Market Macro Myths Debts Deficits and Delusions
Market Macro Myths Debts Deficits and Delusions
Market Macro Myths Debts Deficits and Delusions
Executive Summary
In the context of the role that debts and deficits play in overall economic policy, in this paper I
focus on the philosophy known as sound finance, which includes adherents who believe that
governments should seek to balance their budgets. I, however, take a different view, and believe
that the role of government when dealing with budget deficits should be one of functional finance,
which ensures that the policies implemented help to reach the overarching goals of macroeconomic
policy (generally held to be full employment and price stability).
This paper attempts to show why the proponents of sound finance are mistaken by defining and
unpacking a series of myths that are foundational to, or at least helpful to, convincing us that sound
finance requires that governments run a balanced budget. Though not a complete list, following are
the myths presented:
Jan 2016
Introduction
What do the following people all have in common: Warren Buffet, Seth Klarman, Bob Rodriguez,
Rob Arnott (at this point you may be looking at the list and thinking, hmm, all value investors), Paul
Singer, Angela Merkel, George Osborne, and Barack Obama?
The answer is that they all seem to believe in an economic philosophy known as sound finance, as
witnessed by the quotations below. As Walker (1939) noted, Sound finance is sometimes worshipped
as an end in itselfsound finance means the observance of certain arrangements which have become
sanctified by habit and traditionits intrinsic value [is] taken as self-evident. Effectively this group
of people (some of whom are actually my friends) believe that governments should seek to balance
their budgets.
In the last fiscal year, we were far away from this fiscal balance All of America is waiting for
Congress to offer a realistic and concrete plan for getting back to this fiscally sound path. Nothing
less is acceptable. Warren Buffet, 2012
We are talking about the underlying structural issues of the federal budget deficitthe longterm insolvency of the country due to the government having made (and continuing to make)
massively unpayable promises for the future. Paul Singer, 2013
Governments that run huge deficits, promise entitlements that will be next to impossible to
deliver, and depend on the beneficence of foreigners to stay afloat inevitably must collapse.
Seth Klarman, 2010
I dont see how financial markets do well longer term if you continue to erode the fiscal integrity
of our financial system. Bob Rodriguez, 2012
Our debt level will have to be brought down to a more reasonable level. Rob Arnott
A Swabian Housewife [would say] you cannot live permanently beyond your means.
Angela Merkel, 2008
Without sound public finance, there is no economic security for working people
in normal times, governmentsshould run a budget surplus to bear down on debt.
George Osborne, 2015
Small businesses and families are tightening their belts. Their government should too.
Barack Obama, 2010
In contrast to this group I adhere to a school that takes a very different view of the role of government
budget deficits. It is best summed up by the following quotation from a member of my coterie of long
dead favourite economists, Abba Lerner.
The central idea is that government fiscal policy, its spending and taxing, its borrowing and
repayment of loans, its issue of new money and its withdrawal of money, shall be undertaken with
an eye only to the results of these actions on the economy and not to any established traditional
doctrine about what is sound or unsound. This principle of judging only by effects has been
applied in many other fields of human activity, where it is known as the method of science The
principle of judging fiscal measures by the way they work or function in the economy we may call
Functional Finance. (1943)
2
In essence, Lerner is saying that government deficits should be judged only by the degree to which
they help us reach the goals of macroeconomic policy (generally held to be full employment and price
stability), rather than by some arbitrary measure such as not having deficits of more than X% of GDP.
The latter is sound finance; the former is functional finance.
Of course, finding myself facing the luminaries listed at the outset leaves me feeling a little like Captain
Redbeard Rum in Blackadder II,
Edmund: Look, theres no need to panic. Someone in the crew will know how
to steer this thing.
Rum: The crew, milord?
Edmund: Yes, the crew.
Rum: What crew?
Edmund: I was under the impression that it was common maritime practice
for a ship to have a crew.
Rum: Opinion is divided on the subject.
Edmund: Oh, really?
Rum: Yahs. All the other captains say it is; I say it isnt.
Edmund: Oh, God; mad as a brush.
