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of tbe ~bilippine!i
~upreme QCourt
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EN BANC
THE CITY OF MANILA, represented by
MAYOR JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., and
MS. LIBERTY M. TOLEDO, in her
capacity as the City Treasurer of Manila,
Petitioners,

- versus-

H.
GRECIACARIDAD
HON.
CUERDO, in her capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 112, Pasay City; SM MART,
INC.; SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC.;
STAR
APPLIANCES
CENTER;
SUPERVALUE,
INC.;
ACE
HARDWARE PHILIPPINES, INC.;
WATSON PERSONAL CARE STORES,
PHILS., INC.; JOLLIMART PHILS.,
CORP.;
SURPLUS
MARKETING
CORPORATION and SIGNATURE
LINES,

G.R. No. 175723

Present:
SERENO, C.J,
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,*
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
REYES,
PERLAS-BERNABE, and
LEONEN,JJ
Promulgated:
/

x---------------------------~~~~~-~~~~~~~--------------------~~~~~~~~-~~:---~~-~~DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Resolutions 1 dated
No part.
Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca de Guia-Salvador, with Associate Justices Ruben T. Reyes
(now a retired member of this Court) and Aurora Santiago-Lagman, concurring; Annexes "A" and "B,"
rollo, pp. 43-48; 49-51.

Decision

G.R. No. 175723

April 6, 2006 and November 29, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 87948.
The antecedents of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:
The record shows that petitioner City of Manila, through its
treasurer, petitioner Liberty Toledo, assessed taxes for the taxable period
from January to December 2002 against private respondents SM Mart,
Inc., SM Prime Holdings, Inc., Star Appliances Center, Supervalue, Inc.,
Ace Hardware Philippines, Inc., Watsons Personal Care Stores Phils., Inc.,
Jollimart Philippines Corp., Surplus Marketing Corp. and Signature Lines.
In addition to the taxes purportedly due from private respondents pursuant
to Section 14, 15, 16, 17 of the Revised Revenue Code of Manila
(RRCM), said assessment covered the local business taxes petitioners were
authorized to collect under Section 21 of the same Code. Because payment
of the taxes assessed was a precondition for the issuance of their business
permits, private respondents were constrained to pay the P19,316,458.77
assessment under protest.
On January 24, 2004, private respondents filed [with the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City] the complaint denominated as one for Refund
or Recovery of Illegally and/or Erroneously-Collected Local Business Tax,
Prohibition with Prayer to Issue TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction
which was docketed as Civil Case No. 04-0019-CFM before public
respondent's sala [at Branch 112]. In the amended complaint they filed on
February 16, 2004, private respondents alleged that, in relation to Section
21 thereof, Sections 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of the RRCM were
violative of the limitations and guidelines under Section 143 (h) of
Republic Act. No. 7160 [Local Government Code] on double taxation.
They further averred that petitioner city's Ordinance No. 8011 which
amended pertinent portions of the RRCM had already been declared to be
illegal and unconstitutional by the Department of Justice. 2

In its Order 3 dated July 9, 2004, the RTC granted private respondents'
application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration 4 but the RTC denied it
in its Order 5 dated October 15, 2004.
Petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA
assailing the July 9, 2004 and October 15, 2004 Orders of the RTC. 6

2
3
4
5
6

Rollo, p. 44. (Italics and emphasis in the original; citations omitted)

Records, vol. II, pp. 476-480.
Id. at 481-490.
Id. at 513.
CA rollo, pp. 2-31.

