, 1912, Chaj). IV and passim.
vSee also his "Sociologie et psychologic," InstitiU Solvay, Bullrlin
mensuel, p]i. 180-186, Jan., 1911. Ross and Dupreel being
relationists in sociology, do not belong to the formal school.
502
forms of human relationship, then the processes of dissociation,
opposition, conflict, and warfare must be included in the field of its
study. If we define it as a science of the forms of socialization,
then these processes, as opposed to those of socialization, must
be excluded from the field of sociology. For Simmel and some of
the Simmelists, this heterogeneity of the two definitions does not
exist. They use them interchangeably, and without any attempt to
reconcile them. This naturally results in a series of logical
inconsistencies, and in a vagueness of theoretical constructions.
What has been said of the fundamental conceptions of Simmelian sociology, may be said of its many other propositions.
Although valuable in some respects, they are stamped by the
same vagueness, indefiniteness, changeable meanings, and
often by a purely speculative character. In this respect they are
still in the stage of a purely philosophical or speculative

sociology.^^
Finally, the insufficiency of formal sociology is shown also by the
transgression of its principles by the ^'Formalists" themselves. In
spite of their severe criticism of the ''encyclopedic" sociology, their
own works have the same "encyclopedic char26 From a purely methodological standpoint, Simmel's
sociological method lacks scientific method. I must express my
complete disagreement with Dr. R. Park's or Dr. Spykman's high
estimation of the sociological method of Simmel. Besides the
above logical deficiency, Simmel's method entirely lacks either
experimental approach, quantitative investigation, or any
systematic factual study of the discussed phenomena. In vain one
would look in his work for a systematic method like that of the Le
Play school, or of the methodological principles of social sciences
developed by A. Cournot in his Considerations sur la marche des
idees, etc.; Essai sur le fondements de nos connaissances; Traite
de Venchainement des idees fondamentales dans les sciences et
dans Vhistoire; or some principles like those of H. Rikkert and W.
Windelbandt concerning the classification of sciences and of their
methods of generalizing (nomographic or nomothetic) and
individualizing (ideographic) sciences; or something like Max
Weber's method of the "ideal typology"; or Galton's, Pearson's,
and A. Tchuproff's quantitative methods of investigation; or even
a simple, careful and attentive study of the facts he is talking
about. All this is lacking. What there is represents only the
speculative generalization of a talented man, backed by the
"method of illustration" in the form of two or three facts incidentally
taken and often one-sidedly interpreted. Without Simmel's talent
the same stuff would appear poor. Simmel's talent saves the
situation, but only as far as talent compensates for lack of
scientific methodology. Under such conditions, to call the
sociologists "back to Simmel," as Drs. Park and Spykman do,
means to call them back to a pure speculation, metaphysics, and

a lack of scientific method. Speculation and metaphysics are
excellent things in their proper places, but to mix these with the
science of sociology means to spoil each of those sciences.
503
acter." They are ''contaminated" by a great deal of the ''social
content" poured into their "forms." Dr. Vierkandt's book may serve
as an example. In spite of Vierkandt's declaration that he is going
to deal only with the forms of social phenomena, he fails to carry
on his program. Beginning with the second chapter of the book
(pp. 58-179) it is filled with the "content"; with a long discussion of
human instincts (of self-feeling, subordination, of mutual help,
pugnacity, sympathy, and so on), together with their modification
in the process of interaction; with sketches of the history of family,
professional groups, classes, orders, nations, and states; with a
philosophy of social unity and reality; and with imitation,
suggestion, mob-mind, and so on;in brief, with the usual "stuff"
found in all non-formal sociological books. With a modification, the
same may be said of all the works of the formal school. I do not
know any one which would not have an "encyclopedic character,"
and in which the data of biology, ethnology, anthropology, history,
psychology, political science, economics, and literature, are not
mixed and used. In brief, "the sin of encyclopedism" is as
common within the formal sociology as within the "non-formal"
sociology it criticizes.^'
The above should be sufficient to show that the formal school has
failed to build sociology as ar "autonomous and independent
science" on the discrimination of the categories of form and
content. To this it is possible to add that even the attempt itself to
build such an independent science of sociology or of any other
science, as far as it pretends to be something more than a mere
conditional and approximate limitation of its field for the sake of a
mere practical conveniency, is rather fallacious. Many sociologists

^'^ seem to be very anxious to construct such "an independent
sociology." For this purpose they are ready to prohibit all
sociologists from using the data and the materials used by other
sciences. They dream of a "pure sociology," absolutely inde" This makes baseless the pretension of formal sociology to play
the same r61e for other social sciences which is played by
mathematics or physical mechanics in regard to other physical
and technical sciences. Neither the pretensioir nor the analogy
are justified in any way.
2s See for instance Znaniecki, F., "The Object Matter of
vSociology," Americat: Journal of Sociolo^'y, January, 1927. See
also Spann, O., op. cit., pp. IV, VII, Chapter I and passim.
504
504 CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGICx\L THEORIES
pendent from, and not contaminated with, the data of other
sciences. To achieve this fantastic goal they write and pubhsh
hundreds of volumes filled with a discussion of what sociology, as
an independent science, ought to be, how it ought to be built, and
how it ought to be separated from all other sciences. I confess
that I find almost all such reasoning fruitless. If an author knows a
wonderful secret about building such a sociology, let him show
the validity of his secret by its factual building, but not by a mere
reasoning of ''how scientific sociology ought to be built." The
success of his factual building is a much more convincing
argument in favor of his secret than mere reasoning."^ As a
matter of fact, these reasonings are only a proof of the
helplessness of such an author. Likewise, the attempt itself to
build ''an independent sociology" is rather fallacious. There is
practically no science (except perhaps mathematics and formal
logic) which is independent and "uncontaminated" by data taken
from other sciences. I do not know any chemistry which would not
use the data of physics, or even of biology. I do not know any
biology which would not use the data of chemistry, physics, or
some other sciences. There is no anatomy which does not
contain the data of physiology, ecology, systematics, histology, or
what not. Various branches of physical, chemical, and biological
sciences are so closely interwoven and mixed and some of them,
like organic or colloidal chemistry, are such a ''mixtiim
compositinn' of "different sciences" that only by completely
ignoring their real character is it possible to dream of "an
absolutely independent science." The same "mixture" of data and
premises is still more conspicuous in the field of social sciences,
or those which deal with human beings. I cannot imagine
psychology without the data of biology, anatomy, and physiology.
I have not seen any important treatise in economic or political
sciences which did not use the data of psychology, biology,
history, demography, ethics, or even philosophy.^^ More than
that, practically all the most
23 Pareto, who devotes only five lines to his definition of
sociology in his fifteen-hundred page treatise on the subject, and
Ross, who, in his Principles of Sociology does not give any
definition of sociology, but starts at once to build it, proceed much
better than all those who extensively discuss what sociology is,
and by this discussion complete their "books."
2 A sociologist cannot be troubled much by the divergency of the
existing definitions of sociology. This situation is not worse than
that of the economists,
505
important books in cultural, psychological, and social sciences,
even in biology, have been those which have been rich in such a
mixture of the data of various sciences. Whether I take
Philosophy of Zoology by Lamarck; or The Origin of the Species
by Darwin, I find it difficult to decide exactly to what branch of

science these works belong. The data of various, even of social
sciences, are so mixed in such works that it is not easy to decide
the question. At any rate they do not belong to the kind of "formal
and independent works" of which ''sociological autonomists"
dream. The same is still more true in regard to the epoch-making
works in the field of cultural and social sciences. Whether we take
The Republic of Plato, or The Politics of Aristotle, La Scicnza
Nuova by Vico, Discourse on Livy by Machiavelli, Montesquieu's
The Spirit of Law, Malthus' Essay on Population, or the works of
Adam Smith, Saint-Simon, L Kant, Auguste Comte, H. Spencer,
and so on,all these great works are composed from, and on the
basis of, the data of various sciences, to such an extent that we
cannot say exactly to what "department" of scienceeconomics,
or sociology, or philosophy, or psychology, or political science
they really belong. On the other hand, I do not know any "formal"
work which has produced anything above an average scholastic
value. For these reasons I do not see why sociologists need to
have "an absolutely independent sociology" not contaminated by
the data of other
historians, theorizers of law, and psychologists, or the students of
any other of the cultural sciences. All these sciences still wait for
their definition, and are understood in very different ways. An
illustration of this is given by the papers of the most prominent
economists, published in The Trend of Economics, N. Y., 1924.
The volume conspicuously shows that there are as many different
definitions of economics as there are economists. The most
modern definition of it is that "economics is a science of
behavior." (Mitchell, Wesley C, ibid., pp. 22 ff.) Psychology is
defined now also as a science of human behavior, as is sociology.
Thus, if we must be guided by definitions of "pure sciences,"
psychology, economics and sociology cannot exist, because they
are all "sciences of behavior." Is it necessary to add that such
independent sciences do not exist indeed; but on the other hand,
the identity of the definitions does not hinder the study of the
phenomena of human behavior from somewhat various
stand])oints; and in somewhat different combinations, which give
a basis for a relative and conditional separation of these
disciplines. In all these respects, the situation of sociology is not
worse than that of these cultural sciences. It is worse only in the
sense that while economics and psychology have been busy with
the study of facts, sociologists have greatly wasted their time in a
discussion of the "object-matter of pure sociology." But, luckily for
us, now they also are dropping this fruitless business, and are
getting busy with factual study.
506
sciences, and not overlapping their fields. Neither do I see how
such a fantastic goal could be achieved, whether in the field of
sociology or of any other science. I do not believe that such a
formalism can produce anything valuable. The attempt sacrifices
the real unity of human knowledge to purely accidental and
practical subdivisions required by "departmental subdivisions,"
and by other similar needs external to science itself. This means
that the very attempt of formal sociology to build ''an independent
sociology" is rather fallacious.^^
The above, however, does not mean that the formal school has
been quite fruitless in sociology. Through its analysis of human
relations and their types it has contributed something valuable to
a definite part of sociology in systematizing human relations and
social processes. The multitude of concrete human relationships
and the complexity of social processes make it necessary to
classify them into a few large classes, with further subdivisions, in
this way preventing us from becoming lost in a wild forest of
interrelations. Like zoological or botanical systematics, sociology
must have, among its parts, at least an approximate classification
of social relationships in order to make orientation possible in the

vast field of social phenomena. For this part of sociology, the
formal school, with its consideration of ''the forms of human
relations" and with its efforts to classify them, has contributed
something valuable. However, in this respect also, the school
must share its contributions with other sociological schools which
have contributed to this field, at any rate no less than the formal
school. It is enough to remember H. Spencer's
3^ The same is true of the recent attempt of Professor F.
Znaniecki to define the "object-matter of sociology." After his
severe criticism of all "hodgepodge" sociologies instead of a "pure
sociology" he gave an additional "hodgepodge" conception of
sociology as a science of human interinfluence and relationship,
which embraces criminology, ethics, educational theory, political
science, and so on. It is evident that the conception has all the
sins of other "hodgepodge" definitions so severely criticized by
the author. Nevertheless, such a sin is better than the "purity" of
the "pure sociologists," which has never been attained by
anybody. For my part, as far as some guiding and approximate
definition of sociology is necessary, I find the most suitable
definition of it as a science of the most general characteristics
common to all classes of social phenomena and the correlations
which exist between these classes. (See the Conclusion of this
book.) However, several other definitions are as good as this, and
I do not think it is necessary to argue much about them. It is much
better to "build" than to argue about "how to build." See Znaniecki,
op. cit., pp. 558-584.
507
discrimination of the processes of social growth, differentiation
and integration, and dissolution and disintegration; or G. Tarde's
fundamental classification of social processes into three groups:
repetition, opposition, and adaptation or invention; in order to see
that neither Tonnies, Simmel, nor any other partizans of the

formal school could be regarded as the initiator in the
classification of social relations and processes. Even the detailed
table of Dr. von Wiese, in its three principal divisions of human
relations, toward each other, away from each other, and mixed
follows pretty closely Tarde's classification, but not that of
Simmel. Similarly, von Wiese's classification of social processes:
dijferentiation, integration, and destruction, is but a slightly
changed classification of H. Spencer. These indications are
enough to show that even in this field the contribution of the
formal school does not represent a monopoly.
3. THE FORMAL SYSTEMATICS OF SOCIAL PROCESSES
AND HUMAN RELATIONSHIP IN CONTEMPORARY
SOCIOLOGY
Here it is appropriate to cast a glance at the present situation as
regards the problem of a formal systematics of social processes
and human relations in contemporary sociology. The results of
such a survey show: first, that there is a considerable diversity of
opinion; second, that some sociologists are inclined to identify the
terms social process and human relations, while some others give
them a different meaning; third, that some sociologists mention
and analyze processes and relations somewhat incidentally, not
trying to give their systematic classification, while others
seemingly try to do the reverse; fourth, that the basis of the
classification {fundamentum divisionis) used by sociologists is
different; and fifth, that the majority of the systematic
classifications go on along the lines of the classifications offered
by Herbert Spencer, and especially by Gabriel Tarde.
AH this means that the discussed problem is far from being
definitely settled, and makes it necessary for greater attention to
be paid to it by sociologists. Here are some typical examples
which may corroborate the above statements. As a group of
sociologists who do not try to give a formal systematic

classification of social relations and processes, I will mention the
names
508
of Charles A. Ellwood, E. C. Hayes, E. Waxweiler, Charles H.
Cooley, and Franklin H. Giddings. They give very valuable
classifications of social processes, but not from the ''formal"
standpoint. In the group of sociologists who try to do it, there are
besides L. von Wiese, Edward A. Ross, Robert E. Park, Ernest
W. Burgess, Emory Bogardus, and the writer.
In the works of Charles H. Cooley, there is a brilliant analysis of
such social processes and human relationships as : social
organization and disorganization, ascendancy, domination,
leadership, formalization, individualization, socialization, conflict,
hostility, and suggestion; but all these are given without any
attempt to classify them from the standpoint of a formal
systematics of social processes, or of human relations.^^ In a
similar way, Charles A. Ellwood gives an illuminating analysis of
such social processes as association, social coordination,
socialization, co-adaptation, cooperation, social assimilation,
social organization, social continuity, and social disintegration; ^^
but all this is analyzed not for the sake of classifying social
processes, but for other, no less important, purposes. The same
may be said of the works of Franklin H. Giddings. He gives one of
the most interesting and valuable classifications of societal
facts,^^ but his ''categorical scheme of societal genesis" is
constructed for other purposes and from another standpoint than
that of a formal systematics of social relations. Again, his analysis
of such social processes as adjustment, concourse, achievement,
amelioration, variation, socialization, concerted volition,
organization of action, and pluralistic behavior, is generally made

from another standpoint than that of their formal classification.^^
A somewhat more detailed and careful classification of human
relationsbut not that of social processesis given by Edward C.
Hayes. He discriminates thirteen classes of human relations:
social suggestion of ideas, sympathetic radiation of feelings,
imita^2 See Cooley, Charles H,, Social Process; Social Organization;
Human Nature and the Social Order.
33 See especially Ellwood, Charles A., The Psychology of Human
Society, 1925, passim.
3^ See Giddings, Franklin H., Scientific Study of Human Society,
1924, Chap. IV and pp. 70-79.
^ See ihid., passim. See also Giddings, Studies in the Theory of
Human Society, N. Y., 1922, Part III.
509
tion of overt practices, inducement, deterrence, accommodation,
corroboration, emulation, domination-subordination, competition,
conflict, cooperation, and organization.^^ It is easy, however, to
see that these classes are not given from the ''formal" standpoint,
and that they represent partly the ''forms" of human relations, like
association, conflict, competition, accommodation; and partly the
methods of influencing one individual by another through
suggestion, inducement, deterrence, emulation, etc. The same
may be said of Waxweiler's classification of "social activities" in
the following groups: conjunction, protection, competition,
divulgation, gregariousness, repetition, initiation, acquisition, and
selection.^"
More "formal" are the classifications of the other mentioned group

of sociologists, especially that of E. A. Ross. His Principles of
Sociology is a systematic treatise on the forms of human relations
or social processes. He discriminates between and very ably
analyzes the following forms of social processes; preliminary
socialization, genesis of society, association, domination,
exploitation, opposition, stimulation, antagonism:competition,
conflict, class struggle, war,adaptation, cooperation,
organization of social effort, will and thought, deterioration,
stratification, gradation, segregation and subordination,
equalization, selection, socialization, estrangement, social control,
individuation, liberation, commercialization, professionalization,
institutionalization, expansion, ossification, decadence,
transformation, and re-shaping.^* This book, being free from the
above sins of the formal school, together with Leopold von
Wiese's book, furnishes probably the most conspicuous examples
of a formal classification of social processes. Along the same
lines R. Park's and E. Burgess' Introduction to the Science of
Sociology, and Emory S. Bogardus' Fundamentals of Social
Psychology are built. R. Park and E. Burgess try to give an
analysis of all essential social phenomena
^ See Hayes, E. C, "Some Social Relations Restated," Americaii
Jourfial of Sociology, pp. 333-346, 1925; Sociological
Construction Lines, 1902; Introductio7i to the Study of Sociology,
Chains. XIX-XXIV; see also a very good summary of Hayes'
sociolop;ical theories in Vox Populorum, No. 21, September,
1925.
" See Waxweiler, E., Esqiiisse d'une sociologie, 1906, Chap. VH.
3* See Ross, E. A., Principles of Sociology, i)art HI, N. Y., 1923.
Somewhat similar also is the character of the book of a Russian
professor, Takhtareff, K. M., Science of Social Life, Nauka ob
obschestvennoi jizni, Petrograd, 1920.
510
in the form of a study of a few fundamental social processes such
as: isolation, social contact, social interaction, competition,
conflict, accommodation, assimilation, amalgamation, social
control, and progress.^^ Similarly, E. Bogardus discriminates
between the following forms of interstimulation: isolation,
stimulation, communication, suggestion, imitation, diffusion,
discrimination, dis^ cussion, accommodation, assimilation, and
socialization.^^ E. H. Sutherland's classification is fourfold:
conflict, avoidance, submission, supplementation.^^
In a sense systematic, but yet considerably different, is the
classification of the forms of human relationship given by the
writer. In this classification are indicated the following classes of
interrelations: i. Relationship (or interstimulation) achieved
through the actions of doing and not doing, since individuals may
influence one another not only through doing something, but also
through not doing it. 2. Relationship of a two-sided and onesided
character, as when one party influences another which is not
influenced by it, as takes place in the cases when the living
generation is influenced by those who have already died. 3. Longtime and permanent relationship, and relationship which is
incidental or temporary. 4. Antagonistic and solidaristic. 5. Direct
(face to face) or indirect. 6. Conscious or intentional; and
unconscious, or unintentional. 7. Formal, or institutionalized, and
informal, where there is no generally accepted pattern. Each of
these seven classes of relationship is discriminated from the
''exterior" or ''objectively tangible" standpoint. Being divided into
subclasses, they are enabled to embrace all the fundamental
forms of human relations.^^
These examples are sufiflcient to give a pretty accurate idea of
the present status of the classification problem of social relations
and processes in sociology. We see that the statements given at

the beginning of this paragraph are seemingly accurate. The
principal conclusions which follow from the above may be
summed up as follows:
3^ Park, R. and Burgess, E., Introduction to the Science of
Sociology, Chaps. IV-XIV.
''o Bogardus, E. S., Fundamentals of Social Psychology, Part II,
N. Y., 1924.
41 Sutherland, E., "The Biological and Sociological Processes,"
American Journal of Sociology, Proceedings, Vol. XX, p. 62.
^2 See Sorokin, Systerna Soziologii, Vol. I, Chap. V.
511
The need of a systematics of social processes and human
relations in sociology is evident. Paying great attention to this
problem, the formal school and other "relationists" have
contributed something to the science of sociology, but the
problem is far from being solved. The very fact of the above
heterogeneity of the classifications means that as yet no
unanimity has been achieved. The existing classifications, and
among them even the most elaborate ones are somewhat
imperfect. An example is given in Professor Ross' or Professors
Park and Burgess' classifications. There we find several forms of
social processes which have been somewhat doubled. In Ross'
nomenclature, it is hard to see the reasons for a discrimination
between such processes as association, socialization,
cooperation, adaptation, and organization of social effort, will, and
thought; or between such processes as deterioration, decadence,
ossification, and exploitation. In a similar way, it is
incomprehensible to me why Professors Park and Burgess treat
separately such processes as social contact and interaction;
accommodation, assimilation, socialization, and adaptation. The

boundary lines between such processes and some others are
drawn indistinctly, and their separate treatment looks somewhat
incidental. As a result, the relations of these social processes
become somewhat confused, especially when they are very
numerous. For this reason, the task of a sociologist in this field
consists in giving a better classification, free from the indicated
shortcoming. E. A. Ross' revised classification and that of L. von
Wiese are possibly a step toward a solution of the task. F. H.
Giddings' ''scheme of societal genesis" is already an excellent tool
for a systematization of types of social groups and dynamic and
genetic relationships typical for each of them.
The second defect of the above classifications is the lack of a
clear definition for many social processes. In our common talk,
and in sociological literature, there are a great many terms which
are supposed to be quite clear and which, in fact, are entirely
indefinite. Examples are exploitation, equalization, individuation,
organization, disintegration, decadence and some others. What
social relations are to be styled as exploitation is a pro])lem
remaining to be solved. Permeated by the Marxian conceptions,
we are prone to see exploitation in almost all the actions of a
512
on CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES
capitalist, slave-master, or an aristocrat; yet a slight analysis is
sufficient to show the fallacy of such a conception. Often the
interrelations of a wage-earner and a capitalist, or a slave and his
master, are free from antagonism, reminding one rather of the
protection of a weaker party by a stronger one, than an
exploitation. It is not a rare fact for a class of unskilled laborers to
appear rather as exploiters than as those who are exploited.^^
Many interrelations would appear to be exploitation if we assumed
the standpoint of *'arithmetical equality"; and the same
interrelations would appear in quite a different light if we assumed

the standpoint of ''proportional equality." These brief allusions are
sufficient to suggest why such terms, without a preliminary
analysis, could not be used for the designation of social
processes, and why their use without analysis leads to a
confusion instead of a clarification. The same may be said of the
processes of organization, disorganization, adaptation, and
decadence, not to mention such absolutely subjective evaluations
as progress, regress, aggravation, betterment, and so on. This
means that one of the urgent tasks of sociology in this field is to
begin a careful, monographic, and objective study of these
processes, which will lead to a clarification of their nature, and
through that, will give a better basis for their scientific
classification.
The third defect of the above classifications is that they do not
discriminate between which of these processes are permanent
and universal, found within any social group; and which are
particular, and temporary, found only among specific groups at a
definite period. As far as the fundamental task of sociology
consists in an analysis of the permanent and universal social
processes, it is extremely important to separate them from those
of a local and temporary character. This separation is not made in
a majority of the existing classifications.
Finally, in view of the tendency of the formal school and of
43 "We are told that unskilled labor creates the wealth of the
world. It would be nearer the truth to say that large classes of
unskilled labor hardly create their own subsistence. The laborers
that have no adaptiveness, that bring no ideas to their work, that
have no suspicion of the next best thing to turn to in an
emergency, might much better be identified with the dependent
classes than with the wealth creators," rightly says Professor
Giddings in his Democracy and Empire, p. 83, N. Y., 1900.
513
some of the relationists to limit the content and the task of
sociology by a study of the forms of social relations and
processes, it is necessary to stress that such pretensions are
fallacious. Like botanical or zoological systematics of plants and
animals, the classification and analysis of social relations and
processes composes only a part of sociology. To limit its contents
to this part means to cut from sociology its other more vital parts.
Any classification is descriptive and gives very little opportunity for
a causal analysis of the phenomena. If we had followed literally
the pretensions of the formal school, the result would have been a
transformation of sociology into a purely scholastic and dead
science, a kind of almost useless catalogue of human relations.^*
Accordingly, this pretension must be rejected, and the study of the
''forms" of human relations must be made only one of the parts of
sociology.
With the formal school we shall finish our survey of the principal
types of the general sociologistic theories. Now we shall ])ass to a
survey of the special sociologistic theories, which take a definite
social condition or factor and try to interpret many social
phenomena as its function. We shall begin an analysis of the
special sociologistic theories with the economic school, as one of
the most popular at the present moment. Its analysis done, we
shall survey other special sociologistic studies. In this way we can
obtain an adequate idea of the present situation of the
sociologistic school.
^^ If von Wiese's, Tonnies', Simmers, Park and Burgess', Ross',
Vierkandt's and Bogardus' works have not become such a
scholastic catalogue, it is because of the fact that they themselves
have not followed the "formal pretension." The best parts of their
works are exactly those in which they forget this pretension, and
plunge into an investigation of the "content" phenomena.
514
CHAPTER X SOCIOLOGISTIC SCHOOL (Continued):
ECONOMIC SCHOOL
Under this school I include those theories which have taken one
of the so-called ''economic factors" as the independent variable
and have tried to find out its effects on or its correlations with
other social phenomena.
I. Predecessors
At the present moment only persons quite innocent in knowledge
of the history of social thought could claim that this school
originated with Karl Marx' and Friedrich Engels' works. The fact is
that since immemorial times thinkers were aware of the important
role played by ''economic factors" in human behavior, social
organization, social processes, and in the historical destiny of a
society. Already in the teachings of Eastern sages like Confucius
and Mencius and Hindu thinkers we find many statements which,
implicitly and explicitly, stress the importance of economic
conditions. Confucius and Mencius indicated that poverty calls
forth dissatisfaction of the people and social disorders and that a
satisfactory economic situation of the people is a necessary
condition of social order. They also pointed out that "economic
factors" condition religious and political phenomena. This explains
why the securing of food and other economic necessities is
regarded by them as a primary task of a good government;^ and
why in Confucius' Law of the Three Stages the most important
characteristic of each stage is given in the form of its economic
features, correlated with corresponding political and moral
phenomena; and, finally, why in the long history of China we meet
so many economic reforms and such a vivid dis1 See Legge, J., The Life and Works of Mencius, Philadelphia,
1875, the works of Mencius, pp. 20-24; 48-49; "The Li-Ki," pp. 12
ff., in The Sacred Books of the East, Vol. XXVIII; Chang, Chen
Huan, The Economic Principles of Confucius and his School, pp.
52 ff. and passim, N. Y., 1911.
515
cussion of various economic systems.^ The same may be said of
the Hindu sacred books, and Hindu sages. To Buddha is ascribed
the statement that 'âround hunger and love is centered the whole
history of mankind." The very fact of the great attention which The
Sacred Books of India give to a regulation of economic
relationship, to economic organization, and to economic problems
testifies that in ancient India thinkers were well aware of the
importance of economic conditions for human behavior and social
life.^ The same is true of such a relatively ancient source as ''The
Zend-Avesta" ^ or the Bible.^
As to ancient Greece, its historians and philosophers, like
Thucydides, Plato, and Aristotle, to mention only a few names,
methodically used economic factors for an explanation of many
social processes. Aristotle's theory of the forms of government
consists of a correlation of political and moral phenomena with
economic conditions. His theory of social changes and revolutions
explicitly states that ''the causes for which men will be seditious
are profit and honour; and their contrary: for, to avoid dishonour or
loss of fortune by mulcts, either on their own account or their
friends, they will raise a commotion in the state. . . . What
influence ill-treatment and profit have for this purpose, and how
they may be the causes of sedition, is almost self-evident."
Further, Aristotle gives his explanation and factual
2 See The Sacred Books of the East, Vol. Ill, Texts of
Confucianism, passim; Vol. XXVII and Vol. XXVIII, "The Li-Ki,"
passim; Chang Chen Huan, op. cit., passim; Lee, Mabel PingHua, The Economic History of China, N. Y., 1921, passim.
3 See in the same series of The Sacred Books of the East, The
Institutes of Vishnu, The Laws of Mann, Nardda, The Vedanta
Sutras, Brichaspati, Gautama, Apas-tamba; throughout them are
scattered many statements which express the above idea; a
painstaking regulation of economic relationship shows also that
the authors of these books well understood the significance of
economic conditions for the well-being of a society.
* "He who sows corn, grass and fruit, sows holiness; he makes
the law of Mazda grow higher and higher," this is one of many
statements showing an influence of economic factors upon morals
and religion. "The Zend-Avesta," The Sacred Books of the East,
Vol. IV, Farg. Ill, 31.
^ The very statement: "man doth not live by bread only but by
everything that proceedeth out of the mouth of Jehovah doth man
live" (Deuteronomy, viii:3) indicates an understanding of an
importance of bread-factors. The statements that in conditions of
economic welfare the people arc prone to forget God and morals
(Deuteronomy, viii: 11-17), while in poverty people are prone to
riots; and the very fact of a detailed regulation of economic
relations given in Deuteronomy and other books of the Bible are
sufficient corroborations of my statements.
516
corroboration of this generalization.^ Thucydides' The History of
the Peloponnesian War opens with a short sketch of the early
history of Greece. Tracing Greece's evolution Thucydides
conspicuously stresses the fundamental role of changes in
production, wealth, commerce, and other economic conditions
which determined, and were correlated with, changes in political
and social organization, in behavior and psychology.
The coast populations now began to apply themselves more

closely to the acquisition of wealth, and their life became more
settled; some even began to build themselves walls on the
strength of their newly-acquired riches. For the love of gain would
reconcile the weaker to the dominion of the stronger, and the
possession of capital enabled the more powerful to reduce the
smaller towns to subjection. And it was at somewhat later stages
of this development that they went on the expedition against Troy.
... As the power of Hellas grew, and the acquisition of wealth
became more an object, the revenues of the states increasing,
tyrannies were by their means established almost everywhere,
and Hellas began to fit out fleets and apply more closely to the
sea."^
These are the samples which show Thucydides' attentive
consideration of economic factors in the social evolution of
Greece, in social changes, and in originating the Peloponnesian
War.
In Plato's The Republic and Laws, a series of generalizations
concerning the influence of economic conditions on human
behavior and social phenomena are given. First, in his
classification of human needs Plato indicates eating, drinking, and
sexual intercourse as fundamental needs.^ Second, with a great
insight
6 Aristotle, Politics, Book V, Chaps. II and III. I quote Everyman's
Library Edition, Button Co., pp. 144-147. In this and other works
of Aristotle there are scattered numerous statements concerning
the effects of economic conditions on social life, their role in social
antagonisms and class-struggle, and so on.
7 Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War, tr. by R.
Crawley, Button Co., Chap. I. The majority of the Greek writers,
beginning with Hesiod and Theognis and ending with the
"proletarian" ideologists of ancient Greece, its demagogues and
propagandists, did not fail to mention, to stress, and to analyze

the role of "economic factors" in social and historical processes.
See KovALEVSKY, M., Sovremennya Soziologi, 1905, Chap. V,
pp. 225 ff.; Pohl-MANN, R., Geschichte des Antiken Sozialismus
und Communismus, 2d ed.; Haney, L. H., History of Economic
Thought, Chaps. I-V; Monroe, A. E., Early Economic Thought,
Chaps. I-II; Zimmern, A. E., The Greek Commonwealth; see
especially The Comedies of Aristophanes.
8 Plato, "Laws," Dialogues of Plato, tr. by B. Jowett, Oxford,
MBCCCXCII, Vol. V, pp. 782-783.
517
he characterizes the effects of poverty and wealth on human
psychology and behavior. Here is a sample. Poverty and wealth
are the causes of deterioration. "One is the parent of luxury and
indolence and the other of meanness and viciousness and both of
discontent." They are the causes of social and class-struggle.
**Any ordinary city, however small, is divided into two cities, one
of the city of the poor, the other of the rich, at war with one
another." ^ In his classification of the forms of government he
correlates economic organization with a corresponding political
organization and with the dominant psychological and ethical
characteristics of the people. In this way he shows a full
understanding of the conditioning role of economic factors and
their correlation with other social phenomena.^^
A complex system of economic organization of Roman society, in
its later period,^^ naturally called forth, as in Greece, an intensive
turning of social thought upon economic problems. It would have
been strange indeed if the Roman social and economic thinkers
had failed to understand such a simple idea as the conditioning
role of economic factors. Whether we take the works of Cicero,
Sallust, T. Livy, Seneca, Ammianus Marcellinus, Varro, Lucretius,
Cato, Columella, Tacitus, Pliny, or Polybius, we easily find a
series of statements which describe, indicate, and analyze many

effects of various economic conditions upon social life, historical
processes, human behavior, and psychology. Such for instance,
are Pliny's formula of the fall of Rome: "Lati-fiindia perdirere
ItaJiam, jam vero et proznncias" (the large
Plato, The Republic, The Dialogues of Plato, tr. by Jowett, Vol.
II, pp. 422 ff., 547, N. Y., 1874.
^ A clear understanding of the important r61e played by
economic conditions in human behavior is the reason why Plato
planned communism of property and women and children for the
Guardians in his ideal Republic. The Guardians' "means of
subsistence should be such as will neither impair their virtue, nor
tempt them to prey upon the other citizens." Plato hoped that
communism of property would lead to such effects. Whether his
hope is reasonable or not, this shows that he well understood the
effective influence of economic conditions on human conduct:
changing the former, through this he hoped to change the latter.
Generally, throughout The Republic, especially in its eighth and
ninth books, there are given many valuable generalizations
concerning the discussed problem.
11 See RosTOVTZEFF, M., The Social and Economic History of
the Roman Empire, Oxford, 1926; Salvioli, J., Der Kapitalismus in
Altertum, Stuttgart, 1912; Frank, T., Economic History of Royne.
518
estates, the latifundia, were ruining Rome) ; ^^ a similar statement
of Seneca; ^^ Sallust's statements like the following one:
When the people were gradually deprived of their land, idleness
and poverty left them without a place to live on; they began to
wish greedily for other men's property and to regard their liberty
and the interests of their country an object for sale. Thus the
people . . . became degenerate; and instead of supporting their
commonwealth brought upon themselves individual servitude.^^
Polybius' theory of the cycles of the forms of government
correlated with corresponding changes in economic conditions;
these and hundreds of similar statements ^^' show clearly that the
Roman writers were well aware of the importance of economic
factors, of their influence on many social processes, including
even such a fundamental process as the decay of Rome. There is
no need to say that they were aware of class-struggle and of its
economic causes, and that there was an abundance of many
radical and ''proletarian" ideologies with the slogans and
shibboleths identical with those of contemporary socialism,
communism and Marxianism. ^^
Similar was the situation in the later periods of the Middle Ages,
especially in the period of the Renaissance and the Reformation.
M. Kovalevsky rightly says:
It is hard to find a writer of this period who, discussing the
problem of a change of political forms, would not correlate it with
the changes in economic conditions and with the origin of a new
economic class in whose interests the political regime had to be
altered.^"^
In this respect among these writers especially prominent are
^ Pliny, H. N., xviii. 7. ^^ Senega, Ep. 89. ^^ Sallust, I. 5.
^5 Even such a relatively detailed correlation as that between
occupation and economic status on the one hand, and
ideological, moral and biological characteristics of a man on the
other, was many times stressed by various writers. Here are the
samples: "It is from the tillers of the soil that spring the best
citizens, the staunchest soldiers," Cato, De AgricuUura, pp. 19

fT., N. Y., 1913. See in Varro, Rerum Rusticarum Lihri Tres his
characterization of the city and the country people from a
biological and psychological point of view, a characterization
which shows his full understanding of the occupational and
economic influences on human body and mind.
1^ Even the famous phrase of Marx-Engels' Communist
Manifesto, that in the class-struggle the proletariat can lose
nothing but its chains, is but a repetition of the statements of M.
Agrippa and Sallust. See Pohlmann, R., op. cit., passim.
519
N. Machiavelli and Guicciardini, to mention only a few names.
Both of them, and Gianotti also, pay great attention to economic
factors in their interpretations of historical processes; both of them
viewed a change of government in the light of a class-struggle,
and the class-struggle itself was explained through a conflict of
economic interests of different classes. ^^
Of writers of the seventeenth century the name of James
Harrington, a contemporary of the English revolution, occupies an
especially conspicuous place in this respect. In his The Commonzvcalth of Oceana (1656) he laid down a systematic theory of
economic interpretation of history. His motto is: ''Such as is the
proportion or balance of dominion or property in land, such is the
nature of the Empire." Political power is based on property. When
one man owns the greater part of the property in a country, in
such a country there would exist an absolute monarchy. When the
property (or wealth) is concentrated in the hands of a few men,
this leads to a ''gothic or mediaeval monarchy," to a mixed form
where the political control is in the hands of the king and a small
group of the privileged classes. When the property is distributed
throughout the whole population and no group has an exclusivelv
2:reat wealth, which would outbalance the wealth of the whole
people, in such a country there would be a republic or a

democracy. When in the distribution of national wealth there
happen to be changes, they naturally call forth corresponding
changes in the political regime, and in other fields of social life
and organization. Such is the essence of the theory of Harrington.
These and a gr^*at many other propositions given in his work are
inferred from a study of historical facts, as far as they were
accessible at that time. This still increases the value of
Harrington's theory.^^
Of the writers of the eighteenth century it is possible to mention
the names of Garnier,^*^ Dalrymple,^^ Moser, Reinhard,
^' See Machiavkli.i, The Discourses on Livy, passim, and Book III,
Chap. XVI; Book I, Chaps. V, XI, XII; Book II, Chap. II; History of
Florence, passim. See Guicciardini, Opere inedite, Ricordo, Vol. I,
passim; sec Kovalevsky, op. cit., pp. 227-229.
^^ See The Oceana and Other Works of James Harrington,
London, 1747, passhyi, and pp. 4 ff., 39 ff., 291 ff.
^^ Garnier, De la propriete dans ses rapports avec le droit
politique, ij()2.
21 Dalrymple, An Essay Toward a Grncral History of Feudal
Property in Great Britain, 1757.
520
Mably, John Millar,^^ Barnave, Schlozer, Adam Smith, Adelung,
Turgot, and especially Raynal.^^ In the writings of these authors
almost all the theories, which later on were developed by the
writers of the nineteenth century and K. Marx and F. Engels, were
laid down.
Finally, if we turn to the writers of the first half of the nineteenth

century, whose works were published either before or
simultaneously with that of Karl Marx, their number is so great
that I can here only enumerate their names without any attempt to
give an idea of the character of their theories. Since the end of the
eighteenth and in the first half of the nineteenth centuries, the
''intellectual atmosphere" has been satiated with the idea of the
^'economic or materialistic interpretation of history." Some of the
more ardent followers of Marx, and even some of the prominent
academic writers, used to depict K. Marx's theory as deiis ex
machina, as though it did not have any predecessors, or only a
very few like Hegel, Feuerbach, Saint-Simon, or L. Blanc; and
they correspondingly proclaimed Marx the ''Galileo" or the
"Darwin" of the social sciences.^^
22 MosER, Vorrede zur Osnahrukschen Geschichte, 1768; Millar,
John, Observations Concerning the Distinction of Ranks in
Society, 1771.
23 See an appropriate analysis of their works from this standpoint
in SuLZ-BACH, W., Die Anfdnge der materialistischen
Geschichtsauffassung, Karlsruhe, 1911; VON Below, G., Die
Deutsche Geschichteschreibung, 2d ed., Miinchen und Berlin,
1924, pp. 161-194; Roger, P., "La theorie de la lutte de classes a
la veille de la revolution," Revue d'economie politique, 1911, No.
5. See also Salomon, G., "Historische Materialismus und
Ideologienlehre," Jahrbuch ftir Soziologie, Band II, 1926, pp. 386423.
24 For instance P. Barth mentions only the names of SaintSimon, Hegel, Feuerbach, Bruno Bauer, Louis Blanc, and Lorenz
von Stein, as the predecessors of Marx. A. W. Small goes so far
in his eulogy of Marx, that he "confidently predicts that in the
ultimate judgment of history Marx will have a place in social
science analogous with that of Galileo in physical science." Small,
A. W., "Socialism in the Light of Social Science," American

Journal of Sociology, Vol. XVII, May, 1912, p. 812. Even such a
careful author as Professor E. R. A. Seligman indicates some of
the predecessors of Marx's theory, in criticizing it; nevertheless he
states finally that "Marx must be recognized as in the truest sense
the originator of the economic interpretation of history." Seligman,
E. R. A., The Economic IJiterprelation of History, pp. 52-53, N. Y.,
1907. As far as the originality and the content of the theory of
Marx's materialistic conception of history is concerned (but not
that of Marx's practical influence) at the present moment,
especially after the studies of von Below, Sulzbach, Roger and
some others, there seems to be no possibility to claim that Marx
added any single new idea in this field or gave a new and
scientifically better synthesis of the ideas which existed before
him. From this standpoint earlier opinions of such scholars as A.
Menger, W. j. Ashley, S. H. Patten and of some others who
521
The facts are that practically all the sociological ideas of Marx in
an identical or even a more accurate form were published by
other authors either before or simultaneously with the publication
of his Communist Manifesto, Die Heilige Familie, Misery of
Philosophy, and Zur Kritik der Politischen Oeconomie, where
there is found for the first time a more or less systematic
formulation of Marx's materialistic interpretation of history. Many
historical, economic and philosophical works of the first half of the
nineteenth century were characterized by concentration of
attention on economic conditions, by a study of the influence of
these conditions on various phases of social life, and by an
explanation of many political, social, religious, aesthetic, and
moral phenomena in terms of economic influences.
To show this it is enough to mention the names of Niebuhr,
Bockh, K. W. Nitzsch, Savig^nv, V. A. Huber, Heinrich
V.
Sybel, K. D. Hiillman, H. Leos, G. A. H. Stenzel, Adam Miiller, G.
L. V. Maurer, W. Arnold, M. Toppen, L. Giesebrecht, F. v. Bilow,
Neumann, K. F. v. Kloden, Stiive, Hofler, Hassler, Franz Kurz, J.
V. Koch-Sternfeld, Chmel, K. F. v. Rumohrs, A. v. Haxthausen,
Roscher, B. Hildebrand, Lorenz v. Stein, Drumann, S. Hirsch, G.
v. Raumer, Thierry, Riige, Rodbertus, Lassal, Le Play, partly
Proudhon, not to mention many others. In their works, in the way
of a factual analysis of historical data, these authors formulated
practically all that is sound in a speculative and a more defective
form of Marx's and JMigels' formulas of the economic or
materialistic interpretation of history.-'"* Finally, it is necessary to
mention the name of Georg Wilhelm von Raumer, who in 1837,
and in 1851, earlier rather than Marx, formulated a theory of the
economic conception of history, which is
much more moderately estimated Marx's scientific contributions
seem to be completely warranted by the facts. See especially S.
H. Patten's criticism of Small's "scientific blunder," Patten, S. H.,
Essays iii Econornic Theory, pp. 287-288, N. Y., 1924. See further
the text of this book.
25 See a very good analysis of the works of the mentioned
authors from this viewpoint in von Below, G., Die Deutsche
Geschichteschreibiing, pp. 161-194. See also Sulzbach, W., op.
cit.; partly, Hammacher, E., Das philosophisch-okonomische
System des Marxismus, 1909; Woltmann, L., Der historische
mate-rialismiis, 1906; i)artly Plechanow, G., Beitrafiê zur
Geschichte des Materialismus, 1896; ])artly CuNOW, H., "Zur
Gescliichtc dor Klasskampftheoric," /(i//r/;r///wr Soziologic, Bd.
II. Two last works arc defective.
522
almost identical with that of Marx.^^ This theory was formulated

as a result of a painstaking historical study of Raumer. Here are a
few quotations from his theory which may show its mottoes:
All political changes are nothing but a result of the changes in the
condition of production, manner of living, and in a new situation of
different classes called forth by the changes in commerce and
trade (VcrkcJirsvcrJialtnisse). . . . The political changes in their
final analysis are but the results, and even the necessary results,
of the changed social and economic conditions of the people
which by and by change not only the morals, and mores, and
manners of living and thinking but also the relations of various
social classes toward one another. . . Of course, this does not
mean a denial of an importance and power of the spiritual
(gcistigcn) movements within a people; but it is also true that such
movements in the majority of the cases are either induced
through economic changes, or are followed and carried on by
them.
Summing up the theory of Raumer one can say: first, the
character and the conditions of production are the most important
and primary factors; they condition all other social phenomena: a
change in the conditions of production calls forth a corresponding
change in distribution of wealth and property: this, a change in the
class-differentiation, class-composition and class-interrelations of
society and in its family organization; these changes condition a
corresponding modification of social relations and juridical
institutions; and these are followed by a corresponding
modification of the mores, habits, customs, manners, ideologies,
beliefs, and psychology of society. In brief, we have a theory
practically identical with that of Marx. This, however, does not
mean that both theories were something extraordinary among
other theories of that time. On the contrary, "in the German (and
the same is true in regard to the French and the English) historical
and economic literature of the middle of the nineteenth century
there was such a vivid interest in economic problems, that an

author,
26 See VON Raumer, G. W., Neumdrkischen Landbuchs von,
1337; and especially Die Insel Wollin und das Seebad Misdroy,
1851; about Raumer's work see Voigt, A., "Georg W. von Raumer
und die materialistische Geschichtsauffassung," Preussischen
Jahrbiichern, Bd. 103, 1901, pj). 430 fF.; von Below, G., op. cit.,
pp. 161 ff.
523
simply being within the current of this literature, could easily come
to a stronger appreciation of the economic causes." Raumer, as
well as Marx and Engels, ''were simply within this current, and
depended on it in a degree much greater than it was supposed up
to this time. Their originality, as far as their general formulas are
concerned, consists only in an exaggeration and generalization of
what other authors said before." ^^ Such is the real situation.
The above brief survey of the predecessors of the economic
school in sociology shows that it is as old as human thought itself;
that it is not a monopoly of the nineteenth century; that,
sometimes in a vague, sometimes in a clearly-cut form, the
influence of economic conditions on human behavior, body and
mind, and on social processes was understood, and that long ago
a series of correlations of economic conditions with various social
processes were.formulated.
Now let us turn to a survey and analysis of the principal
contributions made in this field during the last few decades.
2. K. Marx's (1818-1883) and F. Engels' (1820-1895)
Theories
The socialistic dogmas of the founders of the Marxian

socialism,^*" and their economic theories in the narrow sense of
the
" VON Below, G., op. cit., pp. 179 and 191.
28 In regard to these parts of their "ideology" it is enough to say
that at the present moment it is scarcely possible to support them
as scientifically accurate. Marx's theory of the progressive
impoverishment of the laboring classes, of the concentration of
wealth, of the disappearance of the middle classes, and of the
catastrophic advent of socialism proved to be fallacious. Still more
fallacious happened to be his beliefs in the beneficial results of
the annihilation of private property, and a disappearance of
exploitation and misery, as the results of the socialization of the
means and the instruments of production, and all this from the
wonderful effects of "the dictatorship of the proletariat." The most
important part of his economic theory, the labor theory of value,
and the theory of the surplus-value, in their Marxian forms, are
(practically) not sustained by contemporary economists. See
Simkhovitch, V., Marxism vs. Socialism, N. Y., 1913; SoROKiN,
p., Social Mobility, 1927, Chaps. Ill and IV; Michels, R., La teoria
di C. Marx sulla miseria crescente, Torino, 1922; Novgorodzeff,
P., Ob Ohtschestvennom ideale, 1924. About the contribution of
Marx-Engels to economics see Bohm-Bawerk, E., Karl Marx and
the Close of His System, N. Y., 1898, and the courses in
economics of G. Schmoller, F. Taussig, A. Marshall, J. B. Clarke,
R. Ely, M. Tougan-Baranovsky and practically any solid course in
economics. See also Sombart, W., Der Proletarische Sozialismus,
new and greatly changed edition of his Sozialismus und soziale
Bewegting, Vols. I, II,
524
word do not concern us in this book. Only their sociological

generalizations are discussed here. In view of a somewhat
ambiguous terminology of Marx, the best way to characterize his
conception is to do it in his own words. The essence of his theory
is given in his Critique of Political Economy, published in 1859.
Here we read :
The general conclusion at which I arrived and which, once
reached, continued to serve as the leading thread in my studies,
may be briefly summed up as follows: In the social production
which men carry on they enter into definite relations that are
indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of
production correspond to a definite stage of development of their
material power of production. The sum total of these relations of
production constitutes the economic structure of society the
real foundation, on which rise legal and political superstructures
and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness.
The mode of production in material life determines the general
character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life. It is
not the consciousness of men that determines their existence,
but, on the contrary, their social existence determines their
consciousness. At a certain stage of their development, the
material forces of production in society come in conflict with the
existing relations of production, or what is but a legal expression
for the same thing with the property relations within which they
had been at work before. From forms of development of the
forces of production these relations turn into their fetters. Then
comes the period of social revolution. With the change of the
economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more
or less rapidly transfornrt;d. In considering such transformations
the distinction should always be made between the material
transformation of the economic conditions of production which
can be determined with the precision of natural science and the
legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic in short,
ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict
and fight it out. Just as our opinion of an individual is not based on

what he thinks of himself, so can we not judge of such a period of
transformation by its own consciousness; on the contrary, this
consciousness must rather be explained from the contradictions
of material life, from the existing conflict between
Jena, 1924. In brief, the Marxian variety of socialism has no more
right to claim to be "scientific" than any other variety of sociahsm.
525
the social forces of production and the relations of production. No
social order ever disappears before all the productive forces, for
which there is room in it, have been developed; and new higher
relations of production never appear before the material
conditions of their existence have matured in the womb of the old
society. Therefore, mankind always takes up only such problems
as it can solve; since, looking at the matter more closely, we will
always find that the problem itself arises only when the material
conditions necessary for its solution already exist or are at least in
the process of formation. In broad outlines we can designate the
Asiatic, the ancient, the feudal, and the modern bourgeois
methods of production as so many epochs in the progress of
economic formation of society. The bourgeois relations of
production are the last antagonistic form of the social process of
production antagonistic not in the sense of individual
antagonism, but of one arising from conditions surrounding the life
of individuals in society; at the same time the productive forces
developing in the womb of bourgeois society create the material
conditions for the solution of that antagonism. This social
formation constitutes, therefore, the closing chapter of the
prehistoric stage of human society.^^
If we add to this Marx's theory of class-struggle, all essential
features of his economic interpretation of history are at hand.
The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class

struggle. Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and
serf, guild-master and journeyman, oppressor and oppressed,
stood in constant opiXDsition to one another, carried on an
uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time
ended either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or
in the common ruin of the contending classes. . . . The modern
bourgeois society that has s])routed from the ruins of feudal
society, has not done away with class antagonisms. It has but
established new classes, new conditions of oppression, new
forms of struggle in place of the old ones. . . Our epoch, the
epoch of the bourgeoisie, possesses, however, this distinctive
feature; it has simplified the class antagonisms. Society as a
whole is more and more splitting up into two great
29 Marx, K., Zur Kritik dcr Politischcn Oeko7wmic, 1859, PP- IVV; A Conlri-hution to the Critique of Political Ecofwmy, tr. by
Stone, pp. 11-13, N. Y., 1904.
526
hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other:
Bourgeoisie and Proletariat.^^
Such is the essence of Marx's-Engels' sociological theory.^^
3^ Communist Manifesto, pp. 12-13, Kerr, Chicago, 1913.
31 These other works of Marx are important sociologically: Die
Heilige Familie; Das Elend der Philosophie; Die Klassenkampf in
Frankreich; Lohnarheit und Kapital, and a few places in the first,
in the second, and especially in the third volumes of his Das
Kapital. Of the works of Engels the most important are: Ludwig
Feuerhach und der A us gang der klassischen Philosophie in
Deutschland; Die Entwicklung des Sozialismus von der Utopie zur

Wissenschaft; Die Lage Eng-lands; Der Ursprung der Familie, des
Privateigentums und des Staate; Hern Eugen Duhrings
Umwdlzung der Wissenschaft. Besides, several important works
of both authors are published in the volumes, Aus dem
literarischen Nachlass von K. Marx, F. Engels und F. Lassalles,
herausgegeben von F. Mehring. Of an immense literature devoted
to Marxianism besides the already quoted works the most
important are: Annates de Vlnstitut Internationale de Sociologie,
Vol. VIII, Paris, 1902, devoted to an analysis of Marxianism by
various prominent sociologists; Bernstein, E., Die
Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus und die Aufgahen der
Sozialdemokratie, 1899; Struve, P., "Die Marxsche Theorie der
sozialen Entwicklung," Braun's Archiv, Bd. XIV, pp. 677 ff.;
Masaryk, Th. G., Die philosophischen und soziologischen
Grundlagen des Marxismus, 1899; Kautsky, K., Ethik und
material. Geschichtsauffassung; Das Erfurter Programm; Barth,
P., op. cit., pp. 657 ff.; Ell WOOD, Ch., "Marx's Economic
Determinism," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. XVII, July,
1911; Labriola, A., Essays on the Materialistic Conception of
History, tr. by Kerr; Loria, A., The Economic Foundations of
Society, Lx)ndon, 1899; Lorl\, A., The Economic Synthesis, tr. by
E. Paul, N. Y., 1914; Spargo, J., K. Marx, His Life and Works, N.
Y., 1910; Croce, B., Historical Materialism, tr. by C. Meredith;
Novgorodzeff, P., Ob obschestvennom ideale, Social Ideal, 3d
ed.; Tugan-Baranovsky, M., Theoretical Foundations of Marxism,
Russ.; Kareev, N., Old and New Essays on Economic
Materialism, Russ.; Beltov-Plekhanov, G., The Monistic
Conception of History, Russ., tr. into German; Bukharin, N.,
Theory of Historical Materialism (Marxian Sociology), tr. into
German and English; Cunow, H., Grundziige der Marxschen
Soziologie, Vols. I, II, 1920, 1921; Tschernoff, V., Essays in
Economic Materialism, Russ.; Hansen, A., "The Technological
Inter]3retation of History," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.
XXXVI, 1921; Commons, J., "K. Marx," Atlantic Monthly, 1926;
Adler, M., Marx als Denker; Marxistische Probleme; Kant und der
Marxismus; Tonnies, F., Marx Leben und Lehre; Sorel, G.,
Reflections on Violence, N. Y., 1912; Michels, R., "Die Ital.
Literature iiber den Marxismus," Archiv filr Sozialwissenschaft,
Bd. XXIV and XXV; Materiaux d'une theorie du proletariat, 1919;
vSchmidt, K., "Marxistische Orthodoxie," Sozialis-tische
Monatshefte, 1913, Bd. I, 8 Heft.; Gehrlich, Der Kommunismus
als Lehre von Tausendjdhrigen Reich, 1920; Stammler, R.,
Wirtschaft und Recht nach der materialistischen
Geschichtsauffassung, 1896; Gentile, G., La filosofia di Marx,
1899; Ilijn, W. (Lenin), State and Revolution, Russ.; Kelsen, H.,
Sozialismus und Staat, 1920; Trotsky, L., Terrorisme et
communisme (tr. into English also); Kampffmeyer, p., "Zur Kritik
d. philos. Grundlagen des Marxismus," Sozial. Monatshefte, IX;
Korsch, K., Marxismus und Philosophie, 1923; Untermann, E.,
Marxismus und Logik; Penzias, A., Die Metaphysik der
materialist. Geschichtsauffassung, 1905; Oppenheimer, F., Das
Grundgesetz der Marxschen Gesell-schaftslehre, Berlin, 1903;
Pareto, V., Les systemes socialistes, 2 Vols.; Lichten-berger, p.,
op. cit., pp. 291-302; Todd, A. J., Theories of Social Progress,
Chaps. XIV-XV, N. Y., 1926.
527
INTERPRETATION AND CRITICISM
The ambiguity of Marx's wording is responsible for the different
interpretations of his theories and those of Engels' theory by
various writers, Marxian as well as non-Marxian. One who is well
acquainted with the pertinent parts of the writings of Marx cannot
help thinking as he reads the commentaries of the Marxians, that
he is reading a kind of purely dogmatic interpretation of a ''sacred
revelation" by its enthusiastic followers. Omitting such
interpretations, let us briefly indicate the principal shortcomings of
the main points of the theory under consideration.
A. Its first shortcoming is its conception of causal relation and

determinism. It is easy to see that an expression like ''the mode
of production determines the general character of the social,
political and spiritual processes of life," presupposes an
anthropomorphic and one-sided conception of causal relation: the
cause as something active, which one-sidedly determines, "acts,"
"creates," "produces" its result, {causa efficiens of the Middle
Ages) and the result, which is something inert and completely
depending on its cause. At the present moment, it is rather hard
to sustain such a conception. Being metaphysical in its essence it
cannot be applied to a great many relationships of various
phenomena which, especially in the social field, are not onesidedly but mutually dependent. This explains why in the
methodology of contemporary natural science the conception of
functional relation ("variable" and its "function," which may be
one- and two-sided), is being substituted for that of one-sided
causal relation, and correlation for that of one-sided and
metaphysical determinism. That is, the scientist asserts only that
associated phenomena are in functibnal relations or are
correlated to a degree indicated by the coefficient of correlation of
a certain probability.'"^^ Such substitution frees us from all anIn these works are represented all principal varieties of
interpretation and criticism of the Marx-Engels' theory.
^2 See CouRNOT, A., Essai sur le fondements de nos
connaissances, Paris, 1851; Considerations sur la marche des
idees, Paris, 1872; Traite de Venchainement des ideas
fondamenlales dans les sciences et dans I'historie, Paris, 1861;
Mach, E., Erkenntnis nnd Irriuni, 1906; Beit rage zur Analyse der
Empfitidunge?i, 1903;
528
thropomorphic elements in the connection of cause and

determinism, and gives the possibihty of studying one-sided and
two-sided relations. Such a conception presents the possibihty of
treating any ''factor" as a variable and trying to find to what extent
and wdth what phenomena it is correlated. In a great many cases
it permits also inverting such a functional ''equation" : i.e., taking a
function as a variable and trying to find its functions. For instance,
we may take, in one case, an "economic factor" as a variable and
study to what extent it is correlated with religious phenomena. In
another case, we may take religious phenomena as a variable
and try to investigate their "functions," among them, the functions
in the field of economic phenomena.''^''^ In the field of social
phenomena we almost always deal with relations of
interdependence but not wîth that of one-sided dependence. The
application to such phenomena of the conception of one-sided
causal relations leads to a series of logical and factual fallacies,
(see above paragraphs about Pareto). And this is just what
happened with the Marxian theory. Its conception of a one-sided
causal relation, when applied to socially interdependent
phenomena, is responsible for some logical and factual fallacies
of the theory, contradictory interpretations, and for endless
dispute among Marxian followers and among the critics of the
Marxian theory. It is the source of many shortcomings of the
theory. Let us look at the problem closer. The first idea of Marx's
theory is that the economic factor is the primary or the most
important factor which determines all others. The primacy may
mean either: (a) that in a causal chain this factor is the first which
determines all
BoREL, E., Le hasard, -'PsLvis, 1914; Rey, Abel, Die Theorie der
Physik bei den modernen Physikern, Germ. ed. by Alfred Kroner;
Poincare, H., La science et I'hypothese, Paris, 1908; Pearson, K.,
The Grammar of Science, Chap. Ill; Pareto, v., Trattato di
sociologia generate, Chaps. I and II; Tschuproff, A., Essays in the
Theory of,Statistics, Russ., tr. into EngHsh; Tschuproff, A., Das
Gesetz der grossen Zahlen und der Stochastisch-Statistische

Standpunkt in der modernen Wis sense haft, Nord. Stat. Tidskrift,
Bd. I, heft i; Sorokin, P., "M. Kovalevsky's Theory of Social
Factors," in In Memorium of M. Kovalevsky, Russ., 1917; DuHEM,
P., La theorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris, Chevalier
et Riviere Cie.; Weber, jM., Gesammelte Aufsdtze zur
Wissenschaftslehre, pp. 87 fT., 112 ff., 420-445 ff.
23 Precisely this was done by M. Weber in his Gesammelte
Aufsdtze zur Reli-gionssoziologie, 3 vols., passim. In his study
religion is taken as a variable and its "effects" on economic
phenomena are carefully studied. M. Weber stressed the fact that
such a study is but one of many possible studies.
529
other social phenomena or (b) that its efficiency in determining
social phenomena is far greater (say its influence is 90 per cent)
than that of all other factors (whose total efficiency is, say, 10 per
cent only). The first interpretation is nothing but the foregoing
conception of one-sicled and irreversible causal relations. The
second may be reconciled with the functional conception, but,
unfortunately, neither i\Iarx and Engels nor any one of their
followers has tried to indicate either the means of measuring the
comparative effectiveness of various factors in conditioning social
phenomena, nor have they given the indices of the comparative
effectiveness of various factors in this respect. According to the
literal and logical meaning of the theory under discussion the
primacy of the economic factor is to be interpreted in the first
sense; i.e., the economic factor is primary and is the most
important one because, as has been said, it determines all other
social phenomena in the causal chain, or because it is *'the
starter" while all other ones are the ''started."
It is evident that such a conception cannot be accepted: factu-ally,
such factors as geographical conditions and biological drives
inherent in man appeared and operated earlier than economic

factors. Other social factors, such as intelligence, experience,
religious ideas or superstitions, rules of taboo or mores, primitive
art, activity devoted to what could be called ideal aims, play and
so on, are found in the most primitive human societies known to
us and operated as early as economic conditions. The idea of a
primitive man as a mere stomach can scarcely be supported at
the ])resent moment. A series of careful studies have shown its
fallacy.^^ Furthermore, we cannot say that among man's inherent
drives or instincts there is only an instinct of food, or even that it is
the strongest. Such an assumption is likely to be a fallacious
^* See WoDON, L., Sur quelques erreurs de mcthode dans
Vetude de Vhomme primitive, Inst. Solvay; Thurnwald, R., "Die
Gestaltung der Wirtschaftsent-wicklung aus ihren Aufangen
heraus," Munich, 1923; "Psychologic des primi-tiven Menschen,"
Handhuch filr Verglichende Psychologie, Miinchen, 1922; MaliNOWSKI, B., Argonauts i?i the Western Pacific, London, 1922;
Schwiedland, E,, Anjdnge und IVesen der Wirtschaft, Stuttgart,
1923; Somlo, F., Der Gilterverkehr in der Urgesellschaft, Inst.
Solvay, 1909; Mauni^r, R., "Vie religieuse et vie economique,"
Revue Inter. Sociologie, Dec, 1907, Jan., Febr., 1908; Lowik, R.
H., Primitive Society, 1920; Wallis, W. D., An Introduction to
Anthropology, N. Y., 1926.
530
speculation not warranted by the facts.^^ We cannot even claim
that man is an economic creature and always acts "economically,"
as it was supposed by the classical economists. Facts strongly
contradict such a contention.^^
Furthermore, a series of. investigators such as Espinas, Durkheim, P. Huvelin, Thurmvald, Malinowski, Hubert and Mauss have
shown that, even in primitive stages, the technique of production

and the whole of economic life are absolutely inseparable from,
and incomprehensible without, a consideration of contemporary
religion, magic, science, and other intellectual phenomena.^^
^ Thorndike, E. L., Educational Psychology, Vol. I, The Original
Nature of Man, N. Y., 1913; Sorokin, Sociology of Revolution,
Chaps. I-III, especially the note on p. 33; Wallas, G., Human
Nature in Politics, 1919; the courses in psychology by W.
McDougall, R. S. Woodworth and others; Pavlov, I., Twenty Years
of Objective Study of the Higher Nervous Activity of Animals,
Russ., 1923.
^^ See especially Weber, M., Gesammelte Aufsdtze zur
Religionssoziologie, 3 vols., passim, and Vol. I, pp. 12, 21-22, 37,
38, 82, 183, 233-237; Weber, M., Wirtschaftsgeschichte, 1924,
pp. 238, 308-315; Mitchell, W. C, "Human Behavior and
Economics," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. XXIX, pp. 1-47;
"The Prospects of Economics," in The Trend of Economics, N. Y.,
1924, pp. 3-34; Douglas, P. H., "The Reality of Non-Commercial
Incentives in Economic Life," ibid., pp. 153-193; Taussig, F.,
Inventors and Money-Makers, N. Y., 1915; Sombart, W., Der
Bourgeois; Slater, G., "The Psychological Basis of Economical
Theory," The Sociological Review, July, October, 1923; Tugwell,
R. G., "Human Nature in Economic Theory," Journal of Political
Economy, Vol. XXX, pp. 317-395; Clark, J. M., "Economics and
Modem Psychology," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. XXVI, pp.
1-30; Parker, C. H., "Motives in Economic Life," American
Economic Review, SuppL, Vol. VIII, pp. 212-213; Veblen, T., The
Instinct of Workmanship, N. Y., 1918.
*'Wir haben uns angewohnt, als Wirtschaft ein Handeln zu
betrachten, das von einem kiinstlich konstruierten *homo normalis
rationalist ausgeht. Ein Mensch ohne Seek,' eine Art
puppenhafter Rechenmaschine. Dieser homunculus versagt aber
sofort seinen Dienst, wenn wir die grosseren Zusammenhdnge

ins Auge fassen_ Denn alien intelligenten Berechnungen liegen
affecterfullte Strebungen zur Er-haltung, Sicherung und
Functionsbetdtigung zugrunde." . . . Even a seeking for luxuries is
universal and exists among the most primitive groups. "Alle Zeiten
kennen ihren Luxus." "Ehrgeiz und Prunk, Liebe und Hass sind in
alle wirt-schaftlichen Zweckbetdtigungen eingewoben-keineswegs
Hunger und Durst allein.**
Thurnwald clearly shows a mutual dependence of economic and
non-economic phenomena and concludes his interesting analysis
by saying about "the economic" and opposing one-sided
interpretations of history: "Die einseitige 'wirtschaftliche
Geschichtsauffassung' ist ein rationalistisches Truggebilde, sowie
die nur 'idealis-tische' ein romantisches Phantasma." Thurnwald,
op. cit., pp. 274-278, 328.
37 The conclusions at which Espinas arrives in his study of the
origin of technology are as follows:
"General law dominates the development of technology.
Speculation precedes action (or technique) to some extent, and in
certain cavSes; but a more systematic theory of the
corresponding facts of technique becomes possible only when
these facts have already existed for some time."
531
For the later stages, a conditioning of economics by religion,
magic, rationalism, or traditionalism, and even a religious origin of
modern capitalism itself (from Protestantism), has been
elucidated by Max Weber.^^
"It is impossible to deny the existence of a correlation between
mental and practical functions." This is shown schematically in the
following table:
Mental Stages Corresponding Stages of Technique or

Practice
1. Elementary sensations i. Elementary reflexes
2. Perceptions: individual and con 2. Individual habitudes: actions
concrete rej^resentations of forms and trolled by inner, socially
unconscien-events tious impulses^
3. Connaissances (types and laws): 3. Customs: practical or
collective A totality of representations already institutions, a
totality of individual collective and, in a degree, abstract,
habitudes controlled by opinion composed of aggregate individual
perceptions
4. Sciences, a totality of systematic, 4. Arts or techniques, a
totality of rational conceptions customs organized with
deliberation
and knowledge
(EsPiNAS, A., Les origines de la technologie, pp. lo-ii, and
passim, Paris, 1897.)
"Development of economic organization goes hand in hand with
the psychical evolution of man. It is influenced in the first place by
technique and the form of political organization." But the
technique itself is nothing but "die Anhdufung von Kenntnissen
und Fertigkeiten," determined by the psychically constant factors,
by the spacially varying geographical factors, and by the factors
varying in time, like inventions, discoveries, and so on.
(Thurnwald, op. cit., pp. 274 ff.)
See DuRKHEiM, Elementary Forms of Religious Life, passim.;
Huvelin, P., "Magic et droit individuel" Uannee sociologique, Vol.
X; Hubert et Mauss, Esquisse d'une theorie generate de la magie,
ibid., Vol. VII; see also Kapp, Grund-linien einer Philosophic der
Technik, 1877. See in this book the chapter about the
sociologistic school.
28 M. Weber has shown especially clearly how strongly the
character of the economic organization of China, India, the
ancient world, the Middle Ages, and of the present time has been
conditioned through the character of the corresponding religions,
magic, traditions, or rationalisms. He has also clarified the r61e of
the Protestant religion in the origin and development of modem
capitalism. In his study he quite rightly outlines the methodological
principles of the mutual dependence of religious and economic
phenomena upon each other, as well as upon all other social
factors. He rightly says that there may be studies in which the
economic factor can be taken as a variable, with religion or magic
as its function; and there may be studies in which economic
phenomena are viewed as a function of religion. His own study
belongs to this type. His attitude may be seen from the following
quotations: "Eine Wirtschaftsethik ist keine einfache 'Funktion'
wirlschaftliche Organizationsformen, ebensowenig wie umgekehrt
diese eindeutig aus sich heraus prdgt. Keine Wirtschaftsethik ist
jemals nur religios determiniert gewesen." Taking the religious
factor methodologically as a variable, he has shown that "die
Wurzel des modernen okonomischen Menschentiims ist
religiose''; that without the Reformation it would have been
impossible, and that an economic specification of China, or India,
or of Judaism is unaccountable
532
Therefore, the economic factor is not older than the other factors.
This means that social phenomena are, and always were,
mutually, but not one-sidedly, dependent. For these reasons,
there I is no basis for claiming that the economic factor is the first
in the causal series, and therefore, the primary one. So much for
the factual side of the problem.^^
But beside the factual, there is a logical side to it. L. Petra-jitzky
and R. Stammler indicated that law and social order are the
logical and the factual preconditions of economic relationship,
because, without a code of obligatory rules of conduct, the very
facts of social relationship and mutual living are impossible.^^
Furthermore, if the economic factor is always "a starter," and all
changes in the field of social life are due to changes in economic
conditions, how can we explain the dynamics of the economic
factor itself? Are they, due to its mystical property, a pcrpehium
mobile or a self-starter; or are they due to some other factor?
Since the primacy of the economic factor is based on its being
always ''the starter,'* this has to be accounted for. The hypothesis
of ''the self-starter" amounts to the worst kind of mysticism, where
the economic factor becomes a kind of God. For this reason it
must be rejected. If the Marxians, like Engels, Labriola, and
Plechanow, would refer to a "reverse influence of the secondary
factors on the primary one," ^^ then the starting point of the
theory, and the basis of the primacy of the economic factor would
be invalidated. Then we would no longer have a onesided
dependence of other factors on the economic one, but a mutual
interdependence in which there would be neither the "starter" nor
the "started" factors; but all would be "the starters"
without a knowledge of the corresponding reHgions of those
peoples. See the chapter about M. Weber in this book. See his
Gesammelte Aufsdtze zur Religions soziologie, Tubingen, 192223, Vol. I, pp. 12, 21-22, 37-38, 82, 183, 233 ff. and passim; Vol.
II, pp. 363-378; Vol. Ill, passim. A short summary of the principal
conclusions reached in these volumes is given in his WirtschaftsGeschichte, pp. 30, 239, 240, 300-315, Miinchen, 1924.
39 Corap. Hansen, A., "The Technological Interpretation of

History," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. XXXVI, pp. 80-82.
40 See STAMMI.ER, R., Wirtschaft und Recht, passim;
Petrajitzky, L., Die Lehre v. Einkommen.
"See Engels' statements in his letter of 1894, Der Sozialistische
Akademiker, 1895; Marx himself was forced also to admit such a
reverse influence of the non-economic factors on the economic
ones. See also Labriola, op. cit., pp. 110, 201 fl.; Plechanow,
Kvoprosou 0 rasvitii monisticheskago vsgliada na istoriu.
533
and *'the started" at the same time. Through this, the primacy of
the economic factor is taken away, and consecjuently, the theory
loses its characteristics. Every Marxian who admits such a
reverse influence of other factors on the economic one, logically
abandons his theory and comes to the conception of a functional
interdependence, reducing his claims simply to the statement that
the economic factor is correlated with some others.'*" This shows
one side of the wrong causal conception on which the theory was
based, and some of the fallacies which result from such a
conception. They finally destroyed the theory as far as it
represented something specific.
B. The second fundamental shortcoming of the theory is an
ambiguity and indefiniteness in the expression: the economic
factor is the last, the final, and the most important factor of social
phenomena. As is known, this claim has been interpreted in two
senses. Some of the Marxian and the non-Marxian writers {e.g.,
Plechanow and Ell wood) have interpreted it in the sense that the
economic factor is exclusively sufficient to explain all historical
and social processes, as was believed by Marx. Meanwhile, some
other w-riters, including Engels, interpreted it in the sense that it is
only the principal factor, side by side with which there are some
other less important factors, {e.g., Seligman, Labriola, Marx, and