So let me try to explain why I take a very different view of the role of debts and deficits, and hopefully
convince you that I am not as mad as a brush. To do this Im going to attempt to show why the
proponents of sound finance are mistaken by laying out a series of myths (or, for the alliteratively
minded, five fiscal fallacies).
that humans have ever lived in such a system, whereas money/credit/debt seems to appear in very early human societies.
2The tents in which we all live in this make-believe world.
We need to distinguish between governments that are what we might describe as monetarily sovereign
(by which we mean those that issue their own currencies, have floating exchange rates, and issue
debt in their own currency) and those that lack such sovereign status. In the former category we find
countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan whilst the Eurozone is a prime
example of the latter group. This distinction has a great bearing on how one should think about debt
and deficits.
Those nations that enjoy monetary sovereign status can, in effect, borrow from themselves. They have
the ability to create money and spend it essentially ex nihilo. Thus they cant ever be forced into
insolvency. If this sounds a little like Rumpelstiltskin spinning straw into gold that is because it is.
Such are the benefits that are potentially available to monetarily sovereign nations.
However, for both types of regimes public debt is still different from private debt. In fact, public debt is
often the counterpart of private saving. To see this we need to do a little macroeconomic accounting.
(Double jeopardy on the boredom stakes, I know, but try and stay with me here.)
Lets start by stating that output can be thought of as consumption, plus investment, plus government
spending, plus exports minus imports. This is known as the expenditure model of GDP.
Y = C + I + G + (X M)
We could also take a different perspective (the income model of GDP) and say that all output is
consumed, saved, or paid in taxes.
Y = C + S +T
Setting these two equations equal to each other gives:
C + S + T = C + I + G + (X M)
Cancelling out terms and rearranging generates what is known as the sectoral balances:
(S I) = (G T) + (X M)
This states that if the private sector wishes to save in excess of its investment, then there must be a
government deficit and/or a current account surplus. If one were working with a closed economy (i.e.,
no foreign trade) then the government deficit would be the exact counterpart to any private sector
savings surplus.
Now, one of the very many pleasing aspects about accounting identities is that they have to be
true (by construction) and thus, unsurprisingly, when we look at the data we see exactly what we
would expect. The private sector generally runs surpluses with the counterpart coming from the
governments fiscal deficits.
We can see that twice in the sample shown in Exhibit 1, wherein the private sector has run significant
deficits with neither experience ending well. The first was the TMT bubble, when firms drove the
private sector into deficit, and the second was the housing bubble with households driving the private
sector into deficit. Both are examples of the dangers of debt accumulation by the private sector.
However, the government sector has been accumulating debt over this whole period seemingly with
impunity contrary to the proclamations of the sound finance adherents.
Exhibit1:U.S.SectoralBalances
Foreigners
Government
2012Q3
2008Q4
2005Q1
2001Q2
1997Q3
1993Q4
1990Q1
1986Q2
1982Q3
1978Q4
1975Q1
1971Q2
1967Q3
1963Q4
1960Q1
15
Private
Source:BEA,GMO
Once one understands that the government deficits are the counterpart to private sector savings, then
concepts
such as the national debt take on a different hue. There used to be a clock that was0located
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near Times Square that kept a real count of the U.S. national debt. I gather it stopped working when the
$10 trillon mark was surpassed. The current U.S. national debt stands at $18.8 trillion (as of the time
of writing in December 2015). This sounds mind-bogglingly large can anyone imagine repaying
$18.8 trillion? Of course, it wont be repaid. In fact, given the counterpart nature of the government
deficit, the national debt could (and perhaps should) easily be relabled as national saving. Suddenly
that $18.8 trillion figure doesnt seem anywhere near so scary!
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Strangely enough, we know that PY can also be written as the sum of its parts: PY = C + I + G + (X M).
When written this way we see that there is nothing unique about G (government spending). Any of the
3See Hyperinflations, Hysteria, and False Memories (February 2013), a white paper available at www.gmo.com.
compoments of GDP could potentially cause inflation, if it raises output above the full employment level.
Let us be clear here. Yes, it is certainly possible that running government deficits can create inflation
(if doing so pushes the economy beyond its limits), but so could any other element of GDP (e.g.,
consumption or investment). There is nothing unique about government deficits from an inflationary
point of view.
