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    Reymark F. Gomez: Objective

    Uploaded by

    Vanessa Canoza
    The rating agencies were one of the fi rst policy victims of the fi nancial crisis. Even before the collapse of Lehman, a strong consensus had emerged that the industry should be subject to statutory regulation. A consultative document was circulated by the European Commission in July 2008, and a regulation was formally proposed in November 2008. The regulation was adopted in six months, a record in EU policymaking. It institutes a single licence for CRAs in the EU, subject to the supervision of the newly created European Securities Markets Authority (ESMA), with tight conduct of business rules. The debate on the appropriate policy framework for rating agencies considerably predates the fi nancial crisis, however. Already in the 1997 Southeast Asia crisis, the late reaction of the majority of which appear in capital adequacy measures for banks, such as risk weighting. The Fed concluded by saying it will propose amendments to remove references to credit ratings from its capital requirements and rely on substitute standards of creditworthiness for capital calculations that currently rely on external ratings.4 CRAs thus have a dream market in the EU. They are in the news on a daily basis in the context of the sovereign crisis, and their use is obligatory under EU legislation. It is thus high time that EU policymakers emulate their US counterparts and eliminate the regulatory reliance on private credit ratings. Open Up the Market Although it was feared that a formal licence would reduce market entry, this does not seem to be the case so far. Some 22 entities applied for an EU licence, including some unexpected newcomers such as credit insurance companies. ESMA and competition authorities should thus carefully monitor how the market develops and whether the oligopoly of the Big Three diminishes. Two questions emerge in this context: the fi nancing model of the Big Three and the protectionist elements in the regulation. The EU regulation does not address a potentially perverse element of the CRAs’ business model, i.e. the “issuer pays” model. This has been widely criticised as raising enormous confl icts of interests, but no change has been instituted so far, although other models have been proposed.5 The issuer pays model maintains the captive market for the incumbents, as they have the reputation and networks. A clearing house for ratings, whereby an intermediary independently decides who should do the rating, may help newcomers and at the same time reduces confl icts of interest. Another element in the EU regulation restricts market entry but does so in a global context. The regulation requires credit ratings produced outside the EU to be endorsed by a CRA registered in the EU. It has been argued that this regime will unnecessarily fragment global capital markets. Foreign companies will be less inclined to raise capital in the EU, as they will need a local endorsement of their rating. The regime could also be qualifi ed as anti-competitive, as smaller CRAs without an EU presence may stop rating EU sovereigns and issuers. A fi nal element to bring more competition to the sector is to increase CRAs’ exposure to civil liability. Increasing the responsibility of CRAs may be especially constraining for the larger fi rms, as they have a strong market presence and have grossly failed in the past. 4 Federal Reserve: Report to the Congress on Credit Ratings, July 2011. 5 See K. L a n n o o : What Reforms for the Credit Rating industry? A European perspective for an overview. ECMI Policy Brief, October 2010.

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    Reymark F. Gomez: Objective

    Uploaded by

    Vanessa Canoza
    10 views2 pages
    The rating agencies were one of the fi rst policy victims of the fi nancial crisis. Even before the collapse of Lehman, a strong consensus had emerged that the industry should be subject to statutory regulation. A consultative document was circulated by the European Commission in July 2008, and a regulation was formally proposed in November 2008. The regulation was adopted in six months, a record in EU policymaking. It institutes a single licence for CRAs in the EU, subject to the supervision of the newly created European Securities Markets Authority (ESMA), with tight conduct of business rules. The debate on the appropriate policy framework for rating agencies considerably predates the fi nancial crisis, however. Already in the 1997 Southeast Asia crisis, the late reaction of the majority of which appear in capital adequacy measures for banks, such as risk weighting. The Fed concluded by saying it will propose amendments to remove references to credit ratings from its capital requirements and rely on substitute standards of creditworthiness for capital calculations that currently rely on external ratings.4 CRAs thus have a dream market in the EU. They are in the news on a daily basis in the context of the sovereign crisis, and their use is obligatory under EU legislation. It is thus high time that EU policymakers emulate their US counterparts and eliminate the regulatory reliance on private credit ratings. Open Up the Market Although it was feared that a formal licence would reduce market entry, this does not seem to be the case so far. Some 22 entities applied for an EU licence, including some unexpected newcomers such as credit insurance companies. ESMA and competition authorities should thus carefully monitor how the market develops and whether the oligopoly of the Big Three diminishes. Two questions emerge in this context: the fi nancing model of the Big Three and the protectionist elements in the regulation. The EU regulation does not address a potentially perverse element of the CRAs’ business model, i.e. the “issuer pays” model. This has been widely criticised as raising enormous confl icts of interests, but no change has been instituted so far, although other models have been proposed.5 The issuer pays model maintains the captive market for the incumbents, as they have the reputation and networks. A clearing house for ratings, whereby an intermediary independently decides who should do the rating, may help newcomers and at the same time reduces confl icts of interest. Another element in the EU regulation restricts market entry but does so in a global context. The regulation requires credit ratings produced outside the EU to be endorsed by a CRA registered in the EU. It has been argued that this regime will unnecessarily fragment global capital markets. Foreign companies will be less inclined to raise capital in the EU, as they will need a local endorsement of their rating. The regime could also be qualifi ed as anti-competitive, as smaller CRAs without an EU presence may stop rating EU sovereigns and issuers. A fi nal element to bring more competition to the sector is to increase CRAs’ exposure to civil liability. Increasing the responsibility of CRAs may be especially constraining for the larger fi rms, as they have a strong market presence and have grossly failed in the past. 4 Federal Reserve: Report to the Congress on Credit Ratings, July 2011. 5 See K. L a n n o o : What Reforms for the Credit Rating industry? A European perspective for an overview. ECMI Policy Brief, October 2010.