Decision

G.R. No. 175723

In its Resolution promulgated on April 6, 2006, the CA dismissed

petitioners' petition for certiorari holding that it has no jurisdiction over the
said petition. The CA ruled that since appellate jurisdiction over private
respondents' complaint for tax refund, which was filed with the RTC, is
vested in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), pursuant to its expanded
jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 9282 (RA 9282), it follows that a
petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued
in the said case should, likewise, be filed with the CTA.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 7 but the CA denied it
in its Resolution dated November 29, 2006.
Hence, the present petition raising the following issues:
I- Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely
erred in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.
II- Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court gravely
abuse[d] its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
enjoining by issuing a Writ of Injunction the petitioners[,] their agents
and/or authorized representatives from implementing Section 21 of
the Revised Revenue Code of Manila, as amended, against private
respondents.
III- Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court
gravely abuse[d] its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the Writ of Injunction despite failure of private
respondents to make a written claim for tax credit or refund with the
City Treasurer of Manila.
IV- Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court gravely
abuse[d] its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
considering that under Section 21 of the Manila Revenue Code, as
amended, they are mere collecting agents of the City Government.
V- Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court gravely
abuse[d] its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the Writ of Injunction because petitioner City of Manila and
its constituents would result to greater damage and prejudice thereof.
(sic) 8

Without first resolving the above issues, this Court finds that the
instant petition should be denied for being moot and academic.

7
8

Id. at 321-326.
Rollo, p. 20. (Emphasis in the original)

Decision

G.R. No. 175723

Upon perusal of the original records of the instant case, this Court
discovered that a Decision 9 in the main case had already been rendered by
the RTC on August 13, 2007, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby
renders JUDGMENT in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant to
grant a tax refund or credit for taxes paid pursuant to Section 21 of the
Revenue Code of the City of Manila as amended for the year 2002 in the
following amounts:
To plaintiff SM Mart, Inc.
To plaintiff SM Prime Holdings, Inc.
To plaintiff Star Appliances Center
To plaintiff Supervalue, Inc.
To plaintiff Ace Hardware Phils., Inc.
To plaintiff Watsons Personal Care Health
Stores Phils., Inc.
To plaintiff Jollimart Phils., Corp.
To plaintiff Surplus Marketing Corp.
To plaintiff Signature Mktg. Corp.
TOTAL:

- P 11,462,525.02
3,118,104.63
2,152,316.54
1,362,750.34
419,689.04
231,453.62

140,908.54
220,204.70
94,906.34

- P 19,316,458.77

Defendants are further enjoined from collecting taxes under

Section 21, Revenue Code of Manila from herein plaintiff.
SO ORDERED. 10

The parties did not inform the Court but based on the records, the
above Decision had already become final and executory per the Certificate
of Finality 11 issued by the same trial court on October 20, 2008. In fact, a
Writ of Execution 12 was issued by the RTC on November 25, 2009.
In view of the foregoing, it clearly appears that the issues raised in the
present petition, which merely involve the incident on the preliminary
injunction issued by the RTC, have already become moot and academic
considering that the trial court, in its decision on the merits in the main case,
has already ruled in favor of respondents and that the same decision is now
final and executory. Well entrenched is the rule that where the issues have
become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, thereby
rendering the resolution of the same of no practical use or value. 13
9
10
11
12
13

Records, vol. II, pp. 761-762.

Id. at 762. (Emphasis in the original)
Id. at 822.
Id. at 837.
Garcia v. COMELEC, 328 Phil. 288, 292 (1996).

Decision

G.R. No. 175723

In any case, the Court finds it necessary to resolve the issue on

jurisdiction raised by petitioners owing to its significance and for future
guidance of both bench and bar. It is a settled principle that courts will
decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition,
yet evading review. 14
However, before proceeding, to resolve the question on jurisdiction,
the Court deems it proper to likewise address a procedural error which
petitioners committed.
Petitioners availed of the wrong remedy when they filed the instant
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in
assailing the Resolutions of the CA which dismissed their petition filed with
the said court and their motion for reconsideration of such dismissal. There
is no dispute that the assailed Resolutions of the CA are in the nature of a
final order as they disposed of the petition completely. It is settled that in
cases where an assailed judgment or order is considered final, the remedy of
the aggrieved party is appeal. Hence, in the instant case, petitioner should
have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, which is a
continuation of the appellate process over the original case. 15
Petitioners should be reminded of the equally-settled rule that a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original or independent
action based on grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and it will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 16 As such, it
cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal. 17
Nonetheless, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules
of Court and in the interest of substantial justice, this Court has, before,
treated a petition for certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari,
particularly (1) if the petition for certiorari was filed within the
reglementary period within which to file a petition for review on certiorari;
(2) when errors of judgment are averred; and (3) when there is sufficient
reason to justify the relaxation of the rules. 18 Considering that the present
14