Indeed, taking a functional approach to government deficits clearly recognises the possibility that
a deficit could be inflationary. When asking whether a particular deficit/surplus position helps us
achieve our macroeconomic objectives (full employment and price stability) we are explicitly thinking
about the consequences of our actions.
Ultimately, all economic theories should be checked against the data. So lets cast a cursory eye over
the empirical evidence by way of the U.S. and Japan. In neither case is there any evidence of a strong
link between fiscal deficits and inflation. The only evidence of any linkage that I could find in the U.S.
data was around the time of World War II, when the U.S. was running major deficits due to the war,
and then seeing inflation as a result of the shutdown in trade and eventually the return to a peacetime
economy with the unleashing of pent-up demand. Obviously this tells us more about the impact of
war (andExhibit2a&b:DeficitsandInflation
it is well known that wars have often beenU.S.andJapan
associated with inflation) rather than anything
meaningful about the relationship between deficits and inflation.
Exhibit 2: Deficits and Inflation U.S. and Japan
U.S.DeficitsandInflation
JapanDeficitsandInflation
20
15
10
CPI(%,YoY)
10
CPI(%,YoY)
Fiscaldeficit(%ofGDP)
2013
2010
2007
2004
2001
1998
1995
1992
1989
1986
Fiscaldeficit(%ofGDP)
1980
2013
2006
1999
1992
1985
1978
1971
1964
1957
1950
12
1943
10
30
1936
25
1929
20
1983
15
Source:FRED,GMO
Source:Datastream,GMO
We will return to the issue of financing the deficit in the course of our discussion of the next myth.
1
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InterestRate
Supply
5%
Demand
LoanableFunds
$Billions
Source: Mankiw
Source:Mankwi
According to the textbooks, national saving is the source of loanable funds, and is comprised of
the sum of private and public saving. An increasing budget deficit reduces public saving and thus
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3
overall savings, pushing the supply of loanable funds to the left (to the curve S2). According to this
view of the world, the budget deficit doesnt influence the demand for funds, leaving the demand
curve unchanged. Thus the result is rising interest rates.
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As we have detailed in the aforementioned papers, we dont find the loanable funds model to be a
useful way of thinking about the world. It is riddled with flaws that render it unusable. We wont
go over all of the issues again here, but suffice it to say, the biggest issue is that the model assumes
that savings must precede investment. This is a reasonable assumption if you are living in a onecommodity, corn-based economy. If you want to invest in more corn, you must save some corn first.
However, when we move to monetary-based economies this ordering is no longer true. Investment
can (and does) precede savings in such a system. When you want to invest, you go to the bank
and ask for a loan. The bank decides whether or not to grant such a loan, but it isnt constrained
by deposits or reserves. It will make the loan, and then worry about how to ensure regulatory
compliance with reserve requirements, etc., afterward.
So, what would a realist (as opposed to an economist) say about interest rates and budget deficits?
The diagram in Exhibit 4 is taken from Bill Mitchell one of the few living economists whom I
respect deeply.
4We have attempted to highlight the flaws of this model in our previous papers. See Wicksells Red Surstromming in
The Purgatory of Low Returns (GMO Quarterly Letter, July 2013) and The Idolatry of Interest Rates, Part 1: Chasing
Will o the Wisp (May 2015).
Exhibit4:TheRealWorldofGovernmentSpending
Exhibit 4: The Real World of Government Spending
ConsolidatedGovernmentsector
FederalTreasury
1. Spends(G)andtaxes(T)by
debitingandcreditingbank
accounts.
2. G >T=budgetdeficit.
3. G <T=budgetsurplus.
G adds
Tdrains
CentralBank (CB)
1. Setsinterestrate(r)to
conductmonetarypolicy.
2. Managessystemwidecash
balancesto controlr.
3. Thatis,controlslevelof
reservesitholdsforbanks.
CommercialbankreservesheldatCentralBank
1. Thesumoftheindividualbankreservebalances
constitutethesystemwidecashbalance.
2. G addstothereserves,Treducereserves($for$).
3. CBcanreducereservesbysellingdebt,orincreasethem
bybuyingdebtback.