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    The rating agencies were one of the fi rst policy victims of the fi nancial crisis. Even before the collapse of Lehman, a strong consensus had emerged that the industry should be subject to statutory regulation. A consultative document was circulated by the European Commission in July 2008, and a regulation was formally proposed in November 2008. The regulation was adopted in six months, a record in EU policymaking. It institutes a single licence for CRAs in the EU, subject to the supervision of the newly created European Securities Markets Authority (ESMA), with tight conduct of business rules. The debate on the appropriate policy framework for rating agencies considerably predates the fi nancial crisis, however. Already in the 1997 Southeast Asia crisis, the late reaction of the majority of which appear in capital adequacy measures for banks, such as risk weighting. The Fed concluded by saying it will propose amendments to remove references to credit ratings from its capital requirements and rely on substitute standards of creditworthiness for capital calculations that currently rely on external ratings.4 CRAs thus have a dream market in the EU. They are in the news on a daily basis in the context of the sovereign crisis, and their use is obligatory under EU legislation. It is thus high time that EU policymakers emulate their US counterparts and eliminate the regulatory reliance on private credit ratings. Open Up the Market Although it was feared that a formal licence would reduce market entry, this does not seem to be the case so far. Some 22 entities applied for an EU licence, including some unexpected newcomers such as credit insurance companies. ESMA and competition authorities should thus carefully monitor how the market develops and whether the oligopoly of the Big Three diminishes. Two questions emerge in this context: the fi nancing model of the Big Three and the protectionist elements in the regulation. The EU regulation does not address a potentially perverse element of the CRAs’ business model, i.e. the “issuer pays” model. This has been widely criticised as raising enormous confl icts of interests, but no change has been instituted so far, although other models have been proposed.5 The issuer pays model maintains the captive market for the incumbents, as they have the reputation and networks. A clearing house for ratings, whereby an intermediary independently decides who should do the rating, may help newcomers and at the same time reduces confl icts of interest. Another element in the EU regulation restricts market entry but does so in a global context. The regulation requires credit ratings produced outside the EU to be endorsed by a CRA registered in the EU. It has been argued that this regime will unnecessarily fragment global capital markets. Foreign companies will be less inclined to raise capital in the EU, as they will need a local endorsement of their rating. The regime could also be qualifi ed as anti-competitive, as smaller CRAs without an EU presence may stop rating EU sovereigns and issuers. A fi nal element to bring more competition to the sector is to increase CRAs’ exposure to civil liability. Increasing the responsibility of CRAs may be especially constraining for the larger fi rms, as they have a strong market presence and have grossly failed in the past. 4 Federal Reserve: Report to the Congress on Credit Ratings, July 2011. 5 See K. L a n n o o : What Reforms for the Credit Rating industry? A European perspective for an overview. ECMI Policy Brief, October 2010.

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    Reymark F. Gomez: Objective

    Uploaded by

    Vanessa Canoza
    The rating agencies were one of the fi rst policy victims of the fi nancial crisis. Even before the collapse of Lehman, a strong consensus had emerged that the industry should be subject to statutory regulation. A consultative document was circulated by the European Commission in July 2008, and a regulation was formally proposed in November 2008. The regulation was adopted in six months, a record in EU policymaking. It institutes a single licence for CRAs in the EU, subject to the supervision of the newly created European Securities Markets Authority (ESMA), with tight conduct of business rules. The debate on the appropriate policy framework for rating agencies considerably predates the fi nancial crisis, however. Already in the 1997 Southeast Asia crisis, the late reaction of the majority of which appear in capital adequacy measures for banks, such as risk weighting. The Fed concluded by saying it will propose amendments to remove references to credit ratings from its capital requirements and rely on substitute standards of creditworthiness for capital calculations that currently rely on external ratings.4 CRAs thus have a dream market in the EU. They are in the news on a daily basis in the context of the sovereign crisis, and their use is obligatory under EU legislation. It is thus high time that EU policymakers emulate their US counterparts and eliminate the regulatory reliance on private credit ratings. Open Up the Market Although it was feared that a formal licence would reduce market entry, this does not seem to be the case so far. Some 22 entities applied for an EU licence, including some unexpected newcomers such as credit insurance companies. ESMA and competition authorities should thus carefully monitor how the market develops and whether the oligopoly of the Big Three diminishes. Two questions emerge in this context: the fi nancing model of the Big Three and the protectionist elements in the regulation. The EU regulation does not address a potentially perverse element of the CRAs’ business model, i.e. the “issuer pays” model. This has been widely criticised as raising enormous confl icts of interests, but no change has been instituted so far, although other models have been proposed.5 The issuer pays model maintains the captive market for the incumbents, as they have the reputation and networks. A clearing house for ratings, whereby an intermediary independently decides who should do the rating, may help newcomers and at the same time reduces confl icts of interest. Another element in the EU regulation restricts market entry but does so in a global context. The regulation requires credit ratings produced outside the EU to be endorsed by a CRA registered in the EU. It has been argued that this regime will unnecessarily fragment global capital markets. Foreign companies will be less inclined to raise capital in the EU, as they will need a local endorsement of their rating. The regime could also be qualifi ed as anti-competitive, as smaller CRAs without an EU presence may stop rating EU sovereigns and issuers. A fi nal element to bring more competition to the sector is to increase CRAs’ exposure to civil liability. Increasing the responsibility of CRAs may be especially constraining for the larger fi rms, as they have a strong market presence and have grossly failed in the past. 4 Federal Reserve: Report to the Congress on Credit Ratings, July 2011. 5 See K. L a n n o o : What Reforms for the Credit Rating industry? A European perspective for an overview. ECMI Policy Brief, October 2010.

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    of 2

    Reymark F.

    Gomez
    Blk.173 Lot 11 Cubao St. Phase II Mabuhay
    Cabuyao City, Laguna, Philippines
    Mobile Phone Number: 09266376280
    Gomz07@yahoo.com

    Objective:

    To be able to apply all my skills and knowledge and enhance those professionally
    through the help of great institution

    Personal Information:
    Nickname
    Gender
    Age
    Date of Birth
    Civil Status
    Citizenship
    Height
    Weight
    Religion
    Dialects
    Mother`s Name
    Occupation
    Father`s Name
    Occupation
    Their Address

    : Rey
    : Male
    : 24
    : October 07, 1990
    : Single
    : Filipino
    : 58
    : 60 kgs
    : Iglesia Ni Cristo
    : Tagalog & English
    : Cynthia Gomez
    : Vegestable Vendor
    : Relito Gomez
    : Construction Worker
    : Blk.173 Lot 11 Cubao St. Phase II Mabuhay
    Cabuyao City, Laguna, Philippines

    Educational Background:
    Tertiary Level

    Manufacturing Engineering Technology


    People Center for Science and Technology
    Halang Calamba City, Laguna

    2010-2011

    Secondary Level

    Calamba National High School (ANNEX)

    2009-

    2010
    San Cristobal Calamba city, Laguna

    Character References:

    Ma.Regina Gumabras
    Business Woman
    Phase 3 Mabuhay Cabuyao City Laguna

    Haime Hernandez
    Church Offercer
    Brgy. Mamatid Cabuyao City Laguna
    Mrs.Rea Marfori
    Teacher
    Calamba National High School ANNEX

    I hereby certify that all information written herein is true and


    correct.

    REYMARK F. GOMEZ
    Applicant

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