Caneland Sugar Corporation v. Alon, G.R. No. 142896, September 12, 2007, 533 SCRA 28, 33.
Republic of the Philippines, represented by Abusama M. Alid, Officer-in-Charge, Department of
Agriculture-Regional Field Unit XII (DA-RFU-XII) v. Abdulwahab A. Bayao, et al., G.R. No. 179492, June
5, 2013.
16
Mendez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 174937, June 13, 2012, 672 SCRA 200, 207.
17
Id.
18
Tagle v. Equitable PCI Bank, G.R. No. 172299, April 22, 2008, 552 SCRA 424, 444, citing
Oaminal v. Castillo, 459 Phil. 542, 556 (2003); Republic v. Court of Appeals, 379 Phil. 92, 98 (2000);
Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1066, 1075 (1997); Banco Filipino Savings and
Mortgage Bank v. Court of Appeals, 389 Phil. 644, 655 (2000).
15

Decision

G.R. No. 175723

petition was filed within the 15-day reglementary period for filing a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45, that an error of judgment is averred,
and because of the significance of the issue on jurisdiction, the Court deems
it proper and justified to relax the rules and, thus, treat the instant petition for
certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari.
Having disposed of the procedural aspect, we now turn to the central
issue in this case. The basic question posed before this Court is whether or
not the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari
assailing an interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case.
This Court rules in the affirmative.
On June 16, 1954, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 1125 (RA
1125) creating the CTA and giving to the said court jurisdiction over the
following:
(1) Decisions of the Collector of Internal Revenue in cases involving
disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other
charges, penalties imposed in relation thereto, or other matters arising
under the National Internal Revenue Code or other law or part of law
administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;
(2) Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability
for customs duties, fees or other money charges; seizure, detention or
release of property affected fines, forfeitures or other penalties imposed in
relation thereto; or other matters arising under the Customs Law or other
law or part of law administered by the Bureau of Customs; and
(3) Decisions of provincial or City Boards of Assessment Appeals in cases
involving the assessment and taxation of real property or other matters
arising under the Assessment Law, including rules and regulations relative
thereto.

On March 30, 2004, the Legislature passed into law Republic Act No.
9282 (RA 9282) amending RA 1125 by expanding the jurisdiction of the
CTA, enlarging its membership and elevating its rank to the level of a
collegiate court with special jurisdiction. Pertinent portions of the
amendatory act provides thus:

Decision

G.R. No. 175723

Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. - The CTA shall exercise:

a. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as
herein provided:
1. Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments,
refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other
charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other
matters arising under the National Internal Revenue
or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue;
2. Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments,
refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other
charges, penalties in relations thereto, or other
matters arising under the National Internal Revenue
Code or other laws administered by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, where the National Internal
Revenue Code provides a specific period of action,
in which case the inaction shall be deemed a denial;
3. Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional
Trial Courts in local tax cases originally decided
or resolved by them in the exercise of their
original or appellate jurisdiction;
4. Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in
cases involving liability for customs duties, fees or
other money charges, seizure, detention or release of
property affected, fines, forfeitures or other penalties
in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the
Customs Law or other laws administered by the
Bureau of Customs;
5. Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment
Appeals in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction
over cases involving the assessment and taxation of
real property originally decided by the provincial or
city board of assessment appeals;
6. Decisions of the Secretary of Finance on customs
cases elevated to him automatically for review from
decisions of the Commissioner of Customs which
are adverse to the Government under Section 2315
of the Tariff and Customs Code;
7. Decisions of the Secretary of Trade and Industry,
in the case of nonagricultural product, commodity or
article, and the Secretary of Agriculture in the case