Netcashpositionatendofeachdayisinfluencedbybudget:
1. Excessreservesifbudgetdeficit..
2. Deficientreservesifbudgetsurplus.
BankA
Excess
Reserves
BankB
Deficient
Reserves
BankC
Excess
Reserves
CBBonds
salesdrain
CBBonds
buyback
add
BankA
Deficient
Reserves
Source:Mitchell
Source: Mitchell
The real world model is certainly a lot messier than the loanable funds model and, interestingly,4 it comes
to a very different conclusion about the impact of deficits on interest rates. Lets start by acknowledging
that when a government spends it simply tells the central bank to credit the governments account
with funds (created by keystrokes).5 Similarly, when a government taxes, these funds eventually end
up as a credit to the government in their account at the central bank.
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So, when a government runs a fiscal deficit, it creates more money than it receives (by definition).
This money is then used to purchase goods and services, so the central bank transfers money from the
governments account to the reserve account of the bank with whom the sellers of goods and services
happen to hold their accounts. This creates excess reserves at the bank. No bank willingly sits on
excess reserves, and so money is lent out in the interbank market. This has the effect of lowering the
interest rates towards zero (or to the level that the central bank pays on reserves). So the prediction
from the real world model is that interest rates get driven down by budget deficits, not up as per the
loanable funds framework.
We can thus take the predictions to the data and see which is better supported. Exhibit 5 shows the
charts for both the U.S. and Japan with respect to both the deficit and interest rates and the debt to
GDP ratio and interest rates.
5Most economists seem to think in terms of the financing of budget deficits as coming from four sources (for example,
see Fischer and Easterly, The Economics of the Government Budget Constraint, World Bank Research Observer [1990]):
budget deficit = money printing + (foreign reserve use + foreign borrowing) + domestic borrowing. In fact budget deficits
arent financed at all; they are always financed by printing money, then debt is issued effectively to drain reserves
and help the central bank hit its interest rate target. As Lerner noted long ago, The almost instinctive revulsion that we
have to the idea of printing money, and the tendency to identify it with inflation, can be overcome if we calm ourselves
and take note that this printing does not affect the amount of money spent.
Exhibit5a&b:U.S.andJapan Debt,Deficits,andInterestRates
Exhibit 5: U.S. and Japan Debt, Deficits, and Interest Rates
U.S.DebttoGDPandBondYields
140
U.S.GovernmentDeficitandBondYields
10YearBondYield(RHS)
120
16
20
14
15
12
100
10
10
80
10YearBondYield
8
0
FederalDebttoGDP(LHS)
20
10
FiscalDeficit
Exhibit5c&d:U.S.andJapan Debt,Deficits,andInterestRates
2006
2002
1998
1994
1990
1986
1982
1970
2004
2009
2014
1979
1984
1989
1994
1999
1959
1964
1969
1974
1939
1944
1949
1954
1978
15
1974
2014
40
2010
60
Source:FRED,GMO
JapanDebttoGDPandBondYields
8
4
2
4
2012
2010
1984
FiscalDeficit
2008
12
2006
2004
10
Q11990
Q21991
Q31992
Q41993
Q11995
Q21996
Q31997
Q41998
Q12000
Q22001
Q32002
Q42003
Q12005
Q22006
Q32007
Q42008
Q12010
Q22011
Q32012
Q42013
Q12015
2002
50
2000
Govt.DebttoGDP(LHS)
1998
100
10YearBondYield
1996
150
1994
10YearBondYield(RHS)
1992
200
1990
GMO_Template
10
1988
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1986
250
JapanGovernmentDeficitandBondYields
Source:Datastream,GMO
The evidence seems to come in strongly on the side of the real world model. Budget deficits and high
debt levels dont seem to be associated with higher interest rates at all. This probably shouldnt be a
surprise, given that weak economic growth is likely to cause both high deficits and low interest
rates
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6
entirely consistent with the real world model.
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In the interest of full disclosure, I should point out that somewhere around the time that the bond
yield and the debt to GDP ratio crossed in the chart for Japan, a much younger and even more
foolish version of me uttered the phrase Japanese bond yields cant possibly go any lower. Over the
intervening 20 years, I have watched bond yields in Japan halve, halve, and halve again! It was at least
in part due to that experience that I have spent much time thinking about debts and deficits, trying
to learn from my mistakes.
Japan
DebttoGDPRatio(x)
4.5
1000
900
800
3.5
700
3
1.5
600
2.5
500
400
1.5
0.5
300
200
0.5
100
0
0
1
Greece
DebttoGDPRatio(x)
1 12 23 34 45 56 67 78 89 100
YearsfromNow
Source:GMO
Source: GMO
The biggest problem with this kind of analysis is that it assumes that nothing changes. Is it reasonable
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to assume that real rates and real growth will be the same for the next 750 years (as per the Japanese
example)?
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Randy Wray has drawn parallels with Morgan Spurlocks film Supersize Me, in which Morgan
decided to see what would happen if he ate food from McDonalds for breakfast, lunch, and dinner for
a month. By pursuing this path, Spurlock was consuming around 5000 calories a day, and expending
roughly 2500 calories a day. The net calories were enough to generate about a one-pound weight gain
per day. An economist watching this would reason along the following lines: This clearly cant go on
forever, at some point Spurlock would be larger than his house, at some point he would be bigger than
the earth, and at some point he would be bigger than the entire universe, at which point he would
create a black hole and the universe would disappear into it. The problem with such logic is simple:
Long before any of this happens he will either change his eating habits or die.
6Bernanke (2012), The Economic Outlook and the Federal Budget Situation.
7 d=-s+d*[(r-g)/(1+g)] where s is the primary surplus (the budget position before interest payments), d is the initial
level of debt to GDP, r is the real interest rate, and g is the real growth rate.
10
A second issue with the concept of sustainability (as defined by Bernanke) is that because the central
bank sets the interest rate for the group of countries we are talking about (those that enjoy monetary
sovereignty), they should pretty much always be able to ensure that the real interest rate is below the
real growth rate. This ensures that the fiscal position is always sustainable as per the above criteria.
The obvious issue for Greece (in the chart above) is that it isnt monetarily sovereign, and also not
fiscally sovereigna decidedly unfortunate situation!
Exhibit7:IsDebtanIntergenerationalBurden?
Myth 5: Debt is a burden on future generations
The final myth that I would like to tackle is the idea that debt is somehow a burden imposed by this
generation on a future generation. In effect, is the old lady in Exhibit 7 imposing the bill for her
hedonistic life style on the two innocents shown?
Exhibit 7: Is Debt an Intergenerational Burden?
In the specific, the answer is no. These are in fact my two daughters pictured with their 95-year-old
great grandmother. However, it isnt true in general either. Here is one prediction that I am very
nearly absolutely sure about: At some point in the future, everyone alive today will be dead. At that
point in time the bonds that make up the governments debt will be held entirely by our children and
grandchildren. That debt will, of course, be an asset for those who own the bonds (just as it is today).
There may well be distributional issues if all of those bonds are owned by, say, the grandchildren of Bill
Gates, but these will be intragenerational issues, not intergenerational ones.
Thought of another way, lets imagine that for some strange reason a future generation decides to
repay the national debt. Who will they repay it to? Themselves, of course; once again showing that
government debt simply cant be an intergenerational issue.
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11
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creeps into the common parlance, and potentially the pricing of assets,9 it is worth remembering that
secular stagnation is a policy choice. It could always be ended by the use of fiscal policy.
Intriguingly, a greater reliance upon fiscal policy rather than monetary policy could also be good news
for value investors. My colleague, Phil Pilkington, brought the following to my attention as we were
discussing some of the issues contained in this paper. Phil found a wonderful quotation from Nicky
Kaldor (another of my economic heroes) concerning the role of monetary policy and its interaction
with capital markets:
Reliance on monetary policy as an effective stabilising device would involvea high degree of
instability in the capital marketThe capital market would become far more speculative
longer run considerations of profitability would play a subordinate role. As Keynes said, when
the capital investment of a country becomes the by-product of the activities of a casino, the job
is likely to be ill-done. Kaldor, 1958
This struck me as very prophetic. Indeed, I would suggest that the elevated valuation that the U.S.
market has suffered since Greenspan took the helm at the Fed back in 1987 is a testament to the
accuracy of Kaldors insight. Whilst monetary policy may not have much impact upon the real economy
Exhibit8:TheShillerP/E
(except via the debt channel of encouraging households to gear up), it does seem to have influenced an
investors risk appetite. A move away from the obsession with monetary policy potentially could help
generate a return to a more normal world from a valuation perspective.