Engels, in the later period of their writings).^^ If we take the first of
these interpretations, it leads to a series of absurd statements. If
we take the second one, it amounts to an abandonment of the
theory. The first interpretation is a
^2 Marx himself, in his later writings, and also Engels, having
made this inevitable concession, practically abandoned their
earlier claims, and almost reduced "the economic interpretation of
history" to a very general, common, and sound recognition of the
economic factor as one among many others.
''3 In my opinion, both of these interpretations are correct, but the
first is true in regard to the earlier writings of Marx and Engels,
while the second one is true in regard to their later writings, after
they had abandoned many earlier exaggerations. At this period,
Engels wrote that "Marx never meant to claim an absolute validity
for economic considerations, to the exclusion of all other factors.
It is not that the economic situation is the cause, in the sense of
being the only active agent, while all phenomena are only a
passive result. It is, on the contrary, a case of mutual action on
the basis of economic necessity (quite a dark expression,
amounting to the statement: 'white blackness' or 'wooden iron')
which, in the last instance, always works itself out." Letter of
1894, Der Sozial. Akademiker. See similar statements of Labriola,
op. cit., pp. 110 ff., which are as dark and contradictory as this.
534
kind of monistic conception where an attempt is made to account
for the whole of social life, and the whole process of history,
through the economic factor alone. Its hopelessness is shown by
the following considerations."*^ First, if the whole of social life,
war and peace, impoverishment and prosperity, enslaving and
liberation, revolution and reaction, are the results of the same

factor, this gives the equation :
A and non-A = f (E), that is, the most opposite phenomena are the
result of the same cause.
Such an equation is logical nonsense; it contradicts the
fundamental principle of science,the uniform connection of
cause and effect. It admits that the same cause may have the
most different and opposite results. Under such a premise, the
very conception of regularity and causal or functional relation is
destroyed. Indeed, if A and non-A are the results of the same
cause, E, it is hopeless to try to find out any regularity or causal
relation. The premise is a denial of causality or regularity. Such a
monistic factor becomes a very coincidentia oppositoriim
(reconciliation and identification of opposite phenomena)the
same kind of definition through which the mediaeval scholastics
characterized God. In other words, such a monistic conception
amounts to the equation:
E(economic factor) is the cause of
A and non-A B and non-B C and non-C D and non-D F and non-F
N and non-N
that is,the cause of all forms of behavior, social processes, and
historical events.
No mathematician, logician, or scientist could formulate any law,
any causal relation or any formula of regularity with such a
premise. Furthermore, if, in the equation, the factor E means a
universally broad conception equal to that of ''AH," or ''God," or
"the universe," or "the whole social life," the equation becomes
'*'* This criticism of economic monism may be applied to any kind
of monistic theory of factors.
535
tautological. "All" or "God" is the cause of "All," or "God." "The
whole social life is the cause of the whole social life." Being
tautological, it is sterile. If, by such a monistic factor, E is
understood to be something narrower (as is the case), then,
instead of tautology we have something still worse, pars pro
toto, a part of something as the cause of the whole something; an
economic factor (a part of the whole social life) as the cause of
the whole social life. This amounts to the statement: "Out of the
part may be the whole; out of nothing, something." Such are the
logical fruits of the monistic interpretation of Marx's contention.'*"'
The factual hopelessness of such an attempt is clear from the
following consideration. Even the simplest dynamic phenomenon
of our universe,the movement of physical objectscould be
accounted for by contemporary physical mechanics through at
least two factors, inertia and gravitation. To hope for an
explanation of the most complex dynamics of social life and
history through only one factor amounts to nothing but idiocy. At
the most, such an attempt will give only tautology, nothing more.
The above is enough to show the scientific hopelessness of such
a conception of economic materialism. This hopelessness was
possibly the reason for the shifting of Marx and Engels, in their
later writings, to the second interpretation of their claim.
But this second interpretation, which admits other factors side by
side with the economic one, is practically an abandonment of the
theory. It means a pluralistic theory of the factors, signifying that
the economic factor is only one among many others. It is not
necessary to be a Marxian to accept this, and, as we have seen,
in such a pluralistic interpretation, the economic factor was
recognized, stressed, and studied by hundreds of thinkers many
hundreds of years before Marx and Engels. It is true that, having
shifted to such a pluralistic conception, Marx, Engels, and the
Marxians still add: "but among these many factors the economic
one is the most important and primary." But even this contention
was expressed by many non-Marxian writers before and after
Marx and Engels. Therefore, this addition does not give them any
right to claim originality. Furthermore, their *^ Compare Crock, B.,
Historical Materialism, pp. 28 ff.
536
addition has not been corroborated by any clear logical or factual
proofs. Marx and Engels did not even attempt to give any method
for measuring the importance or efficiency of various factors,
neither did they give any indices of the ''primacy" of the economic
factor, nor any logical motivation of their claim. This is enough to
contend that the pluralistic interpretation of the Marx-Engels
theory strips it of any originality, and amounts to its
abandonment.^^
C. The third shortcoming of the theory is that the definitions of the
terms ''the economic factor/' ''forces and relations of production"
and "economic basis'' are not sufficiently exclusive and specific.
To the ambiguity of Marx's wording is due the fact that some of
his interpreters, like K. Kautsky, W. Sombart, A. Hansen,*^ and
others, understand this factor to be only a kind of technique, while
other interpreters like Engels, Masaryk, Selig-man, Cunow and
others understand it to mean the general conditions of production,
including geographical environment, natural resources, extraction,
fashioning, transportation, trade, mechanism of distribution and so
on.^'*^
If we accept the first interpretation, we have the proposition:
Technique is the primary factor, and through technique it is
possible to explain all the miracles of history. Taking into
consideration the fact that technique is only a part of social reality,

the above is logically absurd (pars pro toto). Further, in view of
^^ Trying to save the originality of Marx's theory, Professor
Seligman contends that such a plurahstic interpretation does not
mean its abandonment. Unfortunately, he does not give any
proofs of this statement, except the purely dogmatic assertions
that "the chief considerations in human progress are the social
considerations (this is not at all characteristic of Marxian
economic determinism); that the important factor in social change
is the economic factor (Confucius, Mencius, Plato, Aristotle,
Thucydides, Plinius, Machiavelli, Guicciardini and hundreds of
other writers stressed that); and that they exert not an exclusive,
but a preponderant (why and on what reasons?) influence in
shaping the progress of society." (Seligman, op. cit. p. 67.)
Furthermore, mention of the name of Demolins does not
strengthen, but only aggravates the position of the author,
because Demolins' "economism" is quite different from that of
Marx, and it originated not from Marx, but from a better theory of
Le Play, who, rather earlier and better than Marx, described the
influence of economic factors. See the second chapter of this
book.
'*^ Sombart, W., "Technik und Kulture," Archiv. fiir Sozialwiss.,
Bd. 33, 1911, p. 315; Hansen, A., "The Technological
Interpretation of History," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.
XXXVI, 1921, p. 73.
*^ Seligman, op. cit., Chap. V; Cunow, Die Marxsche GeschichtsGesellschaft und Staats-Theorie, Vol. II, 1921, pp. 158 fi".
537
the fact that the technique itself requires a certain amount of
experience and knowledge of society,**^ Marx's differentiation
between technique and science becomes a separation of what is
identical (science, as a component of technique, as opposed to

science generally), and the establishing of identity between that
which is different, (between technique as something existing
separately from science, and technique composed only of
science). Old logicians used to style such illogical procedures by
the name, qiiaternio terminornm.
If we accept the second and broader interpretation, we have an
increase of vagueness in the theory and the concept of the
economic factor itself. It becomes a kind of bag filled with
geographic conditions; technique, and followingly, science; and by
the whole complex machinery of trade, commerce, and
distribution; which involves juridical and political institutions, and
what not. To take such an indefinite complexity as a cause or
variable, and try to explain something by means of it is a hopeless
enterprise. We would be dealing with that which we do not know,
and we would be trying to find its effects on the phenomena which
directly or indirectly make up the composition of the factor itself.
Under such conditions, it is not likely we could reach any clear
and definite correlation, and it is probable that wê would find the
most absurd correlations, as actually happened wîth many
followers of Marx, and with Marx himself.'*^' In this case we
"^ This is recognized by Marx himself: "Although technique is
mainly dependent on the conditions of science [which he attempts
to account for completely through technique] it is still more true
that science depends on the condition and needs of technique."
(True, but how can it follow from this that technique is an
omnipotent factor, while science is something secondary?)
^ It is enough to remember Marx's correlation between the handmill and feudal society; between the steam-mill and capitalist
society; the explanation of the Reformation exclusively through
the economic revolt of the German nation against the exploitation
of the Papal Court; the accounting of the whole character of
Babylonian culture and organization exclusively through the

canalization of Mesopotamia; and that of ancient Egypt, through
the channeling of the Nile; the development of science, arts, and
inventions exclusively through the needs of technique, and so on.
vSome time ago such childish "ex])lanations" and correlations
were j^roduced by the Marxians in so great an abundance that
the sober Marxians themselves had finally to protest against it. "In
this way (by childish explanations) the simpletons might reduce
the whole of history to commercial arithmetic; and, finally, a new
and authentic interpretation of Dante might give us the Divine
Comedy illustrated with the process of manufacturing pieces of
cloth, which the wily Florentine merchants sold for their greater
profit!" indignantly exclaims Labriola; op. fit., pp. 204-205.
538
are confined to statements and formulas whose indefinite
contents and meanings do not permit us either to prove or to
disprove them. A sterile verbalism is an inevitable result of such a
method. D. As a result of this indicated indefiniteness, the exact
meaning of the Marx-Engels' causal sequence of factors, or the
sequence of their dependency also becomes somewhat indefinite.
In the technological interpretation, this sequence is as follows:
(i)Changes in the technique of production determine (2)the
changes in the economic structure of societyin *'the relations of
production" and the ''property relations,"which, in their turn,
determine (3)changes in the political, social and intellectual life
of a society. In the second, and broader, interpretation of the
economic factor, the sequence assumes a somewhat different
form: I, changes in the general conditions of production and
exchange determine, 2, modifications in class-composition of
a society, which, in their turn, call forth, 3, a modification of
class-antagonisms resulting in 4 a modification of the social,
political, and intellectual "superstructure" of a society. What^ ever

interpretations we take, both sequences may have only a relative
value at best,the value of one of many possible sequences and
alignments of social phenomena. In the above I indicated that
there is no reason for thinking that, among the forces which mold
social and historical processes or human behavior, only the
economic factor is "active" or is "the starter." I indicated also that
the "functional conception" of "causation" and the fact of the
interdependence of social phenomena, permit us to take any
factor as "variable" (not only "technique," but "science," "religion,"
"law," and what not) and attempt to find its "functions" or "effects"
in any field, as in the fields of technique and economic
phenomena. We have seen, and shall further see, that such
attempts have been made and have not been fruitless. As far as
Marx and Engels pretend to make their sequence the only one
possible, their claim is unacceptable. It may be met by an
opposite claim, in which law, religion, or the "intellectual factor" is
set forth as the "starter," w^th the economic factor as a
function."''^ As far as we take this in a relative sense, with
^1 Professor John Commons' Legal Foundations of Capitalism; R.
vStammler's Wirtschaft und Recht and L. Petrajitzky's Die Lehre
v. Einkommen are examples
539
"the economic factor" as "a. variable," but without any claim for its
exclusiveness, the sequence may be accepted, and its value
decided by the results of a study of its correlation with other
phenomena. If the study shows that its correlation with other
phenomena exists and is universal and constant, and that its
coefficient is high, this will be proof of the sequence's scientific
value. If the results of the study are opposite, this would mean
that it is of small value for scientific sociology.'"^^ Later on, I shall
show to what extent a correlation exists between the economic
factor and other social phenomena, and how high it is. Here I only
mention that the Marx-Engels' expectation that the correlation
would be very high and universal, and that it would follow the
sequence exactly was greatly exaggerated.^^ So much about this
point.
in which law is taken as a "starter" (variable), and economic
system as a function. M. Weber's Religionssoziologie is an
example of where religion is taken as a variable, and economic
organization as a function. Geographic and racial schools take as
variables the geographic and the racial factors. An intellectual
factor as a starter is taken in the theories of De Roberty and
Tarde. "What!" exclaims Tarde in his criticism of the Marxian
theory, "Science and religion . . . are made dependent on
economic conditions! But is it not true that the social and
economic environment itself has been created through diffusion
and vulgarization of scientific and religious ideas? Is it not true
also that the density and numbers of the population (and
economic conditions) are dependent upon the character of the
decisions in a series of political problems?" "The very progress of
industry and technique has been due to a series of thinkers with
their love for the truth. Gun-powder, as well as the steam-engine,
were discovered by dreamers." See Tarde's paper in Annales of
the Institut International de Sociologie, Vol. VIII; also De Roberty's
paper where Marx's sequence is inverted. This is an example of
Marx's reversed sequence, in which science is made a variable,
while economic phenomena are viewed as its "function."
Scientifically, such a sequence is as appropriate as Marx's
sequence. If the authors had understood "the functional
conce])tion of causality" there would not have been any such
conflict of oj)])osite theories. But since the authors held
conceptions of "one-sided causality," their sequences naturally
could not be reconciled and they argued endlessly with one
another. A similar reason is at the basis of the endless disputes
between the partisans of various "primary" factors. Compare
Sombart, W., "Technik und Kultur," Archiv fiir Soziahvissenschaft,

1911, pp. 312 ff.
" However, in such an interpretation of the sequence, Marx's
theory, while losing its "sins," at the same time loses its specific
"originality" and becomes something that has been said many
times before.
" For instance, a change of technique or economic basis is not an
absolutely necessary condition for many changes in the field of
economic, social, political and intellectual phenomena. M.
Kovalevsky properly indicates that in England in the period from
the sixth to the sixteenth century, the technique of agriculture, and
the means and the instruments of production remained practically
the same.
540
E. Of the other characteristics of the Marxian theory, its fallacious
and contradictory conception of historical determinism should he
mentioned. It represents an incongruous reconciliation of fatalism
uith free will. Let the reader read attentively the above long
quotations from Marx. Here we read that the relationships of
production entered into by men "are indispensable and
independent of their will." The forces of production are depicted
as developing sua sponte, independently of human beings and
other social factors. The whole process of human history is
depicted in the way ''men are agitatedly acting, while, in fact, they
are led by the economic factor," or, in the paraphrase of Bossuet:
''IMen are agitatedly acting while, in fact, they are led by God."
The very expectation of the victory of socialism is based on the
same idea of the omnipotent, fatalistic, and inevitable play of the
economic factor, which will lead to the destruction of capitalism
and to the victory of socialism.
This fatalistic interpretation of determinism would be quite

objectionable from the scientific standpoint alone, because
scientific determinism has nothing in common with fatalism;
scientific determinism states only that, on the basis of the theory
of probability, the appearance, connection, or disappearance of
such and such phenomena is probable or improbable with such
and such a degree of probability, and that is all. All terms, like
"inevitable," "necessary," and so on, are not a part of science, or
of the scientific conception of determinism.""*
To this sin, however, Marx and Engels add two others: first, an
eschatological, "historical" tendency toward socialism and a future
earthly paradise guaranteed by the "inevitable" play of human
factors; and second, the belief that as soon as the socialistic
In spite of this, in the field of economic relations, social and
political institutions, and in the mental and moral life, a series of
the most important changes occurred. On the other hand, we
have many instances where a modification of technique, or of
economic basis is not followed by any noticeable change in the
ideologies, ethics, or art of a people. See Kovalevsky, op. cit., pp.
244 ff. See also SoM-BART, op. cit., pp. 315 fl.
54 See Pareto, op. cit., Chaps. I, II. See also the quoted works of
A. Tschuproff, Pearson, Coumot, Mach, A. Rey, and so on. The
contemporary theory of cause ^.nd effect, variable and function,
determinism and indeterminism is based on, and expressed in,
the concepts of probability and its coefficient.
541
paradise is reached, fatalism ceases to exist, and mankind ''jumps
from the kingdom of necessity into that of freedom." ^''
The incongruous mixture of these components (fatahty, freedom,

and eschatology) makes any criticism of the Marxian conception
of determinism unnecessary. Its weakness is evident.'"^^
F. Finally, the Marx-Engels' theory of class-struggle, being very
old, has a series of defects. It is evidently fallacious to say that
''the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class
struggle," as far as this means that there has not been a
cooperation of social classes. It is a fallacy because class
cooperation has been an even more universal phenomenon than
class-antagonism. As far as this means that class-struggle alone
has been the dynamic factor to which the progress of mankind
has been due, it is again wrong. After a series of investigations,
like Kropotkin's "Mutual Aid," it is certain that the progress of
mankind has been due rather to cooperation and solidarity than to
" This eschatological belief, a variety of many forms of belief in
a millennium, Marx expressed many times. For this reason he
views all the history of mankind up to this day as "the prehistory of
the human race." "The productive forces developing in the womb
of bourgeois society create the material condition? for the solution
of that antagonism." Crit. of Polit. Econ., pp. 12-13. "To the old
bourgeois society with its classes and class antagonisms will
succeed an association in which the free development of each is
the condition of free development of all." Communist Manifesto. "It
is only when the order of things will be such that there will no
longer be classes and class antagonisms, that social revolutions
will cease to be political revolutions." Misere de la philosophie,
Paris, 1847, p. 178. Engels, as is well known, speaks plainly
about "jumping from the kingdom of necessity into that of
freedom" where "human beings will be the masters of nature and
the masters of themselves." See Engels, Die Entwicklung des
Soz-ialismus von der Utopie zur Wissenschaft, pp. 51-53, Berlin,
1907; Herrn K. Duhring Umwaltzung der Wissenschaft, p. 305,
Stuttgart, 1894. See also Labriola, op. cit., pp. 154 ff., 234, 244.
This part of the Marxian theory, according to P. Struve's

appropriate opinion, "is not a scientific theory of evolution, but an
evident theory of progress which supposes that the evolution of
mankind is an inevitable betterment and a growth of positive
values." Gehrlich, Novgorodzev and some other investigators
style with reason the evolutionary theory of Marxian-ism as "a
variety of the beHef in a millennium," a kind of religious
orthodoxy, as an incongruous mixture of science and ethics,
necessity and freedom, the theory of evolution and progress,
primftive materialism, and fantastic or Utopian idealism. See the
quoted works of Novgorodzev, Gehrlich and Struve.
^ This incongruity is still further aggravated by the selfcontradiction of Marx's theory. It claims that up to this time any
social change or progress has been due to class-antagonism and
class-struggle. Now, if it is going to disappear in the future
millennium, does this mean that with this millennium the history of
mankind will stop and stagnation take place? If it does not mean
this, what will be the dynamic force instead of class-antagonism?
And if it will be solidarity, why did it not work in the past and how
may it appear suddenly, as detts ex machina?
542
class-struggle, antagonism, and hatred. In this respect Tarde's
sharp remarks seem to be accurate: ''Since the beginning of the
history, classes and armies could have struggled with one another
endlessly; and yet, this could not have created either geometry,
mechanics, or chemistry, without which it would be impossible for
man to subdue nature and make progress in industry or military
art. All this became possible only through the fact that in the noise
of this destructive struggle, a few thinkers and seekers for the
truth silently worked in their laboratory and study." As far as
Marx's class-theory means that only an antagonism of economic
classes exists or that it is the most important, it is again wrong.

There have been many other forms of antagonism other than that
of class, -. as the struggle of racial, national, religious and state
groups. These antagonisms, being quite different from the
antagonism of the economic classes, have been sometimes more
important than the former.^^
Finally, apart from the above defects, the Marx-Engels'
conception of social or economic class is indefinite and selfcontradictory. In the Communist Manifesto, they use this term in
the broadest sense, embracing under it caste, occupational
group, estate or order, guild, and political ranks. In their other
works, (in Misery of Philosophy and Capital) they used it in a
narrower sense, and discriminated the social class from the
occupational group, order, and so on.
The manuscript of the third volume of Marx's Capital ends with
the beginning of an analysis of social classes, but the analysis is
not finished. Therefore, we do not gain any clear conception of
social or economic classes from the works of Marx and Engels.
Owing to this, their whole theory of class-struggle becomes
indefinite also. Some of the Marxians have tried to elaborate a
concept and classification of social classes (K. Kautsky, Overberger, S. Solntzev, E. Bernstein, H. Cunow and others).^* This
resulted in a production of contradictory and unsatisfactory
definitions of social class. Interpretations of Marx's concept given
57 See SoROKiN, Systema Soziologii, Vol. II, passim; Delevsky,
J., Soctal Antagonisms, Russ., passim.
58 See my Systema Soziologii, Vol. II, pp. 283-306; Delevsky, op.
cit., passim; Solntzev, S., Social Classes, Russ., Tomsk, 1917;
Cunow, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. .SO ff.
543
by various Marxians have happened also to be quite different.

Therefore, the Marxian theory of social class, as well as the
common terms of ''proletariat," "bourgeoisie/' and so on, are still
undefined. They are the ''shibboleths" whose exact meaning is
not known.''^ For the above reasons it is possible to say that this
part of the Marxian theory is quite unsatisfactory.^^
G. Perhaps the most valuable part of the theory of Marx is his
analysis of the dependency of our ideologies upon our
environment, and especially upon socio-economic environment;
and his contention that the "objective social situation" is very often
reflected, or thought of, in individual minds in an inadequate and
5^ The problem of who a proletarian is became practically
important in the Communist regime of Soviet Russia. vStudying
the theoretical discussions of the Communist leaders and their
practical attempts to separate the proletarians from the nonproletarians, one comes to the conclusion that the theoretical
conceptions of the Communists are vaguely different and
contradictory. In their practice, however, a proletarian has been
regarded as anyone who has supported the Communists although
he occupied the position of a capitalist or was a privileged and a
wealthy man. The non-proletarians have been regarded as all
who have not supported the Communist government, though they
were the common laboring men in factories. See e.g., Petrogr.
Pravda, 1919, No. 162, where some peasants, sympathizing with
the Communist government, are styled "proletarians" while the
working people of the Obouchov and Poutilov factories, who
displeased the Soviet government, are styled as "bourgeois." This
additionally shows that Marxianism does not have any clear
conception of social class, and consequently, slogans like:
"proletariat" and "dictatorship of proletariat" are far from having a
clear and definite meaning.
^^ It is rather surprising that A. W. Small found this part of Marx's

theory especially valuable. I cannot style his statements in this
respect as otherwise than a "blunder." As we have seen, classstruggle was discovered thousands of years ago. Even the
terminology of the Communist Manifesto could be found in the
writings of the Roman and the Greek writers, not to mention the
thinkers of the later periods. Therefore in no way is it possible to
ascribe to Marx the merit of discovering the class-struggle factor.
As to the specific traits of the Marxian theory of class-struggle, the
above shows that they are nothing but fallacies. Another thing to
be mentioned here is the lack of a generally accepted definite
conception of social class in contemporary sociology. The
majority of sociologists continue to use this term carelessly.
Those who have tried to define it have given different definitions.
In my System of Sociology I give thirty-two of the principal forms
of these definitions. Evidently such an anarchy cannot be
continued. It is high time to end it. See an analysis and survey of
the definitions and classifications of social classes in my System
of Sociology, Vol. II, pp. 283-306. See also Michels, R., "Beitrag
zur Lehre von den Klasscnbildung," Arch. f. Sozialw., Vol. XLIX,
1922, pp. 561-593; Mombert, P., "Zum Wesen der sozialen
Klasse," Erinnerungsgabe fiir Max Weber, 1923, Vol. II, pjj. 239278; Bauer, A., Les classes sociales, Paris, 1902; vSchmoller, ().,
Grundriss der Volkswirtschafts-lehre, 1901, Vol. I; vSolntzev, vS.,
op. cit.; Loria, A., "Beitragc zur okonomish Thcorie der sozialen
Klasscn," Arch. f. Sozialw., 1923; Mombert, P., "The Tatsachcn
der Klasscnbildung," Schmollcr's Jahrbiuh fiir Gcsctzgebung, etc.,
1920, pp. 93-122; Fafilbeck, p., Die Klasscn luid die Gesellschaft,
Jena, 1923.
544
disfigured form. This is the idea which he expresses in the words :

''J^st as our opinion of an individual is not based on what he
thinks of himself, so can we not judge of such a period of
transformation (of productive forces and the relations of
production) by its (society's) own consciousness." In this, and
similar statements, Marx and Engels indicate the fact that our
''speech-reactions" and our subjective interpretations of social
phenomena (ideologies) are often misleading; that they reflect
reality inadequately; and that it is impossible to grasp the
objective social reality, the nature of social processes, or the
nature of the social group or individual exclusively on the basis of
the ''speech-reactions" (ideologies) of a man, group, or society.^^
Even the real function of many "ideological phenomena," like
religion and belief, is often different from that which the ideologists
themselves say of it. The essence of this statement is sound, but
again, this was expressed by Marx with his usual exaggeration
and ambiguousness in statements like this: "It is not the
consciousness of mankind that determines its existence, but, on
the contrary, its social existence that determines its
consciousness." Furthermore, the theory is far from being new. It
was expressed, and more clearly, many centuries before Marx.^^
Therefore, even this part of his theory cannot pretend to be an
original discovery.
GENERAL CONCLUSION
Summing up what has been said of the Marx-Engels' sociological
theory, it is possible to say: first, from a purely scientific
^^ vSee SoROKiN, The Sociology of Revolution, Chaps. Ill and
IV; Sorokin* Social Mobility, Chap. II; Sorokin, "Die Russische
Soziologie," Jahrbuch Jilr Soziologie, B. II, pp. 473-477; Pareto,
op. cit.. Vol. I, Chap. Ill and passim (his analysis of the
"derivations").
^2 A sufficient example is fiirnished in Defensor Pads by Marsilio

of Padua, where we find quite a "materialistic" interpretation of the
r61e of religion, and of the discrepancy between the objective
reality and its disfigured reflection in beliefs and ideologies.
Similar ideas of Machiavelli were expressed in his Discourses on
Livy, Book I, Chaps. XI-XVI; Book II, Chap. II. Quite an adequate
expression of the theory may be found in the works of P. Bayle,
with his theory that "opinions and ideologies are not the rules for
actions, and men do not follow them in their conduct. The Turks
believe in Fatalism and Predestination; and yet, they flee from a
danger just as the French who do not have such a belief." See
Bayle, Pensees divers. . . a I'occasion de la comete, etc., pp. 266,
272 ff., Paris, 1704. Among the writers of the eighteenth, and of
the beginning of the nineteenth centuries, there were a great
many who laid down such a theory. See the immediate
predecessors of Marx in this rcsoect^ Salomon, G., op. cit.,
i>assim.
545
point of view, as far as its sound elements are concerned, there is
nothing in their theory that was not said by earher authors;
second, what is really original is far from being scientific; third, the
only merit of the theory is that it in a somewhat stronger and
exaggerated form generalized the ideas given before the time of
Marx. However, as we have seen, the general formulas are
expressed in an obscure and ambiguous form, and they are not
so much the results of any inductive or factual study as of a
speculative and dogmatic deduction. Therefore, from a purely
scientific standpoint, there is no reason for regarding Marx and
Engels as the ''Darwins" or "Galileos" of the social sciences.
There is no reason even for regarding their scientific contributions
as something above the average. The great influence which their
works and names have acquired are due, not to the scientific
merits of their writings, but to quite dissimilar circumstances.^*'^ If
they gave an impetus for some few fruitful scientific studies/'"' at

the same time they have originated an enormous number of
wrong hypotheses and ideologies, and an enormous bulk of
literature whose essence consists only in a "theological"
interpretation of the "scripture" of Marx and Engels, similar to the
theological interpretations of the Koran by theologians.
^3 Such a phenomenon is rather common in the history of social
thought. From a purely scientific viewpoint, the works of
Rousseau, Voltaire, or of many Church fathers, or popular
authors, are far from being perfect. Their leading ideas are,
rather, fallacious from the scientific standpoint, and yet, this did
not prevent their obtaining great popularity and great influence in
certain societies at certain periods. We see something similar to
that at the present moment in the great popularity in Germany in
1919-1923 of the work of O. Spengler. This phenomenon is
interesting and worthy of study. The popularity and influential rdle
of the works of Marx and Engels is a case of this general
phenomenon.
" Many authors, and among them even such as Professor
Seligman, have given credit to Marxianism for works which in no
way have been due to direct or indirect influence from him. For
instance, vSeligman mentions the works of M. Kovalevsky, L. H.
Morgan, Francotte, R. Pohlman, Nietzche, Mommsen, Lamprecht,
and E. Demolins, under a misleading title, "Recent Applications of
the Theory" (of Marx). This title, and some of Seligman's
statements may give an impression that these works have been
written under the influence of the theory of Marx, or for the sake of
an application and corroboration of his theory. See Seligman, op.
cit., Chap. VI. The truth is that all these works (some of which
appeared even before Marx's works) have appeared without any
influence of Marx's theory, and Marxianism could not be given
any credit for their appearance. This remark may be applied to
many similar statements which give to Marxianism credit for that

which does not belong to it.
546
This literature is practically out of the field of science.^'"^ All in all,
Marx and Engels have rather hindered the progress of social
sciences than facilitated it. At the present moment, as we shall
see, their theory is in the past. It is outdistanced and repudiated in
its specific traits by numerous careful and factual studies. Only a
metaphysician could now be busy with the Marx-Engels
conceptions. A scientist will pass them over and will turn to the
inductive and factual studies of the correlations between
economic and other sides of social life.
3. Contemporary Studies of the Correlation Between Various
Economic Conditions and Other Social Phenomena
Their General Characteristics. While the Marxian theoriz-ers
have been busy with a theological exegesis of the "revelation" of
their teachers; while many distinguished thinkers have been
wasting their time and energy in criticism and repudiation of
Marx's statements; and while many speculative minds appeased
themselves in a scientifically fruitless meditation on what the
meaning of such and such a Marxian conception is, such as the
relationship between Kant and Marx, or whether his categories
are logical or historical and so on; while all this was going on, a
great many investigators, before and after Marx, and regardless
of his theory, have been busy with really scientific studies of the
correlations between various economic factors and other social
phenomena. If, at the present moment, we know something in this
field, our knowledge is primarily due to such studies. Almost all
such researches have taken this or that economic condition not
as 'â primary factor" or ''principal cause," but simply as a
''variable." Regardless of the "materialistic conception of history"

or of any ranking of the importance of various factors, without any
preconceptions, they have proceeded to find out what the
correlations are, how close they are, and with what phenomena
they are related. The first result is that the relationship between
various economic and non-economic phenomena has been found
to be much more complex than it was supposed to be by
^ The stamp of this scientific sterihty hes even on such recent
works as N. Bucharin's Marxian Sociology, conspicuous only by
its ignorance and arrogant pretentions. Even Professor Cunow's
good book is marked by the same stamp of "theological" spirit.
547
Marx or by any other uriter who advanced the deductive theory of
the economic interpretation of history. Their second general result
is that various social phenomena are correlated in the most
different degrees of closeness with various economic conditions,
although, between some of the economic and non-economic
phenomena the correlation is pretty high, between some other
non-economic and economic conditions the correlation is almost
nil. Their third result is in ascertaining that there is almost no case
when the correlation is quite perfect. This means that, practically,
there is no social phenomenon of the non-economic character
whose ''nature,'' variation, movement, or change could be
explained exclusively through the ''economic factor.'' Their fourth
residt is in finding out that the economic phenomena themselves
are not to be regarded as something which only condition other
phenomena, but as something which is conditioned by these
other phenomena also. Their relationship is not one-sided
dependence, but mutual interdependence. Therefore, we cannot
regard the economic factors as "the cause," and all other
j)henomena as ''the effects." Only methodologically, or
conditionally, can an "economic factor" be taken as "an
independent variable," while all other phenomena are taken as

"functions." With the same right, these other phenomena may be
taken as "independent variables," while the economic factors may
be viewed as their "function."
Such, in brief, are the results of these studies. At the present
moment we have a rather enormous number of such
investigations. In this book it is impossible to give an exhaustive
account of them. Therefore, in the following pages I will mention
only the princi])al and representative types of such studies. They
will give a sufficient idea of the present situation of social sciences
in this respect.
4. The Economic Conditions, and Bodily and Mental
Characteristics of Population
Numerous statistical, anthropometrical, and e:?^perimental
studies have shown that there is a series of correlations of various
degrees between economic position (degree of poverty or wealth)
and the bodily, biological, and mental characteristics of the
population of the same age and sex in the same society.
548
Among these correlations possibly the most important are as
follows:
The poor classes zvJien compared ivith the well-to-do of the
same society (a) are smaller in stature; (b) have less weigiit; (c)
probably a lower weight of brain or cranial capacity; (d) more
physical ailments; (e) a shorter duration of life; (f) a somewhat
inferior intelligence. The studies of investigators like V. de
Lapouge, O. Ammon, A. Niceforo, K. Pearson, E. Elder-ton,
Pagliani, N. Viazemsky, Wateff, Beddoe, Ch. Roberts, M.
Muffang, H. Schwiening, R. Livi, A. Binet, A. Constantin, F. G.

Parsons, A. MacDonald, G. Bushan, S. D. Porteus, W. Pfitzner,
Matiegka, P. Ricardi, J. Bertillon, Villerme, P. Topinard, Carlier,
Longuet, B. Rowntree, C. Rose, F. A. Woods, A. Odin, J. McKeen Cattell, F. Maas, S. Fisher, J. Philiptschenko, L. Terman, R.
Yerkes, A. Geissler, Weisenberg, Talko-Hryncewitz, Manouvrier,
A. Hrdlicka, Oloriz, Anoutchin, H. H. Goddard, J. Duff and G.
Thomson, M. Haggerty, J. Bridges and L. E. Coler, W. McDougall, B. A. Gould, Wachter, W. Porter, E. A. Doll, H. Ellis, E. B.
Gowin, B. T. Baldwin, P. Sorokin and of many others have made
these correlations rather certain.^^ However, the correlation is not
perfect, and there is a great deal of overlapping. This means that
the role of economic conditions is limited. The limitation becomes
still greater if we take into consideration that even these, though
tangible, are still the imperfect correlations of economic conditions
with the above differences, and they are due not only to
differences in economic position, but to many other factors. The
mere fact of correlation does not necessarily mean that these
differences of various economic classes are the direct result of
the ''economic differences." The correlations indicate only that
such is the factual relationship between the economic positions of
these classes of the population and their characteristics. Whether
the poorer classes have a lower intelligence because they are
poor and do not have much opportunity for intellectual training, or
whether they are poor because they have an inferior intelligence,
the correlation cannot decide. In a short
^ For the sake of brevity I do not give here the corresponding data
and references. They are given in my Social Mobility, Chaps. X,
XI, XII; see also Chap. V of this book.
549
formula, it simply describes the factual situation, and that is all. To
make a decision in the indicated dilemma we have to take further
special studies. They seem to indicate that the above differences

are due to the social and economic conditions of the poor and the
well-to-do classes, as well as to the innate differences between
the upper and the lower classes. Both factors are necessary for
an ''explanation" of these differences.^'^
5. Economic Conditions and Vital Processes
Differences in Vital Processes among the Poor and the Rich
Classes. Of a great many correlations found between various
economic conditions (measured by amount of income, the
number of rooms occupied, the standard of living, and so on) and
birth, death, marriage, and divorce rates, and their fluctuations,
the most important ones are possibly as follows:
First: As a general rule, within contemporary Western societies
and some societies of the past, the poor classes have a greater
mortality and a greater birth rate than the well-to-do classes of the
same society, and of the same se.r and age. Many censuses, and
the studies of the mentioned investigators, besides those of
Korosi, Ollendorf, Oettingen, E. Levasseur, G. U. Yule, A. L.
Bowley, N. A. Humphreys, W. Farr, F. Prinzing, L. Hersch, H.
Westergaard, W. Ogle, J. Wappaus, J. C. Dunlop, T. H.
Stevenson, L. March, G. von Mayr, L. Dublin, C. Gini, F.
Savorgnan, D. Heron, R. May, R. Pearl, W. Willcox, A. Powys,
and a great many others, have made this proposition rather
certain.^'^ However, here again these correlations, being quite
noticeable, are not perfect. There are many exceptions to the rule
and a great deal of overlapping. This means that the rates of
these vital processes depend on many other than economic
factors. Again, even the imperfect correlations could not be
regarded as controlled exclusively by economic conditions. There
is scarcely any doubt that a series of other factors participates in
the conditioning of the mentioned differences of various classes.
Furthermore, there have been societies in which such

correlations, es7 See SoROKiN, Social Mobility, Chap. XIII.
^* See the data and references in my Social Mobility, Chaps. XT
and XV. See also a good summary in Mossk, M., and
Ti'GENDREICH, G., Krankhcil nnd Soziale Lage, Miinchen, 1913.
550
pecially in regard to the birth rate, have not existed. A lower
procreation of the well-to-do classes, compared with that of the
poorer classes, seems not to have taken place in many past
societies, and in Eastern societies (India, China) of relatively
recent time. This is especially true in regard to the societies
practicing polygamy, which shows some preferences for the
procreation of the well-to-do classes. This means again that the
correlation is not universal, and that the movement of these vital
processes is controlled by economic conditions still less than is
shown by the above imperfect correlations found within modern
Western societies. Again, as we shall see further, a study of the
fluctuation of the death and the birth rate in connection with
business conditions, gives results rather opposite to the above.
Instead of a decrease in the period of business prosperity, the
death rate in many cases has risen in such periods, and has
decreased in the periods of business depression. In spite of the
improvement of economic conditions in Western societies during
the second half of the nineteenth century, their birth rate did not
go up, as might be expected, but went down. Such an unexpected
result seems to suggest that there are limits in a correlation of the
vital processes with economic conditions. These limits being
passed, the correlation becomes either intangible, or assumes the
opposite character. A great impoverishment, amounting to
starvation, leads, no doubt, to an increase in the death rate, and

to a decrease in the birth rate. A relatively slight change of
economic conditions, however, may not influence the fluctuation
of the vital processes, or its effects may be overweighed by those
of other non-economic factors, resulting in a movement of the vital
processes which is different from that determined by a great
change of economic conditions, or from the one which may be
expected on the basis of the discussed statistical findings. This
again shows the limited influence of the economic factor in this
field. Finally, even the above greater mortality and greater birth
rate of the poor classes when compared with those of the well-todo strata, in their limited sense, could not be regarded as a
"function" of exclusively economic conditions. It is probable that
they are the result of many other agencies besides that of the
economic factor. With a reasonable degree of probability we can
say that the poorer classes have a
551
greater mortality, not only because they live in less healthy
economic conditions, but also, that they are poor because they
have poor health and a weak inherited constitution, leading to a
higher mortality. This means that the vital, and the economic and
other social phenomena, are interdependent. Consequently,
economic conditions cannot be ignored in an explanation of vital
processes, but, at the same time, they alone are not sufficient to
account for them, and their role must not be overestimated.^*^
In regard to such criteria as the marriage and divorce rates, the
differences between the poor and the rich classes are still less
definite, and are somewhat contradictory. Correlations found in
some societies,for instance, a greater divorce rate in some of
the well-to-do classes than in the poor classes,have not been
found in other societies. In general, the correlation between the
rates of these phenomena and economic conditions seems to be
so complex that they may be regarded only as local and

temporary. This means that these phenomena depend upon
purely economic conditions in a still less degree than death and
birth rates, and that they seem to be controlled in a greater
degree than birth and death processes by the non-economic
conditions which may mask, change, or disfigure the ''influence"
of the economic factors.
Fhictiiation of Vital Processes Correlated with Business
Conditions. Correlations between economic conditions and the
birth, death, marriage and divorce rates, have been found also
through
^^ There have been many other attempts to account for a higher
birth rate in the poorer classes. Some authors hke Thomas
Doubleday tried to explain a lower procreation of the upper
classes through an overabundance of their food, and the
constitutional change due to it. See Doubleday, Thomas, The
True Law oj Population, London, 1843, passim and pp. 67 ff., 128
ff. Darwin, as is known, sharply criticized the hypothesis and laid
down a series of facts which contradict Doubleday's hypothesis.
Recently F. Carli, on the basis of the studies of Pignini and others
set forth a hypothesis similar to that of Doubleday. "Beyond
certain limits, an increase of wealth goes against the interests of
the sjjecies and checks fertility." Carli, op. cit., pp. 177 ff.; Pignini,
La biochimia del cervello, pp. 100 ff., Torino, 1915. R. Pearl, on
his ])art, explains the difference through a greater sexuality of the
poor classes compared with that of the well-to-do and upper
classes. His study of the frequency of the sexual activity of the
poorer, and the wealthier and professional groups, has shown
that the unskilled and poorer groups have a higher frecjuency
than the well-to-do and more intellectual groups. Pearl, R., The
Biology of Population Growth, Chap. VIII, pp. 198 ff. Without
mentioning several other hypotheses, the above shows how
complex is the situation, and how necessary it is to abstain from
an assertion of any "unlimited correlations" in this field. Besides, it

means again that these i)hcnomena cannot be accounted for
through economic factors alone.
552
55^ CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES
the study of the variation of both phenomena in time within the
same, or approximately the same, social unit, as distinguished
from the above studies of their correlation in ''social space''
among different economic classes at the same time. Many
investigators, among them, H. Denis, Pokrovsky, Oettingen,
Levasseur, J. Lescure, G. von Mayr, W. Beveridge, TuganBaranovsky, Aftalion, Farr, A. L. Bowley, Bodio, Longstaff, Ogle,
Hooker, Juglar, and more recently W. Ogburn, G. P. Davies, G. U.
Yule, L. March, D. Thomas, and M. Hexter, have studied the
effects of business cycles (the rhythm of prosperity and
depression) on the variation in marriages, births, deaths, and
divorces."^^
A. In regard to the marriage rate, the statisticians of more than
half a century ago had already noticed that, in agricultural
countries, in years of a good harvest, which mean prosperity, the
marriage rate went up; while, in years of poor crops, the
movement was opposite. With the industrialization of these
countries, the harvest ceased to play an exclusively important part
in the economic well-being of the country, industrial prosperity or
depression having taken its place. Accordingly, many authors
have tried to show that years of industrial prosperity or revival
tend to increase the marriage rate, while years of industrial de' See Oettingen, A., Die Moralstatistik, 1881; von Mayr, G.,
Statistik und Gesellschaftslehre, Vols. II and III; Levasseur, E., La
population frangaise, Vols. I and II; Tschuproff, A., and Postnikow,
The Influence of the Harvests on Various Sides of Social Life,
Vols. I and II, Russ.; Denis, H., La depression economique et

sociale et I'histoire des prix, Bruxelles, 1895; "Les index numbers
des phenomenes moraux," Memoirs deVAcademie Royale de
Belgique, Vol. IV, 1911; Lescure, J., Les crises generates et
periodiqties de snrproduction, 1910; Tugan-Baranovsky, M., Les
crises industrielles en Angleterrc, 1913, (orig. Russ.); Aft.\lion, a.,
Les crises periodiques de surproduction, 1913; Farr, W., Vital
Statistics, 1885; Ogle, W., "On Marriage Rates and Marriage
Ages," Journal of Royal Statistical Society, June, 1890;
Beveridge, W., Unemployment, 1912; Hooker, "Correlation of the
Marriage-rate with Trade," Journal of Royal Statistical Society,
1901, pp. 485-492; Juglar, C, "Y-a-t-il des periodes pour les
manages," etc., Bulletin de Vlnstitut Intern, de Statist'que, Vol.
XIII, 1903; Yule, G. U., "On Changes in the Marriage-Birth-rates in
England and Wales during the Past Half-Century," Journal of
Royal Statistical Society, Vol. LXIX; Davies, G. P., "Social
Aspects of the Business Cycle," Quarterly Journal of the
University of North Dakota, Jan., 1922; Bowley, A. L., Elements of
Statistics, 1907; Ogburn, W. F., and Thomas, D. S., "The
Influence of the Business Cycle on Certain Social Conditions,"
Journal American Statistical Society, Sept., 1922; Thomas, D. S.,
Social Aspects of the Business Cycle, London, 1925; Hexter, M.
B., Social Consequences of Business Cycles, Boston and N. Y.,
1925. In the last two books there is given a good summary of the
principal studies in this field. ^
553
553
pression are marked by its decrease. The greater the contrast
between the period of depression and revival, the more noticeable
is the fluctuation of the marriage rate. The correlations obtained
by different authors between various economic conditions, and

the fluctuations of the marriage rate, are as follows :
These data show that there is a pretty high correlation between
economic conditions and the marriage rate. However, we see
from the data that it is not perfect. It fluctuates considerably from
country to country, and from period to period. This, together with
the above mentioned fact, indicates that the movement of
marriages is considerably determined by economic conditions, but
not entirely by them. The differences between the perfect
coefficient, i, and the obtained coefficients indicate roughly the
amount of influence of other non-economic factors on the
554
movement and the fluctuation of the marriage rate. If we also take
into consideration the ''trend" of the marriage rate, the role of the
non-economic factors will possibly be still more important,
because all attempts to correlate the trends with economic
conditions have not yielded any unquestionable results.
B. The above mentioned studies, and some others have also
shown that there is a noticeable correlation between the
fluctuation of economic conditions and the birth rate. With a lag of
about one or two years the birth rate tends to increase in the
periods of economic prosperity, and to decrease in those of
depression. The coefficients of correlation on page 555 show the
situation.
These data show that the birth rate seems to be less closely
correlated with business cycles than the marriage rate. The
coefficient of correlation is lower here than in the marriage rate.
Hexter's relatively high coefficients are related to periods which
ire somewhat questionable, since we do not know whether or not,
''psychologically," there is a possibility for individuals to foresee or

to feel the approaching improvement or aggravation of the
'economic conditions. However it may be, a lesser dependence of
the birth rate upon economic conditions is suggested by these
data. With the exception of periods of great economic misery,
amounting to famine, when the birth rate falls considerably (look
at the data of India for the years of famine, and the famine of
1917-1922 in Russia for this purpose) the usual normal
fluctuations of business conditions seem to influence only slightly,
though noticeably, the fluctuation in the birth rate. Taking also into
consideration the fact that trends in the movement of the birth rate
have not been satisfactorily explained by economic factors, we
are forced to think that, in this field, the role of economic factors is
still less marked than in the field of marriage fluctuation.
C. As to the death rate, among the investigators previous to the
great work of Malthus, there was a somewhat greater unanimity in
admitting a close correlation between the fluctuation of the death
rate and that of economic conditions. There is no doubt that a
great economic impoverishment, amounting to misery and famine,
greatly increases the death rate; but it was also
555
SOCIOLOGJSTIC SCHOOL
Correlation between Birth
Rate and the Indicated
Economic Conditions
Author
Country and Period
Coefficient of Correlation
Trade of two years earlier.

Business barometer of one year earlier
Business barometer of one year earlier
Business barometer of one, two, three years earlier.
Wholesale prices of one month earlier
Or when conceptions lead by eleven months
Employment with a lag of seventeen months
Yule
Ogburnand
Thomas
Ogburnand Thomas
D. Thomas D. Thomas D. Thomas D. Thomas
Hexter
Hexter Hexter
England, 1850-1896
U. S. A., 1870-1920
England and Wales, I874-1910
England and Wales,
1854-1913 England and Wales,
1854-1874 England and Wales,
I875-1894 England and Wales,

1895-1913 Boston, 1900-1920
Boston, 1900-1920
Boston, 1900-1920
+ .479
33
+ .15
4- .29, + .30
"no significant coefficient"
+ .35, + .34 + .64, + .42
+ .705; synchronous, + .516
.696; synchronous, .090
Seasonal synchronous fluctuations of birth rate and
unemployment
leading 10 months .474
Seasonal synchronous fluctuations of birth rate and
unemployment
leading 2 months -}- .440
thought that any economic depression had to increase it
proportionately, while any economic improvement decreased it.
More recent and careful studies have yielded results which either
do not show any noticeable correlation between business
fluctuation and that of the death rate, or else give somewhat

contradictory re556
suits. Dr. Yule found that since 1850 (in England and Wales)
"there is no evidence that the death-rate has tended to rise in time
of depression. For a very striking instance of this we have only to
turn to the records of the past few years. 1921, 1922 and 1923
have been years of record low death-rates, in spite of the greatest
and most widespread depression of industry to which we have
ever been subject." "^^ For several states of the United States, in
the period from 1870 to 1920, W. Ogburn and D. Thomas found
the correlation a pretty high one: +.57; and with cycles from nineyear moving averages, +.63; but, contrary to expectation, the
correlation happened to be positive. Instead of a decrease, the
death rate in the period of prosperity increased, and vice versa.
Dr. Thomas' study of the data for England and Wales in 1854 to
1913 yielded a correlation which with the death rate lagging a
year behind the business cycle, is positive also: +.30. For the
subperiod from 1854 to 1874, the coefficient is +.24; for the period
1875-1894, ^.7,2;'^^ for the period 1895-1913, +.35.^^ M. B.
Hexter's results are considerably different. The correlation
between the death rate and wholesale prices obtained by him is
+.613 (death lead by 17 months) ; that between the death rate
and unemployment is .361 (death lead by 10 months).'^'^
These data are nearer to the usual expectation, and to the results
of the earlier investigators.
The above entitles us to think that, at the present moment, the
relation between business fluctuation and the death rate is much
more complex and not so close as we used to think. Economic
conditions probably exert some influence on the death rate, but it
is rather remote, often intangible, and sometimes it is modified
71 Yule, G. U., "The Growth of Population and the Factors which

Control It," Journal of Royal Statistical Society, 1925, p. 30; also
his quoted paper: On the Changes in the Marriage, etc., passim.
72 Thomas, D., op. cit., p. 69.
73 Ibid., p. 109. Among recent studies which show the
insignificant r61e of economic and occupational conditions on the
infant mortality rate and on children's health, and the more
important role of an inherited constitution, are to be mentioned the
studies of E. Elderton {Annals of Eugenics, Vol. I) with the
coefficient of correlation 0.03 between infant mortality and all
environmental conditions; of D. N. Paton and L. Finlay {Medical
Research Council, Special Report Series, No. loi, London, 1926);
of M. Greenwood and J. Brown {Journal of Hygiene, Vol. XII). On
the other hand, see Collins, S., Economic Status and Health,
1927; Woodbury, R. M., Hifant Mortality, 1926.
557
by the non-economic factors. In brief, it is far from being the
principal factor in this field, unless economic impoverishment
amounts to starvation and a lack of the minimum necessities. In
this case, Malthus' laws begin to work.
D. Somewhat indefinite, and contradictory also, are the
correlations between the fluctuation of business conditions and
that of the divorce rate. The data of W. Wilcox, W. Ogburn, and D.
Thomas for the U. S. yielded a noticeable positive correlation, +
.70 for 1867 to 1906; and +.33 for the thirteen states in the period
1867-1920. The data of England, studied by Thomas, did not give
any noticeable or uniform correlation."^^ The coefficients obtained
by Hexter also happened to be very low, the highest being.308
(with divorce lagging by 24 months). These results would seem to
entitle us to think that the divorce movement is still less
dependent on economic conditions than the birth, death, and

marriage rates.
The above shows approximately the character of the correlations
between economic factors and vital processes, its degree of
closeness, and the methods of contemporary study of these
correlations. If, on the whole, the vital processes are sensitive to
economic conditions, they could, in no way, be accounted for only
through the economic factor taken as an independent variable.'^^
6. Economic Conditions, Suicide, Pauperism, and Crime
Suicide. Long ago, many investigators noticed some correlation
between economic conditions and suicides. A considerable
number of them have thought that impoverishment or poverty
favors suicide, while economic betterment and wealth favors its
decrease. Later investigations, and among them especially Durkheim's study, have showed that the relation between the
discussed phenomena is more complex and less close. Statistics
show that the poorer classes do not give, as a general rule, a
higher per cent
'5 Thomas, D., ibid., pp. 67-68, 90-93.
'" By the way, the above and the following pages show how far
the scientific study has left behind the metaphysical, speculative,
and verbal Marxian discussions about "the basis" and
"superstructure," "primary" and "secondary" factors, and so on.
The diflference between these and the "Marxian" studies of the
role of the economic factor is scarcely less than between the
alchemy of the Middle Ages, and contemporary chemistry.
558
of suicide than the well-to-do classes. They show also that, in

spite of a general rise in the standard of living in the nineteenth
century, the suicide rate increased rather than decreased.
Furthermore, the wealthier geographical regions of the same
country often give a higher per cent of suicide than the poorer
ones. These, and some other considerations, indicate that, if
there is a correlation between economic conditions and suicide, it
is rather indirect and somewhat complex."^^ On the other hand, it
has been observed many times that periods of acute economic
panic are almost invariably followed by an increase of suicide.^^
Recent studies of the correlation of the suicide rate with business
conditions made by Ogburn and Thomas, have given the
coefficient of the correlation.74 for the U. S. and .50 for
England and Wales.^^ Durkheim's theory that poverty or wealth
are only indirect facilitating factors of suicideas far as they
increase social isolation {ranomie sociale, liberation of an
individual from social rules) seems to be more in harmony with
these contradictory data than any other.^^ This means again that,
in this field, the role of economic conditions is far from being
decisive. Even if we do not accept Durkheim's theory, the results
obtained show a tangible, but not exclusive, influence of
economic conditions on suicide.
Pmiperism. A close correlation in the fluctuation of pauperism
with that of other economic conditions results simply from the fact
that pauperism itself is an economic phenomenon. What is more
interesting is that, in spite of this, the correlation is not perfect.
Miss Rowland's study of poor relief in Massachusetts and F. S.
Chapin's study of the dependency index for Minneapolis yielded
the following coefficients of correlation :
'^ See DuRKHEiM, E., Le suicide, Chap. V; see von Mayr, G.,
Statistik und Gesellschaftslehre, Vol. Ill, pp. 258-406, especially
pp. 353-359. See in these works the literature and the data.
^8 See DuRKHEiM, op. cit., pp. 264 ff.

'^ Thomas, op. cit., pp. 73 and 114-116.
8" "Si done les crises industrielles ou financieres augmentent les
suicides, ce n'est pas parce qu'elles appauvrissent; c'est parce
qu'elles sont des crises, c'est-d-dire des perturbations de Vordre
collective. Toute rupture d'equilibre, alors meme qu'il en resulte
une plus grande aisance et un rehaussement de la vitalite
generate, pousse a la morte volontaire. Toutes les fois que de
graves rearrangements se produisent dans les corps social, qu'ils
soient dus a un soudain mouvement de croissance ou a un
cataclysme inattendue, I'homme se tue plus Jacilement."
Durkheim, ibid., p. 271; see the whole of Chapter V.
559
Between the number receiving poor relief and wage
index .62
Between the number receiving poor reHef and business
failures +44^^
Between the dependency index in Minneapolis and C. Snyder's
Clearing Index of Business for a six-months lag -556 ^^
Dr. D. Thomas' study in England gave the coefficient of
correlation .52, between indoor relief and the business
barometer, with a one-year lag for relief. For the outdoor relief
(relief of paupers in their homes) the coefficient is .32.^*^ This
means that even this phenomenon, which might be expected to
be in the closest dependence on economic conditions, is, in fact,
influenced by many other factors. As far as the phenomenon of
poverty and pauperism generally is concerned, an attempt to
account for their existence, amount, character, and social
distribution through economic conditions alone is a rather

hopeless business. These complex phenomena are the resultant
of many and various factors, economic, as well as non-economic.
A series of studies has made this more or less clear.^"^
Crimes. The correlation between economic conditions and
crime, especially crime against property, was known long ago.
Investigations have shown that often the poor classes give a
higher quota of crime against property than the well-to-do classes
; and that the geographical districts of a country, or city, which are
inhabited by the poor, give a higher rate of criminality than the
districts of the well-to-do classes. Further, many authors have
indicated a parallelism in the movement of crime against property
81 Rowland, K. E., "A Statistical Study of Poor Relief in Mass.,"
Journal of American Statistical Society, Dec, 1922.
82 Chapin, F. S., "A Dependency Index for Minneapolis,"
Publications of the American Sociological Society, Vol. XIX, pp.
200-202; also "Dependency Indexes for Minneapolis," Social
Forces, May, 1926.
83 Thomas, op. cit., Chap. VI.
84 See the literature, the data, and the factors in Gillin, J., Poverty
and Dependency, N. Y., 1922; RowNTREE, B. S., Poverty,
London, 1906; Parmelee, M., Poverty and Social Progress, 1921;
Lidbetter, E. J., "Pauperism and Heredity," The Eugen. Review;
Booth, Charles, Life and Labor of the People of London, all
volumes; Dexter, R. C, Social Adjustment, N. Y., 1927.
For a correlation between business cycles and unemployment
see Busi?iess Cycles and Unemployment, the papers of W. A.
Berridge, W. C. Mitchell, F. R. Macaulay, W. J. King, P. F.
Brissenden, S. A. Rice, N. Y., 1923.
560
and that of the price of wheat or bread in agricultural countries;
many other investigators have shown that, in industrial countries,
the periods of depression have been marked by an increase in
crime against property, while the periods of prosperity have been
marked by its opposite course. So-called ''seasonal fluctuation" of
crimes against property, when the cold winter months show an
increase, and the warm months show a decrease, seem to point
at the same economic factor. In brief, a series of such studies
seems to have made certain the existence of a correlation
between economic conditions and crime, especially crimes
against prop erty.^'' Admitting the correlation, it is necessary,
however, not to exaggerate it. Many of the investigators have
shown that not only the movement of crime generally, but even
that of crime against property, could not be accounted for through
economic factors alone. Several studies, and among them that of
G. Richard and my own, have shown that an extraordinary
increase of ' crime in the periods of social upheaval is due to
other than purely economic conditions.^^' Secondly, not
everywhere nor always do the poor show a greater proportion of
crime. Third, many poorer countries have had less crime than the
richer countries. Fourth, the improvement in the economic
conditions of the population of the Western countries in the
second half of the nineteenth century, and at the beginning of the
twentieth, has not been followed by a decrease of crime. Fifth,
among those who commit crime against property there is always
a considerable number of well-to-do people, and, on the other
hand, many of the poorest
^ A. Quetelet, A. Oettingen, E. Levasseur, G. von Mayr,
Tarnovsky, Bosco, H. Denis, L. Moreau-Christophe, A. Come, M.
Gemet, Foinitzky, Charykhow, A. Meyer, W. Starcke, Tugan-
Baranovsky, J. Bertillon, Villerme, B. Weisz, H. Miiller, E.

Fornasari di Verce, A. Lacassagne, A. Corre, P. Lafargue, P.
Hirsch, M. Yvemes, G. Tarde, E. Ferri, R. Mayo-Smith, Van Kahn,
Bonger.These are a few of the great many who have studied
crime from the discussed standpoint. See the data and the
Hterature in von Mayr, G., op. cit., Vol. Ill; Bonger, W. A.,
Criminality and Economic Conditions, Boston, 1916; van Kahn, J.,
Les causes economiques de la criminalite, Paris, 1903; Gillin, J.,
Criminology and Penology, 1926; Parmelee, M., Criminology,
1923; the quoted works of Levasseur and Oettingen; Gernet, M.,
Crime and Its Prevention, Russ.; Charykhow, Factors of
Criminality, Russ.; Jijilenko, A., Factors of Crime, Russ.;
Aschaffen-BURG, G., Crime and its Repression, Boston, 1913.
^ See Richard, G., "Les crises sociales et les conditions de la
criminality," L'annee sociologique, 1899; Sorokin, P., Crime and
Punishment, Russ., Chap. X; Sociology of Revolution, 1925,
Chap. IX.
561
people do not commit such crimes. Sixth, it is an ascertained fact
that, in the causation of crime and criminals a great many noneconomic factors play an important role.^' Seventh, practically all
correlations between economic conditions and crime are far from
being perfect, or even notably high. Eighth, there is only a
relatively low coefficient of correlation found between crime and
business conditions, through a relatively fine mathematical
analysis.^^ These, and many similar facts, do not at all permit us
to think that the phenomena of crime are controlled by economic
conditions only. They do not permit us even to think that these
conditions are the most important factor. All that they entitle us to
conclude is that economic conditions play a serious role in this
respect.
7. Economic Conditions and Migration
With a reasonable degree of certainty, it is possible to contend

that the phenomena of migration in a population (its direction,
character, and amount) are considerably correlated with the
economic phenomena. An aggravation of the economic situation
in a country of emigration, and an improvement of it in the country
of immigration, facilitates the increase of emigration from the first
to the second country, and vice versa. A series of studies relative
to the migration of primitive tribes and many ancient peoples, of
the statistics of emigration and immigration for the last few
decades, and of the data of migration in various countries at the
periods of famine, corroborate this expectation.^'^ In
*'' vSee the works of von Mayr, Oettingcn, Gillin, Levasseur,
Parmelee and others. See also vSutherland, E., Criminology,
1924.
8* According to G. Davies, the annual admissions to N. Y. state
i)risons, 1896-1915, correlated with the i)rice index, gives a
coefficient of .41; W. Ogburn's and D. Thomas' coefficient of
the correlation between the business cycle and movement of
crime is .35. For crimes against the person it is only .12.
Thomas' coefficients of the correlation for England and Wales,
1857-1913, are: for crime generally, .25; for crimes against
property only, without violence, .25; for crimes against property
with violence, .44; for crimes of violence against the person,
.06; for crimes against morals, .05. Davies, op. cit.; Ogburn, W.,
and Thomas. D., op. cit.: Thomas, D., op. cit., pp. 143-144. These
coefficients show how naive, is the expectation that with an
improvement of economic conditions the phenomena of crime will
disappear.
8^ A detailed study of this was given in my book destroyed by the
Soviet government: The Influence of Famine and the Food Factor
on Human Behavior, Social Organization, and Social Processes,
Cha]). VI; see the data in Philippovicz, "Auswandcrung," in

Ilandwortcrbuch d. Staatsivissenschaftcu, cd. by Conrad, 3d.
562
a recent study, D. Thomas corroborates this expectation by
correlating the number of emigrants from the United Kingdom to
the United States, (1870-1913) with the business conditions in the
United States, and she found the coefficient -{-.yy. Correlating
emigration with the business cycle in both countries she found the
coefficient -\-.6^y^ Both coefficients are sufficiently high to warrant
the above established contention. A similar conclusion is reached
in a recent study of the problem by H. Jerome.^^ Other similar
facts seem to show that human migrations, being considerably
controlled by economic conditions, are, at the same time,
controlled by many other factors.^" This is recently shown by the
facts of Soviet Russia, where, owing to the internal prohibition
against leaving, and the opposition from other countries, there
has been little emigration in spite of the famine conditions
prevailing. The United States' law which limits immigration is
another case in point.
8. Economic Conditions, Social Organization, and Institutions
We have seen that Marxianism and the economic interpretation of
history claim that the character of the means, and the instruments
of production, determine the social, political and ideological
superstructure of society. Guided by this simplicist theory, many
"investigators" have tried to ''corroborate" it through some
''factual" studies. Studies in the field of the "economic
interpretation" of social organization and institutions of primitive
people are especially numerous. Some authors like F. Engels, E.
Grosse, H. Cunow, and partly G. De Greef have tried to show that
the forms of production and economic relationship determine the
sd., Vol. II; Denis, H., "Le mouvement de la population" in

Memoirs of the Belgian Academy of Science, Vol. LIX, 1900;
Tugan-Baranovsky, M., op. cit.; VON Waltershausen, Sart.,
"Einwanderung," in Handworterbuch d. Staats-wissenschaften,
ed. by Conrad, 3d ed., Vol. Ill; von Mayr, vS., op. cit., Vol. II;
Mayo-Smith, Statistics and Sociology; Coletti, Fr., Dell'
emigrazione italiana, Milano, 1912; several articles in the volumes
of the Bulletin de I'Inst. Intern. Stat.; Ravenstein, E. G., "The Laws
of Migration," Journal Royal Statistical Society, Vol. XLVIII, pp.
167-227.
'"Thomas, op. cit., p. 151.
'1 Jerome, Harry, Migration and Business Cycles, Chaps. IV-VIII,
National Bureau of Economic Research, N. Y., 1926.
563
types of family, property, and political institutions.^^ Some others,
like A. Loria, K. Kautsky, and A. Groppali went still further and
pretended to establish a close correlation between economic
factors and the forms and variation of political and juridical
institutions, religious beliefs, morals, mores, ideologies, literature
and arts. All these phenomena are depicted by such authors as a
"mere bizarre reflection" of, or a ''superstructure" on, an economic
''basis." ^"^ All the mysteries of human history are made "simple,"
and even too "simple" in these works. Any social process they
solve as a simple equation with one unknown.^"*
'3 Engels, F., Der Ursprung der Familie, des Privateigentum und
des Staates; Grosse, E., Die Formen der Familie und die Formen
der Wirtschaft, Freiburg, 1896; De Greef, G., Introduction a la
sociologie, Vol. II., pp. 142 ff., Paris, 1889; CuNOW, H., Die
Verwandschafts organisationen der Australneger, Stuttgart, 1894;
Zur Urgeschichte der Ehe und Familie, Stuttgart, 1912.
34 See Loria, A., The Economic Foundations of Society, London,

1899; Le leggi organiche della costituzione economica i le forme
storiche della constituzione economica^ Torino, 1889; Sociology,
1901; The Economic Synthesis, N. Y., 1914; Groppali, A., Lezioni
di Sociologia, Torino, 1902; Elementi di Sociologie, Genova,
1905; Kautsky, K., Foundations of Christianity, N. Y., 1925;
CuNOW, H., Ursprung der Religion und des Gottesglaubens,
Berlin, 1913; Die Marxsche Gtschichts , Gessel , und
Staatstheorie, Bd. II; Kelles-Krauz, C., "Influences du facteur
economique sur la musique," Annates de L'Institut Intern, de
Sociologie, 1903, pp. 305-321; EuLENTHROPOULOS, Abr.,
Wirtschaft und Philosophie, Vols. I, II, 1900-1901. Less one-sided
is Kinderman, C., Volkswirtschaft und Kunst. A cheaper and more
primitive type of the same kind of "interpretation" is given in an
enormous number of essays by the Marxian journalists and by
socialistic and communistic propaganda literature. An example of
such a cheap "interpretation" of literature from the Marxian
standpoint is given in Leo Trotsky's, Literature and Revolution, N.
Y., 1925. This old European kind of interpretation is now being
introduced into the United States as something quite modern by a
group of journalistic writers in "Modern Review," and in other
socialistic and communistic periodicals of America.
5 Here are the most conspicuous examples of such
"interpretations": "Pantheism and migration of the soul of Kabbala
is nothing but a metaphysical expression of the value of
merchandise and its exchange." Lafargue, P., Die Geschichte
des Sozialismus im Einzeldarstellungen, Stuttgart, 1895, Vol. II, p.
489; "the philosophy of Hartmann is an expression of the
disintegration of the German bourgeoisie" (A. Eulenthropoulos);
"the Reformation is nothing but a revolt of the German countries
against Papal exploitation." (Loria, Kautsky); "the disappearance
of Palestrina's quiet sweetness in music, of the eighteenth
century, is caused by the development of capitalism and its
satellite, class-struggle." The introduction of the fugue into music
by the second Venetian school is interpreted as a "musical

reflexion of the passionate social fights" (Kelles-Krauz). The origin
of picture-painting is explained through the appearance of the
bourgeoisie. The whole of religion, law, morals, and "public
opinion" is interpreted as a mere system of control by the upper
classes for the sake of an exploitation of the lower classes and a
prevention of their revolt. (Loria, Economic Foundations of
Society, 1899, pp. 9 ff.) See other examples in Kovalevsky, M.,
Contemp. Sociologists, Chap. V; Barth, P., op. cit., pp. 677 ff.
564
All they contend is that there is the closest correlation between
the economic factor and other social phenomena, including
science, philosophy, religion, literature, arts, and what not. This
contention they 'prove" very simply by the method of speculation
and illustration. Having a definite preconception in mind, they,
consciously or unconsciously, take one or two suitable examples,
especially from narratives about the primitive peoples, and the
desired correlation is proved and the economic factor
corroborated.
The data (of ethnology, anthropology, and history of civilization)
are so vast and so various that it must be an unskilled selector
who is unable, by giving prominence to the instances which agree
and by ignoring those which conflict with his views, to make out a
plausible case in support of some general notion (of human
evolution).^^'
These words explain the essence of the method of ''illustration"
used by such writers, and generally by the early ethnologists,
anthropologists, and historians of culture. It is evident that the
scientific value of such a method is nil.^^ Nil also is the value of
the results obtained through such a method.^^ In the last few

decades, luckily for social science, this was understood by many
96 HoBHOusE, L., Wheeler, G. C, and Ginsberg, M., The Material
Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples, p. i,
London, 1915.
9^ See its criticism in Somlo, F., Zur Grundung einer
beschreibenden Soziologie, Berlin, 1909; also Steinmetz, S. R.,
"Classification des types sociaux," Vannee sociologique, Vol. III.
98 Take Loria's works as an example. They are, comparatively,
the best in this kind of literature. To Loria everything is simple. If
there is a free land it determines a lack of class division, of
exploitation, religion, law, and of morals. In this case we have a
society of free producers,happy, equal and wisely controlled by
their "enlightened egoism." If, owing to some miraculous
machinations of the capitalists (miraculous because Loria does
not explain how these "capitalists" could enslave and subjugate
the laborers, nor how they have succeeded in instilling into their
minds, with moral, religious, juridical and pubhc opinion, rules of
conduct whose only purpose is to help to exploit the laboring
man), they succeed in barring a free access to the land, then
class differentiation, exploitation, and so on appears, and with
them, law, morals, religion, and public opinion. However, a reader
of Loria is consoled, for he (Loria) guarantees that "the final
economic form of society," which will be free from "all manner of
usurpation and every species of conflict" is coming, and
everything will be harmonious and perfect. It would take hundreds
of pages to indicate the shortcomings of Loria's Economic
Foundations of Society. It is enough to say that the whole theory
is speculative, and has only a very remote relationship to either
scientific methods, or to a scientific scrutiny of facts. See, for
instance, the whole of Parts I and II. Factual criticism of the book
may be found in Koval-EVSKY, op. cit., pp. 249-286. ^
565
investigators, and, as a result there appeared a series of works
which permitted the estabhshment of more accurate relationships
between economic factors, and other social phenomena. On the
other hand, they gave a solid basis for deciding to what extent the
pretentious generalizations of the "economic interpreters of
history" were valid.
Let us survey the principal results of these more scientific works,
and, through them, find out what the correlations between
economic conditions and various complex social phenomena are.
9. Economic Conditions, Including the Technology of
Production, and Forms of Social Organization
AND Political Institutions
One of the most important works in this field is The Material
Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples by L. T.
Hobhouse (1864- ), G. C. Wheeler and M. Ginsberg, together with
the studies of J. Mazzarella, summed up in his Les types sociaiix
et le droit.^^ The principal purpose of the first study is to
determine whether or not there is a correlation between economic
conditions and social institutions, and, if it exists, just what it is. As
a starting point the authors take ''material culture" as ''the control
of man over nature as reflected in the arts of life." This
corresponds to the Marxian economic factor; they, however, take
it not as the Marxian "primary cause," but as a methodological
"independent variable." The authors difTer from Marx in saying
that "material culture is a fair index of the general level of
knowledge, and, if we may use a more general term, of mentality"
(pp. 6, 16). In order to avoid a use of "the method of illustration"
the authors carefully classified all more or less studied peoples
(more than four hundred) according to their material culture or
means and instruments of production, or their methods for

procuring a living. This gives the following classification of the
peoples :
'^ See the excellent volumes of his Studi di etnologia guiridica,
Catania, 1903, and subsequent years. Mazzarella was the first
author who took pains to avoid "the method of illustration" in
ethnology. He elaborated the principles of a much better and
sounder stratigraphic method for analyzing social organizations
and causal relations.
566
lower hunters
higher hunters
agricultural (lowest) pastoral (lower)
agricultural (higher) pastoral (higher)
agricultural (still higher)
After this they proceeded to find out the correlations between
these forms of material culture and various social institutions.
They did this by making a careful statistical study of all these
peoples one by one, and by giving the results in the form of
quantitative tables and diagrams, which permit one roughly to
measure the closeness of the correlations. The tables on page
567, a few out of the many given by the authors, may give an idea
of the results obtained. (Ibid., p. 50.)
The table shows, first, that the same form of material culture
(economic basis) is connected with the most various forms of
government (read horizontal lines), and vice versa; and that the
same form of government is found among various economic

cultures (read vertical lines). This means that there is no basis for
claiming that "the character of the forces of production and
relationships of production" are closely correlated with definite
forms of political ''superstructure," or that the political institutions
are but the function of the economic factor. On the other hand, the
table shows also that some forms of government are more
conspicuous among the peoples of a definite stage of material
culture than among other peoples. For instance, the per cent of
cases with slight or no government is 47 per cent for *'lower
hunters" and nothing for the "agricultural peoples IIL" This
suggests that some correlation exists between "economics" and
"government," but it is far from being high or close. The same
conclusion is corroborated by the data which show that "trends" in
the evolution of the forms of government, as we pass from the
lower hunters to the agricultural peoples III, are rather fanciful and
capricious.
Practically the same conclusions are suggested by all other tables
given by the authors. Here are some of them in an abbreviated
form:
567
56-:
o E3 g
r^ On "-
6
ON
.5 -o
rr> ^ '^
^ "^ ^
> 53 <1^
11 '^
oc
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^ -^ ;-H
568
Material Culture and Forms of Justice
The per cent each of the four forms of justice composes to the
total number of cases of each class of people
Somewhat similar are the data in regard to the methods of
punishment (retahation, composition, atonement, etc.), and in
regard to the forms of procedure (trial, ordeal, oath). (See the
tables on pages 569 to 573.)
Similar are the pictures given in regard to chastity, public control
of marriage, and so on. The tables show even more clearly than
the table concerning government and justice, that there is no
more or less high and convincing correlation between the
economic factor and the forms of marriage and family. Some
correlation seems to exist, but it is very low and almost intangible
in regard to many traits of family and marriage institutions.
Material Culture and J Far. Of the 298 peoples studied, only in
nine cases has ''no war" been found. There were four cases
among the lower hunters, two cases among the higher, and two
among the lower agricultural peoples. Thus, contrary to popular
opinion, ''organized war rather develops with the advance of
industry and of social organization in general" (p. 228). The tables
show that even in relatively primitive societies, where the power of
purely economic needs is supposed to be especially
569
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570
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571
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572
great, there is no close correlation between the methods of
production (economic basis) and the forms of various social and
political institutions. This is in spite of the fact that the studied
societies belong to quite different economic ages. There seems to
be some correlation, but it is imperfect and loose.
Essentially similar are the results obtained by Mazzarella in his
painstaking studies of the forms of family, marriage, and
priesthood; and of the forms of political, judicial, property,
inheritance, punishment, and other institutions. After a most
careful study
Number of Cases in Each Form of the Treatment of the
Vanquished 1"
Material Culture and Nobility and Slavery
'00 Ihid., p. 232.
573
Material Culture and Forms of Property ^^
^v:
of the area of diffusion of matriarchy, its variations, its fluctuations,
and so on; and after a still more painstaking study of the
''ambiHan" form of family (where the bridegroom enters the family
of the bride) he concludes: 'These institutions do not depend
directly on economic causes . . . because they are found among a
great many peoples quite different in regard to economic
conditions." ^^^ If there is a correlation, it is remote and

exceedingly indefinite. It consists in :
a lack of the labor forces necessary for the utilization and
conservation of the natural economic resources of the autonomic
social groups (among whom these forms of family and marriage
are found),a lack which is determined by an insufficient number
of the adult males of the groups, [and] in an existence of natural
economic resources potentially or really unlimited, which require a
great amount of labor to be used and preserved.^^^
The dependence of the forms of family (and of a series of other
^'^ Thid., p. 251.
i"^ Mazzarella, J., Les types socianx et le droit, pp. 179-180.
'^ Ibid., \). 311 and passim. See also Carr-Saunders, A. iM., The
Population Problem. Having surveyed a series of customs
(infanticide, sexual regulations, abortion, war, etc.), the author
came to tlie conclusion that "there is no apparent connection
between the practice of any of these customs,, and the different
economic stages," p. 237.
574
social institutions) rests then only very indirectly on the economic
conditions of a society.
If such is the real situation, it is quite reasonable to suppose that
in a more complex society, where social forces are more
numerous, and their interrelations are more complex, the
correlation could not be closer than in the above simple societies.
The facts seem to corroborate this expectation. For the sake of
brevity I shall quote Sombart's statements, which depict the
situation quite accurately. Sombart convincingly shows that,

contrary to Marx, technique (or the means and the instruments of
production) does not tangibly determine the forms of social and
economic organization.
As far as history shows, a close and necessary correlation
evidently does not exist between the technique of production and
the definite economic system of a society. . . . Often an already
existing better technique is not applied. On the other hand, the
cultural situation of a society may be such, and it has often been
such, that an already existing technique becomes forgotten and
ceases to be applied, either because the people become too
indolent, or because they do not want to do it. If possession of a
definite technique must exert a necessary influence upon the
culture-complex of a society, how can we explain the decay of a
whole culture without any change in the technique of production,
which does not become obsolete until later? Some of the
inventions which we now use were made by the Chinese
thousands of years ago; and yet these did not force them to
abandon their system of tiresome cultivation. In what way then
does technique determine all kinds of culture?
In a similar way, we find that there is no close correlation between
the character of the technique of production which is used, and
the definite economic system of social organization.
There are plenty of cases where the same economic system is in
use on the basis of quite different techniques of production; and
there are cases where the same technique is applied in quite
different economic systems. We have had, and do have, a
Capitalistic system of economic organization on the basis of a
technique of handwork and machine-work. The principal forms of
the Capitalistic economic organization . . . remain in their
substantial traits unchanged after the introduction of quite a new
modern technique of production, and
575
vice versa. The three-field system of farming has been applied in
the economic systems of the free farmers, as well as in that of the
dependent serfs. For centuries the Capitalistic system, with the
same technique of production, was served here by the slaves,
and there by the free working men. All this would have been
impossible had the economic organization of a society been a
mere function of production technique.
The dependence of non-economic cultural phenomena on the
technique of production and economic organization of a society is
still less pronounced, because
quite heterogeneous culture-complexes have existed under the
same economic organization; and similar culture complexes have
existed under heterogeneous economic systems. We have the
same Capitalism in the small and in the great states; in republics
and in absolute monarchies; and in the Protestant and Catholic
countries. Within the same Capitalist system, we have most
different forms of arts, and ''sciences" such as the Catholic and
the ''Unprejudiced" science; and the religious-ethical and the
materialistic ideological currents. The opposite is also true.
Scarcely anyone may really prove that Plato, Spinoza, and Hegel
belong to the three economic systems; that they are necessarily
bound with the three various systems; or that they are only a
function of these systems.^^^
These words sum up well that which was shown by the preceding
tables. This does not mean, and Sombart does not believe, that
there is no correlation between the technique of production and
the economic system, or between them and the non-economic
social phenomena. It means only that the correlation is remote,
less definite, and more varying than has been thought by *'the
economic interpreters of history." Being always imperfect, the
correlation in regard to some phenomena is sometimes
sufficiently tangible. Sometimes, in regard to other phenomena, it

is almost unnoticeable, or nil.^^^ This conclusion is practically
corrobo^^ vSoMBART, Technik and Kultur, pp. 317 ff.
^^ Without regarding the technique of production as a "primary
factor" it is fruitful to study its influence on various social
phenomena, not in a general and speculative way, but taking in
each case a definite technical object and a definite social
phenomenon to be correlated. Such a study is exem]jlified by K.
Kries' Die Eisenbahnen und ihre Wirkungen (1853) '^"^1 ^^Y
Sociological Aspects of Auto-mobile Accidents in Omaha,
published by the University of Dniaha, and liy R. H. Lowie's
Priftiitiir Society, p]). 198-201, where lie intHiatcs the changes
among
576
rated, as far as I know, by all careful and really scientific studies
of the correlation between the economic and the complex social
phenomena. The following may serve as additional representative
examples.
lo. Economic Conditions, Strikes, Disorders, and Revolutions
One of the best studies of the correlation between the economic
factors and the movement of strikes is A. H. Hansen's analysis of
the number of strikes and strikers in the United States (and
Canada) for the period from 1881 to 1919. Correlating it with the
business cycles, he found for the period of the falling prices,
1881-1897, the coefficient of correlation between the wholesale
prices and the number of the strikers, .338; and for the second
period of the rising prices, 1898-1919, the coefficient, -{- .494.
''Strikes correlate inversely with the business cycles in periods of

long-run falling prices, while they correlate directly with business
cycles in periods of long-run rising prices." The coefficients are
''not entirely convincing"; nevertheless, they are quite tangible.^^^ This shows that even such phenomena as industrial strikes
and their fluctuation are far from being accounted for completely
through economic conditions.
Somewhat similar conclusions have been reached in a study of
the correlation between the fluctuation of economic conditions
(prosperity and poverty taken as an independent variable) and the
movement of revolts, disorders, and revolutions, methodologically
taken as "functions." For a relatively recent period, including the
years preceding the Russian Revolution and the years of the
Revolution, it has been possible to obtain comparatively
the Chukchee due to a shifting from fishing to reindeer-breeding;
or by C. Wissler's "The Influence of the Horse in the Development
of Plains Culture," American Anthropologist, N. vS., Vol. XVI, No.
i; they are scientifically fruitful indeed. With the above limitation,
the theory of a cultural lag which was developed by W. Ogburn
and F. S. Chapin along the lines of the economic interpretation of
history, may be accepted also, as far as it does not pretend to be
exclusive, and does not insist on a close correlation between
material culture and "adoptive culture." See Ogburn, W. F., Social
Change, N. Y., 1923, Part IV, pp. 265 ff.; Chapin, F. S., "A Theory
of Synchronous Culture Cycles," Journal of Social Forces, May,
1924, for further study of the theory.
^^ Hansen, A., "Cycles of Strikes," American Economic Rnyiew,
Vol. XI, Dec, 1921, pp. 616-621.
577
detailed data. For the past history of various countries I used the
method of a rough historical correlation. It consists in an opposing
to the periods of improvement or aggravation of the economic

situation of the masses of ancient Rome and Greece, or
mediaeval and modern England, France, Germany, Bohemia, and
Russia, on the basis of the testimonies of contemporaries; the
periods immediately preceding great revolutions and social
upheavals, or those periods having a relatively stable social order.
This study led to the following principal conclusions: In great
social disorders, riots, revolutions, strifes,whatever their
concrete form,the participation of economic factors seems to be
certain. The periods immediately preceding such upheavals
coincide usually with the periods of an aggravation of the
economic situation in the corresponding society; while the periods
of social order coincide with those of an improvement in economic
status. The degree of aggravation and its tempo or velocity have
an important significance. On the other hand, this factor alone
seems to be insufficient for producing a revolution or upheaval.
There have been periods of great economic aggravation
(famines) which were not followed by revolution. Again, some of
the upheavals happened to be in relatively prosperous periods. In
order that an upheaval or revolution may take place, the
combination of many other factors is necessary. Combining with
the economic factors, they may produce revolution, but, when
opposed to them, they may annul their effects and thwart
revolution. Among such factors are the degree and the character
of social differentiation; the character of political organization, of
social control, of the nature of the government, of the mores,
habits, and traditions, of religion and education, of racial qualities,
of the intensity of social mobility, and of many other non-economic
conditions. This means that the discussed correlation exists, but
that it is far from being close.^'^^^
The results obtained by Professor N. Kondratieff in his study of
long-time business fluctuations with a period of from 48 to 60
years gave similar results. These long-time business cycles are
' This study composed chapters VII and IX of my above

mentioned book, The Influence of Famine and Food-Factor,
destroyed by the Soviet government. I gave a brief summary of it
in my The Sociology of Revolution, Chap. XVII. See also Sorokin,
Social Mobility, Chap. XXII.
578
correlated also somewhat with social upheavals, though the
correlation is far from being close.^^^
II. Economic Conditions, and Various Political Phenomena and
Attitudes
Among the valuable studies in this field, I may mention the works
of Charles A. Beard, R. Michels, and of some others, who have
elucidated the problem of an interrelation of economic and various
political phenomena. Professor Beard's work, based on a careful
study of a large amount of factual data, shows the role which
economic factors had in shaping the Constitution of the United
States. His principal thesis is that ''the Constitution was
essentially an economic document." It was created and carried
through by those groups of the American population who had an
economic interest in it, and it was opposed by those groups
whose economic interests were opposite.
In the ratification [of the Constitution] it became manifest that the
line of cleavage for and against the Constitution was between
substantial personalty interests on the one hand, and the small
farming and debtor interests on the other.
The movement for the Constitution of the United States was
originated and carried through principally by four groups of
personalty interests which had been adversely affected under the
Articles of Confederation: money, public securities, manufactures,

trade, and shipping.
The first firm steps toward the formation of the Constitution were
taken by a small and active group of men immediately interested
through their personal possession in the outcome of their labor.
The members of the Philadelphia Convention which drafted the
Constitution were, with few exceptions, immediately and directly
and personally interested in, and derived economic advantages
from, the establishment of the new system. ^^^
10^ See KoNDRATiEFF, N., Large Cycles of Conjuncture, Russ.,
in Voprosy kon-junctury, Vol. I, pp. 45 ff. There seems to me to be
one unfortunate statement in his work, when he says that the
periods of upheavals are more common in the upward period of
the large cycles. A study of even his own data shows that the
upheavals begin at the end of the downward periods,(of longtime cycles or at the end of a period of depression),as he
himself states in another place.
^^^ Beard, Charles A., An Economic Interpretation of the
Constitution of the United States, pp. 324 fT., N. Y., 1913. See
also his Economic Basis of Politics.
579
The author has succeeded in showing the existence of the
correlation, but at the same time his general conclusion seems to
exaggerate it somewhat. To give a more adequate picture of the
real correlation, I will take two or three of the tables given by him.
Ill
Pennsylvania. Number of Votes for and Against the Constitution,
According to Economic Groups
Of the 128 men who, in the Connecticut Convention voted in favor

of the Constitution, only about 65 men held public paper in such
an amount as, according to the author, to make it an economic
motive for favoring the Constitution. These data are
representative for all states. Granting that the author's theory is
right, his concrete figures nowhere show that the correlation
between the economic interests and the favoring or disfavoring of
the Constitution is perfect. Not all the capitalists voted for the
constitution, as they should have, had the correlation been
perfect, but only 12 out of 15. Not all the farmers voted against
the Constitution, but only 13 out of 25. Only 65 voters in
Connecticut holding public papers (economic interests) voted for
the Constitution, although a total of 128 voted. For the remaining
63 the author does not indicate any economic motive. These
deviations apparently cannot be accounted for through economic
interests. This means that if *'the line of cleavage for and against
the Constitution" was correlated with economic interests, this
correlation was far from being perfect; and, in many places, the
line seems to have passed in quite a different direction from that
of cleavage between personalty and the small farmer-debtor
interests. On the other hand, situations in which there has been a
^" Ibid., p. 280. vSce the wliole of Chap. X.
580
conflict between the interests of farmer-debtors and personalty
interests have taken place several times in history; and yet they
have never produced a constitution remotely similar to that of the
United States.^^^ These reasons are sufficient to show that in
this, as well as in all studied cases, the correlation studied is
tangible but far from being perfect.
This conclusion is sustained by many similar studies of the

correlations between political attitudes of various social groups
and their economic interests. Professor Robert Michels' valuable
studies in the sociology of political parties,^^^ especially of the
socialist parties, have shown that although the socialist parties
are composed principally of proletarians whose interests may be
in accordance with the aspirations of the socialist parties,
nevertheless, especially among their leaders there always has
been a considerable number of capitalists, rich men, members of
nobility, and intellectuals On the other hand, a very considerable
number of working men have always been affiliated with other
than the socialist and "labor" parties. This fact has been shown by
many other studies and censuses.-^^^ They show that each
political party is composed of members of various economic
classes. On the other hand, members of the same economic
class are affiliated with different parties. Furthermore, the number
of votes for different political parties in a country fluctuates greatly
and in very short periods of time,in France in the years from
1870 to 1911,
"2 As an additional reason, the author indicates that "a majority of
the members [of the Convention] were lawyers by profession,"
who had the same personalty interests. There have been few
conventions in history where lawyers have not composed a
considerable part; and yet, in spite of this, the laws and the
constitutions framed by them have been most heterogeneous,
and there have been none similar to that of the United States,
"3 See Michels, R., Political Parlies, passim, and pp. 79 ff., 264
ff., N. Y., 1915; Le proletariat et la bourgeoisie dans le
mouvement socialiste italien, Paris, 1921.
^^^ See OsTROGORSKi, jVL, La democratie et les partis
politiques, Paris, 1912. R. Blank's study has shown that in
Germany in 1903 about one-third of the proletariat was affiliated
with other than the socialist parties, while about half a million
voters for the socialist parties belonged to the ''bourgeois class."
Blank, R., "Die soziale Zusammensetzung der
socialdemocratischen Wahlerschaft Deutschland," Archiv fiir
Sozialwissenschaft, 1905, Heft III. The census of 1913 in
Germany has shown that out of 5,391,000 proletarians organized
in labor unions, only 2,573,000 were affiliated with the socialist
parties, while the remaining part was affiliated with other than
socialist parties. See LuRjE, The Composition of the Proletariat,
Russ., 1918, p. 10; see other data and the literature in my System
of Sociology, Vol. II, pp. 198-220, and passim.
581
within nine months on the average; in England, 1846 to 1924,
within two years and nine months on the average. The victory
used to pass from one party to another.^^^ This means that within
this short period the pohtical attitude of a great part of the
population changed, and changed greatly. It is evident that the
composition of economic classes of the population cannot change
noticeably within such a short period. We must conclude therefore
that this fluctuation of the political attitudes of the population does
not coincide with, is not parallel to, is considerably independent
from, and could not be accounted for through fluctuation in the
economic classes of the population.^^'^ Such discrepancies
between the supposed line of cleavage of economic interests and
that of political party affiliation and attitudes is again an indication
of the looseness of the supposed correlation. Economic interests
alone cannot account for the distribution and variation of political
attitudes among the population.^^^
The same phenomena are shown still more conspicuously by W.
Ogburn's and D. Peterson's study of the political thought of
various social classes. They have studied the nature of the votes
cast by five different social economic classes in Oregon: the rural
population, the urban population, the upper class, the middle

class, and the laboring class, on 103 different political matters.
The votes of each class were divided into groups ''for" and
''against" each of these matters; and the corresponding per cent
of "pros" and "cons" in each class on each measure was also
computed. The results are given in Table I. In regard to all 103
political matters, there is no single case in which the whole class
voted for or against a measure. In each instance a part of the
same class voted against, and another part for, the measure. As a
result, the votes of the members of the same class are different,
and the votes of a ])art of the members of different classes are
similar. The following few figures from the long table may illustrate
this:
"^ See facts and data in Sorokin, P., Social Mobility, Chap. XVI.
Sec also Taylor, C. C, Rural Sociology, 1926, p. 447.
"<5 See my Systern of Sociology, Vol. II, \)\). 205-211.
"^ Statements like Kautsky's contention that "to the three big
classes of present society correspond the three big political
parties,liberals (to the capitalist class), conservatives (to the
landlord class) and the socialists (to the labor class)" are nothing
but an inaccurate simplification of the real situation. The real
correlation is much less definite and much more "loose."
582
This shows that there is some correlation between the socialeconomic position of a people and their political attitudes, but it is
far from being close.^^^
The results of S. A. Rice's study of the political votes of farmers,
laboring men and of their representatives in several states of
America are similar. These also show that there is a "cohesion"

among the votes of the same class somewhat above a chance
expectation, but it is far from being perfect and stable.^^^
Similar conclusions follow from a series of other studies. As an
example I may mention W. G. Sumner's and my own study of the
factors of expansion and shrinking of governmental interference in
the regulation of economic and other social relations of the
population. The amount of governmental interference is not
constant; it fluctuates from society to society, and from period to
period within the same society. What are the factors of this
fluctuation ? My study led me to the conclusion that they are
numerous. Among them an especially prominent part is played by
the factors of militarism, indicated by H. Spencer and W. G.
Sumner, and by the economic factor in the form of improvement
or aggravation of the economic situation of a considerable part of
the population. Under definite conditions, impoverishment
facilitates an expansion of governmental interference, while
prosperity
"Ôgburn, W., and Peterson, D., "Political Thought of Social
Classes," Political Science Quarterly, 1916, pp. 307 ff.
"^ See Rice, S. A., Farmers and Workers in American Politics,
Chaps. V-VI, N. Y., 1924. The results of C. Taylor's and C.
Zimmerman's study are similar.
583
acts in the opposite direction. Thus there is a correlation, but
again it is far from being per feet. ^^^
These facts and considerations lead to the conclusion that
economic conditions cannot be discounted in an explanation of
the various political phenomena and political attitudes of the
population. Their influence is tangible in the majority of cases; but,
on the other hand, they are far from being sufiflcient to account
entirely for such phenomena. If it is unscientific to deny the
existence of a correlation between the discussed phenomena, it is
no less unscientific to exaggerate it, as is done by the one-sided
Marxian economic interpretation of history. Factual and inductive
studies do not warrant such speculations.
12. Economic Conditions and Ideologies, Religion,
AND Arts
In spite of the voluminous literature devoted by various
investigators, especially by the Marxians, to the establishment of
a correlation betwêen economic factors and the character and
fluctuation of ideologies, beliefs, and phenomena of arts and
literature, it does not amount to much in a scientific respect. The
speculative character of the works, the preconceptions of the
authors, the permeation of the studies by a cheap propaganda
spirit, the lack of scientific methods of study, the complex and
delicate nature of the phenomena and many similar reasons
make the value of the works questionable.^^^
'20 This study in extenso was given in Chapter XII of my Influence
of Famine and Food-Factor. In a greatly abbreviated form, parts
of it were published in my "The Influence of Famine on Socialli^conomic Organization of a Society," in the Russian Ekotiomist,
1922, No. 2; and in my "Impoverishment and the Expansion of
Governmental Control," American Journal of Sociology, Sept.,
1926. Compare Sumner, W. G., "State Interference" in his War
and Other Essays.
'21 The scientific technique of experimental and quantitative study
of "speech reactions" and ideological phenomena and their
correlations with various factors has only recently begun to be
developed. As examples of such studies, I may mention the
following works: The quoted works of Ogburn and Peterson, and
Rice; Allport, F., and Hartman, D., "A Technique for the
Measurement and Analysis of Public Ojînion," Proceedings
Amer. Sociological Society, Vol. XXXII, 1926; Allport, F., "The
Influence of the Grouj) upon Association and Thought," Journal
Experim. Psychol., Vol. Ill, pp. 159-182, 1920; Gates, G. S., "The
Effect of an Audienc-c upon Pcrformantc," Journal of Almormal
Psychology^ Vol. XVIII, ])p. 334-345, 1924; Root, W. T., "The
Psychology of Radicalism," Vol. XIX, i>p. 341-356, 1925; Moore,
H. T., "Innate Factors in Radicalism
584
Of the more serious attempts, I will now mention a series of
hypotheses which try to correlate the number, the movement, and
the character of inventions with various phases of business fluetuation. Such, for instance, is the theory of Kondratieff, which
contends that at the end of the downward period of a long-time
business cycle, the number of inventions increases in a
somewhat greater proportion than in the period of the upward
movement of such a cycle/"" Somewhat similar is the theory
briefly outlined by V. Pareto, partly by W. Ogburn, and by some
others.^"^ They claim that between these phenomena there is
some (not high) correlation. The hypothesis may be probable, but
the corresponding studies being somewhat rough, the hypothesis
still needs to be tested. There have been some attempts to
correlate economic condition with not only a general trend of
inventions, or of ideologies, (scientific, philosophical, religious,
literary, aesthetic, moral and so on), but even in their details.
These hypotheses declare that ''such and such an economic
situation sufficiently explains how that Christianity, Kant's
philosophy, or Macbeth had to appear at such and such a period
in such and such a society; and that, if the economic conditions
were known, their appearance could be predicted exactly." These,
and similar audacious attempts, are to be regarded as baseless

and wrong. I do not know any theory of this kind which is in a
remote way successful in proving such a
and Conservatism," ibid., Vol. XX, pp. 234-244, 1925; Lundberg,
G., "The Newspaper and Public Opinion," Social Forces, June,
1926, pp. 709-715; Pater-son, D. G., and Langlie, T. A., "The
Influence of Sex on Scholarship Ratings," Educational
Administration and Supervision, Sept., 1926; SoROKiN, P.
"P^xperimen-tal Studies of the Effects of Equal and Inequal
Remuneration and Pure Competition on the Efficiency of Work,
etc.," Kolner Vierleljahrshejtc filr Soziologie, Vol. V.
1" See Kondratieff, op. cit., pp. 47 ff.
^'-3 Ogburn, W., Social Change, 1924; Pareto, Traite de
sociologie generate, pp. 1655 ff.
^24 The invention or creation of a definite ideological value is the
function of such a multitude of different "variables," and of such
complex combination, that no mathematician can disentangle
them, or solve such an "equation" and establish the formulas of
correlation. For this reason, the appearance of each certain value
we must regard as something which amounts to a "mere chance."
It is impossible either to foresee or to predict where and when
each value will be invented or created. The authors who bravely
state "that such and such an invention, religion, ideology, or
theory had to be expected at a definite time, and could be
predicted" practically say no more than that "Christianity appeared
in Rome in the first century A. D. Therefore it had to be expected
there and
585
More serious and successful are the hypotheses which try to
correlate the fluctuation of popularity (contagiousness or diffusion)
of a certain ideological value among certain social groups with

certain economic conditions. The above theories of Charles , A.
Beard, R. Michels, and so on, are samples of such theories.
Further examples are Kautsky's interpretation of the origin of
Christianity,^^^ G. Isambert's theory concerning the factors of
fluctuation in the popularity of socialist ideologies, and my own
study of the same problem. In such a setting, the correlation
becomes tangible in regard to certain ideologies, though not all.
The following propositions may serve as examples. They concern
the correlation of the character of economic groups among which
communist-socialist ideologies have or have not had success;
with the fluctuation of their popularity and contagious quality
during certain economic conditions. Understanding communistsocialist ideology to be any ideology which requires and
stimulates the actions of encroachment, expropriation,
redistribution, levelling and ''socialization" of the property of the
well-to-do classes, regardless as to whether this is required in the
name of Christ or Marx, justice or progress; it is possible to make
the following propositions:
then." Try to make them predict three years in advance some of
the ideological values which will be created, and, on the basis of
some experiments made by me in the University of St.
Petersburg, I do not hesitate to predict that their prophecy will fail.
Not only such capricious phenomena as the appearance of a
definite ideological value in a certain society at a certain period
cannot be foreseen, but, unfortunately, we cannot predict with an
accuracy of loo per cent even incomparably more regular and
simple social events. We cannot predict even our own tomorrow's behavior, as my study of several hundred time-budgets
of the students of wSt. Petersburg University, kept during several
months, has shown. Still less can we predict our to-morrow's
"mood," or "kind of thoughts," or "the points of mental interests^'
or "fancies''; and even still less can we predict their character and
fluctuation in some other fellowman, especially in a man whom we
do not know. This is enough to show the fictitiousness of the

statements of the mentioned omniscient prophets.
^"^ See Kautsky, K., Foundations of Christianity, passim;
Isambert, G., Les idees socialistes en France de 1815 a 1848,
Paris, 1905; Sorokin, P., "Famine and Ideology of a Society,"
Ekonomist, Russ., 1922, No. 5. Kautsky's study, however, suffers
from a one-sided exaggeration of correlation, and a great sim])lification of reality. Isambert's theory is defective because it tries
to correlate with economic conditions not only diffusion and
fluctuation in the popularity of an ideology, but the moment of its
creation also. The fact of creation is a function of a great many
variables, and for tliis reason could scarcely be accounted for
tlirough economic (.onditions.
586
1. Other conditions being equal, a communist-socialist ideologyhas a greater success, and infects the poor more readily than the
well-to-do classes. The well-to-do groups are more immune
toward it than the poor classes.
2. Other conditions being equal, an increase in the economic
differentiation of a society, or an impoverishment of its population,
or, especially, a simultaneous increase of economic differentiation
followed by an impoverishment of the masses, facilitates and
increases the success of such an ideology within a society. The
stronger the differentiation, the more intensive these processes
will be.
3. A decrease in differentiation, or the improvement of the
economic situation of the masses, or both these phenomena, lead
to a decrease in the popularity or contagiousness of such an
ideology.
4. When economic differentiation grows, but the economic

situation of the masses improves, or when it becomes worse, but
differentiation decreases, each of these variables may then
neutralize each other and the popularity of such an ideology may
remain constant.^-^
A series of historical and statistical data show that these
propositions are likely to be accurate. They, however, stress the
reservation : ''other conditions being equal/' indicating by this that,
when they are unequal, other factors may mask, annul, and
disfigure the correlation, giving a fluctuation of the popularity of
such an ideology, or its contagiousness among the poor and the
rich which is different from the above. This means that the
correlation is imperfect, and that the fluctuation and
contagiousness of such an ideology depends not only upon the
economic, but on many other factors.
Such an imperfect correlation is likely to exist in regard to many
ideological phenomena, but scarcely in regard to all, and where it
is tangible, it is never perfect. Acceptance or non-acceptance of a
series of ideological values, such as the truths of mathematics
and natural sciences, physics, chemistry and so on, seem not to
show any tangible correlation with the economic conditions of the
poor and the rich. The rules of arithmetic are accepted by both
groups equally, and they are valid in the period of
impoverishment, as well as of prosperity. The same may be said
of many other scientific propositions. If, sometimes, some of
126 SoROKiN, "Famine and Ideology," Ekonomist, Russ., 1922,
No. 5, p. 6 See there the corroborations of these propositions.
587
them are opposed by some groups, and favored by other groups,
the factors responsible for such phenomena are usually
considerably different from economic ones. It is probable that,
besides such scientific values, there are other ideological values

(phenomena of music, art, literature, fashions, etc.), which, in their
contagiousness or fluctuation of success, are also ''neutral" in
regard to economic factors. But even those ideological values
which may not be ''neutral" do not often show any noticeable
correlation with the economic conditions; and if it exists, it is very
loose, as in the case of all great religions. Among the Christians,
the Buddhists, and the Confucianists, we find the poor and the
rich. These religions have existed in periods of impoverishment,
as well as of prosperity; under the system of primitive production
as well as of manufacturing and the machino-manufacturing
technique of production; and under slavery and serfdom, as well
as in the free capitalist-economic systems. The same is true in
regard to a great many other ideological (moral, literary, musical,
aesthetic, and what not) systems and values. On the other hand,
members of the same economic class living under the same
economic system, even in the same community, usually have
various and different ideologies. They often belong to different
religions, have different philosophies of life, aesthetic tastes or
moral convictions. They like different literature, different pictures,
and different music, and belong to different parties and
organizations. These obvious facts mean that even if there is a
correlation of these phenomena with economic conditions, it is
often intangible or very low.^'^
The task which sociologists now face in this field is to drop the
discussion of the general influence of economic factors on
ideologies, and to begin to study carefully the fields of ideology in
which an influence of a certain economic factor exists, how close
it is, and in what fields it is intangible. \\ hen such studies have
^27 Compare Sombart, op. cit., pp. 323 ff. M. Weber also says:
"AusserUch anliche okonomische Organisationsformen mit
verschieden Wirtschaftsethik verein-bar siyid und je nach deren
Eigenart dann sehr verschiedene historische Wirkungen zeitigen.
Rin Wirtschaftsethik ist keine einfache 'Function' wirtschaftlicher

organizations formen." Gesammelte Aufsdtze zur
Religionssoziologie, Vol. I., p. 238. "Cultural phenomena are
neither the result (Ausfluss) nor a mere function of economic
phenomena, as is claimed by the materialistic interpretation of
history." Weber, M., IVirtschaftsgeschichle, p. 16.
588
become numerous, we should have a series of more accurate
correlations, which would give a better insight into the problem.
Otherwise, we are doomed to go on teaching these indefinite and
doubtful generalities which may be, and may not be, true.
13. Economic Conditions, and Decay or Progress of a
Society
There are several theories which try to correlate the rise or decay
of a nation with various economic factors exclusively, or with their
pre-eminent influence. As the very conception of the decay or
ascendancy of a nation in these theories is vague, it is hard either
to prove or to disprove them. They slip between the fingers as the
ancient Proteus. Until their authors take care to define more
clearly what they mean by the terms "decay" or "ascendance,"
such theories may be discussed very briefly as something which
has not yet reached the maturity of scientific hypothesis. This
explains why my survey of the economic theories of decay will be
brief.
Since ancient times we have had a theory which teaches that
economic prosperity leads to corruption, demoralization,
effeminacy, and finally, to decay (Diodorus, Q. Metellus, Polybius,
Seneca, Machiavelli and others). Since ancient times, also, we
have had the statements that impoverishment and poverty breed

crimes, sickness, dissatisfaction, revolt, anarchy and decay. With
variations, these theories have been repeated many times and
are repeated now. It is evident that as a universal explanation
both of the theories are fallacious. We know some "decays" which
happened in the period of impoverishment,the Western Roman
Empire, for instance. The same Roman Empire, however, in its
earlier history passed several periods of impoverishment, and did
not decay. The majority of existing nations and empires,
especially China, have known several periods of the greatest
impoverishment, and have not decayed. This simple induction is
sufficient to show the fallacy of the theory of decay through
impoverishment. With some variation, the same may be said of
the theory of decay through prosperity and economic luxury.
Let us now pass to some more complicated theories, which try to
account for the phenomena of decay through the influence of
589
economic factors. As examples I may take Brook Adams', V.
Simkhovitch's, and partly, R. A. Freeman's theories. Brook
Adams' theories were given in his The Law of Civilization and
Decay, and in his The Nezv Empire. Generally speaking, B.
Adams gave not one, but a series of different and somewhat
contradictory theories. In one place he says that the
''preponderating" factor is a geographical one; ^"^ in another
place, the racial; in still another, the economic, or the
"redistribution of cosmiic energy." ^^'^ Nevertheless, the most
elaborated part of his theory of decay may be styled as an
''economic interpretation of decay." Its essence is as follows:
In an unavoidable struggle for life, men have striven to equip
themselves well for the combat, and, since the end of the Stone
Age, no nation has been able to do so without a supply of
relatively cheap metal. Thus the position of mines has influenced

the direction of travel.
This determined the places of market. Markets, with their tributary
territory, led to the organization of states and empires. Thus the
prosperity of a nation is dependent upon the markets, and the
ways to and from them. "\Mien trade-routes shift, markets move;
and the seat of empire is displaced." This, being followed by wars,
revolutions, and other upheavals, leads to a decay of the nation
from which the dominating markets have been shifted, and to the
ascendancy of a new nation, which now becomes the seat of
commercial centers, and wealth.^^*^ Such is the essence of the
theory. It is complicated by a further "sub-theory." The wellendowed races, according to Adams, do not spend their whole
energy in a daily struggle for life and store of their surplus in the
shape of wealth. By concjuest and economic competition, it is
transferred from community to community. As a result, in some
communities the surplus energy (wealth) becomes "accumulated
in such bulk as to preponderate over productive energ}\" Then
wealth becomes the controlling social force. This is manifested
through a shifting of the social domination from priests
'28 See Adams, B., The New Empire, p. iii, N. Y., 1902. ^"^^ See
Adams, B., The Law of Civilization and Decay, Preface, N. Y.,
1897. '3 See The New Empire, p]). 193-211, where Adams sums
up his theory better than in his The Law of Civilization.
590
and military men to commercial men; military and intellectuals
cease to reproduce themselves, and the dominant figures
become *'the usurer" and the ''peasant." Such a point reached,
sooner or later a decay of the society becomes inevitable.-^^^
It would be necessary to devote many pages to enumerating the

historical inaccuracies of the author.-^^^ Still more pages would
be needed to show that, even granting the validity of his theory, it
does not explain hundreds of the most important facts pertaining
to the phenomena of decay, and to the shifting of social
domination from country to country. This, however, it is not
necessary to do. In order to show the inadequacy of the theory, it
is enough to ask what the causes responsible for the shifting of
the trade-routes are, and, through that, the markets and the seat
of empire. B. Adams' theory does not answer the question. Next,
we may ask what the causes are which are responsible for the
assumed fact that some races are able to store their surplus
energy in the form of wealth, while some others cannot do it.
What factors are responsible for the fact that some nations,
through military conquest and competition, can encroach upon the
wealth of other nations and can change the trade-routes and
market-places and, through that, the seat of powerful empires? B.
Adams assumes this as something given. He does not even try to
analyze the problem. However, if it is possible, as he states, to
transfer the wealth and the trade-routes, through the superiority,
sagacity or military valor of a race, this practically means that race
and its hereditary and acquired traits determine the trade-routes
and markets, and the direction of wealth transference. In other
words, it is the racial factor which is predominant rather than that
of trade-routes and markets. This means, further, that for the
decay of a nation neither trade-routes nor the directions of shifting
wealth are decisive, (they, according to the author, may be altered
by a capable race) ; but race-factor, its training, its equipment,
and its natural sources, and so on, exercise this influence. In
brief, the theory turns against itself. Furthermore, there is no need
to say that, during the thousands
^3^ See The Law of Civilization and Decay, Preface and passim.
132 Part of them are indicated in Roosevelt, T., Administration,
Civil Service^ N. Y., 1900, Essay VIII; see also Kovalevsky, M.,
op. cit., pp. 299-302.
591
of years of existence of the trade-routes to China and India,
routes have changed many times; and yet these countries still
exist, and have not decayed. These indications are sufficient to
indicate the fallacy of the theory. A portion of truth there is in the
theory, but only a part.^^^
Let us now turn to an interesting theory of decay set forth by
several German authors and recapitulated again by Professor V.
Simkhovitch in his theory of Rome's fall.^^^
Properly speaking, this is not exactly the theory of the economic
interpretation of decay. It is rather a ''geographico-economic"
theory, because Simkhovitch's factor of decay, exhaustion of soil,
is a result of physico-chemical-cosmic forces on the one hand,
and on the other, of the economic exploitation of the soil. The
essence of the theory is simple and clear. It contends that neither
corruption, nor latifundia, nor wars, nor racial depletion, nor any
other factors were the primary factor in Rome's decay. Rather,
they all were secondary results of a deeper cause, the exhaustion
of Rome's soil. Its increasing sterility, carefully traced by the
author, determined the transition from a more intensive form of
agriculture in Rome to a less intensive one; from farms of small
size to larger ones; and to latifundia. The exhaustion of the soil
was the cause of the decay of agriculture, of the desertion of land
by farmers, of the transition of farmers into landless proletarians,
of the concentration of wealth, of the increasing economic
disorganization, of depopulation, of corruption, and, finally, of
decay. Summing up his theory, the author says:
All that this study shows is that the progressive exhaustion of the
soil was quite sufficient to doom Rome, as the lack of oxygen in
the air would doom the strongest living being. . . . His moral or
immoral character, his strength or his weakness, his genius or his
^33 Some of the details of Adams' theory are valuable; his
analysis of the negative side of the dictatorship of commercial
men (money-lenders and moneymakers) is true; his theory of
rhythm of the domination of priests, military men, and of the
money-makers (a theory which reminds us of Parcto's similar
one) grasps something im])ortant; even his analysis of the social
effects of the shifting of trade-routes, free from its exclusive
pretension, is likely to be accurate in many respects.
^^ Simkhovitch, V. G., "Rome's Fall Reconsidered," Political
Science Quarterly, June, 1916; see also his "Hay and History,"
ibid., Sept., 1913.
592
mental defects, would not affect the circumstances of his death.
He would have lived had he had oxygen; he died because he had
none. But it must be remembered that while the presence of
oxygen docs not explain his life, the absence of it is sufficient to
explain his death.135
This shows that the author's claim consists not in the simple
contention that, among the various factors of Rome's decay, the
progressive exhaustion of the soil has to be taken into
consideration ; but that this exhaustion was the deepest and quite
sufficient factor for causing the decay,the factor whose effects
could not be averted either by "Rome's moral or immoral
character," or by "its genius or mental defects," or by anything
else. This interpretation makes Simkhovitch's theory "monistic," or
a type of the above "one-sided theories of causation." Though the
very fact of the exhaustion of Rome's soil is denied by the most
prominent historians of Rome,^^^ we may grant that

Simkhovitch's factor played its part in the disintegration of Rome.
In spite of this admission, however, we must reject his claim for
"primacy" or "exclusiveness" for his cause. In the first place, i a
series of historical facts show that exhaustion of the soil does not
necessarily lead to decay. M. Ping-Hua Lee has shown that in
China, with its long history and overpopulation, exhaustion of the
soil has taken place many times, and yet China still exists. After
the periods of exhaustion, through the activity of her people, the
soil has been made fertile again, and the disastrous results of
permanent soil sterility were prevented.^^^ This shows that the
results of soil exhaustion are avoidable, and do not lead
necessarily to decay. In the second place, we know that the
process of a progressive sterility of soil can be stopped, if the
corresponding measures, particularly soil fertilization, are taken.
This means that in no way could it be regarded as something
unavoidable, and that "the genius, morals, strength, and other
qualities of the population" can affect it, and can prevent decay as
a result. This means that the exhaustion of the soil itself is not a
^^^ Ibid., p. 241.
^^^ See RosTOVTZEFF, M., The Social and Economic History of
the Roman Empire, p. 495, Chap. VIII.
1" See Lee, M. Ping-Hua, TJie Economic History of China,
Columbia Univ. Studies, Introduction and passim, N. Y., 1921.
593
cause independent of everything, but a resultant of many other
cosmic, as well as social, biological and mental forces. Its rapidity
and intensiveness are determined by the amount and the density
of the population, by climatic and cosmic influences, by the
agricultural technique of the population, by its genius or stupidity,
by peace or war, and so on. These obvious reasons do not permit
us to interpret it as an independent, primary, or sufficient cause of

decay. Furthermore, if the theory of the author wêre true, one
should wonder why existing nations have been able to live, and
why the territory of Rome continues to support vast aggregates of
population. Since the exhaustion of Roman soil has been
progressive and unavoidable, it should have continued,
consequently making the existence of social bodies there less
and less possible. If the exhaustion was stopped in some way, at
some period, this means that it was not imminent and
unavoidable. Many European countries have been overpopulated
many times, and many times have known famine and
starvation.^^'^ One may wonder why exhaustion of the soil did not
take ])lace in those countries; or, if it has taken place, why it did
not lead to their final decay. Finally, the parallel of the author with
the lack of oxygen, as an imminent cause of death, is still more
fal- ; lacious. It is true that the lack of oxygen may be a sufficient;
cause of death, but death may be caused also by lack of water, j
food, or shelter; and by poison, by infection, by bullet, and by
hundreds of other factors. Any of them may be a sufficient cause
of death. In a similar way, the cause of the decay of a social body
may be military extermination, death from starvation,
degeneration of the ])opulation, great and i)rolongcd anarchv,
great demoralization, depopulation, inundation, geological
catastrophe, and so on. The mere theoretical possibility of death
from one of these causes does not entitle us to take one of them
and to say: "This is the cause." We must ascertain which of the
hundred possible causes factually was present, and why it could
not have been averted or counterbalanced. Granting that in
Rome, Sim-khovitch's cause existed, it is still more certain that
other possible causes, such as war and the invasion of
barbarians, anarchy, racial transformation of the population,
demoralization, depopu-"" See CuRSCHMAN, F"., Ilungersnote in
Millrlalter, 1900, fMissiin.
594

lation, economic disorganization, and so on, were also present.
For this reason, any one following the logic of the author could
pretend, with the same right, that his factor was the cause. If we
ask why the sterility of the soil was not averted in Rome, we do
not find any answer by the author. If we add to this that Rome's
fall was the result of a concurrence of many factors,^^^ the
inadequacy of Simkhovitch's theory becomes clear.
Besides the uncertainty of the very fact of the exhaustion of soil in
Rome, the theory, as far as it claims exclusiveness and primacy
for its factor, is scarcely better than seventy-seven other exclusive
theories of Rome's fall. Generally speaking, it is improbable that
such a complex phenomenon as the decay of an empire could be
accounted for through any single factor, whatever it might be.^^*^
Any such theory is doomed to be fallacious, or, if the factor
chosen is too broad, it would also be too indefinite, and would
mean no more than the statement: *'A11 is the cause of all."
The study of the negative eflfects of ''mechanism" or ''machinotechnique of production" and especially of contemporary
machino-facturing on human beings and social life, offered by R.
Austin Freeman, is quite different. It does not take the studied
factor as a primary cause, but, contrariwise, it shows that
machino-facturing itself is something which has been created and
determined through other factors. The theory does not claim to
give a universal explanation of the phenomena of decay; neither
does it claim that the traced effects of ''mechanism" are
unavoidable. It simply takes the factor of mechanism or "machineindustry" as a given variable, and tries to trace its principal effects
on first, mechanism or machine-industry itself; second, on the
human environment; third, on man collectively; and fourth, on
man individually. This shows that Freeman's claims are moderate,
and his setting of the problem is appropriate. As his conclusions
sum up a great many negative effects of contemporary machinotechnique, and do it, it seems to me, rather accurately, they
deserve to be quoted as valuable sociological propositions. In
13^ See RoSTOVTZEFF, M., op. cit., passim, and Chaps. VIII-XII.
^^ Compare Ross, E., Principles of Sociology, 1923, Chap. XLIII.
595
an abbreviated form, in the words of the author they are as
follows:
I. The reactions of mechanism on itself are manifested in three
directions: (a) In a tendency of mechanism to beget further
mechanisms; (b) in a tendency of the power-generating machine
to beget power-consuming machines, machine tools, and
producing machines; (c) in a tendency of both types of machines
to evolve in the direction of increased automatism, with a
correlative elimination of the human factor.
II. A.On the natural environment of man, mechanism has
reacted (i) by producing a general deterioration of those regions
which have come under its influence; a destruction of natural
beauty and the creation of areas of devastation; (2) by the
creation of great industrial towns, adjusted to the needs of the
machine but unadjusted to those of the multitudes of human
beings who are compelled to live in them; (3) by inducing a
gigantic and wasteful consumption of the natural resources, both
capital and replaceable, whereby the available wealth of the world
is appreciably reduced and there is set up a condition relatively
unfavorable to posterity. The general tendency of these reactions
is to reduce the suitability of the world as a habitat for man, i. e.,
to transform a favorable environment into one less favorable.
B. On the secondary environment, reactions are manifested
[through the locomotive-mechanism] (i) in an apparent
contraction of space and a reduction of the effects of distance.

This tends to result in an increasing uniformity in the appearance
of places and in the suppression of local characteristics; and this
uniformity extends to natural products, which become available in
regions far distant from their place of origin. Facility of transport
tends to be accompanied l)y ever-increasing centralization of the
means of locomotion, by the loss of their control by individuals, by
insecurity of their possession, and by compulsion as to their use.
(2) Machine tends to supersede manual skill . . . and man, as the
agent of production; [leads to the centralization of manufacture,
with resulting extinction of small local industries; and to a
substitution of complex and costly means of production for simple
and inexpensive ones. In regard to the products of industry, the
effects of machine-mechanisms is an increase in the quantity of
produced commodities, with a decrease in their cost; a tendency
to deterioration of commodities in
596
quality of material, workmanship, durability, and beauty; reduction
of the adaptation of products to individual, or even to human,
needs; repetition, uniformity, and lack of interest and character in
commodities. Thus, in these respects, the reactions] in the main,
are unfavorable.
III. Reactions on man collectively, (a) the transformation of the
working class from a discrete body of skilled men of a relatively
high type, living under fairly good conditions and fairly satisfied
therewith, into a concrete body largely composed of
comparatively unskilled men of a relatively low type, living under
conditions which are incurably unfavorable, with which they are
dissatisfied;^*^ (b) as a consequence, the creation of a great
organizationthe federated trades unionswhose members
conceive their interests to be antagonistic to those of the rest of
the community, and whose political activities are of an anti-social

character; (c) the appearance of an international movement,
syndicalismof which the declared purpose is the destruction of
the existing order by revolutionary methods ; (d) transfer of the
initiative of production from individual craftsmen or small bodies of
skilled workers to a financial operatorthe manufacturer
controlling automatic machines and a large body of relatively
unskilled workmen; (e) the chronic disturbance of social order and
economic stability; (f) the formation of anti-social organizations
(combines, cartels, trusts, etc.), the purpose of which is to control
the supply and prices of commodities; (g) the accumulation by a
relatively small number of men of enormous wealth, and through
it, a great controlling power over men; (h) the transfer of large
portions of the population from the producing to the nonproducing class.
IV. Reactions on man individually, (a) the extinction of the
craftsman and his replacement by the machine and the factory
hand (by unskilled men), (b) The change of the character of the
individual; a lack of ''handiness" and self-helpfulness begets a
lack of self-reliance. He becomes willing and even anxious that
his personal activities and duties as a citizen shall be taken over
by the state, (c) A general decrease in pleasurable mental states,
consequent on the exchange of the pleasant, varied, and
interesting work of the craftsman for the disagreeable,
monotonous, and dull occupations of the factory hand; (d)
exchange of the relatively good and human condi1" Compare Patrick, G. T. W., The Psychology of Social
Reconstruction, Boston, 1920.
597
tions of life of a craftsman for the bad conditions of a factory hand,
with his dwelling in an industrial district, his time spent in a
factory, his loss of liberty, and his subjection to rigid discipline; (e)
lowering of the social status of the worker and loss of equality of

opportunity; (f) lowering of the sesthetic taste and standards and
substitution of aesthetic obtuseness and vulgarity of taste for fine
taste and perfect aesthetic arts; (g) loss of culture, resulting from
an individual's transference from the position of an executant to
that of a passive spectator or listener, (h) As a result of a growing
locomotive mechanism,social mobility,we have *'a loss of the
complete social adjustments which are possible in areas inhabited
by a stationary population." (i) Reduction of sustained,
concentrated effort; (j) reduction of leisure and increase in the
amount of time wasted in traveling; (k) evolution of the locomotive
man, or "hustler", and increase of restlessness and unpurposed
strenuousness; (1) diminution of the interest of travel, and lack of
curiosity respecting remote regions and their inhabitants.
Thus, taken as a whole, the reactions of mechanism have not
been favorable to man.^^^
I have made this long quotation from Freeman's book because, in
this dry summary, he, probably more fully than anybody else,
indicates the various effects of the machino-technique of
production contributing to a decay of society. Though the list of
the effects is somewhat one-sided because it does not mention
many beneficial influences of the studied factor, nevertheless its
enumeration of "the evils" of machino-industry seems to be
accurate, and therefore valuable. As machino-industry is regarded
as an economic factor, this is the reason why I have mentioned
Freeman's work in this section. This part of his book is an
example of the tentative correlation of the means and instruments
of production with the complex phenomena of social decay.
14. General Conclusions of the Economic School in
Sociology
(i) The above shows that the school is old. (2) The school is one
of the most important in social sciences. (3) Marx and
**2 Freeman, R, A., Social Decay and Regeneration, j)p. 199-203,
Boston, 1921; see the corroborations, pp. 80-203. Compare
Sorokin, Social Mobility, the last ]>art of the book.
598
Engels can in no way be regarded as the founders of the school,
and as the thinkers who contributed more than hundreds of other
investigators. (4) Studies of a great many investigators have
shown that so-called economic conditions are correlated with
various and numerous social phenomena. For this reason, in an
interpretation or an analysis of social phenomena, they cannot be
disregarded. (5) In many fields social science can now tell not
only whether the correlation of a certain social phenomenon with
a certain economic condition exists, but even the degree, or
coefficient of the correlation. (6) These coefficients show that
there is scarcely any social phenomenon which can be correlated
perfectly with the economic factor. Some of them are correlated
quite tangibly; others, only slightly, and some others do not show
any noticeable correlation. This means that in no way is it
possible to take the economic factor as the omnipotent, primary,
or the final cause, or even as the only '"starter," while all others
are ''only dependent" on it. (7) This conclusion becomes still more
valid if we take into consideration that social phenomena are
interdependent, but not one-sidedly dependent. For this reason
the non-self-sufficiency of the economic factor shown by the
character of the correlations becomes still greater if we take it by
itself as a "function," and show its dependency on other factors
taken in the above studies as "mere functions." This is done by
other sociological schools which are logically and factually entitled
to proceed in this way as much as the economic interpreters in
their way. (8) The above reasons require that the sterile and
fruitless debate as to which factors are primary and secondary,
which the "starters" and the "started," which the cause and the
efYects, which the more and the less important, and so on, be
ended. (9) The above shows also that, at the present moment, the
task of sociologists in this field consists, not in a production of
vague and ambiguous and speculative generalizations, and not in
a "metaphysical brooding" on a somewhat indefinite economic
factor generally, and not in the creation of sensational though
one-sided all-explaining hypotheses ; but in a factual, inductive,
careful, and quantitative study of the existence or non-existence
of a tangible correlation between a certain well-defined economic
condition, and a certain and well599
defined social phenomenon; and, if the correlation exists, in the
study of its degree, universality, character, and variations. Every
study of this kind is likely to contribute more to the science of
sociology than any sweeping and speculative generalization.
When such studies accumulate in a sufficient amount, this, and
only this, will permit us to climb from narrower conclusions to
broader generalizations. (lo) The above shows that contemporary
sociology is already drifting that way.
600
CHAPTER XI THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SCHOOL
It has been mentioned before that the boundary hne between the
Psychological and the Sociologistic schools is pretty indefinite. Tt
reminds one of the difference between the Republican and the
Democratic parties in America. Each of them is republican and
democratic, but at the same time there are some indefinite
differences which lead to the independent existence of these
parties. In a similar way the Sociologistic school is essentially
psychological, and the Psychological school is essentially

sociologistic. Nevertheless, there are some differences which
have caused the independent existence of both streams of
sociological thought during the last few decades. Of these
differences the most tangible has been a methodological one. The
Sociologistic school tries to explain psychical phenomena through
social conditions. It makes them a derivative of the transindividual
processes of interaction and societal circumstances. The
Psychological school, on the contrary, starts with the psychical
characteristics of an individual, takes them as variables, and tries
to interpret social phenomena as their derivative or manifestation.
The difference is put here in a somewhat schematical form, and
many sociologists occupy a position intermediary between these
poles; nevertheless, the difference has existed, and the
subsequent paragraphs will show this clearly.
I. PREDECESSORS AND PRINCIPAL BRANCHES OF THE
SCHOOL
The majority of the predecessors of the various branches of the
sociologistic school may be practically regarded as sharers of the
psychological interpretation of social phenomena. That the human
mind, soul, spirit, desires, wishes, instincts, or other psychical
characteristics of man ''count" in conditioning social events; and
that they are the most important agencies of human behavior and
social processes, was stressed in the most ancient
601
thought. Primitive ''animism," which views the bodily movement of
man and all the changes in nature as a mere manifestation of
various spiritual or psycho-magical agencies, is perhaps the most
conspicuous form of the primitive psychological interpretation of
the dynamics of the universe and human history.
Action springs from the mind.
Mind is the instigator . . . even to that action which is connected

with the body.
The universe rests on the Self; for the Self produces the
connection of these embodied spirits with actions.^
Beyond the senses there are the objects, beyond the objects
there is the mind, beyond the mind there is the intellect, the great
Self is beyond the intellect. . . . He who has perceived that [Self]
which is without sound, without touch, without form, without
decay, without taste, eternal, without smell, without beginning,
without end, beyond the Great, and unchangeable, is freed from
the jaws of death. [Such a man, being the] **Lord of the past and
the future, henceforward fears no more. This is that." All that we are is the result of what we have thought; it is founded
on our thought, it is made up of our thought.
A well directed mind will do us great service.
Thoughtlessness is the path of death.^
These brief quotations from the ancient Hindu, Buddhist, and
Chinese sources well illustrate my statement. The Confu-cianist
and the Taoist philosophy, Plato, Aristotle, Zeno, Epicte-tus,
Polybius, and other Stoics,*^ the Church Fathers, and the majority
of the mediaeval thinkers stressed the same idea in various ways,
partly in the form of ethical and religious teaching, and partly in
the form of various philosophical and psychological theories, but
principally in the form of the applied arts of the re-education of
human beings successfully practiced in the monas^ Laws of Mann, XII, pp. 3-4, 119.
2 "The Uiânishads," Part II, third Valli, 10-15; fourth Valli, passim;
Sacred Books of the East, Vol. XV.
^ The Dhammapada, Chap. I, p. i, Chap. Ill and passim, The

Colonial Press. Compare The Texts of Taoism, The Classic of
Purity, Chap. I; The Thdi-Shang, passim; Tao-Teh-King, passim;
Sacred Books of the East, Vol. XL.
^ Stoicism, with its motto: "Dig within," and "The aids to noble life
are all within," in "our own will and the formation of our judgments
and opinions" occupies a position similar to that of Brahmanism,
Buddhism, and Taoism.
602
teries and similar institutions.^ This branch of psychology is now
represented by various "introspective," ''purposive," or "structural"
psychologies.
Side by side with this "introspective" psychological interpretation
of human behavior, the past also knew the mechanistic, or
behavioristic, psychological interpretation of human conduct and
psycho-social phenomena. Democritus and Titus Lucretius Carus,
with their purely materialistic and mechanistic theory of psychical
phenomena, show this. This stream of interpretation has been
going on throughout the subsequent history of social thought.^ As
we have seen, in the seventeenth century it manifested itself as
the mechanistic psychology of the thinkers of that period. (See the
chapter about the mechanistic school.) In the eighteenth century it
was recapitulated by such "materialist philosophers" as Condillack
or La Mettrie; and in the nineteenth century by Huxley, H.
Spencer, and many others. Now it assumes the forms of various
factions of the behaviorist school in psychology. In brief, the
patterns of all the contemporary schools in psychology were given
long ago, as also were set forth the corresponding interpretations
of human actions and social phenomena from the standpoint of
each specific variety of psychological theory."^ At the present
moment we still have no generally accepted psychology, but

various psychologies almost as numerous as are the
psychologists themselves.^
^ A more attentive study of these measures and the
corresponding ascetic technique of the re-education of individuals
practiced therein is quite necessary from the standpoint of the
theory of social control, and the practical art of education. We
must recognize that in practical ways these educatiors knew
rather more than we know about these problems. According to my
suggestion, one of my students, Mr. Timofeevsky, has found fortyfour different methods of modifications of human conduct
practiced in mediaeval monastic and ascetic orders. All these
methods were very efficient and must be recognized as quite
appropriate from the standpoint of modern science. The reading
of such books as Ignatius Loyola's Spiritual Exercises clearly
shows the deep insight of their authors into the mechanism of
human conduct and an ingenuity in the invention of efficient
methods for its modification in a desirable direction. It is
unnecessary to add that this technique was "psychological" in its
essence, and was based on the change of human psychology
and mind.
^ See Lange, Fr. A., Geschichte des Materialismus, 2 vols., 3d
ed., 1877.
^ See some fragmentary data in Barnes, H. E., New History and
Social Studies, Chap. Ill; Davis, M. M., Psychological
Interpretations of Society, passim.
^ An idea of this is given by the volume: Psychologies of 1925,
Clark University, 1926, where there are represented at least six
various psychologies which are as
603
Leaving their mutual dispute to the psychologists themselves, of

these numerous psychologies we shall take only those which
have really attempted to interpret social phenomena from the
standpoint of their leading principles. This leaves us the following
principal branches of psychological sociology: First, the
instinctivist; second, the behavionst interpretations; and third, the
introspectivist interpretations in terms of desires, ideas, beliefs,
conations, interests, wishes, sentiments, and other psychical
experiences. If to our analysis of these fundamental branches of
the psychological school we add a survey of the theories of the
social role of religion, mores, public opinion, law, and other
psycho-social or cultural factors, our knowledge of the present
situation of the school may be sufficient. Adding to this a survey of
the quantitative and experimental studies of various psycho-social
phenomenathe studies which occupy a position intermediary
between the sociologistic and the psychological schoolswe
shall obtain a still more adequate idea of today's stand of
sociology in this field.
We will now turn to a concise analysis of the instinctivist branch of
the psychological (and, partly, the biological) school.
2. INSTINCTIVIST INTERPRETATIONS
It is not my intention to enter here into a controversy over the
conception of instinct, or instinct classifications, or other phases of
the problem so vividly and somewhat fruitlessly discussed now.^
One thing is clear, that even the most extreme
different from one another as the most different sociological
schools of the present moment.
9 See Pavlov, I., Twenty Years oj Experimental Study of the
Highest Nervous Activity of Animals (in Russian), Petrograd,
1923; Thorndike, E. L., The Original Nature of Man, N. Y., 1913;
McDougall, William, An Introduction to Social Psychology, Boston,
1923; "Can Sociology and vSocial Psychology Dispense with

Instincts?" American Journal of Sociology, Vol. XXIX, pp. 657670; Petra-jiTZKY, Leo, Introduction of the Theory of Law and
Morals (in Russian), 1907; Wagner, W., Biological Foundation of
Comparative Psychology, (in Russian), Vol. II; Paris, E., "Are
Instincts Data or Hypotheses?" American Journal of Sociology,
Vol. XXVII, pp. 184-196; Dunlap, K., "Are There any Instincts?"
Journal of American Psychology, Vol. XIV, pp. 307-311; Allport, F.
L., Social Psychology, Cha]). Ill; Froloff, J. P., "The Problem of
Instincts from the Standpoint of the Physiology of the Conditioned
Responses," (in Russian), Isvestia Voenno-Medizin. Akademii,
1913, Vol. XXVI; Tolman, E. Chase, "The Nature of the
Fundamental Drives," Journal of Abnormal and Social
604
opponents of instincts cannot give them up entirely either in
psychology or sociology. On the other hand, the discussion has
shown that the term has been considerably misused and now
requires a great deal of care in utilizing it.^^ Putting aside this
general discussion, which lies practically outside of sociology, and
leaving the general sketches of ''instinctive" sociology, which
because of their generality cannot show to what extent they are
plausible, let us take the monographic "instinctive interpretations"
of social phenomena, and find to what extent they are
scientifically fruitful. Instead of the mere plan of interpretation
offered by general theories, monographic works try to interpret
social phenomena in fact; therefore, they are much more
symptomatic of the pluses and minuses of this branch. The
monographic works of this type are already numerous. As
representative samples I shall take, first, a series of monographs
devoted to a study of the social functions of the gregarious, herd,
or
Psychology, 1925-26, pp. 349-358; Baldwin, J. Mark, The

Individual and Society, Boston, 1911; Larguier des Bancels, J.,
Introduction a la psychologic; Vinstinct et Vemotion, Paris, 1921;
Freud, Sigmund, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego,
translated by J. Strachey; Koffka, Kurt, The Growth of the Mind,
pp. 84-114, N. Y., 1924; Bernard, L. L., Instinct, N. Y., 1924;
Ellwood, C. A., The Psychology of Human Society, Chap. IX, N.
Y., 1925; Ross, E. A., Principles of Sociology, Chap. IV; Eldridge,
S., "Instinct, Habit and IntelHgence in Social Life," Journal of
Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology, Vol. XIX, pp. 142154; JosEY, C. C, The Social Philosophy of Instinct, N. Y., 1922;
Wood-worth, R. S., Dynamic Psychology, Chaps. III-V; Wells, W.
R., "The Anti-Instinct Fallacy," Psychological Review, Vol. XXX,
pp. 228-234; Watson, J. B., "What the Nursery Has to Say about
Instincts," Pedagogical Seminary, Vol. XXXII, pp. 293-326. See
other Hterature in these works and see the works quoted further.
1 The majority of the functional, structural, and the Gestalt
psychologists recognize their existence. The same is true of the
dynamic psychology of the type of R. S. Woodworth, and of the
biological psychologies of the type of W. Wagner. Of the
behaviorist psychologies, the Russian school of Pavlov
recognizes a great many instincts, identifying them with the
unconditioned reflexes. The behaviorists of the type of F. Allport
operate with the prepotent reflexes and drives whose difference
from the instincts is practically intangible. The same is true of
other moderate behaviorists. The behaviorists of the type of R. B.
Perry and E. C. Tolman are expHcit instinctivists. Finally, the
behaviorists of the type of John Watson emphatically deny the
instincts, but through their admission that a difference in structure
leads to a difference in forms of behavior, and through their
recognition of a series of the unconditioned reflexes, among
which we find "love behavior," "fear reflexes," "rage behavior,"
"defensive movements," "vocal responses" and so on, they
practically reintroduce them also. Some other "anti-instinctivists"
do the same under the name of the "physiological needs" or

'drives" or "impulses." In brief, there are very few, if any,
psychologists or biologists who really do not use (explicitly or
imphcitly) something like instincts.
605
social instincts; second, a series of monographs dealing with the
social functions of the sex instinct; and, third, the studies devoted
to the sociology of the pugnacious or fighting instinct, the parental
instinct, and of other instincts such as ''workmanship," ''freedom,"
"collectioneering," and so on. A concise analysis of two or three
groups of these works is enough to show the strong and the weak
points of all "instinctive sociologies."
A. Social Functions of the Sex Instinct and Sex Difference.
Take, in the first place, the sex instinct and sex difference as
factors of human hehavior and social processes. At the present
moment we have several monographic studies which take these
biological factors as variables and try to indicate their "functions"
in the field of social phenomena. Let us see how they work, and
what results they yield.
Take first S. Freud's school, which gives such an exclusive
importance to the libido and sex. The principal sociological
correlations of this factor with other social phenomena, as claimed
by the school, are as follows: First, the very fact of social life and
the appearance of human society are due to libido or eros in the
sense given to these terms by the Freudian school. Second, the
tie which binds human individuals into a social group is the
libidinal tie. Third, large human societies are due to the specific
variety of the sex impulse of man to man (but not to woman).
Fourth, in any attachment of followers to the leader, of the
members of a society to one another, the same libido operates.
Fifth, the phenomena of crowd, suggestion, imitation, and so on,
are but libido manifestations. Sixth, a series of other phenomena
like totemism, religion, taboo, and so on, are again but various
manifestations of the same factor. A few quotations will illustrate
the above. "Love relationships constitute the essence of the group
mind. . . . Libidinal ties are what characterize a group." ^^
Suggestion is only a screen for libido. Herd instinct is another
name for libido.^^ These ideas of Freud were developed more
extensively by Hans Bliiher. In his work he tries to show that the
force which attracts man to man and leads to his living together,
and to the creation of large social bodies,
" Freud, S., Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, pp.
2>7, 40, 54 80 88,92.
'- Ihui., pp. 85, 89, and passim. See also Freud, Totem and
Taboo, N. Y., io'8
606
is neither economic necessity, nor self-protection, nor any other
factor, but sexuaHty or Hbido in its particular form of the
gravitation of male to male. Bliiher especially strongly stresses the
idea that if small family groups have appeared through the
operation of male-female libido relationship, large societies are
due, by their existence, only to male to male libido relationship,
and are possible only where male-female libido relationship is
either weakened or destroyed; ^^ because the male and female
''coming together for the purpose of sexual satisfaction, in so far
as they seek for solitude, are making a demonstration against the
herd instinct, and the group feeling. The more they are in love, the
more completely they suffice for each other." In this way group
solidarity and sex love between male and female are in
antagonism, and where one is strong the latter cannot develop
the former. Therefore "it seems certain that homosexual love is
far more compatible with group ties." ^^
It is scarcely necessary to go into other details of Freud's

constructions. The above shows that this popular theory is utterly
inadequate. One may only wonder at such unscientific
constructions finding the relatively numerous supporters that they
did. Indeed, take in the first place the Freudian conception of
libido, or eros, or sexuality itself. Here it is:
We call by libido the energy of those instincts which have to do
with all that may be comprised under the word "love." The nucleus
of what we mean by love consists in sexual love with sexual union
as its aim. But we do not separate from this, on the one hand,
self-love, and on the other, love for parents and children,
friendship, and love for humanity in general, and also devotion to
concrete objects and to abstract ideas.^^
1^ Bluher, Hans, Die Rolle der Erotik in der mdnnlichen
Gesellschaft, Vol. I, pp. 4, 6, 37, 190, Jena, 1921; Vol. II, pp. 2-8
and passim, Jena, 1920. Here is Bliiher's own summary of the
hypothesis: All social relations being a modification of sexuality,
"So ist auch klargelegt, dass das, was letzten Endes und
zwingend den Mann zum Manne drdngt, genau dasseibe ist, ivie
das, was ihn zum Weibe treibt: seine Sexualitdt. Liegt die
mannweibliche offen und unverleugnet da, so ist diese durch ein
vielgestaltiges System psychischer Mechanismen verschiittert
und zersprengt. Aber sie ist, und ware sie nicht, so fiele noch am
morgigen Tage der Menschenstaat auseinander." Ibid., Vol. I, p.
190.
"Freud, S., Group Psychology, pp. 121-123.
1^ Freud, S., Ibid., pp. 37, 65, 77, 85, 93, and passim; "Zur
Sexuellen Aufklarung der Kinder," Soziale Medizin und Hygiene
Bd. II, 1907.
607
Further, we read that the herd instinct is also the sexual instinct;
that suggestion, self-preservation, like-mindedness, the hypnotic
state, and many other phenomena are also libido or love.^^
The definition shows that the Freudian libido, love, or sexuality is
a bag filled with everything, beginning with sexuality in a narrow
sense and ending with hypnotism, sociality, idealism, parental
love, friendship, self-protection, and what not. It is as broad as the
conception of life itself. Shall we wonder therefore that the school
regards the whole activity of man as a sex activity; man himself,
beginning with a baby, as a mere sex-machinery; and social
phenomena, beginning with a society itself and ending with
religion, magic, law, arts, and sciences, as a manifold
manifestation of the sex-factor? This procedure is identical to that
of the ancient philosophers who. like Thales, viewed the whole
universe as a manifestation of water. From a metaphysical
standpoint such a philosophy may be all right, but from a scientific
standpoint it is fruitless because it is tautological. The above libido
conception and theory give us no more than the statement: 'The
life-activities of man and society are the function and
manifestation of the life factor," because the Freudian libido is
identical to the conception of life. Such a statement may be true,
but unfortunately it is meaningless. Furthermore, the theory
transgresses the fundamental logical law of identity. ''To explain
all behavior by one formula is to explain nothing," properly say R.
Park and E. Burgess.^^ To the term of "libido" it gives quite
different meanings,sometimes quite narrow, sometimes
unlimitedly broad. As a result, neither the authors nor the readers
know what they are dealing with, and talking about. Under such
circumstances it is impossible to establish any clear correlation,
any causal relation, or any definite relationship between the
phenomena. We do not know what we are trying to correlate with
what, and we wander in the forest of undefined phenomena and
shadows of phenomena. If we are lost, as factually the Freudian
theorizers are, this is only natural. In brief, the theory is utterly

inadequate and unsatisfactory. It
'^ vStill more indefinite is Bluher's (lefinition of Sexualitdt. See
Bluher, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 15-16, 37.
'^ Park and Bi'rgkss, op. cit., p. 497.
608
is hard to admit that it has contributed anything to our
understanding of social phenomena, or the relationship between
the sex factor, and other categories of social facts.^^ So much for
this group.
The next group of works in this field is represented by Have-lock
Ellis' Studies in the Psychology of Sex (six volumes), W. I.
Thomas' Sex and Society, E. Westermarck's History of Human
Marriage, and by chapter X of W. McDougall's Introduction to
Social Psychology. The first three works are sociological only in
part. Their bulk consists either in treating the physiology and
psychology of sex, or in a purely descriptive analysis of the
historical development of sex, marriage, and family phenomena. If
we squeeze the principal sociological statements from these
works, we shall receive the following propositions:
1. The reproductive instinct is ''one of the strongest of the
instincts." ^^
2. Its psychological accompaniment is ''sexual jealousy and
female coyness." ^^
3. It is responsible for the reproduction of human beings and for
the gravitation and love behavior of the sexes.
4. The organic differences between the sexes are responsible for

a series of social phenomena. For instance, "the earliest
groupings of population were about the females rather than the
18 This naturally does not concern the contributions of the
Freudian school in the field of psychology. But even there, it
seems to me, the importance of the school has been greatly
exaggerated. See Psychological Review, Vol. XXXI, May, devoted
to Contributions of Freudism to Psychology, especially the paper
of Lashley, K. S., "Physiological Analysis of the Libido." See also
W. McDougall's paper in Problems of Personality, N. Y., 1925.
The most valuable part of the Freudian contribution is its method
in the treatment of psychoses, and its hypotheses of repression,
displacement, projection, sublimation, compensation, and
rationalization of desires. But again all this in no way is a
discovery of the Freudian school. For instance, the Freudian
method of treatment of psychoses was practiced thousands of
years before Freud on the largest scale, in the form of confession
practiced in many religions. Both methods are essentially
identical. This, by the way, shows that many religious practices,
which often are styled superstitions, in fact have a very serious
reason for their existence and perform the most important
functions. An even superficial study of the technique of social
control practiced in the old and the mediaeval religious orders
shows that other mentioned principles of the Freudian school
were well known to them, and successfully practiced.
" McDouGALL, W., op. cit., pp. 272 ff.
609
males." ^^ 'The movement towards exogamy doubtless [! ]
originates in the restlessness of the male," "^ while the organic
differences of the sexes have called forth the occupational
differences of the sexes, and division of groups into male and
female social classes.^^ "Marriage by capture is an immediate
expression of male forces." ^^ The sex impulse is one of the

principal forces "in the development of the ideal, moral, and
aesthetic sides of life."^^ Sex attraction is one of the principal
sources of family and marriage."^ Sex finds its expression in
poetry, religion, lav^, and so on.^^
These statements are a few among the many given in the quoted
and similar works. The majority of such statements appear to be
valid, yet one who was seeking for somewhat more accurate and
more important correlations in this field would remain unsatisfied
wîth the above and similar statements. We may agree that
marriage and family are a result of the sex instinct, but does such
an admission explain the infinitely numerous variations in the
forms of these institutions in space and time? If the instinct is
something constant, the variations cannot be accounted for
through it. If, in its intensity and forms, the instinct varies from
man to man, and from period to period, then these studies must
show this and must show a correlation of the variation of this
instinct with that of other phenomena. Unfortunately, as yet such
a study has not been made in a really systematic way. We may
grant that ''the movement tow'ard exogamy doubtless [! ]
originates in the restlessness of the male." If it be so, and if the
restlessness of the male is an innate trait, then how can wê
explain the phenomena of endogamy or the disappearance of
exogamy? If the restlessness varies in time, may it not be an
acquired trait erroneously taken for an
2' Thomas, William I., Sex and Society, 7th ed., p. 55; Ellis,
Havelock, Man and Woman, Chap. I, N. Y., 1904. 22 Thomas,
ibid., pp. 57, 196 ff. ^^ Ibid., pp. 51, 61, 67. 2* Ibid., p. 80.
26 Thomas, ibid., pp. 119-120; McDougall, ibid., Chap. X.
2 McDouGALL, ibid.. Chap. X; Ellwood, Charles A., The
Psychology of Human Society, pp. 288-290.
27 See Howard, Clifford, Sex Worship, Chicago, 1917; papers of

Albert Moll, G. BiLshan, and S. Ribbing, in Ilandbtich der
Sexiiahvissenschaften, herausgegeben von A. Moll, Leipzig,
1921.
610
innate one? Evidently endogamy, monogamy, and marriage by
mutual agreement cannot be accounted for through the premise
of restlessness of the male, and we are forced to conclude that
either the premise itself is inaccurate, or that the theory is
insufficient to explain the basic phenomena in the field. The same
is true about ''marriage by capture as an immediate expression of
male forces," and other similar statements. If these "male forces"
are responsible for it, then why has such marriage disappeared?
We may grant again that the phallus cult in religion is a
manifestation of the same instinct, but again, why is it not found in
all religions, and why does it vary in its forms? If the sex instinct is
one of the most powerful, then how explain the facts of absolute
sexual asceticism, or sexual modesty?
These allusions show the weak points of the discussed theories.
They cannot account for the infinitely rich variation of the
phenomena. They claim many correlations which have not been
proved. They do not show exactly what actions are a specific
manifestation of the sex impulse, and which are acquired or
originated from other instincts. They do not discriminate clearly
between the permanent and direct manifestations of the instinct,
and its indirect and varying effects. The theories cannot account
for the greater part of the variations either in the methods of
copulation, or in the forms of love-conduct, courtship, marriage, or
family, not to mention other fields. For instance, the instinct theory
does not explain why among some people monogamy is the form
of marriage, while among other peoples it is polygamy. Why is
homosexual love permitted in some societies, while in others it is

punished? Why is asceticism or divorce high in some periods and
low in others? Why does the sexual tie increase sympathy
between male and female in some cases, while in others it leads
to an increase of hatred? Why are jealousy and female coyness
found in some cases, while they do not exist in others? Why does
the birth rate fluctuate in time and space? In brief, the existing
instinct theories do not account for the most Important
phenomena in the field. If they want to justify their pretensions,
they must explain all these phenomena in a thorough way.
Otherwise they have formed a mere hypothesis, which may have
a part of the truth, but how
611
large this part really is neither the authors of the discussed
theories nor their critics know as yet.^^ The field is extremely
interesting and important; and yet, from a purely sociological
standpoint, it has been cultivated but little.
B. Social Effects of the Parental Instinct. All that is included in
this term represents in fact a bunch of various reflexes or instincts
mixed with a great many acquired reactions. Granting, however,
that the parental instinct exists as a bunch of the simpler reflexes,
let us ask what are its effects in human behavior and social life.
The answer is as follows: ''The parental instinct is the foundation
of family." 'Tt impels to actions of self-sacrifice"; to exertions in
favor of children, to marriage ceremonies, and formal laws
concerning the family. It is ''the source of all tender emotions and
truly benevolent impulses"; it is the great spring of moral
indignation and "enters in some degree into every sentiment that
can properly be called love." To it is due the charity of such
religions as Buddhism or Christianity. "No teaching and no system
of social or religious sanctions could induce benevolence in any
people if their minds were wholly lacking in this instinct." ^'^ I will
not continue the list of the effects of the instinct in human

behavior and social life.
If the above effects are really the manifestations of the parental
instinct, then how can we explain the facts of the killing, tortur^ It is possible to hope that the recent studies of the nervous
mechanism of sex-reactions will help to promote our knowledge of
the sociological effects of the sex-reflexes. I mean in the first
place an application of the theory of the conditioned and the
unconditioned reflexes in this field, the study of "the sex-center of
the nervous system," the conditioned and unconditioned
stimulation, including the stimulation through the hormones, and
so on. On the other hand, the study of sex-differences is entering
into a more careful stage of experimental investigation. Besides
the studies in purely physiological differences in metabolism and
anatomy of the sexes, we already have several experimental
studies in their mental differences. A continuation of these
researches promises to be very helpful for the sociology of the
sex instinct which, as yet, remains unwritten. See some data
about the mental differences in the works: Paterson, D. G., and
Langlie, T. a., "The Influence of Sex on Scholarship Ratings,"
Educational Administration and Supervision, September, 1926,
(see there other references); Starch, D., Educational Psychology,
pp. 68 ff., N. Y., 1919; Jastrow, J., The Psychology of Conviction;
Thompson, H. B., Psychological Norms in Men and Women;
Thorndike, E. L., Educational Psychology.
29 McDouGALL, W., op. cit.. Chap. X. Compare Sutherland, A.,
The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct, 2 Vols., London,
1898; Wagner, W., op. cit.. Vol. II; Westermarck, E., The Origin
and Development of the Moral Ideas, Vol. I, Chaps. XVII and
XXV.
612

ing, and persecuting of children by parents, facts which are pretty
common among many prehterate groups,^^ and in a milder form
in modern society? If such an instinct exists, why do thousands of
parents avoid having children in present society? Why are there
so many careless parents? If the parental instinct is an instinct,
such facts could not have taken place, because the instinct would
have made them impossible. If they happen, it is certain then that
either such an instinct does not exist, or that it is destroyed or
repressed through some other agencies. The last explanation is
usually given. But in this case, in order that the theory may be
clear, it is necessary to indicate when, under what conditions, and
with what means the instinct is repressed. Are the facts of its
repression in some cases and its existence in others due to a
different intensity of the instinct among various individuals and
groups or is it constant, and are the above facts due to the
difference in the pressure of various agencies of repression?
Unfortunately, the authors do not give anything but l)urely
dogmatic statements in this field. As a result, a great many
contentions become highly hypothetical, while manipulations with
the instinct become highly questionable. Here is an illustration of
this : ^^
The Effects of the Parental Instinct
1. It is "the source of all be- i. Savage, ''a tender father nevolent
impulses" not only may behave in an utterly brutal within but
outside the family, manner to all human beings
other than the members of his tribe."
2. Sacrifice for the family. 2. Infanticide.
3. "No teaching and no sys- 3. "The great extension of tem of
social or religious sane- benevolent action in the civi-tions could
induce benevolence lization of ours is not neces-in any people if

their minds sarily due to an increase in the were wholly lacking in
this in- innate strength of this instinct." stinct." (This means that a
30 See Carr-Saunders, op. cit., passim.
613
great increase of benevolence is possible without an increase of
the instinctthe judgment contradicting that on the left.) Without
the support of religious and social sanctions the instinct fails and
leads to infanticide.
The table shows that to the same instinct are ascribed the
opposite effects. This means that A* and non-A are regarded as
the effects of the same factora logical operation of highly
questionable validity. With such operations the theories of this, as
well as other instincts, are full. In one place is ascribed to the
instinct one effect, in another place, without any sufficient
explanation, the opposite one. These indications show how
unsatisfactorily the problem is studied, and how great are the
shortcomings of the discussed theory of the sex and the parental
instincts. What we now have does not go any further than to give
general, half-true and half-wrong sketches, which in no way could
be regarded as something accurate and exhaustive in a scientific
respect.
C. Social Effects of the Gregarious or Herd Instinct. With still
greater reason the above may be said of the gregarious or the
herd instinct. Without entering into a discussion as to whether
such an instinct exists or not, we need only to look attentively at
the functions ascribed to the instinct by various, and even by the
same, authors to see how little has been the study made in this
field. Here is a brief list of these functions taken from only two
books. To it are due by its existence the social phenomena of
cooperation, recreation, growth of cities, attraction of the migrants
to the cities, parades, crowds on the streets, and consciousness

of kind.'*^" Social life of man, suggestion-imitation, altruism,
intolerance, fear of solitude, sensitiveness to the voice of the
herd, standardization of mores, the passion of the pack in mob
violence, the passion of the herd in panics, suscep" McDouGALL, W.. op. fit., Chaix XII.
614
tibility to leadership, and striving for popularity, are also similarly
explained.^^
If all these phenomena are really a manifestation of the same
instinct, then this is excellent evidence that there is no such
instinct, because an instinct with such divergent manifestations is
not an instinct at all. If such an instinct exists, then many of these
''manifestations" are wrongly ascribed to it. Whichever of these
inferences we take, both indicate a great deficiency in the
theories. It is easy to see that some phenomena are quite wrongly
correlated with the instinct. For instance it is rather fallacious to
explain through it the phenomena of the growth of cities. If such a
theory were right, we must conclude that those who do not go to
the city are devoid of the instinct, and that in the past when there
were no big cities the population seems not to have had such an
instinct. This inference leads further to the conclusion that the
instinct appeared recently, and that it has been acquired, which
means that it is not an instinct at all, because an acquired instinct
is a self-contradictory conception. If the phenomenon of
leadership were a manifestation of the instinct of the herd, then
numerous phenomena of anarchy, and a lack of obedience to any
leader, must be interpreted as a manifestation of the instinct of
''independence" denied by Dr. Trotter. If the fear of solitude is a
manifestation of the herd instinct, then evidently the ascetics, the
hermits, and all those who run away from the crowd either do not
have Trotter's instinct or do have "an instinct of solitude," denied
by him. If suggestibility and imitation are a manifestation of the
herd instinct, then evidently there exists "an instinct of originality
and stubbornness," because almost every man is susceptible to
suggestion in some respects and quite insusceptible in some
other respects. I will not continue my criticism. The above is rather
enough to show how highly speculative are these theories, and
how fragile they become after a slight criticism.
D. Other Instincts. Similar shortcomings of the theories of the
fighting or pugnacious instinct were indicated above in the chapter
devoted to the theories of the struggle for existence.
2' Trotter, W., Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War, pp. 17,
112-120, and passim.
615
With still greater reason all the above objections may be applied
to a great many other instinctive interpretations of social
phenomena, such as the "instinct of fear," ''curiosity," ''religion,"
"freedom," "acquisition," "construction," "affection," "property,"
"workmanship," and so on.^*^ For the sake of brevity I shall omit
their analysis and criticism. It is enough to say that the
corresponding theories are much more defective than the above
ones.
E. General Conclusion about the Instinctivist Interpretations. To
the above shortcomings of the discussed theories it is necessary
to add one more, namely, their "animistic" character. The primitive
animistic interpretation of any given phenomena consists in
viewing them as the results of the activity of mysterious spirits
hidden within. A thunderstorm is a "manifestation" of the activity of
Zeus; death, the result of a spirit's departing from the body; birth,
of a spirit's entering into a female, and so forth. The instinctivist
theories are but a refined form of the same animistic

interpretation. Behind a man and his activities they place a certain
number of spirits styled instincts, and interpret all the phenomena
as a manifestation of the instinct-spirits. Sexual activity is
regarded as a manifestation of the sex impulse; the relationship
between parents and children is accounted for through the
mysterious activity of the parental instincts; war, through the
fighting instinct; peace, through the peace instinct, and so on. The
essence of the interpretation consists in the following operation :
man is taken and, according to the whims of an instinctivist, is
filled with a certain number of instinct-spirits. Some investigators
put into man only three or four instinctive agents; others pack him
with some one hundred and fifty instinctive agencies. Having
done this "filling," they take a certain activity of man, for instance
fighting, and explain that all "fighting activity is a manifestation of
the fighting instinct." You want to explain crowd behavior? Take
the herd instinct, and the ex3^ Sec, for instance, Veblen, Thorstein, The Instinct of
Workmanship and the State oj the Industrial Arts, N. Y., 1914.
With a reasonable degree of certainty, it is possible to state that
there is no such an instinct as workmanship, and the very starting
point of the work is consequently wrong. vSce further Wallas,
Graham, Human Nature in Politics, London, 1919, }3p. 1-56;
Eldridge, vS., Political Action, 1924; Patrick, G. T. W., The
Psychology of Social Reconstruction, B(.)st()n and N. Y., 1920.
616
planation is ready. Why do parents care about their children?
Nothing to be wondered at, because the ''parental instinct" is the
cause. Men are hunting? Quite comprehensible, because they
have the "hunting instinct." Men go to church? Very simple
indeed; they have a religious instinct. And so on and so forth. The
method of the explanation is ingenuously simple indeed. It is

clear, however, that in its essence it is identical with the animistic
explanation. The surface difference is that the old-fashioned
words, ''spirit," "soul," "God," or "devil," are replaced by a more
fashionable term, "instincts."
Shall we wonder that in such an explanation everybody is free to
pack a man with as many and as various instincts as he pleases ?
It is evident, however, that such a procedure is nothing but an
explanation of obsciimm per ohscurins of what is dark through
what is still darker. Such an explanation naturally is not an
explanation at all. Furthermore, since an "instinct" itself is
something intangible, it is exceedingly difficult to establish any
certain correlation between this immaterial "variable" and some
"material" phenomena viewed as its "manifestation." Imagine that
A is the parental instinct. The instinctivist claims that a series of
phenomena: a, b, c, d, are the functions of this "variable,"a, b,
c, d = f {A). To verify this equation we need to know A. But since it
is immaterial we cannot grasp it, measure it, and test the validity
of the equation. The very fact that a, b, c, d are material or transsubjective phenomena (actions), and that ^ is a subjective "force"
of an immaterial nature does not permit us to throw any bridge
between them which may be objectively measured and tested.
Therefore, all equation'^ of this type, where one half consists of
trans-subjective phenomena (a, b, c, d) while the other half
consists of purely subjective (psychical) experience (instinct, idea,
feeling, wish, desire, conation, etc.), are doomed to remain
unverifiable, and as such, will remain an assumption whose
validity nobody knows. Evidently such a situation is not very
hopeful.
Let the reader notice that in all the above criticism I have not
denied the existence of instincts. In the terminology of the
German philosophers, my criticism has been "immanent." I have
taken the existence of the instincts for granted; and under
617
this assumption I have tried to show the deficiencies of the
existing theories. For the above reasons the theories should be
recognized as insufficient and defective, in spite of some truth
which they seem to have. What it is we shall now see.
3. BEHAVIORIST INTERPRETATIONS
A. General Characteristic. At present we have not one but
many and various psychologies styled "behavioristic." Let it be
understood that under behaviorism here is meant a branch of the
experimental study of animal and human behavior which has
been developed by C. S. Sherrington, Magnus, and especially by
Ivan Pavlov and his school. This school has contributed to the
science of human behavior possibly more than any other
behavioristic school, and is relatively more free from many a
speculation so common in other behavioristic and pseudobehavioristic ''p^Y' chologies." One of its principal achievements is
the theory of the conditioned and the unconditioned (or innate)
reflexes. The existence of the latter has been proved beyond
doubt. It has been shown that all the conditioned or acquired
reactions are inculcated on the basis of the unconditioned ones. It
has also been proved that the conditioned reactions, repeated
many times without the support of the unconditioned ones, tend to
become "extinguished," and finally disappear. The mechanism of
the relationship between the conditioned and the unconditioned
reflexes and between various conditioned responses, their
inculcation, their modification, extinction, weakening,
reinforcement, and inhibition, has been studied also. As a result
we now know-something in this mystery. Among other things, the
study of the unconditioned reflexes has corroborated the
existence of numerous innate or instinctive drives with their
importance in the behavior of either animal or man.^^
^ See Pavlov, L, Twenty Years of an Experimental Study of the

Higher Nervous Activity of Animals, (in Russian), 1924; Lectures
in Functioning of the Hemispheres of the Brain, (in Russian),
1927; Bekhtereff, W., General Foundations of Reflexology, (in
Russian), 1918; see also the experimental studies of G. V. Anrep,
V. M. Arkhangclsky, B. P. Babkin, M. Besbokaia, M. F. Belitz, V.
V. Beliakoff, V. N. Boldyreff, V. A. Bourmakin, A. S. Bylina, P.
Vasilieff, E. Voskoboinikova, L. N. Voskresensky, E. L. Gorn, F.
Grossman, M. Guberpjitz, V. A. Demidoff, V. A. De^^tiareva, V. S.
Deriabin, V. M. Dobrovolsky, I. E. Egoroff, iM. N. Erofecva, I. V.
Savadsky, G. P. Seleny, B. A. Kogan, P. vS. Kupalov, S. P.
KuraicfT, N. I. Lci)orsky, I. vS. Makovsky, G. Mishtovl, I-:. A.
Neil/., N. Kaslicr618
(l
Does this mean that the behaviorist interpretation of human
activity and social processes is identical with the instinctivist one?
Not at all. There is a great difference. It is that the behaviorists do
not assume the existence of any ''mysterious agents" behind the
objective data of the behavior itself. The very conception of the
unconditioned reflex means that between such and such stimuli
and such and such responses of an organism, the connection is
innate, rather than learned. Whether it is innate or not is decided
again on the basis of several sorts of purely objective data. The
same is true in regard to conditioned responses, that is, the
responses where the connection between the stimulus and
response is acquired. In other words, all equations of the
behaviorist school are the equation between, trans-subjective
phenomena, but not between the subjective and trans-subjective
realms as is the case in the instinctivist theories. In the lectures of
Pavlov one cannot find any ''subjective" term and any operation
with "idea," "emotion," "desire," and so on. Being such, the

behaviorist equations do not have the impassable gap between
the trans-subjective and subjective realms, and they can be
tested, verified, and proved. For this reason they can establish
certain definite correlations not according to the whims of an
author, but according to the evidence of the trans-subjective
phenomena. This is enough to show the difference between the
instinctivist and the behaviorist analysis of human actions and
social phenomena. Although in agreement in regard to the exininova, N. I. Krasnogorsky, A. N. Krestovnikoff, L. A. Orbelli, A.
Palladin, M. K. Petrova, O. vS. Rosental, A. A. Savitch, I. P.
Frolov, D. C. Foursikoff, I. S. Tzitovitch, and others indicated in
Pavlov, Twenty Years of an Experimental Study, and in his
epoch-making Lectures, all in Russian. Claiming that there is no
substantial difference between the innate reflex and instinct, the
school recognizes a great many innate reflexes, and among them,
such ones as the "reflex of investigation," "the reflex of freedom,"
"the reflex of purpose" (similar to "purposive actions" of W,
McDougall), and many others. In this respect there is a
conspicuous difference between Pavlov's school and such
behaviorists as John B. Watson and others, who flatly, though
perhaps without consistency, deny the existence of instincts in
man. See especially Pavlov's "Reflex of Purpose" and "Reflex of
Freedom" in his Twenty Years, and pp. 13-21 in Lectures. See
also Frolov, LP., "The Problem of Instinct from the Standpoint of
the Physiology of the Conditioned Reflexes," Isvestia VoennoMedizinskoi Akademii, Vol. XXVI, 1913. The writer must
acknowledge here his indebtedness to Ivan Pavlov for kindly
semding to the writer his new book. Lectures in which is given a
summary of all the important results of the researches of Pavlov
and his pupils.
619
istence of a certain number of innate responses, they are quite

different in the method of their study.
Accordingly, their approaches to the interpretations of social
phenomena are also different. Any really behavioristic
interpretation must start with a trans-subjective variable, go to the
trans-subjective phenomena, and establish the correlation
between trans-subjective phenomena. The chain of the
phenomena must not be disconnected anywhere by the insertion
of a "psychical agent." Only when such a task is done, is it
permissible to try to establish correlations between transsubjective and subjective phenomena, but even this can be done
only as far as these subjective phenomena are expressed in the
trans-subjective forms of speech-reactions, gesticulations,
exclamations, and other phenomena observable outwardly.
B. Relationship of the Behaviorist and the Non-Behaviorist
Methods of Sfttdy of Human Activity and Social Processes. In a
broad sense every sociological study which correlates one transsubjective phenomenon with another trans-subjective may be
regarded as behavioristic. For instance, the above correlations of
a certain geographical condition with an economic one, or a
certain economic condition with a certain form of religious cult
expressed in overt actions, is a behavioristic theory. All such
studies do not involve in a causal or functional chain any purely
psychic or subjective link. They start with trans-subjective data, go
to the trans-subjective phenomena, and finish with the transsubjective facts, also. In this broad sense we have a great many
behavioristic studies in sociology.
In a narrow sense of behaviorism, as a specific interpretation of
human behavior and psychology from the standpoint of the
formula:trans-subjective stimuli-responses with an elimination
of any introspection and introspective methodsthe behavioristic
interpretations of social phenomena are relatively few. Even those
which exist are devoted not so much to the factual interpretation

of a certain category of social facts as to a mere discussion of the
plan and program of such an interpretation.^^
3* Such, in fact are Benthley, A., Process of Government, 1908;
Seliony, G. P., "Ueber die zukunftige vSoziophysiologie," Archiv
fiir Rassen-und Gesellschafts-Biologic, pp. 405-430, 1912; a
series of articles of the same author in Russian See a criticism of
his theory by Ellwood, Charles A., "Objectivism in Soci620
Furthermore, a considerable number of them, being strong in their
critical part, often fail as soon as they pass to their constructive
part, where they become either pseudo-behavioristic,^^ or
speculative and metaphysical.^^ In view of the heated dispute
ology," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. XXII, pp. 289-305;
partly Wax-WEiLER, E., Esquisse d'une sociologie, 1906, pp. 169
ff.; Kenagy, H. G., "The Theory of the Social Forces," The
Psychological Review, Vol. XXIV, pp. 376-390; Bernard, L. L.,
The Transition to an Objective Standard of Social Control; Allport, F., Social Psychology. Examples of a factual interpretation of
various social phenomena are given in Pavlov, I., "Reflex of
Purpose" and "Reflex of Freedom," in his Twenty Years, pp. 204212, (in Russian); Savitch, V. V., "An Attempt at an Interpretation
of a Creative Activity from the Standpoint of Reflex-Theory," (in
Russian), Krasnaia Nov.^ 1922, No. 4, pp. 207-223; Vasi-LiEFF,
Essays in Physiology of Mind, (in Russian), 1923; Rosental, O. C,
"Influence of Inanition on the Conditioned Reflexes," (in Russian),
Archive oj Biological Sciences, Vol. XXI, Nos. 3-5; and a
considerable number of other works of the laboratory of Pavlov
enumerated in his Twenty Years, pp. 238-244; SoROKiN, P.,
System of Sociology, Vols. I, II.
3^ Such, for instance, are the works of Durkheim, Coste,

Waxweiler; and such, in their constructive part, are the works of
A. Bentley, who operates with the term, "interest," which is as
subjective as the terms "ideas," "feelings," "desires" and so on,
criticized by him in the first part of his Process of Government.
Pseudo-behavioristic also are the works of L. L. Bernard, with his
"psycho-social," "symbolical" and "neuro-psychic" categories, with
his "attitudes of sympathy," "emotional, intellectual, and psychic
attitudes"; practically with the whole set of the methods and
concepts of the subjective or introspective psychology altered
only in name in a behavioristic fashion. Non-behavioristic also is
his discrimination between "instincts" and "physiological needs."
See Bernard, L. L., An Introduction to Social Psychology, passim,
N. Y., 1926. The same is to be said of R. Park's, Principles oj
Human Behavior, 1915. In some cases the term "behavioristic" is
utterly misused. For instance, one will wonder why J. Davis' and
H. E. Barnes' Introduction to Sociology (1927) has a subtitle:
"behavioristic" sociology, while in the whole book there is
absolutely nothing from "behaviorism." AH who really care for and
know "behaviorism" can but protest against such a misuse of the
term.
^ Speculative, for instance, is A. P. Weiss' reduction of psychic
phenomena to the electron-proton aggregations. Besides, like the
above mechanistic theories (see the chapter on the mechanistic
school) it is useless. Granted that, like a stone, dog, or plant,
human consciousness is an electron-proton aggregation, does it
follow from this that the stone, the dog, the plant, and human
consciousness are identical things or phenomena? If not, which
seems to be certain, then what is the difference between each of
the electron-proton aggregations which compose the dog, the
stone, the plant, and consciousness? The answer is not given
and, of coiu-se, cannot be given. Like any "monistic formula"
which tries to explain everything, Weiss' formula is meaningless,
and at the same time illogical. See Weiss, A. P., A Theoretical
Basis of Human Behavior, Columbus, Ohio, 1925. Many

sweeping statements of John B. Watson go far beyond the factual
and experimental data, and in this sense are also quite
speculative. Such, for instance, is his contention that all men of all
races are exactly alike as regards their innate mental endowment.
This conclusion is based practically on nothing, and contradicts
somewhat his own statement that the difference in the structure of
a body leads to a difference in behavior and functioning.
Speculative also is his flat denial of instincts, which again
contradicts his theory of innate reflexes and of the
621
which is going on now in psychology as regards the possibiHties
and the hmits of the behaviorist interpretation of human behavior;
and in view of the fact that this problem will confront us
throughout the discussion of psychological theories, and that it
practically confronts every sociologist in any investigation, let us
dwell a little on the problem as to whether the behaviorist
approach is the only possible approach to the study of human
behavior and social phenomena; whether it has its own
limitations; whether the method of introspection is necessary; and
if both approaches are possible, where and in what form they are
appropriate.
The extreme behaviorists of the type of Watson claim that the
behaviorist method is quite sufficient for the analysis and
description of all human behavior and psychology, and that
introspective methods are quite unnecessary, giving nothing
valuable from a cognitive standpoint. They go so far that they
believe in the possibility of describing in a strictly behavioristic or
trans-subjective terminology even the inner or psychic
experiences of man, beginning with consciousness and ending
with ideas, emotions, desires, and so on. Accordingly, their
''philosophy" tends to assume the forms of a kind of a
materialism, for which all psychic phenomena either do not exist

or are something fictitious, at any rate devoid of any cognitive
value.
On the other hand we have a series of psychological and
sociological theories which claim that the methods of introspection
are the primary methods of the cognition of human behavior and
psychology. In their opinion, psychical phenomena like desires,
ideas, wishes, volitions, sentiments, and so forth, are real forces
which determine human behavior in its overt or trans-subjective
forms. These overt actions are but a manifestation of these
psychic forcesthe trans-subjective social processes are
conditioned by, and could not be understood without, them.
Consequently, their causal explanation consists in the insertion of
these
connection of structural peculiarities with the forms of reactions.
Speculative too are many references to the nature of {processes
going on within the nervous system. In brief, we must carefully
discriminate what in behaviorism is really proved by experimental
and other data, and what is a mere guess based on nothing. See
Watson's pajjcrs and the criticism of his behaviorism in the papers
of K. KofTka, W. Kohler, M. Prince, and especially W. McDougall,
in Psychologies 0/1925.
622
subjective forces into a chain of trans-subjective phenomena (see
further).
Which of these opposite standpoints is accurate? In the opin^ ion
of the writer, from a purely methodological standpoint both are
wrong. The extreme behaviorism is wrong because inner
experiences cannot be adequately described in the terminology of
a strictly overt action. When it is done, the description becomes

either extremely poor and inadequate, like the speech of a
stutterer, or it turns into a disguised introspectivist description and
becomes pseudo-behavioristic. Here are examples:
Consciousness is an electron-proton aggregation (A. P. Weiss).
Consciousness is '*a complex integration and succession of
bodily activities which are closely related to or involve the verbal
and gestural mechanisms, and hence most frequently come to
social expression" (K. S. Lashley).^^
Emotion is ''a particular stimulus-response relationship" (W. S.
Hunter).'^
If I had not put at the beginning of these definitions the words
"consciousness" and "emotions," nobody would have guessed
that these formulas were the definitions of consciousness or
emotions. To such an extent they are poor, inadequate and "deafmute." Furthermore, my table is also an electro-proton
aggregation. Does this mean that it is "consciousness"? A frog
exhibits "a complex integration and succession of bodily activities
which involve the vocal and gestural mechanisms." Does this
mean that the frog is a "consciousness," or that its consciousness
is identical to that of man? A snake certainly shows "a particular
stimulus-response relationship." Shall we conclude that the snake
is "emotion," or that its "emotions" are identical to those of man?
These remarks are sufficient to show why such a description is
poor and utterly inadequate. They show also that these "scientific"
formulas are in fact the worst kind of metaphysics. Here are a little
better samples. Let the reader guess what phenomena or kind of
behavior is described by the following definitions :
" Lashley, K. S., "The Behavioristic Interpretation of
Consciousness," Psychological Review, 1923, Vol. XXX, pp. 237
and 329.
*o Hunter, W. S., "The Problem of Consciousness," Psychological

Review, 1924, pp. 1-31; "Psychology and Anthroponomy,"
Psychologies oj IQ25, p. 91.
623
No. I''Checking of breathing, jump or start of whole body,
crying, often defaecation and urination."
No. 2''Cessation of crying; gurghng, cooing and many other not
determined (reactions). Predomination of visceral factors shown
by changes in circulation and respiration, erection of penis."
No. 3"Stiffening of the whole body, screaming, temporary
cessation of breathing, reddening of face, changing to blueness of
face."'^
If one would say that these descriptions represent a kind of an
incomprehensible hieroglyphic without a key to read them, one
would not be far from the truth. Furthermore, the formulas are so
vague that by them it is possible to understand a dozen of various
forms of behavior. Finally, one scarcely would guess that formula
No. i describes "fear" behavior; No. 2, "love" behavior; and No. 3,
"rage" behavior. Only with the introduction of these introspective
keys: "fear," "love," and "rage" do these formulas acquire a real
cognitive value and some scientific meaning. This fact testifies
that our experience obtained in an introspective way is neither
valueless, nor nil. This shows also that a purely behavioristic
description of human conduct, with a complete disregard of the
knowledge and the terminology of introspective psychology, is
doomed to be extremely poor and inadequate.^^
But that is not all. Further inadequacy of the strictly be-haviorist
description of human actions and psychology is shown
"1 Watson, J. B., "Experimental wStudies of the Growth of the

Emotions," Psychologies of 1925, pp. 49-50.
^2 Dr. W. Kohler is quite right in saying that even the behavior of
a monkey-could not be described adequately if we had to follow
the advices of the extreme behaviorists. In this case "one
consequence would be unavoidable: Our description of behavior
would become extremely poor, and our concepts would very soon
be exactly as poor as our material." Kohler, W., "Intelligence of
Apes," Psychologies of 1925, p. 153. It is comprehensible
therefore that a great many of the prominent behaviorists, like W.
Bekhtereff, I. Pavlov, W. Wagner, E. C. Tolman, even F. A.
Allport, either explicitly recognize the cognitive value of the
introspective method and the necessity of combining both the
inner and the behavioristic methods of studying human
psychology and behavior, or else they implicitly use such terms as
in their essence are "introspective." See Bekhtereff, W., General
Foundations of Reflexology, p. 128, (in Russian); Wagner, W.,
Bio-Psikhologia, Vol. I, pp. 157-249; see other references in my
Systema Soziologii, Vol. I, pp. 50-76; see also Ellvvood, Charles
A., "Objectivism in Sociology," KoFFKA, K., The Growth of the
Mind, Cha})s. I, II, N. Y., 1924.
624
in that it cannot grasp at all what is styled the "meaning" of either
overt actions or subjective psychical processes, or that of
symbolic social phenomena like science, religion, ideology,
church, school, and so on. "Meaning" is generally indescribable in
the terminology of strict behaviorism, because "meaning" is not a
trans-subjective or overt phenomenon which may be observed in
a change of muscles, or glands, or nervous system. The meaning
of Kant's philosophy, or of Newton's "Principia" or Confucianism,
or of "two and two is four," is neither a physical phenomenon, nor
a description in terms of muscular and glandular contractions; nor

may it be seen in a microscope, or studied through a chemical
analysis. A "behaviorist net" cannot catch "meaning" at all, as a
unit of weight cannot be used to measure space. The expression:
"The distance from New York City to Los Angeles is five thousand
pounds" is absurd. No less absurd is the expression: "The
consciousness is vocal or subvocal reflex," or "Kant's ethics is a
totality of the electron-proton aggregations," or "the phenomena of
property are a combination of the grasping and collecting
reactions of an organism followed by such and such a secretion of
a certain kind of glands." Not only the meaning of these complex
experiences, but even the meaning of such things as "love and
hatred, reverence and devotion, rage and fear, happiness and
suffering," could neither be grasped, nor described by strictly
behavioristic methods, providing "the introspective experience" is
really excluded. Watson writes: "Negroes show fear," or "awe" or
"reverence." ^^ This is not a behaviorist description because all
that negroes may show to an observer who excludes
introspection and psychical experience is this or that change of
muscles, reactions, and other trans-subjective movements among
which there is nothing of "fear," or "love," or "awe," or other
psychic experiences. The mere introduction of these and similar
terms is a contamination of pure behaviorism by "introspection."
The same must be said of such popular behaviorist terms as
"symbolic stimuli," or "attitude," or "psycho-social pattern of
behavior." A symbol is inseparable from a meaning and its
meaning is different from
^Watson, John B., "Experimental Studies of the Growth of the
Emotions,''. Psychologies of IQ25, p. 37.
625
the physical character of the symbol stimuli. The national flag is
physically only a bit of cloth attached to a stick. As a symbol,
however, it means something quite different and incomparably

more complex. Physically, Plato's Republic is only a paper with
some black figures on the white field. As Plato's Republic it
means something absolutely different from paper and figures. As
far as a behaviorist refuses to use the inner experience, and limits
his task by a description of overt and physical phenomena, the
very conception of a symbol does not, and cannot, exist for him.
And the real and great behaviorists, like Pavlov or Sherrington, do
not deal with any phenomenon of behavior which is unobservable
from ''outside," and do not use any of the terms of an overt or
masked introspective psychology, and do not try at all to
''measure distance by the unit of weight" or to study "behavior
istically" inner and subjective phenomena. If a behaviorist uses
"inner experience" he ceases to be a pure behaviorist, and in a
disguised form introduces "an introspectivism" previously expelled
by him. The same may be said of the "attitude," ^"^ "adjustment,"
"behavior pattern," and other popular terms of the behaviorists.
These terms, in a disguised form, contain a great deal from "inner
psychic experience," and through it they are given a more or less
clear meaning. In fact all the extreme pseudo-behaviorists do this,
and, in a disguised form, reintroduce what they banished before.
This means that they are inconsistent, and themselves show the
inadequacy of their method. This leads also to another
inconvenience from a methodological standpoint. Owing to this
disguised use of introspective terminology, their descriptions of
human behavior become vague, dull, and unclear, like the above
behavioristic formulas.
These indications are sufficient to show some of the fallacies of
an extreme pseudo-behaviorism.'^''* Does this mean that the
*^ See, for instance, Allport, F., Social Psychology, pp. 244 ff.;
Bernard, L. L., Introduction to Social Psychology, pp. 246 ff.
^^ Many other shortcomings of extreme behaviorism in

psychology and sociology are indicated in the i)apers of K. Koffka,
W. Kohler, W. McDoiigall, M. Benthley, M. Prince, and R. Wood
worth, in P:>ychologics of 1925. See also RoBACK, A. A.,
Behaviorism and Psychology, Cambridge, 1923; Ellwood, Charles
A., "Objectivism in Sociology"; Paris, Ellsworth, "The Subjective
Aspect of Culture," Publications of the American Sociological
Society, Vol. XIX, pp. 37-46; Ogden, C. K., The Meaning of
Psychology, N. Y., 1926. See also the (juotcd works of W.
Wagner, Bckhtcrcff, P. Sorokin, and Petrajitzsky.
626
extreme introspectivists are right? Not at all. Behaviorism in its
proper limits is certainly a most valuable method for making a
scientific study of human behavior, and through that, of social
phenomena. Without the study of the mechanics and the forms of
overt or trans-subjective human actions, vê never can obtain
anything objective and accurate in this field. Within the world of
trans-subjective phenomena, behaviorism is the only method
which may be used scientifically. As I tried to show, its
shortcomings begin when it intrudes into the field of subjective
experience, and begins to measure distance by the units of
weight, and when, being unable to do so, it begins to deny the
value of all other methods, and even of the existence of the realm
of inner psychic experiences themselves. Without such missteps,
from which the real behaviorists (Pavlov, Sherrington, Magnus)
are free, behaviorism is entirely right in its claim that it studies
human behavior as a trans-subjective phenomenon, without any
insertion of the psychical agencies in a causal chain of transsubjective events or reactions. This, however, does not entitle it
to, and the real behaviorists do not, deny the cognitive value of
introspection, nor exclude the possibility of a description of human
experiences from the inner side through the method of

introspection. The terms, "fear," "love," or "rage," when put side
by side with the above formulas of Watson, do not spoil either
their objective character, or rob their significance; but rather, they
increase their scientific value, and our own knowledge of human
behavior. The behaviorist formula shows the outer or transsubjective side of the phenomena, and the introspective describes
the inner experience correlated with them;both together, their
mutual correlation and the phenomena in their entirety. From such
a combination our knowledge increases; each set of descriptions
becomes more accurate and valual)le; and their meaning is
mutually supplemented. From a purely cognitive standpoint, one
cannot see any defect arising from such a mutual supplement,
when it is properly done.
But in order that the above advantages may accrue, both
methods must be used in their proper fields. Neither of them is
entitled to intrude upon the field of the other with its quite
heterogeneous methods absolutely unsuitable for the other field's
627
study. Each description must stand side by side, but not be
mingled with another. The introspective experiences in no way
may be introduced into the causal chain of the trans-subjective
behavior, and the trans-subjective concepts and approaches
cannot be used for a description of inner experiences. The type of
their relationship must be as follows :
'fe'
Fear(introspective descrip- checking of breathing tion from the
inner side) jump, start of whole body, etc.
(behaviorist description from the outer side)
Each of the descriptions, like different languages, designates in

different terms two sides of the phenomena and their correlation.
Let behaviorism study its trans-subjective phenomena with its
objective methods, and let the introspectivists do the same in
regard to the inner experience of man. As soon as they intrude
into the field of the other they begin to measure distance by the
units of weight.^^' In regard to extreme behaviorism this has been
shown above. In regard to introspectivism and introspective
sociology this will be shown further in extenso. Meanwhile, these
remarks are sufficient to outline the position which we must
assume in the discussed problem, and to make comprehensible
the criticism of the introspectivist psychological interpretations of
social phenomena given further. Now let us return to the concrete
studies of the behaviorist type of sociology.
C. Influence of Food Stimuli on Human Behavior, Social
Processes, and Organization. As yet, we have very few factual
interpretations of social phenomena from a behaviorist standpoint.
Some of them were mentioned above. There are others, but they
also represent either a mere plan of behaviorist study, or are too
general to be a real factual interpretation. As an example of the
few factual studies of social phenomena from the standpoint of
the outlined moderate behaviorism, I will take the liberty to give
here a skeleton of my study of the correlation of
*^ The reader should notice that the solution is not a
psychophysical parallelism in its philosophical meaning, but a
mere methodological parallelism quite different from it. This
methodological parallelism of two methods of the study does not
pretend to solve the i)roblem of the mind and the body in any way,
and does not attach itself to any one of the existing solutions of
the problem.
628
the food stimuli with human behavior, psychology, social

processes, and social organization. Its defects may serve as a
warning, its virtues as an incentive to other behaviorist
interpretations of social facts.^^
The guiding principles of this study were those which were
outlined above. First, to start with a trans-subjective stimulus
which may be measured, to proceed to trans-subjective
phenomena, and to finish with the trans-subjective facts. Second,
the causal chain of the trans-subjective phenomena must not be
broken by the insertion of the inner psychical experiences or
agencies. Third, a description of the inner psychical experiences
which are concomitant with the changes in the quantity and
quality of the food consumed is to be added to, but not to be
mingled with, the description of the changes in the field of the
trans-subjective phenomena. Fourth, as a starting point in the
study is taken Pavlov's theory of the nutrition process; the theory
of the nervous center which controls it; and the mechanism of its
operationthe unconditioned and the conditioned ways of the
stimulation and inhibition of ''the nutrition center of the nervous
system" through the blood and nervous system itselfin brief, all
the essentials of Pavlov's theory.^^ Omitting here the details, the
methodology, and many points and reservations, the essential
results obtained may be summed up as follows :
Taking the quantity and the quality of food consumed as an
independent variable, and concentrating attention on the cases
when this variable is below the physiological minimum, or when
we have physiological inanition, we obtain in the first place a
series of correlations betzveen this variable and the bodily
characteristics of man and animals, established by many
investigators. The quantity and the quality of food determine many
characteristics of the alimentary tract and its organs, the stature,
the
*^ SoROKiN, P., Influence of Inanition on Human Behavior, Social

Organization, and Social Life, Petrograd, 1922, Kolos Co. The
book was destroyed by the Soviet government in the process of
printing. From a volume of about 600 pages I have about 300
pages in galley proofs.
*^ See Pavlov, Ivan, Lectures in the Activity of the Principal
Alimentary Glands, (in Russian), 1897, The Work of the Digestive
Glands, London, 1902; Babkin, B., Exterior Secretion of the
Alimentary Glands, (in Russian), 1915; London, E., Physiology
and Pathology of Digestion, (in Russian), 1916; Pavlov, I., "The
Nutrition Center" and "The Real Physiology of the Brain," in his
Twenty Years, pp. 92-99. See other readings in these works.
629
weight, the chemical composition of the body, the size of the
chest, the form of the cranium, and other bodily traits. In all these
respects inanition calls forth considerable changes. For this
reason, a series of bodily differences of various social groups who
consume food in different quantity and quality may be accounted
for through this factor. Such, for instance, are the greater weight
and stature of the well-to-do classes as compared with those of
the poor classes.'*^
In the second place, inanition calls forth a fundamental change in
all physiological processes, which has been pretty well studied by
physiologists.
In the third place, the changes in a body and its physiology,
caused by inanition, are paralleled by a series of changes in
subjective psychical experience. (A) At the beginning of
physiological and comparative inanition, in the field of feeling and
emotions we have the appearance of ''appetite." Inanition
continued, ''appetite" turns into a quite different feeling of "hunger"
; and later into different and complex feelings of weakness, dull
pain, "emptiness," and apathy, interrupted by moments of

irritation, angriness, low feeling, and general psychical
depression. (B) In the field of sensation, perception, and attention,
the first stages of inanition are followed by a decrease of
sensitiveness and attention toward all phenomena which do not
have a relation to food and nutrition, and by a sharp increase of
sensitiveness and attention toward all phenomena which directly
or indirectly are related to food and nutrition. Man becomes dull
and deaf toward everything but food and nutrition phenomena.
Continuation of starvation finally leads to a general dullness and
apathy. The whole receptive system becomes disorganized and
loses its ability of analyzing the exterior world and its components.
(C) In the field of the reproductive imagination and association of
ideas, inanition is paralleled by a driving out of the field of
consciousness of all images, representations, and ideas
heterogeneous to food and nutrition phenomena, and by filling the
field with images, representations, and ideas of "food character."
At the same time, a free course of idea association is interrupted
more and' more by the involuntary intrusion of "the alimentary
represents See also ArmitagI', F. P., Did and Race, London,
1922.
630
tations, images and ideas," which often leads to ''food"
hallucination and delirium of inanition. Men become more and
more unable to think about anything but food and phenomena
related to food. (D) In the field of the speech-reaction this is
expressed by the fact that ''food-topics" begin to occupy more and
more place and drive out all other topics from the conversation of
starving people. (E) In the field of memory, in the first stage
inanition is paralleled by a weakening of the memory of things and
events unrelated to food, and by an intensification of it in regard to
food phenomena. In the later stages of inanition memory

generally weakens and leads to the forgetting of even a man's
own name and address. (F) In the field of desires and wishes, we
have a weakening of all wishes unrelated to food, and a
reinforcement of the wishes for food. (G) In the field of volitions,
as an intentional effort, we have their weakening, which, under a
continued inanition, makes an individual apathetic, in-difTerent,
and incapable of any deliberate eflort. (H) In the field of the whole
psychical life, inanition is paralleled by a revolution of its whole
course. Inanition being strong and long enough, it is paralleled by
a disintegration of "self"; a disorganization of personality, its
harmony, and oneness, by a weakening of the ability of cohesive
thinking, and concentration of thought; and by an increase of
psychoses and mental disease.^^ Thus, with inanition, man's
body, physiology, and psychology greatly change.
In the fourth place, inanition changes all of human behavior. Since
man changes physically, physiologically, and psychologically
under the influence of deficient food, his behavior changes, too.
The central phenomenon in this change may be styled as an
increase in the attraction of a hungry man toward food objects or
their substitutes whose possession helps to obtain food. In other
words, all behavior tends to assume the character of the food^ vSoROKiN, P., Op. cit., pp. I-II2; see also Petrajitzsky, Leo,
Introduction to the Theory oj Law and Ethics, Part II; Luciani, Das
Hungern, 1890; Pashutin, General and Experimental Pathology,
(in Russian), 1902, Vol. II; Boring, E. G., "Processes Referred to
the Alimentary and Urmary Tracts," The Psychological Review,
No. 4, 1915; Marsh, "Individual and Sex Differences," The
Psy:,hological Review, 1916, pp. 434-445; Cannon, W. B., Bodily
Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear, and Rage, D. Appleton Co.;
Armitage, F. P., Diet and Race, London, 1922. Other literature
was given in my book.
631
obtaining reactions, or that of approaching to food and its
substitutes. The very fact of such an attraction is not learned but
innate. The technique or the concrete manifestation of it in certain
patterns of behavior is learned and varies according to
circumstances. From this standpoint, the totality of the foodapproaching actions may be subdivided into the pure, stimulated
exclusively by lack of food, and the mixed, stimulated by lack of
food and other factors. Both varieties may be subdivided further
into the simple food-approaching reactions (taking the food,
chewing, and swallowing it) and the complex food-approaching
reactions, consisting of a long chain of various actions whose
objective is to obtain the food, (the reactions of taking a job, doing
it, going to shop, buying the food, cooking it, and finally
swallowing).
Analyzing the part of such actions in the total budget of human
actions, it is possible to make the following generalization: The
greater are the obstacles to be overcome in order to obtain food,
the greater is the proportion of the food-approaching actions in
the whole of human behavior. When, as in the case of a great
famine, these obstacles become extremely great, the whole of
human behavior tends to become a mere food-searching behavior
composed of the pure and the mixed; of the simple and the
complex food-tropic activities. Study of the budget of time in
man's behavior, and the budget of income and expenses
corroborates this. However, the intensity of the food-tropic
tendency is not constant, but varies according to the length and
the degree of inanition. In absolute starvation it usually reaches its
climax on the third, fourth, and fifth day. After that its intensity
begins to go down, as a result of the general weakening of man's
vitality and energy.
The above means that hunger tends to drive out all other activities
unrelated to nutrition from our behavior, and to turn the bodymachinery into an exclusive mechanism of nutrition.
Conse([uently, under the stinuili of a lack of food, men risk doingmany dangerous actions which they would not have done had
they not been hungry (repression of self-protective reactions by
hunger). The same is true in regard to the group of actions whose
purpose is to protect the interests of the group to which
632
man belongs. Such actions as are harmful to the group or other
fellow men, but which may help under the circumstances te
satiate the hunger, tend to increase. Therefore people who have a
horror of cannibalism when they are well fed often become
cannibals and kill their neighbors, children, and fellow men to eat
them when they are starving. For the same reason we have an
increase in the killing of useless members of a group to alleviate
starvation. Under such conditions, an honest man may become a
traitor to his friends and relatives in order to obtain bread. In a
similar way, the group of sex reactions undergoes a direct and
indirect change also. The sex appetite falls down and weakens.
The actions of copulation decrease in number. Sex love and
romance tend to disappear. On the other hand, sex chastity may
be thrown away if an act of prostitution may help to obtain food.
Hence the increase of such actions on the part of women in time
of famine, if there are buyers. In a similar way all other purely
acquired actions,religious, moral, social, <Testhetic, and
conventionaltend to cease to be performed if their performance
hinders a satiation of hunger under the circumstances. The nonthief becomes a thief; the proud man, meek; and the independent
like Esau, is ready to sell his birthright, dignity, and freedom for
bread and a pottage of lentils. Finally, convictions, opinions, and
beliefs also undergo a change if they hinder satisfaction of

hunger. Thus the whole human behavior changes.
In the fifth place, the above change of human hehaznor makes
comprehensible the noticeable changes in the field of social
phenomena when a considerable part of the population begins to
starve or experiences an aggravation due to lack of nutrition. As
the actions of nutrition are performed several times every day this
explains the existence of several social institutions which are, so
to speak, constant functions of the factor of nutrition in any
existing society. All activities and institutions in a society whose
purpose is to obtain food for its members, to prepare it, and to
distribute it are to be regarded as such constant social functions
of the factor of nutrition. A considerable part of the so-called
economic institutions of production, distribution, exchange, and
consumption are of this nature, whatever may be their concrete
forms. Side bv side with these constant functions
633
there are sporadic social functions of the factor when it assumes
the forms of mass starvation. In this case, the behavior of all the
starving population assumes the above food-tropic character.
Under such conditions plus the existing concrete circumstances of
a starving society, one or several of the following social effects
may be expected: First, the invention of new, or the improvement
of old methods of obtaining food; second, an increase in imports
of food from other societies; third, an increase of peaceful or
violent emigration from the starving country to other non-starznng
ones; fourth, invasion of non-starving societies by the starving
people, or prevention of such an invasion of the non-starving
societies by force, which residts in the phenomena of war and
conflict; fifth, an increase of crimes against property and in a less
degree against persons; sixth, an increase of disorders and
revolution as a form of violent appropriation of the wealth and
food of the well-to-do classes by the poor and the starving; seventh, an increase of governmental interference in economic
affairs and governmental control of food-supply and distribution
(starving state-socialism); eighth, an enslaving or increasing
dependence of the poor upon the rich in exchange for bread;
ninth, if all these manifestations of the food-tropic ac-tiznties fail to
satisfy the need, either the mortality rate increases, or the birth
rate decreases, or both of these phenomena take place; tenth, the
speech-reactions of the society change also in the direction of an
increase of ''food-speech reactions^ measured by the space in
the paper given to food-topics, by the number of meetings of
parliament and other bodies politic for a discussion of the food
problem, by the topics of private conversations, and so on;
eleventh, among the ideologies of society, those which under the
circumstances stimulate to actions which promise a satisfaction of
starvation (for instance, confiscation of the wealth of the rich or
invasion of a rich country) tend to become more contagious, while
the ideologies of the opposite hindering character lose their
popularity.
One, or in the majority of cases, several of these effects invariably
take place in a society where the nutrition of a considerable part
of its po])ulation becomes deficient or worse qualitatively and
quantitatively. An inductive verification of these statements
634
through historical data, statistical data, experimental materials,
and observation, justifies the expectation and makes tangible the
correlation between the fluctuation of the quality and the quantity
of food consumed by a society and the phenomena of migration,
war, crime, revolution, expansion of government control, increase
in the death and decrease in the birth rate, and the increase and
decrease of the popularity and contagiousness of various

ideologies.
Although the social effects of the same factor are manifold, they
must not embarrass us because the circumstances a, b, c, d, e, f,
under which the factor operates are different in various societies.
Naturally, the concrete effects of the discussed factor must be
different. Thus, the above must show that the social effects of
such a prosaic factor as the quantity and the quality of food
consumed are enormous. They go so far as to influence
phenomena so remote as social ideologies and beliefs.
Nevertheless, the correlation is tangible, and, being such, should
be stated.
This study has convinced the writer of the important role of the
unconditioned reflexes.^'^ Though the concrete forms of the
"food-approaching" reactions may vary and a great number of
them have been learned, yet the "food-approaching" direction of
behavior, many "nutrition-reflexes" beginning with the kind of
materials suitable and unsuitable for food, and the fundamental
mechanism which controls the essentials of the process of
nutrition, and so on, are certainly innate. They "give a tone" to the
whole "complex symphony" of the actual behavior of a starving
man and to his learned reactions. These innate reflexes, being
eliminated, the whole behavior of a starving man becomes
incomprehensible. The same is true in regard to many other
unconditioned reflexes. This means that extreme
"environmentalism" is unsupportable from the behaviorist
standpoint.''"
" I can say the same on the basis of my study of the phenomena
of revolution Without an admission of the repression of a series of
unconditioned responses, it is impossible to understand the most
important features of these phenomena. See my Sociology of
Revolution.
^2 In a general discussion about instincts or learned actions it is

easy to construct any kind of a one-sided theory. Not being put
into operation, they may look all right. As soon, however, as an
investigator takes a factual problem and begins to analyze it, a
great many one-sided and "well-:ombed" general theories do not
work. This is the reason why here, as well as in other chapters of
the
635
I have already indicated the main weaknesses of the instinctivist
theories. In a proper behaviorist interpretation there are all the
strong points of the instinctivist theories, without their
weaknesses. Furthermore, when the number of really
behavioristic studies is sufficiently great; when the existing
unconditioned responses and their typical combinations into the
more complex bunches are sufficiently studied; when their
mechanism of stimulation, inhibition, modification, and
interrelations is properly investigated ; when their periodicity is
properly analyzed and the interrelationship of the conditioned
responses is investigated further; and finally, when the relative
powerfulness of various conditioned and unconditioned responses
is measured and a rough index of this comparative powerfulness
is outlined,^^then we will have every reason for expecting that
the behaviorist interpretation of social phenomena will throw a
great light on the mystery of human behavior and history. The
prospect is rather bright, but in order that it may be realized, it is
necessary to forsake the existing "flapping" around "instincts"; or
the metaphysical intrusion into the field of inner experiences; or
extreme speculation. It is necessary that we get busy with a
careful objective study of the unconditioned and the conditioned
responses along the lines outlined above.
book, I usually take the principal factual studies rather than the
general "Outlines," "Fundamentals," and "Introductions," which
are full of these general non-tested reasonings. By the way it is

curious to note that while many a pseudo-behavioristic
sociological treatise denies the existence or important r61e of the
unconditioned responses or "instincts," real behaviorism views
them as the very basis of all the conditioned responses. "The
totality of reflexes (or "instincts") composes a basic fund of man's
or animal's nervous activity," says Pavlov: Lectures, Chap. I and
passim.
" As far as I know only very few attempts have been made to
measure the comparative power of various "drives" and to find
methods for such measurements. wSee iMooRE, Henry T., "A
Method of Testing the vStrcngth of Instincts," American JournaL
of Psychology, Vol. XXVII, pp. 227-233. The method appears to
me unsuccessful. Much better seem to be the ex])erimental
methods applied in Pavlov's school in their attemj^ts to study the
problem. vSee Arkhangelskv, B. M., "A Comparative Power of
Various Forms of Inhibition" (in Russian), Works of Pavlov's
Laboratory, Vol. I, Book I, 1924; Tikhomirokf, N. P., "Power of a
Stimulus," Publications of the Society of the Russian Physicians,
1910 (in Russian); Chapin, F. vS., "Measuring the Volume of
vSocinl Stimuh," Social Forces, Vol. IV, j))). 479-495. Using "the
method of conflict," and observing which of the conflicting
reactions stimulated by diff"erent stimuli is driven out and which
remains in body-machinery, I have tried in a rough way to give
tentative indices of the comparative power of the principal "drives"
in my study of hunger.
636
4. INTERPRETATIONS IN TERMS OF DESIRES, CONATIONS,
PAIN AND PLEASURE, INTERESTS, WISHES, WANTS,
VOLITIONS, AND ATTITUDES
A. General Characteristic of the Branch. The third dominant

variety of the psychological school is represented by numerous
theories which take the psychological experiences of man as the
key to an understanding of human behavior and social processes,
classify them into a number of groups, view them as the dynamic
agencies of human behavior and social processes, and interpret
these processes as a manifestation of the dynamics of these
agencies. It is needless to say that the essentials of such an
interpretation are very old. Beginning with the ancient sources of
Indian, Chinese, Grecian, and Roman thought, and passing
throughout the mediaeval works, everywhere we find statements
which ascribe to human desires, affections, wishes, lusts,
conations, and similar subjective psychical agencies a good or
bad, but great, influence. In the same sources we find several
classifications of these agencies. At the present moment there are
rather numerous theories of this type. Their terminology is
somewhat different, but their essence is similar, in that they all
take psychical experience as a 'Variable" for the interpretation of
human behavior and social processes, and regard the latter as a
function of the play of these variables. The principal varieties of
these theories will next be described.
B. Interpretations in the Terms of Beliefs, Desires, and Conations.
Gabriel Tarde. Possibly the most prominent modern
representatives of this type of interpretation are Gabriel Tarde
(1843-1904) and Lester F. Ward (1841-1913). Among the
sociologists of the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the
twentieth century, Tarde occupied one of the few very prominent
positions. Born in a small town in France, he held the positions of
judge, criminal statistician, editor of a scientific journal, and finally,
the position of a professor of modern philosophy in the College de
France. Among his numerous works the most important are: Les
lois de Vimitation, (1890, English translation by E. C. Parsons,
1903), La philosophic penale, (1890), Les transformations du
droit, (1893), La logigue sociale, (1895),
637
Essais et melanges sociologiqiies, (1895), L'opposition universelle, (1897), Les lots sociales, (1898, English translation by H. C.
Warren, 1899), Etudes de psychologie sociale, (1898), L'opinion
et la foide, (1901). A short summary of the essentials of his
sociological doctrine is given in Tarde's Social Eaivs.^"^
A brilliant writer and inspirational thinker, Tarde left a great many
original plans, ideas, and theories in sociology, social psychology,
criminology, economics, and philosophy. Although marked by
originality, inspiration, and intuitive insight, his theories show also
that Tarde was rather a social philosopher than an accurate
scientific scholar. Many of his theories lack the necessary
accuracy and clearness; and some others are rather speculative.
None the less, Tarde has exerted an enormous influence on
contemporary sociological thought. Leaving here without
discussion his metaphysics, monadology, criminology, and other
theories which do not directly belong to sociology, the essentials
of the Tarde sociological system may be summed up as follows:
I. Social phenomena are psychical in their nature. They consist in
an interaction of individual minds. They are made up of beliefs
and desires of the interacting individuals. Where such a psychical
interaction is found there also is found society and social
phenomena in their pure form. Where such psychical relations are
lacking there is no society.^^ This shows that Tarde, although a
psychological sociologist, at the same time refuses to join either
psycho-social or biological organicism. He emphatically rejects all
theories of a ''social mind" or ''collective soul," and so on. Me
remains a representative of "nominalism" in sociology.
" About Tarde see Davis, M. M., op. cit., pp. 83-260. Notice the
good bibliography of the writings of Tarde, pp. 254-260; the
articles of R. Worms, E. Levasseur, M. Kovalevsky, P. Grimanelli,
Charles Limousin and others in/?^we international de sociologie,
Vol. XII, 1904; Bougle, C, "Gabriel Tarde," Revue de Paris, Vol.

Ill, 1905; Belot, "La logique sociale d'apres M. Tarde," Revue
philosophique, Vol. IV, 1896; Vierkandt, A., "G. Tarde und die
Bestrebungen der Soziologie," Zeitschrift fiir Sozial-Wissenschajt,
Jahrgang II, 1899; Tosti, G., "The Sociological Theories of G.
Tarde," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. XII, 1897; Ward, Lester
F., "Tarde's Social Laws," Science, Vol. XI, 1900; Kovalevsky, M.,
Contemporary Sociologists, Chap. I; Lichtenberger, J. P., op. cit..
Chap. XIV; Sqmllace, F., op. cit., pp. 321 ff.
^ See Tarde, G., "La psychologie intermentale," Revue intern, de
sociologie Vol. IX, 1901, j)p. 1-13; ôpposition universelle, pp.
165, 336, Paris, 1897; La logique sociale, \). 87, Paris, 1895; The
Laws of Imitation, preface.
638
2. The mental or inter-cerebral interaction of individuals, that is,
the exchange and circulation of the desires and beliefs which
compose the essence of social processes,has three principal
forms : repetition or imitation, opposition, and adaptation or
invention. Any new idea or belief which appears in the mind of an
individual tends to be repeated or imitated by other individuals. It
originates a wave of imitation and tends to spread throughout
society. In the process of its diffusion it meets, sooner or later,
another wave of imitation coming from another center of
invention. The meeting of the two or more different waves of
imitation results in the phenomena of their opposition. Thus
imitation produces opposition, as the second fundamental form of
social processes. Opposition of two or more waves of imitation
may result either in a mutual destruction of both waves, when
they are equally strong and irreconcilable; or in a destruction of
the weaker imitational wave by the stronger one; or in a mutual
adaptation of the two imitational patterns, which means a new
invention. Thus, opposition calls forth adaptation or invention as

the third fundamental form of social process. Any invention
adaptation is a ''lucky marriage" of two or more imitational
patterns (ideas, beliefs) in the mind of an individual. A new
invention being made, a new wave of imitation takes place; and
spreading, it meets another wave of imitation. This results in their
opposition; opposition leads to a new invention, and so on.
Such is Tarde's conception of the social process, its dynamics,
and its fundamental forms.^^
3. From the above it follows that, according to Tarde, invention is
the source of social change. Any new idea, belief, or form of
behavior which is invented is similar to a stone thrown into the
water of a social sea. It produces a wave of imitation, and this
spreads until it meets another wave. They clash and either annul
each other, or one of them annuls the other, or they originate a
new invention. Such incessant inventions, imitations, oppositions
constitute the dynamics of social life.
4. Of these three forms of social process, imitation and invention
have been studied by Tarde especially attentively. He tried
66 Tarde, G., Social Laws, passim; Vopposition universelle, pp.
88-98, 331-332, 428; La logique sociale, pp. 166 ff.
639
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SCHOOL
to indicate the factors which facihtate or hinder inventions. Innate
mental abihty. social need, and social conditions are among these
factors. Among Tarde's laws of imitation should be noted the
following: The imitation-wave tends to spread from its initial center
in geometrical progression. "Imitations are refracted by their
social media": a physical or racial heterogeneity of population is a
condition which checks the successful diffusion of an imitationwave. Imitations themselves may be either logical or extra-logical.
Ijoth forms usually proceed from the socially superior to the
socially inferior. Inner imitation in mind i)recedes an overt imitation
in practice. In the life history of a society there is a rhythm of the
period of custom and of fashion. In the period of custom it is the
ancient patterns which are predominantly imitated, while, in the
period of fashion, it is the most modern patterns of beliefs or
conduct which have prestige and are imitated.
Such is the skeleton of Tarde's sociological theory. It shows that
his conception of social life, its dynamics, its forms, and factors
are entirely psychological. The purpose of sociology is not to
explain the trans-subjective events of history or of the behavior of
men in their concrete i)sycho-physical form, but in the dynamics
of ideas, beliefs, desires, and other inner exjêri-ences. Men's
behavior, relationship, historical and social events, as transsubjective phenomena, are interesting to Tarde's sociology only
so far as they are a manifestation of mental phenomena, and as
far as they may influence the psychic processes of invention,
opposition, and imitation. Outside of this they lose any interest for
his sociology.'"^^ This signifies that the very objective
^^ In the above \vc saw that the attitude of De Roberty is similar.
P'ôr him the subject matter of sociology is also "social thought,"
but not a "cosmo-bio-social" phenomenon of history or human
behavior. Of present-day sociologists a similar conception is
logically, developed in E. C. Hayes' (b. 1868) Introduction to the
Study of Sociology. Interrelated psychical activities ("experienceactivity") are the essentials of social life or social process. They
comj)ose the object matter of sociology; and the study of their
relationship (suggestion of ideas, radiation of sentiments, and
imitation of overt practices), their inter-causation, their forms, and
so forth, is considered to be the proper task of sociology. Physical
phenomena, such as the geographic environment, the artificial
physical environmenttechniqueor the psycho-physical traits of

the poj)u-lation, are only "conditioning factors" of social life, and
are taken into consideration only so far as they arc
"manifestations" of social "activity-experiences." Ideas,
sentiments, and other psychic phenomena are regarded as
agencies which
640
of Tarde's sociolog}^ is quite different from that of many other
sociologists who try not so much to study the psychic interaction
of individuals, but human behavior, human interrelations, social
and historical events, as such, regardless of whether they are
"manifestations" of mental processes or not. Tarde, and other
psychological sociologists, try to decipher the dynamics of ideas,
desires, beliefs, in their social circulation, while other sociologists,
on the contrary, try to decipher the dynamics of a trans-subjective
human behavior and social events, as such. This is the great dif,ference in the understanding of the very nature and objective of
sociology. It is responsible for many other differences between
these two classes of sociologists.
Lester F. Ward. Another of the most prominent representatives
of an interpretation of social phenomena in terms of desires and
conations is Lester F. Ward (1841-1913).^^ Together, Henry
Gary, W. G. Sumner, and L. Ward represent probably the most
conspicuous figures of the earlier generation of American
sociologists who ranked at that time among the most prominent
sociologists of the world. In Ward's numerous works, and
especially in Dynamic Sociology (1883), Psychic Factors of Ciz/ilization (1893), Outlines of Sociology (1898), Pure Sociology
(1903) and Applied Sociology (1906), he laid down a broad
system, not so much like a sociology as social philosophy. Putting
aside the philosophical part of his system, which does not
concern us here, we find that its purely sociological part consists

in his theory of social forces, and in his comparison of the
teleological or conative character of social process to the blind
character of natural process.
determine human behavior and social processes. "The human
organism is a mechanism adapted to function under the
stimulation of ideas." See Haves, Edward C, op. cit., Chaps. XVIIXXI and passim, an4 especially pp. 302-306, 311-316, 340-347^^ About L. F. Ward see Lichtenberger, J. P., Development of
Social Theory, Chap. XIII; Dealey, James Q., Sociology, Its
Development and Application, N. Y., 1920; "L. F. Ward," Social
Forces, Vol. IV, pp. 257-272. See further the articles of E. A.
Ross, F. H. Giddings, U. G. Weatherly, C. A. Ellwood, A. W.
Small, published in American Journal of Sociology, Vol. XIX, July;
Barth, P., op. cit., pp. 446 ff.; SoROKiN, P., "Principal Theories of
Progress" (in Russian), Vestnik Snania, September, 191 1;
House, Floyd N., "The Concept 'Social Forces' in American
Sociology," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. XXXI,
September, pp. 156 fT.
641
641
Ward's theory of social forces is marked in the first place by a
discrimination of the dynamic and the guiding agencies among
these forces. Dynamic agencies are desires or feelings; the
guiding agency is the human intellect. The first supplies the
dynamic energy; the second perceives the ways and means of
attaining ends. ''It is no force, but only a condition. It does not
propel, it only directs" (the blind force of desires)."''^ Desires as
real social forces are classified as follows : ^^
Social Forces
Physical forces (Function bodily)
Ontogenetic
forces Philogenetic forces
Spiritual forces fSociogenetic
(Function psychic) 1 forces
Seeking pleasure,
avoiding pain Direct, sexual Indirect, consanguineal
Moral, seeking the safe and good
Esthetic, seeking the beautiful
Intellectual, seeking the useful and true
These desires are the ''motor-power" of human behavior and
social processes. Intellect's function, since the time of its slow
evolving, has been the guidance of the blind forces of desires.
This function of intellect is gradually increasing. Accordingly,
imder its influence the social adaptation of man assumes a more
and more teleological and circuitous or indirect character, instead
of a blind and direct character of the natural process not guided
by intellect. This means that the social adaptation of man
becomes more and more artificial, calculated, self-directed, and
self-controlled by intellect. Ward depicts a rather optimistic
prospect of the future of mankind, and his theory stimulates
human
^' See the details in Ward, Dynamic Sociology, Vol. I, pp. 69, 468
ff.; Vol. II, 89 ff., 93 ff.; Piire Sorinlogy, ])]). 256 ff.; Psychic Factors
of Civilizatio7i, passim and Chap. XXXIII.
* Pure Sociology, p. 261. Compare Dynamic Sociology, Vol. I, p.
472.
642
efforts, guided by knowledge, to an organization of universal
happiness as the ultimate end of conation.^^
Partly under the influence of Ward, partly independent from him,
many a prominent sociologist has set forth theories similar to
those of Ward's. Such is, for instance, E. A. Ross's theory of
desires as social forces. The desires are classified into two large
classes: the natural and the cultural. The natural desires are: (a)
appetitive (hunger, thirst, sex-appetite); (b) hedonic (fear,
aversion to pain, love of ease, warmth, sensuous pleasure) ;
(c) egotic (shame, envy, love of liberty, of glory, of power) ;
(d) affective (sympathy, sociability, love, hate, jealousy, anger,
revenge) ; (e) recreative (play impulses, love of self-expression).
The cultural desires are: (a) religious; (b) ethical; (c) aesthetic; (d)
intellectuals-Professor Charles A. Ellwood, in his later works, side
by side
with the geographic and biological forces, gives great importance
to psychic factors, to impulses, to feelings, and to intelligence.^^
In his opinion, ''all our social life and social behavior are not only
embedded in feeling, but largely guided and controlled by feeling."
Again, ''intelligence is the active agent in social progress" and it
plays an exclusively important part. Several other authors, like W.
G. Sumner and A. Keller (hunger, love, vanity and fear), F. A.
Bushee, and partly O. Spann, hold similar positions.^^ Such is

this hedonistic plus intellectualistic variety of the school.
C. Interpretations in Terms of Interests. The second variety
" See Dynamic Sociology, Vol. I, pp. 15, 18, 29, 487 ff.; Vol. II, pp.
2, 13, 93, and passim; Pure Sociology, pp. 15-29, 545, and
passim.
'2 Ross, Edward A., "Moot Points in Sociology," American Journal
of Sociology, Vols. VIII, IX, X, especially Chap. V. Professor
Ross's position in this respect has undergone slight changes in
his writings. His present attitude in this point in essence is still
essentially the same. "The immediate causes of social
phenomena are to be sought in the human mind." The original
social forces are human instincts. The combination of these
instincts or cravings, or wants, gives "the derivative social forces"
in the form of the "interests" like wealth, government, religion, and
knowledge. To these forces is attached the race factor and
geographic environment. Such is the latest theory of Ross as
outlined in his Principles of Sociology, Chaps. IV to VII.
Êllwood, Charles A., Introductioyi to Social Psychology, pp. 7577, 1917; The Psychology of Human Society, pp. 316 fT., 365 ff.,
and Chaps. Ill, X, XII.
" Sumner-Keller, op. cit., pp. 21 ff. and passim; Bushee, F. A.,
Principles of Sociology, pp. 57 ff.; Spann, O., op. cit., p. 20.
Spann regards "Emphindungen'* and "actions" as the final
"elements" of society.
I
643
of the discussed group of introspectivist psychological
interpretations is represented by theories which take the
''interests" as a variable of human behavior and social processes.

The term, ''interest," is different from that of "desire" or "feeling,"
and the classification of the interests also varies from author to
author. But, in essence, the character of the interest theories is
essentially the same as that of the desire theories. Gustav Ratzenhofer's ^^ and Albion Small's theories of the interests as the
permanent and fundamental factors of social dynamics, are
representative. According to Ratzenhofer, "in the beginning were
interests." Viewing them as "the inner necessities" or drives he
claims that "it is the key of interests that unlocks the door of every
treasure house of sociological lore." Social life is a huge bundle of
interests; social groupings are but the groupings of individuals
around the interests; and social dynamics itself is but an
incessant conflict, adaptation, and inter-play of the interests of the
members of a society. The principal interests, according to
Ratzenhofer, are: (i) the racial or sexual; (2) food and selfpreservation or physiological interest; (3) the individual interest;
(4) the social interests, (in family, class, nation); (5) the
transcendental interests, (in an unseen and ultimate absolute or in
religion and philosophy).^^
Albion Small's ^^ theory of interests represents a modification of
Ratzenhofer's theory. For Small also "interests are the stuff that
men are made of."
The whole life-process, whether viewed in its individual or in its
social phase, is at last the process of developing, adjusting, and
satisfying interests [understood as] the unsatisfied capacity,
corresponding to an unrealized condition, and ])redisposition to
such rearrangement as would tend to realize the indicated
condition.
" Bom in 1842, died in 1904. About Ratzenhofer see
Lichtenberger, J. P., op. cit., Chap. XV; Barth, P., op. cit., pp. 472
ff.; Jacobs, P. P., German Sociology, N. Y., 1909; Small, A.,

General Sociology, 1905, Chap. XIII.
"Ratzenhofer, G., Die soziologische Erkenntnis, pp. 55-66,
Leipzig, 1898; some other works of Ratzenhofer are: Wesen und
Zweck der Politik, 3 volumes Leipzig, 1893; Soziologie, Leipzig,
1907.
" Born 1854, died 1926. Principal works are: An Introduction to
the Study oj Society (in collalôration with (}corge E, Vincent),
1894; General Sociology, 1905; Adam Smith and Modern
Sociology, 1907; The Cameralists, 1910; The Meaning of Social
Science, 1910; Origins of Sociology, 1924. About Small see the
articles of several authors in American Journal of Sociology, Vol.
XXXII, No. i; Hayes, E. C, "A. W. Small," Social Forces, Vol. IV
No. 4.
644
In this sense the theory of interests is ''the latest word in
sociology." ^^ The interests are classified by Small into six
classes: health, wealth, sociability or prestige, knowledge, beauty,
and Tightness.^^
There is no need to enumerate the many other theories which use
the concept of interests for an explanation of social phenomena
and as a principal or partial social force. It is used by Ross, Spann
and even by A. Bentley.'^^ It is extensively used by economists,
but their use of this term is considerably different. Their "interests"
have a stick for measurement, and they represent almost always
some trans-subjective phenomena. For this reason they must not
be mixed with the above sociological concepts of interests,
especially in Ratzenhofer's and Small's interpretation.
D. Interpretations in Terms of Wishes, Volitions, Attitudes, and so

on. If, instead of the interests and desires in the preceding
theories we put the word "wishes," and slightly modify the above
classifications, we shall find the interpretation of social
phenomena in terms of wishes. The theories of W. I. Thomas
(1863- ), R. Park (1864- ), and E. Burgess may be regarded as
the modern forms of this old type of the interpretation of human
behavior and social dynamics. Similarly to Ward, Small,
Ratzenhofer and others, who, like the social physicists of the
seventeenth century, regard the "desires" or the "interests" as the
final atoms into which the social life is dissolvable. Professors
Thomas, Park, and Burgess regard wishes as the most
elementary component of social phenomena. In a sociological
analysis the wishes play a role similar to that of the electrons in
chemical analysis. Wishes are numerous. But they may be
classed into a few fundamental classes. Such classes are four:
the wish for security, the wish for new experience, the wish for
response, and the wish for recognition.
68 Small, A., General Sociology, pp. 197-198, 282-284, 425-426,
433.
69 Ibid., pp. 197-198. See the details in House, F., op. cit.,
American Journal of Sociology, Vol. XXXI, pp. 507-512.
' Through the identification of the concepts of social group
activity and interests, and through the further replacement of
group activity by interests, A. Bentley skipped from a behaviorist
position into that of the psychological interpretation of social
phenomena in terms of interests. See Bentley, A., Process of
Government, pp. 258 fT.; see also his "Simmel, Durkheim and
Ratzenhofer/' American Journal of Sociology, Vol. XXXII, pp. 250256.
645
The combination of wishes and sentiments composes attitudes or

behavior patterns which stand toward the wishes in the same
relationship as the electrons in chemistry toward the elementary
substances.^^ Further examples of the operations with the wishes
as a cognitive principle are given in the works of the Freudian
school, many psychologists, social philosophers, and ordinary
philosophers.^^
E. Interpretations in the Terms of Ideas, Sentiments and
Emotions. The most conspicuous samples of the interpretation
of social phenomena in the terms of ideas, and especially of
scientific ideas, were given above in characterizing the theories of
De Rob-erty and A. Fouillee. (See the sociologistic school.)
Therefore, we need not recapitulate these and similar theories
here.
Furthermore, it is needless also to give a detailed analysis of
other interpretations of social phenomena in terms of the
sentiments, affections, emotions, or other ''components" of
psychical experience. It is enough to say that such interpretations
are not lacking,"^^ but on the other hand, they represent rather a
terminological than a substantial difference from the above
psychological theories. Like them they, under the name of the
sentiments, affections, and emotions, take an intra-individual
psychical datum,
'1 See Park, R., and Burgess, E., Introduction to the Science of
Sociology, pp. 435-443 and Chap. VII; Thomas, William I., The
Unadjusted Girl, pp. 4 ff., Boston, 1923; Thomas, W. I., and
Znaniecky, F., The Polish Peasant in Europe and America, Vol. I,
pp. 21-23, 72-73. In this earher work Thomas' conceptions of
attitude, value, causation, and wishes is somewhat different from
that given in The Unadjusted Girl.
^^ See, for instance, Holt., E. B,, The Freudian Wish and Its Place
in Ethics, N. Y., 1915; Watson, John B., "The Psychology of Wish
Fulfillment," Scien-tific Monthly, pp. 479-486, 1916. The most

important parts of these works are given in Park and Burgess, op.
cit.; Sutherland, E., Crimiîology, pp. 118 ff., 1924; VAN DER
Hoop, J. H., Character and Unconscious, Chap. III. The enormous
literature of the voluntaristic psychology and philosophy
represents a modified variety of the discussed group of the
theories, with the difference which is given between the meaning
of the "wish" and the "will." The philosophies of Schopenhauer,
Nietzsche, and to some extent of Hegel, are samples of such a
philosophical interpretation of the universe in terms of volition.
" See, for instance, Ribot, T. A., Psychology of Sentiments,
Russian translation, pp. 15 ff. and passim, 1898; Lange, The
Dynamics of Emotions, Russian translation, pp. 14 ff., 1896;
Petrajitzkv, L., Introdiiction to the Theory of Law and Ethics,
passim; Patten, Simon S., The Theory of Social Forces,
Philadelphia, 1896; see also Pareto's classification of the residui;
and vSumner's four "motive-interests": hunger, sex passion,
vanity, and fear. Sumner, W. G., Folkways, 22 and passim.
646
and, taking it as a variable, try to show its "operations" in human
behavior and socio-historical phenomena.^^
F. Criticism. The above gives all the essential theories of the
interpretations of social phenomena in the terms of introspective
psychology. Let us now turn to a criticism of the theories. In spite
of their difference in terminology and other details, their essential
''introspective" character is similar. Therefore their weak and
strong points are practically the same. The principal shortcomings
of the theories seem to be as follows:
I. In so far as the theories make of psychic experiences the

causes which determine the dynamics of trans-suhjective
phenomena, they are a variety of an animistic interpretation. In
the above criticism of the behavioristic interpretations I indicated
that their fundamental shortcomings consist in their intrusion into
the field of the inner experience which is indescribable at all in the
terms of, and could not be studied with the methods of,
behaviorism. The same error is made by the discussed theories
with the difference that with their introspective terminology and
methods they unlawfully invade the field of the trans-subjective
phenomena of behavior and social events, for which their
methods and terminology are also unsuited. They claim that these
trans-subjective phenomena are determined by the ideas, the
wishes, the desires, and so on. These psychical experiences are
made the agencies which govern the dynamics of the transsubjective processes, cause, determine, and control them. In so
far the theories must be regarded as a variety of animistic
interpretation. In this sense, they are pseudo-scientific. Indeed, in
what consists their explanation? It is very simple. Each author fills
a man with a certain number of desires, interests, wishes,
sentiments, and emotions. Furthermore, he takes a man's
behavior and explains it in a very simple manner. Man performs a
series of sexual activities because he has the "sex-desire," "sexwish," or "reproductive interest." Man goes to a court and sues
another man because he has the "desire, or the wish, or the
interest" of "rightness." And so on. The wishes, the desires,
'*See, for instance, Fairbanks, A., Introduction to Sociology, 3rd
edit., pp. 108-141; De Greef, G., Introduction d la sociologie, Vol.
I, pp. 214 ff., 1896; Takhtareff, K. M., Soziologia, pp. 25-26, 4748, 1918 (in Russian); Stuck-ENBERG, J. H. W., Sociology, Vol. I,
pp. 203 ff., 1903.
647
the interests and the sentiments here play the same role which in
primitive animistic theories is played by various "spirits" or
supernatural agencies. The explanations are a replica of Moliere's
famous sarcasm: "Opium makes man sleepy because it has a
sleeping power." Like a prestidigitator, the authors betimes put
into a man-bag a series of wishes and desires, and after that, with
a serious expression, they take out of the bag one or several of
the desires and wishes, according to the circumstances, and
convincingly add: "This agency is responsible for the actions or
events studied." The procedure is certainly easy, but one may
seriously doubt as to whether or not it has any cognitive value."^^
2. TJie very nature of the theories makes exceedingly difficult or
even impossible any causal or functional analysis of the transsubjective phenomena. As wê have seen, the theories pretend
that the psychical experiences, like desires, wîshes, interests,
and so on, are the forces which causally determine the
movements of the body and the dynamics of the trans-subjective
social and historical events. The theories try to bridge the psychic
and the trans-subjective sets of phenomena. The first
consequence of such a claim is that the theories should meet all
the objections which are directed against similar theories in
psychology and philosophy. How an "idea," or "desire," or "wish,"
as a pure psychic experience, can influence the receptors,
conductors, and effectors of the nervous system and bodily
movements, together with such trans-subjective phenomena as
fighting, or the decreasing birth rate, and so on, is the problem to
be met by these theories. It is needless to say that, being pretty
crude in their philosophical part, the theories are likely to find
dif^culty in meeting this and many other objections."^^ Meanwhile,
without
'5 In this sense A. Bentley's criticism of all such theories appears
quite valid. See his Process of Governmefit, Part I. I have already
mentioned that in his constructive part this author fell into the
same error of "animism" with his theory of "interests-groups."
'<5 See Weiss, A. P., "Relation between Structural and Behavior

Psychology," Psychological Review, pp. 301-317, 1917; "Relation
between Functional and Behavior Psychology," ihid., No. 5, 1917;
Perry, R. B., "Docility and Pur-posiveness," ibid., No. i, 1918;
Orjentzkv, R. M., "The Nature of P:conomic Phenomena and the
Methods of Their Study," (in Russian), luridichesky Vestnik, No. 5,
1914. Take further any substantial text in psychology and scudy
the arguments of the piirtizans of various theories against their
opponents
648
a satisfactory answer to the above and many other objections,
their fundamental contention remains unproved and questionable.
Questionable also become all their other claims. Owing to this,
they are vitiated from their starting point.
Granting, however, that in some way they will cope with this
difficulty, the theories are very unsatisfactory from the standpoint
of a scientific methodolog}^ Instead of alleviating the difficulty of
the study, they greatly increase it. This may be seen from the
following considerations.
Their causal analysis of human behavior or social events may be
schematically depicted as follows :
A B A' B' A" B"
If a psychical agency is regarded as the cause of an overt action,
then, besides the mystery of such a causation, we have a causal
chain in which the trans-subjective phenomena: B, B', B" are
disconnected from one another by the insertion of the psychic
links: A, A', A" into the causal chain. The whole chain represents
thus an incessant mental salto mortale from the realm of psychic
experience to that of the trans-subjective phenomena, and vice

versa. It is possible of course to talk of such a causal chain, but
science knows nothing similar to it. The very character of such a
chain is a denial of the causation known to other sciences,
because all causal formulas start with trans-subjective
phenomena, use them, and finish with them too. They nowhere
admit a discontinuing of their causal sequence by the insertion of
the non-trans-subjective links. From this standpoint the above
''causation" is sheer mysticism. It precludes any causal analysis of
the phenomena. Such is the first methodological inconvenience of
the theories.
Their second inconvenience may be seen from their analysis of
the stages through which human action passes. Here are two
examples: According to Novicow, any conscientious action is
started with some trans-subjective stimuli; being started it enters
*'the inner or psychic stage" and passes there through the sub649
649
stages of sensation, representation, idea, desire, and volition;
only after this does it assume again the form of an overt action
which becomes 'an incarnation" of all these sensations,
representations, ideas, desires, and volitions. According to M. E.
Mayer, the genesis of an overt action is still more complex. Both
theories may be represented schematically in the following way.
Novicow's stages of the genesis of a response i*^^
B-^sensation->^representation->îdea->-desire-^volition->-C
trans- psychical link of the causal chain of an action transsubjective stimulus
and its successive psychical stages

subjective reaction
M. E. Mayer's genesis of human action:
78
B
.2
o
ctS
c
trans- psychical link of the causal chain of an action trans-sub jec
and its successive psychical stages subjective tive stimulus
reaction
With some variation, all the discussed theories explicitly or
implicitly presuppose something similar. According to the theories
we must take the psychical link as an agency or variable which
produces the overt action C. This means that we must keep an
account of all components of the variables: sensation,
representations, desires, motives, ideas, purposes, and volitions.
'^ Novicow, I., Conscience et volonte socialc, pp. 89 ff.
'^ Mayer, M. E., Die Schuldhaftc Ilandliing und ihre Arten im
Strafrecht, 1901, Chap. II. Possibly the most detailed
psychological analysis of a human action from the psychological
standpoint has been given in numerous works of the crirai*
nv)logists of which Mayer's work is a sample.
650

Each of them represents a sub-variable of the whole psychical
variable. Take further into consideration that all these psychical
sub-variables are extremely unstable, since they incessantly
fluctuate and change. Consider also the lack of method in their
measurement. When only these circumstances are taken into
consideration, it becomes quite clear that even the greatest
mathematician cannot keep account of all these sub-variables
and their fluctuations; therefore, a computation of their ''function,"
that is, a single overt action, becomes impossible. Only God can
solve an equation in which are analyzed a series of actions of
several individuals from the standpoint of the criticized theories.
An investigator is as though in the midst of a great multitude of
psychical shadows, which incessantly dance, change, and
transform. These shadows he must take as 'Variables" to explain
through them a single, or a set of trans-subjective phenomena!
The method is really that of an explanation of clanim per ob-sciir
111711. The overt actions are much simpler than these psychic
variables offered to explain them. Instead of an alleviation of the
difficulties of the study, the theories pile them up to an extent
which makes scientific analysis of behavior impossible.
No better becomes the situation if the above scheme is replaced
by the following one :
Let AB represent the chain of the overt action or trans-subjective
phenomena and CD the stream of the desires, wishes, ideas, or
volitions. Each of the series develops without interruption. The
series CD is the variable, the series AB its "function," result, or
manifestation. The analysis remains impossible still, because the
series CD is more complex than the series AB. The multiplicity
and incessant turmoil of the wishes, desires, etc., make the
variable so complex and poorly defined that the correlation of both
series and their links is practically excluded.
This is not all. According to the scheme, the proposition : "The

trans-subjective phenomena A are a result of the wish, or desire,
or idea a" presupposes that the wish a manifests itself in the form
651
of an overt action A; the wishes h, c, d, e, in the forms of the
corresponding actions B, C, D, E; otherwise, the whole contention
becomes empty. Meanwhile, the establishment of such
propositions is impossible because the same desire a may be
accompanied by various forms of overt activity, and the same
overt activity may be paralleled by the most different wishes or
desires. My desire to eat may be followed by the actions of
entering a restaurant, or of digging potatoes from a kitchen
garden, or of working in a factory to get money to buy the food, or
of singing in a theater for a dinner. The overt action of a typist
may be paralleled by her dreaming of a trip to Florida, or by
thinking of a dress to be bought for the money obtained by typing,
or by the thoughts of spending the money in a dance hall.'^^ If
such is the case, an explanation along the line of the criticized
theory becomes impossible. No certain correlation between a
certain part of the series CD and a certain part of the series AB
can be estabHshed. The whole theory goes to the wall.^^
'5 Compare Hayes, E. C, "Classification of Social Phenomena,"
American Journal of Sociology, Vol. XVII. The same is true of the
attempts to deduce certain social institutions from certain desires
or wishes or interests. For instance, Sumner and Keller regard the
industrial organization, property, war for plunder, and the
regulative organization as the phenomena "summoned by hunger
into being"; marriage and family as an outcome of "love-interest";
ostentation in dress, ornament, social etiquette, war for glory,
games, gambling, narcotics, etc., as a function of "vanity"; religion
as an outcome of "fear-interests." Sumner and Keller, op. cit., pp.
89-90. It is easy to see that the attempt is a mere variety of the
above "instinctive drives" theories, though the authors deny the

instincts; furthermore the authors themselves recognize an
unsatisfactory character of the theory, saying that these
correlations are rather hopeless because "the categories run into
one another across zones of transition, and no such zones are
clean-cut but all are blurred." "Property goes back in no small
degree to vanity; marriage is not by any means to be connected
solely with sex and love," and so on. And factually the above
correlations are of no use in the analysis of these authors except
in the role of a purely exterior frame in their presentation of the
materials.
* No better is that variety of these theories which is represented
by Professors Park and Burgess in their theory of the wishes and
the attitudes. Their very conception of an "attitude" introduced to
help the conception of wish, is a logical monster. We read, "An
attitude is the tendency of the person to react positively or
negatively to the total situation." They "are the mobilization of the
will of the person. . . . The wishes enter into attitude as
components. . . . The clearest way to think of attitudes is as
behavior patterns or units of behavior. The two most elementary
behavior patterns are the tendency to approach and the tendency
to withdraw." Thus we have a concept which on the one hand is
something purely psychological (a wish), and, on the other hand,
something trans-subjective and physical ("behavior unit" or
"pattern"). In fact, it is a kind of a bag (tendency) into whic-li are
\)\\t several wishes, sentiments, emotions.
652
3. As a matter of fact, the theories explain little, and are not used
even by their authors. The above criticism is excellently warranted
by the discussed theories. First, their classification of the number
of desires, wishes, interests, sentiments, or emotions varies from
author to author. Some discriminate four or six classes, while

some others have more than one hundred. Who is right? No one,
because the classifications are not based on any factual reality,
but are purely speculative, and based on the whims of the
authors. Second, if we ask, for instance, why Small discriminates
six, but not thirty-six classes of interests, or why Thomas indicates
only four, but not one hundred forty-four ''wishes," we would not
find any satisfactory answer. The situation is similar to that in the
classifications of instincts, with this difference, however, that
many of the instinct-classifications are better, being based on
observed uniformities, while in these psychological theories it is
hard to find even such an approximation to reality. Consider the
classes of the desires, interests, or wishes, as, for example, ''the
interests in rightness," or "sociability," or "vanity," or the "wish for
response" and "new experience." Is it not clear that these very
classes represent a kind of a dark cellar which you may fill with
w^hatever you please and as you please? Something more
indefinite it is hard to imagine. We are told that the wnsh for new
experience may "incarnate" itself in the forms of hunting, athletics,
gambling, crime, scientific research, exploration, and even a
craving for a variety of sex affairs. Likewise, the wish for security
manifests itself in the actions of securing food and the means of
subsistence, in that of avarice, systematic labor, conservatism,
flying from danger, attacking and fiirhtino: activities, and so on. Or
vanitv-interest "materializes" itself in practices of ostentation in
dress, ornament, social etieven instincts, and some other psychical phenomena. Side by
side with them there is also a "reaction," "behavior pattern," and
"behavior units," "withdrawing" and "approaching" as something
trans-subjective. I am sorry to say that such a monstrous
hodgepodge of the psychical and the trans-subjective elements is
unthinkable, and still less may it be one of the fundamental
concepts of sociology. In this as well as in many "modern
psychologies" we have some new terms which in spite of their
popularity, are in fact quite defective and unsuitable for any

scientific analysis. The fault, however, is not with the authors. It
hes partly in the nature of the problem itself, and partly in the
magic of words which still reigns in social and psychological
sciences. vSee Park and Burgess, op. cit., pp. 438-439; read
attentively the whole of Chapter VII.
653
quette, war for glory, games, gambling, the use of stimulants,
narcotics, dancing, play-acting, the fine arts, etc. This variety and
heterogeneity of the forms of the "incarnation" of each of the
wishes or interests testifies clearly that each of them represents a
bag filled by chance wîth the most heterogeneous activities,
unrelated either neurologically, psychologically, or logically to one
another. Any classification of wishes may be as good as this. The
same is true of the classification of desires, interests, and so on.
Furthermore, in order that the wishes, desires, or interests may
serve as variables, we must know whether or not they are
constant, or whether they are varying in their intensity and
stimulating power. Are they given an identical proportion among
all human beings, or is their distribution among them varied from
man to man, from sex to sex, and within the same man from
moment to moment? We must know further which of the wishes,
desires, interests, and so forth are stronger or wêaker, what their
relationship is, whether antagonistic or solidary, and w^hen,
where, and why. We must also know how to measure their
intensity and variation. Only when these and many other prol)lems are solved may these ''variables" be used as real variables
and we may attempt to correlate them with overt actions and to
interpret them as functions of the "wish-desire-interest-variables."
It is needless to say that nothing like this has been done, or even
attempted. Therefore it is a rather hopeless enterprise to make
such ''foggy blots" the fundamental "variables" of human behavior
and to try to explain something through such variables. Even the

studies of the authors show this clearly. Have Small, Ward,
Sumner and Keller, or Thomas, or any others succeeded in
building something with their help? Nothing. In their works they
play the role of an incidental appendix which is mechanically
attached to their other valuable theories. The categories are not
used at all upon their factual analysis. If, sometimes, they are
incidentally mentioned, they do not add any cognitive value to
what has been obtained by the authors in other ways and without
these instrumental concepts.^^ It is natural,
*i This is especially true in regard to the works of Thomas. The
psychology of the Polish peasant or the unadjusted girl is given by
concrete cases. The
654
therefore, that operating with such ''forces" can aid Httle in a
causal or functional analysis of the trans-subjective
phenomena.^^
4. Several Specific Points of the Theories are Questionable.
Besides the above shortcomings common to all the theories, their
specific features are also questionable.
Take, for instance, Tarde's conception of imitation, and the role
ascribed to it. The very concept is extremely vague. It is so broad
that practically every phenomenon of similarity in the behavior of
men or in the social characteristics of a group is a manifestation
or result of imitation, according to Tarde. It is needless to say that
such an all-embracing concept, like the Freudian libido, ceases to
have any definite contents, and becomes scientifically useless.
Taken in a narrower sense, it does not justify at all that enormous
role which has been ascribed to it by Tarde and many others.^^
four wishes do not add anything to what is depicted in the

concrete cases given in the letters.
82 From this methodological standpoint one cannot but agree with
the following statement of Ivan Pavlov: "During thirteen years of
my study of behavior, in no single case have 'psychological
interpretations' happened to be useful for an analysis of the
phenomena. A reflection of the nervous processes in an inner
experience is very peculiar and disfigured, and, all in all, is
exceedingly inaccurate and conditional." Pavlov, Ivan, "A
Genuine Physiology of the Brain," Twenty Years, p. 182;
Lectures, Chaps. I and II.
83 Tarde, V. Sigele, P. Rossi, B. Sidis, W. BekhterefT, G. Le Bon,
Marpillero, A. Vigouroux, P. Juquelier, G. Dumas, P. Aubry, J. M.
Baldwin, S. Freud, N. K. Mikhailovsky, and the majority of the
writers about imitation, suggestion, mob-mind, and psychology of
a crowd have greatly exaggerated the importance of imitationsuggestion and uncritically ascribed to these factors a great many
effects which do not belong to them. Likewise, there is a
considerable exaggeration of the "mobbish" traits in a description
of the mob-mind and crowd-psychology. Even such relatively
good works as The Behavior of Crowds by E. D. Martin are not
entirely free from the same mistake. The more the corresponding
phenomena are studied, the less important becomes the role of
imitation-suggestion, and the less "mob-minded" becomes a mob
at the virtue of these factors. See a sound criticism of the
imitation-suggestion theories in Durkheim, E., Le suicide, chapter
about imitation; in Kovalevsky, M., Contemporary Sociologists^
Chap. I; Allport, F., Social Psychology, pp. 239 ff.; especially
Faris, Ellsworth, "The Concept of Imitation," American Journal of
Sociology, Vol. XXXII, pp. 367-379; MoEDE, Walter, "Die
Massen- und Sozialpsychologie im kritischen Uberblick,"
Zeitschrift fiir pddagogische Psychologie und experimentelle
Pddagogik, 191 5; a history of the corresponding theories is given
in Davis, M. M., op. cit., pp. 109-118. More adequate is

KrAskovi^, B., Die Psychologie der Kollektivitdten, Vukovar, 1915;
Moede, W., op. cit. For the ancient theories in this field see
Rivista Italiana di Sociologia for 1900, 1901, where are published
the papers of BiANCHi, "II charattere di razza"; de Robertls, R.,
"Intomo alia concezione della psicologia sociale"; Alimena, "Per la
storia della psicologie colletiva," Archivio di Psicologia collettiva,
May, 1900; Orano, Psicologia sociale, Bari, 1920.
655
Take further L. Ward's hypothesis of the replacement of the blind
character of natural evolution by a conative and teleological
progress in the course of time. As far as this theory, and a similar
theory of Professor L. T. Hobhouse, claim that in the course of
time man's behavior becomes more and more rationahstic and
the social processes tend to be more and more controlled by the
conscientious volitions of human beings, the theory is far from
being proved. It appeals to us and appears convincing, and yet,
when carefully tested, it must be recognized as being at least
questionable. Modern man in some respects is certainly more
rationalistic than primitive man; but in other respects we are likely
to be a prey of blind forces in a greater degree than the peoples
of the past and ancient societies.
In a similar way, it would be possible to indicate other
questionable features in the discussed theories, but a lack of
space does not permit our doing it. By these remarks I shall finish
a general criticism of the theories. The above remarks are
sufficient to show their weak points.^^ These shortcomings we
shall meet again in the discussion of the theories which deal with
the social role of religion, mores, law, arts, public opinion, and
other psycho-social factors. (See the next chapter.)
G. Conclusion on the Introspectivist Interpretations. The
preceding criticism of these theories has been adverse as far as
these theories try to intrude upon the field of the trans-subjective

phenomena which cannot be studied with the methods of these
theo-ries; and also as far as the theories claim to make of the
psychical agency a causative agency of trans-subjective
phenomena. This, however, does not mean that the introspective
theories are value-By the way, it should be noted that several
years before Tarde, N. K. Mikhail-ovsky published his Heroes and
Crowd, and other works, in which he more accurately than Tarde
set forth the theory of imitation-suggestion. The theory itself is
very old. In the works of Confucius and Plato we already find a
clear description of the phenomena and practical utiHzation of
imitation for the sake of education.
** The pretensions of the theories which claim to view the desire,
or the interests, or the wishes as the "sociological atoms" or the
"sociological electrons" or the "ultimate elements of social
phenomena," and to view their dynamics as "the simplest modes
of motion" are mere pretensions. Being an imitation of the "social
physics" of the seventeenth century, these pretensions are
altogether unwarranted. To talk about them as "the simplest
modes of motion which we can trace in the conduct of the human
being" is to say something similar to: "A walk to the moon is the
simplest walk after lunch."
656
less. On the contrary, they are very valuable, inasmuch as they
describe the inner psychical experience and meaning of
psychosocial phenomena. This realm is as valuable for us as the
world of trans-subjective facts, and, within this realm, the
introspective psychological theories are likely to be the only
method of their study. This means that they may have a great
cognitive value. Likewise, the dynamics of the psychical
experience of a man or a group could be properly described only
with the methods and terminology of the introspective theories. At

any rate, they are necessary and unavoidable for its knowledge.
Even when we study some trans-subjective phenomena, for
instance a writing, a book, speech-reactions, paintings, music,
ceremonies, and other "symbolical" stimuli and reactions, we
must be introspectivists to understand their meaning and, to some
extent, even their relationship. All this means that the
introspective description of the inner experience in its terms of
desires, wishes, and so forth, or, according to Charles H. Cooley,
*'the dramatic knowledge," ^'^ may have a great cognitive value.
But snnm quique. We must remain behaviorists regarding the
causation, classification, and description of trans-subjective
phenomena, and ''introspectivists" in the interpretation of purely
inner experience and meaning of the psycho-social value. The
intrusion of either of the parties into the field of the other one is
scientifically fruitless.
Finally, we may try to study a parallelism in the dynamics of both
series, but without claiming to make one series the cause or the
effect of the other. This task consists in a description of the
changes within either of the fields which parallel the changes
within the other. Naturally, each series must be described in its
own terminology. Helmholtz's classical study has shown that such
a description is possible;a thing which from a trans-subjective
standpoint is the number of vibrations of the air-waves of a certain
length in a unit of time, from an inner standpoint is perceived as a
sound of a certain tune. A change in the quantity and quality of
food consumed is paralleled by certain changes
^ Compare the above with Cooley, Charles H., "The Roots of
Social Knowledge," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. XXXII,
pp. 59-80; Petrajitzsky, Leo. Introduction to the Theory of Law^
Part I, passim.
657
in the processes of perception, attention, emotion, imagination,
association, and so on. What, from a behaviorist standpoint, is
described as a certain change in the movement of our muscles
and secretion of glands, from the inner standpoint is described as
"lust," or ''fear/' or ''jealousy." Such a "two-sided" picture of the
psycho-social phenomena is richer in its cognitive value than "the
one-sided picture."
But again, in a description of "each" side we must remain either a
behaviorist or an introspectivist. We must avoid a behaviorist
description of the inner side, and an introspectivist description of
the trans-subjective phenomena. From this standpoint the
discussed theories are somewhat unsatisfactory because, being
introspectivist in their nature, they are constructed alon^ the line
of the "scientific tools" used for a study of the trans-subjective
facts. Like them they are "mechanical"; like them they pretend to
be quantitative; and like them they try to classify their objects into
a few classes and to manipulate their units as a chemist or
physicist manipulates atoms, electrons, or their trans-subjective
units. Such an imitation being quite useless, at the same time
robs the theories of what might be their original value. It makes of
them "the units of weight" destined to measure a distance. As a
result of such an imitation, they lose a great deal as an
introspective description of the inner side of socio-psychic
phenomena. They are colorless, dull, and, for an understanding of
the inner world of a man, or group, or an epoch, give
incomparably less than a good novel, historical narrative, "casestudy," romance, biography, or even a talented social philosophy
which, like Keyserling's The Travel Diary of a Philosopher or O.
Spen-gier's work, or the works of Carlyle, Leontieff, Danilevsky,
and many others, do not imitate the natural sciences in their
description of the "mind and spirit of an epoch or society" and are
"honestly and genuinely introspective." Approaching the psychic
world from the inner side and describing it in "introspective terms,"

such novels, biographies, histories, and social philosophies give
an incomparably deeper insight into the "mind of a culture" than
all these "stiff theories" of wishes and desires and other "social
atoms" in which there is nothing left after a careful
658
scrutiny of the wish, desire, or sentiment, and which represent a
kind of "si material psychic" or ''mechanical spirit." ^^ Being
incongruous in their logical nature, such theories do not add much
either to the understanding of the mechanics of trans-subjective
things, or to the quite heterogeneous dynamics of the inner
phenomena. Such is the fate of all logically incongruous
theories.^^ In order to be free from these defects, the theories
must be honestly introspective. Only a freshman or a poor
instructor in sociology may be afraid of the word, ''introspection,"
and think of it as "an outworn source of all scientific evils." If they
learn a little they will see that this "outworn instrument" is
absolutely indispensable for a study of inner experience.^^ Being
honestly introspective, the theories will forsake imitating the
logical structure of the generalizations from sciences of transsubjective phenomena. They must quit also the mechanistic and
quantitative character of these sciences. It is beyond their
competence and purposes. Neither can they meddle with the
problem of the causation of the trans-subjective phenomena, but
instead, it is their business to describe the inner world of a man,
group, or epoch; it is their obligation to show us, not in statistical
tables and causal formulas, but in an introspective description,
"the inner picture of a criminal," "the case of revolutionary
psychology," the psychological type of a king, ruler, priest, captain
of industry, "Protestant," "Buddhist," "the psychological style of
the Renaissance," or of the "Age of Pericles," or "the mentality of
the Western society in the twentieth century." Furthermore, it is

their business to describe the meaning of psycho-social values.
These tasks
86 Compare from this standpoint, for instance, the excellent
summaries of concrete cases of various "unadjusted girls" or
"Polish immigrants" as they are depicted in their "introspective"
letters and in the "introspective comments" of W. Thomas and F.
Znaniecki, with the places in the books where the authors
introduce their theory of the wishes and try to describe the
behavior of the same people in the concepts of their theory. In my
opinion, the works of the second type do not add any tangible
value to an understanding of the situation in each case.
" This does not mean that the above works are valueless. On the
contrary, they are very valuable, but just because the authors do
not follow their own theories criticized here.
8 See the quite appropriate remarks of Professor Cooley about
this point, in The Roots of Social Knowledge, \)p. 65 ff.;
Petrajitzsky's theory of a combined method of an introspective
and behaviorist observation, Introduction, part I; SoROKiN,
System of Sociology, Vol. I, pp. 50-76.
659
are as important as the tasks of the behavioristic, quantitative,
and ''objective" study of social phenomena.
These indications are enough to see the Hmits and functions of
both types of psychological interpretation of social life.^^
89 Compare Cooley, Charles H., ''The Roots," passim; Spranger,
E., Lebens' formen, Halle, 1922; Weber, Max, "Uber einige
Kategorien der verstehenden Soziologie," Logos, IV, 1913; "Die
'Objektivitat' sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer
Erkenntnis," Archiv fiir Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, Vol.

XIX, 1904; Jaspers, K., Allgemeine Psychopathologie, Berlin,
1913; Kluver, H., "M. Weber's 'Ideal Type' in Psychology," Journal
of Philosophy, Vol. XXIII, pp. 29-35; Spann, O., op. cit., pp. 1-22.
Everybody who is familiar with the " Verstehende Soziologie," or
the " Verstehende Psychologie," developed in the works of Max
Weber, Spranger, Jaspers, partly even in the works of the Gestalt
Psychologic, may see that the above of my statements which
repeat what I said in my Systema Soziologii s^ve in harmony with
these strong currents within contemporary sociology and
psychology.
660
CHAPTER XII
PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGISTIC THEORIES OF RELIGION
MORES, LAW, PUBLIC OPINION, ARTS, AND
OTHER CULTURAL PHENOMENA
AS FACTORS
In this chapter we must briefly survey those sociological theories
which try to interpret social phenomena as a function of various
cultural forces, like religion, law, or arts. In so far as these
"variables" are psycho-social phenomena, the corresponding
theories belong to the sociologistic as well as to the psychological
school. For this reason they may be styled as psycho-sociologistic
theories. Any sociologist knows that their number is enormous.
The impossibility of surveying all of the theories in a general work
like this is evident. Therefore I am going to proceed in the
following way. I shall take one group of the theories, for instance
those which study the social role of belief and religion, and after
surveying the principal theories in this field I shall attempt to show
to what extent they are valid, and what are their difficulties and
weak points. Their shortcomings in essentials are the same as
those of the other theories of cultural factors. For this reason,
after an analysis of this group of theories, the other ones may only
be mentioned. A few examples and remarks will be sufficient to
show in what way they are valid and in what way they are
questionable. This way of handling the immensely numerous
theories of cultural factors appears to me the most plausible
under the circumstances. In so far as these theories are
psychological, their analysis will substantiate the statements laid
down in the preceding chapter about the psychological school. Let
us now glance at the interpretations of social phenomena in terms
of beliefs and religion,
661
PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGISTIC THEORIES OF RELIGION 661
I. Beliefs, Magic, Myths, Superstitions, Ideologies and Religion as
a Factor
i. general remarks
I am going to survey the principal theories which try to show the
role of beliefs and of religion generally, especially in the dynamics
of social phenomena. By ''beliefs" I understand the totality of
judgments which are either beyond the competence of science, or
are inaccurate in a scientific sense, or are not proved
scientifically. All judgments which are non-scientific are beliefs,
whatever their contents may be. There is no need to say that in
the "mental luggage" of every one such judgments compose a
considerable part. They often assume a pseudo-scientific
character and are not easily detected. What are the social
functions of such beliefs? Do they play any part in determining
social phenomena? If they do, what is it, and what correlations
are established between the beliefs and the other components of
social life? Such are the problems to be answered by the works to

be discussed in this chapter. Among numerous and valuable
studies devoted to these problems, only those will be taken here
which attempt to answer the above questions. All theological
theories with a claim that the history of the universe and humanity
is controlled by Providence, God, or any other mystical power,
also must be excluded because they are beyond the competence
of science and we cannot either prove or disprove them.^ Such
are the limitations set forth by the nature of the subject. The
literature devoted to the study of the above problems is
enormous, and
1 Among such theological ideologies, beginning with St.
Augustine's wonderful The City of God, and ending with the
brilliant ideologies of the jirovidential control of human history set
forth by J. de Maistre and De Bonald, there are the most
ingenious, enchanting, and impressive "philosophies of history."
Each of us may or may not believe in them, but since they are
beyond the competence of science, we cannot discuss them.
Only as far as these philosophies lay down, beyond their basic
hypothesis, a series of theories which are within the competence
of science, may they be discussed and analyzed. In these "nontranscendental" i)arts they often contain the most valuable
scientific observations, statements, and hypotheses. For instance
J. de Maistre's Considcratio7is stir la France and Les soirees de
Saint-Pctersboiirg or De Bonald's Theorie du pouvoir politique et
religieux dans les socicte civile (1796), or LeontiefF's Bysantitiism
arid Slavinisrn (1883, Russ.), contain in their "empirical" parts
more sociology than a dozen sociological textbooks taken
together. In those parts such works are naturally within the
competence of sociologists, and should be studied bv them.
662
it is beyond the power of a single man to summarize them.

However, the principal types of these studies are sufficiently well
represented by relatively few works. Let us turn to their survey.
A. Predecessors. The theory that belief, especially a magical or
religious belief, is the most efficient factor in human destiny is
possibly the oldest form of social theory. It permeates practically
all the most ancient sources of human thought known to us. It is
manifested in the very facts of religion or magic found among the
most primitive groups. It is the motto of almost all of the Sacred
Books of the East, the Odyssey, Iliad, the Bihle, and other similar
sources. Later on, from St. Augustine and the Church Fathers to
St. Thomas Aquinas, Machiavelli, Marsilio of Padua, Campanella,
J. Bodin, Boussuet, Voltaire, J. Rousseau, Saint-Simon, A.
Comte, and H. Spencer have recognized the role of beliefs in
some degree.^ August Comte even made it a basic factor, and
constructed his "theory of the three stages" on the basis of the
character of religion. Since that time social thinkers have
formulated a multitude of various theories in this field. Among
those who have tried to study the role of beliefs, magic, and
religion more or less factually, and have attempted to set forth
some generalizations in this field, the most conspicuous are the
theories of F. de Coulanges, B. Kidd, G. Le Bon, Charles Ellwood,
E. A. Ross, G. Sorel, E. Durkheim, J. Frazer, and finally, of Max
Weber.
B. F. de Coidanges Theory (1830-1889).Being one of the most
prominent French historians of the ancient world and of mediaeval
history, Fustel de Coulanges laid down his sociological theory of
religion in his classical book. The Ancient City. It represents an
attempt **to show upon what principles and by what
2 Even the anti-religious thinkers have recognized religion as an
efficient factor at least in the sense of MachiavelH or Marsilio of
Padua. "Religion is always necessary for the maintenance of
civilization. . . The sagacious politician will always respect religion

even if he has no belief in it . . . because through inculcating it
even by craft much valour has been roused for the defense of the
country," Machiavelli, Discourses, Bk. I, Chaps. XI-XII. For
MarsiHo of Padua its function consists in a "police job" of
intimidating and discovering secret crimes and their perpetrators.
Because governmental control is not sufficient, a "legislator has
therefore imagined a God from whom nothing is concealed and
who commands the observance of the Law under penalties." A
priest helps the poHce and court through his intimidation "by the
fear of Hell." As we see, even this type of "theories" does not
deny the r61e of reHgion as a factor.
663
rules Greek and Roman society was governed,"^ and what factors
were responsible for the evolution or changes in their social and
political organization in the course of time. The author's theory
may be seen from the following quotations.
The cause which produces the changes must be powerful, and
must be found in man himself. If the laws of human association
are no longer the same as in antiquity, it is because there has
been a change in man. There is, in fact, a part of the human being
which is modified from age to age; this is our intelligence. It is
always in movement; almost always progressing; and on this
account our institutions and our laws are subject to change. Man
has not, in our day. the way of thinking that he had twenty-five
centuries ago; and this is why he is no longer governed as he was
governed then.**
Thus F. de Coulanges contends that ideas generally are the
cause of social changes and the primary factor of social
phenomena. Further he specifies more definitely what sort of

ideas he has in view.
The history of Greece and Rome is a witness and an example of
the intimate relation which always exists between men's ideas
and their social state. Examine the institutions of the ancients
without thinking of their religious notions, and you find them
obscure, whimsical, and inexplicable . . . But by the side of these
institutions place the religious ideas of those times, and the facts
at once become clear, and their explanation is no longer doubtful.
If, on going back to the first ages of this race,that is to say, to
the time when its institutions were founded,we observe the idea
which it had of human existence, of life, of death, of a second life,
and of the divine principle, we perceive a close relation between
these opinions and the ancient rules of private law; between the
rites which spring from these opinions and their political
institutions. A comparison of beliefs and laws shows that a
primitive religion constituted the Greek and Roman family,
established marriage and paternal authority, fixed the order of
relationship, and consecrated the right of property, and the right of
inheritance. The same religion, after having enlarged and
extended the family, formed a still larger association, the city, and
reigned in that as it had reigned in the family.
31 use the English translation by Small, W., The Ancient City, p.
9, Boston, 1900. * Ibid., p. II.
664
From it came all institutions, as well as all the private laws, of the
ancients . . . But, in the course of time, this ancient religion
became modified or effaced, and private law and political
institutions were modified with it.'""
F. de Coulanges shows that the most ancient religion of the

Greeks and the Romans was the worship of their dead ancestors,
and this had for its principal symbol the sacred fire. Further, he
very conspicuously demonstrates how these ideas determined the
character of the ancient family, the laws of marriage, divorce, the
inequality of son and daughter, the forms of kinship, the right of
property, the character of authority, the right of succession, and
all the essential characteristics of ancient society.^ In a second
period of the history of these peoples there came another type of
ancient religiona deification of physical nature in the form of
Zeus, Athene, Juno and so forth. This religion grew at the cost of
the former family-religion. **The morality of this new religion was
different. It was not confined to teaching men family duties. As
this second religion continued to develop, society must have
enlarged." As a result the whole social and political structure of
these societies was changed also. The city was formed, and the
government, the magistracy, the laws, the institutions, the social
classes changed. A series of reforms and revolutions took place/
The final conclusions of the elaborate theory of the author are as
follows:
The ancient society had been established by an old religion
whose principal dogma was that every god protected exclusively
a single family or a single city, and existed only for that. This
religion has produced laws. The relations among men were all
regulated, not by the principles of natural equity, but by the
dogmas of this religion, and with a view to the requirements of its
worship. In the social system of the ancients, religion was
absolute master; the state was a religious community, the king a
pontiff, the magistrate a priest, and the law a sacred formula;
patriotism was piety, and exile, excommunication; individual
liberty was unknown, [and so on]. But little by little, society
became modified. Changes took place in
665
the government and in the laws at the same time as in religious
ideas [note this.] . . . law and politics began to be a little more
independent. It zvas because men ceased to have religions
beliefs. [Note this formulation.]
Later on came Christianity, which introduced new ideas, and
through them it again radically modified ancient society, creating a
new one with a new form of social organization.^ F. de Coulanges concludes:
We have written the history of a belief. It was established, and
human society was constituted. It was modified, and society
underwent a series of revolutions. It disappeared, and society
changed its character. Such was the law of ancient times.^
The theory is so clear that there is no need to interpret it. Before
criticizing it let us glance at other theories of the social role of
religion.
C. Charles A. EUwood's Theory. To essentially similar
conclusions about the social functions of religion came Professor
Charles Ellwood ^^ in the process of an analysis of the present
crisis of religion and civilization.
Today we are in the midst of a religious revolution, which is going
on so quietly that many do not notice it, although it is a greater
and more fundamental revolution than any since the early years
of the Christian era.
Iliis crisis is due to a change in our ideas and values due to the
progress of science.^^ Such a crisis in ideas and religion will be
followed, and is indeed being followed, by a corresponding
change in human behavior and in social institutions, because
religion has always been one of the most important instruments in

the social control of man and society. If this great controlling
factor is weakened, there is a danger of man's retrogression to
primitive and anti-social forms of behavior, of the regress and
decay of civilization, and of a return to social and moral paganism.
The
* Ibid., pp. 519 ff. ^ Ibid., p. 529.
' Born in 1873. Author of a series of valuable works: Sociology
and Modern Social Problems, Sociology in Its Psychological
Aspects; Introduction to Social Psy-chology; The Psychology of
Human Society.
" Ellwood, Ch. A., The Reconstruction of Religion, [)j). i-ii, N. Y.,
192?.
666
symptoms of such a regress, due to the crisis of Christianity, are
already present, according to the author. A glorification of physical
force and struggle in popular ideologies like that of Nietzsche; the
World War; an increase of sensual hedonism and egotism;
disorganization of the family, and increase of divorce; "free love";
an increase of venereal diseases; a rising tide of mysticism,
polytheism, atheism, and materialism; an increase of the belief in
violence and social struggle, and many other facts of today are, in
the first place, a result of this religious crisis.^^ The author
proceeds to show the determining role of religion in regard to
various non-religious social phenomena. Psychologically, religion
is a power which sometimes may eflficiently control human
behavior and physiological processes. The examples of the
ascetics and martyrs show this. It gives a maximum of vital
energy. ''What reason does for ideas, religion does for the
feelings." Through its projection of the essential values of human

personality and of human society into the universe as a whole, it
consecrates human life, bridles purely egotistical impulses, and
facilitates man's socialization. 'Tt harmonizes man on the side of
will and emotions with his world." It is one of the most efificient
means of social control. It stimulates social habits and checks
anti-social tendencies. It gives to the whole society a conception
of its own sacred value. The same is true in regard to social
institutions, law, and order. "A religionless social world would be a
social world of uncertainties, destitute of enthusiasm and of
vision, reduced to the dead level of individual expediency."
Therefore it is natural that any progress of a people would be
manifest in a progress of their religion, while the decay of a
civilization would be preceded by that of religion. 'The death of
religion would accordingly mean the death of all higher
civilization." ^^ Even if an individual may be moral without being
religious, a whole society cannot be moral without it.
After this general summary of the social functions of religion, the
author proceeds to analyze the character of today's crisis of
^ Ibid., pp. 14-26. See also his "Religion and Social Control,"
Scientific Monthly, Oct., 1918. vSimilar opinions have been
expressed by many other authors. See Kidd, B., The Science of
Power, first part; Hayes, E. C, Sociology and Ethics; Hobhouse, L.
T., Morals in Evolution, N. Y., 1915; Ross, E. A., Social Control,
1920, Chaps. XII-XVI" Ibid., Chaps. I-III
667
Christianity, and outlines the direction in which the reHgion must
be reconstructed in order to serve successfully its important social
functions.^* We need not follow this part of the author's plan. It is

but the practical conclusion of his theoretical statements.
D. jS. Diirkheim's Theory. We have already seen the essentials
of Durkheim's theory of religion. Being the product of a society,
and concentrating "the social" in its brightest and best form,
religion has served as a powerful means for the creation,
expansion, and increase of solidarity among its members. From
this standpoint its role has been great and quite positive.
Religious beliefs rest upon a specific experience whose
demonstrative value is, in one sense, not one bit inferior to that of
scientific experiments, though different from them.^^
Nearly all the great social institutions have been born in religion . .
. The fundamental categories of thought, and consequently of
science, are of religious order. Up until a relatively advanced
moment of evolution, moral and legal rules have been
indistinguishable from ritual prescriptions. The religious life is the
eminent form and the concentrated expression of the whole
collective life. If religion has given birth to all that is essential in
society, it is because the idea of society is the soul of religion.
[From this standpoint] the believer who has communicated with
his god is not merely a man who sees new truths of which the
unbeliever is ignorant; he is a man who is stronger. He feels
within him more force, either to endure the trials of existence, or
to conquer them. . . . Thus there is something eternal in religion
which is destined to survive all the particular symbols in which
religious thought has successively enveloped itself. There can be
no society which does not feel the need of upholding and
reaffirming at regular intervals the collective sentiments and the
collective ideas which make its unity and its personality.^^
E. G. Le Bon's Theory (1841- ).With a different flavor, but also

quite definitely, Le Bon states the great eflficicncy of beliefs. The
essence of his theory is as follows. Man is not a
" Ibid., Chaps. TV-XI.
" DuRKHEiM, Elementary Forms oj Religious Life, p. 417; comp.
James, W., The Varieties of Religious Experience, pp. 20 ff. ^*
Ibid., pp. 416-427.
668
logical creature. He is apt to believe the most illogical and
unreasonable things if they correspond to his emotions and
feelings. As soon as a belief enters man's mind, reason becomes
incapable of controlling it. Any criticism becomes impotent in such
a case. Therefore the historical role of reason and logic has been
rather moderate. The real factors in life and history have been
beliefs. They are unavoidable. They have always composed the
essential part of human mental luggage. Up to this time humanity
could not have lived without beliefs, and it cannot avoid it in the
future. A certain God and religion may be overthrown, but only to
be replaced by a new form of God and beliefs. Their place has
never been vacant and is not going to be vacant in the future.
Hence any change in the beliefs of a people is followed by a great
change in their whole social life. In this sense beliefs have been
one of the most powerful factors of human history.-^''
F. /. G. Fra::er's Theory (1854- ).Much more factual and definite
are the conclusions to which this eminent investigator of primitive
society and human beliefs has come in his study of the social role
of beliefs and superstitions. These conclusions are: first, that
beliefs are efficient factors of human behavior and social control;
and second, that all in all the role of superstitions has been rather
beneficial. This is Frazer's own summary of his study.
To sum up this review of the influence which superstition has
exercised on the growth of institutions, I think I have shown, or at
least made probable:
I. That among certain races and at certain times superstition has
strengthened the respect for government, especially monarchical
government, and has thereby contributed to the security of its
enjoyment: II. That among certain races and at certain times
superstition has strengthened the respect for private property and
has thereby contributed to the security of its enjoyment: III. That
among certain races and at certain times superstition has
strengthened the respect for marriage and has thereby
contributed to a stricter observance of the rules of sexual morality
both among the married and unmarried:
*' Le Bon", G., Psychology of Socialism, Chaps. I, III, and passim.
669
ZV. That among certain races and at certain times superstition
has strengthened the respect for human hfe and has thereby
contributed to the security of its enjoyment.^^
G. C. Bougie's Theory (1870- ).C. Bougie, in his study of the
India caste regime, has come to the conclusion that without the
religious factor neither the origin nor the long existence of the
caste-system are comprehensible. Neither the economic theory of
Niesfeld, nor the familial theory of Senart, nor the racial theories
of several authors, satisfactorily explain the origin of the caste
system. Although possibly playing some part, these factors could
not have produced the system if it were not for the interference of
the religious factor. It originated the first law in the form of a

religious fas. It promoted the isolation of various racial groups and
made any mixture of races an unforgivable sin. It gave
consecration to such a separation, and turned the former family
sacrifice into something sacred. As the rules and the rites of
sacrifices grew more and more complicated, more and more
necessary became a special technical education for their
performance. Hence the increase in the power of the Brahman
caste; and hence their isolation from other groups, and from one
another. In the course of time,this formerly only relative
specialization of various groups became more and more rigid,
became hereditary, and finally was fixed forever under the
influence of
** Frazer, J. G., Psyche's Task, A Discourse Concerning the
Influence of Super-stition on the Growth of Institutions, 2d ed.,
London, 1913, p. 154. See here the facts on which these
conclusions are based. If not in its evaluative part, then at least in
the part which states the efficiency of beliefs and superstitions in
controlling human behavior and relationship among the primitive
societies, Frazer's theory has been corroborated and supported
by many field-studies. As an example of such works I may
mention: Malinowski, B., Argonauts of the Western Pacific,
London, 1922; James, E. O., Primitive Ritual and Belief, London,
1917; CoDRiNGTON, R., The Melanesians, Oxford, 1891; Hauer,
L. W., Die Religion, ihr Werden, ihr Sinn, ihre Wahrheit, Bd. I, Das
religiose Erlebnis auf den unteren Stufen, Stuttgart, 1925, See
further the courses in anthropology and in primitive society by
Kroeber, R. Lowie, W. Wallis, W. Rivers, and others; WesterMARCK, W., The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas,
Vol. L Especially valuable from the discussed standpoint is E. D.
Starbuck's The Psychology of Religion, N. Y., 1903. In the way of
a quantitative study the author reaches the conclusion that
religion helps the adult to realize the need of helping others and to
adapt the adolescent's budding self into the social organism
which is "fixed in its ways and relentless in its demands." Ibid., p.

195. See also Leuba James H., The Belief in God aiid Immortality,
Boston, 1916.
670
the Brahman priests.^^ In this briefly outHned theory we have an
attempt to correlate rehgion with a poHtical and social system. H.
E. A. Ross\ G. S or el's, W. G. Sumner and A. G. Keller's
Statements. Very concisely and clearly E. A. Ross and G. Sorel
have stressed the specific point of the influence of beliefs,
legends, and myths on human psychology and social processes.
Professor E. A. Ross ^^ in his Social Control outlined in a
systematic form the influence of various cultural agencies
belief, religion, law, arts, science, and so onupon human
behavior and social processes. With typical inspiration, and in his
shining style, he stressed that man's conduct may be and is
controlled by illusion. A beliefregardless of whether it is right or
notif it is believed, is a real force which determines human
actions. Religion has been one of the forces which has
conditioned social processes."^ Sorel's point is that the framing of
a future course of action or events is efficient, and determines
greatly their objective course, even when such a framing is quite
wrong from an objective standpoint. The same is true in regard to
various myths and legends.
Experience shows that the framing of a future, in some
indeterminate way, may, when it is done in a certain way, be very
effective, and have very few inconveniences. This happens when
the anticipations of the future take the form of those myths, which
enclose with them all the strongest inclinations of a people, of a
party, or of a class, inclinations which recur to the mind with the
insistence of instincts in all the circumstances of life; and which
give an aspect of complete reality to the hopes of immediate
action by which men can reform their desires, passions, and

mental activity. The truth of this may be shown by numerous
examples. The first Christians expected the return of Christ and
the total ruin of the pagan world, with the inauguration of the
kingdom of the saints, at the end of the first generation. The
catastrophe did not come to pass, but Christian thought profited
so greatly from the apocalyptic myth that certain contemporary
scholars maintain that the whole preaching
1^ See BouGL^, C, Essais sur le regime des castes, Paris, 1908.
20 Born in 1866. One of the founders of American sociology.
Author of several valuable works: Foundations of Sociology;
Social Control; Social Psychology; Principles of Sociology. The
"American Tarde"such is a short summary of Ross as a
sociologist.
671
of Christ referred solely to this one point. The hopes which Luther
and Calvin had formed of the religious exaltation of Europe were
by no means realised. Must we for that reason deny the immense
result which came from their dreams of Christian renovation? It
must be admitted that the real developments of the Revolution did
not in any way resemble the enchanting pictures which created
the enthusiasm of its first adepts; but without those pictures,
would the Revolution have been victorious. In our own times
Mazzini pursued what the wiseacres of his time called a mad
chimera but it can no longer be denied that, without Mazzini, Italy
would never have become a great power.^^
Thus myths as myth, and belief as a mere belief, determine the
course of events.
I. Benjamin Kidd's Theory (1858-1916).B. Kidd attempted to

give possibly one of the most general theories of the social
functions of belief and religion. The essentials of Kidd's
hypothesis are as follows: The primary factor in the evolution of all
organisms has been the struggle for existence. Through it the
superior organisms have been surviving at the cost of the inferior
ones. Any step in evolution has cost an enormous price in the
extermination and elimination of a great many lives. Man also
evolved through the factor of the struggle for existence. His
victory over other animals was due particularly to reason or
intellect which he developed in the process of this inexorable
struggle. As among other animals, any progress within mankind
itself has cost an enormous price. In order that a few individuals
or a few groups could progress, a great many other individuals or
groups have had to sacrifice themselves. If, however, only this
factor were responsible for human progress, a great many
phenomena would have become incomprehensible. Indeed, if the
law of a struggle for life, which is fought with the egotistical
weapon of intellect, were the only factor of human progress, then
most intellectual and egotistical social groups should have always
survived at the cost of the less intellectual ones. Then a pitiless
struggle would have been welcomed among human beings and
the law of an absolute egotism would have reigned supreme. But
22 SoREL, G., Reflections on Violence, pp. 133 fl., N. Y., 1912.
See also Mali-NowsKi, B., Myth in Primitive Psychology, N. Y.,
1926; Sumner and Keller, op. cit., pp. 1465-1407; Todd, A. j., op.
cit., Chap. XXIX.
672
progress itself should have been stopped to avoid this terrible
cost, because, from the purely egotistical standpoint, there could
not be any rational motive for continuing a progress which
required an incessant sacrifice of individuals in favor of a group,

and of a great many groups in favor of a few. Neither of these
expectations has been realized. A great many peoples with
brilliant brain-capacity, for instance the Greeks, decayed while
some other people with an inferior intellectual capacity have
survived. Even our own civilization has been ascending not so
much through our intellectual superiority, which is certainly not
higher than that of many extinct civilizations, but through another
factor. In the second place, in our social life we do not preach the
command of absolute egotism, but the opposite command of an
unlimited altruism and sacrifice of one's interests and lives in
favor of his fellow men. We have charitable and philanthropic
institutions, and so on. Finally, in spite of the direct interests of
men to stop progress, they do not stop it, but continue to pay an
enormous price for it incessantly.
All these phenomena represent the paradox of progress. They
evidently cannot be accounted for through human intellect only,
which in its essence is egotistical, or even through the struggle for
existence led by egotistical reason. Since the above facts are
unquestionable, we must admit besides egotistical reason and the
struggle for existence some other factor as being responsible for
the social progress of man, for incessant sacrifices of individuals
in favor of a group and of the groups in favor of mankind, for our
altruism, charity, philanthropy, and finally, for the very fact of the
survival of many groups which are not more superior intellectually
than many extinct groups."^
This factor is religion, as
a form of belief, providing an ultra-rational sanction for that large
class of conduct in the individual where his interests and the
interests of the social organism are antagonistic, and by which the
former are rendered subordinate to the latter in the general
interests of the evolution which the race is undergoing ... No form
of belief is capable of functioning as a religion in the evolution of

society which does not provide an ultra-rational sanction for the
social conduct
23KIDD., B., Social Evolution, pp. 66-72, 106-107, 305-306, N. Y.,
1894.
673
of the individual ... A rational religion is a scientific impossibility,
representing from the nature of the case an inherent contradiction
of terms.^*
Such is Kidd's answer. This means that human social evolution
has been due not only, and not even so much, to egotistical
reason as to ultra-rational faith or religion. Its role has been
increasing more and more. It is responsible for all the altruistic
actions among human beings. It is the force which urges
individuals to sacrifice for the group; and the group, for the whole
of mankind. The stronger it is the more social are the groups, and
the more chances they have to survive. This explains why some
intellectually superior but religiously weak societies perished,
while some other groups which were less brilliant intellectually,
but stronger socially or religiously, have survived. Finally, religion
is responsible for man's non-revolt against progress, and for his
continuing to pay its terrible price. ''The intellect, of course,
continues to be a most important factor in enabling the system to
which the individual belongs to maintain its place in the rivalry of
life; but it is no longer the prime factor." -''
J. Max Weber's Sociology of Religion}^ The Fundamental
Problem of His Study. The three large volumes devoted by M.
Weber to the sociology of religion ^^ represent possibly one of the
most valuable contributions in this field made in the twen-
24 Ibid., pp. 108-116. Compare this with Ellwood's and

Durkheim's ''rational religion."
^ Ibid., pp. 306-307. See about Kidd's theory, Giddings, F.,
Studies in the Theory of Human Society, pp. 9-11; Lichtenberger,
J., op. cit., pp. 287-291; KovALEVSKV, M., Contemporary
Sociologists, pp. 210-222; Barth, P., op. cit., pp. 425 ff.
2fi Died in 1920. Professor of economics at various German
universities. Besides Religionssoziologie, Weber's principal works
are: Wirtschaftsgeschichte, 2d ed., 1924; Gesammelte Aujsdtze
zur Wissenschaftslehre, 1922; Wirtschaft und Gesell-schaft,
Grundriss der Sozial-oconomik, III, 1921-22; Gesammelte
Aufsdtze aur sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Tubingen, 1924.
These works made AI. Weber possibly one of the most
outstanding economists and sociologists of the present time.
About M. Weber's works see Walter, A., "Weber, M., als
Soziologe," Jahrbuch fiir Soziologie, Vol. II; VON Schelting, A.,
"Die logische Theorie der histor. Kulturwissenschaft von M.
Weber," etc., Archiv fiir Sozialwissejischaft, Vol. XLIX, Heft 3; a
series of papers published in two volumes in memory of M.
Weber: Erinneriingsgabe fiir Max Weber, Miinchen und Leipzig,
1923, 2 vols.; HoNiGSHEiM, P., "Max Weber als Soziologe,"
Kolner Vierteljahrshefte fiir Soziologie, I. Jahrgang, i. Hcfte, 1921;
Weber, M., Max Weber: Ein Lebensbild.
-' Wi:her, Max, Gesammelte Aitfsdtzezur.Religionssoziologie, I,
II, III, Tubingen, 1922-23; further in references it will be indicated
Religionssoziologie.
674
tieth century. Though these volumes are a collection of his papers
published in the period from 1904 to the moment of his death, and
though the whole work is unfinished, nevertheless these volumes,

together with some other works of the author, give a sufficiently
systematic and clear idea of M. Weber's theory in this field. The
principal topic of the work is an analysis of the relationship
between religion and economic phenomena. This topic is,
however, taken on such a large scale and with such an
extraordinary erudition, that the work represents not only a
sociology of religion but of all culture. Again, contrary to a great
many works in this field, it is based on immense factual material
which makes it especially valuable. I shall omit here Max Weber's
specific methodology and terminology and somewhat simplify his
too complicated ''technique" of analysis, without, however,
disfiguring his principles. The fundamental problem of his study is
probably to ascertain just what the relationship between economic
and religious phenomena is. Is it a one-sided conditioning of
religious phenomena by economic ones, as is contended by the
economic interpretation of history; or it is a conditioning of
economic phenomena by the religious ones; or are both of these
phenomena mutually interdependent? If they are mutually
interdependent upon each other, and each of them upon other
categories of factors, then how is it possible to find out that the
religious factor is efficient; and if it is efficient, what are its real
effects on economic phenomena and on the whole cultural life
and social organization of a society? Such is the fundamental
problem the solution of which is attempted by Max Weber.
MetJwdological Principles. His answer to the above questions
mav be outlined as follows: First, religious and economic
phenomena are mutually dependent. Any one-sided interpretation
of one of them as a mere function of another is wrong. Wrong
therefore is the theory of the economic interpretation of history;
and wrong also is the opposite theory which would view the
economic phenomena as a mere function of the religious factors.
They are interdependent, and each of them is influenced by a
series of other conditions. But methodologically it is possible to
take one of these factors as ''a variable" and to find its specific
effects in a certain field, in this case, in the field of economic phe675
nomena. Such is the starting point of Max Weber. He takes the
reHgious factor as a variable and tries to disclose its influence on
the economic and on other social phenomena.^^ Thus Max
Weber is a pluralist and ''a functionalist" in the sense which I
outlined in the chapters about Pareto and the economic
interpretation of history.
What Components of Religion Are Taken for a Study of the
Effects of Religion on Economic Phenomena? Having taken the
religious factor as a methodological variable, Max Weber takes
"the economic ethics of a religion" (JVirtschaftsethik) to find the
influence of religion on economic life. By the ''economic ethics of
religion" he means not so much the various theological dogmas of
religion, as the totality of ''the practical forms of conduct" required
and urged by a religion in regard to its members. He
acknowledges that the economic ethics of every religion is the
result of various factors; but among them there is the factor of
religion also. As a study of all the factors of ''economic ethics"
would lead to infinity, and is impossible factually, one must take
"economic ethics" as an essentially religious product, and through
a study of its effects find the effects of religion generally. Such a
task may be realized when an investigator studies the economic
effects of religious ethics on the life of those social groups which
strongly influence its character and are influenced by it.~^ Limiting
in this way his task, Weber takes the ''JVirtschaftsethik'' of
28 See Weber, Max, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 12, 21-22, 37-38, 82, 183,
233-237; Weber, Max, Wirtschaftsgeschichte, pp. i6, 238, 308315, Munchen und Leipzig, 1924. "Any explanation (of a typical
social phenomena) must in the first place take into consideration

the economic conditions. But also it must not overlook the reverse
causal relationship, because a rational technique and rational law,
as well as an economic rationalism, in their origin are dependent
on the capacity and predisposition of men to a certain kind of a
practical manner of living {Lehensfuhrung). Where the former
meet the obstacles of this psychical {see-lische) kind, there the
development of an economically rational organization finds the
strongest obstacles. To the most important factors of the manner
of living belong, especially in the past, the magical and the
religious powers, and the ethical ideas of duty
{Pflichtvorstellungen) based on them." A religion and "Eine
Wirtschaftsethik ist keine einfache 'Funklton' wirtschaftltcher
Organisationsformen, ebensowenig wie sie umgekehrt diese
eindeutig aus sich herausprdgt. Keine Wirtschaftsethik ist jemals
nur religios determiniert gewesen. Sie hesitz selbstverstdndlich
ein im hochsten Mass durch wirtschaftsgeographische und
geschichtliche Gegeben-heiten bestimmtes Mass von reiner
Eigengesetzlichkeit gegeniiher alien durch religiose Oder andere
{in diesem Sinn) 'innerliche' Momcnte bedingten Eiyistellungen
des Menschen zur Welt." Religionssoziologie, Vol. I, pp. 12, 238.
676
(376 CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES
the six world religions: Confucianism, Hinduism, Buddhism,
Christianity, Islam, and Judaism, and studies the character of the
JVirfschaffsethik of each of them, with its effects on the economic
organization and life of the peoples who belong to one of these
religions/^^ In this way he tries to correlate religion with
economics. We naturally cannot follow here Weber's long and
elaborate analysis of the effects of each of these religions.
However tempting such a task may be, space does not permit
doing it. Therefore I shall take only one example to illustrate Max
Weber's method of analysis and conclusions. Adding to this his

own summary of the fundamental influences of other religions, we
shall have an idea of the work of Max Weber. As an example, I
shall take the relationship between modern capitalism and
Protestantism, which was especially well studied by the author.
Modern Capitalism and Protestantism}^ Though various elements
of what is styled a ''capitalistic economy" have been found in the
past and in many non-European societies, modern Western
capitalism is a recent and specific phenomenon. The typical
characteristics of ''the spirit of the modern capitalism" C'Der Geist
des Kapitalisrmts') are: a rationally organized and managed
economic enterprise based on exact scientific principles, and
private property; the production for a market; the production for
masses and through masses; the production for money; and the
maximum of enthusiasm, ethos, and efficiency in work which
requires the complete devotion of a man to his calling, vocation,
or business. Such a devotion is accompanied by viewing
vocational work as a self-goal, as a principal function of
everybody's life; accordingly, work is not regarded as something
incidental in a modern capitalistic society, but as something for
which man exists, which is his principal life-vocation, and which
imposes on him the most important obligations to serve his
vocation or calling earnestly, devotedly, and "religiously." This
"vocational ethics" is one of the most conspicuous traits of the
spirit of modern capitalism. Consequently, men are estimated and
paid according to the efficiency of their work. Those who are poor
in their voca30 In the published three volumes, a factual study is made of
Protestantism, Confucianism, Taoism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and
Judaism.
31 R. H. Tawney's Religion and the Rise of Capitalism, N. Y.,
1926, is but a mere recapitulation of M. Weber's theory.
677
tion go down; and those who are good go up; capitaHstic society
rates a man in first place as a worker, whatever may be his work
or vocation. To these traits there must be added: rationalism,
utilitarianism, stimulation of initiative and inventiveness by all
possible means, on the one hand; and on the other, the greatest
repulsion to "traditionalism," to everything which is inefficient, and
obsolete, existing only through inertia, or to anything which is
superstitious, irrational, or imperfect from the standpoint of the
existing more perfect and rational methods.^^ Such are the typical
the ideally typical characteristics of modern capitalism.^^ In
these traits it differs radically from other forms of ancient or
mediaeval capitalism, and represents a specific modern
phenomenon of Western society.
In order that such an economic organization may be possible, we
must have human beings with a definite psychology, conduct, and
corresponding social conditions. It is clear that among quite idle,
superstitious, inefficient, and irrational people, such a system of
economic organization is impossible. It became possible only
when men began to have ''a certain psychology" and conduct,
and when there were given the conditions of: (a) rational capital
accounting and business-management; (b) appropriation of all the
means of production; (c) rational technique of production; (d)
rational law; (e) free labor; and (f) commercialization and
marketing of the products of labor.^*
As to the psychology and conduct which are necessary for the
existence of such a system, they are ideally exemplified by one of
the builders and early representatives of the spirit of modern
capitalism, Benjamin Franklin, in his own conduct and in his
Adznce to a Young Tradesman and Necessary Hints to those that
32 Rcligionssoziologie, Vol. I, pp. 17-63; Wirtschaftsgeschichte,

pp. 238 ff., 308 ff.
^ In this we have an illustration of M. Weber's methodological
theory of the "ideal type." The "ideal type" is a concrete, but at the
same time a general image of studied social phenomena, in which
must be summarized the specific characteristics of the
phenomenon in its most conspicuous, even in an exaggerated
form, to make quite clear the specificity of the phenomenon. An
ideal type is not an "average" of the phenomenon, but a
conspicuous stressing of its specific traits. The outlined "spirit of
modern capitalism" is an example of one of the "ideal types" of
Max Weber. From the above we see that his "spirit of modern
capitalism" is not an image of the average business-organization,
or of the psychology of the average business man or workingman, but an image of an ideal business organization, an ideal
captain of industry, or working-man.
'^ Wirtschaftsgeschichte, pp. 237-239.
678
would he Rich. Here again the method of the ''ideal type" is
apphed by Max Weber, "Time is money," ''Credit is money,"
"Money grows money," "Honesty is the best pohcy," "Careful
accounting is -necessary for any business," "And orderly conduct
and honesty, diligence, efficiency, truth, sincerity and integrity are
necessary for success in any field and in the field of business,
too." These and similar recipes given by Franklin and carried on
methodically by him in his own activity,^^ are the psychological
characteristics without which, at least in some degree, modern
capitalism would have been impossible.^^ Since it has appeared
and exists, evidently such a psychology and conduct have been
inculcated to some extent into the masses of Western society.
Now the problem to be solved is just what forces have been

responsible for such a transformation of human beings, and for
their behavior and psychology. Weber answers: Modern Western
capitalism has been originated by the Protestant religion and its
''IVirtschaftsethik/' The spirit of modern capitalism is that of
Protestantism, of its rides of conduct and practical ethics. Before
modern capitalism appeared, it had been perceived, cultivated,
and prepared in the realm of the Protestant religion. The spirit of
capitalism appeared before capitalism itself. This is, Weber
remarks, an example of how an economic organization is
preceded and conditioned by the ideological factors.^^
What are the proofs of such contention? They are numerous. In
the first place, Weber, by a painstaking analysis of the teachings
of Luther, Calvin, and of a great many other Protestant teachers,
shows that the spirit of Protestantism in its practical everyday
ethics was identical to the above spirit of modern capitalism.
Protestantism set forth a rationalization of human life on a large
scale; it gave an immense ethical value to a worldly vocation and
calling; it consecrated labor, and began to regard an orderly,
honest, and enthusiastic performance of man's vocational work as
his sacred duty; and through its preaching that the salvation of
man consisted primarily in an orderly and rational living,
^ See especially Franklin's Autobiography. 36 Religionssoziologie,
Vol. I, pp. 30-34, 63 ff. 3^ Ibid., pp. 38-39.
679
it averted man from a purely ''ascetic ideal" and turned him to
more worldly but religious duties. Protestantism also inspired
honest money-making as a sinless activity. In brief, the GeUf des
Kapitalismiis is essentially the Geist of Protestantism. In the
second place, the validity of Weber's answer is also supported by
the fact that since the Reformation the economically leading
countries have been the Protestant countries (Holland, England,
America and so on), while the Roman Catholic or the nonProtestant countries have been far behind. The explanation of this
is at hand. The Protestant economic ethics educated and trained
its members to a capitalistic economy. The spirit of Protestantism
has been an inculcation of the habits and forms of activity
necessary for a successful building and management of modern
capitalistic enterprises. In the third place, the validity of the
hypothesis is shown also by the statistical data which show that in
Germany the Protestant population is better off economically, and
their children attend in greater per cent the practical and business
schools than do the non-Protestant part of the population and
their children. Max Weber perceives the possibility of an opposite
explanation of these facts. This hypothesis is as follows :
England, Holland, and some other countries have been
economically better off not because they accepted Protestantism;
but they accepted it because they were economically better off.
Protestantism was accepted by the wealthier families for the
reason of their being wealthy. Such is the opposite hypothesis. It
is, however, wrong, says Weber, because there were a number of
poor and persecuted Protestant sects in the Roman Catholic
countries, the Huguenots in France, the Protestants in Austria,
and Quakers of England, and so on; and yet all of them became
famous by their successful industries, by their prosperous
management of business, and by their leading role in the field of
economic activities. Even in the countries where Roman Catholics
reigned supreme, and where the previously well-to-do classes
were Roman Catholics, they were outdistanced by the Protestants
of those countries, who were very often recruited from the poorer
classes. These and similar facts show the fallacy of the
hypothesis and the validity of that of Max Weber. In this way, step
by step he follows tlie Calvinistic, the Pietatic, the Methodist, and
680
other Protestant varieties, and shows that his correlation is

supported by a study of all these Protestant peoples in Germany,
England, Holland, and America.^^ Such are the essentials of Max
Weber's theory of the origin of modern capitalism from
Protestantism. The above of course gives only a skeleton of
Weber's careful and painstakingly factual argumentation in favor
of his hypothesis, but the skeleton gives a sufficient idea of the
character of the author's theory and method.
In a similar way, Weber analyzes the Wirtshaftsethik of
Confucianism, Taoism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and finally of
Judaism.^^ The economic and everyday life ethics of each of
these world religions have been such as to shape the
corresponding economic and social organization exactly in the
form in which they have existed among the peoples of each of
these religions. Their "traditionalism" and spirit are quite different
from "the spirit of modern capitalism," which has been responsible
for the undevel-opment of capitalism in those countries.^^ The
following quotation sums up the essentials of Weber's theory of
the influence of the religious factor on the economic organization
and phenomena of a society.
For a realization of modern capitalism, there has been necessary
"a rational long-time existing enterprise, a rational bookkeeping, a
rational technique, a rational law; and, besides a rational frame of
mind (Gesinnnng),a. rationalized manner of living, and a rational
economic enthusiasm (IVirfschaffsefhos). At the beginning of all
ethics and the corresponding economic relationships,
traditionalism has everywhere reigned supreme in the form of a
sacredness of tradition, and in a sticking to the economic ways
and economic methods of the forefathers. Traditionalism exists in
abundance even up to the present day." Rooted in the earliest
ethics and economic methods, traditionalism may be reinforced
through two special conditions: when it happens to
38 Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 17-30, 63-236, especially 162, 190-195, 202206.

39 Ibid., Vol. I (Chinese religions); Vol. II (Hinduism and
Buddhism); Vol. Ill (Judaism) and its economic ethics.
^0 vSee the summary of the Confucianist and the Taoist
economic effects, Vol. I, pp. 524-528; the summary of the
economic effects of the Buddhist and the Hindu religions, Vol. II,
pp. 367 ff.; a short resume of the economic effects of all world
religions is given in Weber's Wirfschaftsgeschichte, pp. 302-315.
681
be in harmony with the vested interests of some social groups,
and through the magical stereotyping of human actions, which
makes man follow by intimidation the path of traditionalism.
"These traditional obstacles cannot be broken through a mere
desire for profit (Erwerhstrieh). The idea that our rationalistic and
capitalistic epoch has a stronger gainful impulse than other
epochs is childish. A representative of modern capitalism is not
driven by a stronger gainful motive than a dealer of the East."
Similarly, an increase in a population is not sufficient to break the
chain of traditional folkways. China shows this clearly. There has
always been only one way to break it, and that is by the
appearance of great rational prophets. Not always, but often, such
prophets, being ''legalized" by miracles and other ''proofs," have
succeeded in breaking the chains of traditionalism, driving away
its magical enchantment, and through this, creating the
foundations of modern economic organization, technique, and
capitalism. "In China such ])rophets failed to appear. When they
happened to come, they came from outside like Lao-tse and
Taoism." In India, on the contrary, such prophets appeared and
laid the path for liberation from the chains of traditionalism. But,
unfortunately, they were the prophets of the Hindu type who, like
Buddha, though calling for a liberation from traditions, saw
rational freedom only in the field of a purely spiritual meditation
and thinking (Nirvana), neglecting completely the empirical
everyday life. As a result, their rationahzing prophecy and
teaching could influence only a narrow group of thinkers. For the
large masses they were too delicate to be understood and
assimilated. For them Buddhism has meant only a primitive
magical method of getting salvation. For this reason, prophecy
failed to inspire rationalism in the masses of the Indian population,
leaving their economic activity in its traditional frame. Contrary to
these religions, Judaism and Christianity exerted an immense
influence on the masses and their activity, because these
religions were ever the "plebeian mass-religions." It is true that
there also was a struggle between "the intellectual aristocracy"
(the gnostics) and the "intellectual plebs." The former tried to
transform religion into a refined v>hilosophicaI system, while the
latter held the
682
simplified forms of teaching which were accessible to the minds of
the masses. The struggle luckily was solved in the form of a
dualism. The intellectual aristocracy could isolate themselves into
the monastery and deserts, and meditate there, leading the
rational form of life. The intellectual plebs, however, were given
the possibility of carrying on their worldly life, and of performing
their duties as laymen without the obligations of the religious
aristocracy of the monks and ascetics. Hence the difference of
degree in the rationalization of the manner of living of these two
Christian strata. The mediaeval monk was the first living man who
in the Middle Ages, methodically and with rational means tried to
achieve his goalHeaven. Only for him was there a watchringing, his time alone was methodically divided into hours. The
economic organization of the monasteries was also a rational
Drganization, methodically planned, computed, measured, and
managed. But these monastery limits of life-rationalization were
too narrow; the life of the masses remained outside it. Then came
Protestantism, which, in its own way, expanded life-rationalization
over the masses, thus creating the foundations of modern
capitalism. Protestantism was exclusively responsible for its
creation.^^ At the present moment these religious roots of modern
capitalism are dead. The early religious enthusiasm and religious
conception of the world are lost. This means that a stage in the
development of modern capitalism is over. With the death of its
religious roots, it must be changed also.**^ Such are the prin^^ Contrary to Sombart, who holds that modern capitaHsm was
created principally by the Jews, Weber shows that this is a wrong
theory. Though Judaism early overcame the obstacles of
traditionalism, and, like Christianity, became inimical to magic,
nevertheless, the specific situation of the Jewish people during
the Middle Ages, their isolation from the Christians, the absence
of the jus connubium, and their situation of a "pariah-people,"
made any rational and creative economic achievement impossible
for them. If they participated somewhat in economic activity
through money-lending and so on, this was not modern rational
capitalism, but a degenerated "pariah-capitalism." "A rational
capitalist was exclusively Christian, and only on the basis of
Christianity thinkable." Outside of the pariah-capitalism, the
economic ethics of the Talmud became conspicuously traditional
and unprogressive. "The repellence of a pious Jew from any
novelty is as great as that of a native of a primitive society with
magical traditions." Only in modern times did the Jewish
enterprisers begin to play a role in the field of capitalism.
Wirtschaftsgeschichte, pp. 305-308; Religions-soziologie, Vol. Ill,
passim.
*2 Wbber, M., Wirtschaftsgeschichte, pp. 302-315.

683
ciples of Weber's sociology of religion, and his theory of the
religious determining of economic phenomena. With this we may
end our survey of these theories and turn to their criticism.
K. Criticism. I. A serious criticism of these theories is greatly
handicapped by the very nature of the concepts with which they
operate. In spite of the fact that some of the theories give a
definition of religion, it remains somewhat vague. Therefore
neither the authors nor the readers know exactly what they are
dealing with and talking about. For instance, shall we understand
by religion or magic only some system of ideas and other
psychical experiences, or shall we include also the transsubjective phenomena of rituals, ceremonies, forms of religious
behavior, and all the physical compulsion and punishing coercion
with which they are often backed? If one takes only religious
ideas and psychical experience, one has to show exactly how and
in what way they, in their pure form, are efficient. This in
conditioning the trans-subjective social phenomena has
practically never been done by these authors. All these theories
include mores, rules of conduct, rites, interests, ceremonies and
almost all laws, customs, and ethical prescriptions in their
''religious factor." In other words, it represents an unanalyzed
mixture of trans-subjective and psychic phenomena. Such a
broad understanding of the "religious factor" makes much easier
the task of demonstrating its efficiency, but it also has a great
disadvantage. It is this. Since such a ''religious factor" represents
"a hodgepodge" filled with the forms of behavior, rites,
ceremonies, "economic ethics," laws and ethical norms,
"interests," and even with physical compulsion and repressive
coercion, it factually embraces almost all psychic and a great
many physical factors. It ceases to be "a religious" factor in fact;

and becomes a mere factor covering a multitude of the transsubjective factors and psychical experiences, vague and mosaical
in its very nature. If, therefore, the authors succeed in showing its
efficiency, it is not the efficiency of "the pure factor of religion,"
"magic," or "belief" as a psychical experience, but that of a series
of various physical and "cultural" agencies. With no less reason
such a factor could be styled "speech-reactional," "physical,"
"coercive," "ethical." "juridical." or a factor of the
684
''mores." In fact many sociologists called them these names. In
this way the theories prove much less and much more than they
intend to prove. Such is their first general shortcoming. It vitiates
them in their nature. It makes it absolutely impossible for them to
reach any clear and convincing evidence of the causative
influence of religion, as a psychical force, on the dynamics of
trans-subjective phenomena. The reason for this vâs indicated
clearly in the preceding chapter. It consists in a mingling of the
trans-subjective and psychic categories, and in making either of
them the cause or the effect of the other. As a result, we have a
causal chain of trans-subjective phenomena all the time
disconnected by psychic agencies, and described partly in
objective, partly in introspective, terms. Since the ''religious factor"
represents a mysterious box filled with numerous trans-subjective
stimuli-like speech-reactions, bodily movements in rituals, by
stimuli of songs, music, paintings, dances, statues, buildings,
''religious" objects, other men and their behavior-patterns, the
actions of physical punishment, coercion, imprisonment, various
chemicals used in the ceremonies, etc., and by numerous
psychical experiences like "ideas," images, emotions, sentiments,
volitions, etc.; we are lost in the multitudinal complexity of the
factors united under the name of "religion," and we do not know

which of these stimuli is really effective, even if it is proved that
the "religious factor" is generally influential. Thus wê see here in
a concrete form the general shortcomings of the psychic theories
discussed in the preceding chapter. In order to show how great
are the difficulties to be overcome in obtaining any certain
conclusion about the role of beliefs, religion, or ideals, I shall take
an incomparably simpler case. It will show more clearly the
shortcoming of these theories.
In order to find whether or not "it is possible to inculcate ideals
and attitudes powerful enough to dominate human purposes and
conduct," Dr. P. F. Voelker took four experimental groups of Boy
Scouts, and two control groups of other children,all of them
having about the same intelligence, and home and neighborhood
environment. The inculcated ideal was that of trustworthiness.
Through various methods, the puzzle test, lost-article test.
685
the overstatement test, the let-me-help-you test, and others, the
groups were tested in trustworthiness at the beginning of the
training. After that the experimental groups B, C, J, K, were
trained in trustworthiness with the usual methods of Boy Scout
training during approximately three months, w^hile the control
groups E and I were not trained. At the end of the training the
experimental and the control groups were tested again. The
essential results are shown in the following table.^^
In the first test various groups made the following points in
trustworthiness.
The table shows only a slight correlation of trustworthiness with
training.
After the training of the four experimental groups, the changes in

the trustworthiness of these and the non-trained two groups
happened to be as follows:
Experimental group B showed a gain of 13.5 points in tiustworthiness
9.9 15-0
" K " " loss "10.2 " " Control group E showed a loss of 7.6 points in
trustworthiness (( u T u u u " 10 2 " " "
" VoELKER, P. F., The Function of Ideals and Attitudes in Social
Education, pp. 99, 115-118, 120-126, and passim, N. Y., 1921.
686
I regard these results as much less convincing than the author
thinks, especially when we take into consideration that in the
second test in the groups B and C the worst boys were dropped,
which naturally led to a rise in the points of these groups. But
even granting that the training was efficient, can we say that the
changes in the trans-subjective behavior were due to ''ideals" as a
psychical experience? This is just what could not be inferred from
the study. The changes were due to a bunch of various factors
styled by the name of ''training" : to the patterns of conduct
conveyed through speech-reactions, to the reactions and actions
of the leaders of the Boy Scout groups and other Boy Scouts, to
the repetition of an inculcated pattern of behavior, to various
trans-subjective incentives and interstimulation, to an overt
menace to exclude the dishonest boys from the group, and so
forth. In brief, there were operating numerous and various transsubjective stimuli,^"* and just exactly what the efficiency of "the
ideals" and what was meant by thema pattern of behavior
conveyed through words, or something elsethe study does not

and cannot answer. If the situation is so indefinite in this relatively
simple case, how much more indefinite it must be in the problem
of the influence of a religion on the masses and complex social
processes. In this case we certainly do not know what we are
talking about. Neither the agency whose influence we try to
measure, the phenomena on which we try to trace the influence of
"the religion," nor the criteria of the measurement are known.
** This is more clearly shown by E. D. Starbuck's table of the
causes of the religious conversion of loii men and 254 women
studied by him. The "causes" are as follows:
Cause Per Cent
Fear of Death or Hell 14
Other Self-Regarding Motives 6
Altruistic Motives 5
Moral Ideal 17
Remorse 16
Response to Teaching 10
Imitation and Example 13
Social Pressure and Urging ' 19
Total 100
Op. cit., p. 52. Thus the act of a religious conversion is a function
of many variables, among which the last three groups are overtly
trans-subjective, while the first five groups are in part, at least,
trans-subjective too, as a result of "experience" received from
others.
687
PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGISTIC THP:ORIES OF RELIGION 687
Therefore the theories cannot give even a remotely certain
answer. All their statements are but vague and dogmatic
assumptions. So much for this point.
II. Even granting, however, that together with the authors we
know what we are dealing with and talking about, we can still see
a very serious **flaw" in all the theories. F. de Coulanges assures
us that the whole dynamics of Greek and Roman history was but
the result of the dynamics of religious beliefs. They changed, and
as a consequence, the social and political institutions changed
also. Such is a summary of his theory. But does he prove his
contention? Does he really show that the causal sequence was
such that in the first place there was a change in religious ideas,
and after this came the changes in the institutions? Does he
demonstrate that the opposite sequence, or a simultaneity of the
changes did not happen? No, he does not give even a scintilla of
such a demonstration. More than that, if the reader rereads the
above quotations from his work, especially the lines which I have
put in italics, we may see that F. de Coulanges in one place says
that law and politics began to change ''because men ceased to
have religious beliefs," while in another place he claims that
''changes took place in government and in laws at the same time
as in religious ideas." This is a conspicuous illustration of F. de
Coulanges' dogmatic assumption, of the inconsistency of his
thought, and of the lack of demonstration in his thesis. All that his
brilliant book proves is only that changes in one field of social
phenomena are concomitant wîth changes in other fields. No
more. But which of these changes is the cause, and which is the
effect? This is not demonstrated at all in his work. Taking its
factual side, one may say together with Ed. Meyer: "Religion is
not a source (lVur::e!) of mores, but only an expression and
manifestation of the social life of human beings," or together with

W. G. Sumner :"*'' "Religion conies out of the mores and is
controlled by them," but mores (and institutions) do not come out
of religion, nor are they controlled by it, as we are assured by the
above authors. Moreover, even granting that F. de Coulanges
^^ Sumner, W. G., "Religion and the Mores," American Journal of
Sociology^ Vol. XV, p. 591. Later on we shall see that the above
objection may be made also against Sumner's mores factor. He
treats it just as the criticized authors treat their religious fat-tor.
688
is right in his contention, he does not answer at all the question: if
all social institutions change under the influence of the changes in
religion, how then and why does religion itself change? If such an
answer had been attempted, it would at once have shown the
fallacy of the theory, which is similar to that of the one-sided
economic interpretation of social processes. (See the chapter on
the economic school.)
The above may also be said of the theories of Ellwood, Le Bon,
Sorel, Ross, Frazer, and others. As far as they try to show that, in
the causal relationship between the religious and the other
phenomena, the religion, belief, or magic is the cause and other
phenomena are the effects, their proofs are inadequate. For
instance, does Professor Ellwood demonstrate that in the alleged
parallelism of the decay of religion and of civilization, the decay of
religion is the cause for the decay of civilization instead of a mere
expression or symptom of it or of other operative forces? No, his
arguments do not prove such a contention. This may be seen
even in his own book. At one place he interprets the present crisis
of religion as a mere symptom of the general social crisis of today,"*^* and at another place, the social crisis as a result of the
crisis of religion.^"^ He does not give any conclusive proof that

the modern reversion to paganism, to unmorality, to brute force,
and so on, is the result of the religious crisis, as he claims,
implicitly and explicitly. With no less reason one may reverse the
causal relation and say that to-day's religious crisis is the result of
an increase in paganism, brute compulsion, war, disintegration of
family, and so on. The net result of his study is that a series of
social phenomena undergo a change together or simultaneously,
but which is the cause, and which is the result, his study fails to
show. We may agree with Ross, Le Bon, Sorel, or Frazer, that
beliefs, myths, or superstitions may appear as effective factors in
human behavior and social processes when they are accepted,
objectivized in overt actions, backed by a physical coercion and
compulsion and permeated by emotions, instincts, feelings,
volitions and interests. This, however, is not sufficient
** "All the institutions of the modern world may be said to be at
the present time in the melting pot, being tested in the crucible of
fiery criticism," and so on. The Reconstruction of Religion, p. 14.
*^ Ibid., pp. 15 ff., and passim.
689
to demonstrate their contention. In the process of history millions
of various beliefs, superstitions, and myths have been originated;
yet we know well that the majority of them have not been followed
by the masses. They have fallen flat, and have not found any
response from the people. This means that beliefs or myths, as
mere beliefs, are not sufficient to grasp the ''human soul"; and
that there are some other conditions which must be present to
make them acceptable and influential. Pareto may be right in
saying that beliefs and myths are only derivations of some other
operative forces. These forces determine whether a belief is
accepted or not, the ideologies being only a kind of a cloak for

these operative forces. The cloak, since it is accepted and
objectivized, is certainly not impotent and counts for something,
but it is inaccurate to ascribe to it the whole power of these
operative forces hidden beneath the *'cloak" of beliefs or
superstitions. The same may be said of religious dogmas
generally. Guignebert has shown in his excellent monograph that
"the beliefs or dogmas of religion are only an ideological
manifestation of the emotions and feeling of man." It is quite
unimportant as to whether they are logical, reasonable, and
rational, or irrational and absurd. What is important is that they
suit corresponding ''emotions and drives." If they suit and beautify
them they will be accepted, and vice versa. "This [emotional] faith
does not care for logic in dogmas and beliefs." "It would accept
any belief or dogma which is suited to its appetite.""*^ From this
standpoint St. Augustine's paradox: Credo quia ab-surdnni (I
believe because it is absurd) is typical of the attitude possessed
by a man with such a faith."*^ For these reasons it is not sufficient
to show that some of the accepted myths, beliefs, and dogmas
seem to have been "effective." To show their effectiveness, the
authors have to take an idea in its pure form and demonstrate
with it the accuracy of their theory. Contrariwise, their analysis
remains "superficial" and their conclusion unconvincing.
* See Guignebert, Vevolution des dogmes, passim and pp. 143
ff., Paris, 1910.
^9 Comp. SoROKiN, The Sociology of Revolution, Chaps. Ill, IV,
XV; Lippmann, W., Public Opinion, passim; Lowell, op. cit.,
passim; Sumner, Folkways, passim] and "Religion and Mores";
see also Pareto's theory, and the literature indicated there.
690
In a somewhat better condition is the theory of Max Weber. Since

he takes the rehgious factor only as a methodological variable, he
avoids much of the above objection. Nevertheless, Weber very
often slips from his "functional" standpoint into that of one-sided
''causation." In this case he also makes the above mistake.
Furthermore, his very concept of the Wirtschaftsethik does not
entitle him to regard its effects as that of religion alone or even as
its principal effects. According to Weber's own statement, ''no
JVirfschaftsethik has ever been determined by religion only." It is
a function of geographical, historical, and other physical and
psychological facts. The religious factor is only one, among many
factors of the Wirtschaftsethik.
Zu den Determinanten der Wirtschaftsethik gehbrt als eine
zvoJiIbemerkt: nur cine auch die religiose Bestimmtheit der
Lebens-fiihrung. Diese selbst aber ist nati'irlich zmederum
innerhalb gege-bener geographischcr, politischer, sozialer,
nationaler Grenzen durch okonomische and politische momente
tief beeinflnsst.^^
This shows that the Wirtschaftsethik (X) is in no way a product of
the religious factor only (A), and that neither Weber nor we know
what is its relative importance among the other factors (B, C, D,
E, F,) which shape it. For this reason granting that Weber's
analysis of the effects of the Wirtschaftsethik on economic life is
accurate, we in no way can ascribe these effects to religion (A)
only because the factor of the Wirtschaftsethik is a complex
embodiment of numerous and various factors (B, C, D, E, F,)
wîich shape it. In a schematical way this may be expressed as
follows:
X {Wirtschaftsethik) = f((A) (reHgion) -fB-fC-f-D-hE-f-F, ...) X
exerts such and such effects on the economic php.nomena.
These
effects will be not only the effects of A, but -F B -}- C -|- D -f E
+ F, . . .
In other words, if Weber's conclusions concerning the effects of
the Wirtschaftsethik were true, he would have proven only that a
series of factors: A, B, C, D, E, F, . . . exert such and such effects
on the economic life, but in no way could he be
691
thought to have proved that these effects are that of rehgion (of A)
as Weber often states, or that the rehgious factor is the most
important among these, A, B, C, D, E, F, . . . Even more, Weber's
analysis does not show even tentatively what the share of the
religious factor is in molding the IVirtschaftsethik, and
correspondingly, its share in conditioning the effects of the
IVirtschaftsethik in the field of economic phenomena. Thus, after
M. Weber's work we are as ignorant about the degree of
efficiency in the religious factor as we were before. In this respect,
Weber's work has the same shortcomings as these theories.
III. Side by side with these fundamental ''flaws" of the theories
which considerably invalidate their scientific value but not their
practical utility there are numerous factual assumptions which
are either vague or at least questionable. For instance, Hobhouse
and Ell wood ^^ claim that a decay of religion is followed by a
decay of civilization, and that ''the death of religion would mean
the death of all higher civilization." Frankly, I find such a
statement vague. I do not find a single example of an absolute
decay of religion. All I know is that the decay of one religion is
followed by the ascent of another. For instance, in ancient Rome
about the end of the second century B.C., there appeared a
decay of the former religion; but side by side with it we see the
expansion and progress of various oriental religions, and finally of
Christianity. In Europe, about the end of the fourteenth century,
the Roman Catholic religion began to show some symptoms of

decay, but it was followed by a growth of various sects, and finally
by the triumph of Protestantism. The same may be said of all
other cases of "decay" in religions. When one religious system is
dying, another is coming in its place. If such is the real situation,
then the above statement appears "empty" in essence. If the
statement means a relative weakening of a religion, it must show
how this could be measured. Only after such measurement may
the explanation have some significance. If we take it as an
approximate judgment, the situation is no better. For instance,
since the end of the second century A.D., in the
" Ellwood, The Reconstrnctiofi, pp. 60-64; "Religion and Social
Control," pp. 335 ff.; Hobhouse, L. T., Social Evolution and
Political Theory, p. 128.
692
history of Rome ''from the intellectual and spiritual point of view
the main phenomenon is the decline of ancient civilization, of the
city civilization of the Greco-Roman world." Science, literature,
philosophy, and so on began to become more primitive,
elementary, less fine and creative.^^ According to the statement
criticized, this must be paralleled by an increase of irreligion. Was
it paralleled in fact? This is quite doubtful. It was paralleled rather
by an increase but not by a decrease of another religious
mentality in various forms.
It was the mentality of the lower classes, based exclusively on
religion and not only indifferent but hostile to the intellectual
achievements of the higher classes. This new attitude of mind
gradually dominated the upper classes, or at least the larger part
of them. It was revealed by the spread among them of the various
mystic religions, partly Oriental, partly Greek. The climax was

reached in the triumph of Christianity.^^
Thus the Roman Empire's decay, which is usually thought to
show the decay of a civilization through the decay of religion,
testifies rather against such an assumption. Gobineau already
indicated that there are many cases when a society or even a
civilization declined in the midst of a strong religious spirit of the
people. Tyre, Carthage, and Judea are examples.^^ These
remarks are enough to show the insufficiency of such a
statement. Perhaps it is accurate potentially, but this possible
accuracy must be shown by a systematic scientific verification
which is not given at all in the presentation of these theories.
Let us take another example. B. Kidd, E. Durkheim, and many
others state that the fundamental social function of religion has
been the creation and expansion of solidarity (Durkheim), and that
practically all the altruistic actions of individuals and groups, and
the whole process of the liberation of the masses from slavery
and bondage, has been due to religion (B. Kidd). Can these
propositions meet successfully a scientific test? I am
^2 ROSTOVTZEFF, M., Op. cit., p. 479.
^^ Ibid., pp. 479-480; see also Angus, S., The Mystery-Religions
and Christi-anity, pp. 4-5, N. Y., 1925; Legge, F., Forerunners and
Rivals of Christianity, Vol. I, p. xlix, Cambridge, 1915; Aust, E.,
Die Religion der Romer, p. 107, Miin-ster, 1899.
" See Gobineau, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 21-22.
693
afraid they cannot. Judging, as these theories do, on the bases of
the surface of the phenomena, one may obviously see that reh-
gion in some cases serves as an instrument of soHdarity; but in

other cases as an instrument of mutual animosity, warfare, and
struggle (persecution and torturing of the peoples of a different
religion, their spoliation, religious wars, religious antagonisms,
conflicts, and so forth). Therefore it seems to be inaccurate to
stress one side and to forget the other. Kidd^s statement may be
valid in regard to some of the historical cases, but it is fallacious in
regard to others. For instance, it seems to be safe to say that the
India caste system and a complete disfranchisement of the lower
castes appeared and has been existing with the support of
religion. Mohammedanism and Judaism, in the period of their
expansion, have made thousands of slaves from the van-({uished
peoples. Even Christianity is not free from the same traits. If, on
the one hand. Saint Paul and the Church Fathers condemned
slavery and disfranchisement of the masses, on the other, they
preached: ''Servant be obedient unto them that . . . are your
masters, with fear and trembling," and it is rather hard to say
whether Christianity's role has been greater in a liberation of the
masses from slavery and bondage or in supporting these
institutions. Whether a thing is good or bad does not concern us.
What is important here are the real facts, and these do not permit
us to say that Kidd's statement is valid. It is at least one-sided. No
more valid is his assumption that science and the intellect are
purely egotistical agencies, or that super-rational beliefs have
been increasing in the course of history. I do not belong to those
enthusiasts of science who believe that science is always
altruistic, and that any scientific progress leads to a progress of
sociality and altruism. However, Kidd's statement is no less
fallacious than the statements of these enthusiasts of science.
Neither of these two opposite statements appears to be accurate.
Neither do I belong to those who expect that within a few days the
''irrationalism" of human beings shall disappear, and that
''rationalism" will grow in the course of history. But if I fail to see
this, it does not give me any serious reason for finding Kidd's
opposite statement accurate. Both opinions belong to the field of

the unverified assumptions whose truth or fallacy is yet
694
to be ascertained. Furthermore, Kidd's starting points are rather
questionable. In the chapter about the Darwinistic school I have
indicated that the concept of the struggle for existence is
somewhat vague. If it has been a factor in the evolution of
organisms, it has not been the only factor. Side by side with it has
been operating the factor of mutual aid or solidarity. It was
operating as early as the factor of the struggle for existence.
Therefore it is fallacious to say that the "progress" of organisms
has been due to the struggle for existence only, as is claimed by
Kidd. Since mutual aid has existed among plant and animal
organisms, this means that such actions are possible without
religion because the assumption of religion among plants and
animals would be childish. This means that mutual aid is as
general a phenomenon of life as the struggle for existence.
Therefore the acts of solidarity, sacrifice, and mutual aid among
humanity could be satisfactorily explained as a manifestation of
the same biological factor within human beings. This means that
Kidd's fundamental assumption that all altruistic actions are due
to religion, and that without it, there would be none, is rather
fallacious. Since such actions are possible and may be
satisfactorily explained without religion, the whole theory of .Kidd
about the social role of religion loses its ground and becomes
unconvincing. Let us now turn to the factual side of M. Weber's
theory. It is also questionable on several points. He claims that
only Christianity, and partly Judaism, have been inimical to
traditionalism, to magic, and to superstition; and that their
practical ethics alone have been rational and have promoted a
rationalization of life. ^'Outside of Judaism, Christianity, and two
or three oriental sects, there has been no religion with an obvious

animosity towards magic" (and traditionalism).''''^ Through this, as
we saw, Weber explains why modern capitalism has been
developed within the Christian world, and why it has failed within
the countries of other world-religions. I am afraid such a
statement is questionable. I do not see why Confucianism with its
evident contempt of supernaturalism and mysticism, its openly
agnostic attitude toward the existence of supernatural beings, its
extraordinary ''practical" character, its balanced common sense,
" Weber, Wirtschaftsgeschichte, p. 307.
695
and, finally, with its systematic and rational theory of the
education of man,"'*^ should be declared more superstitious and
less inimical toward magic than Christianity or Judaism. Together
with many a competent investigator of Confucianism, I am
inclined to regard it as one of the most ''positive" and the least
magical, mystical, and superstitious religions in the world.^"^
Therefore in no way can I agree with Weber's statement. It is true
that Confucianism stresses ''traditionalism," but only in the sense
of a prudent and harmonious policy of sound conservatism. In this
respect it is no more "traditional" than Judaism or Christianity.
Finally, the whole system of Confucianism is a consistent theory
of a pragmatic and balanced rationalization of social life, free from
any mysticism and magic.''^^ Thus Weber's discussed
presumption is at least questionable. In so far as it is so, all his
conclusions concerning the religious origin of modern capitalism
and the causes responsible for the existing economic regimes in
each of the countries of the principal world religions become
questionable. In a similar way, one can seriously question other
"typological" characteristics of Weber. Being quite complex and
fluctuating, Weber's "ideal types" of each of the world religions
and of their IVirtschaftsethik, even his concepts of "rationalism"

and "traditionalism," are at least vague and questionable as
adequate explanations of reality. Finally, a series of facts directly
contradicts his theory. Since the second half of the nineteenth
century in Japan, there has not been any conspicuous change in
the religion of the population. Japan has not become
'^ "To search for what is mysterious, and to practice marvelous
arts in order to be mentioned with honour in future agesthis is
what I do not do." This is one of Confucius' mottoes. Another is
given by him in his answer to the question about human fate after
death: "When you do not know about Hfe how can you know
about death?"
*^ Read The Texts of Confucianism published in The Sacred
Books of the East, Vols. Ill, XXVII, XXVIII; see also Legge, J., The
Life and Teaching of Confucius, London, 1895, pp. 100 ff., Ch.
XV, and passim; Legge, J., The Life and Works of Mencius,
Philadelphia, 1875; Chang, Chen Huan, The Economic Principles
of Confucius and Ilis School, N. Y., 1911.
*" If Weber finds the organization of life in mediaeval monasteries
rational, I wonder why he fails to see that in the field of a purely
economic organization of society, China has tried the most
various rational systems beginning with various forms of socialism
and state-socialism, and ending with the regime of "private
property. See Chang, Chen Huan, op. cit., passim; Lee, Mabel
Ping-Hua, The Economic History of China, passim, N. Y., 1921.
696
either Christian or Jewish. In its reHgion it has remained
essentially the same as it was before the second half of the
nineteenth century; yet the country has made a miraculous
progress in the way of a ''rationalization" of its economic, social,

political, and cultural life. "The traditionalist and the magical"
religion of the majority of Japan's population evidently did not
hinder at all the most successful development of modern
capitalism. According to Weber, this is impossible, in the midst of
such a religion. Furthermore, his statement that the Protestants
everywhere and always are economically better off than the
members of other religions is likely to be far from being universal
in space and time phenomena. His statistical data are rather
scarce and concern almost exclusively Baden in Germany. It is
impossible to make any universal generalization on the basis of
such fragmentary and limited statistical material.
Space does not permit me to go into an analysis of many of the
other factual statements of Weber.^^ The above, however, may
be sufficient to show that Weber's theory is highly vulnerable in its
fundamental and secondary points. It is far from being
unquestionable and perfect as we are told by some of Weber's
followers.
The above is sufficient to show that all these sociologies of
religion are still speculative and unsatisfactory. No one gives to us
a really scientific analysis of ''the role of religion." No one supplies
us with a severely verified correlation between well-defined
religious and non-religious social phenomena.
This does not mean that they do not possess at least a part of
truth. It is highly probable that they do. How great this part is
remains to be found. The theories themselves do not give any
certain basis for solving the problem. It is up to the future student,
first, to forsake the existing half-speculative method of these
theories; second, to define clearly and scientifically their "factor of
religion"; and, third, to plunge into a scrupulous sifting of the truth
from "the rubbish" in the field by a careful statistical, historical,
and even experimental analysis of the corresponding facts.^^
^^ See Brentano, L., Der Wirtschaftende Mensch in der

Geschichte, Leipzig, 1923. 60 Something in the way of a
statistical study of the correlations between religious and nonreligious phenomena is already being done. We even have some
697
2. Social Role of Folkways, Mores, and Customs
The ''flaws" of the above theories of the social role of reHgion
may be found also in the theories which stress the importance of
folkways, mores, and customs as factors. Long ago their
importance was discovered and used for practical purposes. This
is evident in the Confucianist applied sociology, which is built
principally on the decisive importance of folkways, styled there
*'path," and ''rules of propriety," or "ceremonial usages."
The rules of propriety serve as instruments to form men's
characters, and they are therefore prepared on a great scale.
Being so, the value of them is very high. They remove from a man
all perversity and increase what is beautiful in his nature. [They]
secure the display of righteousness . . . showing the people all the
normal virtues. . . . Their path may not be left for an instant. If it
could be left it would not be the path. . . . The rules of propriety
and ceremonial usages should be most carefully considered.^'^
Tacitus' Quid leges sine morihiis! and hundreds of similar
statements of ancient and more modern thinkers who have
stressed the conditioning role of the mores, traditions, and
customs are further examples. More recently a series of
sociologists have developed the same idea in a detailed form. As
examples of this may serve H. Spencer's theory of "Ceremonial
Government" ;^^
quantitative data and some hypothetical conclusions made on

their basis. Such are, for instance, the tentative correlations:
between certain religions and divorce (G. von Mayr, Bosco,
Oettingen, Lichtenberger and others); between certain religions
and suicide (Durkheim, von Mayr, and others); between a certain
religion, criminality, and types of criminality (von Mayr, G.
Aschaffenburg, Lom-broso, P. R. Radosavljevich, and others);
between a certain religion and marriage and birth rates (M.
Tougan-Baranovsky, J. Wolff, and others); between certain
religions and the economic status (M. Weber, B. Shell, M.
Offenbacher, C. A. Hanna, and others); between certain religions
and the character of mores (W. G. Sumner and others); between
religion and certain characteristics of ethics and political and
social institutions. It is possible to say with a reasonable degree of
certainty that some of these correlations are "fictitious," being a
mere coincidence of a parallel or of an opposite fluctuation of the
figures due to the fragmentary and limited-in-time-and-space
character of the data studied. Some of them, however, are likely
to be functional correlations. Continuing this type of study with all
the necessary precautions, we may gradually come to more and
more valid conclusions, free from the defects of these theories. In
spite of the great interest of this kind of study, space does not
permit me to enter here into further analysis. It is the proper object
of a special monograph.
^'Li-Ki, VII: 3; VIII: 15, i; 1:62-63.
" See Spkn(-er. H.- Principles of Sociology, Part IV, "Ceremonial
Institutions."
698
M. Kovalevsky's theory of the origin and the interrelation between
''custom and law";^^ Waxweiler's formula of social adaptation;^*
E. A. Ross's brilliant generalizations in this field ;^^ E.

Westermarck's theory of the origin and role of moral rules; ^^ and
finally, W. G. Sumner's work.^^
A brief analysis of Sumner's ^'^ theory of the folkways and mores
is enough to show the shortcomings of all these theories. Its
essence is as follows: 'The folkways are habits of the individual,
and customs of the society which arise from efiforts to satisfy
needs." As "the first task of life is to live, men begin with acts, not
with thought." By the trial and error method of various ways of
doing, the best and the fittest under the conditions are selected.
They are repeated. The repetition "produces habit in the individual
and custom in the group." Thus "folkways as a rule are made
unconsciously." After their appearance, "they become regulative
for succeeding generations, and take on the character of a social
force. They arise no one knows whence or how. They grow as if
by the play of internal life energy. They can be modified, but only
to a limited extent by the purposeful efforts of men. In time they
lose power, decline, and die or are transformed. While they are in
vigor they verv largely control individual and social undertakings,
and they produce and nourish ideas of world philosophy and life
policy." "When the elements of truth and right are developed into
doc^3 KovALEVSKY, M., Coutume contemporaine et lot ancienne, in
Russian, published in 1886, and his Origin of the Permitted and
Unpermitted Actions, Russ., and in Revue int. de sac, 1891-2.
" Waxweiler's formula of the origin of the mores and successive
stages of social adaptation runs as follows: In a group of
interacting individuals, many actions are performed; the best ways
of acting are repeated; repeated actions become customs; when
customs become conscious they turn into a juridical rule; a totality
of such rules pertaining to one field of activity composes a social
institution; and a totaUty of such institutions composes the social
organization of the group. In a shortened way the scheme is

expressed in the formula: "action-repetition,habit,custom,
rule,institution-organization." See Waxweiler, E., "Avantpropos," in Bulletin Mensuel of the Solvay Institute of Sociology,
1910, No. I.
Ross., E., Social Control, Chaps. XI, XIX, XV, and passim.
^ Westermarck, E., The Origin and Development of the Moral
Ideas, 1906, Vol. I, Chaps. I-XIII and passim.
" Sumner, W. G., Folkways, 1906. See also Keller, A., Societal
Evolution,
191538 Born in 1840, died in 1910. Author of many valuable works in
economics,
political science, and sociology.
699
trines of welfare, the folkways are raised to another plane. Then
we call them mores." The folkways and the mores ''are a directive
force." ''Institutions and laws are produced out of mores." "World
philosophy, life policy, right, rights, and morality are all products of
the folkways." "They pervade and control the ways of thinking in
all the exigencies of life, returning from the world of abstractions
to the world of action to give guidance and to win revivification."^^
Such is the essence of Sumner's theory in which he recapitulated
more systematically what had been said by E. Burke, Sa-vigny,
Puchta, H. Spencer, H. Taine, E. Renan, Kovalevsky, Makarewicz
and other historians of custom, law, and moral rules. We may
agree that the theory states correctly the origin, variation,

selective character, societal nature, growth, and decay of the
folkways and mores; ^^ but quite different is the situation in that
part of the doctrine which claims a great controlling power for the
folkways and mores, and tries to make them a basic factor of
social processes. Is this part sufficiently proved? Is the very
meaning of the claim itself clear? I am afraid it is not. Since the
folkways and mores "are the ways of doing things which are
common in a society" (Folkways, pp. 34, 61), to say that they
determine human behavior, means no more than a tautology: "the
ways of doing things determine the wâys of doing things," or X
determines X. Sumner himself seems to have felt the
unsatisfactory character of his basic statement, and many times
has tried to indicate the forces which are responsible for the
powerfulness of the folkways. In some places he mentions "the
interests" (pp. 1-2), as such a force lying behind the folkways; in
some places, "the first task of life is to live"; in some others, the
"four great motives ot human actions: hunger, sex passion, vanity,
and fear" (p. 22) ; in some others, "pain and pleasure," and so on.
If the above tautological statement is unsatisfactory, this
interpretation of thepowerfulnessof the folkways as a shrine,
" Sumner, W. G., Folkways, pp. i, 2, 25, 26, 34, 39, 44, 61, 66-67,
and passim. See also Keller, A., op. cit., Chaps. Ill, L, and passim.
^ Though even there several points are dark; for instance, the
selective character of the folkways. Sumner, Keller, and
Kovalevsky also, have to admit that "there are folkways which are
positively harmful." Sumner, op. cit., p. 26. Such exceptions testify
that the selection is not always good, or that sometimes there is
no selection.
700
or an embodiment of ''interests, hunger, sex passion, vanity, and

fear, pleasure," and many other forces makes of them a factor of
exclusively complex and vague character, in which the specificity
of the folkways and mores as a factor is lost in a sea of various
trans-subjective, physical, biological, ''introspective" social and
psychical forces. The "variable" becomes indefinite and as broad
as "the factor of life"; being such, it does not give any possibility of
establishing any definite correlation with other phenomena, or of
clearly describing its functions in life. As a result, statements like
this: "institutions and laws, life policy and philosophy, right and
rights are determined by the folkways" become "empty." Thus we
have either a tautological "the ways of doing determine the ways
of doing," or an indefinite statement which claims that interests,
plus pleasure and pain, plus hunger, plus sex passion, plus
vanity, plus many other drives and things exert an influence on
human behavior and social processes. Certainly so. But what
about the influence of the folkways, as a specific factor differing
from these forces? What is its influence? Which are its
correlations with certain other phenomena? The answer is not
given by the theory. Furthermore, it is enough to modify slightly
my other objections against the "religious" theories to see that
they may be set forth against the theory of the mores too. This
task I leave to the reader. The above allusions are sufficient to
show in which points Sumner's and other similar theories are
imperfect. Let us now turn to the theories which try to analyze the
social role of such a "variable" as law and morality.
3. Social Functions of Law
Among numerous and various psychological theories of law'^^
and its social role, possibly the most elaborate is the theory of
71 See their excellent survey and criticism in Petrajitzsky, L.,
Essays in Philosophy of Law, Russ.; Theory of Law and Morals,
Vol. II, 1909, Russ. See also Jhering, R., The Struggle for Law;
Cruet, La vie du droit et I'impuissance des lois, Paris, 1908;

Ehrlich, E., Grundlagen der Soziologie des Rechts, Miinchen,
1913; Jerusalem, F. W., Soziologie des Rechts, 1925; Ross, E.,
Social Control, Chap. XI; Park, R., and Burgess, E., Introduction,
Chap. XII; Sorokin, P., Theory of Law, Russ., 1920; Commons, J.,
Legal Foundations of Capitalism, N. Y., 1924; Stammler, R.,
Wirtschaft und Recht; Theorie der Rechtswissenschaft; KanTOROWicz, H., "Der Aufbau der Soziologie," IV, part, Die
Rechtsoziologie, in
701
Professor L. I. Petrajitzsky. In its essence it is as follows : Law is
neither ''official nor state orders" which are only a variety of the
more general phenomena of law; nor are they the obligatory rules
of conduct enacted by the state officials because a state and the
state authorities presuppose the existence of law without which
their very existence would be impossible or unlawful. Neither is
law the expression of a general will of the people, because in the
past and in the present there have existed many laws enacted
without any consultation with the majority of the people. Nor are
laws to be found in codes, because, physically, codes are but
paper with some figures in the form of letters. Law is a specific
psychical experience. Outside of the human mind it does not exist
as law, but only as a symbol of law which, without a
corresponding psychical experience, is incomprehensible and
represents a mere combination of various physical phenomena.
Psychologically law-experience is composed of a specific
emotion, which is simultaneously passive and active, and of an
idea of certain patterns of action (rules and conduct). This latter
element consists of the ideas of (a) a subject who is entitled to be
given what he has a right to demand; (b) of the subject of an
obligation who is obliged or bound to do his duty; (c) of the idea of
what is to be done by the subject of the right; and (d) what, by the
subject of the obligation; plus several other 'îdeational images."
In other words, psychologically the phenomena of law are
composed of an emotion plus the above ideas of the subjects of
the right and the duty, and of their corresponding forms of
conduct. Emotional elements give to law-experience its force, and
dynamics; ''ideational" elements define the patterns of conduct to
which the law-emotion is urging. Such a psychological
composition of law manifests itself in our feeling of the law-rules
of conduct as "obligatory" or two-sided. On the one hand they
assign to the subject of a duty the obligation to perform it; on the
other, they entitle the subject of the right to require or demand a
satisfaction of his right. By this two-sidedness the phenomenon of
law difYers from that of morals. Moral rules of conduct only
command to do such and such things,
Errinneriingsgabc fiir M. Weber, Vol. I; Todd, A, J., op. rit., Chiip.
XXIV; Pound R., Introdmtion to the Philosophy of Law, 1922.
702
for instance, to give one's wealth to a poor man; but they do not
ascribe to this poor man the right to demand the wealth of the
other. They are one-sided, only imperative; while the law-rules are
two-sided, imperative-attributive. Being such, they naturally are
felt as "binding" or ''obligatory." Thus, according to Professor
Petrajitzsky, law is imperative-attributive psychical experience,
composed of specific emotion plus an idea of a certain pattern of
behavior of the subjects of right and obligation. Such is the
psychical essence of the phenomena of law. Any psychical
experience which has the above characteristics is a phenomenon
of law regardless of the concrete character of the rules of
conduct. Even a band of brigands has its own law, as far as its
members have the above experience. There are many varieties of
law. The two principal ones are the official law enacted by the
state officials, and the unofficial law, which may very often be
contradictory to the official law, and sometimes may break it."^^
Guided by the above conception of law, Petrajitzsky very clearly
depicted the influence of law on human behavior and law's social
functions. Laiv's influence on human hehaznor, and through it, on
social phenomena is manifested in three principal forms: (a) in a
definite motivation of human behavior; (b) in its shaping through
repetition of the forms of conduct required by law; (c) in the
physical coercion to follow the forms of conduct indicated by law.
As a motivating force, law urges us to do our duty; it gives us the
power to demand what we are entitled to by law; it makes us fight
for our rights when they are transgressed and it urges a subject to
a sense of the obligation to do his duty. Without the law-factor we
would do nothing unpleasant or hard; we would not dare to
require service of other men if we were not entitled to it by law; we
would not have the energy to oppose a strong man or to fight for
our rights in case of their transgression.
In brief, without law as a motivating factor, our behavior
'2 The above is only a poor skeleton of an extraordinarily logical
and deep psychological theory of law developed in detail by
Petrajitzsky, in his Introduction to the Theory of Law, and Theory
of Law, Vols. I and II. Contrary to many philosophical theorizers of
law, the author made a minute analysis of the codes of the
constitutional, civil, administrative, criminal, and processual law
from the standpoint of his theory, and he has most successfully
shown how easily his conceptions "work" in their analysis and
interpretation.
703
would be quite different. Law is an energy which puts the human

machinery into motion and controls its movement. The influence
of law, however, goes further. Actions performed at the beginning
under the influence of law as a motivating agency, become, after
many repetitions, habits, and begin to be performed as quite
habitual actions. In this way law influences human behavior still
more profoundly. Finally, when certain forms of conduct required
by law are not fulfilled, or when certain forms of actions prohibited
by law are fulfilled, the law manifests itself as a physical power,
and through coercion, compulsion, punishment and execution,
forces ''the offenders" to follow its requirements, or -it imposes
upon them a compulsory rigid form of conduct in prison, or it
eliminates them from the field of life. In the last case it operates
as an agency of social selection and elimination of "the unfit."
Such are the three principal forms of law's influence on human
behavior. Taken together they exert an enormous amount of
pressure on human beings; they give to their behavior a quite
definite shape; they greatly change the population through
selection and elimination; and through all this, they shape social
institutions and processes. The social functions of law are two:
distributive and organisational. Being in its essence an emotional
idea which distributes rights and duties among human beings, law
determines all the essential forms of human relationship;
prescribes sinnn quiqiie, distributes rights and duties among the
members of a group; and, in brief, operates as a distributive
agency. It definitely indicates to everybody what, when, where,
and in regard to whom he has to act. As far as rights and duties
are social values, their distribution by law means the distribution
of all social values, among the members of a society including the
economic ones. In this function the social role of law is enormous.
Tt is the force which shapes the whole social organization; the
political constitution, economic institutions, social classes, and so
forth. Oflicial "laws," courts and judges are nothing but
instruments for the realization of the distributive function of law. Its
organizational function is the other side of the distributive function.
In order that the distribution of rights and duties may be efficient,

there nuist 1)C some power or authority thnnigh wliich the dis704
tribution is enforced and protected. On this basis appeared the
government, or power, the state, and the law agents; legislatures,
courts, judges, police and so on. Authority is nothing but a
creation of law. The power of a government is but the power of
law; that is, the power of a conviction which attributes to the
corresponding persons the rights of governing, and to the
subjects, the duty of obedience. Giving to the various classes of
people and authorities different rights and duties, law creates a
hierarchy of the authorities, organizing the social, economic,"^^
and political institutions of a society. From these statements it
follows that there must be a close correlation between the
character of the law-convictions of a group and its social and
political organization. The former being changed, the latter will be
changed also. Such is the essence of Petrajitzsky's theory of law
as a psycho-social factor.
In the opinion of the writer the theory is logical, elegant, and valid,
as far as the law-convictions are taken as a given variable.
Certain law-convictions like the mores being given, they influence
human behavior in the above three forms and perform the
distributive and organizational functions. But is this enough, and
will we penetrate far enough into the wilderness of the dynamics
of trans-subjective social phenomena with these propositions? I
am afraid we shall not. Indeed, in the first place the theory has all
the difficulties of the above theories as an explanation of the
influence of psychic experience on overt action. Furthermore, it
tells us that human beings tend to behave in accordance with the
forms of convictions which they have in regard to behavior and
relationship. But why do they have any particular law-convictions?
Why do some individuals and groups have one form of lawconvictions, while other individuals and groups have often the
opposite ones? Why do the law-convictions of the same individual
or group often change in the course of time? Why, in a complex
society, in spite of the heterogeneity of the law-convictions among
its members and classes, do only certain
73 Professor John Commons, in his Legal Foundations of
Capitalism, in his own way has demonstrated a similar idea and
has backed it by an enormous mass of materials.
705
forms of these convictions become ''the official law/' while other
ones are often suppressed and persecuted?
Furthermore, there have been set forth millions of forms of
conduct and many constitutions like the French constitutions of
1791, 1793, 1795, 1814, 1830 which should have been followed.
And yet, these and many similar constitutions remained on paper
only, and only some of these patterns of conduct became ''the
law-convictions" of a certain group at a certain time. The majority
of would-be-law patterns of behavior could not be inculcated, and
were without effect."^^ We may agree that the power of a
government consists in the power of the law-convictions of its
subjects, who attribute to the government the right of governing,
and to themselves, the duty of obedience. But why do they do it?
And why do they often obey a government which they style as
"rotten," and why, out of the thousands of the would-be rulers, do
only a few candidates become rulers in fact? It is enough to put
these questions to see that the theory does not answer them. Like
the theory of the mores it is true in the contention that men tend to
behave and to shape their social institutions in accordance with
their convictions of what ought to be the forms of conduct and
relationship. But this is near to a tautology. To be a real

explanation the theory must answer all the above questions which
it does not. If it tried to do so, it would be obliged to turn
elsewhere to explain why these factors are such and such in a
given case but not in others; why they change; why they are
different among various groups; why among these different
convictions only certain ones become "the enforced official law";
and so on. In this case the law-factor appears principally as a
mere channel through which numerous non-law forces find their
aggregate outlet, and whose aggregate power is what determines
the form of the power of the law-factor. As a result, the proper
power of the pure law-factor remains unknown. At the same time,
an undifferentiated complex of various factors, united under the
name of the law-factor, makes their analysis, or the establishment
of a correlation, exceedingly difficult, and dooms us to go around
in a world of vague uncertainty. In other words, we have here the
same "flaw" ^* See about this a sharp criticism in Cruet, op. cif.,
pp. i-io, 336 and passim.
706
which was indicated above in the criticism of the religious and the
mores theory.
4. Public Opinion and Propaganda, as Factors
During the last few years several studies have been published
devoted to the analysis of what is styled ''public opinion,"its
nature, factors, mechanism of formation, accuracy, and
influence.^^ The studies have clarified our knowledge of the
phenomena to a considerable degree. They have also given us a
deeper insight into the nature and influence of various instruments
which aid in the formation of public opinion,such as the
newspapers, press, propaganda, and so forth."^^ Have they
clarified the problem of these influences on the dynamics of social

events? Can we say now exactly what is the influence of these
agencies? The question must be answered rather negatively. We
still know little in this field. On the one hand, several authors
assure us with conspicuous talent that ''the way in which the world
is imagined determines at any particular moment what men will
do"; that "the picture of our environment which we have in our
heads," regardless of its accuracy when compared with the real
world, determines our behavior; and that these "pseudoenvironments, men's interior representations of the world, are the
determining elements in thought, feeling, and action." "^^ Having
shown further that these "pictures in our heads" are greatly
'^ See especially Lippmann, W., Public Opinion, N. Y., 1922;
Phantom Public, N. Y., 1926; ToNNiES, F., Kritik der offentlichen
Meinung, Berlin, 1922; Lowell, L., op. cit.; Public Opinion and
Popular Government, N. Y., 1913; Hayes, E. C, "The Formation of
Public Opinion," Journal Applied Sociology, September-October,
1925; Dicey, A. V., Law and Public Opinion in England, 1905;
Wallas, G., The Great Society, N. Y., 1914; Bauer, W., Die
offentliche Meinung und ihre geschichtlichen Grundlagen,
Tubingen, 1914; Todd, A. J., op. cit., Chap. XXV; and the quoted
works of Pareto, J. Bryce, Ostrogorski, G. Mosca, and R. Michels.
'^ Yarros, V. S., "The Press and Public Opinion," American
Journal of Sociology, 1899; Park, R., "The Natural History of the
Newspaper," ibid., November, 1923; Leupp, F. E., "The Waning
Power of the Press," Atlantic Monthly, February, 1910; Lundberg,
G., "The Newspaper and Public Opinion," Social Forces, June,
1926; Salmon, L. M., The Newspaper and the Historian, N. Y.,
1923; Irwin, W., "The American Newspaper," Collier's, XLVI and
XLVII, 1911; Scott, W. D., The Psychology of Advertising, 1916;
Belloc, Hilaire, The Present Position and Power of the Press,
London, A. Allen and Unwin, Ltd.; Scott-James, R. A., Influence of
the Press, London, 1913. See other bibliography in these works.
^' Lippmann, Walter, Public Opinion, pp. 25-30.

707
disfigured by artificial censorships, the Hmitations of social
contact, the comparatively meager time available in each day for
paying attention to public affairs, the vested interests, the
fragmentary character of newspaper information, the intentional
distortion of the truth, and other factors, these authors come to
the conclusion that ''the pictures in our heads" are fallacious,
inadequate, and wrong; and that for this reason a competent
public opinion can scarcely exist. Consequently, various
interindividual and intergroup misunderstandings and social
conflicts are almost unavoidable.^^ If indeed we admit that ''the
world's picture in our head" determines our behavior as efficiently
as a real world, and that these pictures are greatly dependent
upon the above agencies, and especially upon the newspapers,
then it seems logical to conclude that the newspapers "create
great men out of next to nothing, and destroy the reputation of
men truly fit for leadership, decide questions of war and peace,
carry elections, overawe and coerce politicians, rulers, and courts,
and when they are virtually unanimous, nothing can withstand
them" (Yarros, op. cit., p. 32). In this case the popular belief in the
great efficiency of propaganda and in the omnipotence of the
capitalist or communist groups, which control the press, seems to
be unreservedly right.
Nevertheless, a little closer study of the facts makes the theory
very questionable. All the objections against the above theories of
psychic factors may be set forth against this theory. In its essence
it is a variety of the old belief in the omnipotent role of ideas. At
the present moment the belief can scarcely be sustained. If the
theory is right, we should expect that in Soviet Russia, where
during the last few years the press and all information has been
absolutely monopolized by the communists who have fed the
people exclusively with what they have wanted to give them,

these and the communist ideology should be exclusively popular.
As a matter of fact, the ideology is discredited among the Russian
population probably more and certainly no less, than in any other
country. This evidently contradicts the theory. G. Lundberg's
study leads to the same conclusion. He compared the attitude of
several newspapers in several important
Ibid., pp. 30-32, and passim.
708
political issues,the city manager plan, presidential elections,
and so on, with how their regular readers voted on these issues. If
the hypothesis of the influential role of newspapers on their
readers' attitudes had been true, we should have expected the
existence of a close correlation between the attitude of the paper
and that of its regular readers. As a matter of fact, Lundberg's
study did not find any tangible correlation. The Times had a
vigorous position against the city-manager plan. Of its readers, 42
per cent voted in favor, and 52 per cent, against the plan. The
Post-Intelligence and The Star favored the plan. Of the Post
readers 50 per cent, and of the Star readers only 35 per cent,
voted in accordance with the stand of the papers. Similar are the
results in other political issues."^^
In spite of the claim that the dominant public opinion in England
determines the course of legislation, A. V. Dicey shows especially
clearly that public opinion itself ''arises from the occurrence of the
circumstances," and is determined ''by external one might
almost say by accidental conditions." This, and the facts given by
him, show clearly that public opinion itself is a kind of a
weathercock which is turned by any change in the wind, but which
in itself has little influence to change the wind. These and similar
studies testify against the theory of the exclusive influence of

newspapers and propaganda, as a factor in human behavior and
social processes.^^ They show also that the statements of W.
Lippmann about the decisive role of "the wrong pictures in our
heads" is considerably exaggerated. His theory, being pushed to
its conclusion, leads to the conviction that men live mainly in, and
react principally to, a pseudo-environment, having almost no
chances of being in contact with the real world. This psycho-social
solipsism obviously cannot be accepted, because if it were true,
mankind would have already ceased to exist for the simple reason
that under a dominantly inadequate reaction
^9 LUNDBERG, Op. cit., pp. 7IO-7II.
^^ For these reasons C. A. Ellwood's criticism of the exaggerated
belief in an influence of propaganda and Park's statement that the
press rather reflects than makes public opinion, seem to be
nearer to the truth than the criticized theory. See Ell WOOD, C.
A., "Tolerance," Publications of the American Sociological
Society, Vol. XIX, pp. lo-ii. In my Sociology of Revolution, I have
tried to show also how changeable are ideas, and how closely
they depend upon deeper factors.
709
to the real environment, no maintenance of life would have been,
in a long course of time, possible. If mankind still exists, evidently
human beings have been living to a considerable degree in a real
world rather than in a Plato-Lippmann's den, and have reacted
principally to the real environment, rather than to the shadows of
the pseudo-environment which they see from the bottom of the
den.^^ These indications are sufficient indeed to show that we still
know little about the exact social influence of propaganda, news,
opinions, ideas, and ''public opinion" in their pure forms. Like the
above theories of religion, mores, and laws, these theories have
the same flaw. The truth seems to lie somewhere between those
who believe in the omnipotence of the discussed factors, in their

objectivized form, and those who deny their efficiency. But even
this conclusion must still be tested.
5. Other Cultural Agencies
After the above it is unnecessary to analyze the various theories
of the social role of arts, morality, fashions, and other cultural
agencies. It is safe to say that in their trans-subjective form they
play some part in social control, but just how great it is, the
existing theories do not answer.^^ At best they show only in what
forms each of these agencies influences social life or certain
phenomena. But what the coefficient of the influence is, and
whether the influence is due to the particular factor itself, or to
other
^^ There is another doubtful point in Lippmann's theory, namely,
his belief that the more truth men obtain in their information about
human affairs, the more beneficial will be its role. In spite of the
popularity of such a rationalist opinion, one may doubt it. If every
man or group knew exactly what other men really have in mind
and what is really happening in the world, the animosity, hatred,
war, and conflicts would scarcely be decreased. If many present
conflicts due to an imaginary animosity would have disappeared
in this case, other ones, due to a knowledge of the hidden
animosity unknown now, would have taken their place. The net
balance of such an omniscient information in regard to conflicts
would probably be near what we have now, when a part of our
environment is a pseudo-environment. See Lippmann, op. cit.,
Part VIII. Compare Pascal, B., Thoughts, Section V, p. 294,
Harvard Classics, Vol. XLVIII,
^ See for instance about the r61e of the arts, Guyau, M., Uart au
point de vue sociologique, passim and pp. 378-384, Paris, 1895;
Ross, E., Social Control, Chap. XX; BusHEE, op. cit., Chap.
XXIX; Bucher, K., Arbeit und Rhythmus, Leipzig, 1902; Lederkr,
E., "Aufgaben einer Kultursoziologie," Erinnerungsgabe Jiir M.

Weber, Vol. II; Combarieu, J., La musique et le magic, Paris,
1908; von Vogt, O., Art and Religion, New Haven, 1921; Ellis, H.,
"The Philosophy of Dancing," Atlantic Monthly, 1914. Much better
is Diserens, Ch. M. The Influence of Music on Behavior, 1926
710
forces for which the factor is a mere shrine or channel, the
theories do not answer. As a rule they do not even attempt to
make such a discrimination. More than that, under various names
they often count the same *'force" many times. When one reads
attentively the existing discussions about the role of belief,
opinion, ceremony, law, arts, religion, morals, and so on, he may
easily discover that under the names of these various agencies
there are, to a great extent, identical ''forces." In this way the
same agency is counted several times. The theories identify what
is different, and separate what is identical. One must not be
surprised, therefore, that the theories are vague and have not
given us any valid correlation.^^ In this field our scientific
knowledge is especially small, making particularly great our need
of beginning to study these phenomena more carefully with a
strict separation of the trans-subjective from the psychic variables,
and with a clear definition of the studied factors. Otherwise, we
are doomed to wander amidst the existing dim half-true, half-false
speculations.
6. General Conclusion
The last two chapters give a sufficient idea about the character
of the psychological school,its branches, varieties, pluses, and
^ From this standpoint there are some preferences for a different

approach to the problem of social control used by Professor F. E.
Lumley in his Means of Social Control, N. Y., 1925. Instead of the
traditional subdivision of the agencies of social control into
science, religion, arts, and so on, he classifies them according to
the nature of the actions through which individuals are influenced
by other individuals. As a result we have: rewards, praise, flattery,
persuasion, advertising, propaganda, gossip, satire, laughter,
calling names, threats, and punishments, as means of social
control. A similar approach has been used by the writer in his
Crime and Punishment, Service and Reward, Russ., 1914. All
these means of control are used by religious, scientific, judicial,
aesthetic, moral, educational and other agencies of social control.
As a result, when the agencies are classified in the above
traditional way the same "force" enters under different names in
the r61e of arts, religion, mores, and so on. This greatly vitiates
the whole theory. Meanwhile, by proceeding in the way of Lumley
we avoid such a false duplication or triplication of the same
means under various names; we may make all means of control
trans-subjective; we can observe them, and obtain more accurate
data on their influence, and a more valid sociological correlation.
Generally speaking, the traditional division of social phenomena
into law, arts, science, religion and so forth must be abandoned in
sociology. Being important from a practical point of view,just as
"vegetables," or "game," are important practically, scientifically
these subdivisions cannot be sustained. Botanists and zoologists
have already ceased to classify "vegetables" and "game" as a
plant or animal species. We sociologists still operate with such
"classes" of social phenomena.
711
minuses. Being certainly valuable the school should be

remodeled greatly along the suggested lines in order to get rid of
its present shortcomings, which greatly vitiate all its
achievements. Instead of the present mixed half-behavioristic and
half-introspective theories, we must have the pure behavioristic
and the pure introspectivist types of the psychological
interpretation of social phenomena. Such a reform made, it is
reasonable to expect that both of them would contribute more
than the present dim theories.
712
CHAPTER XIII
OTHER FSYCHO-SOCIOLOGISTIC STUDIES OF THE
CORRELATION BETWEEN VARIOUS PSYCHO-SOCIAL
PHENOMENA AND THEIR DYNAMICS
Besides the general and special sociologistic and psychological
theories, there are numerous studies devoted to an analysis of
the functional relationship between two or more specified
components of psycho-social phenomena. As a rule these studies
do not pretend to give an all-explaining interpretation of social life.
All that they claim is to show that such and such a correlation
exists between such and such studied phenomena. In spite of this
modesty, they are highly valuable because of their factual,
quantitative, and experimental character. Being such, they
contribute to the science of sociology no less than the broad
philosophical generalizations. Until these generalizations are
verified through such special studies, their accuracy remains
unknown. The data of these researches accumulating, they more
and more compose the foundation of a real inductive sociology.
For the last few decades the progress of sociology has been due
principally to this type of study. They already are of such
importance that no future writer of a general treatise in sociology
can ignore them if he does not want to be behind the times. For
these reasons it is necessary at least to mention briefly the

principal groups of such studies. Part of them I have already used
in the above criticism of various schools. Samples of other studies
will be surveyed in this chapter.
I. STUDIES OF A CORRELATION BETWEEN FAMILY OR
HOME, AND OTHER SOCIAL PHENOMENA
Among these special studies, a conspicuous place belongs to
those which analyze correlations between various components of
the family home, and other social phenomena. Of such
researches, the first group is composed of studies which measure
713
the influence of family and home environment, as variables, on
the personality and behavior of the people zvlio come from them.
All in all, the studies corroborate the contention of Confucius, the
Le Play school, and that of Charles H. Cooley, that the family and
the home environment are very important factors in molding
human personality. Different investigators have taken various
components of the family and home environment: the economic
status of the family, the characters of the parents, their
occupation, their morality, their relationship, cleanliness of the
home, the number of the books in the home, the character of
home furniture, and so on. Having graded the families and homes
according to one or several of these criteria, they have studied the
correlations between these conditions and health, juvenile
delinquency, criminality, suicide, insanity, feeble-minded-ness,
intelligence, genius, school and business success, and other
personality traits of the people who have come from these
families. Almost all of these studies have discovered the
existence of various tangible correlations. As a rule, the families
and homes which have a better economic status, better home
environment, honest and intelligent parents, and good relationship
between them, yield a greater portion of children with better
health, superior intelligence, those successful in their school and

business curriculum, and a greater number of geniuses and men
of talent; and, at the same time, a smaller proportion of the feebleminded, insane, the young delinquent, criminals, prostitutes, and
other socially inadequate individuals, than do the families and
homes which are poor, dirty, and unattractive, whose parents are
biologically defective, ignorant, bad-tempered, drunkards,
divorced, deserted, dead, inmioral or criminal; and whose
relationship is far from being good. In brief, on the basis of these
studies, the existence of these and similar correlations seems to
be certain, and quite tangible, though not perfect. It goes without
saying that what in these correlations is due to family and home
and what to heredity, the studies cannot exactly answer. Probably
both of these factors are responsible.^
* Of an enormous literature, see the following representative
studies of the eorrelations between the family and delinquency
and moral deficiency: Williams, J. H., "The Whittier vScale for
(trading Home Conditions," Journal of
714
In addition, several other studies have shown that practically all
the important social characteristics of an individual, such as
religion, language, mores, habits, beliefs, and even his economic
status and occupation, are determined principally by the family.
Delinquency, Vol. I, pp. 273-286; "The Intelligence of the
Delinquent Boy," ibid., Mono. No. i, 1919; Breckenridge, S., and
Abbott, E., The Delinquent Child and the Home, N. Y., 1912;
Fernald, M., Hayes, M., and Dawley, A., A Study of Women
Delinquents in N. Y. State, N. Y., 1920; Healy, W., The Individual
Delinquent, Boston, 1915; Johnson, E., "The Relations of the
Conduct Difficulties of a Group of Public School Boys," etc..
Journal of Delinquency, Nov., 1921; Shilder, E. H., "Family

Disintegration and the Delinquent Boy," Journal of Criminal Law,
Jan., 1918; Gernet, M. N., Criminal Children (Russian), Moscow,
1909; Drucker, S., and Hexter, M. B., Children Astray, Cambridge,
1923; Burt, C, The Young Delinquent, N. Y., 1925; Taft, J., "The
Effect of an Unsatisfactory Mother-Daughter Relationship," The
Family, March, 1926. See a good summary of these studies in
vSutherland, E., Criminology, Chaps. VII-VIII; GiLLiN, J.,
Criminology and Penology, Chap. XI, 1926; Burgess, E., "Topical
Summaries of Current Literature, The Family," American Journal
of Sociology, July, 1926. The following studies are representative
of a demonstration of the correlations between the family and the
intelHgence, school success, genius, integrity of personality, and
so on: Term an, L., Genetic Studies of Genius, 1925, Vol. I;
O'Brien, F., The High School Failures, N. Y., 1919; Kelly, A. M.,
and Lidbetter, E. J., "A Comparative Inquiry of the Heredity and
Social Conditions," etc.. Eugenic Review, Vol. XIII; Book, W. F.,
The Intelligence of High School Seniors, N. Y., 1922; Isserlis, L.,
"The Relation between Home Conditions and the Intelligence of
School Children," London, 1923; Duff, J., and Thomson, G. H.,
"The Social and Geographic Distribution of Intelligence in
Northumberland," British Journal of Psychology, Vol. XIV; Pintner,
R., Intelligence Testing, N. Y., 1923; Holley, Charles E., The
Relationship between Persistence in School and Home
Conditions, Chicago, 1916; Waples, D., "Indexing the
Qualifications of Different Social Groups," The School Review,
1924; Burdge, H., Our Boys, N. Y., 1921; Counts, G. S., The
Selective Character of American Secondary Education, Chicago,
1922; Ellis, H., A Study of British Genius, London, 1904; Odin, A.,
Le geneuse des grands hommes, Paris, 1895; De Candolle, A.,
Histoire des sciences et des savants, Geneve, 1885; Maas, F.,
"Ueber die Her-kunftsbedingungen der Geistigen Fiihrer," Archiv
fiir Sozialwissenschaft, 1916; Cattell, J. McKeen, American Men
of Science, 3d ed.; Clarke, E., American Men of Letters, N. Y.,
1916; Davies, G. R., "A Statistical Study of the Influence of
Environment," Quarterly Journal of University of North Dakota,

Vol. IV; Sorokin, p., "American Millionaires," Journal of Social
Forces, May, 1925; "Monarchs and Rulers," ibid,, 1925-26;
Woods, F. A., op. cit.; Huntington, op. cit. See other sources and
summary in Sorokin, Social Mobility, Chaps. X-XII; Hollingworth,
L. T., Gifted Children, N.Y., 1926. The quoted studies of N. Paton
and L. Findlay, A. B. Hill, and E. Elderton, have shown that the
health of the mother and the mother's care of the children is the
most important factor in the children's health and behavior. H.
Hartshorne's and M. A. May's study has shown also that the
children, in their knowledge of right and wrong, show the greatest
likeness to that of their parents, the coefficient of the correlation
being .545, while the coefficient of the correlation in the likeness
to children's friends is only .353; to club leaders .137; to their
teachers .028 and .002. "Testing the knowledge of Right and
Wrong," Religious Education, Vol. XXI, p. 545.
715
As a rule, the majority of men formerly had the same religion,
native language, mores, economic status, and occupation which
their parents had. The closeness of the correlation in these fields
varies from time to time, from society to society, and it is greater
in the field of language, for instance, than in the field of
occupation. Nevertheless, the correlations remain tangible even
within modern Western society.^
The second group of the studies has disclosed many correlations
between such family conditions as being married, single,
divorced, or widowed, and duration of life, criminality, suicide,
insanity, and pauperism. Almost all the studies with few
exceptions, show that the married have a lower per cent of
insanity, criminality, suicide, and pauperism, and have a longer
duration of life than the unmarried, or, especially the divorced of
the same sex, age group, and social status.^
The third group of studies has tried to show the factors which
influence a modification of various family characteristics. Contrary
to the above investigations, these studies take a certain family
characteristic as a function and endeavor to find its variables.
Many studies of this type have already been mentioned in the
preceding paragraphs of the book. Of other studies we have
several valuable contributions to the problem of the factors
responsible for an increase or decrease of divorce and desertion.
These studies have shown that occupation, industrial changes,
economic status, religion, social and racial heterogeneity of
husband and wife, the number of children, social mobility, the
character of the laws of marriage and divorce, war, and several
other factors determine the movement of divorce and separation.*
2 See especially von Mayr, G., Die Gesetzmdssigkeit im
Gesellschaftsleberit Munchen, 1877, passim. About the
fluctuation of these correlations in time and space see Sorokin,
Social Mobility, Chaps. VII, IX, XVI-XIX. See there the
bibliography.
3 See the data and the literature in von Mayr, G., Statistik und
Gesellschafts-lehre, Vols. II, III; Oettingen, A., op. cit.; Levasseur,
E., La population jran-gaise, Vols. I, II; Ogburn, W. F., "The
Relationship of Marital Condition to Death, Crime, Insanity, and
Pauperism," XVI'^ session de VInstitut International de
Statistique, Roma, 1926.
* Besides the quoted works of von Mayr, Levasseur, and
Oettingen, see Licht-enberger, J. P., Divorce, N. Y., 1909;
Willcox, W., The Divorce Problem, N. Y., 1891; Jacquart, C, Le
divorce et la separation de corps, Bruxelles, 1909; United States
Bureau of the Census, Marriage and Divorce, 1867-1906, 2 vols.,
Washington, 1908-09; Bosco, A., / divorzi e le separazioni
personali dei conjugi^
716
The next group is composed of researches which analyze the
factors responsible for a choice in marriage, or for preferential and
assortative mating in men. As far as the studies show, neither the
theory that "the opposite poles attract" nor the theory of similia
similibiis ciirantiir seem to be correct in their extreme forms. As a
general rule, the similarity of the mates in stature, age, color,
race, nationality, and in social, occupational, religious, economic,
cultural, and other respects, facilitates marriage choice, and is a
preferential factor. But the rule knows several exceptions which
make necessary a further study of the phenomena.^
The next group of studies has endeavored to discover the factors
responsible for determining the sex of individuals. The problem
still remains more or less certainly unsolved.^
A large number of the studies deal with the factors which
determine the fluctuation of the birth rate in time and space, as
well as with that of the different fecundity of various social
classes. The principal works of this type have been mentioned in
the preceding chapters.
Without mentioning other researches dealing with the correRoma, 1908; Bertillon, J., Etude demographique du divorce,
Paris, 1883; Bockh, R., "Statistik der Ehescheidungen in der Stadt
Berlin in den Jahren 1885 bis 1894," Bulletin de VInstitut
International de Statistique, tome XI, pp. 251-281; YvERNES, M.,
"Les divorces et les separations de corps en France depuis
1884," Journal de la Societe de Statistique de Paris, 1908;
Savorgnan, F., "Nuzialita e Tecundita delle case sovrane
d'Europa," Metron, Vol. Ill, No. 2; Sorokin, P., 'Influence of the
World War upon Divorces," Journal Applied Sociology, Nov., Dec,
1925; Ogburn, W., "Factors Affecting the Marital Conditions of the

Population," Proceedings Amer. Sociol. Soc, Vol. XV, 1923;
Eubank, E., A Study of Family Desertion, Chicago, 1916; Colcord,
J., Broken Homes, N. Y., 1919; Sherman, C, "Racial Factor in
Desertion," The Family, Vol. Ill, 1922-23; Thomas, W. I., and
Znaniecki, F., The Polish Peasants in Europe and America, 4
vols., Boston, 1918-20.
5 Fay, E. a.. Marriages of the Deaf in America, Washington, 1898;
Pearson, K., Grammar of Science, 2nd ed., pp. 431-437;
Savorgnan, F., La scelta matri-moniale, Ferrara, 1924; Benini,
Prirtcipi di demografia, 1901; Chessa, F., La trasmissione
ereditaria delle professioni, Torino, 1912; Jenks, A. E., "Ethnic
Census in Minneapolis," Am. Journal Soc, Vol. XVII; Harris, J. A.,
"Assortative Mating in Men," Scientific Monthly, April, 1912; Lutz,
F. E., "Assortative Mating in Man," Science, N. S., 1905;
Drachsler, J., Intermarriage in N. Y. City, N. Y., 1921; Marvin, D.,
"Occupational Propinquity as a Factor in Marriage Selection,"
American Statistical Assn., Vol. XVI, pp. 131-151; Weatherly, W.
G., "Race and Marriage," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. XV;
"Assortative Mating in Man: A Cooperative Study," Biometrika,
Vol. II, pp. 481-498.
6 See the literature and brilliant analysis in GiNi, C, // sesso dal
punto di vista statisiico, Le leggi della produzione dei sessi, 1908;
see also voN Mayr, op. cit., Vol. II.
717
lations between the family and other social phenomena, the
above is sufficient to show the intensive work which has been
going on in this field. The data obtained already permit us to a
considerable degree to build an inductive theory of "family
sociology."
2. STUDIES OF THE CORRELATION BETWEEN THE

CHARACTER OF A NEIGHBORHOOD AND OTHER SOCIAL
PHENOMENA
The second category of the studies is represented by careful
investigations of the influence of a neighborhood on man's
physical, mental, and moral characteristics. They have also
yielded many data which indicate the kind and the character of
the correlation between the neighborhood and a man's behavior.
Studies of Charles Booth, B. S. Rowntree, R. D. McKenzie, J.
Williams, E. W. Burgess, R. A. Woods, W. J. Thomas,^ and other
investigators, have thrown a great deal of light on the effects of
the neighborhood on man's traits, behavior, and psychology.
Now^ we are reasonably certain that among the many factors
which shape a personality, the agency of the neighborhood in
which a man was born and reared must be taken into
consideration. Otherwise, one of the effective factors is likely to
be overlooked.
3. STUDIES OF THE INFLUENCES OF OCCUPATION, AND
OCCUPATIONAL CORRELATIONS
Side by side with these works which, like Durkheim's De la
division du travail social, try to analyze the general influences of
the division of labor, we have now numerous factual studies which
give accurate data about the effects of occupation on man's
physical, vital, mental, and moral nature. The studies are so
7 Rowntree, B. S., Poverty^ London, 1901; Booth, Charles, Lije
and Labour of the People in London, all volumes; McKenzie, R.
D., The Neighborhood, Chicago, 1923; Williams, J. H., "A Scale
for Grading Neighborhood Conditions," Whittier Slate School,
Bull. No. 5, 1917; Chapin, F. S., "A Quantitative Scale for
Measuring the Home, etc.," Journal of Educational Psychology,
Feb., 1928; Burgess, E. W., "Juvenile Delinquency in a Small
City," Journal of Criminal Law, Jan., 1916; GoLDMARK, P., West
Side Studies, Boston, 1898; Woods, R. A., The City Wilderness;

Thomas, W. I., The Unadjusted Girl, Boston, 1923; Addams, J.,
The Spirit of Youth and the City Streets, N. Y., 1909; Simkhovitch,
M. K., The City Worker's World in America, N. Y., 1917; Woods,
R., "The Neighborhood in Social Reconstruction," American
Journal of Sociology, Vol. XIX.
718
numerous that it is impossible to give here even a very
abbreviated Hst of the corresponding works. Instead, it is better to
indicate a few sources in which the greater part of such
researches have been already summed up. Krankheit und
So$iale Lage, edited by Professors M. Mosse and G.
Tugendreich, (Miinchen, 1913) and Handhuch dcr Sodden
Hygiene und der Gesimdheitsfiirsorge, five volumes, edited by
Professors A. Gottstein, A. Schlossman, and Dr. L. Teleky (Berlin,
1926-27), give a summary of a great many studies of the
biological effects of occupation on the human body and health. In
my Social Mobility ^ I have summed up the principal works and
correlations between the character of the occupational groups
and their physical, vital, and intellectual properties.^ Numerous
studies in this field have made certain the enormous influence of
this social condition on man, his behavior, and through that, on
social processes. Neither individual conduct and psychology, nor
group behavior and characteristics, nor social antagonisms and
solidarity, nor processes of social reconstruction and revolution,
nor almost any important social change or irregularity, can be
accounted for satisfactorily without the occupational factor.
Besides, the studies have disclosed a series of correlations
between the nature of occupational groups and their bodily, vital,
and mental characteristics. If we classify the occupational classes
beginning with the unskilled occupations, passing to semi-skilled,
skilled, clerical, and the semi-business class, and ending with the
big business and qualified professional groups, we may see that
as we proceed from the unskilled to the qualified professionals,
the stature, weight, health,
Chaps. VI, X-XII, XIII, XVII.
9 Out of the immense literature, I shall mention only a few studies
of the various "occupational" types of social group: Williams, J.
M., Our Rural Heritage, N. Y., 1925; The Expansion of Rural Life,
N. Y., 1926; Groves, E., Rura' Mind and Social Welfare, Chicago;
Hermes, G., Die geistige Gestalt des Marx-istischen Arheiters und
die Arbeiterhildungsfrage, Tubingen, 1926; Lurye, Sostav
proletariata (Composition of the Proletariat), Russian, 1918;
Blaha, Arnost, Sociologie sedlaka a delmka, Prague, 1925; Ruhle,
Otto, Die Seek des prole-tarischen Kindes, Dresden, 1925;
several exclusively valuable volumes of the Deutsche Verein fiir
Sozialpolitik, Auslese und Anpassung der Arheiterschaft, Vols.
CXXXIII-CXXXV; Sombart, W., Der Bourgeois; Taussig, F. M.,
Inventors and Money-Makers, N. Y., 1915; Bauer, A., Les classes
sociales, Paris, 1902. See also Revue international de sociologie
for 1900-1903, where a series of discussions concerning this
point is given; also Veblen, T., The Theory of the Leisure Class.
See other Hterature in the indicated books- of Mosse and
Tugendreich and Sorokin. See also the next paragraph.
719
duration of life and the size of head are increasing; while fertility,
on the contrary, decreases. Intelligence again increases. There is
a considerable overlapping, and some exceptions to the rule;
nevertheless they do not annul the correlation.^^
4. STUDIES OF THE EFFECTS OF URBAN AND RURAL
ENVIRONMENT
During the last few decades numerous and valuable studies of the
complex effects of city and country environment have been
published. At the present moment we already have the
fundamental division of sociology into the rural and urban
branches. The studies disclosed a series of the most conspicuous
differences in physical traits, vital processes, mentality, criminality
and mores between the people of the country and the city,
correlated with various components of these two environments,
their predominant occupations and their selections. The
investigations have contributed a great deal to our knowledge of
the "social mystery." The energetic work which goes on in these
fields promises to contribute still more to the science of
sociology.^^
5. STUDIES OF PSYCHO-SOCIAL TYPES OF INDIVIDUALS
AND
GROUPS, AND THE CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL
TRAITS AND SOCIAL AFFILIATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS
We have already mentioned several kinds of studies which try to
depict the psycho-social types of individuals and social groups.
^0 See the literature and the data in Social Mobility, Chaps. X-XIL
" The literature is already enormous. See the data and the
bibliography in the following representative courses on rural
sociology: Gillette, J. M., Rural Sociology, N. Y., 1925; Vogt, P. L.,
Introduction to Rural Sociology, N. Y., 1920; Taylor, C, Rural
Sociology, N. Y., 1926; Phelan, J., Reading in Rural Sociology;
Galpin, Charles J., Rural Life, N. Y., 1918; Steiner, J. F.,
Community Organization, N. Y., 1925; Sims, N. L., The Rural
Community, N. Y., 1920; McClena-HAN, B. A., Organizing the
Community, N. Y., 1922.
A careful bibliography of urban sociology is given in Park, R., and

Burgess, E., The City, Chicago, 1925; in Burgess, E., Urban
Community, Chicago, 1926. See also Weber, A. F., The Growth
of Cities in the Nineteenth Century, N. Y., 1899; Thurnwald, R.,
"Stadt und Land im Lebensprozess der Rasse," Archiv fiir Rassen
und Gesellschafts Biologic, 1904; Kohlbrugge, J. H. F., "Stadt und
Land als biologische Umwelt," Archiv fiir Rassen und
Gesellschafts Biologic, 1909; KuczYNSKV, R., Der Zug nach der
Stadt, Stuttgart, 1897. Besides, see the data and the literature in
the quoted works of von Mayr, Oettingen, and Levasseur. An
exhaustive and severely critical monograph in the field is now
being prepared by the writer and C. Zimmerman.
720
Such, for instance, are the patriarchal, particularist, and statecommunist types of personahty and people, as set forth by the Le
Play school. Another example of this typological sociology is
given in the above works which try to picture the occupational or
class types of a farmer, proletarian, banker, priest, scholar,
physician, and so on. The third variety of the typological sociology
is represented by the works which describe the national psychosocial types. The works of Emile Boutmy, H. Miinster-berg, A.
Fouillee, A. De Tocqueville, and James Bryce ^^ are good
samples of this variety. The works of this kind are numerous, but
a great part of them are either one-sided or superficial. The fourth
variety of sociological typology is represented by various theories
of the cultural types of personality and groups. Possibly the most
serious attempt to clarify the concept of the "ideal social type" and
to develop the method of the ''ideal type" as a specific method in
an investigation of social problems, has been made by Max
Weber. We saw something of it in his analysis of the "ideal types"
of capitalism, Protestantism, Confucianism, and so on.^^ It was
used, however, long ago, and used well. At the present moment
we have many samples of cultural typologies of various kinds.
Such, for instance, are the eight types of cultures set forth by O.
Spengler, a theory which in this, as well as in many other
respects, is in fact an independent recapitulation of what was
developed in 1869 ^Y Danilev-sky.^* Another variety of this
"cultural typology" is represented by numerous works of various
historians and sociologists, who have tried to make a
classification of cultures or societies. The theories are so
numerous that there is no possibility of giving
12 See Boutmy, E., Essai d'une psychologic politique du peuple
anglais au XIX* siecle, Paris, 1901, English translation, N. Y.,
1904; Elements d'une psychologie politique du peuple American,
Paris, 1902; Munsterberg, H., The Americans; Fouillee, A.,
Psychologie du peuple frangais, 2d ed., 1898; Esquisse
psychologique des peuples europeens, 2d ed., Paris, 1903; De
Tocqueville, A., Democracy in America; Bryce, James, The
American Commonwealth, 1891. See also the mentioned works
of E. Demolins, P. Rousieurs, H. de Tourville, and F. Le Play.
^^ See Weber, M., Gesammelte Aiifsatze zur Wissenschaftslehre,
pp. 190 ff., 1922; Walter, Andreas, "Max Weber als Soziologe,"
Jahrhuch fiir Soziologie, Bd. II, 1926; KlDver, H. M., "Weber's
'Ideal Type' in Psychology," Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XXIII.
^* See Spengler, O., op. cit.. Vol. I, passim. Compare Danilevsky,
Russia and Europe (in Russian), 2nd ed., 1871. See Schwartz,
M., Spengler and Danilevsky (in Russian), Sovremennia Zapiski,
Vol, XVTII, pp. 436-456.
721
even their mere enumeration.^^ It is enough to say that in
historical, poHtical, sociological, economic, and other cultural
sciences, the method of the "ideal type" or simply, typology, is
widely practiced and seems to be unavoidable. When an historian

talks of '*the Greek city-society," "feudal," "caste," or "modern
society," he uses this method. When an economist classifies
economic organization into the "capitalist" and the "socialist"
systems, or into a system of "natural economy," "money
economy," "credit economy," and so on, he applies the same
method. The same may be said of the anthropological
classification of races, of "democratic and autocratic types" of
society, and so forth. Being unavoidable and useful, the method
is, however, often used unsatisfactorily and results in a distorted
classification, and a quite one-sided characterization of the
corresponding "type" of cultural phenomena. In order to give
positive results, the method requires a great deal of knowledge of
the subject, an ability to grasp the typical traits in the multitude of
the concrete characteristics, and a talent for a well-balanced
synthesis of these traits. Only great minds and talents use it with
good results.
The fifth variety of psycho-social typology is given in the theories
which may be styled as ''the formal typologies of indiznd-uality."
E. Spranger's classification of the "ideal types" of man may serve
as an example. He discriminates between the ideal types of the
theoretical man, the economic man, the aesthetic man, the social
man, the man of power, and the religious man.^''
The sixth variety of the classification of the types of human
personality is represented by numerous psycho-analytical and
psycho-sociological theories. They try to classify individuals not
so much on the basis of their "ideologies," "speech-reactions,"
'^ vSee a survey and analysis of the principal theories of the
sociologists in SoROKiN, P., Systema Soziologii, Vol. II, pp. 306346; Steinmetz, S. R., "Classification des types sociaux et
catalogue des peuples," Uannee sociologique, Vol. Ill; SoMLO, F.,
Zur Griindung einer heschreibenden So2iologie, Berlin-Leipzig,
1909; Mazzarella, op. cit., passim; Kareeff, N., Historical Typology

(in Russian).
IS See Spranger, E., Lebensformen, Halle, 1922; see other
samples in Die Typen der Weltanschanutig und ihre Ausbildung in
den metaphysischen Systemen, Weltanschauung,
herausgegeben von M. Frischeisen-Kohlcr, Berlin, 1922; Kluver,
H., "Problem of Type in 'Cultural Science' Psychology," Journal of
Philosophy, Vol. XXII, pp. 225-234.
722
and the character of their opinions as on the basis of their
temperament, emotionahty, reactibiHty, and other somewhat
deeper characteristics. Accordingly, the types are regarded as
''universal" and "eternal" and found amidst various societies and
at various periods. Paretd's types of the ''renfien' and the "speculatori' is one sample of such classifications. C. G. Jung's, and
other psychologists' classifications of individuals into the introvert
and extravert types ^^ are other examples. L. Klages'
classification of temperaments according to the formula
T (drive)
,-, , : r=R (reactibiHty)^^ is a third sample. The
W (resistance) \ jj i
still more complex classification of E. Kretschmer into the schizothymic and cyclothymic types,^^ or the typologies of personality
set forth by E. R. Jaensch, H. Rorschach, G. Ewald, A. Kron-feld,
and K. Jasper are further samples of this variety."" Though the
majority of these psychological typologies are very old,
nevertheless, modern theories try to base their classifications on
the data of experimental study and exact measurement. If their
present form is far from being unquestionable, they at least

promise to be fruitful and scientifically significant.
In connection with these psychological classifications of the types
of human personality, it is necessary to mention some studies
which try to analyze some more overt social groups in the terms
of these classifications. We saw above that this was done by
Pareto, who correlated his type of the ''specidaton" with certain
societies and social processes (Athens, democracies, etc.), while
the type of the ''renticri' was correlated with other societies
(Rome) and processes. Men similar ideologically may belong to
opposite types, from the standpoint of their dominant ''residues,"
and vice versa. Such is the conclusion of Pareto. A similar idea
lies at the basis of several studies of such social types as the
radical, the reactionary, the conservative, and so on. Outwardly
these types of personality seem to be opposite, be17 Jung, C. G., Psychological Types, 1923.
18 Klages, L., Principien der Characterologie, Leipzig, 1920.
19 Kretschmer, E., Korperbau und Character, Berlin, 1922.
20 See a good survey of the theories and their analysis in Kluver,
Heinrich, "An Analysis of Recent Works on the Problem of
Psychological Types," The Journal of Nervous and Mental
Disease, Vol. LXII, pp. 561-596. See there a good bibliography.
723
cause their aspirations and ideologies are opposite. But are they
different from the standpoint of their emotionahty, reac-tibihty,
intelHgence, extra- and introversion, and other deeper traits? And
if they are different, in exactly what consists the difference? H. T.
Moore's and F. A. Allport's studies may serve as an example of
the experimental or quantitative attack of the problem. Professor
Moore (1886- ) studied about 350 radical and conservative

students from this standpoint. The principal results of his
elaborate study show that neither of the groups differs from each
other either in intelligence, emotional stability, or any general
superiority and inferiority. The principal differences are ''innate,"
and consist in such specific factors as ''greater speed of reactions
among the radicals, and their ease in breaking habits; and their
readiness to make snap judgments and independence (of
opinion) in the face of majority influence. The last of these
differences is the most clearly indicated." ^^ Somewhat similar is
F. A. Allport's and D. A. Hartman's study. They studied the
psychological differences of radicals and reactionaries, and the
differences between these groups and a group of the moderates.
The first result of the study was to show that the extreme groups
were more similar to each other than to the moderates. This
supports the opinion of Pareto that the difference in ideology is
rather superficial, and does not hinder an essential similarity
between radicals and reactionaries in their deeper psychological
traits. The study showed further that both extreme groups have a
much greater certainty in their opinion than the moderates. The
next difference between the groups is that religion plays a vital
part in the radical group, while *'the reactionary group is lowest in
its interest in religion," the moderates occupying the intermediary
position. Further, both extreme groups rate themselves as
distinctly less rapid in talking and walking, and less emotional and
more self-reliant in their opinions than are the moderates. The
radical group rates itself as the least expansive, the conservative
group being the most expansive, and the reactionary
intermediary. As to a regard
21 Moore, H. T., "Innate Factors in Radicalism and
Conservatism," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, Vol.
XX, 1925-6, pp. 234-244. See there the method of the study and
the quantitative data.
724
for the opinions of others the moderates and reactionaries are
less sensitive to the approval of others than the radicals. As to the
degree of insight, and self-estimation, the reactionaries have the
least degree of insight and the highest self-estimation; the next
place in this respect belongs to the radicals, and the moderates
occupy the intermediary position. Furthermore, the reactionary
group is more scientifically minded, snobbish, cynical, and
mechanistic in its ideology; while the radicals are more idealistic,
religious, moralistic, and meliorative in their attitudes.^^
One scarcely can think that the differences found in these two
studies are really certain. Their data are somewhat
contradictory.^^ Their method, which is based on the data of
speech-reactions, can scarcely yield reliable and accurate results.
The character of the curves of the second study is much more
complex and indefinite than the above conclusions of the authors.
The conclusion of Professor Moore about the ''innate factors" in
radicalism and conservatism appears to go beyond the data given
to support it. In brief, the conclusions may be taken only as very
tentative, as properly say the authors themselves. Yet the studies
are interesting and valuable as the first steps toward a
quantitative and factual study of the discussed and similar
phenomena.
6. STUDIES IN A CORRELATION OF LEADERSHIP AND
INTELLIGENCE WITH A NUMBER OF SOCIAL GROUPS
PARTICIPATED IN AND WITH
A SOCIAL SHIFTING
We know that De Roberty, Durkheim, Simmel, and Bougie have
contended that there had to be a positive correlation between the
mental and leadership capacity of an individual and the number of

groups participated in by him. However, they have not supplied
sufficient factual material to corroborate their
22 Allport, Floyd A., and Hartman, D. A., "The Measurement and
Motivation of Atypical Opinion in a Certain Group," The American
Political Science Review, Vol. XIX, pp. 735-760.
2^ Somewhat discordant also are the results obtained by S. A.
Rice, Wolfe, G. Lundberg. See Rice, S. A., op. cit.; Wolfe,
Conservatism, Radicalism, and Scientific Method, Chap. VII;
Lundberg, G., "The Demographic and Economic Basis of Polit.
Radicalism and Conservatism," Amer. Journ. of Soc, Vol. XXXII,
PP- 719-732.
725
statement. At the present moment, we already have some factual
studies in this field. Professor F. S. Chapin's (1888- ) studies may
serve as representative of this purpose. Having studied 250
students, and having compared their extra-curricular activities
with their academic grades and physical condition, he found a
tangible positive correlation between these three series. 'The
upper 50, or most active students (connected with a great number
of groups and more intensively participating in their activity) are
also highest in average academic grade and in physical
condition." The correlation between the extra-curricular activities
and the academic grades is 0.402, which is quite a tangible,
though not perfect, correlation.^^ O. M. Mehus, in a study of 500
University of Minnesota students, reaches similar results. Thus,
these findings corroborate the contention of earlier sociologists.
The writer's study of 1,400 labor leaders of America and Europe
has also shown that the group of the big leaders are affiliated with
a greater number of social groups than the group of the small
leaders. This confirms Professor Chapin's finding. (See So-rokin
and others, Leaders of Labor and Radical Movements.) Whether
such a correlation is the result of the influence of the participation

in the groups, or the participation itself and high intelligence are a
result of the innate ability of the individuals, these studies do not
answer. However this may be, still further studies of this type
would seem to be necessary to test the extent to which the
correlation is universal and permanent.
Another correlation between intelligence and leadership, on the
one hand, and social mobility of the individuals, on the other,
should be mentioned. Understanding by mobility any change in
the habitation or social position of an individual, it is possible to
claim that the mentioned phenomena are correlated within a
certain limit. The writer's and Professor C. Zimmerman^s studies
of the leaders of American farmers, and the writer's study of labor
leaders, have shown that the territorial shifting of the leaders is
greater than that of the common population. The per cent of
leaders who live in other states or countries than that of
24 Chapin, F. S., "Measuring the Volume of Social Stimuli: A
Study in Social Psychology," Social Forces, March, 1926; "ExtraCurricular Activities of College v^tudcnts, A Study in College
Leadershij)," School and Society, Feb., 1926; "Leadership and
Group Activity," Journal Applied Sociology, January, 1924.
726
their birth seems to be higher than that of the common people.^^
The same is true of the notables in Who's Who in America and
seems to be true of prominent men generally. A similar correlation
is shown by a rough historical comparison of the periods of
intensive social mobility and the periods of a relatively less
intensive mobility with the number of the men of genius born in
these periods. The facts tend to show that, within a certain limit,
the periods of upheavals and high mobility are marked by a more
abundant crop of men of genius, and by a more intensive

progress of inventions and mental achievement.~^ Professor Carl
Murchison has also found that among the criminals studied, those
criminals who came from the regions far more distant than the
criminals from the nearer places, have a conspicuously higher
intelligence than the ''home-criminals." R. Livi indicated that the
upper classes of Italian population are more mobile than the lower
classes.^^ Several other facts suggest the same correlation. If we
take into consideration that the more mobile individuals are likely
to participate in a greater number of groups than the less mobile
ones, the two discussed correlations mutually support each other.
However, the correlations seem to be limited and cease to exist
after a certain degree of mobility. Even in this limited sense they
are still tentative and need to be tested further. It is clear also that
the studies cannot yet answer whether leadership and higher
intelligence are the result of participation in many groups and of
greater mobility, or whether the participation itself is the result of
an innate characteristic of the corresponding individuals, although
Chapin's recent study, 'The Measurement of Sociality" {Journal of
Applied Sociology, Feb., 1928) bears on this very important point.
7. STUDIES OF CONDITIONS WHICH FACILITATE
INTERINDIVIDUAL AND INTERGROUP SYMPATHY AND
REPELLENCE
We saw that, according to E. Durkheim and G. Simmel, a
25 See SoROKiN, P., and Zimmerman, C, "Leaders of Farmers of
the United States," Social Forces, March, 1928; Sorokin, P., and
others, "Leaders of Labor and Radical Movements in the United
States and Europe," American Journal of Sociology, 1927;
"Leadership and Geogr. Mobility," J. Appl. Soc, Vol. XIL
2 See Sorokin, Social Mobility, Chap. XXL
27 Murchison, C, Criminal Intelligence, 1926, pp. 44-57; Livi, R.,

Aniropo-metria Militare, pp. 46-51, 87-91, and passim, Roma,
1896.
727
division of labor and increase of social dissimilarity of individuals
lead from a ''mechanical" to an ''organic solidarity." They and their
followers are inclined to think that such an increase of
heterogeneity facilitates generally an increase of solidarity. An
opposite theory was set forth by Franklin Henry Giddings.^** He
coined the expression, "the consciousness of kind," and claimed
first, that "like-mindedness" or similarity of individuals is a
necessary condition for the conversion of a mere gregari-ousness
into a society; and second, that it is a factor facilitating an
increase of solidarity or positive liking in the relationship of the
individuals.'^ In this sense his theory is opposite to that of
Durkheim, Simmel, Bougie, and others, being similar to that of F.
Tonnies. Though the problem is still little studied, the truth seems
to be principally on the side of Professor Giddings. His later
factual studies in this field have shown that similarities in taste,
ideas, beliefs, manners, and morals "unmistakably" facilitate the
relationship of liking, sympathy, and solidarity among the
individuals and groups, while the dissimilarities in this field tend to
produce the relationship of repellence or antipathy.'"^^ A great
many other sociologists have discussed the phenomena of social
antagonism and solidarity. At the present moment we already
have several quantitative studies of the factors of these
phenomena. The studies of Professor E. Bogardus should be
mentioned as representative in this field.^^ Using the quantitative
2** Bom in 1855. Pioneer of the American and world sociology.
Author of many valuable works in sociology, especially in the
methodology of sociological investigation. In his later works he
developed his valuable theory of "the j)luralistic behavior."
Principal works of Giddings are: The Principles of Sociology, 3d

ed., 1896; Elements of Sociology, 1900; Readings in Descriptive
and Historical Sociology, 1906; Inductive Sociology, 1901;
Studies in the Theory of Human Society, 1922; The Scientific
Study of Human Society, 1924. About Giddings see
KovALEVSKY, M., Contemporary Sociologists, Chaj). II; Barth, P.,
op. cit., pp. 446 ff.; Squillace, F., op. cit., pp. 381 fT.; Gillin, J. L.,
in H. W. Odum's American Masters of Social Science, pp. 191231, N. Y., 1927; and a great many articles and practically the
majority of the textbooks in sociology.
29 Giddings, F., Studies in the Theory of Human Society, passim
and pp. 164 ff. and Chap. XV.
'"Giddings, F., The Scientific Study of Human Society, pp. 122 ff.
3' See a scries of the articles of E. Bogardus on "Social Distance"
in the Journal of Applied Sociology, 1925, 1926, 1927. See also
his "Social Distance in the City," Proceedings of the American
Sociological Society, Vol. XX. The only thing to which I may object
is the term of "Social Distance" given to these studies. In my
opinion, the term of "sociology of friendliness and antagonism"
728
and the case methods he has disclosed, first, the complexity of
the phenomena; second, a series of factors responsible for the
creation of either sympathetic or antagonistic relationship; third,
the mechanism for the development of these attitudes; and fourth,
the possibility of converting one attitude into another through a
corresponding modification of the stimuli. In this way a step has
been made toward a better understanding of these phenomena.
8. STUDIES OF THE FLUCTUATIONS, RHYTHMS, AND

CYCLES OF
SOCIAL PROCESSES
For the last few decades in few fields have sociological
investigations been so intensive as in the field of a study of
various aspects of social dynamics. One of the aspects of such a
study has been the character of the fluctuations and rhythms in
the field of various social processes. Let us briefly survey today's
situation of this problem.
Social thought of the second half of the nineteenth century has
been marked by a linear conception of social and historical
change. The majority of sociologists, economists, and
philosophers of history have been busy principally in formulating
**the laws of historical evolution" and in discovering *'the historical
tendencies and trends." Since Auguste Comte's ''law of the three
stages," which represents a conspicuous example of the linear
conception, dozens of similar ''laws" and "tendencies" have been
offered by many sociologists, historians, economists and social
philosophers. In their theories the social process has been
depicted as something drifting toward a definite goal. The process
of history has been outlined as a kind of college course: all
peoples start with the same historical class of freshmen (e.g.,
Comte's "theological stage") ; later on, all pass into the stage of
the sophomore (Comte's "metaphysical stage") ; and, having
passed through the class of the juniors, all societies are
graduated with "the stage of positivism" or "socialism" or
"anarchy" or "democracy" or "degeneration" or what not. In this
way the linear conception has assumed the character of an
eschatological interpretation of a social and historical process.
more properly describes the object of Bogardus' studies. See also
Delevsky, J., Social Antagonisms, 1910 (Russian), French edition,
in 1923.
729
It is not my purpose to characterize or to criticize here all the
varieties of this linear conception. After the criticisms of it by F.
Boas, W. H. Rivers, A. Goldenweiser, C. Wissler, R. H. Lowie,
and others, there is no need to prove the contention that almost
all such "laws" happened to be "pseudo-laws" and "successive
stages" of a mere fiction.^^ The domination of this conception
since the second half of the nineteenth century has led
sociologists to neglect another,the cyclical conception of social
change and historical process. Having been busy with a discovery
of "the historical tendencies" they naturally could not pay much
attention to cycles, rhythms, and repetitions in social change. If I
am not mistaken, at the present moment we are at the turning
point of social thought in this field. Changes in social life for the
last few decades; a failure of the eschatological conception of
history and that of the attempts to discover the "historical trends";
a better knowledge of many social phenomena; discoveries of
many brilliant civilizations of the past; these, and many other
factors, are responsible for the fact that social thought seems to
begin again to pay a somewhat greater attention to the
repetitions, rhythms, and cycles in social and historical processes.
The great success of Bergson's conception of a goalless creative
evolution in modern philosophy; the substitution of the term
"social change" for that of "social evolution" in soci-olog}^; a more
and more attentive study of business cycles, fluctuations,
oscillations in economics and social sciences; the extraordinary
success of O. Spengler's Der Untergang des Abendlandes with its
cyclical conception of history;all these phenomena are only a
few symptoms among many others which indicate the mentioned
turn of contemporary social thought.
Under such conditions it may be timely to outline briefly the
principal cyclical conceptions of the historical process given in
contemporary sociology. Both the linear and the cyclical
conceptions are by no means new discoveries. They were set

forth long ago, and have been running throughout the history of
human
32 See a very good survey of the problem and the hterature in
Goldenweiser, A., "Cultural Anthropology," in The History ajid
Prospects of the Social Science^ pp. 221-232, N. Y., 1925.
730
thought.^^ For the sake of brevity I will not characterize separately
the very numerous attempts made in the nineteenth and the
twentieth centuries to prove the existence of cycles in various
fields of social life, but will give only a concise summary of them in
the form of a table which will indicate, in the first place, the
character of a cycle; in the second place, the social field in which
it is observed; and in the third place, the authors who have
indicated or discovered it. Proceeding in this way, I will include all
cycles, regardless of whether they are given by the authors as the
cycles which in their totality tend to lead to a definite goal (linear
theory of cycles), or whether they do not have any steady and
perpetual trend (non-linear theory of cycles). In giving the
contemporary theories of social cycles I naturally do not take any
responsibility for their scientific accuracy and validity. Since the
cycles may be periodic, that is, repeated regularly in a definite
span of time, and non-periodic, which take place in an indefinite
and varying span of time, therefore it is convenient to divide all
attempts to establish the existence of the cycles into these two
groups and to give them separately. We will begin with the
periodical cycles.
Periodic Cycles
33 See SoROKiN, "A Survey of the Cyclical Conceptions of Social

and Historical Process," Social Forces, September, 1927; see
also an excellent analysis of the concept of "cycle" by W. Mitchell,
in Business Annals, N. Y., 1926; see further "Report of
Conference on Cycles," The Geographical Review, Special
Supplement, October, 1923.
3* DuRKHEiM, E., Le suicide, Paris, 1912; Colonel Millard, "Essai
de physique social et de construction historique," Revue
International de sociologie. February, 1917.
731
OTHER PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGISTIC STUDIES
731
^ See ViLLERME, "De la distribution par mois des conceptions,"
etc., Annates d'hygiene, Vol. V, 1831; Quetelet, A., Physique
social, Vol. I, 1869, pp. 104 et seq.; Oettingen, Moralstatistik,
1882; von Mayr, G., Statistik und Gesellschaftslehre, 1897, Vol. II,
pp. 169 et seq.; Levasseur, La population franqaise, Vol. II, 1891,
pp. 20 et seq.
3^ See the quoted works of Quetelet, Oettingen, von Mayr,
Levasseur, and other statisticians.
3^ Wagner, A., Die Gesetzmdssigkeit in den scheinhar
willkurlichen Handlungen, etc., Teil I, Hamburg, 1864, ])p. 128 et
seq.; Morselli, Der Selbstmord, Leii)zig, 1881, p. 72 et seq.;
Masaryk, T. G., Der Selbstmord, 1887, pp. 7 et seq.; von Mayr,
G., Statistik und Gesellschaftslehre, Vol. Ill, 1917, pp. 281-291;
the quoted works of Durkhcim, Oettingen, Levasseur, and
Quetelet.
3"* Sec the quoted statistical works. Dexter, E., Weather

Influences, N. Y., 1904; Ferri, E., Das Verbrechen in seiner
Abhdngigkeit v. d. Temperaturwechsel, 1882.
732
Time-Span of the Cycles
The Character of a Social Process
Whose Change Is Supposed to Be
Cyclical
Authors
and Works
35^ and years
countries the cycles are almost reversed.
Furthermore, seasonal fluctuations have been noticed by various
investigators in the phenomena of dependency, labor demands
and unemployment, in the movement of different illnesses, in
business, and in labor turnover. It is apparent that such
phenomena as seasonal fluctuations of the principal forms of
economic activities of the population, especially in the agricultural
countries; fluctuations in seasonal buying and selling of different
objects necessary in one season of the year and not necessary in
another; repetition from year to year of the seasons of teaching
and vacation; repetition from year to year of definite days of
holidays (Christmas, Thanksgiving Day, etc.); these and many
similar phenomena show pretty regular periodic cycles within one
year.
Business Fluctuation of the periods of in-cycles: crease and

depression
Births: In France each fourth year,
since 1815 to 1878 shows an abnormally low birth rate. Since
1875 up to 1905 the cycles continue to exist in somewhat
modified forms.
In the life of the great men (Alexander the Great, J. Caesar,
Napoleon I, Bismarck, Cromwell and some others) every fourth
year was a conspicuous turning
Juglar, J. Kitchin, and Lescure^'
Col. Millard^"
Millardî
39 Kitchin, J., "Cycles and Trends in Economic Factors," Review
of Econ. Statistics, Jan., 1923; Lescure, J., Les crises generates
et periodiques des surpro-ductions, Paris, 1907.
'ô Millard, op. cit., pp. 71-72.
^ Millard, op. cit., pp. 71-72.
733
733
*2 Odin, A., Gen^se des grands hommes, Vol. I, pp. 424-426,
Paris, 1895.
*3 Tugan-Baranovsky, M., Les crises industrielles en Angleterre;
Aftalion, A., Les crises periodiques de surproduction, Paris, 1913;
Moore, H. L., Economic Cycles, 1913; Generating Economic

Cycles, 1923; Mitchell, W., Business Cycles; Robertson, A Study
of Industrial Fluctuation.
** Ogburn, W. F., "The Influence of Business Cycle on Certain
Social Conditions," Journal of American Statistical Assn., 1922;
Hexter, M. B., Social Consequences of Business Cycles, 1925;
Thomas, D. S., Social Aspects of the Business Cycle, 1925. See
further, Bonger, W. A., Criminality and Economic Conditions
1916; VAN Kan, J., Les causes economiques de la criminalite,
Paris, 1903; Tugan-Baranovsky, op. cit.
^ D ROM el, ]., La loi des revolutions.
734
Time-Span of the Cycles
The Character of a Social Process
Whose Change Is Supposed to Be
Cyclical
Authors and
Works
3t>-33 years
48-60 years
Births:
litical opinions and in government.
Thirty-year cycles in the movement of the births in France

Epidemics: Cholera
Death: Movement in Finland, Sweden
Norway
Business cycles
Dominating Within thirty or thirty-three
literary years they change, superseding
movements each other. and schools:
Dominating Great many different social phepolitical noraena have the cycle of 30-33
parties and years. This span of time is a
governmen natural unit of historical period. tal policy:
Business Many social phenomena corre-cycles: lated with these
large business
cycles; the first rushing period of business cycle is followed by
social upheavals, wars, revolutions, and other social and political
changes.
Millard"
Moore*' Millard"
G. Ferrari, O. Lorenz, K. Joel"
N. Kondratieff, A. Spiethoff, Moore
* Millard, op. cit.

*' Moore, Economic Cycles.
*8 Millard, op. cit.
*^ Lorenz, O., Die Geschichtswissenschaft in Hauptrichtungen
und Aufgaben, Berlin, 1886, pp. 299 et seq.; Leopold von Ranke,
1891, pp. 143-276; Joel, K., "Der seculare Rhythmus der
Geschichte," Jahrbuch fiir Soziologie, B. I, pp. 137-165; Ferrari,
G., Teoria die periodici politici, Milano, 1874.
^^ Kondratieff, N., Great Cycles of Conjuncture (Russian),
Voprosy Konjunc-tury, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 28-79, 1925; Spiethoff, A.,
"Krisen," Handworterbuch der Staatwiss, 4th ed.; Moore,
Generating Economic Cycles.
735
735
'^ Same as footnote No. 49 above.
" Brownlee, D. J., "The History of the Birth and Death Rates in
England and Wales," Public Health, June-July, 1916. See
Beveridge's criticism in Bev-ERIDGE, W., "The Fall of Fertility
among European Races," Economics, 1925.
" Scherer, W., Geschichte der DeutscJien Literature, Introduction
and Chaps-I, II.
" Millard, op. cit.
" Lorenz, O., op. cit.; Joel, K., op. cit.; Scherer, W., op. cit.
736
I will not continue this list of the attempts to establish the
existence of a periodic cycle in social and historical processes.
The above gives an approximate idea of the variety of periodicity
according to different authors. Let us now proceed to the nonperiodical cycles.
Non-Periodical Cycles
Side by side with periodic cycles many authors have indicated the
existence of cycles, or oscillations, which repeat themselves
without any definite periodicity, but, nevertheless, cyclically. Here
are samples of such theories:
The invention cycle: An incline, a plateau, and decline.
(Mikhailovsky, Tarde, E. Bogardus, F. S. Chapin, W. F. Og-burn,
and many others) ^'^
Social process cycle: i Imitation; 2opposition, as a collision of
two different waves of imitation; 3adaptation-invention. (Tarde
and many others) ^^
Cycles in an increase and decrease of economic prosperity:
Economic, political, and occupational stratification; vertical
mobility or circulation. (V. Pareto, W. Mitchell, P. Sorokin) ^^
Social institution cycle: Appearance, growth, disintegration. (F. S.
Chapin, W. Ogburn) ^^
Cycles in the sphere of ideologies, belief, religions, political
opinions, fashions, etc.: incline, plateau, decline. (V. Pareto,
Guignebert) ^^
Rhythm of the spiritual and materialistic civilisations: (Their

alternation) (Weber) ^^
Rhythm in the growth of popidation: The period of a rapid
increase of population is superseded by a period of a slow
increase and vice versa. (Verhulst, SchmoUer, R. Pearl, G. U.
Yule) ^^
5^ Mikhailovsky, N., Heroes and Mob (Russian); Tarde, G., The
Laws oj Imitation; Bogardus, E,, Fundamentals of Social
Psychology, pp. 401-402; Chapin, F. S., "A Theory of
Synchronous Culture Cycles," Journal of Social Forces, 1925, P599; Ogburn, W., Social Change.
^8 Tarde, Social Laws, passim.
59 Sorokin, Social Mobility; Mitchell, Wesley, Business Annals, N.
Y., 1926.
^ Chapin, F. S., op. ciL; Ogburn, W., Social Change.
^1 Pareto, V., Trattato di Sociologia Generate, Vols. I, II, 1916;
Guignebert, Uevolution des dogmes, 1910.
^2 Weber, Le rhythme du progres, Paris, 1913.
^ Pearl, R., op. cit.; Verhulst, op. cit.; Yule, op. cii.
737
Rhythm in the distribution of national income: Alternation of
periods of a concentration of wealth and a more equal distribution
of wealth. (G. Schmoller, V. Pareto, P. Sorokin) ^^
Rhythm of the periods of prosperity and impoverishment in the life
of a nation. (D'Avenel, Pareto, Sorokin, and many others) ^^
Cycle in the life of a nation or culture: Appearance, growth,

decline. (K. Leontieff, Danilevsky, V. de Lapouge, C. Gini, O.
Ammon, O. Spengler)^^
Rhythm of an expansion and decrease of state interference: (G.
Hansen, H. Spencer, P. Sorokin and many others) ^^
Cycles in historical self-realization of the world spirit or logos:
Thesis, antithesis and synthesis. (Hegel)
Eternal rhythm of transformation of substance into energy and
energy into substance. (G. LeBon) ^^
Rhythm of "the critical'' and dynamic periods in history and that of
the "organic'' or static periods. (Saint Simon, Pareto, E. A. Ross,
P. Lavrov) ^^
Cycle in the course of revolution: Period of "liberation'' and that of
"restraint." (P. Sorokin) ^^
Cycle in rise and degeneration of aristocracy. (P. Jacoby and
others) ^^
The world history is an eternal repetition of the same cycles. (F.
Nietzsche) '^-The above is enough to give an idea of the great
variety of dif" Schmoller, "Die Einkommensverteilung in alter und neuer Zeit,"
Bull, de VInst. Int. de Statist., Vol. IX.
^ D'Avenel, G., Le paysan et Vouvrier; La fortune privee.
^Danilevsky, Russia and Europe (Russian); Spengler, O., Der
Untergang des Abendlandes; de Lapouge, V., Les selections
sociales; Ammon, O., Die Gesell-schaftsordnung und Hire
natiirlichcn Grundlagen, 1895.
" Hansen, G., Die drei Bevolkerungstufen, 1889; Spencer, H.,

Principles of Sociology, Vol. II, Chap. XVII; Sorokin, P., "Influence
of Inanition on Social Organization and Ideology," Ekonomist
(Russian), 1922.
^^ LeBon, G., Vevolution de la matiere.
*^ Saint-Simon, Letters of an Inhabitant of Geneva to his
Contemporaries; Pareto, op. cit.; Ross, E. A., Principles of
Sociology; Lavrov, P., Zadatchi Ponimania Istorii, 1903.
^ Sorokin, P., The Sociology of Revolution.
" Jacoby, P., Etudes sur la selection chez Vhomme, 1904.
'2 Nietzsche, F., Also Sprach Zarathustra.
738
ferent rhythms and cycles which have been indicated by different
authors/^
All varieties of the above theories of the cyclical conception of
historical and social changes may be conveniently summed up in
the following scheme:
Theories of cyclical conception of historical and social change
Theory of linear or spiral cycles which ^ tend toward a definite
goal
Theory of ever-repeating identical cycles
Theory of cycles and rhythms which are neither identical nor
tending toward a definite goal
Periodic
J Progressive \ Regressive
f Progressive Non-periodic\ Regressive
Periodic (many of the
above theories) Non-periodic (majority of
the above theories)
It is not my intention to discuss here all the above theories and
the many complicated problems connected with the conception of
the historical process generally, and that of the linear and cyclical
conceptions of evolution. I have discussed these problems
elsewhere.^^ What I desire to do here is to put dogmatically
several statements which, in my opinion, may contend for
scientific validity. These statements are as follows:
I. The existence of ever-repeating identical cycles, whether in \
the evolution of the whole world or in the history of mankind is
^3 See also Vierkandt, A., Die Stetigkeit in Kulturwandel, Leipzig,
1908.
74 SoROKiN, "The Fundamental Problems of the Theory of
Progress," New Ideas in Sociology, Vol. Ill (Russian); "The
Concepts of Evolution and Progress," The Psycholog. Review
(Russian), Sept., 1911; "The Theory of Social Factors," In
Memory of M. Kovalevsky (Russian), 1917. See Rickert, H., Die
Grenzen d. Naturwissenschaftlichen Be griffsbildung;
Windelband, W., Die Praeludien, Vol. II, 1911; Xenopol, a. D., La
theorie de Vhistoire, 1908; Simmel, G., Die Probleme der
Geschichtsphilosophie, 1907; Hauptprohleme der Philosophie;
Lappo-Dani-levsky, a., Methodology of History, Vol. I (Russian);
Eulenburg, Franz, Sind "Historische Gesetze" moglich,
Eringnerungsgate fiir Max Weber, Vol. I; Croce, Benedetto, Zur

Theorie und Geschichte des Historicgraphie, Tubingen, 1915;
Bernheim, Lehrbuch der Historischen Methode, Leipzig, 1914;
Berr, H., La syn-these en histoire, Paris, 1911; the quoted works
of E. Mach, P. Duhem, A. Cournot, A. Tschuproff,
739
not proved. Therefore the corresponding theories of the identical
cycles are likely to be scientifically in error."^^
2. The existence of a definite, steady, and eternal trend in
historical and social changes is not proved either. All attempts to
establish the existence of a definite historical tendency, as
permanent and eternal, have failed. Among hundreds of such
tendencies, formulated by various authors, I do not know of a
single one which, after a careful scientific scrutiny, could be said
to have scientific validity. It is certain that there may be some
temporary ''secular trends" and ''tendencies," but many of them
have happened to be only a part of a long-time cycle, and there is
no guaranty that all such tendencies would not share the same
fate. Even such an apparently undoubted tendency as an
increase of human population on this planet may be a long-time
parabola at least, the natural sciences which predict the future
cooling of the sun seem to suggest this conclusion. Parallel to the
cooling of the sun the amount of life on the earth has to decrease;
consequently, the human population has to decrease also. G.
Tarde in his Utopia has very conspicuously depicted this process.
V. de Lapouge has outlined it in scientific terms."^^ For this
reason, all "linear" and "eschatological" theories of evolution and
historical process seem to be only speculations rather than
scientific conceptions. As to the theories of progress or regress,
since they are "judgments of evaluation" they are doomed,
because of this very fact, to be subjective and, according to their
logical nature, they never can be scientific statements. "Science
always speaks in the indicative mood, and never in the

imperative, as the ethical statements and the judgments of
evaluation do," says H. Poincare (juite properly. In so far, the
theories of progress, with their evaluation of what is good and
what is bad, what is progressive and what is not, may express
only the subjective tastes of their authors and nothing more.'^'^ If
sociology is
" See the quoted works of Windelband, Rikkert, Xenopol, Simmel,
Eulenburg and others.
" See DE Lapouge, V., Les selections sociales. Chap. XV
" See the writer's indicated works. See also Sorokin, "Is Ethics a
Normative Science and is a Normative Science Logically
Possible?" Pysch. Review (Russian), 1914; Pareto, v., Trattato di
sociologia generale, Vols. I, II; Poincar6, "Science and Ethics," in
his Dernieres Pensees; Husserl, E., Logische Untersuchungen,
Vol. I (Russian translation), pp. 33-34; Sigwart, Die Logik
(Russian translation), Vol. I, p. 425.
740
going to be a science, it must get rid of such judgments of
evaluation. ^^
3. The existence of a periodicity in the cycles of various social
processes is still questionable and needs to be tested further."^^
4. From the above it follows that it is possible to speak only of a
''temporary and relative" trend or ''tendency," which, being a trend
during a comparatively short period of time, may be superseded
by an opposite trend or tendency, and in this way finally may
happen to be a part of a long-time cycle.
5. From the above it follows that we scarcely may admit the

existence of identical cycles in history or in social change. Every
social cycle or social rhythm seems to be only similar to, or only
approximately identical to, another in the same field of social
change. This means that we may speak only of the relative and
approximately similar social or historical cycles.
6. From this position of sociological relativism, a study of the
cyclical or rhythmical repetitions of social phenomena is, at the
present moment, one of the most important tasks of sociology. It
should be promoted by all means because, in the first place, only
where a cyclical or rhythmical repetition of social phenomena
exists, may we grasp its causal or functional interrelations and
formulate "sociological laws." Without repetition there is no
possibility of making any valid generalization. Without such
generalizations the very raison d'etre of sociology, as a
generalizing science, disappears. In the second place, the field of
the repeated, or cyclical, or rhythmical phenomena is more
convenient for a study of correlative dependence and
interdependence with different social processes. The most
valuable scientific conclusions have been obtained in just this
way. In the third place,
^8 From this standpoint Pareto's pitiless criticism of all evaluating
theories in sociology is quite valid. However, in a purely
conditional sense, with an explicit declaration in the
conventionality of a certain ideal of progress, it is possible to
discuss and measure scientifically whether a society is
approaching or going away from such an ideal in the course of
time. Samples of such a study are given by NiCEFORO, A., Les
indices numeriques de la civilisation et du progres, Paris, 1921;
WiLLCOX, W., "A Statistician's Idea of Progress," International
Journal of Ethics, 1913; TONNIES, P., "Richtlinien fiir das
Studium des Forschritts und der Soziale Entwicklung," Jahrbuch
fiir Soziologie, Vol. I, 1925, pp. 166-221. See the theories of
progress in Todd, A. J., Theories of Social Progress, N. Y., 1918.

There is a good bibhography in Park and Burgess, Introduction,
Chap. XIV.
75 See my Social Mobility, Chaps. III-VI.
741
the field of the repeated social phenomena seems to be one of
the most convenient for a quantitative study, which is the final
purpose of any generalizing science. If in this way we may obtain
only an approximately true generalization this must not trouble us;
we still know so little about the "mysterious" world of social events
that any approximate real knowledge is of great value. If, among
these attempts to establish the existence of cycles in social life,
there are some childish theories, this does not vitiate many other
theories which compose the comparatively valid generalizations
of social science. Studying more and more different repeated
social phenomena, we approach more and more to a solution of
the great sociological problem: what in the incessantly changing
process of history is relatively permanent, and what is quite
temporary; what is relatively universal, and what is purely local;
what relations between two or more phenomena are incidental,
and which are really causal. In this way, sociology may more and
more transform itself into this real ''Scienza Niiova" of which the
great Vico dreamed, and which he tried to establish.
Such, in brief, are the reasons which urge us to pay a greater
attention to the cyclical, rhythmical, and repeated phenomena in
social life and history, than has been paid in the last century.^^
9. STUDIES OF THE VELOCITY OF CHANGE OF VARIOUS
PARTS OF
CULTURE, AND THE CLOSENESS OF A CORRELATION
BETWEEN THEM
The next group of studies in social dynamics is represented by
the investigations which try to find how close the correlation is
between various components of ''culture" in the process of its
change. Does a change of one of these components at once and
necessarily lead to a change of other components? If it does, do
these other components change in only one direction, or are there
several alternative possibilities? Which of these components
usually takes the lead or is the ''starter" in a social change, and
which are led and follow the "starters"? What is the velocity of the
change in various fields of social processes? Such are the
principal problems of this group of studies.
* The writer hopes to pubHsh in the near future a special
monograph devoted to the problems discussed in this ])arajj:raph.
742
W. F. Ogburn's (1886- ) Social Change and F. S. Chapin's
''Theory of Synchronous Culture Cycles" try to answer these
questions. In essentials, their similar conclusions are as follows:
What is styled ''culture" is in a permanent process of change.
However, various parts of a culture do not change simultaneously.
Some parts of it, especially material culture, may change, while
other parts, especially non-material culture, forms of social
organization, religion, arts, and mores, may remain, at least for a
time, unchanged. This means that the correlation between various
components of culture is not so close as to lead to the
simultaneity of a change in all its parts. This results in cultural
lags, and disharmony between various parts of material and nonmaterial culture. For instance, through the industrial revolution,
the material culture of modern Western society has changed
enormously during the last hundred years. Meanwhile, our family
institution and other social and political forms of organization still

remain in the form which was well adapted to the material culture
preceding the industrial revolution, but is ill-fitted to the material
culture of to-day. This non-material part of culture has lagged.
Hence, a disharmony between these parts and social
maladjustment is the result. Furthermore, the authors show that
the change of culture becomes more and more rapid in the course
of time. In this they recapitulate the "law of acceleration"
formulated by Novicow.^^ Both authors ask which part of
culturethe material or the non-materialusually leads in the
process of a cuhure change, and which usually lags. Their answer
is that, though there are cases where the non-material part of
culture changes somewhat earlier in time than the material one,
as a general rule, the changes in material culture precede and
lead to the changes in the other part of culture. Besides, the
changes in material culture exert a stronger influence on the nonmaterial culture than that of the latter on the former. In this way
they come to a conclusion somewhat similar to the economic
interpretation of history. The principal arguments in favor of this
answer are that, first, the changes in material culture are relatively
more rapid in time than those in non-material
81 Novicow, J., Les luttes entre societes humaines, Paris, 1896,
chapter on "Loi de racceleration."
743
culture; that they come first; that material culture is markedly
cumulative while the non-material is not so markedly cumulative;
that a new invention in material culture diffuses more rapidly and
is adopted more quickly than an invention in the field of nonmaterial culture; and that finally, the changes in material culture
influence culture's non-material part more effectively than the
changes in the latter influence material culture. Such is the
essence of this elaborated theory.^^
As we see, the theory is a mild form of an economic interpretation

of history. Which part of it is valid and which is questionable? It
seems to be true that various parts of culture do not change
simultaneously. In other words, the correlation between various
parts is not quite close. We have seen this in all the preceding
parts of this book. For this reason, a discrepancy between, and a
maladjustment of, various components of a culture complex
seems indeed to exist. This part of the theory is valid, but its other
part, which claims that ''material culture is a source of modern
social change" or a ''starter," has many of the above indicated
shortcomings of the economic interpretation. In the first place, it is
uncertain as to whether the changes in material culture require a
shorter period of time than those in non-material culture. The
methods of production in the form of agriculture existed in
mediaeval Europe for centuries without any serious change.
However, religious beliefs, mores, political organization, social
organization, forms of marriage, customs, poetry, schools of
painting, styles of architecture, and other forms of non-material
culture changed many times. Change in the political sympathy of
a population seems to belong to the non-material culture.
According to my computation, in England it underwent a change
on an average of every two and a half years; in France, in each
nine months. (See Social Mobility, Chap. XVI.) According to E.
Bogardus' study, the average duration of various fads rarely
exceeds one year. The rapidity of the change of various
"fashions" and "tastes" in literature, arts, music, dances, and
ideologies of the present society is well
2 0gburn, op. cit., Part IV, cspecically pp. 268-280; Chapin, op.
cit., passim, and pp. 596-601. vSce also Wissler, Clark,
"Aboriginal Maize Culture as a '^yi)ical Culture Complex,"
American Journal of Sociology, March, 191 6, p. 661
744

known. I wonder if such a rapid change in these and other fields
of non-material culture could be confronted by as rapid changes
in material culture, and in the first place, in industry. It is true that
for the last century industry has undergone a rapid change, but it
is doubtful whether it has been more rapid than many changes in
non-material culture. We know also some periods in the past
which were marked by stagnation in material culture, while the
religious attitude of the people changed very rapidly. Such, for
instance, were the first centuries of the appearance and diffusion
of Buddhism, Mohammedanism, Christianity, and Protestantism.
Furthermore, there seems to be some truth in the theory of L.
Weber that there are periods marked by intensive innovations in
material technique, and periods marked by innovations in the nonmaterial culture of a society.^' For this reason the proposition of
the authors is still questionable. The above briefly enumerated
periodicity of various social processes also shows that the
shortest periods do not belong to the changes in material culture
only; they are given in other fields of culture, too. These brief
allusions, which could be substantiated seriously, must show that
the question is quite complex, and needs to be studied more
carefully before any definite answer can be given.
Questionable also to me is the contention that the change in
material culture commonly precedes that in its non-material part.
The reason for this doubting is given by W. Ogburn himself.
Concerning the question of whether in modern times the initiation
of the vast cultural changes lies more largely with the material
culture or with the non-material culture, it should be recalled that
there are a great many changes occurring in the material culture
because of inventions^ (o/j. cit,, p. 269).
I subscribe with both my hands to this statement. It means that
the changes in the material culture are greatly determined by
inventions. Inventions are an embodiment of human thought and

knowledge, and are dependent on the general state of science.
Knowledge, thought, and science, as I understand, belong to non^ See Weber, L., Le rhythme du progres, passim, Paris, 1913.
745
material culture. Ergo : the conclusion is rather in accordance with
the opposite theory of De Roberty than with the author's theory. I
attentively read Professors Ogburn's and Chapin's analysis of the
problem, and looked for a method whereby they would reconcile
their contention with the role of knowledge and science, but I
failed to find in their works any systematic answer to the question.
If science is a part of non-material culture, and if, as a rule, a
scientific study and thought precedes a materialization of this
thought in almost all the inventions, it is hard to agree with the
contention that changes in the material culture precede those in
the non-material one. If we add to this that at a great many
periods the scientific thought of a society used to have at its
disposal a series of already elaborated plans for the
reconstruction of the material and the non-material culture of
society, (a primitive *'steam engine" was discovered more than a
thousand years ago) and that, owing to the resistance of material
and non-material culture, a realization of the plans which had
already been born in the realm of thought used to lag for dozens
and even hundreds of years,^^ one would comprehend the
questionable character of the statement.
In a similar way I question the contention that inventions in
material culture spread more rapidly than inventions in nonmaterial culture. I think the question has been studied too little to
justify a definite answer in the field. I wonder whether the radio,
the automobile, or the ideas of communism have spread more
rapidly in the last few years P^''' I wonder also whether "jazz," the
Charleston, or the bathtub have been diffused more rapidly for
this period? I am sure that in Russia for the same period the
pattern-behavior of a sex-freedom has been spreading more
rapidly and successfully than tractors or gas stoves. In the past,
the rapidity of the diffusion of many world religions, or many
mediaeval psychical epidemics, or the idea of the Crusades, or
hundreds of similar non-material innovations have
" For instance, modern science has an excellent plan for a
construction of "Garden-cities"; yet the resistance of the existing
cities and material culture does not permit the realization of it.
^ The degree of diffusion of a cultural traitmaterial and nonmaterial should be measured by the number of people who
adopt and use it, rather than by the size of a gcograi)hical arccL
746
scarcely been slower than that of the more or less substantial
innovations in material culture. In brief, the problem seems to be
still open, and needs to be studied further.
Doubtful also is the statement that material culture is more
cumulative than non-material. If science, human experience, and
knowledge are a non-material culture, then certainly the nonmaterial culture is cumulative. Each new generation does not start
anew with its own experience, but with the gathered experience of
all previous generations which has been accumulating in the
course of time. This is evident. The same may even be said of
beliefs, arts, music, literature, and other forms of non-material
culture. Neither the Iliad, Mahabharata, Plato's philosophy, the
Buddhist religion, Beethoven's symphonies, nor Rembrandt's
pictures are lost. We have them, and we enjoy them. Without
such a non-material value created by previous generations, our
non-material wealth would be very poor. On the other hand, the
disappearance of a culture-trait has happened not only with nonmaterial cultural values, but with material too. W. H. R. Rivers and
W. J. Perry have shown this clearly in regard to primitive groups.
The history of human culture supplies the facts in regard to more
complex society.^^
Finally, all the preceding chapters have shown that "non-material"
innovations influence very strongly the material ones. Weber's
theory is especially important in this respect. Before our eyes we
have an example of how great is the importance of a non-material
innovation such as Marx's theory. The communist plan of social
reconstruction has been largely responsible for the destruction
and paralysis of the whole economic life of Russia.
Space does not permit me to go into a more detailed criticism of
these propositions. However, the above remarks may show that
these problems are not solved as yet. It is to the credit of the
authors that they put them in a clear and scientific way for further
study.
86 Perry, W. J., "The Disappearance of Culture," The Eugenic
Review, July, 1924, pp. 104-113; Rivers, W. H. R., "The Loss of
Useful Arts," Westermarck Anniversary Volume, 1912.
747
10. STUDIES IN MIGRATION, DIFFUSION, AND MOBILITY OF
CULTURAL OBJECTS, FEATURES, VALUES AND
INDIVIDUALS
As we have seen, the term "social dynamics, mechanics, and
social physiology" had been invented long ago. Their purpose
was to be a study of the ''motions" or processes going on within a
social group or a culture complex. Although perhaps something in
this field was gained from a purely qualitative standpoint, very
little was done from a purely quantitative point of view. Treatises
published on the subject talked more of the social physiology or

mechanics than really studied social processes. Only recently
there appeared the first attempts at real study of the dynamics of
social processes or of social change. The first variety of this is
given in the works of the so-called ''diffusion-ists" in cultural
anthropology. Their contribution to sociology has consisted not
only in their decisive criticism of the ''linear concept of evolution,"
and not so much in a setting forth of interesting but doubtful broad
hypotheses, as in their careful study of the area, the alteration,
the routes, the velocity, the obstacles, and the favorable
conditions of the migration or diffusion of a definite and tangible
cultural feature, beginning with a pot or design, or stone collars,
and ending with a definite rite, ceremony, myth, or belief. Studying
carefully these phenomena they started what may be styled a
scientific study of the social circulation and diffusion of cultural
features. A real knowledge of these phenomena is as important
for sociology as a knowledge of the circulation of blood in an
animal organism for physiology. The works of F. Graebner and his
pupils, W. H. R. Rivers, Elliot Smith, W. J. Perry, Franz Boas, R.
H. Lowie, A. L. Kroeber, A. Gol-denweiser, C. Wissler, and of
many others, have already given a great deal in this field.^^ They
have set forth an example to
"See Graebner, F., Methode der Ethnologie, Heidelberg, 1911;
Boas, P., "Evolution or Diffusion," Am. Anthropologist, JulySeptember, 1924; Wissler, C, The Relation of Nature to Man in
Aboriginal America, N. Y., 1926; Lowie, R. H., Primitive Society;
Mackenzie, D. A., The Migration of Symbols, N. Y., 1926;
Goldenweiser, a., Early Civilization; see other literature in Goldenweiser, a., "Diffusionism and the American School of Historical
Ethnology," American Journal of Sociology, July, 1925; Barnes,
H. E., New History and Social Studies, Chap. IV; Wallis, W., An
Introduction to Anthropology, 1926, Chap. XXXIX; Ethnologica, a
special journal edited by F. Graebner. See also Ogburn W., Social
Change, Part III; and Vierkandt, A., Stetigkeit im Kulturzvandel;
748
be followed by an intensive study of migration and diffusion of
various cultural traits within the present complex society. An
accumulation of accurate and quantitative data about these
phenomena would permit us to construct an inductive theory of
social circulation, migration, diffusion, fading, modification,
combination and disassociation of the components of culture, and
through that, the ^'dynamics" of culture complexes.
The second group of studies in social dynamics deals with the
phenomena of territorial migration, shifting, segregation, and
concentration of individuals. They were started much earlier.
Being done principally by statisticians, they have already yielded
many valuable results free from any speculation. As a variety of
this type of study may be mentioned that of migration from the
country to the city, and vice versa. The investigation of the
dynamic processes in the social mobility of cultural traits and
individuals, however, did not stop with the above phenomena. A
series of sociologists, like V. Pareto, G. Sensini, O. Ammon, M.
Kolabinska, and many others, began to study the social
circulation of individuals from one occupational, religious,
economic, political, and other social position to another, and from
one social stratum to another. In this way, step by step, the field
of ''social physiology" has been broadened, and at the present
moment we are at the beginning of the first attempts to construct
a general, but factual theory of social mobility. One of such
attempts has been made by the writer in his Social Mobility.
Concentrating his attention principally on the vertical mobility of
individuals, he has tried to give an account of what has been done
in this field, and what are the factors, the forms, the fluctuations,
the mechanism, and the effects of social mobility, especially in its
vertical form. The reader had best go to this book for detailed
information, but it may be proper here to outline briefly the

principal conclusions of the study. In its essentials they are as
follows:
Conception of Social Mobility and Its Forms. By social mobility I
understand any transition of an individual or social
WiLLEY, M. M., and Herskovits, M. J., "Psychology and Culture,"
Psychological Bulletin, Vol. XXIV, 1927. The school has, however,
many doubtful premises and questionable generalizations. Part of
its weak points is well outlined in Uannee sociologique, 1923-24,
pp. 310-318, 324-330.
749
object or valueanything that has been created or modified by
human activityfrom one social position to another. There are
two principal types of social mobility, horizontal and vertical. By
horizontal social mobility or shifting, I mean the transition of an
individual or social object from one social group to another
situated on the same level. Transitions of individuals, as from the
Baptist to the Methodist religious group, from one citizenship to
another, from one family (as a husband or wife) to another by
divorce and remarriage, from one factory to another in the same
occupational status, are all instances of social mobility. So too are
transitions of social objects, the radio, automobile, fashion,
communism, Darwin's theory, within the same social stratum, as
from Iowa to California, or from any one place to another. In all
these cases, ''shifting" may take place without any noticeable
change in the social position of an individual or social object in the
vertical direction. By vertical social mobility I mean the relations
involved in a transition of an individual (or a social object) from
one social stratum to another. According to the direction of the
transition there are two types of vertical social mobility: ascending
and descending, or social climbing and social sinking. According
to the nature of the stratification, there are ascending and
descending currents of economic, political and occupational

mobility, not to mention other less important types.
The situation is summed up in the scheme shown on page 750.
Immobile and Mobile Types of Stratified Societies.
Theoretically, there may be a stratified society in which the
vertical social mobility is nil. This means that within it there is no
ascending or descending, no circulation of its members; that
every individual is forever attached to the social stratum in which
he was born. Such a type of stratification may be styled as
absolutely closed, rigid, impenetrable, or immobile. The opposite
theoretical type of inner structure of stratification is that in which
the vertical mobility is very intensive and general; here the
membranes between the strata are very thin and have the largest
holes to pass from one floor to another. Such a type of social
stratification may be styled open, plastic, penetrable, or mobile.
Between these two extreme types there may be many middle or
intermediary types of stratification.
750
Social Mobility
Some Results of a Study of the Vertical Mobility. Propositions
Concerning the Fhictuation of the Velocity and Generality of
Vertical Mobility in Space and Time. i. There has scarcely been
any society whose strata were absolutely closed, or in which
vertical mobility in its economic, political, occupational, and other
forms was not present.
2. There has never existed a society in which its vertical mobility
has been absolutely free and in which the transition from one
social stratum to another has had no resistance.
3. The intensiveness and generality of vertical mobility varies from

society to society (fluctuation in space) and within the same
society from time to time.
4. In the fluctuation of vertical mobility in time there seems to be
no definite perpetual trend toward either an increase or a
decrease of the intensiveness and generality of mobility. All
trends seem to have been only temporary, being superseded by
the
751
opposite ones in a longer period of time. This is proposed as valid
for the history of a country, for that of a large social body, and,
finally, for the history of mankind.
5. The nineteenth and the twentieth centuries in the history of the
Western societies have been periods of highest mobility in its
occupational, economic, and poHtical forms. However, in the past
there have been periods of an equal and, perhaps, even greater
mobility.
Propositions Concerning the Channels and the Machinery which
Controls the Vertical Mobility of Indiznduals. i. The most
common channels through which vertical shifting of individuals
goes on are the series of social institutions like: the army, church,
school, political parties, and different occupational institutions.
They play the role of "elevators" through which people go '*up"
and *'down."
2. With the exception of periods of anarchy, vertical mobility of
individuals and their placement at different social strata is
controlled by a complex machinery of social testing, selection and
distribution of individuals within the society. This machinery is
composed of social institutions of the family, church and school,
which test the general intelligence and character of individuals,
and of different occupational institutions which re-test the results

of the family, church and school testing, and especially test the
specific ability of individuals necessary for a successful
performance of definite occupational functions. This ''testing and
selective" role of these institutions is no less important than their
''educational and training" role. From this it follows that the
population of different social strata is selective.
Propositions Concerning the Effects of Mobility. i. In the field of
racial composition of a society: Under the condition of lower
procreation of the upper strata an intensive vertical mobility leads
to wasting of the best population of society. It is probable that in a
long period of time this wâsting may lead to a racial depletion of
the population. This is the price paid by a mobile society for its
rapid progress.
2. In the field of human behavior and psychology: An intensive
vertical mobility facilitates an increase of the plasticity and
versatility of behavior, open-mindedness, mental strain, in752
tellectual progress, and progress of discoveries and inventions.
On the other hand, it facihtates an increase of mental diseases,
superficiaHty, insensitiveness of nervous system, scepticism,
cynicism, and "idiosyncrasies"; it also diminishes intimacy in
interrelations of individuals, increases their social isolation and
loneliness, favors an increase of suicide, hunting for sensual
pleasure and restlessness; finally, mobility facilitates
disintegration of morals.
3. In the field of social processes and organization: Mobility, under
some conditions, facilitates a better and more adequate social
distribution of individuals among different social strata, economic
prosperity and social progress. The effects of mobility on social

stability are very complex, partly positive, partly negative; all in all,
rather negative. Its influence upon longevity and continuity of
culture complex is negative also. It facilitates atom-ization and
diffusion of solidarity and antagonisms, increase of individualism
followed by a vague cosmopolitanism and collectivism.
Such are the most general conclusions reached. They, however,
are tentative only. In spite of the author's desire to base his
conclusions only on factual materials, the data were often lacking.
Therefore, the propositions need to be tested by future studies in
the field.
II. STUDIES OF SUDDEN, CATACLYSMIC, REVOLUTIONARY,
AND CATASTROPHIC CHANGES
The last group of the studies of social dynamics deals with the
phenomena of a sudden and spasmodic social change. The first
variety of these works deals with sudden ''mutations" of cultural
features generally.^^ Their principal object is a study of the
factors of, and the regularities in, the dynamics of inventions, as
a principal form of such innovations. The above mentioned
works dealing with men of genius have contributed a great deal
to the elucidation of the problem. Furthermore, the studies of
W. Ogburn, Charles Cooley, W. Ostwald, A. E. Tanner, R.
Thurnwald, Engelmeyer, F. Taussig, C. L. Morgan, G. Tarde,
88 See Petrie, W. M. F., The Revolutions of Civilization, London,
191 2; Teg-GART, F. J., Theory of History, 1925; Perry, W. J.,
The Growth of Civilization, Paulhan, Fr., Les transformations

social des sentiments, Paris, 1920.
753
T. Ribot, V. Pareto, and others have indicated many social
conditions important from this standpoint.^^
The next variety of studies is a factual study of the social changes
called forth by a catastrophe like an inundation, earthquake,
cyclone, or other cosmic phenomena. S. H. Prince's monograph
represents a good sample of this type of investigation. Like a
naturalist or a geologist he observed and analyzed the effects of
the Halifax disaster (explosion) on various sides of social life,
behavior, activity, and organization of the Halifax community.^'^ A
continuation of similar studies promises a great deal for the
inductive knowledge of the character of such catastrophic
changes.
The third variety of the studies deals principally with what is
known as political or social revolution. Among many works of this
class, especially important are the contributions of H. Taine, G.
LeBon, A. Bauer, Galeot, Charles A. Ellwood, R. Pohlmann, G.
Richard, I. King, L. von Wiese, G. Landauer, L. P. Edwards, A.
Vierkandt, and the writer.^^
"See Ogburn, W., and Thomas, D., "Are Inventions Inevitable?"
Political Science Quarterly, March, 1922; Cooley, Charles,
"Genius, Fame, and the Comparison of Races," Annals of Amer.
Academy Political and Social Sciences, 1897; Engelmeyer, a
Theory of Creation, Teoria Tvorchestva (Russia); Taussig, F.,
Inventors and Money-Makers; Ostwald, W., Grosse Manner,
Leipzig, 1909; Tanner, A. E., "Certain Social Aspects of
Invention," Amer. Journal of Psychology, 1915; Morgan, C. L.,
Emergent Evolution, London, 1923; Ribot, T., Essay on the
Creative Imagination, Chicago, 1906; Baldwin, M., Social and
Ethical Interpretations, part II, N. Y., 1897; Gowin, E. B., The

Executive and His Control of Men, N. Y., 1915; Thurnwald, R.,
"Fiihrerschaft und Siebung," Ztschft. fiir Volker Psychologic und
Soziologie, March, 1926.
' Prince, S. H., Catastrophe and Social Change, N. Y., 1920.
'1 One of the deepest analyses of the phenomena of revolution
still remains in H. Taine's classical work: Les origines de la
France contemporaine, translated into English: The French
Revolution, N. Y., 1878-85; Le Bon, G., The Psychology of
Revolution, N. Y., 1913; Pohlmann, R., Geschichte d. Antik.
Communismus; Bauer, A., Essai sur les revolutions, Paris, 1908;
Ellwood, Charles A., "A Psychological Theory of Revolutions,"
American Journal of Sociology, XI, 1905-06; The Psychology of
Human Society, N. Y., 1925, Chap. VIII; Richard, G., "Les crises
sociales et les conditions de la criminalite," Vannee soc, 1899;
Vierkandt, A., "Zur Theorie der Revolution," Schmoller's Jahrbuch
f. Gesctzgebung, 46 Jahrgang, Heft 2, 1922; Galeot, La
psychologic revolutionaire, Paris, 1923; VON Wiese, L.,'s, and
several other studies in Verhandlungen des Dritten Deutschen
Sociologentage, Tubingen, 1923; Landauer, G., Die Revolution,
Frankfurt, 1907; Freimark, H., Die Revolution, etc., Miinchen,
1921; King, I., "The Influence of the Form of Social Change upon
the Emotional Life of a People," American Journal of Sociology,
Vol. IX; Edwards, L. P., "Mechanics of Revolution," St. Stephen's
CollegQ Bulletin, May, 1923; Lederer, E., Einige Gedanken zur
Socio-logie der Revolution, 1918; Sorokin, P., The Sociology of
Rivolution, 1925; Toller,
754
As a result of the studies at the present moment we know a great
deal about the phenomena of revolution, and what is especially
important, we know several regularities and ''eternal

components," which, in a degree, are found in all revolutions and
compose their ''eternal" skeleton. In their totality, the studies
enumerated above under the paragraph numbers 7, 8, 9, 10 and
11 are a great contribution to our knowledge of social dynamics.
They do not unravel all its mysteries, but none the less they
represent a considerable progress toward a better and more
objective acquaintance with social processes and their
relationship.
12. BEGINNING OF THE STAGE OF EXPERIMENTAL
SOCIOLOGY
Though in the above the term "experimental" has been used in an
application to several studies, nevertheless they are experimental
only in a broad sense of the term. Purely "experimental" studies in
which all the relevant conditions are under the control of an
investigator and are created by him have been very few in
sociology. Meanwhile, in so far as sociology is a nomographic
science, and tries to formulate functional or causal laws, it needs
an experimental method in a narrow sense of the term no less
than any other nomographic science. Hence, sooner or later,
sociology has to begin to work "experimentally." A series of quite
comprehensible conditions makes an application of this method to
the study of social phenomena difficult, often impossible. None
the less, there are many problems which seem to be possible to
be studied experimentally. As an example of such pioneer
experimental attempts may be mentioned here the investigations
of P. F. Voelker, F. Allport, G. S. Gates, A. Mayer, E. Meumann,
quoted in Chapter VIII, and the studies of E. B. Hurlock, M.
Parten, M. Walker, and the writer carried on at the University of
Minnesota.^^ These studies are to be regarded as the first
E., Masse Mensch, Potsdam, 1921; Lombroso, C, Le crime
politique et les revolutions, Paris, 1922. Besides, still
extraordinarily valuable are de Maistre, J., Considerations sur la

France; Theorie des revolutions par I'auteur de I'esprit de
I'histoire, Paris, 1817, 4 volumes; not to mention the wonderful
analysis of revolution by Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Guicciardini,
J. Bodin, T. Hobbes and other classical authors.
92 See for instance, Hurlock, E. B., "The Value of Praise and
Reproof," Archives of Psychology, Vol. XI, No. 71; Sorokin, P.,
"An Experimental Study of the Effects of Collective and Individual,
Equal and Unequal Remuneration and Pure Competition on the
Efficiency of the Work," Kolner Vierteljahrshefte
755
weak steps toward a really experimental sociology. It is highly 1
probable that these attempts in a better and better form will be '
made more and more often until sociology, at least in some parts,
j
will become a really experimental science. Anyhow, things seem /
to be drifting that way.
13. CONCLUSION ABOUT SPECIAL STUDIES
Space does not permit us to continue a further enumeration of
other special studies. The above, however, shows that at the
present moment we already have a considerable number of them.
They suggest that the stage of speculation in sociology is passing
away. If general theories, as hypotheses, were necessary to start
special and more accurate investigations, the general hypotheses
themselves may now be judged on the basis of the special
studies. As they have been accumulating, they have begun to
exert more and more influence on the general theories
themselves. This means that a real progress of sociology as a
science has been going on principally in the form of these special
studies. I do not hesitate to prophesy that, such studies being

continued, within a few decades we shall have textbooks in
sociology as different from the existing ones as the biological
treatises before Lamarck and Darwin are different from the
present courses in biology.
Being grateful to our predecessors for their suggestive
hypotheses and tentative generalizations, we, nevertheless, must
devote ourselves not to a pondering upon generalities, but to the
special, factual, and especially experimental studies, of social
problems.
14. GENERAL CONCLUSION ABOUT THE SOCIOLOGISTIC
AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SCHOOLS
We have passed a long way in our analysis of the general
theories of the sociologistic and psychological schools, their
branches, and special studies. It is time to give a general
conclusion about the schools. It is brief. There is no doubt that
they have contributed greatly to the science of sociology. There is
no doubt also that they have an unquestionable right to existence.
iir Soziologie, Bund V, Heft /, 1927. Further studies of the writer
and of several graduate fellows who work under his guidance (A.
Anderson, M. Tan-quist), will be published some time in the
future.
756
There is no doubt that a continuation of the studies along the
Hnes of their principles promises a rich harvest, but in so far as
they pretend to have a monopoly on the scientific study of social
phenomena, and in so far as they try to regard the processes of
history as an equation with one unknown, their claims are not

justified and ought to be rejected.
757
CHAPTER XIV CONCLUSION: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT
It IS time to finish our walk over the field of sociology. We have
crossed it from border to border in various directions. It is certain
that we have not studied its secondary features as attentively as
perhaps we should have. It is certain also that we could not study
in detail the character of the small sociological houses built by
individual sociologists. Nevertheless, we have explored the most
important features of the field sufficiently well to have an
approximately accurate idea about its present situation. Let us
briefly sum up our impressions.
First, the field is divided into many areas with different methods of
cultivation of sociological knowledge. Consequently, the
knowledge itself grows in an elementary and somewhat
anarchical way. The whole field reminds one of a half-wild
national forest rather than a carefully planned garden. Shall we
regret such a situation? The answer is that some improvement in
the general planning for the whole field is probably desirable.
Nevertheless, the planning and standardizing must not be
overdone. An artificial standardization in sociology is especially
dangerous. It may lead to a degeneration of real sociological
knowledge into dry and lifeless scholastics. The complex nature
of social phenomena makes rather necessary a variety of the
approaches and methods of study. Attacking them with various
methods and from various scientifically sound standpoints we
have more chances to know them than by attacking with only one
standardized method and from one standardized standpoint.
Some sociologists are worried about the lack of such a uniform
standard, and some non-sociologists often indicate this feature as
an evidence that there is no such science as sociology. We must
not be troubled much with these worries and criticisms. If the

critics know something about the non-sociological cultural
sciences like law, eco758
nomics, history, political science, psychology, and so on, they
must recognize that these disciplines are approximately in the
same state of wilderness in which sociology is placed. Only those
of these ''scholars" who do not know their specialty beyond a
couple of textbooks, or beyond their own block in the whole field
of these sciences, can believe that they are standardized and well
"combed." As a matter of fact, each of these sciences is in about
the same state of "wilderness" as sociology. Therefore we may
advise the critics that they would be better silent in this respect.
Medice cura te ipsiini we can say to them. So much about this
point, f The second conspicuous feature of the explored field is
that it is rich with "sterile flowers" and "weeds." Speculative
discussions about what sociology is; what it ought to be; what
culture is; whether society is a bio-organic, psycho-organic,
super-organic, or mechanic system; whether culture is a psychical
or non-psychical phenomenon; what the difference is between
cultural, social, psycho-social and psychological phenomena;
what progress is; what the relationship of society and the
individual is; and so forth and so on are examples of what is
styled "sterile flowers" in sociology. Many sociological works have
factually consisted in a mere speculation over these and similar
problems and have not gone further. They have taken the
"antechamber" of sociology for its whole building. Besides, even
these introductory problems have been often outlined in the
vaguest and the most unsatisfactory way. Shall we wonder that
such "sociologies" have not given us any real knowledge of social
phenomena, except a lot of somewhat indefinite words piled one
upon another? Shall we be surprised that after reading such

"sociologies" many people of thoughtful mind should have
assumed a negative attitude toward such a "science" ? They are
right as far as this "word-piling" is concerned. They rightly say:
"Instead of a long and tedious reasoning of what sociology is,
show it in fact." "Instead of a discussion over how sociology ought
to be built, build it." "Instead of 'flapping' around the introductory
problems of the science, give us something certain; show us your
causal formulas, and 2:ive us a sins:le real analvsis of the phe759
CONCLUSION: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT 759
nomena." They seem to be right in their criticism, as far as these
''sterile flowers" of sociology are concerned.
Now come the ''weeds." Their first variety is represented by "the
preaching and evaluating judgments" in the field. Many a
"sociological" work in its bulk is but a book of prescriptions of what
is good and what is bad, what ought to be done, and what ought
to be avoided, what is progress, and what is regress, what
reforms are to be made to save "the world" from its evils, and so
on. As this preaching job does not require any serious study of
the facts, a great many incompetent persons have pretended to
be omniscient doctors who know how the world is to be saved,
and give their "prescriptions" about war eradication, birth-control,
labor organization, the sex and race problem, and so forth. In this
way, all kinds of nonsense have been styled, published,
circulated, and taught as "sociology." Every idler has pretended to
be a sociologist. Shall we wonder that this again has discredited
sociology greatly? In view of the heterogeneity of scientific and
evaluative judgments, and in view of the radical difference
between a study of the facts as they are and moralizing on what
they ought to be, it is rather evident that this "weed" should be
eradicated from the field of scientific sociology and planted where

it belongs.
Other "weeds" are different, but also harmful. An insufficient study
of the facts in time and space; a mania for generalizing a certain
conclusion far beyond the factual basis on which it is built; an
ignorance of the theories and studies made by others and in
preceding times; a failure to make from a certain hypothesis all
the important conclusions and to verify them as to whether they
are corroborated in space and time; a failure to test an invented
hypothesis seriouslysuch are some of these "weeds." Shall we
wonder that even the best theories in sociology are fallacious to a
certain extent? A slight attempt to test them shows at once that
either their factual analysis is wrong, or that their generalization is
overdrawn, or that a purely fictitious correlation is accepted for a
real one, or that the conclusion is one-sided. Under such
conditions, it would naturally be expected that sociology would
remind one of a "museum of scientifically pathological theories,"
as Professor Petrajitzsky rightly says. The reading
760
of this book has shown this. It is needless to say that these
''weeds" must be eradicated, too.
This criticism does not mean, however, that in this field we have
found only sterile flowers and weeds. By no means. We have
seen in each district a considerable number of potentially strong
trees, fine plants and beautiful flowers. I say ''potentially" because
they are considerably overgrown by the weeds and sterile flowers
that need to be cleared away from them. This being done, they
may be the pride of every scientific gardener. In so far as this,
sociology is not only going to be a science, but already is one; but
only within the mentioned limits. In order to broaden these limits,
we must evidently avoid a repetition of the above mistakes. This

is the task of the younger and the future generations of
sociologists.
Finally, one inference is to be made from the above survey. There
are a great many theories devoted to a discussion of what
sociology is and what is its subject-matter. It is not my intention to
enter into a discussion of the problem. My intention is to indicate
that instead of a speculation over the problem, many an author
would have done better by studying the development of
sociological theories for the last fifty years. Such study shows
something very instructive in this respect. In the first place it
shows that several definitions of sociology are in contradiction
with the real movement of sociological studies. For instance, if we
must accept the definition of the formal school, almost all the
above studies would have to be excluded from sociology. What
would remain would represent something so insignificant that it
scarcely would deserve the name of a sociology or any other
science. With a corresponding change, this may be said of some
other definitions of sociology. In the second place, the
development of sociology begins to show more and more clearly
what its subject-matter is. It seems to be a study, first, of the
relationship and correlations between various classes of social
phenomena, (correlations between economic and religious; family
and moral; juridical and economic; mobility and political
phenomena and so on); second, that between the social and the
non-social (geographic, biological, etc.,) phenomena; third, the
study of the general characteristics common to all classes of
social phe761
CONCLUSION: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT 761
nomena. All the surveyed schools are busy with either the
establishment of correlations between various classes of social
phenomena or between the social and the non-social

phenomena, or with an elaboration of the formulas which describe
their most general features. ^ Whether a sociologist likes this or
not, such seems to have been the real subject-matter of
sociological theories. More than that, this subject-matter becomes
more and more clear as we proceed from the beginning to the
end of the period studied. It is not my purpose to develop and
substantiate this conception of sociology and its subject-matter. I
have done it elsewhere. Through indicating the above fact I want
only to draw the attention of the sociologist to what has been the
real subject-matter of sociological theories. This may prevent
many a wild speculation over the problem and may be useful for
those who are inclined to study this type of topic. In addition, I
shall observe only that this conception agrees with the best
definitions of sociology, though differently worded, and with the
nature of really existing sociology. Being a mere inference from
the survey, it is less speculative and more inductive than many
other definitions; and therefore, it is likely to be more accurate
than many other definitions set forth by various authors. Sociology
has been, is, and either will be a science of the general
characteristics of all classes of social phenomena, with the
relationships and correlations between them; or there will be no
sociology.
' It is easy to understand that both components of the subjectmatter of sociology are logically inseparable. Where we have to
study N classes of phenomena there logically should be A^ + i
classes of sciences. Each of N special sciences studies the
characteristics of its special class of phenomena; the additional
A^ + I science would study the characteristics common to all N
classes. Two fundamental classes of organisms, plants and
animals, require the existence of botany, which studies the
specific characteristics of plant-organisims; zoology, which deals
with animal organisms; and general biology, which studies the
characteristics common to both classes of organisms and their
relationship. Likewise if social phenomena are classified into the

classes: a, b, c, d, . . . n, each class being studied by a special
social science (economics, political science, law, etc.), besides N
special sciences there should be an A^+ i science which would
study the general characteristics common to all A^ classes of
social phenomena and the relationship or correlation between
them. Such is the logical reason for an existence of sociology in
the defined sense. And such has really been the subject-matter of
sociological theories for the period studied. See a brilliant analysis
of the above in Petrajitzskv, Leo, Introduction to the Theory of
Law and Morals, pp. 80-81; vide also Sorokin, P., Systema
soziologii, Vol. I, pp. 30-36.
762
763
INDEX OF NAMES
Abbott, E., 714
Abercromby, J., 173
Adams, B., 589, 590, 591
Addams, J., 717
Adler, M., 526
Aftalion, A., 552, 733
Alimena, 654
Allen, J. A., 130, 131
Allport, F., 47, 48, 455-457. 583, 603,
604, 620, 623, 625, 654, 723, 724, 754 Ammon, Otto, 60, 222,
244-251, 256,
268, 270, 307, 308, 334, 453. 737. 748 Andrews, B. R., 462
Angus, S., 692 Anoutchin, D. N., 134, 135 Arbuthnot, J., 100
Aristotle, 99, 221, 437, 505, 516 Arkhangelsky, B. M., 635 Arlitt,
A. H., 290, 296-298 Armitage, F. P., 112, 133, 629, 630
Aschaffenburg, G., 560 Aust, E., 692 Avenarius, R., 42 Ayres, L.,
380
Babcock, M., 300-302
Babkin, B., 628
Baer, K. E. See von Baer
Bagehot, W., 12, 311, 313
Bakeless, J., 353
Baldwin, B. T., 264
Baldwin, J. M., 457, 458, 604, 753
Ballod, C, 204
Baltzly, A., 385
Barcelo, A. P. y, 12, 13, 16-18, 35
Barker, E., 198
Barnes, H. E., 100, 207, 463, 475, 480,
602, 620, 747 Barnich, G., 20 Barone, E., 40, 44 Bartels, A., 735
Barth, P., 92, 100, 207, 448, 463, 481,
482, 490, 520, 526, 563, 640, 643, 673,
727 Bass, 158

Bauer, A., 543, 718, 753 Bauer, W., 706 Baxter, J. H., 135 Bayle,
544
Beard, C. A., 578-580, 585 Bechtereff, W., 12, 13, 18-20, 35, 617,
623 Beddoe, J., 278 Belloc, H., 706 Belot, 637
Below, G. See von Below Bender, H. H., 265 Benini, 716
Bentham, J., 11 Bentley, A. F., 12, 28, 617, 620, 644,
647 Berdiaieff, N., 26 Bergson, 729 Berkeley, G., 11 Bernard, E.,
400 Bernard, L. L., 604, 620, 625 Bemays, M., 153, 159 Bemdt,
O., 329 Bemhardi, 318, 328 Bemheim, 738 Bernstein, E., 526
Berr, H., 738
Bertillon, J., 135, 398, 401, 716 Besson, L., 147 Beveridge, Sir
William, 100, 120-126,
379. 552, 735 Bianchi, 654 Bienkowsky, 153 Bilsky, F., 375 Binet,
A,, 143
Blache, V. See de la Blache Blaha, A., 718 Blank, R., 580 Bloch.
See von Bloch Bliiher, H., 605-607 Bluntschli, J. K., 206, 210
Boag, H., 338
Boas, F., 131, 132, 133, 304, 729, 747 Bockh, R., 716 Bodart, G.,
324, 326 Bodin, J., 100 Bodio, L., 159 Bogardus, Emory S., 11,
458, 508-510
727, 728, 736, 743 Bogart, E. L., 338 Bohn, G., 371
Bonald, M. See de Bonald Bongcr, W. A., 166, 560, 733
764
INDEX OF NAMES
Bon wick, i68

Boodin, J. E., 465
Book, W. F., 290, 714
Booth, C, 559, 717
Borel, E., 528
Borgatta, G., 39
Boring, E. G., 630
Bosco, A., 715
Boudin, 135
Bougie, C., 211, 413, 417-419, 421, 422,
454, 463, 464, 467, 475. 478, 479, 480,
493, 637, 669, 670, 724, 727 Bourgeois, L., 210, 211 Bourne, R.,
320 Boumet, A., 341 Bousquet, G. H., 39, 40 Boutmy, E., 720
Boven, P., 60 Bovet, P., 353 Bowley, A. L., 37i-373 376, 378,
379,
552 Bozi, A., 12
Bramwell, B. S., 269, 273 Branford, V., 463 Breckenridge, S., 714
Brentano, L., 696 Breysig, K., 213 Bridges, J. M., 290 Brigham, C.
C., 296 Brinkmanr, C,, 213 Broca, 134, 135 Brown, G. L., 301
Brown, J., 556
Brownlee, D. J., 371, 379. 735 Bruckner, 120, 124 Bruhnes, J.,
100, 103, 104, 106, 107,
109, no, III, 115, 117, 118 Bryant, W., 122, 125, 126 Bryce, J., 60,
720 Biicher, K., 709 Buckle, H. T., 100, 114, 115, 116, 129,
130, 133, 150, 462 Budge, 359
Bukharin, N., 526, 546 Burdge, H., 714 Burgess, Ernest W., 327,
328, 353, 446,
489, 508-511, 607, 644, 645, 651, 652,
700, 714,717, 719, 740 Burke, E., 200, 437 Burr, C. S., 263 Burt,
C., 714 Bushan, G., 609
Bushê, F. A., 332, 340, 642, 709 Butler, N. M., 320 Buxton, D.,
135
Caldwell, O., 462
CandoUe, A. See de CandoUe
Cannan, E., 394
Cannon, W. B., 630
Carey, H. C, 12-16, 34, 434, 640
Carli, F., 12, 13, 39, 46, 60, 383, 384,
386-388, 389, 391, 393, 394, 413-417,
427, 428, 551 Carlyle, 657 Carr-Saunders, A. M., 357, 359, 382,
384, 394, 402, 406, 413, 429, 573,
612 Carver, T. N., 12, 13, 18, 22, 23, 328,
338 Case, Clarence M., 340 Casper, J. L., 139 Castle, C., 192
Cato, 518 Cattaneo, 438 Cattell, J. McK., 192, 264, 284, 409,
410, 714 Cauderlieu, 338

Chamberlain, H. S., 221, 222, 229-233 Chamberlain, K., 60
Chang, C. H., 396, SH, 5i5, 695 Chapin, F. Stuart, 458, 559, 576,
635,
717, 725, 726, 736, 742, 743, 745 Chardin, Sir J., 100 Charychov,
166, 560 Chateauneuf, B., 334 Chessa, F., 716 Childe, V. G., 265
Christopher, W. S., 159 Cicero, 99
Claassen, W., 141, 142, 264, 334 Clark, J. M., 530 Clarke, E. L.,
192, 264, 285, 714 Clayton, H. H., 120 Closson, C. C, 250
Codrington, R., 669 Coker, F. W., 100, 200, 207 Colajanni, N.,
166 Colcord, J., 716 Coler, L. E., 290 Coletti, F., 562 Colignon,
R., 334 Collins, M., 556 Combarieu, J., 709 Commons, J., 526,
538, 700, 704 Comte, August, 12, 41, 43, 58, 92, 362
369, 433, 438, 505, 728 Comte, C, 100 Confucius, 99
Constantin, A., 474, 328, 335 Conway, M., 353
765
INDEX OF NAMES
765
Cooley, Charles H., 85, 192, 286, 434, 436, 447, 457, 458, 508,
656, 658, 659,
713. 752, 753 Come, A., 341 Coste, A., 359-370, 388, 390, 391,
407,
409, 460 Cottin, P., 211, 215 Coulanges, F. See de Coulanges
Counts, G. S., 290, 714 Coumot, A., 37, 42, 502, 527 Cox, H.,
382, 398 Cressy, E., 462 Crile, G. M., 353 Croce, B., 526, 535,
738 Cruet, 700, 705 Cumberland, R., 8 Cunningham, W., 462

Cunow, H., 521, 526, 536, 542, 546, 562,
563
Curschman, F., 399, 593 Curzon, E. See de Curzon Cuvier, 100
Dallemagne, 271
Danilevsk>% 26, 60, 657, 720, 737
Dannemann, F., 462
Dante Alighieri, 349
Darwin, Ch., 168, 247, 252, 309, 310,
311, 329, 505 Darwin, L., 331 Dasliiell, J. F., 296 D'Avenel, G.,
113, 399, 737 Davenport, Ch. B., 135, 264 Davies, G. R., 409,
410, 552, 553, 561,
714 Davis, J., 620
Davis, M., 458, 602, 637, 654 Dawley, A., 714 Dealey, J. Q., 640
de Bonald, M., 437, 438, 661 de Candolle, A., 283, 409, 714 de
Coulanges, F., 43, 368, 474, 662, 664,
687 de Curzon, E., 64, 91 de Gobineau, Arthur, 60, 115, 221,
222229, 231, 232, 266, 292, 303, 308, 692 de Greef, G., 562, 563,
646 de Guerry, 159
de Jastrzebsky, T. T. S., 371, 376 de la Blache, V., 65, 100
Delafossc, J., 211, 215 de la Grasserie, R., 16, 447 de Lapouge,
V., 60, 132, 222, 233, 234244, 245, 246, 250, 251, 256, 268, 269,
270, 271, 273, 276-278, 307, 308, 329,

737-739 Delevsky, J., 328, 542, 728 de Maistre, J., 200, 325, 350,
437, 661,
754 DeMarinis, 12 de Molinari, 320 DemoHns, E., 64, 65, 67, 69,
70, 72-78,
82-84, 86-90, 93, 94, 100, 116, 119 de Morgan, J., 265 Deniker,
J., 136, 265, 279 Denis, H., 199, 552, 562 Deploige, S., 443, 475
de Quatrefages, A., 309 de Robertis, R., 654 de Roberty, E., 434,
438-443, 44^, 448453, 461-463, 465, 539, 639, 645, 724,
745 de Rousiers, P., 65, 69, 84, 88 Derrick, S. M., 296, 297
Descamps, P., 264, 394, 486 Descartes, 6, 8 de Tocqueville, A.,
720 de Tourville, H., 65, 69, 79-82, 84, 88,
95, 100 de Vitry, G., 438 Dexter, E. G., 100, 139, 156, 157, 159,
161, 162, 290, 559, 731 Dicey, A. V., 706, 708 Diserens, C. M.,
709 Dixon, R. B., 131, 132, 136, 137, 265,
266, 268, 277, 279, 291-293 Doubleday, T., 551 Douglas, P. H.,
530 Drachsler, J., 716 Draghicesco, D., 434, 444-446 Dreyfus, R.,
222 Dromel, J., 733 Drucker, S., 714 Drzwina, A., 371 Dublin, L.,
264, 382, 394, 398 Dubois, M., 117 Duclaux, 462 Dudfield, 373
Duff, J. F., 289, 290, 714 du Fresnoy, L., 100 Duguit, L., 496
Duhem, P., 42, 45, 528 Dunbar, J., n Dunlap, K., 603 Dunn, L. C,
308 Dunning, W., 199, 221 Duprat, G. L., 207, 212, 454, 464, 466
Dupreel, E., 388, 391, 447, 501
766
INDEX OF NAMES
Durkheim, E., 14, 28, 143, 160-162, 175, 215-217, 388, 390, 408,
434, 438, 443, 446, 447, 448, 463-480, 491-493, 530, 531, 558,
654, 662, 667, 692, 717, 724, 727, 730
Duruy, 43
East, E. M., 308, 394, 402
Eddy, W. H., 462
Edgeworth, 12, 37
Edwards, L. P., 753
Ehrlich, E., 700
Elderton, E. M., 264, 556
Eldridge, S., 604, 615
Eleutheropulos, B., 563
Ellis, H., 168, 192, 275, 282, 608, 609, 709, 714
Ellwood, Charles A., 457, 508, 526, 533, 604, 609, 619, 623, 625,
640, 642, 662, 665, 666, 668, 691, 708, 753
Eltinge, B., 353
Engelgardt, A. N., 326
Engelman, G. J., 168
Engelmeyer, 752, 753
Engels, P., 313, 514, 523, 526-546, 562,
563 Enriques, P., 42 Eratosthenes, 99
Espinas, A., 434, 443, 462, 530, 531 Eubank, E., 716 Eulenburg,
P., 738 Ewald, G., 722
Pahlbeck, P., 305, 408, 543 Fairbanks, A., 646 Palk, J. S.. 144.
170 Paris, E., 603, 625, 654 Parr, W.. 370,371,372, 552
Pauconnet, 464 Fay, E. A., 716 Peingold, G. A., 301 Ferguson, G.
O., 294, 295 Ferland, M., 714 Ferrari, G., 388, 734 Ferrero, G.,
320 Ferri, E., 313, 320, 731 Ferriere, 465 Finch, V. C., 116 Pinlay,
L., 556 Fisher, S., 192, 409, 410 Piske, B. A., 462 Piske, J., 12
Fleming, R. M., 132 Pleure, H. J., 132, 265 Flexner, S., 462
Plorus, 99 Porry, 139 Pouillee, A., 201, 207, 210, 211, 450,
645, 720 Fourier, P. M. C., 11 Prank, T., 263, 305, 517 Franklin,
678 Prazer, J. G., 54, 168, 172, 412, 474,
486, 662, 668, 669, 688 Freeman, R. A., 589, 594-597 Freimark,
H., 753 Fresnoy, L. See du Fresnoy Freud, S., 604-606
Frischeisen-Kohler, M., 490 Froloff, J. P., 603, 618 Prymann, D.,
388 Purst, C. M., 135
Gaedeken, P., 159, 160
Gageman, 168
Galeot, 753
Galpin, C. J., 719
Galton, P., 60, 222, 252-256, 282, 502
Gamier, 519
Garth, T. R., 299
Gates, A., 159
Gates, G. S., 455, 583, 754
Gehlke, C. E., 443, 460, 464, 475

Gehrlich, 526, 541
Geikie, Sir A., 178
Gentile, G., 526
George, H., 177
Gernet, M., 166, 560, 714
Gianotti, 519
Giddings, Franklin H., 11, 207, 311,
340, 390, 391, 457, 458, 508, 511, 512,
640, 673, 727 Gide, C., 211, 329, 331 Gierke, O. See von Gierke
Gilby, W. H., 290 GilPillan, S. C., 107, 182 Gillette, J. M., 719
Gillin, John L., 164, 559, 560, 714, 727 Gini, Corado, 133, 196,
263, 304, 333,
381, 382, 383, 384, 388, 401, 422-427,
429, 430, 431, 716, 737 Ginsberg, M., 323, 406, 420, 484, 564.
565 Girat, 312 Gisi, W., 139
Gobineau, Arthur. See de Gobineau Goddard, H. H., 288
Goldenweiser, A., 487, 719, 747 Goldmark, P., 717 Goldsbury, P,
W., 147
767
INDEX OF NAMES
767
Gorovoi-Shaltan, 336
Gossen, 37
Gottstein, A., 718
Gould, B. A., 134, 135
Gould, C. W., 263
Gowin, E. B., 264, 753
Graebner, F., 747
Graig, F. J., 278
Grasserie, R. See de la Grasserie
Greenwood, M., 373, 374, 556
Grimanelli, P., 637
Grimm, J., 222
Groppali, A., 23, 563
Grosse, E., 562, 563
Grotius, H., 8
Grotjahn, A., 113
Groves, E., 718
Gruenhagen, 168
Guerry, 730
Guicciardini, 519
Guignebert, 689, 736

Gumplowicz, L., 199, 207, 316, 328, 340,
434, 480-487 Giinther, F. K., 262, 263 Guyau, M,, 709 Guyot, A.
H., 100, 359
Haddon, A. C, 136, 265, 266, 279, 381
Haeckel, E., 214
Haff, K., 200, 207, 466
Haggerty, M. E., 290
Halbwachs, M., 447, 448, 463
Hall, G. S., 154, 353
Hall, W., 154
Hammacher, E., 521
Haney, W. H., 359, 516
Hankins, F. H., 221, 222, 230, 234, 265,
267, 269, 308 Hansen, A. H., 128, 129, 526, 532, 536,
576 Hansen, G., 244, 245, 246, 307, 381, 737 Haret, 12, 13, 1618, 35 Harington, J., 519 Harmon, G. E., 271 Harris, J. A., 128,
716 Hart, H., 290
Hartman, D., 583, 723, 724 Hartshorne, H., 714 Hauer, L. W., 669
Hauriou, M., 211 Haycraft, 335 Hayes, Edward C, 449, 457, 458,
508,
509, 639, 640, 643, 651, 666, 706 Hayes, F., 151 Hayes, M., 714
Healy, W., 264, 714

Heape, W., 168
Hegel, 737
Heger, 271
Helm, G., 12
Herbart, 11, 438
Herbertson, D., 64
Herder, 100
Hermes, G., 718
Herodotus, 99
Herrick, D. S., 301
Herskovits, M. J., 748
Hertwig, O., 201
Hexter, M. B., 142, 144, 169, 170, 552,
553. 555, 556, 557, 7i4, 733 Hines, L. N., 158 Hippocrates, 99
Hirsh, N. D. M., 274, 294, 295, 298 Hobbes, 6 Hobhouse, L., 323,
406, 420, 484, 564J
565-573. 655. 666, 691 Hoffman, F. L., 308 Holley, C. E., 290,
714 Hollingworth, L. T., 714 Holmes, S. J., 263, 265, 333 Holt, E.
B., 645 Hone, J. M., 222 Honigsheim, P., 673 Hooker, 552, 553
Hoop. See van der Hoop House, F. N., 640, 644 Houze, E., 267,
269, 276, 278 Hovelaque, 355 Howard, C., 609 Howland, K. E.,
559 Hrdlicka, A., 264, 274 Hubert, 475, 530, 531 Humboldt, A.
See von Humboldt Hunter, W. S., 299, 622 Huntington, E., 100,
116, 120, 121, ir;
128, 138-162, 186, 187-193, JTI 7't
Hurlock, E. B., 754 Husserl, E., 739 Huth, H., II Huvelin, P., 530,
531
Ibn-Khaldun, 100 Ihering, R., 339, 496, 700 Irwin, W., 706 Isserlis,
L., 290, 714 Izoulct, J., 434, 443, 446
Jacobs, P. P., 480, 643 Jacoby, P., 409, 737 Jacquart, C. J., 159,
715
768
INDEX OF NAMES
Jaensch, E. R., 722
Jahns, M., 328
James, E. O., 669
James, T. C, 132
James, W., 667
Janet, P. 199
Jasper, K., 659, 722
Jastrow, J., 611
Jastrzebsky, T, T. S. See de Jastrzebsky
Jenks, A. E., 716
Jentsch, 335
Jerome, H., 562

Jerusalem, F. W., 700
Jevons, H. S., 120, 121, 124
Jevons, W. S., 120, 121, 124
Jijilenko, A., 560
Joel, K., 734, 735
Johnson, E., 714
Johnson, R. H., 265, 306, 333
Jones, D. J., 308
Jones, M. Z., 117
Jones, Sir W., 221
Jordan, D. S., 329, 331
Jordan, H. E., 331
Jordan, L., 447
Jorger, J., 274
Josey, C. C, 604
Judd, J. W., 309
Juglar, C, 552
Jung, C. G., 722
Kahn, J. See van Kahn
Kame, Lord, 11, 99, 100

Kampffmeyer, P., 526
Kant, I., 505
Kantorowicz, H., 700
Kapp, 531
Kareeff, N., 207, 526, 721
Kaufmann, A., 200, 395
Kautsky, K., 526, 536, 563, 585
Keith, Sir A., 131, 133, 134. 265
Keller, A. G., 320, 322, 340, 383, 388,
412, 458, 642, 651, 669, 671, 699 Keller, R., 294 Kelles-Krauz, C,
563 Kellogg, v., 329, 331, 336 Kelly, A. M., 714 Kelly, H. A., 169
Kelsen, H., 526 Kelsey, C, 192 Kenagy, H. G., 274, 620 Keynes,
J. M., 383 Keyserling, 657 Kidd, B., 326, 327, 662, 666, 671-673,
692-694
Kimura, 126
Kinderman, C, 563
King, I., 753
Kirchoff, A., 100
Kistiakowski, B., 207, 492, 496
Kitchin, J., 732
Kjellen, 201
Klages, L., 722
Klaproth, J. V., 222
Klepikov, S., 113
Kliiver, H., 659, 720, 721, 722
Knibbs, G. H., 374, 376, 380, 394, 402
Knowles, L. C. A., 462
Kochanowski, L., 480, 482, 483
Koffka, K., 604, 622, 623
Kohl, J. G., 100
Kohlbriigge, J. H. F., 719
Kohler, W., 622, 623
Kolabinska, M., 60, 748
Koller, A. H., 100
Kondratieff, N., 577, 578, 584, 734
Komhauser, A. W., 290
Korsch, K., 526
Kossina, G., 265
Kotcharovsky, R., 395
Kovalevsky, M., 174, 180, 234, 269, 320, 359, 388-391, 393, 395,
397, 399, 407, 412, 464, 479, 481, 484, 485, 496, 516, 518, 539,
540, 563, 564, 590, 637, 654, 673, 698, 727
Kracauer, S., 490
Kraepelin, E., 159
Kraskovi?, B., 654
Kretschmer, E., 122
Krieger, E., 169
Krieken, A. T., 198, 199
Kries, K., 575
Kroeber, A. L., 747
Kronfeld, A., 722
Kropotkin, P., 60, 313, 321, 453
Krose, H. A., 159
Krummeich, 380
Kuczynsky, R., 719
Kuhn, A., 222
Kuhnes, L. L., 154, 159
Kummer, F., 735
Labriola, A., 526, 532, 533, 537, 541
Lafargue. P., 563
La Ferriere, 201
Laird, D. A., 274, 455
Lalande, A., 215, 217
Lamarck, 100, 505
Landauer, G., 753
Lange, F. A., 602
769
INDEX OF NAMES
769
Lange, M., 222
Langlie, T. A., 584, 6n
Lao-tse, 99
Lapouge, V. See de Lapouge
Lappo-Danilevsky, A., 738
Larquier des Bancels, J., 604
Lashley, K. S., 608, 622
Laski, H. J., 496
Lassalles, F., 526
Lavrov, P., 100, 215, 737
Lazarus, M., 434, 435
LeBlanc, T. J., 374

Le Bon, G., 54, 60, 328, 353, 457, 662,
667, 668, 688, 737, 753 Lederer, E., 709, 753 Lee, M. P. H., 393,
396, 400, 515, 592,
695
Leffingwell, A., 159, 160-163
Legge, E., 692
Legge, J., 514, 695
Legoyt, 159
Lehman, A., 100, 154, 158
Leibnitz, 8, 9
Lenin, N., (Ilijn), 526
Lenz, F., 262
Leontieff, K., 25, 26, 60, 351, 657, 661,
737 Le Play, F., 63^8, 100, 103, 116, 175,
436, 502, 521, 713, 720 Leroy-Beaulieu, 207, 359 Lescure, J.,
552, 732 Letourneau, C., 171, 178 Leuba, J. H., 669 Leupp, F. E.,
706 Levasseur, E., 139, 166, 338, 341, 369,
370, 388, 389. 392, 552, 637, 715, 731 Levi-Bruhl, 475 Lewes,
G., 438 Lewinson, M., 339 Libich, 389 Lichtenberger, J. P., 481,
526, 637, 640,
643, 673, 715 Lidbetter, E. J., 559, 714 Lilienfeld, P., 200-205,
208 Limousin, C, 637 Linguct, S. N., 484 Linton, R., 308
Lippmann, W., 60, 348, 689, 706, 708,
709 Litt, T., 196, 207, 210, 213, 466, 493 Little, A. D., 462
Livi, R., 135, 271, 273, 278, 334, 726 Lobsien, M., 157 Lombard,
W. P., 159 Lombroso, C, 342, 754
London, E., 628
Lorenz, C, 734, 735
Loria, A., 359, 390, 526, 543, 563, 564
Lotka, A. J., 12, 13, 16-18
Love, A. G., 135
Lowell, A. L., 48, 52, 60, 348, 349, 689,
706 Lowie, R. H., m, 115, 486, 529, 575,
729, 747 Loyola, 602 Luciani, 630 Lucretius, 99 Lumley, F. E.,
710 Lundberg, G., 584, 706-708, 724 Lurye, 580, 718 Lutz, F. E.,
716
Maas, F., 192, 283, 409, 410, 714
MacDonald, A., 271
Macdonel, W. R., 141
MacDougall, W., 262-264, 269, 290,
353, 457. 603, 608, 609, 611, 613, 618,
621 Mach, E., 42, 45, 527 Machiavelli, 54, 100, 350, 368, 505,
519,
662 Mackenzie, D. A., 172, 747 Mackinder, H. J., 100, 192

MacLean, A. H. H., 282 Magnus, 626 Maine, H. S., 43, 53, 60
Maistre, J. See de Maistre Malebranche, 6, 8 Malinowski, B., 529,
530, 669, 671 Malling-Hansen, 154 Mallock, W. H., 335 Malthus,
505 Mannhardt, 168 March, L., 264, 553, 554 Maroi, L., 383, 384
Marro, A., 169 Marsh, H. D., 159, 630 Marshall, F. H., 168
Marshall, H. R., 353 Martin, E. D., 654 Martin, R., 265 Marvin, D.,
716 Marvin, F. S., 462 Marx, K., 50, 54, 245, 313, 483, 514,
521-547, 574, 585 Masaryk, T. G., 526, 536, 731 Matiegka, 264
Mattcuzzi, A., 100, 171, 174, 179, 180 Maunier, R., 486, 529
Maurras, C., 211, 215
770
INDEX OF NAMES
Mauss, 475, 530, 531
May, M. A., 714
Mayer, A., 455, 754
Mayer, M. E., 649
Mayo-Smith, 562
Mayr, G. See von Mayr
Mazzarella, J., 176, 405-407, 420, 573,
721 McCall, 158 McClenahan, B. A., 719 McFadden, 296
McKenzie, R. D., 717 Mead, R., 100 Mehus, O. M., 725 Mencius,
99
Mendes-Correa, 134, 135 Merriam, C. E., 200 Metchnikoff, L.,
100 Meumann, E., 455, 754 Meyer, E., 399, 687 Meyerson, A.,
168 Michel, H., 200 Michelangelo, 100 Michels, R., 39, 60, 526,
543, 578, 580,
585 Mikhailovsky, N. K., 207, 215-217,
368, 453, 479, 736 Mill, J. S., 43, 130 Millar, J., 484, 519 Millard,
730, 732, 734, 735 Miner, J. R., 159, 160 Mismer, 12 Mitchell, L,
294, 295 Mitchell, P. C, 312, 313, 321 Mitchell, vS. C, 320
Mitchell, W. C, 121, 128, 135, 505, 530,
730, 733, 736 Mjoen, J. A., 308 Moede, W., 455, 654 Molinari.
See de Molinari Moll, A., 609 Mombert, P., 264, 543 Mommsen,
T., 496 Monroe, A. E., 516 Montesquieu, 100, 175, 181, 505
Moore, H. L., 100, 121-125, 127, 739 Moore, H. T., 583, 635, 723,
724, 734 Morgan, C. L., 752, 753 Morgan, J. See de Morgan
Morgan, L., 453 MorselH, 100, 132, 159, 265, 266, 279,
303, 304, 731 Mosca, G., 60 Moser, 519, 520 Moser, L., 139
Mosse, M., 549, 718
Mougeolle, P., 100, 107, 109, 171, 182,
359, 388, 390, 391 Moulinee, H., 200, 211, 437 Muffang, 271
Muller, F. M., 100, 175, 222, 473 Mumford, E., 264, 486
Miinsterberg, H., 720 Murchison, C, 726 Murdoch, K., 280, 300
Murdock, M., 296, 297 Musselman, J. R., 271 Myres, J. L., 381
Nash, H. B., 290
Nasmith, G., 309, 331, 340, 343, 350
Nearing, S., 192
Neudeck, G., 462
Newman, H. H., 309
Newsholme, A., 139

Newton, 11
Niceforo, A., 264, 270, 273, 740
Nicholson, J. S., 394
Nicolai, G. F., 311, 320, 329, 331, 338, 343, 350, 353, 383
Nietzsche, F., 737
Nilsson, M. P., 477
Nixon, S. W., 338
Norbury, F. P., 161
Novgorodzeff, P., 526, 541
Novicow, J., 201, 205, 206, 208, 311, 313, 314-316, 320-322,
328, 329, 331, 338, 341, 343, 350, 648, 649, 742
Novoselsky, S. A., 264, 338
O'Brien, F., 714
Odin, A., 192, 282, 409, 714, 733
Odum, H. W., 297, 727
Oettingen, A., 139, 166, 336, 338, 552,
715, 731 Ogburn, W. F., 460, 552, 553, 555-558,
561, 576, 581, 583, 584, 715, 716, 733,
736, 742-745, 747, 752 Ogden, C. K., 625 Ogle, W., 552 Oldfield,
168 Oloriz, 271
Onslow, H., 269, 271, 276 Oppenheimer, F., 481, 483, 486, 526
Orano, 654
Orjentzky, R. M., 647 Osbom, H. F., 309 Osipoff, 336
Ostrogorsky, M., 60, 580
771
INDEX OF NAMES
771
Ostwald, W., 12, 13, 18, 20-22, 33, 35,
752, 753 Otlet, P., 331, 338
Palante, G., 215, 217, 453, 457, 460
Pantaleoni, M., 37
Pareto, V., 12, 13, 29, 37-62, 210, 305, 345, 346, 416, 428, 463,
504, 526, 528, 540, 544, 584, 722, 736, 737, 739, 740,
748, 753 Park, Robert E., 327, 328, 353, 446,
489. 502, 508-511, 607, 620, 644, 645,
651, 652, 700, 706, 708, 719, 740 Parker, C. H., 530 Parker, S.
L., 371 Parmelee, M., 164, 166, 342, 453, 559,
560 Parsons, G., 264, 270 Parten, M., 754 Pascal, B., 709
Pashutin, 630 Paterson, D. G., 584, 611 Paton, D. N., 556
Patrick, G. T. W., 353, 596. 615 Patten, S., 207, 520, 521, 645
Paulhan, F., 454, 752 Pavlov, I., 530, 603, 604, 617, 618, 620,
623, 626, 628, 635, 654 Peake, H., 265, 267 Peaks, A. H., 154,
158 Pearl, R., 140, 264, 371, 374-378, 402,
551, 736 Pearson, K., 39, 42, 45, 60, 133, 158,
222, 252, 256-262, 269, 271, 273, 278,
290, 304. 306, 307, 308, 335, 502, 528,
716 Pedersen, R. N., 154 Penzias, A., 526 Perrier, E., 309 Perry,
R. B., 604, 647 Perry, W. J., 746, 747, 752 Pervushin, 113
Pcschel, O., 100, 171 Peterson, D., 581, 583 Peterson, J., 294,
295 Petrajitzsky, L., 30, 31, 48, 320, 496,
532, 538, 603, 630, 645, 656, 658, 700,
701-704, 761 Petrenz, O., 119 Petrie, W. M. F., 735, 752 Petty,
W., 10, II Phelan, J., 719 Philippovicz, 561 Philiptschenko, J.,
192, 264, 287 Pignini, 551
Pinot, R., 65, 67, 69, 84-87
Pintner, R., 288, 290, 294, 295, 301, 714
Pizzi, 180
Planta, J. C., 12
Plato, 99, 221, 436, 516, 517, 595
Plechanow, G., 521, 526, 532, 533
Pliny, H. N., 518
Ploetz, A., 265, 306
Pogodin, A., 447
Pohlmann, R., 345, 346, 516, 518, 753
Poincare, H., 42, 45, 528, 739
Pokrovsky, T., 496

Polybius, 99
Popenoe, P., 265, 306, 333
Porter, W. T., 154
Porteus, S. D., 264, 300-302
Posada, A., 465
Postnikow, 552
Pott, F. A., 222
Pound, R., 701
Poyer, G., 265
Pressey, S. Z., 290, 296, 297
Prince, A. E., 182
Prince, M., 621
Prince, S. H., 753
Prinzing, F., 141, 142, 264
Proudhon, 328, 521
Puffendorff, 8
Pyle, W. H., 296, 297, 299, 300
Quatrefages, A. See de Quatrefages Quctelet, A., 12, 252, 731
Rageot, 427
Ralston, R., 290

Raseri, 169
Ratzel, F., 100, 107, 117, 130, 175, 177,
178, 388, 389 Ratzenhofer, G., 28, 316, 328, 481, 483,
643 Raumer, G. See von Raumer Ravenstein, E. G., 562 Reclus,
fi., 100 Reed, 371
Rcinach, S., 265, 267 Renan, E., 328 Retzius, G., 135, 278
Reuter, E. B., 297, 302, 308, 357, 359 Rey, A., 42, 528 Reynaud,
359 Rhode, J. G., 221 Ribbing, S., 609 Ribot, T. A., 645, 753
Rice, S. A., 582, 583
772
INDEX OF NAMES
Richard, G., 489, 492, 493, 496, 497,
498, 560, 753 Richet, C, 265 Ridgeway, W., 131, 265 Rickert, H.,
442, 502, 738 Ripley, W. Z., 265, 269, 273, 278 Rissland, 455
Ritter, K., 100, 117, 130, 175 Rivers, W. H. R., 353, 729, 746, 747
Roback, A. A., 625 Roberts, M., 201 Robertson, 733 Roger, P.,
520 Roosevelt, T., 590 Root, W. T., 583 Roper, A. G., 358
Rorschach, H., 722 Rosanoff, A. J., 294, 295 Rosanoff, I. R., 294,
295 Rose, C., 271 Rose, H., 383 Ross, Edward A., 327, 332, 353,
457,
458, 481, 489, 494, 501, 504, 508, 509,
511, 594, 604, 640, 642, 644, 662, 666,
670, 688, 698, 709, 737 Rostoutzeff, M., 191, 305, 393, 396, 400,
517, 592, 594, 692 Rousi^rs, P. See de Rousiers Rousseau, J. J,,

54 Rowntree, B. S., 559, 717 Rubin, M., 140 Rudin, E., 141
Ruger, 158 Ruhle, O., 718 Russell, B., 353
Saint-Simon, 11, 505, 737
Sallustius, 99, 518
Salomon, G., 12, 200, 207, 480, 483, 484,
520, 544, 706 SalvioH, J., 517 Sauer, W., 213 Savitch, V. V., 620
Savorgnan, F., 264, 308, 328, 333, 334,
428, 481, 483, 716 Schaffle, A., 200, 204, 208 Schallmayer, W.,
141, 142, 221, 300,
358 Schelting, A. See von Schelting Schemann, L., 222 Scherer,
W., 735 Schiff, W., 339 Schlegel, F., 221 Schlossman, A., 718
Schmalenbach, H., 490
Schmidt, C. F., 165
Schmidt, K., 526
Schmitz, W., 153
Schmoller, G., 543, 736, 737
Schuster, F., 252
Schuyten, M. C., 154, 157
Schwartz, M., 720
Schwegler, R. A., 296, 297
Schweisinger, G. C., 452
Schwiedland, E., 529
Scott, W. D., 706

Scott-James, 706
Seeck, O., 305, 329, 331
Seligman, E. R. A., 520, 533, 536, 545
Seliony, G. P., 619
Selliere, E., 222, 230
Semple, E. C., 100, 116, 130, 131, 133,
171, 177 Seneca, 99, 518 Sensini, G., 60, 263, 747 Sergi, G.,
131, 132, 265, 266, 279, 304 Servius, 99 Shaler, N. S., 192
Shaw, W. H., 120, 124 Sherman, C., 716 Sherrington, 626
Shilder, E. H., 714 Shuster, Sir A., 125 Shy ten, 100 Sigwart, 739
Simar, R., 221 Simkhovitch, W., 393, 589, 591, 592,
594. 717 Simmel, G., 12, 14, 28, 178, 327, 438, 446, 447, 449,
467, 474, 489, 490, 493,
494, 496-498, 500-502, 507, 724, 726, 727, 738
Sims, N. L., 22, 719
Skalet, M., 455
Slater, G., 530
Slosson, E. E., 462
Small, A., 28, 207, 359, 480, 482, 483,
495, 520, 543, 640, 643 Smith, A., 505
Smith, E., 747 Smith, J. R., 116 Snow, E. C., 306 Socquet, J., 341
Soddy, F., 462 Soecknick, A., 336 Sohm, 496
Solntzev, S., 542, 543 Solvay, E., 12, 13, 18, 20, 35 Sombart, W.,
328, 339, 530, 536, 539, 540, 574, 575, 587, 682, 718
773
INDEX OF NAMES
773
Soml6, F., 529, 564, 721
Sommermier, E., 299
Sorel, G., 54, 58, 60, 464, 662, 669, 671, 688
Sorokin, P., 9, 34, 36, 60, 192, 218, 264, 271, 280, 285, 287, 290,
291, 303, 307, 328, 331, 338, 340, 342, 346, 347. 348, 351. 353,
358. 369, 382, 387, 388, 390, 417, 431, 446, 464, 479, 482, 486,
490, 496, 510, 528, 542, 543, 544, 560, 577, 581, 584, 585, 586,
597, 620, 628, 630, 640, 689, 700, 710, 715, 716, 721, 725, 726,
730, 736-740, 748, 753, 754, 761
Spann, O., 210, 213, 458, 497, 501, 503, 642, 644, 659
Spargo, J. K., 526
Spektorsky, E., 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10
Spencer, H., 28, 41, 43, 53, 92, 202, 207, 214-218, 309, 329, 344,
345, 412, 473, 505, 507, 582, 697, 737
Spengler, O., 26, 657, 720, 729, 737
Spiethoff, A., 734
Spiller, G., 309
Spinoza, 6, 7
Spranger, E., 659, 721

Spykman, N. J,, 489, 490, 491, 502
Squillace, F., 12, 637, 727
St. Augustine, 99, 661
St. Thomas Aquinas, 100
Stammler, R., 465, 489, 492, 496, 500, 526, 532, 538, 700
Starbuck, E. D., 669, 686
Starch, D., 304, 611
Starke, W., 341
Stecher, L. J., 146, 154, 158. 159
Stefansson, 107
Stein, L., 207
Steiner, J. F., 719
Steinmetz, R., 207
Steinmetz, S. R., 322, 328, 334-336, 340, 341, 343, 345, 353,
484, 564, 721
Steinthal, H., 434, 435
Stem, W., 290
vStevenson, T. H. E., 371, 377, 379
Strabo, 99
Strangeland, C. E., 357, 359

Strong, A. C., 297
Struve, P., 526, 541
Stuckenberg, J. H. W., 646
Sumner, W. G., 320, 322, 333, 340, 343, 345, 346, 383, 388, 412,
436, 458, 582, 583, 640, 642, 645, 651, 669, 671, 687, 689, 698,
699
Sunne, D., 296
Sutherland, A., 611
vSutherland, E. H., 510, 561, 645, 714 Sweeney, J. S., 140
Swinny, S. H., 92 Symonds, P. M., 300
Taft, J., 714
Taft, W. H., 320
Taine, H., 171, 753
Takhtareff, K. M., 509, 646
Talko-Hryncewitz, 271
Tanner, A. E., 752, 753
Tarde, G., 166, 207, 211, 212, 215, 311,
320, 327, 342, 457, 464, 466, 467, 507.
539, 542, 636-640, 736, 752 Taussig, F., 530, 718, 752, 753
Tawney, R. H., 676 Taylor, C. C., 581, 582, 719 Taylor, I., 265,
267 Teggart, F. J., 192, 752 Teleky, L., 718 Temple, W., 100
Terman, L., 264, 270, 286, 289, 290,
297, 300, 714 Tertullian, 99 Teter, G. P., 296, 297 Thomas, D. S.,
166, 169, 552, 553, 555,
556, 558, 559, 561. 562, 733, 753 Thomas, F., 100 Thomas, W.
I., 608, 609, 644, 645, 658,
716, 717 Thompson, H. B., 611 Thompson, J. A., 311 Thompson,
W., 359, 394, 400 Thomson, A., 135 Thomson, G. H., 289, 290,
714 Thomdike, E. L., 158, 265, 294, 295,
353, 530, 603, 611 Thucydides, 99, 516 Thumwald, R., 115, 117,
180, 264, 487,
528, 530, 531, 719, 752, 753 Tikhomiroff, N. P., 635 Tilden, W.
A., 462 Timofeevsky, 602 Tippett, L. H. C., 133 Tocher, J. F., 264,
274 Tocqueville, A. See de Tocqueville Todd, W., 264, 340, 481,
482, 526, 671,
701, 740 Toller, E., 753
Tolman, E. C., 603, 604, 623 Tonnies, F., 467, 489, 491-493,
496498, 507, 526, 706, 740 Topinard, P., 135, 265, 266, 268 Tosti,
G., 637 ' Tourville, H. See de Tourville
774
INDEX OF NAMES
Towney, E. T., 198, 199
Trabue, M. R., 294, 295
Travis, L. E., 455
Trotsky, L., 526, 563
Trotter, W., 353, 614

Tschernoff, V., 526
Tschuproff, A., 31, 42, 502, 528, 552
Tugan-Baranovsky, M., 526, 552, 562,
733 Tugendreich, G., 549, 718 Tugwell, R. G., 530 Turgot, 100
Tylor, E., 473
Umoff, N. A., 461 Untermann, E., 526
Vaccaro, M., 314, 317-320, 322, 330.
332, 481, 483 Vaihinger, H., 42
Valbert, G., 325, 328, 340, 343, 35o Vallaux, C, 100, 105, in, 117,
i77,
178, 181 van der Hoop, 645 Vanderkindere, L., 278 van Kahn, J.,
166, 560, 733 Varenius, B., 100 Varro, 99, 518 Vasilieff, 620
Veblen, T., 462, 530, 615, 718 Vegetius, 99
Verhulst, P. E., 370, 736 Vernon, E., 153, 171 Vico, J. B., 100,
505 Vierkandt, A., 213, 264, 486, 488, 489,
493, 496-498, 503, 637, 738, 747, 753 Vignes, J. B. M., 65, 67,
73 Villani, G., 100 Villerm^, L., 334, 731 Vincent, G. E., 207, 340
Vitruvius, 99 Vitry, G. See de Vitry Voelker, P. F., 684, 685, 754
Vogt, O. See von Vogt Vogt, P. L., 719 Voigt, A., 522 von Baer, K.
E., 100 von Below, G., 520-523 von Bloch, 329 von Gierke, O.,
199, 465 von Humboldt, A., 100 von Mayr, G., 107, 139, 145, H^,
I59,
164-166, 338, 341, 392, 480, 552, 558,
560, 562, 715, 716. 731 von Raumer, G., J521-523

von Schelting, A., 673
von Vogt, O., 709
von Waltershausen, S., 562
von Wiese, L., 327, 489, 493-49^, 498,
507-509, 511, 753 VoronofE, 12, 16, 17, 32 Vossler, K., 447
Wagner, A., 159, 731
Wagner, W., 603, 604, 611, 623
Walker, M., 754
Wallas, G., 530, 615, 706
Wallis, W. D., 529, 747
Walras, 37
Walter, A., 673, 720
Waltershausen, S. See von Waltershausen
Waples, D., 290, 714
Wappaus, J. E., 139
Ward, L., 328, 480, 482, 483, 636, 637, 640-642, 655
Ward, R. de C., 126, 149, 173, 181, 182, 186
Watson, J. B., 353, 373, 604, 618, 621, 623, 624, 626, 645
Watt, W. E., 147, 161
Waugh, K. T., 300, 301

Waxweiler, E., 113, 412, 494, 508, 509, 620, 698
Weatherly, W. G., 640, 716
Webb, A., 113
Weber, A. F., 719
Weber, L., 736, 745
Weber, M., 40, 42, 44, 153, 159, 494, 502, 528, 530, 531, 539,
587, 659, 662, 673-682, 690, 691, 694, 695, 720
Weigel, E., 8, 10
Weiss, A. P., 620, 622, 647
Wells, W. R., 604
Westergaard, H., 139, 370, 371
Westermarck, E., 167, 168, 176, 322, 406, 412, 608, 611, 698
Westermarck, W., 669
Wheeler, G., 323, 406, 420, 484, 564,
565 Whipple, G. C., 142, 144-146, 170 Whitbeck, R. H., 116, 170,
171 White, E., 339 White, R. C., 167 White, W. A., 353 Wiese, L.
See von Wiese Wilcox, W., 557, 715, 740 Willey, M. M., 748
Williams, F. E., 116
775
INDEX OF NAMES
775
Williams, J., 713, 717, 718 Williamson, E. G., 455 Willoughby,

207 Wilson, D. R., 153 Windelbandt, W., 442, 502, 738 Winiarsky,
L., 12, 13, 23-28, 35-39
215, 217, 218, 359, 367, 368, 453 Winn, E., 296
Wissler, C, 278, 576, 743, 747 Wodou, L., 529 Wolf, J., 359
Wolfe, A. B., 338, 380, 394, 402, 724 Woltmann, L., 335, 521
Woodbury, R. M., 556 Woods, F. A., 263, 264, 281, 282, 320,
324, 325, 333, 353, 385, 714 Woods, R. A., 717 Wood worth, R.
S., 604 Woolston, H. B., 378, 380 Worms, R., 200, 201, 206, 208,
637 Wright, P. G., 125
Wundt, W., 458
Xenophon, 99 Xenopol, A. D., 738
Yarros, V. S., 706, 707
Yates, 290
Yerkes, R. M., 265, 288, 294, 295
Young, K. T., 300, 301
Young, T., 221
Yule, G. U., 140, 371, 373, 378, 552,
553, 555, 556, 736 Yvemes, M., 716
Zaborovski, M. S., 265
Zacharia, K. S., 12
Zahn, F., 342
Zebrowski, B., 480, 582

Zimmerman, C. C, 151, 582, 725, 726
Zimmem, A. E., 516
Znaniecki, F., 503, 506, 645, 658, 716
776
777
GENERAL INDEX
Abstract sciences, definition of, 442-443 Acceleration, law of, 314,
742 Accumulation of culture, 441-442, 445,
742-747 Acquisition, instinct of, 615 Adaptation, acceleration of,
314 and invention, 507, 638 and struggle, 310-314 as a social
form, 507 Adequacy, logical, 29-37 Alpine race, 266-268, 293
Altitude, law of, 109, 251
and population's density, 108 Amalgamation of races, 228, 231232,
308, 716 Ambilian marriage, 405-406, 573 Analogies, organical,
201-206, 208 Anglo-Saxon, superiority, 89
type of family, 87 Animistic theories, 61, 615-616, 646647 Antagonism, forms of, 327-328, 494, 507-510, 540
See also Conflict; vStruggle; War Anthropometry, data of, 233236, 244,
269-276 Anthropo-racial theories. Chap. V Aristocracy, and
genius, 281-287 cephalic index of, 269-272 closed and open,
427-428 I. Q. of, 288-290 physical traits of, 269 pigmentation of,

273-276 Army, measurements of, 272-273, 287,
294 Arts, as a factor, 709
as a form of social thought, 448-449 conditioned by geographic
factor, 170-174 by economic factor, 537, 539, 563,
57 by science and religion, 448-449 by war, 349-352 Aryans,
228-235, 266-267 Assortative mating, 716 Atomistic concept of
society, 195, 457,
.637 Attitude, definition of, 644, 651-652 Attraction, social, law of,
7-8, 11, 13-20
Behaviorism, pscudo-, 619-627 Behavioristic sociology, 5, 617635 Belief, definition of, 660-661 influence of. Chap. XII
See also Legend; Myth; Religion; Superstition Biological
differentiation, 214 Biological sociology, analysis of, Chaps. IV, V,
VI, VII, VIII types of, 194-195 Biometric sociology, 252-260 Biosocial hypothesis, 440-442 Birth control, and density of
population, 413 effects of, 305-307 Birth rate, correlated with
death rate,
140
economic conditions, 549-557 geographic conditions, 164-169
periodicity of, 731 population's density and size, 374376 rehgion, 697 war, 337-338 Blondness, alleged superiority of,
228-229, 234, 250 and intelligence, 275-276 of the upper classes,
273-275 Bodily traits, of men of genius, 269 of races, 291-293
of social classes, 269-278, 548-549 See also Aristocracy; Genius
Brachycephaly, and inteUigencc, 270-272 and races, 234-235,
292 and social classes, 235, 250, 266, 269^
271 concept of, 235 Brahmins, and aristocracy, 427 and

inteUigence, 300 and purity of blood, 219-220 Brain, weight of,
251, 279 Brutalization and war, 3.J0 Budget, as an expressiven of
tamily life, 66-69 of families, 66-67 Business-cycles, correlated
with birth rate, 555 crime, 559-561
778
GENERAL FNDEX
death rate, 554-555 divorce, 557 marriage rate, 553 pauperism,
558-559 suicide, 557-558 periodicity of, 732-734
Capitalism, characteristics of, 676-677
originated by Protestantism, 677-678 Caste, and purity of blood,
219-220
conditioned by density, 417
religious origin of, 669 Cataclysm, social, studies of, 753-754
Causal relationship, and functional relationship, 42-46, 527-530
definition of, 42 Causes of belief in God, 683 Centralization,
political, and war, 344345 Cephalic index, and intelligence, 270-272
of races, 234-235, 292
of social classes, 235-240, 270-272 Change, social, acceleration
of, 314, 742
and culture, 742-743
linear and cyclical, 730-738
See also Cycles; Mobility; Revo-' lution Choice in marriage, 716

Cinematographic theories, 42-44 Circulation, social, channels of,
751
effects of, 387-388, 751-752
forms of, 747-750
of ehte, 58 City, and decay, 424-426
and equality, 418
and genius, 409
and ideologies, 415-417
classification of, 363
distribution of, 277
environment of, 719
population of, 278
selection by, 242, 245, 251 Civilization, progress and decay of,
186-191, 363, 422-431, 588-591 Classes, social, concept of, 542543
struggle of, 525, 542-543 Classification, logically adequate, 29-37
of concepts of society, 195-196
of cycles, 738
of environment, 70-71
of forms of social thought, 449
of forms of struggle for existence, 315-316

of mobility-processes, 750
of races, 228, 234-236, 292 of social relationship, 507-512 of
sociological schools, Introduction of stages of evolution, 363, 567
of types of family, 86-88 of types of personality, 719-724 Climate,
correlated with birth rate, 167 business-cycles, 120-127 crime,
163 death rate, 140-148 decay, 180
density of population, 108 efficiency, 149 genius, 186-189 health
and vitality, 139 insanity, 161 marriage rate, 169 reHgion and arts,
170 suicide, 159 ideal, 139 Clothing, and geographic
environment,
III Collective experience, 439-440
mind and soul, 195, 457, 464-467,
481-485 representations, 474-475
See also Communism; Group-concept; Individualism; Socialism
Communism, and militarism, 344-346 and patriarchal family, 8688 and steppes, 'JS~77 Communist ideology, fluctuation of,
584-586 Communist type of society, 86-87 Community land
ownership, and population's density, 395-396 and work, 75
Community, rural, Hterature of, 719
See also Individualism; Socialism Competition, 314-316, 2,2^
See also Antagonism; Conflict; Struggle; War Concentration of
wealth, 250, 523 Concept, superorganic phenomenon,
439-441, 449, 474-476 Concrete sciences, defined, 442-443
Conflict, 314-317, 525, 542-543
See also Antagonism; Competition; Struggle; War Conquest, and

inequality, 482-487 and peace, 339 evolution of, 317-320
Consciousness of kind. See Giddings Conservatism, psychology
of, 55-56, 722-724
779
GENERAL INDEX
770
Contact, social, 435
See also Collective Experience; Interaction; Social Facilitation
Control, social, monastic methods of,
602, 608 Cooperation, 313, 484-485, 494, 541 Correlations,
sociological, as the subject matter of sociology, 760-761
coefficients and types of, 84, 108, 114, 120-122, 128, 138, 140,
178-181, 258-259, 372, 375-376, 409, 549, 553-557, 561,697,
725 Cranial capacity, of intellectuals, 251 of races, 291-292, 300
of social classes, 279 Criminality, correlated with climate, 163-165
economic conditions, 559-561 family, 713-717 mobility, 752 war,
340-344 Culture, as a superorganic phenoi lenon,
439-441 as social thought, 439 change of, 742 diffusion of, 747748 elements of, 448-449 longevity of, 752 Curiosity, instinct of,
615, 617 Custom, 412-414 See also Mores
Dark, See Blondness Death rate, correlated with birth rate, 140
business-cycles, 549-557 climate, 140-148 population's density,
340-374 war, 337-338 fluctuation of, 730-731 Decay of society,
and mobility, 751 climatic factors of, 26, 186-192 demographic
factors of, 422-427 economic factors of, 588-593 moral factors of,
592 racial factors of, 228-229, 242-243, 25c, 304-306
See also Progress; Prosperity; Regress Degeneration, racial, 26,

228-229, 242243, 250, 304 Democracy, among primitive peoples, 420, 468,
566 as a derivation, 41, 52, 57 as a sym])tom of decay, 26
demographic factors of, 417-422, 425 in time of war, 344-345
religious factors of, 676-678 Demographic factors, effects of,
Chap.
VII Demoralization, and decay, 223-224 and mobility, 752 and
war, 340-344 See also Criminality Density of population, effects
of. Chap. VII
See also Depopulation Dependence of phenomena, one-sided
and mutual, 41-44, 527-531, 644 Depopulation, and decay, 422427 and prosperity, 400-401 and war, 384-385 in Europe, 399 in
France, 400 in Rome, 400 Derivation, concept of, 41, 48-54
Descent, matrilineal and patrilineal,
570 Desires, as a factor, 636-642
classification of, 5-6, 630, 641-642, 652-654
See also Interests; Wishes Determinism, concept of, 40-43, 527531, 644 Differences, of individuals, 57, 60, 279 of races, 291-300
of social classes, 269-274, 280-290 Differential reproduc:ion, 261,
549-557
See also Birth rate; Death rate Differentiation, social and
biological, 26, 214-216, 363, 367-368, 493 See also Division of
labor Diffusion of culture, 743-747 Dispute, as a form of
antagonism, 327-328
See also Antagonism Distance, social, 8-9, 748 Distribution of

wealth, 250, 523 Distributive function of law, 703-705 Division of
labor, effects of, 367-368, 467-470 source of, 470-472, 479-480
See also Differentiation Divorce, factors of, 557
forms of, 570 Dolichocephaly. See Brachycephaly Domestication
of fire and animals, 411 Domination, as a result of conquest, 482487
780
'80
GENERAL INDEX
as a social form, 492, 496, 507-511 of races, 292 Drift, equatorial,
181 Dwelling, and geographic conditions,
no Dynamics, social. See Cycles; Mobility; Process
Economic conditions, correlated with geographic environment,
124-128 population's density, 388-401 race, 250 war, 338, 354
See also Arts; Birth; Bodily Traits; Criminality; Death; Divorce;
Marriage; Religion; Suicide Economic factor defined, 536-538
Economic interpretation of history.
Chap. X Education, efficiency of, 237 Effemination, 425
Efficiency, conditioned by climate, 149158 Elite, circulation of, 58 Emigrants, qualities of, 242, 245, 424,
430 Emotions, and law, 701-702
as a factor, 636-639 Enemy, treatment of, 572-573 Energy, social,
crude and useful, 21 defined, 20-23 transformation of, 22-27
Entropy, social, 27 Environment, and heredity, 252-262
and race, 83, 129-137, 226-227, 237 Equality, and decay, 26-27
arithmetic and proportional, 512 as a derivation, 41-47 factors of,
417-422, 425 See also Democracy Equalization, trend toward, 2627,
417-422, 511 Equatorial drift, 180 Equilibrium, social, 46-48
Eradication of "weeds" in sociolog\%
758-760 Eschatology, of Marxianism, 538-541 of other theories,
369, 407-408, 738-740 Evolution. See Change Examination as a
selection, 248 Expansion of government interference,
344-345, 426, 582 Experimental sociology', 684-685, 754
Exploitation, vaeueness of, 511-512
Facihtation, social, 453, 455-456 Factor, concept of, 42-44, 46,
527-531 Family, as a social unit, 66-67
influence of, 712-717
social functions of, 85-87
types of, 86-88, 405, 406, 5^9-573 Farmer class, degradation of,
425
poHtical attitude of, 582 Fascism, 40, 58 Fear, emotion of, 627
FertiHty. See Birth rate; Differential
reproduction Fluctuation, seasonal, 128-129, 142-146, 152-154,
160-161, 163, 167169. 730-733 See also Cycles Folkways, role of, 697-700 Food,
and geographic environment, 112 as a factor, 627-629 Forces,
social, 641-642 Form and content, defined, 489, 499^
503 Formal sociolog>% defined, 488-489 Formal systematics of

social relations,
507-512 Forms, see Types Freedom,
and science, 450
as a derivation, 41-47
instinct of, 615, 617 Fimctional,
concept of society, 195
relationship, 42, 44-46, 527-530
Genius, bodily traits of, 269
correlated with density, 409-410 geographic environment, 187190 heredity, 253-259 mobility, 360-362, 725, 751-752 race, 225228
social interaction, 446, 724-725 war, 349-350 Geographic
environment, defined, loi-102 effects of, 102-106, Chap. Ill Gestalt
psycholog>% 623, 625 Goal. See Eschatolog>^ Goalless
evolution, 369, 407-408, 538541, 739-740 Gods, age of, 229
as a symbol of society, 474-475 causes of belief in, 683 idea of,
i7o
781
GENERAL INDEX
781
Government, fluctuation of interference of, 344-345, 426, 582

forms of, 566 Gregariousness, instinct of, 613 Groupinterpretation, 195, 433, 457,
600 Growth of population, correlated with density, 376-380
economic conditions, 391-394, 549556, 633 religion, 697 war, 337
See also Birth; Death
Head, size of, 251, 270, 292
See also Cranial capacity-Health and geography, 138-149
Heaven, ideas of, 170 Height of various classes, 280, 547-549
Hell, ideas of, 170 Herd, instinct of, 613 Heredity, 227, 234, 247,
252-262, 291 Heroic age, 229 Historical trend. See Cycles;
Eschatology; Fluctuation Home, influence of, 85, 712-717 Husband,
position of, 405, 571, 573 Hybridism, 228, 231, 308
Idea-force, 449-452, 461, 601, 641, 645651 Ideal type, method of, 677, 678, 720 Ideological and social
facts, 360-362 Ideological factors, 524, 543-544 Ideologies, as a
derivation, 41, 48-54,
210, 345, 543
See also Belief; Religion correlated with density, 417
economic conditions, 583-588
starvation, 633
war, 348 cquahtarian, 417-422 fluctuation of, 650 Imitation, 636639, 654 Immobility. See Mobility Inanition, effects of, 628-634
Indians, inteUigence of, 299 Individualism, 79, 87-89, 344, 467,

752
See also Communism; Militarism;
Socialism Individualistic concept of society, 195,
433. 457. 600 Industry, conditioned by density, 388398 gcograpliy, 67, 73, 116-119
religion, 676 science, 449-452 war, 338 Inferiority, unscientific
term, 279, 301 Insanity and climate, 161 Instinct, 603-607
Intelligence, of races, 225-228, 293-299 of social classes, 281288 See also Genius Interaction, and mental progress, 42, 452460 role of,' 440-444 Interdependence of social phenomena,
42-47, 527-531, 644, 674 Interests, as factors, 642
classification of, 643, 651-653 Intermarriage, effects of, 228, 231,
308 Introspection, method of, 619-625,
646-651, 655-659 Invention, factors of, 409-411, 460
See also Genius Irrationalism in man, 48-55, 352, 415, 462, 605615, 630, 639, 641, 668-677, 677-681
Jews, 232-241
Judaism and capitalism, 682
Jurisconsults, as formal sociologists,
496-497 Justice, as a derivation, 41, 48 forms of, 568
Labor classes, characteristics of, 269278, 281-288, 548 Lagging, law of, 449, 451, 463, 524-526,
528-533, 677-683, 742-746 Language and population's density,

414, 440-444 Law, defined, 701 influence of, 702 social functions
of, 703-705 Laws, sociological, and physical, 13-19 defined, 4046, 527-533. 674-675 of altitude. See Altitude of lagging. See
Lagging of progress. See Progress of repulsion and attraction.
See Attraction; Repulsion of thermodynamics, 25-26 See also
Causal relationship; Determinism; Functional relationship
Leadership, correlated with group-participation, 724 mobility, 725
782
GENERAL INDEX
See Classes, social; Genius; Intelligence Legend, influence of,
670 Legend-making, 415-417 Libido, defined, 605-607
Likemindedness and solidarity, 468,
492, 726 Linear concept of evolution, 730-737 Literature,
correlated with density, 413
geography, 170-174
science and religion, 449
war, 349-352
See also Arts; Ideology Logico-experimental method, 40-46
Logistic theory of population, 376-380 Loneliness and mobility,
752
Marriage, forms of, 569-578
inter-, 228, 231, 308
stability of, 571 Marriage rate, correlated with climate, 164-169

war, 337 Matrilineal descent, 570 Meaning, and introspection,
655-657 Mechanistic sociology defined, 3 Mechanistic solidarity,
468, 492 Memory and society, 445, 447 Mentality. See
Personality Metaphysics in behaviorism, 619-624 Methods of
social control, 602, 608 Methods of sociology, behavioristic, 617627
budgetary, 66-69
experimental, 754
ideal-type, 677, 720
introspective, 619-625, 646-651, 655659
logico-experimental, 29-37, 40-45
quantitative, 42-45
vSimmelian, 502 Migration, and business-cycle, 561
and density, 380-382
and starvation, 633
of social features, 747, 748
to cities, 242-245 Militant type of society, 344-346 Militarism. See
Struggle; War Mind, social, 195, 457, 464-467, 481485 Mixture of race, 228, 231, 308 Mobility, and leadership, ^2^
and war, 347
channels of, 751
defined, 748
effects of, 750-752
forms of, 749-750 Mob-mindedness, 654 Monastic rationalism,
682
technique of social control, 602, 608 Monistic theory of causation,
533-536, Monogenic theory of races, 131, 227,
266, 484 Mores, defined, 412
effects of, 413-414
factors of, 49, 75, 175-179, 227, 305, 340-344, 348, 412, 449,
492, 567575 Mutual aid, 313, 484, 494, 541 Mysticism, correlated with
density, 415
geography, 170-174 Myths, influence of, 670
See also Belief; Legend; Religion
Nationality and race, 301
Negro, 292-299
Neighborhood, influence of, 717
Neo-positivism, 438
Newspaper, influence of, 607
Nomenclature, the, 70
Nominalistic concept of society, 195,
637
Nordic. See Blondness; Brachycephaly Northward trend of

civilization, 182-185
Objectivity, scientific, 28, 40-47 Occupation, influence of, 717-719
Opposition, 314, 327, 508-511 Optimum density of population,
348, 402
temperature, 139 Organic concept of society, 195-197
solidarity, 469 Organismic. See Bio-organismic Organization,
social, correlated with density, 395, 403-409
economic conditions, 522, 524, 565575 geography, 75, I75-I79 law, 703. Mores, 697-700 public
opinion, 706-708 race, 225-228 religion, 662-670 science, 449450 war, 344 Orientation, instinct of, 615
783
GENERAL INDEX
'8f}
Overpopulation, 382, 398-402 Ownership. See Property
Parabola of social evolution, 423 Particularist type, of man, 87
of society, 87-88 Paternal instinct, 611-613 Patriarchal type, of
family, 75
of man, 74-76
of society, 73-77 Patrilinear descent, 570 Pauperism and
business-cycle, 558-559 Peace, periods of, 314-327, 339, 568,
572 Periodicity. See Cycles; Fluctuation Personality, types of, 55,
86-89, 7^0-
722 Physics, social, 3, 13-16 Pigmentation. See Blondness

Pluralistic behavior, 727
theory of factors, 47, 533-536, 674 Political attitudes, 348-349,
578-582
institutions. See Organization, social Polygamy, 405, 570, 573
Polygenic theory, 131, 227, 266, 484 Popularity of ideology,
fluctuation of,
348, 583-587, 633, 650 Prediction sociological, possibility of,
583-585 Preferential mating, 716 Prejudice. See Belief; Legend;
Myths;
Superstition Probability, principle of. See Causal
relationship; Determinism Process, social, types of, 730-738, 749750 Progress, as a derivation, 41, 48-54 extra-scientific concept,
223-229,
236, 242, 250, 304, 739-740 factors of, 26, 181-192, 422-427,
588597 Utopia of, 228, 243
See also Cycles; Eschatology Proletariat, 543 Propaganda,
influence of, 708 Property, correlated with density, 395-398
division of labor, 469-471 technique, 565-574 forms of, 75, 86,
573 Prosperity, correlated with density, 398-403 division of labor,
470 geography, 114, 120-128 race, 236, 241
religion, 676-678
technique, 565, 574
war, 338 Protestantism and capitalism, 676 Pseudo-behaviorism,

619-627 Pseudo-environment, 706-708 Psycho-analysis, 608
Psychological school, 433-434, 457, 600 Psychology and
sociology. See Neopositivism; Psychological school Public opinion, influence of, 706709 Pure races, 228, 231, 234
sociology, 502-505
Race, and environment, 83, 129-137, 226, 237
and nationality, 301
bodily traits of, 291-293
classification of, 228-236, 292
intelligence of, 225-228, 292
mixture of, 308
purity of, 228, 231, 234 Racial theory of, decay, 228, 242, 250,
304-305
progress. See Decay; Progress Radicalism, psychology of, 722724 Rationalism, and capitalism, 678-68C
and Protestantism, 676-678
in man. See Irrationalism Rationalization of impulses, 608
Rational prophets, 680 Realism, sociological, 70, 464-467, 481
Reflex, conditioned and unconditioned, 617-618
relationship to instinct, 618, 635 Reform. See Revolution Regress,
228, 243
See also Progress Religion, defined, 473-474, 660-662, 665, 672
factors of, 170-174, 583-587, 673677 role of. Chap. XII

See also Belief; Derivation; Judaism; Protestantism Repulsion
and likemindcdness, 726 Residue, 48-56
Revolution, factors of, 346-347, 386-387, 450, 576 studies of,
752-754 Royalty and genius, 281 Rural environment, influence of.
719
selection by, 242-245 Rhythm. Sec Cycles; Fluctuation
784
GENERAL INDEX
Sacredness in religion, 475 School as a selective agency, 248,
749 Schools in sociology, Introduction Scientific description, 22,
40-47
See also Causal relationship; Determinism Seasonal fluctuation,
128, 142-146, 152-154, 160, 163, 167-169, 730733 Selection, defined, 237-238
forms of, 239-242, 304-307
mechanism of, 247, 751
of war, 239, 329-335 Selective death rate, 141, 260, 306 Sex,
differences, 611
instinct, 605-611
maturity, 169 Shifting of zones of culture, 187-191,
589 Simplicist theor}^ 42-44 vSkepticism and mobility, 749-750

Social classes. See Classes, social ^Socialism, 86, 90, 344-346,
584-586
See also Communism Society, concepts of, 22-27, 46, 195,
202, 442-446, 457, 464, 494, 524,
600, 637 Sociologistic school defined, 433-434
457, 600 Sociology, defined, 40-47. 760-761 relation to other
social sciences, 3738, 760
See also, :Method; Pure sociology;
Schools in sociology; Society Sociometrika, 8-10, 364 SoHdarity,
and likemindedness, 726 as a derivation, 41-47, 210 forms of,
467-470, 492
See also Organic solidarity; War Space, social, 8-9, 748 Speechreaction. See Ideologies; Language Stability, of family, 86-88
of marriage, 570 Stature. See Height Stratification, forms of, 749
origin of, 483-487 Strikes and business-cycle, 576 Struggle for
existence, evolution of,
315-327 forms of, 314 meaning of, 310-313 of classes, 525, 542
of races. 260-261
religion and, 671-673
See also Antagonism; Conflict; Cooperation; War Subject matter
of sociolog>% 760-761 Suggestion. See Imitation Suicide,
correlated with climate, 159-161
econom'c conditions, 558 isolation, 471-472 mobility, 751 forms

of, 471-472 Sun-spot, and business-cycle, 120-129 and treegrowth, 128 periodicity, 125 Superiority an unscientific term, 279,
301-302 Superstition, defined, 661 role of, 668, Chap. XII
See also Belief; Legend; Myth; Religion Symbolic meaning, and
behaviorism,
623-627, 655 Symbolic stimuli, 620 vSympathy. See Mutual aid;
Solidarity
Technique of production, correlated
with density, 388-390
division of labor, 470
geography, 116-119
invention, 744
religion, 673-677
science, 449-451
war, 338 influence of, 5^5-575 Teleolog\'. See Eschatology Telic
evolution. See Eschatology;
Goalless evolution; Linear concept
of evolution; Progress Temperament. See Personality
Temperature and population's density,
108 Tendency, historical. .SeeCycles; Linear
evolution; Trend Teutons, 230-233 Traditionalism, 680, 694-695

Transformation of energy, 20-27 Trend, concept of, 730-737
equatorial, 181 northward, 182 Truth and usefulness, 42, 54
See also Myth; Religion; Super
stition Type, ideal. See Ideal type of cycles, 730-737 of family, 86,
405, 563
785
GENERAL INDEX
78.5
of society, 86-88, 34.4, 720-724 Typological method, 719-724
Uniformity of phenomena. See Causal; Determinism; Functional
relationship
Unrest and mobility, 749
Urban, environment, studies of, 719 selection, 242, 245, 251 See
also City
Utopia of progress. See Progress
Valuative judgment, 40-48, 739-740 Vanity, 699
Velocity of social processes, 733-737, 741, 743-744
Violence, role of, 58 Vitality, formulas of, 140-141 Vocabulary,
and intelligence, 452 Vocation in capitalist society, 676
War, effects of, 336-348
evolution of, 314-327, 568, 572 factors of, 352-355, 382-387
selection of, 329-335 Wealth. See Concentration; Prosperity
Weight. See Bodily traits Wife, position of, 405, 571-573 Wishes,
classification of, 644, 652 influence of, 644
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Contemporary sociological

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Students of sociological theory are prone to fall into two

conceptions are considered only as it becomes necessary to link

V Anthropo-Racial, Selectionist, and Hereditarist

I. Predecessors. 2. Adolphe Coste. 3. Size and density of the

I. Predecessors. 2. K. Marx and F. Engels: their theories,

I. Beliefs, magic, myths, superstitions, ideologies, and religion as

about special studies. 14. Conclusion about the sociologistic and

to the last period of sociology. There are many valuable essays in

In the second place, the field of sociology has grown to such an

theory is followed by a critical paragraph to show its fallacies or

factors" Experimental studies of a correlation between various

those ''social philosophies" which have given a deep insight into

The essential elements of the mechanistic interpretation of man's

the Epicureans and the Stoics. Cicero stresses their presence in

social, political, and ethical thought, that it ought to be translated

century (Descartes, Leibnitz, Spinoza, Malebranche, and others),

tendency to preserve himself and to look after his own interests.

broken." Descartes, "Les passions de Tame," Art. VI, Oeuvres,

2. Society: an astronomical system composed of the attraction

''sicut Mathematici figuras a corporibus semotas considerant'\'

processes as a result of the gravitation and inertia of human

quantity, as opposed to quality. It ought to be because without

physical gravitation has its analogue. The centrifugal forces are

relation to the "mechanistic" interpretation of social phenomena.

decentralization of a State and of a population in the cities is

Among purely agricultural communities association scarcely

the production of a great central mass, obedient to but a single

of social phenomena are the works of Voronoff, Haret, Alfred

degeneration and decay, "disintegration of forces"; law and

extracted from the subject matter of mechanics. Such are the

3^ Bechtereff, W., Kollektivnaija Refiexologia, Russ., Petrograd,

for example, "a theory of constitutional government may appear

According to W. Ostwald (1853- ), "energetics can give to social

7. The value and justification of any state consists in a better and

sometimes even quantitative, analysis of basic economic

4. Nevertheless, psychical phenomena themselves are nothing

not always recognize as arising from this deeper drive. It is

and hunger, when it encounters an obstacle in the natural

basic laws operate in the field of psycho-social phenomena also,

higher to those of lower energy. But as in physics the

expounded by Danilevsky as early in the century as 1869. Thus

unit of measurement, such as money, which is the measure for

the contemporary schools of social physics and social energetics,

his own criticism, Bentley strongly praises these theories in his

laws of physics, mechanics, energetics, and logic as well. I am

logical predicate is referred to a logical subject which, in fact, is

Their unscientific character consists in their logical inadequacy, in

to the Theory of Law and Morals, (Russ., Vedenie v teoriju prava i

theories ascribe to physical phenomena a series of human

that language, law, commerce, state, culture, government and

This conclusion would remain valid even if it could be shown that

beyond curious analogies whose scientific value is nil. They do

of the school and try to apply them in an explanation of any social

way, and that of another in quite a different manner? It is sufiicient

Earlier than Winiarsky and many other representatives of social