Decision

G.R. No. 175723

of agricultural product, commodity or article,

involving dumping and countervailing duties under
Section 301 and 302, respectively, of the Tariff and
Customs Code, and safeguard measures under
Republic Act No. 8800, where either party may
appeal the decision to impose or not to impose said
duties.
b. Jurisdiction over cases involving criminal offenses as herein
provided:
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all criminal
offenses arising from violations of the National
Internal Revenue Code or Tariff and Customs Code
and other laws administered by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue or the Bureau of Customs:
Provided, however, That offenses or felonies
mentioned in this paragraph where the principal
amount of taxes and fees, exclusive of charges and
penalties, claimed is less than One million pesos
(P1,000,000.00) or where there is no specified
amount claimed shall be tried by the regular Courts
and the jurisdiction of the CTA shall be appellate.
Any provision of law or the Rules of Court to the
contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and
the corresponding civil action for the recovery of
civil liability for taxes and penalties shall at all times
be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly
determined in the same proceeding by the CTA, the
filing of the criminal action being deemed to
necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action,
and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action
separately from the criminal action will be
recognized.
2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal
offenses:
a. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or
orders of the Regional Trial Courts in tax cases
originally decided by them, in their respected
territorial jurisdiction.
b. Over petitions for review of the judgments,
resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in
the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over tax
cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in their respective jurisdiction.

Decision

G.R. No. 175723

c. Jurisdiction over tax collection cases as herein

provided:
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction in tax collection
cases involving final and executory assessments for
taxes, fees, charges and penalties: Provides,
however, that collection cases where the principal
amount of taxes and fees, exclusive of charges and
penalties, claimed is less than One million pesos
(P1,000,000.00) shall be tried by the proper
Municipal Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court and
Regional Trial Court.
2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in tax collection
cases:
a. Over appeals from the judgments,
resolutions or orders of the Regional
Trial Courts in tax collection cases
originally decided by them, in their
respective territorial jurisdiction.
b. Over petitions for review of the
judgments, resolutions or orders of
the Regional Trial Courts in the
Exercise
of
their
appellate
jurisdiction over tax collection cases
originally
decided
by
the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts, in their respective
jurisdiction. 19

A perusal of the above provisions would show that, while it is clearly

stated that the CTA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over decisions,
orders or resolutions of the RTCs in local tax cases originally decided or
resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction,
there is no categorical statement under RA 1125 as well as the amendatory
RA 9282, which provides that the CTA has jurisdiction over petitions for
certiorari assailing interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in local tax cases
filed before it.
The prevailing doctrine is that the authority to issue writs of certiorari
involves the exercise of original jurisdiction which must be expressly
conferred by the Constitution or by law and cannot be implied from the mere

19

Emphasis supplied.

Decision

10

G.R. No. 175723

existence of appellate jurisdiction. 20 Thus, in the cases of Pimentel v.

COMELEC, 21 Garcia v. De Jesus, 22 Veloria v. COMELEC, 23 Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Lubrica, 24 and Garcia v.
Sandiganbayan, 25 this Court has ruled against the jurisdiction of courts or
tribunals over petitions for certiorari on the ground that there is no law
which expressly gives these tribunals such power. 26 It must be observed,
however, that with the exception of Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, 27 these rulings
pertain not to regular courts but to tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers.
With respect to the Sandiganbayan, Republic Act No. 8249 28 now provides
that the special criminal court has exclusive original jurisdiction over
petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari,
habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction.
In the same manner, Section 5 (1), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution grants power to the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction, to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
With respect to the Court of Appeals, Section 9 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129 (BP 129) gives the appellate court, also in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction, the power to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari,whether or
not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. As to Regional Trial Courts, the
power to issue a writ of certiorari, in the exercise of their original
jurisdiction, is provided under Section 21 of BP 129.
The foregoing notwithstanding, while there is no express grant of such
power, with respect to the CTA, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution provides, nonetheless, that judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law and
that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
20
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Lubrica, 497 Phil. 313, 322 (2005); Veloria
v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 94771, July 29, 1992, 211 SCRA 907, 915.
21
189 Phil. 581 (1980).
22
G.R. Nos. 88158 and 97108-09, March 4, 1992, 206 SCRA 779.
23
Supra note 20.
24
Supra note 20.
25
G..R. No. 114135, October 7, 1994, 237 SCRA 552.
26
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Lubrica, supra note 20; Veloria v.
COMELEC, supra note 20; Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, id. at 563-564; Garcia v. De Jesus, supra note 22, at
787-788; Pimentel v. COMELEC, supra note 21, at 587.
27
Supra note 25.
28
An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, Amending for the Purpose
Presidential Decree No. 1606, As Amended, Providing Funds Therefor, And for Other Purposes.