Exhibit 8: The Shiller P/E
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
1881
1885
1889
1894
1898
1902
1907
1911
1915
1920
1924
1928
1933
1937
1941
1946
1950
1954
1959
1963
1967
1972
1976
1980
1985
1989
1993
1998
2002
2006
2011
2015
Source:Shiller,GMO
Kaleckis insights
In some ways this brings us back full circle to the very start of this paper and that list of sound
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finance acolytes. Why do so many very smart people10 subscribe to the edicts of sound finance?
In
part I think it is because of the extension of the intuition built from the dangers of private debt that I
outlined in Myth 1. Ultimately, however, the neglect of fiscal policy stems from political rather than
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9 See, for example, The Idolatry of Interest Rates, Part 2: Financial Heresy and Potential Utility in an ERP Framework
where we showed that both bond and equity markets were pricing in very low real rates pretty much forever. This white
paper is available at www.gmo.com.
10 It should be noted that even if I am right about functional finance and the role of debts and deficits, a
misunderstanding clearly hasnt impacted a number of the sound finance believers when it comes to investment returns.
However, I do worry a little about a halo effect occurring, in as much as we tend to regard the successful as being experts
in all areas.
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economic foundations. Perhaps the most insightful analysis of the political problems with fiscal
policy as a policy tool can be found in Kaleckis excellent analysis from 1943, Political Aspects of Full
Employment. In this short paper, Kalecki lays out three reasons why business doesnt like the idea
of fiscal policy.
The reasons for the opposition of the industrial leaders to full employment achieved by
government spending may be subdivided into three categories: (i) dislike of government interference
in the problem of employment as such; (ii) dislike of the direction of government spending (public
investment and subsidizing consumption); (iii) dislike of the social and political changes resulting
from the maintenance of full employment.
With regard to the dislike of government interference, Every widening of state activity is looked
upon by business with suspicion, and this is especially true with respect to the creation of employment
by government expenditure. Kalecki notes that in a system without significant active fiscal policy,
business is in the drivers seat, and their animal spirits may determine the state of the economy. This
gives the capitalists a powerful indirect control over government policy, he writes. Effectively anything
they dont like will be said to dampen their confidence and thus endanger growth and employment.
Because active fiscal policy should reveal that the state can create employment, it must be undermined
from the business perspective.
On the dislike of the direction of government spending, Kalecki notes that industrial leaders hold
a moral principle of the highest importance to be at stake. The fundamentals of capitalist ethics
require that you shall earn your bread in sweat unless you happen to have private means.
Finally, businesses may not like the long-term consequences of the maintenance of full employment.
Under a regime of permanent full employment, the sack would cease to play its role as a disciplinary
measure discipline in the factories and political stability are more appreciated than profits11 by
business leaders. Their class instinct tells them that lasting full employment is unsoundand that
unemployment is an integral part of the normal capitalist system.
Given the evidence of the widespread dominance of the sound finance view across the political
spectrum found by examining the list of its adherents that started this note, and Kaleckis insights,
much as I may hope that fiscal policy comes back on the policy agenda, I shant be holding my breath.
11 Under full employment, everyone would be working and thus spending, which, as per the Kalecki profits equation,
James Montier is a member of GMOs Asset Allocation team. Prior to joining GMO in 2009, he was co-head of Global Strategy at Socit
Gnrale. Mr. Montier is the author of several books including Behavioural Investing: A Practitioners Guide to Applying Behavioural
Finance; Value Investing: Tools and Techniques for Intelligent Investment; and The Little Book of Behavioural Investing. Mr. Montier
is a visiting fellow at the University of Durham and a fellow of the Royal Society of Arts. He holds a B.A. in Economics from Portsmouth
University and an M.Sc. in Economics from Warwick University.
Disclaimer: The views expressed are the views of James Montier through the period ending January 2016, and are subject to change at
any time based on market and other conditions. This is not an offer or solicitation for the purchase or sale of any security and should
not be construed as such. References to specific securities and issuers are for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to be, and
should not be interpreted as, recommendations to purchase or sell such securities.
Copyright 2016 by GMO LLC. All rights reserved.
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