Sandoval Consti
Sandoval Consti
assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily
understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent
and the prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions,
petitioner is completely informed of the accusations against him as
to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense.
SEC. 12.
Power of Eminent Domain The President shall
determine when it is necessary or advantageous to exercise the
power of eminent domain in behalf of the National Government,
and direct the Solicitor General, whenever he deems the action
advisable, to institute expropriation proceedings in the proper
court.
The foregoing provision does not require prior unsuccessful
negotiation as a condition precedent for the exercise of eminent
domain. In Iron and Steel Authority v. Court of Appeals, the
President chose to prescribe this condition as an additional
requirement instead.
In the instant case, however, no such
voluntary restriction was imposed.
(SMI Development
Corporation v. Republic, 323 SCRA 862, Jan. 28, 2000, 3 rd
Div. [Panganiban])
140. Discuss the nature of the right of eminent domain and the
limitations thereof.
Held: The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate
right of the sovereign power to appropriate any property within its territorial
sovereignty for a public purpose (Bernas, 1987 Edition, p. 276, quoting Justice Story
in Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge). Fundamental to the independent
existence of a State, it requires no recognition by the Constitution, whose provisions
are taken as being merely confirmatory of its presence and as being regulatory, at
most, in the due exercise of the power. In the hands of the legislature, the power is
inherent, its scope matching that of taxation, even that of police power itself, in many
respects. It reaches to every form of property the State needs for public use and, as
an old case so puts it, all separate interests of individuals in property are held under a
tacit agreement or implied reservation vesting upon the sovereign the right to resume
the possession of the property whenever the public interest so requires it (US v.
Certain Lands in Highlands [DY NY] 48 F Supp 306).
The ubiquitous character of eminent domain is manifest in the nature of the
expropriation proceedings. Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial in the
conventional sense, for the condemning authority is not required to assert any
conflicting interest in the property. Thus, by filing the action, the condemnor in
effect merely serves notice that it is taking title and possession of the property, and
the defendant asserts title or interest in the property, not to prove a right to
possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the taking (US v. Certain Lands
in Highlands [DY NY] 48 F Supp 306; San Bernardino Valley Municipal Water
District v. Gage Canal Co. [4th Dist] Cal App 2d 206, 37 Cal Rptr 856).
Obviously, however, the power is not without its limits: first, the taking
must be for public use, and second, that just compensation must be given to the
private owner of the property (Sena v. Manila Railroad Co., 42 Phil. 102). These
twin proscriptions have their origin in the recognition of the necessity for achieving
balance between the State interests, on the one hand, and private rights, upon the
other hand, by effectively restraining the former and affording protection to the latter
(Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus, 40 Phil. 550). In determining public use, two
approaches are utilized the first is public employment or the actual use by the
public, and the second is public advantage or benefit (Thornton Development
authority v. Upah [DC Colo] 640 F Supp 1071). It is also useful to view the matter
as being subject to constant growth, which is to say that as society advances, its
demands upon the individual so increases, and each demand is a new use to which
the resources of the individual may be devoted (Visayan Refining, supra). (Republic
of the Philippines v. The Hon. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146587, July 2, 2002,
1st Div. [Vitug])
143.
When may the property owner be entitled to the return of
the expropriated property in eminent domain cases?
The Court proceeded to reiterate its pronouncement in Alfonso v. Pasay City (106
Phil. 1017) where the recovery of possession of property taken for public use prayed
for by the unpaid landowner was denied even while no requisite expropriation
proceedings were first instituted. The landowner was merely given the relief of
recovering compensation for his property computed at its market value at the time it
was taken and appropriated by the State.
law;
3)
(Citations
(People v.
3. Considering its factual milieu, this case falls squarely under the
plain view doctrine. X x x.
When Spencer wrenched himself free from the grasp of PO2
Gaviola, he instinctively ran towards the house of appellant. The
members of the buy-bust team were justified in running after him
and entering the house without a search warrant for they were hot
in the heels of a fleeing criminal. Once inside the house, the police
officers cornered Spencer and recovered the buy-bust money from
him. They also caught appellant in flagrante delicto repacking the
marijuana bricks which were in full view on top of a table. X x x.
Hence, appellants subsequent arrest was likewise lawful, coming
as it is within the purview of Section 5(a) of Rule 113 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure x x x.
Section 5(a) is commonly referred to as the rule on in flagrante
delicto arrests. Here two elements must concur: (1) the person to
be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer. Thus, when appellant was seen
repacking the marijuana, the police officers were not only
authorized but also duty-bound to arrest him even without a
warrant.
(People v. Elamparo, 329 SCRA 404, 414-415,
March 31, 2000, 2nd Div. [Quisumbing])
172.
Held:
Accused-appellants assail the manner by which the
checkpoint in question was conducted. They contend that the
checkpoint manned by elements of the Makati Police should have
been announced. They also complain of its having been conducted
in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner.
We take judicial notice of the existence of the COMELEC
resolution imposing a gun ban during the election period issued
pursuant to Section 52(c) in relation to Section 26(q) of the
Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881). The national
and local elections in 1995 were held on 8 May, the second Monday
of the month. The incident, which happened on 5 April 1995, was
well within the election period.
This Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are illegal.
Those which are warranted by the exigencies of public order and
are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists are allowed.
For, admittedly, routine checkpoints do intrude, to a certain extent,
on motorists right to free passage without interruption, but it
cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of
coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making
the arrest.
As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled that
reliable information alone, absent any overt act indicative of a
felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the
arresting officers, are not sufficient to constitute probable cause
that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. Thus, in People v.
Aminnudin (163 SCRA 402, 409-410 [1988]), it was held that the
accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing
a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had
just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of
the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called
for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other
passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only
when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana
that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension.
Likewise, in People v. Mengote (210 SCRA 174, 179-180
[1992]), the Court did not consider eyes . . . darting from side to
side . . . [while] holding . . . [ones] abdomen, in a crowded street
at 11:30 in the morning, as overt acts and circumstances sufficient
to arouse suspicion and indicative of probable cause. According to
the Court, [b]y no stretch of the imagination could it have been
inferred from these acts that an offense had just been committed,
or was actually being committed, or was at least being attempted
in [the arresting officers] presence. So also, in People v. Encinada
(280 SCRA 72, 86-87 [1997]), the Court ruled that no probable
cause is gleanable from the act of riding a motorela while holding
two plastic baby chairs.
Then, too, in Malacat v. Court of Appeals (283 SCRA 159
[1997]), the trial court concluded that petitioner was attempting to
commit a crime as he was standing at the corner of Plaza Miranda
and Quezon Boulevard with his eyes moving very fast and
looking at every person that come (sic) nearer (sic) to them. In
declaring the warrantless arrest therein illegal, the Court said:
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto arrest
preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on
the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the
part of petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been committed,
was being committed or was going to be committed. (Id., at 175)
It went on to state that
The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No.
308 cannot be underplayed x x x. The more frequent the use of
the PRN, the better the chance of building a huge and formidable
information base through the electronic linkage of the files. The
data may be gathered for gainful and useful government purposes;
but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal information
constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be
too great for some of our authorities to resist.
It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that
personal information which will be gathered about our people will
only be processed for unequivocally specified purposes. The lack of
proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with
the individuals liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities
to track down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous
persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right
against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for fishing
expeditions by government authorities and evade the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The possibilities of abuse and
misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer technology are
accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks control
over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less verify the
correctness of the data encoded. They threaten the very abuses
that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent.
5)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
Freedom of Expression
182. Distinguish content-based restrictions on free speech from
content-neutral restrictions, and give example of each.
Held: Content-based restrictions are imposed because of the
content of the speech and are, therefore, subject to the clear-andpresent danger test. For example, a rule such as that involved in
Sanidad v. Comelec (181 SCRA 529 [1990]), prohibiting columnists,
commentators, and announcers from campaigning either for or
against an issue in a plebiscite must have compelling reason to
support it, or it will not pass muster under strict scrutiny. These
restrictions are censorial and therefore they bear a heavy
presumption of constitutional invalidity. In addition, they will be
tested for possible overbreadth and vagueness.
Content-neutral restrictions, on the other hand, like Sec. 11(b) of
R.A. No. 6646, which prohibits the sale or donation of print space
and air time to political candidates during the campaign period, are
not concerned with the content of the speech. These regulations
need only a substantial governmental interest to support them. A
deferential standard of review will suffice to test their validity. The
clear-and-present danger rule is inappropriate as a test for
determining the constitutional validity of laws, like Sec. 11(b) of
R.A. No. 6646, which are not concerned with the content of political
ads but only with their incidents. To apply the clear-and-present
Held:
Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are
privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or
slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general
every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false,
because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially
proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious,
nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against
a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily
actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public
official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of
fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is
an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is
immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it
might reasonably be inferred from the facts. (Borjal v. CA, 301
SCRA 1, Jan. 14, 1999, 2nd Div. [Bellosillo])
186. What is the raison detre for the New York Times v.
Sullivan (376 US 254) holding that honest criticisms on the conduct
of public officials and public figures are insulated from libel
judgments?
Held: The guarantees of freedom of speech and press prohibit a
public official or public figure from recovering damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he
proves that the statement was made with actual malice, i.e., with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it
was false or not.
The raison detre for the New York Times doctrine was that to
require critics of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all their
factual assertions on pain of libel judgments would lead to selfcensorship, since would-be critics would be deterred from voicing
out their criticisms even if such were believed to be true, or were in
fact true, because of doubt whether it could be proved or because
of fear of the expense of having to prove it. (Borjal v. CA, 301
SCRA 1, Jan. 14, 1999, 2nd Div. [Bellosillo])
187. Who is a public figure, and therefore subject to public
comment?
Held: [W]e deem private respondent a public figure within the
purview of the New York Times ruling. At any rate, we have also
defined public figure in Ayers Production Pty., Ltd. v. Capulong
(G.R. Nos. 82380 and 82398, 29 April 1988, 160 SCRA 861) as
189. The Office of the Mayor of Las Pinas refused to issue permit
to petitioners to hold rally a rally in front of the Justice Hall of Las
Pinas on the ground that it was prohibited under Supreme Court En
Banc Resolution dated July 7,1998 in A.M. No. 98-7-02-SC, entitled,
"Re: Guidelines on the Conduct of Demonstrations, Pickets, Rallies
which pertains to it and departs from the orderly and serious quest
for truth for which our judicial proceedings are formulated.
Courts do not discriminate against radio and television media by
forbidding the broadcasting or televising of a trial while permitting
the newspaper reporter access to the courtroom, since a television
or news reporter has the same privilege, as the news reporter is not
permitted to bring his typewriter or printing press into the
courtroom.
In Estes v. Texas (381 U.S. 532), the United States Supreme Court
held that television coverage of judicial proceedings involves an
inherent denial of due process rights of a criminal defendant.
Voting 5-4, the Court through Mr. Justice Clark, identified four (4)
areas of potential prejudice which might arise from the impact of
the cameras on the jury, witnesses, the trial judge and the
defendant. The decision in part pertinently stated:
"Experience likewise has established the prejudicial effect of
telecasting on witnesses. Witnesses might be frightened, play to
the camera, or become nervous. They are subject to extraordinary
out-of-court influences which might affect their testimony. Also,
telecasting not only increases the trial judge's responsibility to
avoid actual prejudice to the defendant; it may as well affect his
own performance. Judges are human beings also and are subject to
the same psychological reactions as laymen. For the defendant,
telecasting is a form of mental harassment and subjects him to
excessive public exposure and distracts him from the effective
presentation of his defense.
"The television camera is a powerful weapon which intentionally or
inadvertently can destroy an accused and his case in the eyes of
the public."
Representatives of the press have no special standing to apply for a
writ of mandate to compel a court to permit them to attend a trial,
since within the courtroom a reporter's constitutional rights are no
greater than those of any other member of the public. Massive
intrusion of representatives of the news media into the trial itself
can so alter or destroy the constitutionally necessary judicial
atmosphere and decorum that the requirements of impartiality
imposed by due process of law are denied the defendant and a
defendant in a criminal proceeding should not be forced to run a
gauntlet of reporters and photographers each time he enters or
leaves the courtroom.
Held: Our task here is extremely difficult, for the 30-year old
decision of this court in Gerona upholding the flag salute law and
approving the expulsion of students who refuse to obey it, is not
lightly to be trifled with.
It is somewhat ironic however, that after the Gerona ruling had
received legislative cachet by its incorporation in the Administrative
Code of 1987, the present Court believes that the time has come to
reexamine it. The idea that one may be compelled to salute the
flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge,
during a flag ceremony on pain of being dismissed from ones job
or of being expelled from school, is alien to the conscience of the
present generation of Filipinos who cut their teeth on the Bill of
Rights which guarantees their rights to free speech (The flag
salute, singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic
pledge are all forms of utterances.) and the free exercise of
religious profession and worship.
Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the
highest priority and the amplest protection among human rights,
for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator (Chief Justice
Enrique M. Fernandos separate opinion in German v. Barangan,
135 SCRA 514, 530-531).
The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold
aspect, viz., freedom to believe and freedom to act on ones belief.
The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the
realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the
belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare
(J. Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1991 Ed., pp. 176-177).
Petitioners stress x x x that while they do not take part in the
compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in external acts or
behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in
expressing their love of country through the observance of the flag
ceremony.
They quietly stand at attention during the flag
ceremony to show their respect for the rights of those who choose
to participate in the solemn proceedings. Since they do not engage
in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.
The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the
exercise of religious freedom (according to the late Chief Justice
Claudio Teehankee in his dissenting opinion in German v. Barangan,
135 SCRA 514, 517) is the existence of a grave and present danger
of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public
safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public
interest, that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent. Absent
such a threat to public safety, the expulsion of the petitioners from
the schools is not justified.
Religious dogma and beliefs are often at war and to preserve peace
among their followers, especially the fanatics, the establishment
clause of freedom of religion prohibits the State from leaning
towards any religion. Vis--vis religious differences, the State
enjoys no banquet of options. Neutrality alone is its fixed and
immovable stance. In fine, the MTRCB cannot squelch the speech
of the INC simply because it attacks another religion. In a State
where there ought to be no difference between the appearance and
the reality of freedom of religion, the remedy against bad theology
is better theology. The bedrock of freedom of religion is freedom of
thought and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace of
dueling ideas. When the luxury of time permits, the marketplace of
ideas demands that speech should be met by more speech for it is
the spark of opposite speech, the heat of colliding ideas, that can
fan the embers of truth. (Iglesia Ni Cristo v. CA, 259 SCRA
529, July 26, 1996 [Puno])
196. Is solicitation for the construction of a church covered by
P.D. No. 1564 and, therefore, punishable if done without the
necessary permit for solicitation from the DSWD?
Held: First. Solicitation of contributions for the construction of a
church is not solicitation for "charitable or public welfare purpose"
but for a religious purpose, and a religious purpose is not
necessarily a charitable or public welfare purpose.
A fund
campaign for the construction or repair of a church is not like fund
drives for needy families or victims of calamity or for the
construction of a civic center and the like. Like solicitation of
subscription to religious magazines, it is part of the propagation of
religious faith or evangelization. Such solicitation calls upon the
virtue of faith, not of charity, save as those solicited for money or
aid may not belong to the same religion as the solicitor. Such
solicitation does not engage the philanthropic as much as the
religious fervor of the person who is solicited for contribution.
Second. The purpose of the Decree is to protect the public against
fraud in view of the proliferation of fund campaigns for charity and
other civic projects. On the other hand, since religious fund drives
are usually conducted among those belonging to the same religion,
the need for public protection against fraudulent solicitations does
not exist in as great a degree as does the need for protection with
respect to solicitations for charity or civic projects as to justify state
regulation.
Third. To require a government permit before solicitation for
religious purpose may be allowed is to lay a prior restraint on the
April 21, 1987) by stating that the Civil Service law and rules
governing concerted activities and strikes in the government
service shall be observed.
It is also settled in jurisprudence that, in general, workers in the
public sector do not enjoy the right to strike. Alliance of Concerned
Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment (124
SCRA 1, August 3, 1983, also per Gutierrez, Jr., J.) rationalized the
proscription thus:
"The general rule in the past and up to the present is that the
'terms and conditions of employment in the Government, including
any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof are governed by
law.' X x x.
Since the terms and conditions of government
employment are fixed by law, government workers cannot use the
same weapons employed by the workers in the private sector to
secure concessions from their employers. The principle behind
labor unionism in private industry is that industrial peace cannot be
secured through compulsion by law. Relations between private
employers and their employees rest on an essentially voluntary
basis. Subject to the minimum requirements of wage laws and
other labor and welfare legislation, the terms and conditions of
employment in the unionized private sector are settled through the
process of collective bargaining.
In government employment,
however, it is the legislature and, where properly given delegated
power, the administrative heads of government which fix the terms
and conditions of employment.
And this is effected through
statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not
through collective bargaining agreements." (Ibid., p. 13)
After delving into the intent of the framers of the Constitution, the
Court affirmed the above rule in Social Security System Employees
Association (SSSEA) v. Court of Appeals (175 SCRA 686, July 28,
1989) and explained:
"Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or
associations, either petition the Congress for the betterment of the
terms and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of
legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government agencies
for the improvement of those which are not fixed by law. If there
be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the
Public Sector Labor-Management Council for appropriate action.
But employees in the civil service may not resort to strikes,
walkouts and other temporary work stoppages, like workers in the
private sector, to pressure the Government to accede to their
demands. As now provided under Sec. 4, Rule III of the Rules and
explicitly subject to the police power of the State because they are
not ordinary contracts but are impressed with public interest.
Article 1700 thereof expressly provides:
Art. 1700. The relations between capital and labor are not merely
contractual. They are so impressed with public interest that labor
contracts must yield to the common good.
Therefore, such
contracts are subject to the special laws on labor unions, collective
bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working
conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects.
The challenged resolution and memorandum circular being valid
implementations of E.O. No. 797 (Creating the POEA), which was
enacted under the police power of the State, they cannot be struck
down on the ground that they violate the contract clause. To hold
otherwise is to alter long-established constitutional doctrine and to
subordinate the police power to the contract clause.
(The
Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc. v. POEA,
243 SCRA 666, April 21, 1995 [Davide, Jr.])
2. Petitioners pray that the present action should be barred,
because private respondents have voluntarily executed quitclaims
and releases and received their separation pay. Petitioners claim
that the present suit is a "grave derogation of the fundamental
principle that obligations arising from a valid contract have the
force of law between the parties and must be complied with in good
faith."
The Court disagrees. Jurisprudence holds that the constitutional
guarantee of non-impairment of contract is subject to the police
power of the state and to reasonable legislative regulations
promoting health, morals, safety and welfare. Not all quitclaims are
per se invalid or against public policy, except (1) where there is
clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or
gullible person, or (2) where the terms of settlement are
unconscionable on their face. In these cases, the law will step in to
annul the questionable transactions. Such quitclaim and release
agreements are regarded as ineffective to bar the workers from
claiming the full measure of their legal rights.
In the case at bar, the private respondents agreed to the quitclaim
and release in consideration of their separation pay. Since they
were dismissed allegedly for business losses, they are entitled to
separation pay under Article 283 of the Labor Code. And since
there was thus no extra consideration for the private respondents
to give up their employment, such undertakings cannot be allowed
5.
Anent petitioners' contention that the forcible refund of
incentive benefits is an unconstitutional impairment of a
contractual obligation, suffice it to state that "[n]ot all contracts
entered into by the government will operate as a waiver of its nonsuability; distinction must be made between its sovereign and
proprietary acts. The acts involved in this case are governmental.
Besides, the Court is in agreement with the Solicitor General that
the incentive pay or benefit is in the nature of a bonus which is not
a demandable or enforceable obligation. (Blaquera v. Alcala,
295 SCRA 366, 446, Sept. 11, 1998, En Banc [Purisima])
1)
11)
Xxx
xxx
xxx
Imposed in Baylon v. Sison (243 SCRA 284, April 6, 1995) was this
mandatory duty to conduct a hearing despite the prosecution's
refusal to adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant
and fix bail. (Joselito V. Narciso v. Flor Marie Sta. RomanaCruz, G.R. No. 134504, March 17, 2000, 3 rd Div.
[Panganiban])
220. What are the duties of the judge in cases of bail applications
where the accused is charged with capital offense?
Held:
Basco v. Rapatalo (269 SCRA 220, March 5, 1997)
enunciated the following duties of the trial judge in such petition for
bail:
1)
2)
Xxx
The Court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on
provisional liberty under the same bail bond during the period to
appeal subject to the consent of the bondsman.
The bail bond that the accused previously posted can only be used
during the 15-day period to appeal (Rule 122) and not during the
entire period of appeal. This is consistent with Section 2(a) of Rule
114 which provides that the bail shall be effective upon approval
and remain in force at all stages of the case, unless sooner
cancelled, until the promulgation of the judgment of the Regional
Trial Court, irrespective of whether the case was originally filed in
or appealed to it.
This amendment, introduced by SC
Administrative Circular 12-94 is a departure from the old rules
which then provided that bail shall be effective and remain in force
at all stages of the case until its full determination, and thus even
during the period of appeal. Moreover, under the present rule, for
the accused to continue his provisional liberty on the same bail
bond during the period to appeal, consent of the bondsman is
necessary. From the record, it appears that the bondsman x x x
filed a motion in the trial court x x x for the cancellation of
petitioners bail bond for the latters failure to renew the same upon
its expiration. Obtaining the consent of the bondsman was, thus,
foreclosed. (Maguddatu v. Court of Appeals, 326 SCRA 362,
Feb. 23, 2000, 1st Div. [Kapunan])
223. Is a condition in an application for bail that accused be first
arraigned before he could be granted bail valid?
Held: In requiring that petitioner be first arraigned before he could
be granted bail, the trial court apprehended that if petitioner were
released on bail he could, by being absent, prevent his early
arraignment and thereby delay his trial until the complainants got
tired and lost interest in their cases. Hence, to ensure his presence
at the arraignment, approval of petitioners bail bonds should be
deferred until he could be arraigned. After that, even if petitioner
does not appear, trial can proceed as long as he is notified of the
date of the hearing and his failure to appear is unjustified, since
under Art. III, Sec. 14(2) of the Constitution, trial in absencia is
authorized. This seems to be the theory of the trial court in its x x
x order conditioning the grant of bail to petitioner on his
arraignment.
3)
whose members are overly protected from publicity lest they lose
their impartiality. x x x. Our judges are learned in the law and
trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera
performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to
publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their
impartiality.
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the
part of the trial judge due to the barrage of publicity that
characterized the investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino,
et al. v. Alejandro, et al., we rejected this standard of possibility of
prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that
to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be
allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced,
not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the
case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed
actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the extensive
media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of
circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge
acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is
incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial.
Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not
discharged the burden.
We expounded further on this doctrine in the subsequent
case of Webb v. Hon. Raul de Leon, etc. (247 SCRA 652 [1995]) and
its companion cases, viz.:
Again, petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial publicity on their
right to due process while undergoing preliminary investigation.
We find no procedural impediment to its early invocation
considering the substantial risk to their liberty whole undergoing a
preliminary investigation.
Xxx
The democratic settings, media coverage of trials of sensational
cases cannot be avoided and oftentimes, its excessiveness has
been
aggravated
by
kinetic
developments
in
the
telecommunications industry. For sure, few cases can match the
high volume and high velocity of publicity that attended the
preliminary investigation of the case at bar. Our daily diet of facts
and fiction about the case continues unabated even today.
Commentators still bombard the public with views not too many of
which are sober and sublime. Indeed, even the principal actors in
the case the NBI, the respondents, their lawyers and their
Held:
Our Bill of Rights deals with two (2) kinds of double
jeopardy. The first sentence of Clause 20, Section 1, Article III of
the Constitution ordains that no person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.
The second
sentence of said clause provides that if an act is punishable by a
law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. Thus,
the first sentence prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense whereas, the second contemplates double jeopardy
of punishment for the same act. Under the first sentence, one may
be twice put in jeopardy of punishment of the same act, provided
that he is charged with different offenses, or the offense charged in
one case is not included in, or does not include, the crime charged
in the other case. The second sentence applies, even if the offense
charged are not the same, owing to the fact that one constitutes a
violation of an ordinance and the other a violation of statute. If the
two charges are based on one and the same act, conviction or
acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a
prosecution under the other.
Incidentally, such conviction or
acquittal is not indispensable to sustain the plea of double jeopardy
of punishment or the same offense. So long as jeopardy has been
attached under one of the informations charging said offense, the
defense may be availed of in the other case involving the same
offense, even if there has been neither conviction nor acquittal in
either case.
Elsewhere stated, where the offense charged are penalized either
by different sections of the same statute or by different statutes,
the important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses charged.
The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available
only where an identity is shown to exist between the earlier and the
subsequent offenses charged. The question of identity or lack of
identity of offenses is addressed by examining the essential
elements of each of the two offenses charged, as such elements
are set out in the respective legislative definitions of the offenses
involved. (People v. Quijada, 259 SCRA 191, July 24, 1996)
guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused
has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil
liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only
(Manahan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 202, 214 [1996], citing
Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 558 [1984]). This is the
situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, where the
civil action for damages is for the same act or omission.
Although the two actions have different purposes, the matters
discussed in the civil case are similar to those discussed in the
criminal case. However, the judgment in the criminal proceeding
cannot be read in evidence in the civil action to establish any fact
there determined, even though both actions involve the same act
or omission (Almeida Chantangco and Lete v. Abaroa, supra note
13, at 1061). The reason for this rule is that the parties are not the
same and secondarily, different rules of evidence are applicable.
Hence, notwithstanding herein petitioners acquittal, the Court of
Appeals in determining whether Article 29 applied, was not
precluded from looking into the question of petitioners negligence
or reckless imprudence. (Manantan v. Court of Appeals, 350
SCRA 387, Jan. 29, 2001, 2nd Div. [Quisumbing])
242.
of
Administrative
1)
2)
3)
E.B. Marcha is, however, not on all fours with the case at bar. In
the former, the Court considered the Republic a proper party to sue
since the claims of the Republic and the Philippine Ports Authority
against the petitioner therein were the same. To dismiss the
complaint in E.B. Marcha would have brought needless delay in the
settlement of the matter since the PPA would have to refile the
case on the same claim already litigated upon. Such is not the
case here since to allow the government to sue herein enables it to
raise the issue of imprescriptibility, a claim which is not available to
the BCDA. The rule that prescription does not run against the State
does not apply to corporations or artificial bodies created by the
State for special purposes, it being said that when the title of the
Republic has been divested, its grantees, although artificial bodies
of its own creation, are in the same category as ordinary persons
(Kingston v. LeHigh Valley Coal Co., 241 Pa 469). By raising the
claim of imprescriptibility, a claim which cannot be raised by the
BCDA, the Government not only assists the BCDA, as it did in E.B.
Marcha, it even supplants the latter, a course of action proscribed
by said case.
Moreover, to recognize the Government as a proper party to sue in
this case would set a bad precedent as it would allow the Republic
to prosecute, on behalf of government-owned or controlled
corporations, causes of action which have already prescribed, on
the pretext that the Government is the real party in interest against
whom prescription does not run, said corporations having been
created merely as agents for the realization of government
programs.
It should also be noted that petitioner is unquestionably a buyer in
good faith and for value, having acquired the property in 1963, or 5
years after the issuance of the original certificate of title, as a third
transferee. If only not to do violence and to give some measure of
respect to the Torrens System, petitioner must be afforded some
measure of protection. (Shipside Incorporated v. Court of
Appeals, 352 SCRA 334, Feb. 20, 2001, 3rd Div. [Melo])
251. Discuss the nature and functions of the NTC, and analyze its
powers and authority as well as the laws, rules and regulations that
govern its existence and operations.
Held: The NTC was created pursuant to Executive Order
No. 546, promulgated on July 23, 1979. It assumed the functions
formerly assigned to the Board of Communications and the
Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided
(E.O. 200, Section 1).
The Rules of Practice and Procedure of the NTC, which
implements Section 29 of the Public Service Act (C.A. 146, as
amended), fall squarely within the scope of these laws, as explicitly
mentioned in the case of Tanada v. Tuvera (146 SCRA 446 [1986]).
Our pronouncement in Tanada v. Tuvera is clear and categorical.
Administrative rules and regulations must be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation. The only exception are interpretative regulations, those
merely internal in nature, or those so-called letters of instructions
issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules and
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance
of their duties (PHILSA International Placement & Services Corp. v.
Secretary of Labor, G.R. No. 103144, April 4, 2001, 356 SCRA 174).
Hence, the 1993 Revised Rules should be published in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation before it
can take effect. Even the 1993 Revised Rules itself mandates that
said Rules shall take effect only after their publication in a
newspaper of general circulation (Section 20 thereof). In the
absence of such publication, therefore, it is the 1978 Rules that
governs. (Republic v. Express Telecommunication Co., Inc.,
373 SCRA 316, Jan. 15, 2002, 1st Div. [Ynares-Santiago])
253. May a person be held liable for violation of an administrative
regulation which was not published?
Held: Petitioner insists, however, that it cannot be held
liable for illegal exaction as POEA Memorandum Circular No. II,
Series of 1983, which enumerated the allowable fees which may be
collected from applicants, is void for lack of publication.
There is merit in the argument.
Xxx
Even the draft contract submitted by Commissioner Sadain,
that provides for a contract price in the amount of P1.2 Billion Pesos
is unacceptable. X x x While the contract price under the draft
contract is only P1.2 Billion and, thus, within the certified available
funds, the same covers only Phase I of the VRIS Project, i.e., the
issuance of identification cards for only 1,000,000 voters in
specified areas (Ibid., p. 382). In effect, the implementation of the
VRIS Project will be segmented or chopped into several phases.
Not only is such arrangement disallowed by our budgetary laws and
practices, it is also disadvantageous to the COMELEC because of
the uncertainty that will loom over its modernization project for an
indefinite period of time. Should Congress fail to appropriate the
amount necessary for the completion of the entire project, what
good will the accomplished Phase I serve? As expected, the project
failed to sell with the Department of Budget and Management.
Thus, Secretary Benjamin Diokno, per his letter of December 1,
2000, declined the COMELECs request for the issuance of the
Notice of Cash Availability (NCA) and a multi-year obligatory
authority to assume payment of the total VRIS Project for lack of
legal basis. Corollarily, under Section 33 of R.A. No. 8760, no
agency shall enter into a multi-year contract without a multi-year
obligational authority, thus:
SECTION 33. Contracting Multi-Year Projects. - In the
implementation of multi-year projects, no agency shall enter into a
multi-year contract without a multi-year Obligational Authority
issued by the Department of Budget and Management for the
purpose. Notwithstanding the issuance of the multi-year
Obligational Authority, the obligation to be incurred in any given
calendar year, shall in no case exceed the amount programmed for
implementation during said calendar year.
Petitioners are justified in refusing to formalize the contract with
PHOTOKINA. Prudence dictated them not to enter into a contract
not backed up by sufficient appropriation and available funds.
261.
The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does
not automatically confer security of tenure in its occupant even if
he does not possess the required qualifications. Such right will
have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn
depends on his eligibility or lack of it. A person who does not have
the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to
it in the first place or, only as an exception to the rule, may be
appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the absence of
appropriate eligibles. The appointment extended to him cannot be
regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated.
Evidently, private respondents appointment did not attain
permanency. Not having taken the necessary Career Executive
Service examination to obtain the requisite eligibility, he did not at
the time of his appointment and up to the present, possess the
needed eligibility for a position in the Career Executive Service.
Consequently, his appointment as Ministry Legal Counsel-CESO
IV/Department Legal Counsel and/or Director III, was merely
temporary. Such being the case, he could be transferred or
reassigned without violating the constitutionally guaranteed right
to security of tenure.
Private respondent capitalizes on his lack of CES eligibility
by adamantly contending that the mobility and flexibility concepts
in the assignment of personnels under the Career Executive Service
do not apply to him because he s not a Career Executive Service
Officer. Obviously, the contention is without merit. As correctly
pointed out by the Solicitor General, non-eligibles holding
permanent appointments to CES positions were never meant to
remain immobile in their status. Otherwise, their lack of eligibility
his CES rank and not on the basis of the position or office he
occupies.
respect to posts held without additional compensation in an exofficio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary
functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then
called Ministers) as examples during the debate and deliberation on
the general rule laid down for all appointive officials should be
considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the
constitutions manifest intent and the peoples understanding
thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Article
VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution, Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is
unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions
that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries
may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than two
(2) positions in the government and government corporations,
Executive Order No. 284 actually allows them to hold multiple
offices or employment in direct contravention of the express
mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the
1987 Constitution itself.
The Court is alerted by respondents to the impractical
consequences that will result from a strict application of the
prohibition mandated under Section 13, Article VII on the
operations of the Government, considering that Cabinet members
would be stripped of their offices held in an ex-officio capacity, by
reason of their primary positions or by virtue of legislation. As
earlier clarified in this decision, ex-officio posts held by the
executive official concerned without additional compensation as
provided by law and as required by the primary functions of his
office do not fall under the definition of any other office within the
contemplation of the constitutional prohibition. With respect to
other offices or employment held by virtue of legislation, including
chairmanships or directorships in government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries, suffice it to say that the feared
impractical consequences are more apparent than real. Being head
of an executive department is no mean job. It is more than a fulltime job, requiring full attention, specialized knowledge, skills and
expertise.
If maximum benefits are to be derived from a
department heads ability and expertise, he should be allowed to
attend to his duties and responsibilities without the distraction of
other governmental offices or employment.
He should be
precluded from dissipating his efforts, attention and energy among
too many positions and responsibility, which may result in
haphazardness and inefficiency. Surely the advantages to be
Xxx
Indeed, the framers of our Constitution could not have
intended such absurd consequences. A Constitution, viewed as a
continuously operative charter of government, is not to be
interpreted as demanding the impossible or the impracticable; and
unreasonable or absurd consequences, if possible, should be
avoided (Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 87 L. Ed. 1774,
63 S. Ct. 1375; others omitted).
To reiterate, the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is
not to be interpreted as covering positions held without additional
compensation in ex-officio capacities as provided by law and as
required by the primary functions of the concerned officials office.
The term ex-officio means from office; by virtue of office. It refers
to an authority derived from official character merely, not
expressly conferred upon the individual character, but rather
annexed to the official position. Ex officio likewise denotes an act
done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and
without any other appointment or authority than that conferred by
the office. (Blacks Law Dictionary, p. 516; 15A Words and
Phrases, p. 392) An ex-officio member of a board is one who is a
member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and without further
warrant or appointment (15A Words and Phrases, p. 392). To
illustrate, by express provision of law, the Secretary of
Transportation and Communications is the ex-officio Chairman of
the Board of the Philippine Ports Authority (Sec. 7, E.O. 778), and
the Light Rail Transit Authority (Sec. 1, E.O. 210).
The Court had occasion to explain the meaning of an exofficio position in Rafael v. Embroidery and Apparel Control and
Inspection Board (21 SCRA 336 [1967]), thus: An examination of
Section 2 of the questioned statute (R.A. 3137) reveals that for the
chairman and members of the Board to qualify they need only be
designated by the respective department heads.
With the
exception of the representative from the private sector, they sit exofficio. I order to be designated they must already be holding
positions in the offices mentioned in the law. Thus, for instance,
one who does not hold a previous appointment in the Bureau of
Customs, cannot, under the act, be designated a representative
from that office.
The same is true with respect to the
representatives from the other offices. No new appointments are
necessary. This is as it should be, because the representatives so
designated merely perform duties in the Board in addition to those
already performed under their original appointments. (Italics
supplied)
grounds since it seems unjust that the public should benefit by the
services of an officer de facto and then be freed from all liability to
pay any one for such services (Patterson v. Benson, 112 Pac. 801,
32 L.R.A. [NS] 949).
Any per diem, allowances or other
emoluments received by the respondents by virtue of actual
services rendered in the questioned positions may therefore be
retained by them.
(Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary, 194 SCRA 317, Feb. 22, 1991, En Banc [Fernan,
CJ])
271.
May a Senator or Congressman hold any other office or
employment?
Ans.: No Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the
government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither
shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or
the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he
was elected (Sec. 13, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution). The first sentence
is referred to as an incompatible office; the second is a forbidden
office.
272.
Petitioner claims that Benipayo has no authority to remove
her as Director IV of the EID and reassign her to the Law
Department. Petitioner further argues that only the COMELEC,
acting as a collegial body, can authorize such reappointment.
Moreover, petitioner maintains that a reassignment without her
consent amounts to removal from office without due process and
therefore illegal.
Held: Petitioners posturing will hold water if Benipayo does
not possess any color of title to the office of Chairman of the
COMELEC. We have ruled, however, that Benipayo is the de jure
COMELEC Chairman, and consequently he has full authority to
exercise all the powers of that office for so long as his ad interim
appointment remains effective. X x x. The Chairman, as the Chief
Executive of the COMELEC, is expressly empowered on his own
authority to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel in accordance
with the Civil Service Law. In the exercise of this power, the
(226 SCRA 207) and more recently Del Castillo v. Civil Service
Commission (237 SCRA 184). (CSC v. Pedro O. Dacoycoy, G.R.
No. 135805, April 29, 1999, En Banc [Pardo])
277.
Held:
Imposed during the pendency of an administrative
investigation, preventive suspension is not a penalty in itself. It is
merely a measure of precaution so that the employee who is
charged may be separated, for obvious reasons, from the scene of
his alleged misfeasance while the same is being investigated. Thus
preventive suspension is distinct from the administrative penalty of
removal from office such as the one mentioned in Sec. 8(d) of P.D.
No. 807. While the former may be imposed on a respondent during
the investigation of the charges against him, the latter is the
penalty which may only be meted upon him at the termination of
the investigation or the final disposition of the case. (Beja, Sr. v.
CA, 207 SCRA 689, March 31, 1992 [Romero])
278. Discuss the kinds of preventive suspension under the Civil
Service Law. When may a civil service employee placed under
preventive suspension be entitled to compensation?
Held: There are two kinds of preventive suspension of civil service
employees who are charged with offenses punishable by removal or
suspension: (1) preventive suspension pending investigation (Sec.
51, Civil Service Law, EO No. 292) and (2) preventive suspension
pending appeal if the penalty imposed by the disciplining authority
is suspension or dismissal and, after review, the respondent is
exonerated (Section 47, par. 4, Civil Service Law, EO No. 292).
Preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty. It is a
measure intended to enable the disciplining authority to investigate
charges against respondent by preventing the latter from
intimidating or in any way influencing witnesses against him. If the
investigation is not finished and a decision is not rendered within
that period, the suspension will be lifted and the respondent will
automatically be reinstated. If after investigation respondent is
found innocent of the charges and is exonerated, he should be
reinstated. However, no compensation was due for the period of
preventive suspension pending investigation. The Civil Service Act
of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) providing for compensation in such a case
once the respondent was exonerated was revised in 1975 and the
provision on the payment of salaries during suspension was
deleted.
Xxx
the Local
under the
Held:
We reach the foregoing conclusion, however, without
necessarily subscribing to petitioners claim that the Local
Government Code, which he averred should apply to this case of an
elective local official, has been violated. True, under said Code,
preventive suspension may only be imposed after the issues are
joined, and only for a maximum period of sixty days. Here,
petitioner was suspended without having had the chance to refute
first the charges against him, and for the maximum period of six
months provided by the Ombudsman Law. But as respondents
argue,
administrative
complaints
commenced
under
the
Ombudsman Law are distinct from those initiated under the Local
Government Code. Respondents point out that the shorter period
of suspension under the Local Government Code is intended to limit
the period of suspension that may be imposed by a mayor, a
governor, or the President, who may be motivated by partisan
political considerations. In contrast the Ombudsman, who can
impose a longer period of preventive suspension, is not likely to be
similarly motivated because it is a constitutional body.
The
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the
public officer concerned must be suspended only in the office
where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has
been charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of the word
office would indicate that it applies to any office which the officer
charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under
which he stands accused. (Bayot v. Sandiganbayan, supra; Segovia
v. Sandiganbayan, supra.)
En passant, while the imposition of suspension is not
automatic or self-operative as the validity of the information must
be determined in a pre-suspension hearing, there is no hard and
fast rule as to the conduct thereof. It has been said that
x x x No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension
hearing. Suffice it to state that the accused should be given a fair
and adequate opportunity to challenge the VALIDITY OF THE
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS against him, e.g., that he has not been
afforded the right of due preliminary investigation; that the acts for
which he stands charged do not constitute a violation of the
provisions of Republic Act 3019 or the bribery provisions of the
Revised Penal Code which would warrant his mandatory suspension
from office under Section 13 of the Act; or he may present a motion
to quash the information on any of the grounds provided for in Rule
117 of the Rules of Court x x x.
x x x
Likewise, he is accorded the right to challenge the propriety of his
prosecution on the ground that the acts for which he is charged do
not constitute a violation of Rep. Act 3019, or of the provisions on
bribery of the Revised Penal Code, and the right to present a
motion to quash the information on any other grounds provided in
Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.
However, a challenge to the validity of the criminal proceedings on
the ground that the acts for which the accused is charged do not
constitute a violation of the provisions of Rep. Act No. 3019, or of
appointee.
appointing authority;
recommending authority;
chief of the bureau or office; and
person exercising immediate supervision
over
the
COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 does not require that every transfer
or reassignment of COMELEC personnel should carry the
concurrence of the COMELEC as a collegial body. Interpreting
Resolution No. 3300 to require such concurrence will render the
resolution meaningless since the COMELEC en banc will have to
approve every personnel transfer or reassignment, making the
resolution utterly useless. Resolution No. 3300 should be
interpreted for what it is, an approval to effect transfers and
reassignments of personnel, without need of securing a second
approval from the COMELEC en banc to actually implement such
transfer or reassignment.
The COMELEC Chairman is the official expressly authorized by law
to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel. The person holding
that office, in a de jure capacity, is Benipayo. The COMELEC en
banc, in COMELEC Resolution No. 3300, approved the transfer or
reassignment of COMELEC personnel during the election period.
Thus, Benipayos order reassigning petitioner from the EID to the
Law Department does not violate Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus
Election Code. For the same reason, Benipayos order designating
Cinco Officer-in-Charge of the EID is legally unassailable. (Matibag
v. Benipayo, 380 SCRA 49, April 2, 2002, En Banc [Carpio])
292. Is a government employee who has been ordered arrested
and detained for a non-bailable offense and for which he was
suspended for his inability to report for work until the termination
of his case, still required to file a formal application for leave of
absence to ensure his reinstatement upon his acquittal and thus
protect his security of tenure? Concomitantly, will his prolonged
absence from office for more than one (1) year automatically
justify his being dropped from the rolls without prior notice despite
his being allegedly placed under suspension by his employer until
the termination of his case, which finally resulted in his acquittal
for lack of evidence?
EUSEBIA R. GALZOTE was employed as a lowly clerk in the
service of the City Government of Makati City. With her meager
income she was the lone provider for her children. But her simple
life was disrupted abruptly when she was arrested without warrant
and detained for more than three (3) years for a crime she did not
commit. Throughout her ordeal she trusted the city government
that the suspension imposed on her was only until the final
disposition of her case. As she drew near her vindication she never
did expect the worst to come to her. On the third year of her
detention the city government lifted her suspension, dropped her
from the rolls without prior notice and without her knowledge,
much less gave her an opportunity to forthwith correct the omission
of an application for leave of absence belatedly laid on her.
Upon her acquittal for lack of evidence and her release from
detention she was denied reinstatement to her position. She was
forced to seek recourse in the Civil Service Commission which
ordered her immediate reinstatement with back wages from 19
October 1994, the date when she presented herself for
reassumption of duties but was turned back by the city
government, up to the time of her actual reinstatement.
Xxx
Plainly, the case of petitioner City Government of Makati
City revolves around a rotunda of doubt, a dilemma concerning the
legal status and implications of its suspension of private
respondent Eusebia R. Galzote and the automatic leave of absence
espoused by the Civil Service Commission. Against this concern is
the punctilious adherence to technicality, the requirement that
private respondent should have filed an application for leave of
absence in proper form. The instant case is therefore a dispute
between, at its worst, private respondents substantial compliance
with the standing rules, and the City Governments insistence that
the lowly clerk should have still gone through the formalities of
applying for leave despite her detention, of which petitioner had
actual notice, and the suspension order couched in simple
language that she was being suspended until the final disposition
of her criminal case.
she had been advised three (3) days after her arrest, or on 9
September 1991, that petitioner City government of Makati City
had placed her under suspension until the final disposition of her
criminal case. This act of petitioner indubitably recognized private
respondents predicament and thus allowed her to forego reporting
for work during the pendency of her criminal case without the
needless exercise of strict formalities. At the very least, this official
communication should be taken as an equivalent of a prior
approved leave of absence since it was her employer itself which
placed her under suspension and thus excused her from further
formalities in applying for such leave. Moreover, the arrangement
bound the City Government to allow private respondent to return
to her work after the termination of her case, i.e., if acquitted of the
criminal charge. This pledge sufficiently served as legitimate
reason for her to altogether dispense with the formal application for
leave; there was no reason to, as in fact it was not required, since
she was for all practical purposes incapacitated or disabled to do
so.
Indeed, private respondent did not have the least intention to go on
AWOL from her post as Clerk III of petitioner, for AWOL means the
employee leaving or abandoning his post without justifiable reason
and without notifying his employer. In the instant case, private
respondent had a valid reason for failing to report for work as she
was detained without bail. Hence, right after her release from
detention, and when finally able to do so, she presented herself to
the Municipal Personnel Officer of petitioner City Government to
report for work. Certainly, had she been told that it was still
necessary for her to file an application for leave despite the 9
September 1991 assurance from petitioner, private respondent
would have lost no time in filing such piece of document. But the
situation momentarily suspending her from work persisted:
petitioner City Government did not alter the modus vivendi with
private respondent and lulled her into believing that its
commitment that her suspension was only until the termination of
her case was true and reliable. Under the circumstances private
respondent was in, prudence would have dictated petitioner, more
particularly the incumbent city executive, in patria potestas, to
Xxx
The holding of the Civil Service Commission that private
respondent was on automatic leave of absence during the period of
her detention must be sustained. The CSC is the constitutionally
mandated central personnel agency of the Government tasked to
establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale,
efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness and courtesy
in the civil service (Const., Art. IX-B, Sec. 3) and strengthen the
merit and rewards system, integrate all human resources
development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize
a management climate conducive to public accountability. (Ibid.)
Besides, the Administrative Code of 1987 further empowers the
CSC to prescribe, amend, and enforce rules and regulations for
carrying into effect the provisions of the Civil Service Law and other
pertinent laws, (Bk. V, I (A), Ch. 3, Sec. 12) and for matters
concerning leaves of absence, the Code specifically vests the CSC
to ordain
Sec. 60. Leave of absence. Officers and employees in the Civil
Service shall be entitled to leave of absence, with or without pay,
as may be provided by law and the rules and regulations of the
Civil Service Commission in the interest of the service.
Pursuant thereto the CSC promulgated Resolution No. 911631 dated 27 December 1991 entitled Rules Implementing Book V
of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws
which it has several times amended through memorandum
circulars. It devotes Rule XVI to leaves of absence. Petitioner City
Government relies upon Secs. 20 and 35 to debunk the CSC ruling
of an automatic leave of absence. Significantly, these provisions
have been amended so that Sec. 20 of the Civil Service Rules is
now Sec. 52 of Rule XVI, on Leave of Absence, of Resolution No. 911631 dated 27 December 1991 as amended by CSC MC No. 41, s.
1998, and Sec. 35 is now Sec. 63 as amended by CSC MC Nos. 41,
s. 1998 and 14, s. 1999.
Xxx
for is not compulsory, but voluntary. Voters may also choose not to
reveal their identities. Indeed, narrowly tailored countermeasures
may be prescribed by the Comelec, so as to minimize or suppress
incidental problems in the conduct of exit polls, without
transgressing the fundamental rights of our people. (ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corporation v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133486,
Jan. 28, 2000, En Banc [Panganiban])
303. Discuss the meaning and purpose of residency requirement
in Election Law.
Held: 1. The meaning and purpose of the residency requirement
were explained recently in our decision in Aquino v. Comelec (248
SCRA 400, 420-421 [1995]), as follows:
X x x [T]he place where a party actually or constructively has his
permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at
any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his
domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of
residence for the purposes of election law. The manifest purpose of
this deviation from the usual conceptions of residency in law as
explained in Gallego v. Vera is to exclude strangers or newcomers
unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community from
taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that
community for electoral gain. While there is nothing wrong with
the practice of establishing residence in a given area for meeting
election law requirements, this nonetheless defeats the essence of
representation, which is to place through the assent of voters those
most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if
a candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated by law
for him to qualify. That purpose could be obviously best met by
individuals who have either had actual residence in the area for a
given period or who have been domiciled in the same area either
by origin or by choice.
(Marcita Mamba Perez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133944, Oct.
28, 1999, En Banc [Mendoza])
2. The Constitution and the law requires residence as a
qualification for seeking and holding elective public office, in order
to give candidates the opportunity to be familiar with the needs,
difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and all matters vital to
the welfare of their constituencies; likewise, it enables the
electorate to evaluate the office seekers qualifications and fitness
for the job they aspire for. Inasmuch as Vicente Y. Emano has
proven that he, together with his family, (1) had actually resided in
a house he bought in 1973 in Cagayan de Oro City; (2) had actually
Held:
Stated differently, the act of registration is an
indispensable precondition to the right of suffrage. For registration
is part and parcel of the right to vote and an indispensable element
in the election process. Thus, x x x registration cannot and should
not be denigrated to the lowly stature of a mere statutory
requirement. Proceeding from the significance of registration as a
b)
314. What are the two conditions that must concur before the
COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a
afailure of election?
Held: Before the COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking
to declare a failure of election two conditions must concur, namely:
(1) no voting took place in the precinct or precincts on the date
fixed by law, or even if there was voting, the election resulted in a
failure to elect; and (2) the votes not cast would have affected the
result of the election. Note that the cause of such failure of
election could only be any of the following: force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes.
Thus, in Banaga, Jr. v. COMELEC (336 SCRA 701, July 31, 2000,
En Banc [Quisumbing]), the SC held:
We have painstakingly examined the petition filed by petitioner
Banaga before the Comelec. But we found that petitioner did not
allege at all that elections were either not held or suspended.
Neither did he aver that although there was voting, nobody was
elected. On the contrary, he conceded that an election took place
for the office of vice-mayor of Paranaque City, and that private
respondent was, in fact, proclaimed elected to that post. While
petitioner contends that the election was tainted with widespread
anomalies, it must be noted that to warrant a declaration of failure
of election the commission of fraud must be such that it prevented
or suspended the holding of an election, or marred fatally the
preparation and transmission, custody and canvass of the election
returns. These essential facts ought to have been alleged clearly
by the petitioner below, but he did not.
315. Cite instances when Comelec may or may not validly
declare failure of elections.
Held: In Mitmug v. COMELEC (230 SCRA 54 [1994]), petitioner
instituted with the COMELEC an action to declare failure of election
in forty-nine precincts where less than a quarter of the electorate
were able to cast their votes. He also lodged an election protest
with the Regional Trial Court disputing the result of the election in
all precincts in his municipality. The Comelec denied motu proprio
and without due notice and hearing the petition to declare failure of
election despite petitioners argument that he has meritorious
grounds in support thereto, that is, massive disenfranchisement of
voters due to terrorism. On review, we ruled that the Comelec did
not gravely abuse its discretion in denying the petition. It was not
proven that no actual voting took place. Neither was it shown that
even if there was voting, the results thereon would be tantamount
to failure to elect. Considering that there is no concurrence of the
conditions seeking to declare failure of election, there is no longer
need to receive evidence on alleged election irregularities.
In Sardea v. COMELEC (225 SCRA 374 [1993]), all election materials
and paraphernalia with the municipal board of canvassers were
destroyed by the sympathizers of the losing mayoralty candidate.
The board then decided to use the copies of election returns
furnished to the municipal trial court. Petitioner therein filed a
petition to stop the proceedings of the board of canvassers on the
ground that it had no authority to use said election returns
obtained from the municipal trial court. The petition was denied.
Next, he filed a petition assailing the composition of the board of
canvassers.
Despite that petition, the board of canvassers
proclaimed the winning candidates. Later on, petitioner filed a
petition to declare a failure of election alleging that the attendant
facts would justify declaration of such failure. On review, we ruled
that petitioners first two actions involved pre-proclamation
controversies which can no longer be entertained after the winning
candidates have been proclaimed.
Regarding the petition to
declare a failure of election, we held that the destruction and loss
of copies of election returns intended for the municipal board of
canvassers on account of violence is not one of the causes that
would warrant the declaration of failure of election. The reason is
that voting actually took place as scheduled and other valid
election returns still existed. Moreover, the destruction or loss did
not affect the result of the election. We also declared that there is
failure of elections only when the will of the electorate has been
of canvass or election returns even in elections for president, vicepresident and members of the House of Representatives for the
simple reason that the correction of manifest error will not prolong
the process of canvassing nor delay the proclamation of the winner
in the election. The rule is consistent with and complements the
authority of the Comelec under the Constitution to "enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall" (Section 2[1],
Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution) and its power to "decide, except
those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections."
(Section 2[3], Article IX-C, supra) (Federico S. Sandoval v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 133842, Jan. 26, 2000 [Puno])
321. Who has authority to rule on petitions for correction of
manifest error in the certificate of canvass or election returns?
Held: The authority to rule on petitions for correction of manifest
error is vested in the Comelec en banc. Section 7 of Rule 27 of the
1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure (took effect on February 15,
1993) provides that if the error is discovered before proclamation,
the board of canvassers may motu proprio, or upon verified petition
by any candidate, political party, organization or coalition of
political parties, after due notice and hearing, correct the errors
committed. The aggrieved party may appeal the decision of the
board to the Commission and said appeal shall be heard and
decided by the Commission en banc. Section 5, however, of the
same rule states that a petition for correction of manifest error may
be filed directly with the Commission en banc provided that such
errors could not have been discovered during the canvassing
despite the exercise of due diligence and proclamation of the
winning candidate had already been made. (Federico S.
Sandoval v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133842, Jan. 26, 2000
[Puno])
322.
Answer:
An autonomous region consists of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and
distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework
of the Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as the
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. (Sec. 15,
Art. X, 1987 Constitution)
329. What are administrative regions?
Are they considered
territorial and political subdivisions of the State? Who has the
power to create administrative regions?
Held: Administrative regions are mere groupings of contiguous
provinces for administrative purposes. They are not territorial and
political subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays. While the power to merge administrative regions is not
Xxx
Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power
delegated to the MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila Council to
promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the
implementation of the MMDAs functions. There is no grant of
authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general
welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis. This was explicitly
stated in the last Committee deliberations prior to the bills
presentation to Congress. X x x
It is thus beyond doubt that the MMDA is not a local government
unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative power. It is
not even a special metropolitan political subdivision as
contemplated in Section 11, Article X of the Constitution. The
creation of a special metropolitan political subdivision requires
the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected. R.A. No. 7924 was not submitted to
the inhabitants of Metro Manila in a plebiscite. The Chairman of the
MMDA is not an official elected by the people, but appointed by the
President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member. In fact,
part of his function is to perform such other duties as may be
assigned to him by the President, whereas in local government
units, the President merely exercises supervisory authority. This
emphasizes the administrative character of the MMDA.
Clearly then, the MMC under P.D. No. 824 is not the same entity as
the MMDA under R.A. No. 7924. Unlike the MMC, the MMDA has no
power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is
the local government units, acting through their respective
legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police
power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati
City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening
of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA
is illegal x x x. (MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., 328
SCRA 836, March 27, 2000, 1st Div. [Puno])
331.
Certainly, Congress did not intend that laws creating new cities
must contain therein detailed technical descriptions similar to those
appearing in Torrens titles, as petitioners seem to imply. To require
such description in the law as a condition sine qua non for its
validity would be to defeat the very purpose which the Local
Government Code seeks to serve. The manifest intent of the Code
is to empower local government units and to give them their
rightful due. It seeks to make local governments more responsive
to the needs of their constituents while at the same time serving as
a vital cog in national development. To invalidate R.A. No. 7854 on
the mere ground that no cadastral type of description was used in
the law would serve the letter but defeat the spirit of the Code. It
then becomes a case of the master serving the slave, instead of
the other way around. This could not be the intendment of the
law. X x x
(Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 211, 217-219, Mar. 7,
1995, En Banc [Puno])
336.
340. What are the requisites before a Local Government Unit can
validly exercise the power of eminent domain?
Held:
1)
Answer:
Yes, because he has served only two full terms
successively.
In both cases, the mayor is entitled to run for reelection because
the two conditions for the application of the disqualification
provisions have not concurred, namely, that the local official
concerned has been elected three consecutive times and that he
has fully served three consecutive terms. In the first case, even if
the local official is considered to have served three full terms
notwithstanding his resignation before the end of the first term, the
fact remains that he has not been elected three times. In the
second case, the local official has been elected three consecutive
times, but he has not fully served three consecutive terms.
Case No. 3. The case of vice-mayor C who becomes mayor by
succession involves a total failure of the two conditions to concur
for the purpose of applying Art. X, Sec. 8. Suppose he is twice
elected after that term, is he qualified to run again in the next
election?
Answer: Yes, because he was not elected to the office of mayor in
the first term but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of
law. Neither had he served the full term because he only continued
the service, interrupted by the death, of the deceased mayor.
(Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC and Capco, Jr., G.R. No. 133495, Sept.
3, 1998, 295 SCRA 157, En Banc [Mendoza])
343. What are the policies embodied in the constitutional
provision barring elective local officials, with the exception of
barangay officials, from serving more than three consecutive
terms?
Held: To prevent the establishment of political dynasties is not the
only policy embodied in the constitutional provision in question
(barring elective local officials, with the exception of barangay
officials, from serving more than three consecutive terms). The
other policy is that of enhancing the freedom of choice of the
people. To consider, therefore, only stay in office regardless of how
the official concerned came to that office whether by election or
by succession by operation of law would be to disregard one of
the purposes of the constitutional provision in question. (Borja, Jr.
v. COMELEC and Capco, Jr., G.R. No. 133495, Sept. 3, 1998,
295 SCRA 157, En Banc [Mendoza])
344.
Lonzanida was previously elected and served two
consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the
May 1995 mayoral elections. In the May 1995 elections he again
ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was proclaimed
winner. He assumed office and discharged the rights and duties of
mayor until March 1998 when he was ordered to vacate the post by
reason of the COMELEC decision on the election protest against
him which declared his opponent Juan Alvez the duly elected
mayor. Alvez served the remaining portion of the 1995-1998
mayoral term. Is Lonzanida still qualified to run for mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales in the May 1998 local elections?
Held: The two requisites for the application of the three term rule
was absent. First, Lonzanida cannot be considered as having been
duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and second, he
did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of
involuntary relinquishment of office. After a re-appreciation and
revision of the contested ballots the COMELEC itself declared by
final judgment that Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral
elections and his previous proclamation as winner was declared null
and void. His assumption of office as mayor cannot be deemed to
have been by reason of a valid election but by reason of a void
proclamation. It has been repeatedly held by the SC that a
proclamation subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all
and while a proclaimed candidate may assume office on the
strength of the proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he is only
a presumptive winner who assumes office subject to the final
outcome of the election protest. Lonzanida did not serve a term as
mayor of San Antonio, Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998
because he was not duly elected to the post; he merely assumed
office as presumptive winner, which presumption was later
overturned by the COMELEC when it decided with finality that
Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections.
Second, Lonzanida cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995
to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his post before the
expiration of the term. His opponents' contention that Lonzanida
should be deemed to have served one full term from May 19951998 because he served the greater portion of that term has no
legal basis to support it; it disregards the second requisite for the
application of the disqualification, i.e., that he has fully served
three consecutive terms. The second sentence of the constitutional
provision under scrutiny states, "Voluntary renunciation of office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected."
The clear intent of the framers of the Constitution to bar any
348.
since the nature of the duties of the Provincial Governor calls for a
full-time occupant to discharge them. Such is not only consistent
with but also appears to be the clear rationale of the new (Local
Government) Code wherein the policy of performing dual functions
in both offices has already been abandoned. To repeat, the
creation of a temporary vacancy in the office of the Governor
creates a corresponding vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor
whenever the latter acts as Governor by virtue of such temporary
vacancy. This event constitutes an inability on the part of the
regular presiding officer (Vice-Governor) to preside during the SP
sessions, which thus calls for the operation of the remedy set in
Article 49(b) of the Local Government Code concerning the
election of a temporary presiding officer. The continuity of the
Acting Governors (Vice-Governor) powers as presiding officer of
the SP is suspended so long as he is in such capacity. Under
Section 49(b), in the event of the inability of the regular presiding
officer to preside at the sanggunian session, the members present
and constituting a quorum shall elect from among themselves a
temporary presiding officer. (Gamboa, Jr. v. Aguirre, Jr., G.R.
No. 134213, July 20, 1999, En Banc [Ynares-Santiago])
351.
What is recall?
Xxx
Both petitioner Claudio and the COMELEC thus agree that the term
recall as used in Sec. 74 refers to a process. They disagree only
as to when the process starts for purpose of the one-year limitation
in paragraph (b) of Sec. 74.
Held: The term regular local election under Sec. 74 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 which provides that no recall shall take
place within one (1) year x x x immediately preceding a regular
local election refers to one where the position of the official sought
to be recalled is to be actually contested and filled by the
electorate (Paras v. Comelec, G.R. No. 123169, Nov. 4, 1996). The
one-year time bar will not apply where the local official sought to
be recalled is a Mayor and the approaching election is a barangay
election. (Angobung v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 126576, March 5,
1997)
360. Does the word Recall in paragraph (b) of Section 74 of the
Local Government Code include the convening of the Preparatory
Recall Assembly and the filing by it of a recall resolution? Discuss.
Held: Petitioner contends that the term recall in Sec. 74 (b)
refers to a process, in contrast to the term recall election found in
Sec. 74 (a), which obviously refers to an election. He claims that
when several barangay chairmen met and convened on May 19,
1999 and unanimously resolved to initiate the recall, followed by
the taking of votes by the PRA on May 29, 1999 for the purpose of
adopting a resolution to initiate the recall of Jovito Claudio as
Mayor of Pasay City for loss of confidence, the process of recall
began and, since May 29, 1999 was less than a year after he had
assumed office, the PRA was illegally convened and all proceedings
held thereafter, including the filing of the recall petition on July 2,
1999, were null and void.
The COMELEC, on the other hand, maintains that the process of
recall starts with the filing of the petition for recall and ends with
the conduct of the recall election, and that, since the petition for
recall in this case was filed on July 2, 1999, exactly one year and a
day after petitioners assumption of office, the recall was validly
initiated outside the one-year prohibited period.
Xxx
To sum up, the term recall in paragraph (b) refers to the recall
election and not to the preliminary proceedings to initiate recall
1)
prohibit him from entering into contracts unless and until funds are
appropriated therefor. In fact, it is his bounden duty to so represent
the city in all its business transactions. On the other hand, the city
council must provide for the depositing, leaving or throwing of
garbage and to appropriate funds for such expenses. (Section 177
[b]). It cannot refuse to so provide and appropriate public funds for
such services which are very vital to the maintenance of
cleanliness of the city and the good health of its inhabitants.
By entering into the two contracts, Mayor Simon did not
usurp the city councils power to provide for the proper disposal of
garbage and to appropriate funds therefor. The execution of
contracts to address such a need is his statutory duty, just as it is
the city councils duty to provide for said services. There is no
provision in B.P. Blg. 337, however, that prohibits the city mayor
from entering into contracts for the public welfare, unless and until
there is prior authority from the city council. This requirement was
imposed much later by R.A. No. 7160, long after the contracts had
already been executed and implemented.
Even the very Charter of Quezon City, more particularly
Section 9(f), Section 12(a)and Section 12(m) thereof, simply
provide that the mayor shall exercise general powers and duties,
such as signing all warrants drawn on the city treasurer and all
bonds, contracts, and obligations of the city, even as it grants the
City Council the power, by ordinance or resolution, to make all
appropriations for the expenses of the government of the city, as
well as to prohibit the throwing or depositing of offal, garbage,
refuse, or other offensive matter in the same, and to provide for its
collection and disposition x x x. (Citations omitted)
While the powers and duties of the Mayor and the City
Council are clearly delineated, there is nothing in the cited
provisions, nor even in the statute itself, that requires prior
authorization by the city council by proper enactment of an
ordinance before the City Mayor can enter into contracts.
Private respondent Lexber asserts that the subject contract
was entered into by Mayor Simon in behalf of the Quezon City
Xxx
In the case at bar, while the City of Pasig vigorously claims that the
areas covered by the proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico
are within its territory, it can not deny that portions of the same
area are included in the boundary dispute case pending before the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo. Surely, whether the areas in
controversy shall be decided as within the territorial jurisdiction of
the Municipality of Cainta or the City of Pasig has material bearing
to the creation of the proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico.
Indeed, a requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial
jurisdiction to be properly identified by metes and bounds or by
more or less permanent natural boundaries (Sec. 386[b], R.A. No.
190 SCRA 130 (1990), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs just sent a
letter directly to the Secretary of Labor and Employment, informing
the latter that the respondent-employer could not be sued because
it enjoyed diplomatic immunity. In World Health Organization v.
Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 (1972), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs sent
the trial court a telegram to that effect. In Baer v. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1
(1974), the U.S. Embassy asked the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to
request the Solicitor General to make, in behalf of the commander
of the United States Naval Base at Olongapo City, Zambales, a
suggestion to respondent Judge. The Solicitor General embodied
the suggestion in a Manifestation and Memorandum as amicus
curiae.
In the case at bench, the Department of Foreign Affairs, through the
Office of Legal Affairs moved with this Court to be allowed to
intervene on the side of petitioner. The Court allowed the said
Department to file its memorandum in support of petitioners claim
of sovereign immunity.
In some cases, the defense of sovereign immunity was submitted
directly to the local courts by the respondents through their private
counsels. In cases where the foreign states bypass the Foreign
Office, the courts can inquire into the facts and make their own
determination as to the nature of the acts and transactions
involved. (Holy See, The v. Rosario, Jr., 238 SCRA 524, Dec.
1, 1994, En Banc [Quiason])
388. Is the determination of the executive branch of the
government that a state or instrumentality is entitled to sovereign
or diplomatic immunity subject to judicial review, or is it a political
question and therefore, conclusive upon the courts?
Held: The issue of petitioners (The Holy See) non-suability can be
determined by the trial court without going to trial in light of the
pleadings x x x. Besides, the privilege of sovereign immunity in
this case was sufficiently established by the Memorandum and
Certification of the Department of Foreign Affairs.
As the
department tasked with the conduct of the Philippines foreign
relations, the Department of Foreign Affairs has formally intervened
in this case and officially certified that the Embassy of the Holy See
is a duly accredited diplomatic mission to the Republic of the
Philippines exempt from local jurisdiction and entitled to all the
rights, privileges and immunities of a diplomatic mission or
embassy in this country. The determination of the executive arm of
government that a state or instrumentality is entitled to sovereign
or diplomatic immunity is a political question that is conclusive
purposes and international objects. Despite its size and object, the
Vatican City has an independent government of its own, with the
Pope, who is also head of the Roman Catholic Church, as the Holy
See or Head of State, in conformity with its traditions, and the
demands of its mission in the world. Indeed, the world-wide
interests and activities of the Vatican City are such as to make it in
a sense an international state (Fenwick, supra, 125; Kelsen,
Principles of International Law 160 [1956]).
389. Discuss the Status of the Vatican and the Holy See in
International Law.
Held:
It is the process by which persons charged with or
convicted of crime against the law of a State and found in a foreign
State are returned by the latter to the former for trial or
punishment. It applies to those who are merely charged with an
offense but have not been brought to trial; to those who have been
tried and convicted and have subsequently escaped from custody;
and those who have been convicted in absentia. It does not apply
to persons merely suspected of having committed an offense but
against whom no charge has been laid or to a person whose
presence is desired as a witness or for obtaining or enforcing a civil
judgment. (Weston, Falk, D' Amato, International Law and
Order, 2nd ed., p. 630 [1990], cited in Dissenting Opinion,
Puno, J., in Secretary of Justice v. Hon. Ralph C. Lantion,
G.R. No. 139465, Jan. 18, 2000, En Banc)
391.
398.
Held:
1. Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime.
First, extradition treaties are entered into for the purpose of
suppressing crime by facilitating the arrest and custodial transfer
and judicial system of its treaty partner; as well as in the ability and
the willingness of the latter to grant basic rights to the accused in
the pending criminal case therein.
3. By nature then, extradition proceedings are not equivalent to a
criminal case in which guilt or innocence is determined.
Consequently, an extradition case is not one in which the
constitutional rights of the accused are necessarily available. It is
more akin, if at all, to a courts request to police authorities for the
arrest of the accused who is at large or has escaped detention or
jumped bail. Having once escaped the jurisdiction of the
requesting state, the reasonable prima facie presumption is that
the person would escape again if given the opportunity.
4. Immediately upon receipt of the petition for extradition and its
supporting documents, the judge shall make a prima facie finding
whether the petition is sufficient in form and substance, whether it
complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and whether the
person sought is extraditable. The magistrate has discretion to
require the petitioner to submit further documentation, or to
personally examine the affiants or witnesses. If convinced that a
prima facie case exists, the judge immediately issues a warrant for
the arrest of the potential extraditee and summons him or her to
answer and to appear at scheduled hearings on the petition.
5. After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may apply
for bail. Since the applicants have a history of absconding, they
have the burden of showing that (a) there is no flight risk and no
danger to the community; and (b) there exist special, humanitarian
or compelling circumstances. The grounds used by the highest
court in the requesting state for the grant of bail therein may be
considered, under the principle of reciprocity as a special
circumstance. In extradition cases, bail is not a matter of right; it is
subject to judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of
each case.
6. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process
and to fundamental fairness. Due process does not always call for
400.
What is its
Held:
Ratification is generally held to be an executive act,
undertaken by the head of state or of the government, as the case
may be, through which the formal acceptance of the treaty is
proclaimed. A State may provide in its domestic legislation the
process of ratification of a treaty. The consent of the State to be
bound by a treaty is expressed by ratification when: (a) the treaty
provides for such ratification, (b) it is otherwise established that the
negotiating States agreed that ratification should be required, (c)
the representative of the State has signed the treaty subject to
ratification, or (d) the intention of the State to sign the treaty
subject to ratification appears from the full powers of its
representative, or was expressed during the negotiation. (BAYAN
[Bagong Alyansang Makabayan] v. Executive Secretary
Ronaldo Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, Oct. 10, 2000, En Banc
[Buena])
407.
Held:
One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in
international law is pacta sunt servanda international agreements
must be performed in good faith. A treaty engagement is not a
mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on
the parties x x x. A state which has contracted valid international
obligations is bound to make in its legislations such modifications
as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations
undertaken. (Tanada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997
[Panganiban])
408. Explain the "rebus sic stantibus" rule (i.e., things remaining
as they are). Does it operate automatically to render a treaty
inoperative?
Held: According to Jessup, the doctrine constitutes an attempt to
formulate a legal principle which would justify non-performance of a
treaty obligation if the conditions with relation to which the parties
contracted have changed so materially and so unexpectedly as to
create a situation in which the exaction of performance would be
unreasonable. The key element of this doctrine is the vital change
in the condition of the contracting parties that they could not have
foreseen at the time the treaty was concluded.
The doctrine of rebus sic stantibus does not operate automatically
to render the treaty inoperative. There is a necessity for a formal
act of rejection, usually made by the head of state, with a
statement of the reasons why compliance with the treaty is no
longer required. (Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines, 210
SCRA 256, June 23, 1992)
409. What is the doctrine of effective nationality (genuine link
doctrine)?
Held:
This principle is expressed in Article 5 of the Hague
Convention of 1930 on the Conflict of Nationality Laws as follows:
Art. 5. Within a third State a person having more than one
nationality shall be treated as if he had only one. Without prejudice
to the application of its law in matters of personal status and of any
convention in force, a third State shall, of the nationalities which
any such person possesses, recognize exclusively in its territory
either the nationality of the country in which he is habitually and
principally resident or the nationality of the country with which in
the circumstances he appears to be in fact most closely connected.
(Frivaldo v. COMELEC, 174 SCRA 245, June 23, 1989)
410. What are the conditions before foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities may be allowed in the Philippines?
Ans.: After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement
between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of
America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops,
or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a
treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so
any form of treaty with a wide variety of subject matter, such as,
but not limited to, extradition or tax treaties or those economic in
nature. All treaties or international agreements entered into by the
Philippines, regardless of subject matter, coverage, or particular
designation or appellation, requires the concurrence of the Senate
to be valid and effective.
In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provision
that applies to treaties which involve the presence of foreign
military bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines. Under this
provision, the concurrence of the Senate is only one of the
requisites to render compliance with the constitutional
requirements and to consider the agreement binding on the
Philippines. Section 25, Article XVIII further requires that "foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities" may be allowed in the
Philippines only by virtue of a treaty duly concurred in by the
Senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national
referendum held for that purpose if so required by Congress, and
recognized as such by the other contracting State.
It is our considered view that both constitutional provisions,
far from contradicting each other, actually share some common
ground. These constitutional provisions both embody phrases in
the negative and thus, are deemed prohibitory in mandate and
character. In particular, Section 21 opens with the clause "No
treaty x x x," and Section 25 contains the phrase "shall not be
allowed." Additionally, in both instances, the concurrence of the
Senate is indispensable to render the treaty or international
agreement valid and effective.
To our mind, the fact that the President referred the VFA to
the Senate under Section 21, Article VII, and that the Senate
extended its concurrence under the same provision, is immaterial.
For in either case, whether under Section 21, Article VII or Section
25, Article XVIII, the fundamental law is crystalline that the
concurrence of the Senate is mandatory to comply with the strict
constitutional requirements.
On the whole, the VFA is an agreement which defines the
treatment of United States troops and personnel visiting the
Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of
military personnel, and further defines the rights of the United
States and the Philippine government in the matter of criminal
jurisdiction, movement of vessels and aircraft, importation and
exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.
it is necessary to refer to the VFA itself. Not much help can be had
therefrom, unfortunately, since the terminology employed is itself
the source of the problem. The VFA permits United States
personnel to engage, on an impermanent basis, in activities, the
exact meaning of which was left undefined. The expression is
ambiguous, permitting a wide scope of undertakings subject only to
the approval of the Philippine government. The sole encumbrance
placed on its definition is couched in the negative, in that United
States personnel must abstain from any activity inconsistent with
the spirit of this agreement, and in particular, from any political
activity. All other activities, in other words, are fair game.
We are not completely unaided, however. The Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, which contains provisos governing
interpretations of international agreements, state x x x.
It is clear from the foregoing that the cardinal rule of interpretation
must involve an examination of the text, which is presumed to
verbalize the parties intentions. The Convention likewise dictates
what may be used as aids to deduce the meaning of terms, which it
refers to as the context of the treaty, as well as other elements
may be taken into account alongside the aforesaid context. X x x
The Terms of Reference rightly fall within the context of the VFA.
After studied reflection, it appeared farfetched that the ambiguity
surrounding the meaning of the word activities arose from
accident. In our view, it was deliberately made that way to give
both parties a certain leeway in negotiation. In this manner,
visiting US forces may sojourn in Philippine territory for purposes
other than military. As conceived, the joint exercises may include
training on new techniques of patrol and surveillance to protect the
nations marine resources, sea search-and-destroy operations to
assist vessels in distress, disaster relief operations, civic action
projects such as the building of school houses, medical and
humanitarian missions, and the like.
1)
419. Should Courts blindly adhere and take on its face the
communication from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) that a
person is covered by any immunity?
Held: Courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the
communication from the DFA that petitioner is covered by any
immunity. The DFAs determination that a certain person is covered
by immunity is only preliminary which has no binding effect in
courts. In receiving ex parte the DFAs advice and in motu proprio
dismissing the two criminal cases without notice to the prosecution,
the latters right to due process was violated. It should be noted
that due process is a right of the accused as much as it is of the
prosecution. The needed inquiry in what capacity petitioner was
acting at the time of the alleged utterances requires for its
resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to be presented at the
proper time (See United States v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]). At
any rate, it has been ruled that the mere invocation of the
immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the dropping of the
charges (Chavez v. Sandiganbayan, 193 SCRA 282 [1991]). (Liang
v. People, 323 SCRA 692, Jan. 28, 2000, 1 st Div. [YnaresSantiago])
between
Diplomatic
and
Held:
There are three major differences between
diplomatic and international immunities.
Firstly, one of the
recognized limitations of diplomatic immunity is that members of
Ans.: The United States is invoking its right to defend itself against
an expected attack by Iraq with the use of its biological and
chemical weapons of mass destruction. There is no evidence of
such a threat, but Bush is probably invoking the modern view that a
state does not have to wait until the potential enemy fires first.
The cowboy from Texas says that outdrawing the foe who is about
to shoot is an act of self-defense.
Art. 51 says, however, that there must first be an armed attack
before a state can exercise its inherent right of self-defense, and
only until the Security Council, to which the aggression should be
reported, shall have taken the necessary measures to maintain
international peace and security. It was the United States that
made the armed attack first, thus becoming the aggressor, not
Iraq. Iraq is now not only exercising its inherent right of selfdefense as recognized by the UN Charter. (Justice Isagani A.
Cruz, in an article entitled A New World Order written in
his column Separate Opinion published in the March 30,
2003 issue of the Philippines Daily Inquirer)