Decision

11

G.R. No. 175723

On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be fairly

interpreted that the power of the CTA includes that of determining whether
or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in
cases falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It,
thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested with
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in these cases.
Indeed, in order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its
appellate jurisdiction, it must have the authority to issue, among others, a
writ of certiorari. In transferring exclusive jurisdiction over appealed tax
cases to the CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law intended to
transfer also such power as is deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in aid
of such appellate jurisdiction. There is no perceivable reason why the
transfer should only be considered as partial, not total.
Consistent with the above pronouncement, this Court has held as early
as the case of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al. 29 that if a case
may be appealed to a particular court or judicial tribunal or body, then said
court or judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary
writ of certiorari, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. 30 This principle was
affirmed in De Jesus v. Court of Appeals, 31 where the Court stated that a
court may issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if said
court has jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of error, the final orders or
decisions of the lower court. 32 The rulings in J.M. Tuason and De Jesus
were reiterated in the more recent cases of Galang, Jr. v. Geronimo 33 and
Bulilis v. Nuez. 34
Furthermore, Section 6, Rule 135 of the present Rules of Court
provides that when by law, jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial
officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it
into effect may be employed by such court or officer.
If this Court were to sustain petitioners' contention that jurisdiction
over their certiorari petition lies with the CA, this Court would be
confirming the exercise by two judicial bodies, the CA and the CTA, of
jurisdiction over basically the same subject matter precisely the split29
30
31
32
33
34

118 Phil. 1022 (1963).

J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al., supra, at 1026.
G.R. No. 101630, August 24, 1992, 212 SCRA 823.
De Jesus v. Court of Appeals, supra, at 827-828.
G.R. No. 192793, February 22, 2011, 643 SCRA 631, 635-636.
G.R. No. 195953, August 9, 2011, 655 SCRA 241, 246-247.

Decision

12

G.R. No. 175723

jurisdiction situation which is anathema to the orderly administration of

justice. 35 The Court cannot accept that such was the legislative motive,
especially considering that the law expressly confers on the CTA, the
tribunal with the specialized competence over tax and tariff matters, the role
of judicial review over local tax cases without mention of any other court
that may exercise such power. Thus, the Court agrees with the ruling of the
CA that since appellate jurisdiction over private respondents' complaint for
tax refund is vested in the CTA, it follows that a petition for certiorari
seeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the said case should,
likewise, be filed with the same court. To rule otherwise would lead to an
absurd situation where one court decides an appeal in the main case while
another court rules on an incident in the very same case.
Stated differently, it would be somewhat incongruent with the
pronounced judicial abhorrence to split jurisdiction to conclude that the
intention of the law is to divide the authority over a local tax case filed with
the RTC by giving to the CA or this Court jurisdiction to issue a writ of
certiorari against interlocutory orders of the RTC but giving to the CTA the
jurisdiction over the appeal from the decision of the trial court in the same
case. It is more in consonance with logic and legal soundness to conclude
that the grant of appellate jurisdiction to the CTA over tax cases filed in and
decided by the RTC carries with it the power to issue a writ of certiorari
when necessary in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. The supervisory power
or jurisdiction of the CTA to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction should co-exist with, and be a complement to, its appellate
jurisdiction to review, by appeal, the final orders and decisions of the RTC,
in order to have complete supervision over the acts of the latter. 36
A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it the
power necessary to exercise it effectively, to make all orders that will
preserve the subject of the action, and to give effect to the final
determination of the appeal. It carries with it the power to protect that
jurisdiction and to make the decisions of the court thereunder effective. The
court, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, has authority to control all auxiliary
and incidental matters necessary to the efficient and proper exercise of that
jurisdiction. For this purpose, it may, when necessary, prohibit or restrain the
performance of any act which might interfere with the proper exercise of its
rightful jurisdiction in cases pending before it. 37

35

Southern Cross Cement Corporation v. Philippine Cement Manufacturers Corp., 478 Phil. 85, 125

(2004).
36
37

Breslin v. Luzon Stevedoring Company, 84 Phil. 618, 623 (1949).

4 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error, 5, p. 536; 2 Am Jur, Appeal and Error, 9, 850.

Decision

13

G.R. No. 175723

Lastly, it would not be amiss to point out that a court which is

endowed with a particular jurisdiction should have powers which are
necessary to enable it to act effectively within such jurisdiction. These
should be regarded as powers which are inherent in its jurisdiction and the
court must possess them in order to enforce its rules of practice and to
suppress any abuses of its process and to defeat any attempted thwarting of
such process.
In this regard, Section 1 of RA 9282 states that the CTA shall be of the
same level as the CA and shall possess all the inherent powers of a court of
justice.
Indeed, courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to
be implied from a general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly
conferred on them. These inherent powers are such powers as are necessary
for the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or are essential to the
existence, dignity and functions of the courts, as well as to the due
administration of justice; or are directly appropriate, convenient and suitable
to the execution of their granted powers; and include the power to maintain
the court's jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the litigants. 38

Thus, this Court has held that while a court may be expressly granted
the incidental powers necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of
jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive legislation, implies the necessary
and usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it, and, subject to existing
laws and constitutional provisions, every regularly constituted court has
power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of
justice within the scope of its jurisdiction and for the enforcement of its
judgments and mandates. 39 Hence, demands, matters or questions ancillary
or incidental to, or growing out of, the main action, and coming within the
above principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court and determined,
since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over the principal matter,
even though the court may thus be called on to consider and decide matters
which, as original causes of action, would not be within its cognizance. 40

38

Santiago v. Vasquez, G.R. Nos. 99289-90, January 27, 1993, 217 SCRA 633, 648.
Treasurer-Assessor v. University of the Philippines, 148 Phil. 526, 539 (1971); Amalgamated
Laborers' Association v. Court of Industrial Relations, 131 Phil. 374, 380 (1968); Philippine Airlines
Employees' Association v. Philippine Airlines, Inc. 120 Phil. 383, 390 (1964). (Citations omitted).
40
Id.
39

14

Decision

G.R. No. 175723

Based on the foregoing disquisitions, it can be reasonably concluded

that the authority of the CTA to take cognizance of petitions for certiorari
questioning interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in a local tax case is
included in the powers granted by the Constitution as well as inherent in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
Finally, it would bear to point out that this Court is not abandoning the
rule that, insofar as quasi-judicial tribunals are concerned, the authority to
issue writs of certiorari must still be expressly conferred by the Constitution
or by law and cannot be implied from the mere existence of their appellate
jurisdiction. This doctrine remains as it applies only to quasi-judicial bodies.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

.PERALTA

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Associate Justice

~~Iv~

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

J. VELASCO, JR.
A ociate Justice

a~
AR~O
D. BRION
Associate Justice

15

Decision

G.R. No. 175723

No part

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

'~
~VlLLA
~ ~R.

RO~AD
Associate Justice

Associate Justi

JOSE

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

CA~ll"ENDOZA

As;~;~;i~tice

t/-e~S-BER.NABE

ESTELA
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that

the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice