EN BANC

G.R. No. 129296

September 25, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ABE VALDEZ y DELA CRUZ, accused-appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For automatic review is the decision1 promulgated on February 18, 1997, by the Regional Trial Court
of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. 3105. It found appellant Abe Valdez y
Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as amended by R.A. No. 7659. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
death by lethal injection.
In an Information dated September 26, 1996, appellant was charged as follows:"That on or about
September 25, 1996, at Sitio Bulan, Barangay Sawmill, Municipality of Villaverde, Province of Nueva
Vizcaya, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
who was caught in flagrante delicto and without authority of law, did then and there wilfully (sic),
unlawfully and feloniously plant, cultivate and culture seven (7) fully grown marijuana plants known
as Indian Hemp weighing 2.194 kilos, from which dangerous drugs maybe (sic) manufactured or
derived, to the damage and prejudice of the government of the Republic of the Philippines.
"That the property where the said seven (7) fully grown marijuana plants were planted, cultivated
and cultured shall be confiscated and escheated in favor of the government.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."2
On November 15, 1996, appellant was arraigned and, with assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty
to the charge. Trial on the merits then ensued.
The first witness for the prosecution was SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, a member of the police force of
Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya. He testified that at around 10:15 a.m. of September 24, 1996, he
received a tip from an unnamed informer about the presence of a marijuana plantation, allegedly
owned by appellant at Sitio Bulan, Ibung, Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya. 3 The prohibited plants were
allegedly planted close to appellant's hut. Police Inspector Alejandro R. Parungao, Chief of Police of
Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya then formed a reaction team from his operatives to verify the report.
The team was composed of SPO3 Marcelo M. Tipay, SPO2 Noel V. Libunao, SPO2 Pedro S. Morales,

SPO1 Romulo G. Tobias and PO2 Alfelmer I. Balut. Inspector Parungao gave them specific
instructions to "uproot said marijuana plants and arrest the cultivator of same." 4
At approximately 5:00 o'clock A.M. the following day, said police team, accompanied by their
informer, left for the site where the marijuana plants were allegedly being grown. After a threehour, uphill trek from the nearest barangay road, the police operatives arrived at the place
pinpointed by their informant. The police found appellant alone in his nipa hut. They, then,
proceeded to look around the area where appellant had his kaingin and saw seven (7) five-foot high,
flowering marijuana plants in two rows, approximately 25 meters from appellant's hut. 5 PO2 Balut
asked appellant who owned the prohibited plants and, according to Balut, the latter admitted that
they were his.6 The police uprooted the seven marijuana plants, which weighed 2.194 kilograms. 7 The
police took photos of appellant standing beside the cannabis plants. 8 Appellant was then arrested.
One of the plants, weighing 1.090 kilograms, was sent to the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for analysis.9 Inspector Prevy Fabros Luwis, the Crime
Laboratory forensic analyst, testified that upon microscopic examination of said plant, she found
cystolitic hairs containing calcium carbonate, a positive indication for marijuana. 10 She next
conducted a chemical examination, the results of which confirmed her initial impressions. She found
as follows:
"SPECIMEN SUBMITTED: Exh "A" - 1.090 grams of uprooted suspected marijuana plant placed
inside a white sack with markings.
xxx
"FINDINGS: Qualitative examination conducted on the above stated specimen gave POSITIVE
result to the test for Marijuana, a prohibited drug."11
The prosecution also presented a certification from the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources that the land cultivated by appellant, on which the growing marijuana plants were found,
was Lot 3224 of Timberland Block B, which formed part of the Integrated Social Forestry Area in
Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya.12 This lot was part of the public domain. Appellant was acknowledged in
the certification as the occupant of the lot, but no Certificate of Stewardship had yet been issued
in his favor.13
As its sole witness, the defense presented appellant. He testified that at around 10:00 o'clock
A.M., September 25, 1996, he was weeding his vegetable farm in Sitio Bulan when he was called by a
person whose identity he does not know. He was asked to go with the latter to "see something." 14
This unknown person then brought appellant to the place where the marijuana plants were found,
approximately 100 meters away from his nipa hut.15 Five armed policemen were present and they
made him stand in front of the hemp plants. He was then asked if he knew anything about the
marijuana growing there. When he denied any knowledge thereof, SPO2 Libunao poked a fist at him

and told him to admit ownership of the plants. 16 Appellant was so nervous and afraid that he
admitted owning the marijuana.17
The police then took a photo of him standing in front of one of the marijuana plants. He was then
made to uproot five of the cannabis plants, and bring them to his hut, where another photo was
taken of him standing next to a bundle of uprooted marijuana plants. 18 The police team then brought
him to the police station at Villaverde. On the way, a certain Kiko Pascua, a barangay peace officer
of Barangay Sawmill, accompanied the police officers. Pascua, who bore a grudge against him,
because of his refusal to participate in the former's illegal logging activities, threatened him to
admit owning the marijuana, otherwise he would "be put in a bad situation." 19 At the police
headquarters, appellant reiterated that he knew nothing about the marijuana plants seized by the
police.20
On cross-examination, appellant declared that there were ten other houses around the vicinity of
his kaingin, the nearest house being 100 meters away.21 The latter house belonged to one Carlito
(Lito) Pascua, an uncle of the barangay peace officer who had a grudge against him. The spot where
the marijuana plants were found was located between his house and Carlito Pascua's. 22
The prosecution presented SPO3 Tipay as its rebuttal witness. His testimony was offered to rebut
appellant's claim that the marijuana plants were not planted in the lot he was cultivating. 23 Tipay
presented a sketch he made,24 which showed the location of marijuana plants in relation to the old
and new nipa huts of appellant, as well as the closest neighbor. According to Tipay, the marijuana
plot was located 40 meters away from the old hut of Valdez and 250 meters distant from the hut
of Carlito Pascua.25 Tipay admitted on cross-examination that no surveyor accompanied him when he
made the measurements.26 He further stated that his basis for claiming that appellant was the
owner or planter of the seized plants was the information given him by the police informer and the
proximity of appellant's hut to the location of said plants.27
Finding appellant's defense insipid, the trial court held appellant liable as charged for cultivation
and ownership of marijuana plants as follows:
"WHEREFORE, finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of cultivating marijuana
plants punishable under section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, accused is
hereby sentenced to death by lethal injection. Costs against the accused.
"SO ORDERED."28
Appellant assigns the following errors for our consideration:
I

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE SEVEN (7)
MARIJUANA PLANTS DESPITE THEIR INADMISSIBILITY BEING PRODUCTS OF AN
ILLEGAL SEARCH.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT OF VIOLATION OF
SECTION 9, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425 DESPITE THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE

CORPUS DELICTI AND THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH
UPON APPELLANT DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THAT THE
LAND WHERE THE MARIJUANA PLANTS WERE PLANTED IS A PUBLIC LAND ON THE
ASSUMPTION THAT INDEED APPELLANT PLANTED THE SUBJECT MARIJUANA. 29
Simply stated, the issues are:
(1) Was the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in the present case lawful?
(2) Were the seized plants admissible in evidence against the accused?
(3) Has the prosecution proved appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
(4) Is the sentence of death by lethal injection correct?
The first and second issues will be jointly discussed because they are interrelated.
Appellant contends that there was unlawful search. First, the records show that the law enforcers
had more than ample time to secure a search warrant. Second, that the marijuana plants were found
in an unfenced lot does not remove appellant from the mantle of protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures. He relies on the ruling of the US Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1,

20 L. Ed 2d 898, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), to the effect that the protection against unreasonable
government intrusion protects people, not places.
For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that the records clearly show that
there was no search made by the police team, in the first place. The OSG points out that the
marijuana plants in question were grown in an unfenced lot and as each grew about five (5) feet tall,
they were visible from afar, and were, in fact, immediately spotted by the police officers when
they reached the site. The seized marijuana plants were, thus, in plain view of the police officers.

The instant case must, therefore, be treated as a warrantless lawful search under the "plain view"
doctrine.
The court a quo upheld the validity of the search and confiscation made by the police team on the
finding that:
"...It seems there was no need for any search warrant. The policemen went to the plantation site
merely to make a verification. When they found the said plants, it was too much to expect them to
apply for a search warrant. In view of the remoteness of the plantation site (they had to walk for
six hours back and forth) and the dangers lurking in the area if they stayed overnight, they had a
valid reason to confiscate the said plants upon discovery without any search warrant. Moreover, the
evidence shows that the lot was not legally occupied by the accused and there was no fence which
evinced the occupant's desire to keep trespassers out. There was, therefore, no privacy to protect,
hence, no search warrant was required."30
The Constitution31 lays down the general rule that a search and seizure must be carried on the
strength of a judicial warrant. Otherwise, the search and seizure is deemed "unreasonable."
Evidence procured on the occasion of an unreasonable search and seizure is deemed tainted for
being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree and should be excluded. 32 Such evidence shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.33
In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination of
the existence of probable cause. From the declarations of the police officers themselves, it is clear
that they had at least one (1) day to obtain a warrant to search appellant's farm. Their informant
had revealed his name to them. The place where the cannabis plants were planted was pinpointed.
From the information in their possession, they could have convinced a judge that there was
probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant. But they did not. Instead, they uprooted the
plants and apprehended the accused on the excuse that the trip was a good six hours and
inconvenient to them. We need not underscore that the protection against illegal search and seizure
is constitutionally mandated and only under specific instances are searches allowed without
warrants.34 The mantle of protection extended by the Bill of Rights covers both innocent and guilty
alike against any form of high-handedness of law enforcers, regardless of the praiseworthiness of
their intentions.
We find no reason to subscribe to Solicitor General's contention that we apply the "plain view"
doctrine. For the doctrine to apply, the following elements must be present:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally
present in the pursuit of their official duties;

(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where
they are; and
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and
(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. 35
In the instant case, recall that PO2 Balut testified that they first located the marijuana plants
before appellant was arrested without a warrant.36 Hence, there was no valid warrantless arrest
which preceded the search of appellant's premises. Note further that the police team was
dispatched to appellant's kaingin precisely to search for and uproot the prohibited flora. The
seizure of evidence in "plain view" applies only where the police officer is not searching for
evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. 37 Clearly,
their discovery of the cannabis plants was not inadvertent. We also note the testimony of SPO2
Tipay that upon arriving at the area, they first had to "look around the area" before they could
spot the illegal plants.38 Patently, the seized marijuana plants were not "immediately apparent" and a
"further search" was needed. In sum, the marijuana plants in question were not in "plain view" or
"open to eye and hand." The "plain view" doctrine, thus, cannot be made to apply.
Nor can we sustain the trial court's conclusion that just because the marijuana plants were found in
an unfenced lot, appellant could not invoke the protection afforded by the Charter against
unreasonable searches by agents of the State. The right against unreasonable searches and
seizures is the immunity of one's person, which includes his residence, his papers, and other
possessions.39 The guarantee refers to "the right of personal security"40 of the individual. As
appellant correctly points out, what is sought to be protected against the State's unlawful intrusion
are persons, not places.41 To conclude otherwise would not only mean swimming against the stream,
it would also lead to the absurd logic that for a person to be immune against unreasonable searches
and seizures, he must be in his home or office, within a fenced yard or a private place. The Bill of
Rights belongs as much to the person in the street as to the individual in the sanctuary of his
bedroom.
We therefore hold, with respect to the first issue, that the confiscated plants were evidently
obtained during an illegal search and seizure. As to the second issue, which involves the
admissibility of the marijuana plants as evidence for the prosecution, we find that said plants
cannot, as products of an unlawful search and seizure, be used as evidence against appellant. They
are fruits of the proverbial poisoned tree. It was, therefore, a reversible error on the part of the
court a quo to have admitted and relied upon the seized marijuana plants as evidence to convict
appellant.
We now proceed to the third issue, which revolves around the sufficiency of the prosecution's
evidence to prove appellant's guilt. Having declared the seized marijuana plants inadmissible in

evidence against appellant, we must now address the question of whether the remaining evidence
for the prosecution suffices to convict appellant?
In convicting appellant, the trial court likewise relied on the testimony of the police officers to the
effect that appellant admitted ownership of the marijuana when he was asked who planted them. It
made the following observation:
"It may be true that the admission to the police by the accused that he planted the marijuana
plants was made in the absence of any independent and competent counsel. But the accused was not,
at the time of police verification; under custodial investigation. His admission is, therefore,
admissible in evidence and not violative of the constitutional fiat that admission given during
custodial investigation is not admissible if given without any counsel." 42
Appellant now argues that his admission of ownership of the marijuana plants in question cannot be
used against him for being violative of his right to counsel during the police investigation. Hence, it
was error for the trial court to have relied upon said admission of ownership. He submits that the
investigation conducted by the police officers was not a general inquiry, but was meant to elicit
information on the ownership of the marijuana plants. Appellant theorizes that since the
investigation had narrowed down to him, competent and independent counsel should have assisted
him, when the police sought information from him regarding the ownership of the prohibited plants.
Appellant claims the presumption of regularity of duty of officers cannot be made to apply to his
purported voluntarily confession of ownership of the marijuana plants. Nor can it override his
constitutional right to counsel during investigation.
The Office of the Solicitor General believes otherwise. The OSG avers that appellant was not yet
under custodial investigation when he admitted to the police that he owned the marijuana plants.
His right to competent and independent counsel, accordingly, had not yet attached. Moreover,
appellants failure to impute any false motive for the police officers to falsely accuse him indicates
that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties by police officers was not
sufficiently rebutted.
The Constitution plainly declares that any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right: (1) to remain silent; (2) to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice; and (3) to be informed of such rights. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.43 An investigation begins when it is no longer a
general inquiry but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the police
investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect in connection with an
alleged offense.44 The moment the police try to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain
information from a person suspected of having committed an offense, he should at that juncture be
assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right in writing and in the presence of counsel. 45

In the instant case we find that, from the start, a tipster had furnished the police appellant's
name as well as the location of appellant's farm, where the marijuana plants were allegedly being
grown. While the police operation was supposedly meant to merely "verify" said information, the
police chief had likewise issued instructions to arrest appellant as a suspected marijuana cultivator.
Thus, at the time the police talked to appellant in his farm, the latter was already under
investigation as a suspect. The questioning by the police was no longer a general inquiry. 46
Under cross-examination, PO2 Balut stated, he "did not yet admit that he is the cultivator of that
marijuana so we just asked him and I think there is no need to inform (him of) his constitutional
rights because we are just asking him..."47 In trying to elicit information from appellant, the police
was already investigating appellant as a suspect. At this point, he was already under custodial
investigation and had a right to counsel even if he had not yet been arrested. Custodial investigation
is "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."48 As a suspect, two armed
policemen interrogated appellant. Behind his inquisitors were a barangay peace officer and three
other armed policemen.49 All had been dispatched to arrest him.50 From these circumstances, we
may infer that appellant had already been deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way,
even before the actual arrest. Note that even before he was arrested, the police made him
incriminatingly pose for photos in front of the marijuana plants.
Moreover, we find appellant's extrajudicial confession flawed with respect to its admissibility. For
a confession to be admissible, it must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary;
(2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be
express; and (4) it must be in writing.51 The records show that the admission by appellant was
verbal. It was also uncounselled. A verbal admission allegedly made by an accused during the
investigation, without the assistance of counsel at the time of his arrest and even before his formal
investigation is not only inadmissible for being violative of the right to counsel during criminal
investigations, it is also hearsay.52 Even if the confession or admission were "gospel truth", if it was
made without assistance of counsel and without a valid waiver of such assistance, the confession is
inadmissible in evidence, regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily
given.53
It is fundamental in criminal prosecutions that before an accused may be convicted of a crime, the
prosecution must establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that a crime was committed and that
the accused is the author thereof.54 The evidence arrayed against the accused, however, must not
only stand the test of reason,55 it must likewise be credible and competent.56 Competent evidence is
"generally admissible" evidence.57 Admissible evidence, in turn, is evidence "of such a character that
the court or judge is bound to receive it, that is, allow it to be introduced at trial." 58
In the instant case, the trial court relied on two pieces of probative matter to convict appellant of
the offense charged.1wphi1 These were the seized marijuana plants, and appellant's purportedly

voluntary confession of ownership of said marijuana plants to the police. Other than these proofs,
there was no other evidence presented to link appellant with the offense charged. As earlier
discussed, it was error on the trial court's part to have admitted both of these proofs against the
accused and to have relied upon said proofs to convict him. For said evidence is doubly tainted.
First, as earlier pointed out, the seized marijuana plants were obtained in violation of appellant's
constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. The search and seizure were void

ab initio for having been conducted without the requisite judicial warrant. The prosecution's very
own evidence clearly establishes that the police had sufficient time to obtain a warrant. There was
no showing of such urgency or necessity for the warrantless search or the immediate seizure of the
marijuana plants subject of this case. To reiterate, said marijuana plants cannot be utilized to prove
appellant's guilt without running afoul of the constitutional guarantees against illegal searches and
the inadmissibility of evidence procured pursuant to an unlawful search and seizure.
Second, the confession of ownership of the marijuana plants, which appellant allegedly made to the
police during investigation, is not only hearsay but also violative of the Bill of Rights. The purported
confession was made without the assistance of competent and independent counsel, as mandated by
the Charter. Thus, said confession cannot be used to convict appellant without running afoul of the
Constitution's requirement that a suspect in a criminal investigation must have the services of
competent and independent counsel during such investigation.
In sum, both the object evidence and the testimonial evidence as to appellant's voluntary
confession of ownership of the prohibited plants relied upon to prove appellant's guilt failed to
meet the test of Constitutional competence.
The Constitution decrees that, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved..."59 To justify the conviction of the accused, the prosecution must
adduce that quantum of evidence sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence. The prosecution must stand or fall on its evidence and cannot draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the accused.60 Absent the required degree of proof of an accused's
guilt, he is entitled to an acquittal.61 In this case, the seized marijuana plants linking appellant to
the crime charged are miserably tainted with constitutional infirmities, which render these
inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."62 Nor can the confession obtained during the
uncounselled investigation be used against appellant, "it being inadmissible in evidence against
him."63 Without these proffered but proscribed materials, we find that the prosecution's remaining
evidence did not even approximate the quantum of evidence necessary to warrant appellant's
conviction. Hence, the presumption of innocence in his favor stands. Perforce, his acquittal is in
order.
In acquitting an appellant, we are not saying that he is lily-white, or pure as driven snow. Rather, we
are declaring his innocence because the prosecution's evidence failed to show his guilt beyond

reasonable doubt. For that is what the basic law requires. Where the evidence is insufficient to
overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused, then his "acquittal must follow in
faithful obeisance to the fundamental law."64
WHEREFORE, the decision promulgated on February 18, 1997, by the Regional Trial Court of
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. 3105, finding Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, and
imposing upon him the death penalty, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for insufficiency of
evidence. Appellant is ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED immediately from confinement unless
held for another lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Purisima, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, J., on leave.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 140538-39

June 14, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
GODOFREDO B. ADOR and DIOSDADO B. ADOR III, appellants.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
The quiescence of the fading day was shattered by bursts of gunfire, startling the otherwise
tranquil but sanguine folks of Pacol, Naga City. As the fusillade of shots ceased and the wisp of
smoke cleared, frolicking promenaders stumbled upon Ompong Chavez who was gasping his last,
clutching his intestines which had spewed out from his bloodied stomach. He did not in fact reach
the hospital alive. A breath away, Abe Cuya lay lifeless on the pavement. He died on the spot. For
the twinned deaths, the Adors, six (6) of them, were haled to court.
In two (2) separate informations,1 Diosdado Sr.,2 Diosdado Jr., Diosdado III, Godofredo, Rosalino
and Allan, all surnamed Ador, were charged with the murder of Absalon "Abe" S. Cuya III and
Rodolfo "Ompong" S. Chavez. The Informations in Crim. Cases Nos. 97-6815 and 97-6816 identically
read:
That on or about March 10, 1997, in the City of Naga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and
mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with treachery and the aid of armed men,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot ABSALON "ABE" CUYA III
(RODOLFO "OMPO" CHAVEZ y SAN ANDRES3 for Crim. Case No. 97-6816) with firearms,
inflicting upon him multiple and mortal gunshot wounds which caused his death, to the
damage and prejudice of his heirs.
With the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation and nighttime.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
However, only four (4) of the six (6) Adors, namely, Diosdado Sr., Godofredo, Rosalino and Allan,
were taken into custody. The two (2), Diosdado Jr. and Diosdado III, remained at large. Trial thus
proceeded only against Diosdado Sr., Godofredo, Rosalino and Allan who all pleaded not guilty.
Diosdado Sr. is the father of Diosdado Jr., Diosdado III and Godofredo, while Rosalino is the
father of Allan. Diosdado Sr. and Rosalino are brothers.4

In its effort to secure the conviction of the accused, the prosecution presented a total of sixteen
(16) witnesses: Mercy Beria, Larry Cado, Medico-Legal Officer of Naga City Dr. Joel S. Jurado,
Police Inspector Ma. Julieta Razonable, SPO1 Benjamin Barbosa, SPO3 Augusto Basagre, Major
Ernesto Idian, Inspector Reynaldo F. Fulgar, SPO1 Noli Reyes Sol, SPO3 Eduardo C. Bathan,
Inspector Vicente C. Lauta, Ernani Castillo, PO3 Augusto I. Nepomuceno, Absalon Cuya Sr., Efren
Chavez and Pablo Calsis.
From the evidence of the prosecution, it appears that on March 10, 1997, at around seven-thirty in
the evening, while Mercy Beria, Larry Cado and some eleven (11) others were leisurely walking along
Kilometer 11 on their way to Zone 1, Kilometer 10, Pacol, Naga City, to attend a wedding anniversary,
they heard several gunshots. Shortly after, they met a certain Pablito Umali who told them that
"Ompong" Chavez had been shot. They ran to Chavez straight off and saw him already lying on the
ground, about 1 meters away from a lighted electric post, holding on to his intestines
which were starting to come out. Beria shook Chavez and asked him what had happened. Chavez
replied "tinambangan kami na Ador" ("We were ambushed by the Adors") and requested that he be
brought to the hospital as he was dying. About eight (8) meters from where Chavez was, in a dark
spot, lay "Abe" Cuya, dead.5
Upon learning of the shooting incident through their radio communication, SPO1 Benjamin Barbosa,
together with PO2 Alexander Diaz, immediately proceeded to the crime scene to conduct an
investigation. SPO3 Eduardo Bathan and SPO1 Wilfredo Fernandez, among others, were already
there.6 SPO1 Barbosa collected some pieces of evidence, took some pictures and made some
sketches.7 SPO1 Fernandez on the other hand interviewed one Cresenciana Mendoza in her house
which was nearby, and when he heard people shout that Chavez was still alive, he brought Chavez to
the hospital but the latter expired on the way.8
That same evening, upon being informed that the Adors had a long-standing grudge against the
Cuyas, SPO1 Barbosa sought the help of then Barangay Captain Josue Perez to accompany him to
the residence of the Adors. They arrived at the Adors at around ten oclock that evening and spoke
with their patriarch, Diosdado Ador Sr. SPO1 Barbosa looked for the other male members of the
Ador family but was told by Diosdado Sr. that they were already asleep. Diosdado Sr. nevertheless
promised to present them the following day.9
The following morning, March 11, 1997, Barangay Captain Perez accompanied the Adors, namely,
Diosdado Sr., Diosdado III, Godofredo, Rosalino, Allan and Reynaldo, to SPO1 Barbosa at the PNP
Central Police Headquarters. The Adors were informed of their constitutional rights to remain
silent and to choose their own counsel. They were then brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory at the
Provincial Headquarters and subjected to paraffin tests.10 On the way to the crime laboratory,
Godofredo told his police escort that he had been entrusted with a handgun which he kept in his
residence.11 The information was relayed to Major Ernesto Idian, then Deputy Chief of Police of

Naga City, who ordered PO3 Augusto I. Nepomuceno to accompany him in recovering the gun
because Godofredo
said that he would turn in the gun only to PO3 Nepomuceno. Thus, Major Idian, PO3 Nepomuceno
and some others accompanied Godofredo to the latters residence.
Upon reaching the Ador residence, Godofredo, together with PO3 Nepomuceno, went to their
backyard, retrieved the gun from under a fallen coconut trunk and turned it in to the latter.
Godofredo allegedly told the police that he fired the said gun outside their house on the night of
March 10 after he heard several gunshots.12 PO3 Nepomuceno identified the gun as a caliber .38
"paltik" handgun which had no serial number.13 PO3 Nepomuceno then turned over the handgun to
Major Idian14 who likewise identified it as a .38 caliber revolver. Major Idian returned the handgun
to PO3 Nepomuceno for ballistic and paraffin examination.15 Thereafter, PO3 Nepomuceno placed
his initials on the gun and put it in his private locker while preparing the documents for the
examinations and the possible filing of a case for Illegal Possession of Firearm. 16
Also, on the same day, March 11, 1997, Dr. Joel S. Jurado, Medico-Legal Officer of Naga City,
conducted an autopsy on the bodies of Chavez and Cuya. Based on the autopsy reports, Dr. Jurado
testified that Cuya sustained five (5) gunshot wounds and died from "cardio-pulmonary arrest,
massive intra-thoracic, intra-abdominal, intra-cranial hemorrhage secondary to multiple gunshot
wounds penetrating the heart, brain, lungs and digestive tract."17 Chavez on the other hand had
three (3) gunshot wounds and died from "traumatic shock and massive intra-abdominal hemorrhage
secondary to multiple gunshot wounds penetrating the right kidney and the internal abdominal
organs."18 Dr. Jurado further testified that that he recovered a slug from Cuyas head three (3)
days after he conducted the autopsy - after Cuyas relatives called his attention to a protruding
mass in Cuyas head. Thus, he had Cuyas cadaver sent back to the funeral parlor, opened it and was
able to extract a deformed .38 caliber slug which he thereafter submitted to the City Prosecutors
Office.19
Police Inspector Reynaldo Fulgar, Chief of the Firearm Identification Section of the PNP Crime
Laboratory, Camp Ola, Legaspi City, testified that based on the ballistic examination he conducted
on the bullets submitted to his office, the .38 caliber slug recovered from Cuyas head matched the
three (3) .38 caliber test bullets which were test-fired from the suspected firearm surrendered by
Godofredo. He however averred that the .38 caliber bullets were actually fired from a .357 Smith
and Wesson Magnum homemade revolver without serial number, and not from a .38 caliber
revolver.20
The paraffin casts taken from the Adors were also transmitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory
Services for examination and yielded the presence of gunpowder nitrates, thus
(1) Diosdado A. Ador both hands, positive;

(2) Diosdado B. Ador III right hand, positive; left hand, negative;
(3) Godofredo B. Ador right hand, positive; left hand, negative;
(4) Rosalino A. Ador both hands, positive;
(5) Reynaldo T. Ador both hands, negative;21
(6) Allan T. Ador both hands, positive.22
Absalon Cuya Sr., father of deceased Cuya III, said that the killing of his son was driven by the
long-standing feud between the Adors and his family. He said that Diosdado Jr. had earlier accused
his other son Liberato of frustrated homicide for allegedly stabbing him (Diosdado Jr.). 23 Then,
Adelina, a daughter of Diosdado Sr., filed a case for abduction with multiple rape against him,
Absalon III, Rayne and Josephine, all surnamed Cuya, after the romantic relationship between
Adelina and his deceased son Absalon III turned sour.24 He also presented official receipts of the
funeral and burial expenses which amounted to P10,230.00.25
Efren Chavez, brother of deceased Chavez, likewise spoke of the animosity between the Chavez and
the Ador families. He produced a certification from the PNP Naga City Police Station that on
February 17, 1997, a blotter was entered in the Daily Record of Events showing that deceased
Chavez reported a certain Ricardo Ador who while under the influence of liquor caused him physical
injury.26 The witness likewise presented an official receipt showing that the family spent P3,500.00
for the funeral of the deceased Chavez.27 After presenting Chavez, the prosecution rested its case.
On April 7, 1998, the four (4) accused filed a demurrer to evidence "for utter lack of evidence." 28
On May 13, 1998, the trial court dismissed the cases against Diosdado Sr., Rosalino and Allan but
denied the demurrer to evidence against Godofredo
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the demurrer to evidence to be justified for the accused
Diosdado A. Ador, Allan T. Ador and Rosalino Ador, hence, the same is hereby granted
insofar as these accused are concerned. Said accused therefore, namely: Diosdado A. Ador,
Allan T. Ador and Rosalino Ador are ACQUITTED in Crim. Cases Nos. 97-6815 and 97-6816.
The bailbonds posted for their provisional liberty are hereby cancelled.
Trial of the case insofar as Godofredo B. Ador is concerned shall proceed.
SO ORDERED.29
Thus, trial proceeded against Godofredo.

For his defense, Godofredo denied any participation in the killings of Cuya and Chavez. He said that
on March 10, 1997, at around seven oclock in the evening, he heard several gunshots while he was
having dinner with his wife and four (4) children in their house in Pacol, Naga City. Since his wife
advised him not to go out anymore, he slept after dinner. The following day, while he was gathering
pili nuts, his long-time friend Dominador Bautista arrived and asked him to go down from the tree.
Bautista wanted to borrow money and on his way to see him, found a gun by the footpath. Bautista
gave the gun to him. It was his first time to hold a gun. He tried it out and fired three (3) times.
After firing the gun, he removed the empty shells from its chambers and threw them away. He then
wrapped the gun with plastic and hid it under a coconut trunk. Bautista left when he told him that
he had no money. He then continued to gather pili nuts until Major Idian and three (3) other
policemen came.
Godofredos father told him that they were being suspected of killing Chavez and Cuya the night
before. Thus, they went to the provincial headquarters, were subjected to paraffin testing and
made to sign a blank bond paper. After that, they went back to the central police station. At the
central police station, Godofredo narrated to a certain Calabia that that morning, his friend
Bautista found a gun along the road and gave it to him. He hid the gun under a coconut trunk. Calabia
relayed the information to Major Idian who directed PO3 Nepomuceno to go with Godofredo to get
the gun. Godofredo led PO3 Nepomuceno to where he hid the gun, retrieved it and handed it to the
latter. They then returned to the police headquarters where he was jailed. He asserted that the
gun presented in court is different from the gun he surrendered to the police. 30
Bautista corroborated Godofredos story. He testified that he found the gun which Godofredo
yielded to PO3 Nepomuceno. He said that he was on his way to see Godofredo to borrow money
when he chanced upon the handgun on the pathway. He gave the gun to Godofredo and the latter
tested it by pulling its trigger. After firing the gun, Godofredo removed the empty shells and threw
them. Godofredo then wrapped the gun with plastic and hid it under a fallen coconut trunk. 31
Meanwhile, Diosdado Jr. was arrested on October 9, 1998, at Barangay Doa, Orani, Bataan, and
committed to the Naga City Jail on November 17, 1998, while Diosdado III surrendered to the
court and was committed to the same city jail on November 22, 1998. On November 23, 1998, both
Diosdado Jr. and Diosdado III were arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty. Hence, trial against
them commenced and proceeded jointly with the case of the remaining accused, Godofredo.
The prosecution presented Pablo Calsis32 as a witness against Diosdado Jr. and Diosdado III. Calsis
testified that on March 10, 1997, at around 7:30 in the evening, he dropped by the house of
Cresenciana Mendoza whom he fondly called Lola Kising at Kilometer 10, Pacol, Naga City, before
going home from work. After asking permission from her to go home and while about to urinate
outside her house, he heard several gunshots. He ducked by a sineguelas tree at a nearby flower
plantation. As he was about to stand up, he saw Disodado Jr., Diosdado III, Godofredo and another
unidentified man run away. Godofredo was carrying a short firearm while Diosdado Jr. had a long

firearm.33 He saw Chavez and Cuya lying on the road. Chavez was about five (5) meters away from
where he stood while Cuya was ten (10) meters away. The place was illuminated by a bright light
from an electric post. There were no other people around. Calsis ran away for fear that he might be
identified by the assailants. He heard Chavez mumbling but shirked nevertheless. 34
Calsis narrated to Absalon Cuya Sr. what he saw only after about one (1) year and nine (9) months.
Fear struck him.35 He maintained that he knew the assailants because he and his wife lived in the
house of Lola Kising after they got married.36 Immense fear prevented him from attending to
Chavez, even while he heard him murmuring, and from informing the families of the victims of the
incident that very same night. He was about to tell the Chavez family the following morning but was
counseled by his Lola Bading, the sister of his Lola Kising, against getting involved in the case. 37
Calsis and his family left their residence in Pacol one (1) month after the incident because he was
afraid the assailants might have identified him.38 Even Lola Kising left her residence two (2) months
after the incident.39 It was only after he learned from Absalon Cuya Sr. that the trial court
dismissed the cases for lack of evidence insofar as some of the original accused were concerned
that he took pity on the respective families of the victims who have failed to get justice for the
death of their loved ones.40
In defense, Diosdado Jr. testified that on March 10, 1997, he was in Marikina City working as a
warehouseman and timekeeper of the Consuelo Builders Corporation. He was there the whole time
from February 15, 1997, until March 24, 1997.41 Pablo Aspe, a co-worker of Diosdado Jr.,
corroborated the latters testimony. He said that on February 15, 1997, he and Diosdado Jr. left
Pacol, Naga City, together to work in Consuelo Construction in Marikina City. They were with each
other in Marikina City the whole time from February 15, 1997, until he (Aspe) went home to Naga
City on March 22, 1997. While in Marikina City, they resided and slept together in their barracks at
the construction site.42
Diosdado III also took the witness stand. On March 10, 1997, at around seven oclock in the
evening, he was at their house at Zone 1, Pacol, Naga City, watching television with his parents and
cousins Reynaldo and Allan when they heard gunshots. They ignored the gunshots, continued
watching television and slept at eight oclock. The following day, at around six oclock in the morning,
while he was fetching water, four (4) policemen arrived at their house and talked to his father.
Thereafter, his father called him, his brother Godofredo, uncle Rosalino and cousins Allan and
Reynaldo. The policemen then requested all of them to go to the PNP Central Police Headquarters
for investigation regarding the killings of Chavez and Cuya. Upon reaching the police headquarters,
they were interviewed by the media and afterwards brought to the provincial headquarters where
they were subjected to paraffin tests. They were then brought back to the Central Police
Headquarters and later allowed to go back home to Pacol.
Then, sometime in October, 1997, his father was arrested by the police. Diosdado III was at their
residence when his father was picked up. Only his father was taken by the police. He continued to

reside in their house until April, 1998, when he transferred to Sagurong, San Miguel, Tabaco, Albay,
to work as a fisherman. On November 21, 1998, he received a letter from his father telling him to
come home. Thus, he went home the following day. On November 23, 1998, he surrendered to the
court.43
The defense also presented Barangay Captain Josue Perez and an uncle of Diosdado Jr. and
Disodado III, Jaime Bobiles. Perez testified that he was the barangay captain of Pacol from 1982
until May, 1997. In 1996, Cresenciana Mendoza left their barangay permanently to live with her
children in Manila because she was sickly and alone in her house. He said that Mendoza never came
back. He does not know any Pablo Calsis and the
latter could not have talked to Mendoza on March 10, 1997, because at that time, Mendoza was not
there and her house was already abandoned.44 Similarly, Bobiles confirmed the testimony that
Diosdado III worked as a fisherman in Tabaco and stayed in his residence from May 1, 1998, until
November 1998 when Diosdado III received a letter from his father and had to go home. 45
In rebuttal however, prosecution witness SPO1 Fernandez asserted that he interviewed
Cresenciana Mendoza that fateful night of March 10, 1997.46 After the rebuttal witness was
presented, the cases were finally submitted for decision.47
On August 2, 1999, the trial court held that "a chain of circumstances x x x lead to a sound and
logical conclusion that indeed the accused (Diosdado III and Godofredo) committed the offense
charged"48 and as such rendered judgment
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court finds the accused Godofredo B. Ador and
Diosdado B. Ador III GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER, defined
and penalized under the provisions of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act 7659 in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-6815 and 97-6816, hereby sentences the said
accused Godofredo B. Ador and Diosdado B. Ador III to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA in Criminal Case No. 97-6815; RECLUSION PERPETUA in Criminal Case No. 976816, to pay the heirs of Absalon "Abe" Cuya III P25,000 each by way of actual damages
and P50,000 in each criminal case by way of indemnity. To pay the heirs of Rodolfo
"Ompong" Chavez the sum of P50,000 in each criminal case by way of indemnity, such
accessory penalties as provided for by law and to pay the cost. For insufficiency of the
prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused Diosdado B. Ador, Jr. beyond reasonable
doubt, he is hereby ACQUITTED in Crim. Cases Nos. 97-6815 and 97-6816.
The Jail Warden of the Naga City District Jail is hereby ordered to forthwith release from
its custody the accused Diosdado B. Ador, Jr., unless his further detention is warranted by
any other legal cause or causes.

SO ORDERED.49
Hence, this joint appeal interposed by Disodado III and Godofredo. They maintain that the trial
court gravely erred in convicting them of murder based on circumstantial evidence. The testimony
of prosecution witness Pablo Calsis that he saw them running away from the scene of the crime was
concocted. The handgun turned in by Godofredo was not the same gun presented by the prosecution
during the trial. The unusual discovery of a slug from the head of the deceased - three (3) days
after the autopsy was conducted and after the cadaver was turned over to the family of the victim
- was quite doubtful. Even the supposed dying declaration of the victim specifically pointed to
neither Diosdado III nor Godofredo. And, the trial court erred in admitting in evidence those taken
against them in violation of their constitutional rights to counsel during custodial investigation. 50
The rules of evidence allow the courts to rely on circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion
of guilt.51 It may be the basis of a conviction so long as the combination of all the circumstances
proven produces a logical conclusion which suffices to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.52 All the circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the
theory that all the accused are guilty of the offense charged, and at the same time inconsistent
with the hypothesis that they are innocent and with every other possible, rational hypothesis
except that of guilt.53 The evidence must exclude each and every hypothesis which may be
consistent with their innocence.54 Also, it should be acted on and weighed with great caution. 55
Circumstantial evidence which has not been adequately established, much less corroborated, cannot
by itself be the basis of conviction.56
Thus, for circumstantial evidence to suffice, (1) there should be more than one circumstance; (2)
the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 57 Like an ornate tapestry
created out of interwoven fibers which cannot be plucked out and assayed a strand at a time apart
from the others, the circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one
fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.58 The test to determine whether or not the circumstantial evidence on record are
sufficient to convict the accused is that the series of the circumstances proved must be consistent
with the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with his innocence. 59 Accordingly, we have set
guidelines in appreciating circumstantial evidence: (1) it should be acted upon with caution; (2) all
the essential facts must be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt; (3) the facts must exclude
every theory but that of guilt; and (4) the facts must establish such a certainty of guilt of the
accused as to convince the judgment beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is the one who
committed the offense.60
Measured against the guidelines set, we cannot uphold the conviction of the accused based on the
circumstantial evidence presented.

The first circumstance which the prosecution sought to prove is that the accused were supposedly
seen fleeing from the locus criminis, armed with their respective weapons. Thus, the trial court,
gleaning from the evidence presented, found that "[w]hen about to stand, Calsis saw Godofredo B.
Ador, Diosdado B. Ador, Jr. and Diosdado B. Ador III, and a person going to the direction of the
house of the Adors which is about 500 meters away." 61 In fact, prosecution witness Calsis allegedly
even saw Diosdado Jr. carrying "a long firearm but x x x could not determine what kind of gun it
was."62 However, the trial court acquitted Diosdado Jr. But only rightly so. For, Calsis had difficulty
in identifying the Adors notwithstanding his assertion that he knew and saw them personally. We
defer to his direct examination
ATTY. TERBIO (Private Prosecutor):
Q. You said you recognized the persons running, could you tell us their names?
PABLO CALSIS:
A. Yes sir.
Q. Name them?
A. Godofredo Ador, Jr., Sadang III.
Q. How about the others?
A. I could not tell his name but if I see him I could identify him.
Q. The 4 persons whom you saw that night, if they are present in court, please point them
out?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Point particularly Godofredo Ador, Jr.?
A. (Witness pointed or tapped the shoulder of a person inside the courtroom who answered
by the name Diosdado Ador, Jr.)
Q. How about this Sadang III?
A. (Witness tapped the shoulder of a man who answered by the name of Diosdado Ador III.)
Q. Likewise, point to the third person?

A. (Witness pointed to a man)

COURT:
Delete that portion from the record, he is not on trial.
ATTY TERBIO:
Q. You said you saw 4 persons, is the fourth one inside the courtroom?
A. None sir.
Q. But if you saw that person, will you be able to recognize him?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Why do you know these persons whom you just tapped the shoulder?
xxx

xxx

xxx

A. I know these persons having lived in the house of Lola Kising.

Q. How far?
A. Around 100 meters.
Q. On the said date and time and place, you said you saw them running, how far were you
from them?
A. Around 10 meters. (Emphases supplied)63
The testimony of Calsis, if at all, could hardly be used against Diosdado III whom he miserably
failed to positively identify during trial. In fact, the acquittal of Diosdado Jr. by the trial court
renders the entire testimony of Calsis in serious doubt. Calsis was presented to positively identify
the assailants who were supposedly personally known to him and were just ten (10) meters away
from him. It puzzles us no end why he cannot even identify the Adors in open court.
Thus, despite Calsis assertion that Diosdado Jr. was one of the assailants, the trial court doubted
him and gave credence to the alibi of Diosdado Jr. that the latter was in Nangka, Marikina, when
the killings took place. The trial court favored the unbiased testimony of Aspe who said that
Diosdado Jr. worked as a timekeeper and warehouseman with him at the Consuelo Construction at
Nangka, Marikina, from February 15, 1997, until March 22, 1997, and went home to Pacol only on

May 27, 1997. This ruling is strengthened by the fact that on the morning following the killings, all
the male members of the Ador family were brought to the police headquarters for paraffin
examination and Diosdado Jr. was not among them.64 We thus respect the finding of the trial court
that indeed Diosdado Jr. was not at the scene of the crime absent any indication that the lower
court overlooked some facts or circumstances which if considered would alter the outcome of the
case.65
While it is true that the courts are not bound to accept or reject an entire testimony, and may
believe one part and disbelieve another,66 our Constitution and the law mandate that all doubts must
be resolved in favor of the accused. Calsis committed an obvious blunder in identifying the supposed
assailants which this Court cannot simply let go. On the contrary, it creates reasonable doubt in our
minds if Calcis really saw the persons he allegedly saw or if he was even where he said he was that
evening. For, it is elementary that the positive identification of the accused is crucial in
establishing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. That is wanting in the instant case.
What is more, Calsis asseverations, at the outset, could no longer be used against Godofredo since
both the prosecution and the defense have already rested and the case against Godofredo was
already submitted for decision when Calsis was presented.67 Neither can they still be used against
Diosdado Jr. who was already acquitted by the trial court.
Both Diosdado III and Godofredo denied the charges hurled against them. But, while it is true that
alibi and denial are the weakest of the defenses as they can easily be fabricated, 68 absent such
clear and positive identification, the doctrine that the defense of denial cannot prevail over
positive identification of the accused must yield to the constitutional presumption of innocence. 69
Hence, while denial is concededly fragile and unstable, the conviction of the accused cannot be
based thereon.70 The rule in criminal law is firmly entrenched that verdicts of conviction must be
predicated on the strength of the evidence for the prosecution and not on the weakness of the
evidence for the defense.71
The second circumstance is the handgun turned in by Godofredo. But this was bungled by the
prosecution. Major Idian, Deputy Chief of Police of the Naga City Police Station, to whom the
handgun was turned over after Godofredo surrendered it, identified it as a caliber .38 revolver,
thus
ATTY TERBIO (Private Prosecutor):
Q. What kind of firearm was it?
MAJOR IDIAN:
A. Revolver handgun, caliber .38 with 6 rounds ammunition.

Q. What is the caliber?

A. .38 caliber.72
Similarly, PO3 Nepomuceno who then had been with the PNP for eight (8) years already and to
whom Godofredo turned in the handgun, likewise identified it as a caliber .38, thus
ATTY TERBIO (Private Prosecutor):
Q. What is the caliber of that gun?
PO3 NEPOMUCENO:
A. .38 caliber.73
However, Insp. Fulgar, Chief of the Firearm Identification Section of the PNP Crime Laboratory,
testified that "[t]he indorsement coming from the City Prosecutors Office x x x alleged that the .
38 caliber live bullet was fired from a .38 caliber revolver. But our office found out that the
firearm was not a .38 caliber revolver but a .357 caliber revolver." 74
Could it be that the handgun was replaced before it was turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory?
While the prosecution traced the trail of police officers who at every stage held the gun
supposedly recovered from Godofredo, it never clarified this discrepancy which is quite glaring to
ignore. It is difficult to believe that a Deputy Chief of Police and a police officer of eight (8) years
will both mistake a .357 caliber for a .38 caliber handgun. Likewise, a Chief of the Firearm
Identification Section of the PNP Crime Laboratory cannot be presumed not to know the difference
between the two (2) handguns. Suffice it to say that the prosecution failed to clear up the variance
and for this Court to suggest an explanation would be to venture into the realm of pure speculation,
conjecture and guesswork. Thus, faced with the obvious disparity in the suspected firearm used in
the crime and that which was turned over by Godofredo, his declaration that the handgun
presented in court was different from the gun he gave to the police deserves serious, if not sole
consideration.
Consequently, even the third circumstance, the .38 caliber slug supposedly recovered from the head
of the victim three (3) days after the autopsy was conducted loses evidentiary value as its source is
now highly questionable. It has become uncertain whether the deformed slug was fired from the .38
caliber revolver turned in by Godofredo or from a .357 caliber handgun as attested to by the Chief
of the Firearm Identification Section of the PNP Crime Laboratory.
Neither can this Court rely on the dying declaration of the dying Chavez nor on the results of the
paraffin tests to convict either Diosdado III or Godofredo or both. To refute these, we need not

go far and beyond the 13 May 1998 Order of the trial court partially granting the demurrer to
evidence filed by the accused
The only direct evidence introduced by the prosecution is the testimony of Mercy Beria, that she
heard Rodolfo "Ompong" Chavez say "tinambangan kami na Ador" (We were ambushed by the
Adors). Sad to say, no specific name was ever mentioned by the witness. Neither was she able to
tell how many (persons) "Adors" were involved. This testimony if it will be given credence may
inculpate any person with the family name Ador as assailant. The prosecution therefore was not
able to establish with moral certainty as to who of the Adors were perpetrators of the offense x x
x x Paraffin tests are not conclusive evidence that indeed a person has fired a gun.
The fact that the accused-appellants tested positive of gunpowder nitrates does not conclusively
show that they fired the murder weapon, or a gun for that matter, for such forensic evidence
should be taken only as an indication of possibility or even of probability, but not of infallibility,
since nitrates are also admittedly found in substances other than gunpowder. (People v. Abellarosa,
G.R. No. 121195, 27 November 1996; People v. de Guzman, 250 SCRA 118; People v. Nitcha, 240
SCRA 283)75
Thus, while a dying declaration may be admissible in evidence, it must identify with certainty the
assailant. Otherwise, it loses its significance. Also, while a paraffin test could establish the
presence or absence of nitrates on the hand, it cannot establish that the source of the nitrates was
the discharge of firearms a person who tests positive may have handled one or more substances
with the same positive reaction for nitrates such as explosives, fireworks, fertilizers,
pharmaceuticals, tobacco and leguminous plants.76 In People v. Melchor,77 this Court acquitted the
accused despite the presence of gunpowder nitrates on his hands
[S]cientific experts concur in the view that the result of a paraffin test is not conclusive.
While it can establish the presence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand, it does not always
indubitably show that said nitrates or nitrites were caused by the discharge of firearm. The
person tested may have handled one or more of a number of substances which give the same
positive reaction for nitrates or nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks, pharmaceuticals and
leguminous plants such as peas, beans and alfalfa. A person who uses tobacco may also have
nitrate or nitrite deposits on his hands since these substances are present in the products
of combustion of tobacco. The presence of nitrates or nitrites, therefore, should be taken
only as an indication of a possibility but not of infallibility that the person tested has fired
a gun.
In fine, the admissions made by Godofredo to Major Idian and PO3 Nepomuceno including the gun in
question cannot be considered in evidence against him without violating his constitutional right to
counsel. Godofredo was already under custodial investigation when he made his admissions and
surrendered the gun to the police authorities. The police had already begun to focus on the Adors

and were carrying out a process of interrogations that was lending itself to eliciting incriminating
statements and evidence: the police went to the Ador residence that same evening upon being
informed that the Adors had a long-standing grudge against the Cuyas; the following day, all the
male members of the Ador family were told to go to the police station; the police was also informed
of the dying declaration of deceased Chavez pointing to the Adors as the assailants; the Adors
were all subjected to paraffin examination; and, there were no other suspects as the police was not
considering any other person or group of persons. The investigation thus was no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime as the Adors were already being held as suspects for the killings of
Cuya and Chavez.
Consequently, the rights of a person under custodial investigation, including the right to counsel,
have already attached to the Adors, and pursuant to Art. III, Sec. 12(1) and (3), 1987 Constitution,
any waiver of these rights should be in writing and undertaken with the assistance of counsel.
Admissions under custodial investigation made without the assistance of counsel are barred as
evidence.78 The records are bare of any indication that the accused have waived their right to
counsel, hence, any of their admissions are inadmissible in evidence against them. As we have held, a
suspects confession, whether verbal or non-verbal, when taken without the assistance of counsel
without a valid waiver of such assistance regardless of the absence of such coercion, or the fact
that it had been voluntarily given, is inadmissible in evidence, even if such confession were
gospel truth.79 Thus, in Aballe v. People,80 the death weapon, a four-inch kitchen knife, which was
found after the accused brought the police to his house and pointed to them the pot where he had
concealed it, was barred from admission as it was discovered as a consequence of an uncounseled
extrajudicial confession.
With hardly any substantial evidence left, the prosecution likewise played up the feud between the
Adors on one hand and the Chavezes and the Cuyas on the other hand, and suggested that the
Adors had an axe to grind against the Chavezes and the Cuyas. For sure, motive is not sufficient to
support a conviction if there is no other reliable evidence from which it may reasonably be adduced
that the accused was the malefactor.81 Motive alone cannot take the place of proof beyond
reasonable doubt sufficient to overthrow the presumption of innocence. 82
All told, contrary to the pronouncements of the trial court, we cannot rest easy in convicting the
two (2) accused based on circumstantial evidence. For, the pieces of the said circumstantial
evidence presented do not inexorably lead to the conclusion that they are guilty. 83 The prosecution
witness failed to identify the accused in court. A cloud of doubt continues to hover over the gun
used and the slug recovered. The dying declaration and paraffin examination remain unreliable.
Godofredos uncounseled admissions including the gun he turned in are barred as evidence. And, the
supposed motive of the accused is simply insufficient. Plainly, the facts from which the inference
that the accused committed the crime were not proven. Accordingly, the guilt of the accused
cannot be established, more so to a moral certainty. It is when evidence is purely circumstantial

that the prosecution is much more obligated to rely on the strength of its own case and not on the
weakness of the defense, and that conviction must rest on nothing less than moral certainty. 84
Consequently, the case of the prosecution has been reduced to nothing but mere suspicions and
speculations. It is hornbook doctrine that suspicions and speculations can never be the basis of
conviction in a criminal case.85 Courts must ensure that the conviction of the accused rests firmly on
sufficient and competent evidence, and not the results of passion and prejudice. 86 If the alleged
inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two (2) or more explanations, one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused, and the other consistent with his guilt, then the
evidence is not adequate to support conviction. 87 The court must acquit the accused because the
evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is therefore insufficient to support a
judgment of conviction.88 Conviction must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of the guilt of
the accused.89 The overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the
accused but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. 90 It is thus apropos to repeat
the doctrine that an accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt
the prosecution must overthrow the presumption of innocence with proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. The prosecution has failed to discharge its burden. Accordingly, we have to acquit.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Br. 25, in Crim. Cases
Nos. 97-6815 and 97-6816 dated August 2, 1999, finding accused-appellants Godofredo B. Ador and
Diosdado B. Ador III guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of murder and imposing on
them the penalty of reclusion perpetua, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellants
Godofredo B. Ador and Diosdado B. Ador III are ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt and their
IMMEDIATE RELEASE is hereby ORDERED unless they are being held for some other legal cause.
SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 149889

December 2, 2003

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
RUEL BACONGUIS y INSON, appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
On automatic review is the Decision of July 11, 2001 promulgated by the Regional Trial Court of
Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 18, convicting Ruel Baconguis y Inson (appellant) of murder and
sentencing him to death.
To the charge of murder allegedly committed as follows,
That on or about June 23, 2000 at 2:04 early in the morning at Phase 3, Block 21, Lot 9, Villa
Trinitas Subd., Bugo, Cagayan de Oro City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with treachery and with intent to kill, attacked one Roberto C. Mercado with
the use of an undetermined caliber of a gun thereby inflicting mortal wounds which is the cause of
his immediate death.
Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to RA 7659, as amended. 1
appellant pleaded not guilty during his arraignment on July 27, 2000.2
Culled from the evidence for the prosecution is its following version of the case:
On June 23, 2000, at around 2:40 a.m., while Lydia Mercado-Lledo was sleeping in her 3-bedroom
one storey house, she was awakened by the sound of a gunshot. She immediately looked out of her
bedroom window and saw to her right a tall man some five meters away from her 3 leave her house
and jump over the 21/2 - 3 meters high bamboo fence.4 Before the man who was wearing khaki short
pants and a white T-shirt jumped, he turned his face to the left, thus enabling her to see his slim
face and tall nose.5
Lydia soon heard someone moaning. She thus repaired to the sala where she found her younger
brother, taxi-driver 24-year old Roberto Mercado (the victim), sprawled and bleeding on the floor.
He was brought to the hospital but he died on the way due to severe hemorrhage resulting from a

gunshot wound at the left chest. Aside from the chest, the victim also suffered gunshot wounds on
his left forearm.6
The investigating officers found that the description of the man seen leaving Lydias house matched
that of herein appellant Ruel Baconguis who was a suspect in several cases of theft and robbery.
In the afternoon of the incident, the police arrested appellant in the house of his in-laws at Purok
2-B, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City.7 At about noon of the following day or on June 24, 2000, appellant
was paraffin-tested and was found positive for gunpowder nitrates on both hands. 8
Lydia was accordingly informed by her other brother, policeman Adolfo Mercado, that the suspect
had been arrested. In the early afternoon of June 24, 2000, she was brought to the cell of the
police station where appellant was detained and was informed that the lone detainee therein was
the suspect.9 On seeing appellant, she declared that he was the man she saw leaving her house and
jumping over the fence.10
The defense, on the other hand, denied the accusation.
Proffering alibi, appellant claimed that on the night of June 22, 2000, he took a walk along
Limketkai with his common-law-wife Liezel Sacala, child, mother-in-law and sister-in-law after which
they returned to the house of his in-laws; and at the time of the incident, he was fast asleep. 11
Liezel corroborated appellants claim, adding that on the night of the incident she woke up twice to
give milk to their 2-year old baby, and appellant never left the house following their return from
the walk.12
Crediting Lydias positive identification of appellant as the man she saw leaving her house and
jumping over the fence and the results of the paraffin test, the trial court convicted appellant by
the decision on review,13 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused RUEL BACONGUIS y INSON GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of MURDER punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to R.A.
7659, and after taking into account the presence of one generic aggravating circumstance of
dwelling, without any mitigating, the said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the supreme
penalty of DEATH by lethal injection. He is further directed to indemnify the heirs the amount of
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS as damages for the death of the victim, another FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS as exemplary damages, actual expenses in the amount of THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND
PESOS, plus to pay the costs. Pursuant to section 22 of R.A. 7659 and section 10 of Rule 122 of the
Rules of Court, let the entire record of this case be forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic
review.

SO ORDERED.14
In his brief, appellant proffers the following assignment of errors:
I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE TESTIMONIES OF THE ACCUSED AND
DEFENSE WITNESSES AND IN RELYING HEAVILY ON THE TESTIMONY OF THE
PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
III.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE FACT THAT THE ACCUSED WAS NOT
ASSISTED BY A LAWYER DURING THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION IN VIOLATION OF HIS
BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT.
IV.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE PRESENCE OF THE GENERIC
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF DWELLING DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT WAS NOT
ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION. (Underscoring supplied)
Appellant questions his arrest as bereft of a valid warrant. Having, however, submitted to the
jurisdiction of the trial court when he entered his plea 15 and actively participated in the trial of the
case, any infirmity in his arrest was deemed cured.16
Appellant likewise questions his subjection to custodial interrogation without the assistance of
counsel. There was, however, nothing inculpatory or exculpatory obtained from him by the police
during his custodial investigation.
While it cannot be denied that accused-appellant was deprived of his right to be informed of his
rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, he has not shown that, as a
result of his custodial interrogation, the police obtained any statement from himwhether
inculpatory or exculpatorywhich was used in evidence against him. The records do not show that
he had given one or that, in finding him guilty, the trial court relied on such statement x x x x In
other words, no uncounseled statement was obtained from accused-appellant which should have
been excluded as evidence against him.17

It bears noting that the evidence relied upon by the prosecution is circumstantial.
It is settled that for circumstantial evidence to suffice to convict, the following requisites must be
met: 1) there is more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences are derived
are proven; and 3) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.18
The first circumstance which the prosecution sought to prove is that appellant was seen leaving the
house where the victim lay bleeding of gunshot wounds not long after a gunshot was heard.
Prosecution witness Lydia identified appellant, then alone in the detention cell, and in open court as
the person she saw leaving the house.
The value of the in-court identification made by Lydia, however, is largely dependent upon the outof-court identification she made while appellant was in the custody of the police. In People v.

Teehankee, Jr.,19 this Court held that corruption of out-of-court identification contaminates the
integrity of in-court identification during the trial of the case.
In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have
adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz: (1) the
witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of
attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level
of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the
crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.20
(Underscoring supplied)
The totality of circumstances test has been fashioned to assure fairness as well as compliance with
constitutional requirements of due process in regard to out-of-court identification. 21
Applying the above-said test, there are nagging doubts if Lydia had a good opportunity to view the
man she saw leaving her house. For by her claim, after hearing a gunshot, she stood up and "opened"
the 3-panel jalousied and grilled bedroom window upon which she saw a tall, slim man who was about
5 meters away at the "right side of the window";22 and the man turned his face to the left, glancing
at the terrace23 which terrace she could not see from where she was, but which was lighted by an
18-watt "[n]ot quite dim" but "more yellow" bulb "attached to the road (sic)." 24
If Lydia could not see the terrace25 which was five meters away from where she was, how could the
suspect, who was by her account also five meters away from the terrace, glance at the terrace by
merely turning his whole face to the left, given the logical location of the terrace to be obliquely
behind (to his right) him.

If before appellant jumped he was, by Lydias claim, about three meters away from the light bulb
"attached to the road" which light illuminated the terrace, how could Lydia have clearly seen the
face of the man turning his face to the left?
As for the circumstances surrounding the identification process, they were clearly tainted by
improper suggestion. While there is no law requiring a police line-up as essential to a proper
identification, as even without it there could still be proper identification as long as the police did
not suggest the identification to the witness,26 the police in the case at bar did even more than
suggest to Lydia.
Thus, by Lydias own account, the following transpired after she arrived at the cell where appellant
was detained.
Pros. Nolasco: On June 24, that is the following day, where were you?
A : I was in our house.
Q : In the afternoon or morning?
A : In the morning, Adolfo Mercado went to my house and informed me that they already arrested a
suspect last June 23.
Q : And what did you do with that information?
A : At 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon, June 24, I went together with my brother to Puerto Police
Station.
Q : What did you do?
A : They let me see the suspect.
Q : Were you able to see the suspect?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : What was your reaction upon seeing the suspect?
A : I was so mad because the person whom I saw at that time was the same person. 27
xxx

Atty. Azis [defense counsel]: You said that at about 8:00 o'clock of the same morning there were
operative[s] from the Puerto Police Station and you said they investigated you about the incident?
A : Yes, ma'am.
Q : Who among the police officer[s]?
A : PO3 [Eddie] Akut, PO3 Ruben and PO3 Achas.
Q : You only described to them what you saw, the description of the suspect?
A : Yes, maam.
Q : About his being slim built?
A : Yes, ma'am.
Q : You could not determine whether he is a fair skin[ned] or dark person?
A : I could not determine.
Q : In fact you could not determine whether there is mark on his face?
A : Yes, ma'am.
Q : You said that on June 24, 2000 you were informed that there was already a suspect arrested
by the police?
A : Yes, ma'am.
Q : But you were not or you did not accompany the police officer where that suspect was arrested?
A : No, ma'am.
Q : So it was not you who pointed to the suspect in order for him to be arrested?
A : No maam.
Q : And when you went to the Puerto Police Station they introduced to you the suspect?
A : Yes ma'am.
Q : When did you first know his name?

A : From my brother.
Q : When?
A : When he went to the house on June 24 in the morning.
Q : Where did you see the suspect inside the police station?
A : He was still inside the cell when they let me see.
Q : In other words, when you saw him he was inside the cell?
A : Yes, ma'am.
Q : But he was alone at the time?
A : Yes, ma'am.
Q : And the police officer pointed to you that that is Ruel Baconguis?
A : Yes, ma'am.
Q : And after pointing to you they told you that he was the suspect?
A : Yes, ma'am.
Q : And because of that, you were convinced that he was the one?
A : I was convinced because his face is the same person whom I saw [jump] over the fence. 28
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A showup, such as what was undertaken by the police in the identification of appellant by Lydia, has
been held to be an underhanded mode of identification for "being pointedly suggestive, generating
confidence where there was none, activating visual imagination, and, all told, subverting their
reliability as an eyewitness."29 Lydia knew that she was going to identify a suspect, whose name had
priorly been furnished by her brother-policeman, when she went to the police station. And the
police pointed appellant to her, and told her that he was the suspect, while he was behind bars,
alone.30
The unusual, coarse and highly singular method of identification, which revolts against accepted
principles of scientific crime detection, alienates the esteem of every just man, and commands
neither respect nor acceptance.31

In People v. Acosta,32 this Court rejected the identification by a witness of the accused while the
latter was alone in his detention cell. There, this Court held that the identification of the suspect,
which was tainted by the suggestiveness of having the witness identify him while he was
incarcerated with no one else with him with whom he might be compared by the witness, was less
than objective to thus impair the trustworthiness of their identification. 33
Under the circumstances attendant to the identification of appellant, this Court is not prepared to
hold that the prosecution had established that appellant was the man seen leaving the house-scene
of the crime soon after a gunshot was heard.
As for the positive paraffin findings on appellant, it is well settled that nitrates are also found in
substances other than gunpowder.34 Thus, in a number of cases,32 the Court acquitted the accused
despite the finding of gunpowder nitrates on his hand, noting that:
[S]cientific experts concur in the view that the result of a paraffin test is not conclusive. While it
can establish the presence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand, it does not always indubitably show
that said nitrates or nitrites were caused by the discharge of firearm. The person tested may have
handled one or more of a number of substances which give the same positive reaction for nitrates
or nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks, pharmaceuticals, and leguminous plants such as peas,
beans, and alfalfa. A person who uses tobacco may also have nitrate or nitrite deposits on his hands
since these substances are present in the products of combustion of tobacco. The presence of
nitrates, therefore, should be taken only as an indication of a possibility but not of infallibility that
the person tested has fired a gun.33
In fact, prosecution witness Police Superintendent Liza Madeja Sabong, who conducted the paraffin
test on appellant, testified that a person who fires a gun can transfer gunpowder from his hands to
someone standing very near him even if the second person did not fire a gun himself. 34
But even assuming arguendo that appellants being positive for gunpowder may be credited as
circumstantial evidence indicating his culpability, that is only one circumstance, and since no other
circumstance was established by the prosecution, the first requirement for circumstantial evidence
to warrant conviction of appellant has not been met.
The prosecution having failed to discharge its burden of proving the guilt of appellant beyond
reasonable doubt, he must be acquitted.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Cagayan de Oro City
finding appellant RUEL BACONGUIS y INSON guilty of murder is hereby REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE and appellant is ACQUITTED thereof. He is ordered IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from
confinement unless he is being held for some other legal cause.

The Director of Prisons is DIRECTED to forthwith implement this Decision immediately and to
inform this Court within five days from receipt hereof of the date appellant shall have actually
been released from confinement.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 109144 August 19, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MORENO L. TUMIMPAD, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Miguel M. Lingating for accused-appellant.

KAPUNAN, J.:
Accused-appellant Constable Moreno L. Tumimpad and co-accused Constable Ruel C. Prieto were
charged with the crime of rape committed against a 15-year old Mongoloid child in a complaint
dated on May 24, 1991, signed by her mother, Mrs. Pastora L. Salcedo, which reads:
That during the period between the last week of March 1989 and the first week of
April 1989, in Barangay Lower Lamac, Oroquieta City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, have (sic) carnal knowledge with Sandra Salcedo,
complainant's daughter, a woman who is a mongoloid and so weak of mind and in
intellect as to be capable of giving rational and legal consent.

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged and due trial ensued.
The facts as established by evidence are as follows:
Sandra Salcedo at the time of the incident was a 15-year old Mongoloid and daughter of Lt. Col.
Teofisto Salcedo and Pastora Salcedo. She had a mind of a five-year old child, who still needed to
be fed and dressed up. Her vocabulary was limited and most of the time she expressed herself by
motions.
Col. Teofisto Salcedo was then Provincial Commander of Misamis Occidental. Four security men
were assigned to him, two of whom were accused Constable Ruel Prieto and accused-appellant
Moreno Tumimpad.

The Salcedo family, composed of Col. Salcedo, his wife Pastora, his son Alexander and wife and
daughter Sandra, lived in a two-storey officers' quarters inside Camp Lucas Naranjo, Provincial
Headquarters, in Oroquieta City. The upper storey of the house was occupied by Col. Salcedo, his
wife and Sandra while the lower storey had two (2) rooms, one of which was occupied by the four
security men and the other by Alexander Salcedo and his wife.
It was on August 7, 1989, when Sandra complained of constipation. Mrs. Salcedo then brought her
to a doctor in Oroquieta City for a checkup. Medication was given to Sandra but her condition did
not improve. Sandra became irritable and moody. She felt sick and unhappy.
The following day, August 8, 1989, Sandra saw Moreno Tumimpad coming out from the kitchen and
told her mother, "Mama, patayin mo 'yan, bastos."

Mrs. Pastora Salcedo, worried of her daughter's condition, brought her to Regina Hospital. Sandra
was able to relieve herself the following day but still remained moody and irritable. She refused to
take a bath in spite of scoldings from her mother. She did not want to eat and whenever she did,
she would vomit.
Sandra was brought to a doctor in Oroquieta City for a second checkup. Dr. Conol, the examining
physician, ordered a urinalysis. Jose C. Lim, a Medical Technologist, conducted the urinalysis. The
result revealed that Sandra was pregnant.

Mrs. Pastora Salcedo could not believe that her

daughter was pregnant and so she brought Sandra to Madonna and Child Hospital in Cagayan de Oro
City. Dr. Kho, and OB-GYNE Specialist, examined Sandra and subjected her to a pelvic ultra-sound
examination. The results were positive. The fetus' gestational age was equivalent to 17.1 weeks.

Another ultra-sound examination at the United Doctors Medical Center (UDMC) at Quezon City on
September 11, 1989 confirmed that she was indeed pregnant.

On January 11, 1990, Sandra gave birth to a baby boy who was named Jacob Salcedo. Hence, the
filing of the complaint

by Mrs. Pastora Salcedo.

During the investigation conducted by the CIS, about thirty (30) pictures of different persons
were laid on the table and Sandra was asked to pick up the pictures of her assailants. Sandra
singled out the pictures of Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto.

Later, Sandra was brought out of

the investigation room to a police line-up of ten people, including Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto.
She was again asked to point to her assailants. Without hesitation, Sandra fingered Moreno
Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto. 8
Mrs. Pastora Salcedo testified that she requested her two daughters-in-law, Joy Salcedo and Celsa
Salcedo, to ask Sandra the identity of the persons who sexually molested her.

Joy confirmed in her testimony that she asked Sandra who sexually molested her. Sandra revealed
that Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto were the ones who raped her. Sandra demonstrated how she
was raped. First, her thighs were touched, then she was hugged and her panty was taken off. A
push and pull movement followed.

10

Celsa testified that she was present when the victim

demonstrated how she was sexually abused by the two accused, including the way her nipples were
touched saying "dito hawak," and holding her breasts to emphasize. She likewise went through the
motion of removing her panty, uttering at the same time "hubad panty."
Sandra identified in open court accused Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto as the persons who raped
her and said she wished them dead, as they did something bad to her.

11

She once again

demonstrated how she was sexually abused. She held her two thighs with her two hands next to her
sexual organ saying, "panty" and then placed her hand on her breast and gestured as if she were
sucking. She also touched her private organ and made a push and pull movement.

12

During the trial, the accused moved that a blood test, both "Major Blood Grouping Test" and "Pheno
Blood Typing" be conducted on the offended party, her child Jacob and the two accused. The result
of the test conducted by the Makati Medical Center showed that Jacob Salcedo has a type "O"
blood, Sandra Salcedo type "B", accused Ruel Prieto type "A" and accused-appellant type "O".
Both accused anchored their defense on mere denial contending that it was impossible for them to
have committed the crime of rape.
After trial on the merits, the trial court convicted Moreno Tumimpad of the crime charged but
acquitted the other accused, Ruel Prieto, on reasonable doubt, stating that he "has a different type
of blood with (sic) the child Jacob Salcedo as his type of blood is "A", while that of child Jacob
Salcedo is
type "O".
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused, PO1 Moreno
Tumimpad, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape, as charged in the
information, and pursuant to the provisions of Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, there being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance attendant
in the commission of the crime, said accused Moreno Tumimpad is hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA; to indemnify the offended girl,
Sandra Salcedo, in the amount of P20,000.00; and to suffer the other accessory
penalties provided for by laws; and to pay the costs of the proceedings.
On reasonable doubt, accused Ruel Prieto is hereby declared ACQUITTED from the
charge.

SO ORDERED.

13

Accused-appellant assigns the following as errors of the lower court:

1. The lower court erred in not appreciating the impossibility of committing the
offense charged without detection.
2. The lower court erred in convicting the accused-appellant base on major blood
grouping test known as ABO and RHS test, not a paternal test known as
chromosomes or HLA test.
The appeal is devoid of merit.
Accused-appellant argues that it was impossible for him to have committed the crime of rape
because most of the time he and his co-accused Ruel Prieto were together with Col. Salcedo on
inspection tours while the victim was always in the company of her mother. He further contends
that it was likewise impossible for Sandra, if she had really been molested, not to have shouted out
of pain, she being a virgin. As if adding insult to injury, accused-appellant suggests that it was
Sandra's brother, Cristopher Salcedo, allegedly a drug user, who could have raped her.
We are not convinced.
It is true that the accused usually went with Col. Salcedo during inspection tours but sometimes
they were left behind and would play pingpong or card games with Sandra at the ground floor of the
house. While Sandra was always with her mother, there were times when she was left alone in the
house with the accused.

14

Mrs. Pastora Salcedo testified:

Q How many security men remain if you can recall when your husband
reported for work?
A Two (2).
Q Who were these security men who remained?
A Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto.
Q How about the 2 other security men Tanggan and Colaljo?
A My husband sent (sic) them for an errand and sometime they used
to go with my husband to the office.

Q Every time when your husband is out what they do while they were
(sic) at the headquarter?
A I saw them sleeping and sometime they were playing at the porch
with my daughter Sandra playing pingpong and sometime they were
listening music.
Q Where did they play usually take place?
A Living room.

15

xxx xxx xxx

Q By the say, (sic) Mrs. Salcedo, you said a while ago when you were
at the headquarters you were able to do your choirs, ( sic) doing
laundry jobs in the second storey of your house. Do you know where
is your daughter Sandra at that time?
A Yes, she spent her time at the second floor.
Q What part of the ground floor she used (sic) to stay?
A Because she is found (sic) of music she stay in the living room.
Q Did she has (sic) any playmates?
A Moreno and Prieto.
Q Have you seen actually the 2 accused playing with your daughter?
A Yes, playing pingpong and playing cards.

16

The victim more than once positively identified accused-appellant Moreno Tumimpad as one of the
perpetrators of the crime. First, during the investigation conducted by the CIS, Sandra singled out
accused-appellant and his co-accused from among the thirty (30) pictures of different persons
shown to her. Second, at the police lineup of several persons, likewise conducted by the CIS,
Sandra once again unerringly pointed accused-appellant and his co-accused as the ones who raped
her. Third, in open court, Sandra without hesitation, pointed to accused- appellant as the
perpetrator of the crime.
The following is the victim's own testimony:

PROS. RAMOS:
Will you please demonstrate before this Honorable Court what
Moreno and Ruel did to you?
RECORD:
The witness when she stood up held both her thighs (sic) with her
two hand (sic) down to her sexual organ saying a word "panty" and
she placed her hand on her breast and did something as if sucking
and held her private part (sic) and did a push and pull movement and
she cried.
Q When you said that there was a push and pull movement of the
body and when this was being done did you feel pain?
A Yes pain.
Q What part of your body is painful?
RECORD:
The witness touching her private parts.
Q Did you also see blood on your sexual organ?
A Yes.
Q Where did you see these blood?
RECORD:
The witness touching her private parts.
Q When this push and pull movement was being made, did you see a
man's organ?
A Yes sir.
Q Where did you see this male organ?
A Witness touching her private part.

Q Who did this to you, who removed your panty?

A Moreno and Ruel.
Q Did you see Moreno taking off his pants?
A Yes.
Q Did you see his sex organ?
A The witness touching her private parts.
Q How about this Ruel, did you see if he taken ( sic) off his pants?
A Yes.
Q Did you see his sex organ?
A Yes, witness again touching her private part.
Q Both of them?
A Yes.
Q Where did Moreno and Ruel removed (sic) your panty?
A Moreno.
Q In your house?
A Yes.
Q What part of your house did Moreno and Ruel remove your panty?
A Downstairs Moreno and Ruel remove panty.
Q What part of the ground floor, was it outside or inside the room?
A In the room.
Q When (sic) Moreno and Ruel are inside the courtroom now, can you

point to them?

A Yes.
Q Will you please point to them?
PROS. RAMOS:
May we request the accused to stand up your honor?
RECORD:
Both accused stood up from where they were sitting inside the
courtroom.
PROS. RAMOS:
Who is that person (prosecutor Ramos point to accused Moreno
Tumimpad)?
A Moreno.
RECORD:
The witness pointing to a certain person who is standing and when
asked what is his name, he readily answered that he is Moreno
Tumimpad.
PROS. RAMOS:
Who is that person standing besides Moreno?
A Joel.
PROS. RAMOS:
If your honor please, she could not pronounced (sic) well the word
Ruel but the way she called this name is Joel which refers to the
same person who is one of the accused in this case.

17

Melinda Joy Salcedo, the victim's sister-in-law, testified that Sandra demonstrated to her how she
was ravished by the two accused, thus:

Q Now, will you please tell us what did Sandra Salcedo told (sic) you
as to how she was abused?
A By what she had stated there were also actions that she made.
Q Will you please demonstrate to this Honorable Court how did
Sandra Salcedo was abused as narrated or demonstrated to you by
Sandra Salcedo?
A According to her she was held in her thigh and then she was
hugged and then the panty was taken off and making a push and pull
movement (witness demonstration by holding her thigh)?
Q Now, after Sandra Salcedo told you and demonstrated to you how
she was abused. What else did Sandra Salcedo tell you if she had
told you any more matter?
A She did not say anything more.
Q Now, when Sandra Salcedo refused to talk or say anything else.
What happened next?
A Then it was Celsa who asked her.
Q Where were you when Celsa asked Sandra Salcedo?
A I was just beside her.
Q You said that after Sandra Salcedo refused to talk, Celsa did the
questioning, did you hear the question being asked by Celsa to Sandra
Salcedo?
A Yes.
Q And what was the question being asked by Celsa to Sandra
Salcedo?
A Celsa asked Sandra Salcedo as to what other things that these
two had done to her?
Q And what if any did Sandra Salcedo tell you as to what was done
to her?

A By way of talking and action.

Q And what was the answer of Sandra Salcedo?
A He (sic) answered it by action and talking.
Q And what was the answer of Sandra Salcedo as related by her to
Celsa through words and action?
RECORD:
The witness demonstrated by holding his (sic) nipple going down to
her thigh.
Q What else had transpired next?
A No more.
Q Now, whenever Sandra Salcedo mentioned the names of accused
Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto, have you observed whose names
was usually mentioned first by Sandra Salcedo?
A She mentioned first the name of Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel.
Q And what happened after that?
A I informed my mother-in-law of what Sandra Salcedo had told us.
Q When did you tell your mother-in- law about what Sandra Salcedo
told you and Celsa?
A That very evening sir.

18

Accused-appellant simplistically and quite erroneously argues that his conviction was based on the
medical finding that he and the victim have the same blood type "O".
Accused-appellants' culpability was established mainly by testimonial evidence given by the victim
herself and her relatives. The blood test was adduced as evidence only to show that the alleged
father or any one of many others of the same blood type may have been the father of the child. As
held by this Court in Janice Marie Jao vs. Court of Appeals

19

Paternity Science has demonstrated that by the analysis of blood samples of the
mother, the child, and the alleged father, it can be established conclusively that the
man is not the father of a particular child. But group blood testing cannot show only
a possibility that he is. Statutes in many states, and courts in others, have
recognized the value and the limitations of such tests. Some of the decisions have
recognized the conclusive presumption of non-paternity where the results of the
test, made in the prescribed manner, show the impossibility of the alleged paternity.
This is one of the few cases in which the judgment of the Court may scientifically
be completely accurate, and intolerable results avoided, such as have occurred
where the finding is allowed to turn on oral testimony conflicting with the results of
the test. The findings of such blood tests are not admissible to prove the fact of
paternity as they show only a possibility that the alleged father or any one of many
others with the same blood type may have been the father of the child.
WHEREFORE, accused-appellant's guilt of the crime of rape having been proven beyond reasonable
doubt, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ., concur.

Cruz, J., is on leave.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 132676

April 4, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JAIME CARPO, OSCAR IBAO, WARLITO IBAO and ROCHE IBAO, accused-appellants.
PER CURIAM:
The accused might as well have borrowed the famous line of Shakespeare " How this world is given

to lying!"1 when they impute error to the trial court for relying on the testimony of a single
witness in convicting them of multiple murder complexed with attempted murder for the death of
Florentino Dulay, Norwela Dulay and Nissan Dulay, and the wounding of Noemi Dulay. 2
The challenged testimony of witness Ruben Meriales follows: 3 On 25 August 1996 at about 8:00
oclock in the evening while he was watching television with his family his dogs barked. His mother
who was apprehensive that their cow might be stolen prodded him to check the disturbance. To
allay her fears he stood up, took his flashlight and trudged the unpaved path towards his cow that
was tied to a mango tree. Then the noise grew louder thus arousing his suspicion that something was
really wrong. After transferring his cow nearer to his house, he went inside the kitchen, stood atop
the concrete washbasin, hid himself behind the bamboo slats and peeped outside to observe. The
darkness helped conceal him from outside view while the light from the two (2) bulbs positioned at
about three (3) meters from where he stood filtered through the slats and illumined the
surroundings. There was also moon in the sky.
A few minutes later, he saw barangay captain Jaime Carpo together with Warlito Ibao suspiciously
stooping near his barn. He knew Jaime and Warlito very well. Jaime was his uncle and Warlito lived
in his neighborhood. Warlitos son Roche was also there; he was standing by the mango tree. They
were all looking in the direction of Florentino Dulays house which was about a meter to the south
from where he was. He also saw Oscar Ibao, another son of Warlito, striding towards Dulays hut.
As soon as he reached the hut Oscar lifted the sawali mat near the wall and hurled something
inside. Oscar then scurried off towards the nearby creek with Roche following him. Seconds later, a
loud explosion shook the entire neighborhood and Teresita Dulays screams broke into the night.
Ruben Meriales rushed outside. He ran towards Florentinos hut but was deterred by darkness. He
returned home to take his flashlight and raced back to lend aid to Teresita. Inside the hut he was
stunned by the terrifying gore that greeted him a bloodied Florentino cradled in the arms of his
weeping widow, Norwela and Nissan lying side by side on a cot both doused in blood, and a motionless
Norma whose head was oozing with blood.

Realizing the exigency of the situation, he left the crime scene to borrow the jeepney of Brgy.

Kagawad Edgardo Marquez for the hapless victims. The neighbors milling around at once gave up
hope on Florentino so that only Norwela, Nissan and Noemi were loaded in the jeepney and rushed
to the Eastern Pangasinan District Hospital. On their way, Norwela who had injuries on her chest
and lower appendage died. Nissan who was five (5) years old and the youngest of the victims died
later due to "shock from pains" caused by the shrapnel wounds in her left shoulder, abdomen and
lower extremities.4 Noemi luckily survived. Her attending physician, Dr. Emiliano Subido, testified
that Noemi was semi-conscious and vomiting although ambulatory at the time he examined her. But
due to the seriousness of her wounds and the hospitals lack of facilities she was taken to another
hospital in Dagupan City.5
In the course of their investigation, the policemen questioned the people who might have witnessed
the carnage. Fearful however that the culprits would return, Ruben Meriales refused to give any
statement but intimated to Police Officer Guillermo Osio that he would go to the police station
after the burial.
On 4 September 1996, or a week later, Ruben kept his promise and went to the police station where
he gave his statement to Police Officer Osio. He named Jaime Carpo, Warlito Ibao, Oscar Ibao and
Roche Ibao as the perpetrators of the crime. He further said that Florentino was killed because he
was about to testify against Roche Ibao for the murder of his brother Delfin Meriales. 6
On 3 October 1996, solely on the basis of Rubens testimony, a criminal complaint for the murder of
Florentino Dulay and his two (2) daughters Norwela and Nissan as well as the frustrated murder of
his daughter Noemi was filed against Jaime Carpo, Warlito Ibao, Oscar Ibao and Roche Ibao.
Warrants for their immediate arrest were issued by the municipal circuit trial court.
On 25 October 1996 Jaime Carpo was taken into custody by the police, while Roche Ibao eluded
arrest until 9 December 1996 when he was apprehended by police officers in La Union. With Roches
arrest, Oscar and Warlito realized the futility of hiding and surrendered themselves to the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in La Union.
At the trial, the prosecution presented Ruben, Noemi, Dr. Rosalina O. Victorio, Dr. Emiliano Subido
and Police Officers Virgilio dela Cruz, Jovencio Tapac and Guillermo Osio as witnesses.
Police Officer Osio testified that on the night of 25 August 1996 after receiving a report of an
explosion in Brgy. Baligayan, he together with Police Officers Julius Aurora, Ricardo Lugares and
Jovencio Tapac immediately responded. They were able to gather several grenade shrapnels and a
grenade shifting lever from the crime scene. He spoke with the weeping Teresita Dulay who told
him that she suspected the accused of having perpetrated the assault. He likewise conferred with
Ruben Meriales who named the same set of suspects and who promised to give his statement to the
police after the funeral.

After speaking with Teresita and Ruben, he summoned his colleagues to go with him to Warlito
Ibaos house which was just across the road. Warlitos house was dark and its front door was
locked. He called out but there was no answer. They then proceeded to Oscars house which was
also padlocked and unoccupied. He went to Roches house and peeped inside before they left. 7
Against their positive identification by Ruben, the four (4) accused interposed alibi claiming that
they were somewhere else when the Dulay hut was blasted. They likewise assailed Rubens testimony
for being a fabrication and insisted that he lied to get back at them because Roche was a suspect in
the killing of his brother Delfin Meriales.
Jaime and his wife Veronica Carpo were one in testifying that in the evening of 25 August 1995
Jaime was at home in Brgy. Libsong, a hundred and fifty (150) meters away from the house of the
Dulays in Brgy. Baligayan. When he heard the loud explosion, he summoned his tanods to check
whether the blast happened within their barangay. When he learned that the explosion occurred in
the adjoining Brgy. Baligayan, he went home to sleep. Brgy. Baligayan is separated from his barangay
by a creek and could be reached in ten (10) minutes. However, on the night of the incident, the
creek was neck deep such that one had to make a detour through a mountainous route for about
thirty (30) minutes to reach Brgy. Baligayan.8
Jaime testified that Ruben implicated him because the latter was angry at him. Rubens grudge
supposedly started when Jaime sided with the Ibaos in the murder case instituted by the
Merialeses against Roche for the death of Delfin Meriales. As a matter of fact, on 10 December
1996 while he was incarcerated at the Balungao District Jail, Ruben supposedly visited him asking
his forgiveness for having named him as one of the perpetrators of the crime. Ruben subsequently
pleaded with him to reveal the names of those responsible but when he claimed ignorance, Ruben
left in a huff.
Warlito, Oscar and Roche Ibao testified that on the night of the explosion their family was having
a farewell party for the familys only girl Maribel Ibao who was leaving for Hongkong. They heard
the blast but they did not bother to check. They denied having heard the police officers call for
them an hour after the explosion. Roche further asserted that he did not have a house in Brgy.

Baligayan as reported because he lived with his parents-in-law in Brgy. Libsong. However, on the
night of the blast, he slept at his parents house as all of his siblings and their families were there.
He only learned of the bloodbath the following morning when they went home to his in-laws. His wife
Jovelyn corroborated his testimony in the same manner that Remedios supported the story of her
husband Warlito.9
In convicting Jaime Carpo, Warlito Ibao, Oscar Ibao and Roche Ibao of the multiple murder of
Florentino, Norwela and Nissan Dulay and the attempted murder of Noemi Dulay the trial court
gave full credit to the testimony of Ruben.10 It accepted his straightforward testimony and ruled
that "at no instance throughout the twin testimonies of Meriales did the Court notice a twitch of

falsehood on his lips."11 Accordingly, in accordance with Sec. 6, RA 7659, and Art. 48 of The

Revised Penal Code the trial court imposed upon all of the accused the supreme penalty of death
and ordered them to solidarily indemnify the heirs of the deceased as well as Noemi Dulay in the
amount of P600,000.00.12
Forthwith, the case was elevated to this Court for automatic review. After the filing of briefs, the
accused filed an Addendum to Appellants Brief urging that the favorable result of their lie
detector tests with the NBI be admitted into the records.13
A lie detector test is based on the theory that an individual will undergo physiological changes,
capable of being monitored by sensors attached to his body, when he is not telling the truth. The
Court does not put credit and faith on the result of a lie detector test inasmuch as it has not been
accepted by the scientific community as an accurate means of ascertaining truth or deception. 14
The explosion by means of a hand grenade on the night of 25 August 1996 resulting in the death of
Florentino, Norwela and Nissan Dulay and in the wounding of Noemi Dulay is an admitted fact. The
identity of the perpetrators, as tenaciously questioned by the accused, depends upon the credibility
of Ruben Meriales.
In this appeal, accused-appellants challenge the veracity of the testimony of Ruben Meriales
primarily on two (2) grounds: first, Rubens testimony in court is different from and is
contradictory to his affidavit of 4 October 1996; and second, Ruben is not a disinterested witness
because he has a grudge against the Ibaos.
Consistent with giving due deference to the observations of the trial court on credibility of
witnesses, we agree with the court a quo when it believed Ruben Meriales more than the defense
witnesses.15 Indeed, the trial court is best equipped to make an assessment of witnesses, and its
factual findings are generally not disturbed on appeal unless it has overlooked, misunderstood or
disregarded important facts,16 which is not true in the present case.
The twin arguments therefore raised by accused-appellants against the testimony of Ruben
Meriales are devoid of merit. A scrutiny of the records reveals that his testimony is not
inconsistent with his affidavit of 4 October 1996 inasmuch as the former merely supplied the
details of the event which the latter failed to disclose. But assuming that there was any
inconsistency, it is settled that whenever an affidavit contradicts a testimony given in court the
latter commands greater respect.17 Such inconsistency is unimportant and would not even discredit
a fallible witness.18
The mere fact that Ruben admitted harboring resentment against the Ibaos for the murder of his
brother Delfin does not confirm that he fabricated his story. His frankness in admitting his
resentment against the Ibaos should even be considered in his favor. 19

There is likewise nothing unnatural in Rubens attitude of concealing himself behind the kitchen wall
instead of warning the Dulays of the looming danger to their lives. It is a well-known fact that
persons react differently to different situations there may be some who will respond violently to
an impending danger while there may be others who will simply assume a cravenly demeanor. In this
case, Ruben was ruled by his fear rather than by his reason, but for this alone, his credibility
should not be doubted.

Apropos Jaimes imputation that Ruben had admitted to him while in jail that he lied in his
testimony, we find this accusation farcical as nothing was ever offered in support thereof. The lone
corroborative testimony, which was that of Roche, does not inspire belief since Roche himself
admitted overhearing the conversation while Jaime together with other prisoners was constructing
a hut outside of his cell at about three (3) meters away. As correctly hinted by the prosecution, the
noise generated by the construction made it unlikely for Roche to hear conversations three (3)
meters away.20
The defense proffered by the accused is alibi. But this is futile. By his own admission, Jaime was
only a hundred and fifty (150) meters away from the scene of the crime. In fact, it would only take
him thirty (30) minutes, at the most, to be at the place of the Dulays.
More so for the Ibaos who acknowledged that they were having a party just a stones throw away
from the crime scene at the time of the explosion. Curiously though, if they were indeed reveling
inside their house on that fateful night, then we cannot comprehend why they did not go out to
investigate after hearing the blast. Besides, it was rather strange for the Ibaos not to have joined
their neighbors who had instantaneously milled outside to view the mayhem. Their conduct indeed
betrayed them.
Further, the immediate flight and tarriance of the Ibaos to La Union until Roches arrest cannot
but demonstrate their guilt and desire to evade prosecution. 21
The trial court also correctly ruled that accused-appellants conspired in perpetrating the offense
charged. From the detailed account of Ruben, Jaime and Warlito positioned themselves near the
hay barn while Roche casually stood by the mango tree. As observed by the trial court, the present
of Jaime, Warlito and Roche inescapably gave encouragement and a sense of security to Oscar, the
groups preceptor. Surely, the latter was emboldened to commit the crime knowing that his coconspirators were not far behind.
Under the doctrine enunciated in People v. Tayo,22 the crime committed may otherwise be more
appropriately denominated as murder qualified by explosion rather than by treachery. However,
since it was treachery that is alleged in the Information and appreciated by the trial court, the
explosion of the grenade which resulted in the death of Florentino, Norwela and Nissan, and the
wounding of Noemi can only be multiple murder complexed with attempted murder. 23

The crime committed against Noemi Dulay was correctly denominated by the trial court as
attempted murder considering that none of her injuries was fatal. Her attending physician even
made conflicting statements in the assessment of her wounds, to wit: although he said that Noemi
could have died from the shrapnel wound in her head, he specifically ruled out the possibility of
"intercerebral hemorrhage"24 and despite the seriousness of the possible complications of her
injuries she would suffer from physical incapacity for only ten (10) to fourteen (14) days.
As none of her wounds was severe as to cause her death, accused-appellants not having performed
all the acts of execution that would have brought it about, the crime is only attempted murder. 25
Since the three (3) murders and attempted murder were produced by a single act, namely, the
explosion caused by the hurling of a grenade into the bedroom of the Dulays, the case comes under
Art. 48 of The Revised Penal Code on complex crimes. Article 48 provides that the penalty for the
more serious crime, which in the present case is reclusion perpetua to death, should be applied in its
maximum period. As the crime was complexed, the death penalty was properly imposed by the trial
court.
At this point, we take exception to the court a quo's award of damages in the "negotiated amount
of P600,000.00." It appears that under the auspices of the trial court counsel for the defense
entered into an oral compromise with the public prosecutor, which was subsequently ratified by the
private complainant, limiting the amount of civil liability to P600,000.00. We note the discourse
between the court and the counsel for both parties regarding the award:
PROS. CORPUZ:

x x x x (W)e would like to enter into stipulation the civil aspect of the

case.
COURT:

Are the accused confident that they could be acquitted in this case? Atty

Sanglay?
ATTY. SANGLAY:
COURT:

What about Atty. Rafael?

ATTY. RAFAEL:
COURT:

We are confident, your Honor.

All right. So you can easily stipulate. First of all, how much do you want Fiscal?

PROS. CORPUZ:
COURT:

I think so, your Honor.

P1,282,740.00, your Honor x x x x

x x x x Agree gentlemen of the defense?

ATTY. SANGLAY:

P600,000.00, your Honor.

COURT:

Do you agree Fiscal?

PROS. CORPUZ:
COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

All right so P600,000.00 is the agreed liquidated amount in case of conviction

without necessarily having to interpret this stipulation as admission of guilt on the part of
any of the accused. All right so we will dispense with the testimony on the civil aspect x x x
x
COURT:

x x x x Are you the private complainant in this case?

TERESITA DULAY:
COURT:

Yes, sir.

If the accused get convicted and I will hold them severally liable for you of

damages in the liquidated sum of P600,000.00 as agreed upon by the counsel, will you be
satisfied? x x x x
TERESITA:
COURT:

Yes, sir.1wphi1.nt
So let that be of record. Will you sign the note so that there will be evidence.

(At this juncture private complainant Teresita Dulay affixed her signature at the bottom
right margin of the stenographic notes page 2 hereof).26
Article 1878 of the Civil Code and Sec. 23 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court set forth the
attorney's power to compromise. Under Art. 1878 of the Civil Code, a special power of attorney is
necessary "to compromise, to submit questions to arbitration, to renounce the right to appeal from
a judgment, to waive objections to the venue of an action or to abandon a prescription already
acquired." On the other hand, Sec. 23, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides, "(a)ttorneys have
authority to bind their clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and
in taking appeal, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure, but they cannot, without special
authority, compromise their clients' litigation or receive anything in discharge of their clients'
claims but the full amount in cash."
The requirements under both provisions are met when there is a clear mandate expressly given by
the principal to his lawyer specifically authorizing the performance of an act. 27 It has not escaped
our attention that in the present case counsel for both parties had no special power of attorney
from their clients to enter into a compromise. However, insofar as Teresita was concerned, she was
apprised of the agreement and in fact had signed her name as instructed by the court, thereby
tacitly ratifying the same. As for accused-appellants, the aforecited dialogue between the court
and counsel does not show that they were ever consulted regarding the proposed settlement. In the

absence of a special power of attorney given by accused-appellants to their counsel, the latter can
neither bind nor compromise his clients' civil liability. Consequently, since Atty. Sanglay and Atty.
Rafael had no specific power to compromise the civil liability of all accused-appellants, its approval
by the trial court which did not take the precautionary measures to ensure the protection of the
right of accused-appellants not to be deprived of their property without due process of law, could
not legalize it. For being violative of existing law and jurisprudence, the settlement should not be
given force and effect.
In light of the foregoing, the award of damages must be set aside and a new one entered with all
the circumstances of the case in mind. For the death of Florentino, Norwela and Nissan Dulay, civil
indemnity at P50,000.00 each or a total amount of P150,000.00 is awarded to their heirs. This is in
addition to the award of moral damages at an aggregate amount of P150,000.00 for their emotional
and mental anguish. With respect to Noemi, an indemnity of P30,000.00 would be just and proper.
All taken, an award of P330,000.00 is granted.
Four (4) members of the Court maintain their position that RA 7659, insofar as it prescribes the
death penalty, is unconstitutional; nevertheless they submit to the ruling of the Court, by a
majority vote, that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty should be accordingly
imposed.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the trial court finding accused-appellants JAIME CARPO,
OSCAR IBAO, WARLITO IBAO and ROCHE IBAO GUILTY of the complex crime of multiple
murder with attempted murder and sentencing them to the supreme penalty of death is AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that they are ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased Florentino,
Norwela and Nissan, all surnamed Dulay, P50,000.00 as death indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral
damages for each death or an aggregate amount of P300,000.00. In addition, accused-appellants
are ordered to pay Noemi Dulay P30,000.00 as indemnity for her attempted murder. Costs against
accused-appellants.
In accordance with Sec. 25 of RA 7659, amending Art. 83 of The Revised Penal Code, upon finality
of this Decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the
President for possible exercise of executive clemency or pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Buena,
Pardo, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 111742 March 26, 1998

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROMAN MENESES Y MARIN, accused-appellant.

KAPUNAN, J.:
Eyewitness identification is vital evidence and, in most cases, decisive of the success or failure of
the prosecution. 1 Subject of the Court's scrutiny in the instant criminal case is the credibility of a
child's alleged eyewitness account on which the appellant's conviction by the trial court was solely
anchored.
At around three o'clock in the early morning of December 15, 1991, thirty-three year old Cesar
Victoria was stabbed to death while sleeping by his seven-year old son Christopher in a rented
makeshift room in Tondo, Manila.
Appellant Roman Meneses was charged with the murder of Cesar Victoria, in an Information dated
December 27, 1991, which reads:
That on or about December 15, 1991, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused, with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, attack, assault and use
personal violence upon one CESAR VICTORIA y FERNANDEZ, by then and
there stabbing the latter with a fan knife (balisong) on the different parts
of his body, thereby inflicting upon the said CESAR VICTORIA y
FERNANDEZ mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of
his death immediately.2
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: Christopher R. Victoria, SPO3 Jaime Mendoza,
SPO3 Eduardo Gonzales and Medico-Legal Officer Florante Baltazar.
Christopher R. Victoria testified that he witnessed the stabbing of his father. He testified that
while he lived with his Kuya Odeng on Kasipagan Street, Tondo, on the night of December 14, 1991,
he went to his father's rented makeshift room to sleep after he (Christopher) was whipped by his
brother. Christopher's other siblings lived elsewhere in Tondo and his mother was living in Quezon.
He further testified that he was awakened from sleep and saw his father being stabbed in the
heart with a "veinte nueve." After the assailant ran away, Christopher cried.
SPO3 Jaime Mendoza, a police investigator of the Western Police District testified that on
December 15, 1991, a kagawad of Barangay 123, Zone 9, Tondo, Manila called the precinct informing

him that Cesar Victoria was found stabbed to death. With three policemen, Mendoza immediately
went to the crime scene, arriving there at around three o'clock in the morning. Mendoza described
the scene as a makeshift room about three by five square meters. The room was connected by a
divider with a door to a house owned by the Spouses Ardiete, the victim's landlord. The policemen
saw the victim's bloodied body, with several stab wounds, lying on a wooden bed.
Mendoza testified that when he questioned Christopher, who was then in the house, Christopher
could not identify nor describe the attacker, but that the child said he could identify him because
he knew his face. On re-direct examination however, Mendoza said that Christopher identified the
assailant as appellant.
Mendoza and the policemen brought Christopher to the precinct where his statement was taken.
After the appellant was arrested and turned over to the investigators on December 26, 1991,
Christopher was again brought to the precinct where, during a confrontation with appellant,
Christopher identified appellant as the person who stabbed his father. 4

SPO3 Eduardo C. Gonzales testified that at about two o'clock in the morning of December 25, 1991,
he arrested appellant. The arrest was based on the report of Angelina Victoria, appellant's wife,
who implicated appellant in the crime. The policemen found appellant at the place pointed to by
Angelina, which was a flower box at the corner of Tuazon and Mithi Streets. Frisked, appellant
yielded a balisong. After announcing that they were policemen and that appellant was being arrested
as the suspect in the stabbing of Cesar Victoria, Gonzales and his companions brought appellant to
Police Station No. 2. Appellant was later transferred to the Homicide Section.
On cross-examination, Gonzales stated that he and his companions merely "invited" appellant to go
with them to the police station for investigation, but that at the police station, appellant verbally
admitted to stabbing Cesar Victoria.5
Medico-Legal Officer Florante P. Baltazar of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory
conducted the autopsy on the victim. He testified in court that the cause of death of the victim, as
stated in his Autopsy Report, was "cardio-respiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage
secondary to stab wounds," and that the victim sustained five external injuries, two of which were
fatal. 6 He opined that based on the direction of the stab wounds, the victim was not lying down
when stabbed, but could have been standing or silting when stabbed by the attacker who could have
also been standing.7
The lone witness for the defense was the appellant himself, Roman Meneses. He interposed the
defense of denial and alibi. Appellant testified that the victim, who was his brother-in-law, and
Christopher used to live with him and his wife Angelina, the victim's sister, in their house at A.
Tuazon Street, Tondo, Manila. On the day of the crime, appellant alleged that he was in San Isidro,
Mexico, Pampanga, and had been there since the tenth or eleventh of that month, after he had a
misunderstanding with Angelina.
He further testified that he was arrested on December 24, 1991, without a warrant after being
implicated in the crime by his wife. He was brought to the police station where he was mauled by
policemen; he never admitted though to killing Cesar Victoria, his brother-in-law.

Appellant also denied that there was animosity between him and his brother-in-law. In fact, when
Cesar was stabbed after he (Cesar) got out of prison, appellant even brought him to the hospital
and paid for his medical expenses. Appellant even sent his nephew Christopher to school. 8
In a Decision dated July 26, 1993, the trial found appellant guilty, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered convicting the accused of the
crime of Murder, and he is hereby sentenced with the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua.
The accused is hereby ordered to indemnify and pay the heirs of the victim
Cesar Victoria the sum of P50,000.00 as damages sustained by them on
account of the victim's death.9
In this appeal, appellant assigns to the trial court the following errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING EXCULPATORY WEIGHT TO
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE DEFENSE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT OF THE CRIME
CHARGED NOTWITHSTANDING THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION
TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
III
ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT APPELLANT IS GUILTY, THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING HIM OF MURDER INSTEAD OF
HOMICIDE ONLY. 10
The issue in the instant case is credibility. The judgment of appellant's conviction is anchored
entirely on the testimony of the single eyewitness, Christopher Victoria, who identified appellant as
the one who he allegedly saw stab his father.
We find that the trustworthiness of the identification of appellant by Christopher is dubious,
raising reasonable doubt in the mind of the Court as to appellant's culpability.
It was established that the crime took place in the wee hours of the morning, before the crack of
dawn, at around three o'clock. 11 The court can take judicial notice of the "laws of nature," 12 such
as in the instant case, that at around three in the morning during the Christmas season, it is still
quite dark and that daylight comes rather late in this time of year. 13 Nowhere in the description of
the crime scene by witness SPO3 Mendoza in his testimony was it established that there was light

or illumination of any sort by which Christopher could see the attacker. SPO3 Mendoza testified
thus:
Q You said you found the body of the victim, what ( sic) did
you found (sic) at the body of the victim?
A We found the body of the victim on adjacent makeshift of
the No. 1324.
Q The makeshift room which was adjacent to the house,
whose house of that makeshift was adjacent?
A It was owned by Cesar Victoria and his son Christopher.
Q You said you interviewed a couple named Ardiete, where
did you see this couple?
A Inside the house, sir.
Q How far is that house to the house of the victim?
A Only a division within that house, only division separate.
COURT:
Q You said that the makeshift was adjacent to the house,
does the Court understand from you that the makeshift was
attach to the house?
A Part of the house, Your Honor.
Q Is there an opening on it?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q How wide?
A The main door going to the house.
Q Did you come to know, what that makeshift was for?
A It was occupied intended for the victim Cesar Victoria and
his son, they actually rented the space.
Q So the place where you found the victim is a place which
can be used for living purposes?

A Yes, sir.
Q How did you come to that conclusion?
A Because that portion, there was a door, there was a door
before you can get inside.
FISCAL SULLA:
Q How big is that room more or less?
A More or less about three meters or five meters.
Q Now who occupied the room adjacent to the room occupied
by the victim?
A The spouses Ardiete, sir.

14

The crime took place in a makeshift room measuring about three by five square meters. While the
room had a door, there was no mention of a window which could have allowed entry of some kind of
light from the outside. It is highly improbable that a young boy, just roused from sleep and his eyes
adjusting to the unlit room, could identify the attacker, much less identify the knife used, as
Christopher did, as a "veinte nueve."
The prosecution failed to paint a crystal-clear picture of the environ by which Christopher could
have made an accurate and reliable identification of the attacker. Christopher's testimony being
improbable, is not credible. Evidence is credible when it is "such as the common experience of
mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. We have no test of the truth of
human testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge, observation, and experience." 15
We now consider the identification itself. We note a glaring discrepancy, not inconsequential, in the
testimony of SPO3 Mendoza regarding Christopher's identification of appellant. SPO3 Mendoza
testified thus:
Q Where was the son of the victim when you arrived?
A Inside the house, sir.
COURT:
Q Did you talked (sic) to the son of the victim?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did he tell you?

A He told me he can remember the suspect whenever he

sees him again.
Q Then he can identify him?
A Yes, Your Honor.
ATTY. SARMIENTO:
Q So at the time that you were there, the son of the victim
was not able to tell you who the suspect was?
A Yes, sir.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q Neither the wife nor the husband [referring to the

spouses Ardiete], nor the son tell you that they saw the
killing?
A The son of the victim said that he can identified (sic) the
suspect.
Q Did you asked (sic) him if he can identify?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what did he tell you?
A He knows the face of the suspect.
Q Did you ask him the name of the suspect, if he knows him
at that time?
A He can't tell the name.
Q Did he tell you the description of the suspect?
A He can't tell the description of the suspect but he insist
(sic) that if he can see him again, he can identify. 16
During his direct and cross-examination, SPO3 Mendoza asserted that Christopher could not name
his father's attacker nor give a description; however, in his re-direct examination he said that
Christopher mentioned categorically appellant's name, Roman Meneses, thus:

Q When you responded to the scene of the crime, and talking

to Christopher Victoria who can identify the suspect, did you
asked [sic] him why he can identify the suspect?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did he say?
A He remember [sic] the face.
Q And did you ask him why he can remember the face?
A Yes, sir. Because he openly sees the face, sice (sic) he was
his uncle.
Q Did you asked [sic] the son what is the name of his uncle?
A Yes, sir.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q What is the name?

A Roman Meneses.17
This inconsistency in the testimony of SPO3 Mendoza not only tolls on his credibility as well as the
credibility of his testimony, but more significantly, casts doubt on the trustworthiness, veracity
and reliability of the alleged identification itself. Significantly, this inconsistency was noted by the
trial court with vexation, but the court merely glossed over the same, stating that the
identification of appellant by Christopher during the subsequent confrontation rendered such
inconsistency unimportant.
Even in the Advance information 18 prepared by SPO3 Mendoza on December 15, 1991, no mention
was made regarding an identification made by Christopher when questioned immediately after the
crime. Mendoza wrote:
CHRISTOPHER VICTORIA, 8 years old, son of victim, who was sleeping
beside the latter during the commission of the crime when interviewed
stated that he was awakened, while his father was being stabbed by suspect,
whom he claimed he can identify if he can see him again.
Case to be further investigated and follow-up to determine the motive
behind the knife-slaying and efforts will be exerted to establish the
identity of suspect. 19

Indeed, it taxes the credibility of Christopher's testimony that while he knew appellant prior to
the crime, being his uncle, who for some time he was staying with, he failed to point to appellant as
the attacker when questioned by the police immediately after the incident. Wall 20 in his work on
eyewitness identification expounds on the danger signals which a trial court judge and the appellate
courts should watch out for when considering identifications in criminal cases, thus:
When a person has been the victim of a crime committed by a friend,
acquaintance, relative, or other person previously familiar to him, and
decides to make a complaint to the police, it is to be expected that he would
immediately inform them of the name (or it that be unknown, then at least
the identity) of the person whom they should arrest. The victim would
normally tell the police that he had been hit by John Smith, or that her
purse had been snatched by the grocer's delivery boy. Of course, some
crimes are never reported, for one reason or another. But once the victim
decides to make a criminal complaint, then he will almost invariably name or
designate the perpetrator of the crime immediately, if he is able to do so.
The occasional failure of a complainant to do this is a danger signal of which
the courts have sometimes taken note.
In an Idaho prosecution for rape, for example, the complaining witness
identified the defendant at the trial, but had not accused him when making
her original complaint to the police, even though he was previously known to
her. As an explanation, she testified she had not recognized him during the
commission of the crime. The ensuing conviction was reversed on the ground
that the evidence of identification was insufficient. In an lowa prosecution
for assault with intent to commit rape, the complainant was a young married
woman who had known the defendant prior to the commission of the alleged
crime. She identified him at the trial, but admitted that she had not
recognized him during the assault, for he had a veil covering his face. It was
after he left, she testified that it came to her mind that he assault, and on
the same day, she became afraid to stay alone at home while waiting for her
husband to return, and asked none other than the defendant to wait with
her a course of action that which was commented upon by the appellate
court which reversed the conviction on grounds which included the
insufficiency of the evidence of identification.
In a New York murder prosecution, the victim's widow identified the
defendant prior to her husband's killers. Although she knew the defendant
prior to her husband's death, she admitted that she had not named him to
the police on the night of the crime, and admitted also that she had told the
coroner that she had never before seen her husband's murderers. A
conviction for murder in the first degree was reversed because the trial
judge had failed to charge the jury that they should consider those facts in
determining the accuracy of the identification. And in a recent New York
robbery prosecution, it was brought out that the two women who had
identified the defendant at the trial had not immediately named him to the

police, even though they had known him previously, since he was the son of an
acquaintance of one of them. The conviction was reversed on appeal, the
court stating, with respect to the identifying witnesses, that:
If we give credence to their testimony, it appears that they
were able to and did observe fully the fact and general
appearance of one of the three alleged robbers who was
identified by them 17 months later as the defendant . . . .
Certainly, if, at the time of the incident, they had recognized
the particular individual as one whom they knew or as
resembling one with whom they were acquainted, it is
reasonable to expect that they would have given this
information promptly to the police. . . . On the state of this
record, there was no plausible explanation for the failure of
the two women, or one of them, to recognized the defendant
at the time of the robbery or, in any event, to pass along to
the police within a reasonable time information which would
have led them to identify the defendant as one of the
robbers. We realize. . . . That the issue is one of credibility
and that, generally speaking, such issued is for the trier of
the facts. Here, however, on the whole record, we have
concluded that the finding of the jury as to the guilt of the
defendant . . . is contrary to the weight of the evidence; and
that, in any event, a new trial should be had in the interests
of justice.
These four cases should suffice to illustrate how the courts react to this
danger signal on the rather rare occasions when it is in the record before
them. Those occasions are rare, it is submitted, because when the point
actually arises in a case, it usually produces that reasonable doubt which
causes a jury to acquit. It may also be of some significance that when a jury
convicts despite such a glaring weakness in the identification, it is usually in
the type of case that stirs up the greatest emotions sex crimes and
crimes of violence. Common sense, however, dictates that when this danger
signal is present in a case, and the failure of the witness or complainant to
do what would normally be done, i.e., to name or designate the perpetrator of
the crime immediately, is not satisfactorily explained, no conviction should
occur or should be allowed to stand in the absence of independent and
persuasive evidence of the defendant's guilt.
The prosecution did not endeavor to explain Christopher's failure to name the attacker at the time
he was questioned immediately after the crime. From SPO3 Mendoza's testimony, Christopher was
at that time coherent and answering clearly questions from the police.
We further find objectionable Christopher's identification of appellant during a "show-up" at the
police station. As testified to by SPO3 Mendoza, "I made confrontation between them," referring

to Christopher and appellant. SPO3 Mendoza testified on the circumstances surrounding the
"confrontation" between Christopher and appellant, thus:
Q Who was able to arrest the suspect?
A PO Eddie Gonzales sir.
Q And what did you do when you informed about this?
A I invited again the eye witness, the son of the victim.
Q And what did you do when you invited the eye witness?
A We make confrontation between the suspect and him.
Q Where?
A Inside the room sir.
Q When was that?
A Right after the suspect was arrested.
Q When was he arrested?
A December 25, 1991
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q And then in the confrontation between the suspect and

the eye witness, what happened?
A The eye witness positively identified the suspect as the
one who stabbed the victim.
COURT:
Who identified?
A The eye witness Your Honor.
xxx
FISCAL SULLA:

xxx

xxx

Q Exactly, where was the suspect when he was identified by

the witness?
A Inside the office.
Q In what Particular place inside your office?
A Crime against person, homicide.
xxx

xxx

21

xxx

Q So, when the accused was arrested and you were informed
about it, what did you do?
A I investigated again, after I made a confrontation between
the son of the victim and the suspect.
Q Son of the victim alone?
A Together with Angelina? 22
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q So the suspect was turn-over (sic) over to you?

A Yes, sir.
Q When was that?
A Day after December 25, 1992.
Q And when the suspect was turned-over to your office, who
were there?
A The night shift in charge.
Q How about the son of the victim, were (sic) he there?
A I just saw him (there) when I arrive (sic).
Q What happened when they arrived.
A I took immediately the statement of the son of the victim.
Q Did you point them the suspect?

A No, sir.
Q Was there confrontation between the suspect and the son
together with Angelina?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened during the confrontation?
A He pin-pointed the suspect.
Q Who pin-pointed the suspect?
A The son of the victim.
Q How about Angelina?
A She did not.
xxx

23

xxx

xxx

Q And from that time how long did it take? When they arrive
(sic), how long (did) this Christopher Victoria identify the
suspect?
A Immediately during my investigation I made a
confrontation with the suspect and the victim, and he pinpointed to me that the suspect was really the one.
Q You said that the suspect was inside the jail, when you
made the investigation in your office, how far is your office
to the detention cell?
A About three meters.
Q When did the confrontation exactly took (sic) place?
A I let the son of the victim to go (sic) nearer the detention
cell.
COURT:
Did you tell something, did you asked (sic) did you tell
anything to the son before the confrontation?
A Yes, sir.

COURT:
What did the son told (sic) you?
A He told me he can.
Q And after he told you he can, what did you do?
A I made confrontation between them.
COURT:
And during the confrontation, what did the son tell you?
A He is Roman Meneses.
COURT:
Did you asked (sic) him where did he saw (sic) the person
pointed to?
A Yes, he told me that he saw him in the room they rented at
Alinia. 24
In Tuazon v. Court of Appeals, 25 the Court stated that an identification of the accused during a
"show-up" or where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification,
is seriously flawed. We stated thus:

26

. . . the mode of identification other than an identification parade is a showup, the presentation of a single suspect to a witness for purposes of
identification. Together with its aggravated forms, it constitutes the most
grossly suggestive identification procedure now or ever used by the police
(See Louisell, David W., Kaplan, John, and Waltz, Jon R., Cases and Materials
on Evidence; Wall, Eyewitness Identification in Criminal Cases, 1968 ed., p.
1263)
In the Tuazon case, during a first encounter in the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
headquarters, the accused therein was pointed to by the alleged eyewitnesses after an NBI agent
first pointed him out to them. The Court said that "[the eyewitnesses'] Identification of
[petitioner] from a [subsequent] line-up at the NBI was not spontaneous and independent. An NBI
agent improperly suggested to them petitioner's person." 27
From Mendoza's testimony we can gather that appellant was presented as the suspect in the crime
to Christopher inside Mendoza's office in the Homicide Section of the police station, or later in the
detention cell the boy was made to approach. While Mendoza did not literally point to appellant as in

the Tuazon case, equally pervasive in the "confrontation" in the instant case is what Wigmore calls
"the suggestion of guilty identity." 28
Even applying the totality of circumstances test set in People v. Teehankee, Jr., 29 formulated and
used by courts in resolving the admissibility and reliability of out-of-court identifications, we must
hold the identification of appellant by Christopher to be seriously flawed. The test lists three
factors to consider:
. . . (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime;
(2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any
prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time
between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the
identification process. (See Neil v. Biggers, 409 US 188 (1973); Manson v.
Brathwaite, 482 US 98 (1977); Del Carmen, Criminal Procedure, Law and
Practice, 3rd Edition., p. 346)
Indeed, we cannot discount the angle that young Christopher was influenced by prior prompting or
manipulation by an adult, his aunt Angelina. Rather than reinforce the identification, the
circumstances pointed out by the trial court plants in mind the plausibility that appellant's wife
Angelina could have coached the young impressionable Christopher. These circumstances are:
First, was the insistence of [appellant's] wife as testified by the accused
himself, that he was the one who killed the victim, and was pointed to by her
as the assailant, thus, he was arrested. Another was the resentment of the
accused against his brother-in-law-victim brought about by the latter's
intervention in that serious quarrel between him and his wife. Thirdly, that
the accused no doubt disliked the financial support and subsistence being
given by his wife to the victim.
Quite revealingly, Angelina was the one who went to the police to implicate appellant in the crime
and who directed the police to where he could be found. She later herded Christopher to the police
station for the boy to give his statement. She was also with the boy when he was made to identify
appellant during the "confrontation." We see Angelina's actuations as suspect, especially when we
consider that per SPO3 Mendoza's testimony, when he questioned Christopher immediately after
the crime, the boy could not simply name the attacker.
And while the above circumstances, particularly, the supposed resentment of appellant against the
victim, who was his wife Angelina's brother, and envy proceeding from Angelina's giving financial
support to the victim may constitute motive, motive alone, without credible positive identification,
cannot be a basis for conviction. 30
The People points out that appellant had verbally admitted having committed the crime at the time
of his arrest and later during the conduct of the investigation. 31 The appellant however during the
trial denied having made such verbal admissions of guilt. Granting arguendo that appellant indeed
made such verbal admissions, the same would not be admissible in evidence against him because the

constitutional preconditions for its admission were not complied with. The mere assertion by a
police office that after an accused was informed of his constitutional right to remain silent and to
counsel he readily admitted his guilt, does not make the supposed confession admissible against the
purported confessant. 32 Here, it was not even shown that appellant's supposed admissions of guilt
were made with benefit of counsel. 33
It is conceded that appellant's defense of alibi is weak. 34 The settled rule however is that
conviction should rest on the strength of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense.
35
The onus is on the prosecution to prove the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt, in view of
the constitutional presumption of the innocence of the accused. 36 We must rule that the
prosecution failed to so discharge its burden.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated July 26, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 34 in Criminal Case No. 91-101878 convicting
appellant ROMAN MENESES y MARIN is REVERSED and appellant is ACQUITTED of the crime
charged on the ground of reasonable doubt. The Court orders his RELEASE from commitment
unless he is held for some other legal cause or ground. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Romero and Purisima, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 142295

May 31, 2001

VICENTE DEL ROSARIO y NICOLAS, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
PARDO, J.:
Petitioner Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas appeals via certiorari from a decision of the Court of
Appeals1 affirming with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan, Branch 20,
Malolos, and finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P. D. No. 1866, as amended,
by Republic Act No. 8294 (illegal possession of firearms), sentencing him to four (4) years, nine (9)
months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P30,000.00.1wphi1.nt
On June 17, 1996, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Eufracio S. Marquez of Bulacan filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Bulacan, Malolos an Information charging petitioner Vicente del Rosario y
Nicolas with violation of P. D. No. 1866, as follows:
"That on or about the 15th day of June 1996, in the municipality of Norzagaray, Province of
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession under
his custody and control, the following, to wit:
"a) One (1) pc. Pistol Cal. 45 SN:70G23792 (w/o license)
"b) One (1) pc. Revolver Cal. 22 SN:48673 (w/o license)
"c) Twenty Seven (27) rds live ammos. For cal. .45
"d) Five (5) pcs. Magazines for cal. .45
"e) Eight (8) rds live ammunitions for cal. 22
"f) Five (5) pcs. Magazines short for cal. 5.56 (M16)

"g) Twenty (20) rds live ammunitions for cal 5.56.

"without first having obtained" a proper license therefor.
"Contrary to law."2
On June 25, 1996, the trial court arraigned the petitioner. He pleaded not guilty. 3 Trial ensued.
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
"Sometime in May 1996, the police received a report that accused-appellant Vicente del
Rosario was in possession of certain firearms without the necessary licenses. Acting upon
the report, P/Sr. Insp. Jerito Adique of the PNP Criminal Investigation Group at Camp
Olivas, Pampanga inquired from the PNP Firearms and Explosive Division "whether or not the
report was true. On May 10, 1996, P/Sr. Insp. Edwin C. Roque of the PNP Firearms and
Explosives Division issued a certification (Exhibit L) stating that per records in his office,
the appellant is not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind and caliber. Armed
with the said certification, P/Sr. Insp. Adique applied for a search warrant to enable his
team to search the house of appellant. 1wphi1.nt
"On June 13, 1996, a search warrant (Exhibit A) was issued by Judge Gil Femandez, Sr. of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 217, authorizing the search of the
residence of appellant at Barangay Tigbe, Norzagaray, Bulacan. 4 On June 15, 1996, at about
7:00 o'clock in the morning, a team led by P/Sr. Insp. Adique went to Norzagaray to serve
the warrant. Before proceeding to the residence of the appellant, the police officers
requested Barangay Chairman Rogelio de Silva and Barangay Councilman Aurelio Panteleon to
accompany them in the implementation of the warrant. Upon arrival at the house of
appellant, the police officers introduced themselves to the wife of appellant. When the
appellant came out, P/Sr. Insp. Adique informed him that they had a search warrant and
that they were authorized to search his house. After appellant gave his permission, the
police officers conducted a search of the house. The search yielded the following items: (a)
a caliber .45 pistol with Serial No. 703792 with five magazines of caliber .45 (Exhibits B
and H) found at the master's bedroom; (b) five magazines of 5.56 M-16 rifle and two radios
(Exhibits C to C-4) found in the room of appellant's daughter; and (c) a caliber .22 revolver
with Serial No. 48673 (Exhibit F) containing 8 pieces of live ammunition (Exhibit M) found in
the kitchen of the house. When asked about his license to possess the firearms, the
appellant failed to produce any. This prompted the police officers to seize the subject
firearms.
"SPO2 Marion Montezon, one of the searching officers, prepared three separate
inventories of the seized items (Exhibits H, M and N). The inventories were signed by P/Sr.

Insp. Adique, the appellant and the barangay officials who witnessed the search. Thereafter
SPO2 Montezon prepared a certification of orderly search (Exhibit I) which was signed by
the appellant and the barangay officials attesting to the orderly conduct of the search.
"For his defense, appellant contends that he had a license for the caliber .45 pistol
recovered in his bedroom and that the other items seized during the search including the
caliber .22 revolver, were merely planted by the police officers. Appellant likewise assails
the manner in which the search was carried out, claiming that the police officers just
barged into his house without asking permission. Furthermore, he claimed that the barangay
officials arrived only after the police already had finished the search.
"After trial and on July 2, 1998, the trial court rendered a judgment of conviction, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused VICENTE DEL
ROSARIO y NICOLAS guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P. D. No. 1866
as charged under the Information dated June 17, 1996.
"Conformably with the provisions of said law, as amended by Republic Act No. 8294,
and pursuant to the provisions, of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court
hereby sentences the accused to suffer imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to six (6) years of prision correctional, as maximum, and to pay a
fine of Fifteen. Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00).
On July 20, 1998, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, assailing the decision for being
contrary to facts and the law.6
On July 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision affirming with modification the
decision of the trial court as set out in the opening paragraph of this decision. 7
On August 10, 1999, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration and/or
new trial.8 He contended that the certification issued by the Chief, Firearms and Explosives
Division, Philippine National Police stating that the person named therein had not been issued a
firearm license referred to a certain Vicente "Vic" del Rosario of barangay Bigte, Norzagaray,
Bulacan, not to him. He comes from barangay Tigbe, Norzagaray, Bulacan, and that he has a valid
firearm license.
On February 22, 2000, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit.9
Hence, this appeal.10

Petitioner submits that the search conducted at his residence was illegal the search warrant was
issued in violation of the Constitution11 and consequently, the evidence seized was inadmissible. He
also submits that he had a license for the .45 caliber firearm and ammunition seized in his bedroom.
The other firearm, a .22 caliber revolver seized in a drawer at the kitchen of his house, a magazine
for 5.56 mm. cal. Armalite rifle, and two 2-way radios found in his daughter's bedroom, were either
planted by the police or illegally seized, as they were not mentioned in the search warrant.
We find the petition impressed with merit. We define the issues as follows:
First: whether petitioner had a license for the .45 caliber Colt pistol and ammunition seized in his
bedroom; and
Second: whether the .22 caliber revolver seized in a drawer at the kitchen of his house, a magazine
for 5.56 mm. cal. Armalite rifle and two 2-way radios found in his daughter's bedroom, were planted
by the police or were illegally seized.
We shall resolve the issues in seriatim.
First: The .45 cal. Colt pistol in question was duly licensed.
Normally, we do not review the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial courts. 12
However, this case comes within the exceptions.13 The "findings of fact by the Court of Appeals will
not be disturbed by the Court unless these findings are not supported by evidence." 14 In this case,
the findings of the lower courts even directly contradict the evidence. Hence, we review the
evidence. The trial court held that the copy of the license presented was blurred, and that in any
event, the court could rely on the certification dated May 10, 1996, of P/Sr. Inspector Edwin C.
Roque, Chief, Records Branch, Firearms and Explosives Division, Philippine National Police stating
that Vicente "Vic" del Rosario of Barangay Bigte, Norzagaray, Bulacan is not a licensed/registered
firearm holder of any kind and caliber.15 As against this, petitioner submitted that he was not the
person referred to in the said certification because he is Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas from
Barangay Tigbe, Norzagaray, Bulacan. The Court takes judicial notice of the existence of both
barangay Tigbe and barangay Bigte, in Norzagaray, Bulacan.16 In fact, the trial court erred
grievously in not taking judicial notice of the barangays within its territorial jurisdiction, believing
the prosecution's submission that there was only barangay Tigbe, and that barangay Bigte in the
certification was a typographical error.17 Petitioner presented to the head of the raiding team,
Police Senior Inspector Jerito A. Adique, Chief, Operations Branch, PNP Criminal Investigation
Command, a valid firearm license. The court is duty bound to examine the evidence assiduously to
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. It is true that the court may rely on the
certification of the Chief, Firearms and Explosives Division, PNP on the absence of a firearm
license.18 However, such certification referred to another individual and thus, cannot prevail over a
valid firearm license duly issued to petitioner. In this case, petitioner presented the printed

computerized copy of License No. RCL 1614021915 issued to him on July 13, 1993, expiring in
January 1995, by the Chief, Firearms and Explosives Division, PNP under the signature of Reynaldo
V. Velasco, Sr. Supt. (GSC) PNP, Chief, FEO.19 On the dorsal side of the printed computerized
license, there is stamped the words "Validity of computerized license is extended until renewed
license is printed" dated January 17, 1995, signed by Police Chief Inspector Franklin S. Alfabeto,
Chief, Licence Branch, FEO.20 Coupled with this indefinite extension, petitioner paid the license
fees for the extension of the license for the next two-year period. 21
Consequently, we find that petitioner was the holder of a valid firearm license for the .45 caliber
Colt pistol seized in the bedroom of his house on June 15, 1996. 22 As required, petitioner presented
the license to the head of the raiding team, Police Senior Inspector Jerito A. Adique of the
Criminal Investigation Division Group, PNP.23 As a senior police officer, Senior Inspector Adique
could easily determine the genuineness and authenticity of the computerized printed license
presented. He must know the computerized license printed form. The stamp is clearly visible. He
could decipher the words and the signature of the authorized signing official of the Firearms and
Explosives Division, PNP. He belonged to the same national police organization.
Nevertheless, Senior Insp. Adique rejected the license presented because, according to him, it was
expired. However, assuming that the license presented was expired during the period January 1995
to January 1997, still, possession of the firearm in question, a .45 caliber Colt pistol with serial No.
70G23792, during that period was not illegal. The firearm was kept at home, not carried outside
residence. On June 15, 1996, at the time of the seizure of the firearm in question, possession of
firearm with an expired license was not considered unlawful, provided that the license had not
been cancelled or revoked. Republic Act No. 8294, providing that possession of a firearm with an
expired license was unlawful took effect only on July 7, 1997. 24 It could not be given retroactive
effect.25
According to firearm licensing regulations, the renewal of a firearm license was automatically
applied for upon payment of the license fees for the renewal period. The expired license was not
cancelled or revoked. It served as temporary authority to possess the firearm until the renewed
license was issued. Meantime, the applicant may keep the gun at home pending renewal of the
firearm license and issuance of a printed computerized license. He was not obliged to surrender the
weapon. Printed at the dorsal side of the computerized license is a notice reading:
"IMPORTANT
1. This firearm license is valid for two (2) years. Exhibit this license whenever demanded by
proper authority.
2. Surrender your firearm/s to the nearest PNP Unit upon revocation or termination of this
license. Under any of the following instances, your license shall be revoked for which reason

your firearm/s is/are subject to confiscation and its/their forfeiture in favor of the
government.
a. Failure to notify the Chief of PNP in writing of your change of address, and/or
qualification.
b. Failure to renew this license by paying annual license, fees, within six (6) months from
your birth month. Renewal of your license can be made within your birth month or
month preceding your birth month. Late renewal shall be penalized with 50% surcharge for
the first month (from the first day to the last day of this month) followed by an additional
25% surcharge for all of the succeeding five (5) months compounded monthly.
c. Loss of firearm/s through negligence.
d. Carrying of firearm/s outside of residence without appropriate permit and/or carrying
firearm/s in prohibited places.
e. Conviction by competent court for a crime involving moral turpitude or for any offense
where the penalty carries an imprisonment of more than six (6) months or fine of at least
Pl,000.00.
f. Dismissal for cause from, the service.
g. Failure to sign license, or sign ID picture or affix right thumb mark.
3. Unauthorized loan of firearm/s to another person is punishable by permanent
disqualification and forfeiture of the firearm in favor of the government.
4. If termination is due to death, your next of kin should surrender your firearm/s to the
nearest PNP Unit. For those within Metro, Manila, surrender should be made with FEO,
Camp Crame.
5. When firearms become permanently unserviceable, they should be deposited with the
nearest PNP Unit and ownership should be relinquished in writing so that firearms may be
disposed of in accordance with law.
6. Application for the purchase of ammunition should be made in case of a resident of Metro
Manila direct to the Chief, FEO and for residents of a Province to secure recommendation
letter to the nearest PNP Provincial Command who will thereafter endorse same to CHIEF,
FEO for issuance of the permit. License must be presented before an authority to purchase
ammo could be obtained."26

Indeed, as heretofore stated, petitioner duly paid the license fees for the automatic renewal of
the firearm license for the next two years upon expiration of the license in January, 1995, as
evidenced by official receipt No. 7615186, dated January 17, 1995. 27 The license would be renewed,
as it was, because petitioner still possessed the required qualifications. Meantime, the validity of
the license was extended until the renewed computerized license was printed. In fact, a renewed
license was issued on January 17, 1997, for the succeeding two-year period. 28
Aside from the clearly valid and subsisting license issued to petitioner, on January 25, 1995, the
Chief, Philippine National Police issued to him a permit to carry firearm outside residence valid until
January 25, 1996, for the firearm in question.29 The Chief, Philippine National Police would not issue
a permit to carry firearm outside residence unless petitioner had a valid and subsisting firearm
license. Although the permit to carry firearm outside residence was valid for only one year, and
expired on January 25, 1996, such permit is proof that the regular firearm license was renewed and
subsisting within the two-year term up to January 1997." A Permit to Carry Firearm Outside
Residence presupposes that the party to whom it is issued is duly licensed to possess the firearm in
question."30 Unquestionably, on January 17, 1997, the Chief, Firearms and Explosives Division, PNP
renewed petitioner's license for the .45 cal. Colt pistol in question. 31
Clearly then; petitioner had a valid firearm license during the interregnum between January 17,
1995, to the issuance of his renewed license on January 17, 1997.
Finally, there is no rhyme or reason why the Court of Appeals and the trial court did not accept
with alacrity the certification dated June 25, 1996, of P/Sr. Inspector Edwin C. Roque, 32 Chief,
Records Branch, Firearms and Explosives Division, PNP that Vicente N. del Rosario of Barangay
Tigbe, Norzagaray, Bulacan is a licensed/registered holder of Pistol, Colt caliber .45 with serial
number 70G23792, covered by computerized license issued dated June 15, 1995, with an expiry
date January 1997.33 Reinforcing the aforementioned certification, petitioner submitted another
certification dated August 27, 1999, stating that Vicente N. del Rosario of Barangay Tigbe,
Norzagaray, Bulacan, was issued firearm license No. RL-C1614021915, for caliber .45 Pistol with
Serial Number 70G23792, for the years covering the period from July 13, 1993 to January 1995,
and the extension appearing at the back thereof for the years 1995 to 1997. 34 Had the lower courts
given full probative value to these official issuances, petitioner would have been correctly
acquitted, thus sparing this Court of valuable time and effort.
"In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, the prosecution has the burden of proving the
elements thereof, viz.: (a) the existence of the subject firearm and (b) the fact that the accused
who owned or possessed it does not have the license or permit to possess the same. 35 The essence
of the crime of illegal possession is the possession, whether actual or constructive, of the subject
firearm, without which there can be no conviction for illegal possession. After possession is
established by the prosecution, it would only be a matter of course to determine whether the
accused has a license to possess the firearm."36 "Possession of any firearm becomes unlawful only if

the necessary permit or license therefor is not first obtained. The absence of license and legal
authority constitutes an essential ingredient of the offense of illegal possession of firearm and
every ingredient or essential element of an offense must be shown by the prosecution by proof
beyond reasonable doubt. Stated otherwise, the negative fact of lack or absence of license
constitutes an essential ingredient of the offense which the prosecution has the duty not only to
allege but also, to prove beyond reasonable doubt."37 "To convict an accused for illegal possession of
firearms and explosives under P. D. 1866, as amended, two (2) essential elements must be
indubitably established, viz.: (a) the existence of the subject firearm or explosive which may be
proved by the presentation of the subject firearm or explosive or by the testimony of witnesses
who saw accused in possession of the same, and (b) the negative fact that the accused had no
license or permit to own or possess the firearm or explosive which fact may be established by the
testimony or certification of a representative of the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit that the
accused has no license or permit to possess the subject firearm or explosive." x x x We stress that
the essence of the crime penalized under P. D. 1866 is primarily the accused's lack of license or
permit to carry or possess the firearm, ammunition or explosive as possession by itself is not
prohibited by law."38 Illegal possession of firearm is a crime punished by special law, a malum

prohibitum, and no malice or intent to commit a crime need be proved.39 To support a conviction,
however, there must be possession coupled with intent to possess (animus possidendi) the firearm.40
In upholding the prosecution and giving credence to the testimony of police officer Jerito A.
Adigui, the trial court relied on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties
by the police officers.41 This is a flagrant error because his testimony is directly contradictory to
the official records of the Firearms and Explosives Division, PNP, which must prevail. Morever, the
presumption of regularity can not prevail over the Constitutional presumption of innocence. 42 Right
from the start, P/Sr. Insp. Jerito A. Adigue was aware that petitioner possessed a valid license for
the caliber .45 Colt pistol in question. Despite this fact, P/Sr. Insp. Adigue proceeded to detain
petitioner and charged him with illegal possession of firearms. We quote pertinent portions of the
testimony of petitioner:
Q:

What else did Adigue tell you after showing to him the license of your cal. .45 pistol

and the alleged cal. .22 found in a drawer in your kitchen?

A:

He told me that since my firearm is licensed, he will return my firearm, give him

ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) and for me to tell who among the people in our barangay
have unlicensed firearm, sir.
Q:

How did he say about the ten thousand pesos?

A:

He said "palit kalabaw na lang tayo" sir.

Q:

And what did you answer him?

A:

I told him my firearm is licensed and I do not have money, if I have, I will not give

him, sir, because he was just trying to squeeze something from me.
Q:

How about the unlicensed firearms in your barangay which he asked, from you?

A:

I said I do not know any unlicensed firearm in our barangay, sir.

Q:

About the .22 cal. pistol, what was your answer to him?

A:

I told him that it was not mine, they planted it, sir.

Q:

What did he say next?

A:

He said that it is your word against mine, the Court will believe me because I am a

police officer, sir.

Q:

What was your comment to what he said?

A:

I said my firearm is licensed and we have Courts of law who do not conform with

officials like you and then he laughed and laughed, sir." 43

The trial court was obviously misguided when it held that "it is a matter of judicial notice that a
caliber .45 firearm can not be licensed to a private individual."44 This ruling has no basis either in
law or in jurisprudence.45
Second issue. The seizure of items not mentioned in the search warrant was illegal.
With respect to the .22 caliber revolver with Serial No. 48673, that the police raiding team found
in a drawer at the kitchen of petitioner's house, suffice it to say that the firearm was not
mentioned in the search warrant applied for and issued for the search of petitioner's house.
"Section 2, Article III of the Constitution lays down the general rule that a search and seizure
must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant, absent which such search and
seizure becomes 'unreasonable' within the meaning of said constitutional provision." 46 "Supporting
jurisprudence thus outlined the following requisites for a search warrant's validity, the absence of
even one will cause" its downright nullification: (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the
probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other
person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or
affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant
issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized." 47
Seizure is limited to those items particularly described in a valid search warrant. Searching
officers are without discretion regarding what articles they shall seize. 48 Evidence seized on the
occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and excluded for being the

proverbial "fruit of a poisonous tree." In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.49
In this case, the firearm was not found inadvertently and in plain view. It was found as a result of a
meticulous search in the kitchen of petitioner's house. This firearm, to emphasize, was not
mentioned in the search warrant. Hence, the seizure was illegal. 50 The seizure without the requisite
search warrant was in plain violation of the law and the Constitution. 51 True that as an exception,
the police may seize without warrant illegally possessed firearm or any contraband for that matter,
inadvertently found in plain view. However, "[t]he seizure of evidence in 'plain view' applies only
where the police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes
across an incriminating object."52 Specifically, seizure of evidence in "plain view" is justified when
there is:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally
present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where
they are.
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. 53
Hence, the petitioner rightly rejected the firearm as planted and not belonging to him. The
prosecution was not able to prove that the firearm was in the effective possession or control of the
petitioner without a license. In illegal possession of firearms, the possessor must know of the
existence of the subject firearm in his possession or control. "In People v. de Gracia, 54 we clarified
the meaning of possession for the purpose of convicting a person under P. D. No.1866, thus: x x x
'In the present case, a distinction should be made between criminal intent and intent to possess.
While mere possession without criminal intent is sufficient to convict a person for illegal possession
of a firearm, it must still be shown that there was animus possidendi or an intent to possess on the
part of the accused.' x x x x Hence, the kind of possession punishable under P. D. No. 1866 is one
where the accused possessed a firearm either physically or constructively with animus possidendi or
intention to possess the same."55 That is the meaning of animus possidendi. In the absence of

animus possidendi, the possessor of a firearm incurs no criminal liability.

The same is true with respect to the 5.56 cal. magazine found in the bedroom of petitioner's
daughter. The seizure was invalid and the seized items were inadmissible in evidence. As explained
in People v. Doria,56 the "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the law
if enforcement officer is in a position where he has a clear view of a particular area or alias prior
justification for an intrusion; (2) said officer inadvertently comes across (or sees in plain view) a

piece of incriminating evidence; and (3) it is, immediately apparent to such officer that the item he
sees may be evidence of a crime or a contraband or is otherwise subject to seizure."
With particular reference to the two 2-way radios that the raiding policemen also seized in the
bedroom of petitioner's daughter, there was absolutely no reason for the seizure. The if radios
were not contraband per se. The National Telecommunications Commission may license two-way
radios at its discretion.57 The burden is on the prosecution to show that the two-way radios were
not licensed. The National Telecommunication Commission is the sole agency authorized to seize
unlicensed two-way radios. More importantly, admittedly, the two-way radios were not mentioned in
the search warrant. We condemn the seizure as illegal and a plain violation of a citizen's right.
Worse, the petitioner was not charged with illegal possession of the two-way radios. 1wphi1.nt
Consequently, the confiscation of the two 2-way radios was clearly illegal. The possession of such
radios is not even included in the charge of illegal possession of firearms (violation of P. D. No.
1866, as amended) alleged in the Information.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. CR
No. 22255, promulgated on July 09, 1999.
The Court ACQUITS petitioner Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas of the charge of violation of P. D. No.
1866, as amended by R. A. No. 8294 (illegal possession of firearms and ammunition), in Criminal Case
No. 800-M-96, Regional Trial Court, Bulacan, Branch 20, Malolos.
Costs de oficio.
The Chief; Firearms and Explosives Division, PNP shall return to petitioner his caliber .45 Colt
pistol, with Serial Number No. 70023792, the five (5) extra magazines and twenty seven (27)
rounds of live ammunition, and the two 2-way radios confiscated from him. The Chief, Philippine
National Police, or his duly authorized representative shall show to this Court proof of compliance
herewith within fifteen (15) days from notice. The .22 caliber revolver with Serial No. 48673, and
eight (8) live ammunition and the magazine for 5.56 mm. caliber Armalite rifle are confiscated in
favor of the government.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Puno, Kapunan, Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 117485-86 April 22, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MELCHOR ESTOMACA y GARQUE, accused-appellant.

REGALADO, J.:p
With our recent adjudgment in People vs. Alicando 1 as a backdrop, even an initial perusal of the
records of these cases now before us on appeal and/or automatic review gives a sense of
paramnesia or, in the French term more often used, deja vu. One cannot escape the illusion of
remembering events when experienced for the first time, or of something overly or unpleasantly
familiar in the present appellate review.
Indeed, the courtroom dramatis personae in the cases at bar are the same as in Alicando, that is,
the presiding judge,

the government counsel de oficio, 3 and the substitute counsel de parte.

The

cases likewise involve the heinous crime of rape and were repressed by the sentence of death. The
crux of the controversy in both is identically the validity vel non of the arraignment conducted by
the same trial court which followed closely equivalent procedures in conducting the questioned
proceedings. Hence, as will hereafter be demonstrated, the observations of this Court will also
inevitably converge and move along the same channels of thought.
On May 24, 1994, consequent to five separate complaints, Criminal Cases Nos. 43567, 43568,
43569, 43570 and 43571 were filed in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Iloilo City charging
herein appellant, an illiterate laborer, with rape committed on five separate occasions against his
own daughter, complainant Estelita Estomaca.
The trial court detailed its findings and the prosecution's contentions on the multiple incestuous
rapes, as follows:
Melita is the eldest daughter of the accused, the second husband of Melita's
mother. Melita has a full-blood younger brother around twelve (12) years old. She
has two (2) half-blood sisters (from) the first marriage of her mother who are
residing in Manila.

Melita claims that she was first raped in July 1993, at their residence at Barangay
Tiolas, San Joaquin, Iloilo. This is now the subject of Criminal Case No. 43567. The
offense was repeated by her father before Christmas of December, 1993 (Criminal
Case No. 43568); January 1994 (Criminal Case No. 43569); February 1994 (Criminal
Case No. 43570); and on March 6, 1994 (Criminal Case No. 43571). 5
There is some inconsistency in the statements on record as to what actually took place on June 14,
1994 during the arraignment of appellant, assisted by his government counsel de oficio, Atty.
Rogelio Antiquiera. The decision of the court below, dated July 15, 1994, declares that he entered a
plea of guilty to Criminal Cases Nos. 43568 and 43571, and a plea of not guilty to Criminal Cases
Nos. 43567, 43569 and 43570. 6 Obviously engendered by the insufficiency of the proceedings
conducted and the imprecision of the notes taken at this stage, this matter will be further
discussed hereafter.
The two criminal complaints, both subscribed by the offended party on April 29, 1994 and which
are the subject of the joint judgment of the lower court challenged in this appellate review,
respectively allege:

Criminal Case No. 43568

That sometime in the month of December, 1993, in the Municipality of San Joaquin,
Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, taking advantage of his superior strength, abuse of
confidence and trust, he being the father of the undersigned, with deliberate intent
and by means of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the undersigned who, at that
time, (was) 15 years of age. 7

Criminal Case No. 43571

That on or about March 6, 1994, in the Municipality of San Joaquin, Province of
Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, being the father of the undersigned complainant, with deliberate
intent and by means of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse (with) the undersigned, who, at
that time, (was) 15 years of age.

Proceeding upon the capital nature of the offenses involved, the trial court, after appellant
ostensibly waived the presentation of evidence for his defense, required the prosecution to adduce
evidence purportedly to establish appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, on June 29,
1994, the complainant herself, Melita Estomaca, appeared in court and testified that she was raped

by her father once in December, 1993 and, again, on March 6, 1994. Both incidents, according to
her, took place inside their residence at Sitio
Tan-agan, Barangay Tiolas in San Joaquin, Iloilo at nighttime and that, on those two occasions, she
tried to resist her father's assaults to no avail. After the last rape, she gathered enough courage
to flee from their home, and thereafter she reported the incidents to her mother who was then
living separately from them. Apparently, appellant was later apprehended and has since been under
detention. 9
On the authority of Republic Act No. 7659 which took effect on December 31, 1993, the lower
court imposed upon appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the sexual assault supposedly
perpetrated in December, 1993, and the supreme penalty of death with respect to the rape
allegedly committed on March 6, 1994. In each of the said cases, he was further ordered to
indemnify the offended party in the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.

10

What disconcerts this Court, however, is the alarming consistency of non-compliance by the court a

quo of the procedural rules to be observed for the validity of the arraignment of an accused.
Indeed, the importance of this particular stage of a criminal proceeding, especially when capital
offenses are involved, cannot be over-emphasized. Hence, we pause at this juncture to once again
briefly expound on this vital procedural aspect which the trial court, once in Alicando and again in
the case at bar, appears to have treated with cavalier disregard or frustrating misapprehension.
1. In People vs. A. Albert, 11 we traced the developmental antecedents which culminated and found
expression in reglementary form in Section 3, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
governing a plea of guilty to a capital offense. We there pointed out that the rationale behind the
rule is that courts must proceed with more care where the possible punishment is in its severest
form death for the reason that the execution of such a sentence is irrevocable and experience
has shown that innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty.

12

We stressed the need to avoid improvident pleas of guilt since the accused may thereby forfeit his
life and liberty without having fully understood the meaning, significance and consequences of his
plea.

13

We lamented the confused application adopted or the apathetic indifference in the

application of said rule considering the paramount importance of a valid arraignment, it being the

stage where the issues are joined in the criminal action and without which the proceedings cannot
advance further or, if held, will otherwise be void. We then enjoined the trial courts to review and
reflect upon the jurisprudential and statutory rules which evolved over time in response to the
injustice created by improvident pleas acknowledging guilt, at times belatedly discovered under the
judicial rug, if at all.
With exacting certitude, Section 1(a) of Rule 116 requires that the arraignment should be made in
open court by the judge himself or by the clerk of court furnishing the accused a copy of the
complaint or information with the list of witnesses stated therein, then reading the same in the

language or dialect that is known to him, and asking him what his plea is to the charge. The
requirement that the reading be made in a language or dialect that the accused understands and
knows is a mandatory requirement, just as the whole of said Section 1 should be strictly followed by
trial courts. This the law affords the accused by way of implementation of the all-important
constitutional mandate regarding the right of an accused to be informed of the precise nature of
the accusation leveled at him and is, therefore, really an avenue for him to be able to hoist the
necessary defense in rebuttal thereof.

14

It is an integral aspect of the due process clause under

the Constitution.
2. For a more graphic illustration, and thereby a clearer appreciation of what actually transpired in
the so-called arraignment of appellant in the court below, we quote at length the pertinent
transcripts of the stenographic notes taken at that stage, with emphases on significant portions:
Pros. Nelson Geduspan : For the prosecution.
Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera : For the accused. Ready for arraignment.
Court : The offended party is the daughter.
Interpreter : (Reading the information/complaint to the accused in

Ilonggo/local dialect).
For Crim. Case No. 43567,
the accused, pleads Guilty.
For Crim. Case No. 43568,
the accused, pleads Guilty.
For Crim. Case No. 43569,
the accused, pleads Guilty.
For Crim. Case No. 43570,
the accused, pleads Guilty.
For Crim. Case No. 43571,
the accused, pleads Guilty.
Court : What is your educational attainment?
Witness : I was not able to finish Grade I.
Court : The court would like to explain to you in your plea of Guilty.
If you plead Guilty to these five (5) offenses, definitely, you will

have five (5) sentences.

Accused : Yes, your honor.

Court : Under the New Law the least most probably would be life
sentence.
Accused : Yes, your honor.
Court : How old are you now?
Accused : Forty two.
Court : Because of this fact you have no chance to get back to the

new society and your rights will be affected.

Accused : I know. That's what they told to me.
Court : Despite of (sic) this fact you still insist on your plea of guilty
in these five cases?
Interpreter : According to him, he performed only two (2) acts.
Court : When (were) these two acts performed?
Accused : December 1993 and March 1994.
Court : The other cases charged against you (are) not true?
Accused : It is not true maybe it was committed by her boyfriend

then it was charged against me.

Court : In so far as. . . What is not included in the plea therefore, is
the month of July 1993, January 1994 and the month of February
1994. You did not commit these? Why is it that when you were asked

you entered a plea of guilty?

Accused : Because I committed two acts only.
Court : Why is it that when you were asked you entered a plea of
guilty?
Accused : Because what I recall is that I just committed two acts of

rape.

Court : Not Guilty in the three (3) charges and Guilty in two (2)
charges. Does counsel and accused agree to pre-trial conference?
Atty. Antiquiera : We dispense (with) the pre-trial conference.
Court : For the two charges (to) which he pleads guilty, the court will
receive evidence in order to impose the proper penalty and on the
other charges, the court will receive evidence for the prosecution.

15

(Emphasis and corrections in parentheses ours.)

xxx xxx xxx
At the subsequent hearing, just like what happened in Alicando, the presiding judge went through
the same formality of having appellant stand again before him, and this is what transpired:
Court : Before the court allows the prosecution to present evidence,
accused, please come here again.
(At this juncture, the accused came near to the court)
Court : The court informs you as accused that you are charged (with)
the crime of rape; under the new law which if you plead guilty, you
will be sentence(d) to death penalty, did you understand that?
A : Yes, Your Honor.
Q : Despite this warning for the second time by the court to you, do
you still insist (o)n your plea of guilty?
A : Yes, Your Honor.
Q : Is this plea your voluntary will without force or intimidation from
anyone else to include the complaining witness or the family?
A : No, Your Honor.
Q : So, therefore, the court will allow you to present evidence if you
wis(h) to because you insist (o)n your plea of guilty. Do you intend to
present evidence.
A : No, I will not present evidence.

Court : Okey, because of this the court will receive evidence of the
prosecution.
In another case, the last time when arraigned, you admitted that
sometime in December, 1993, you likewise raped your daughter, do
you still confirm and affirm this?
A : Yes, Your Honor.
Q : In this case, because this was committed (i)n December 1993,
the penalty here is reclusion perpetua. After learning this as
informed to you by the court, do still insist on your plea of guilty?
A : Yes, I will admit. I did it.
Q : Do you admit this voluntarily without force, intimidation or
physical injuries or mauling on you by anyone whomsoever?
A : No, Sir.
Q : In connection with this, therefore, definitely you will be

convicted in both cases?

A : Yes, your honor.
Q : What is your educational attainment?
A : Grade I.
Q : Being Grade I, the court emphasized that you are swayed by

your own fashion because of your low education?

A : I am not.
Q : In other words, you still insist on your plea of guilty?
A : Yes, sir.
Court : Okey, proceed with the presentation of prosecution evidence.
Q : In this Criminal Case No. 43568, do you intend to present
evidence?

A : No, Your Honor.

Court : Okey, proceed.

16

xxx xxx xxx

3. At threshold, what strikes this Court as peculiar is that the arraignment appears to have
consisted merely of the bare reading of the five complaints, synthetically and cryptically reported
in the transcript, thus: "(Reading the information/complaint to the accused in Ilonggo/local
dialect)." Since what was supposed to have been read was stated in the singular, but there were
five criminal complaints against appellant, this Court is then left to speculate on whether all five
criminal complaints were actually read, translated or explained to appellant on a level within his
comprehension, considering his limited education.
Again, on the presumption of correctness, since this Court has no other bearings to steer by, it may
be assumed that all five complaints were read since the clerk is supposed to have thereafter
announced in cadence and in the consecutive order of cases that appellant pleaded guilty to all the
charges. What, however, punctures this possible bubble of regularity is that appellant subsequently
declared, and the clerk consequently contradicted her previous recital, that he was not pleading
guilty to three of the complaints. This is hardly a respectable and credible performance in the
solemnity of a court trial of five capital offenses.
We cannot, therefore, be persuaded that on this very basic procedure alone, involving just the
mechanical process of arraignment outlined in Section 1, there was the necessary degree of
compliance by the court below. Other considerations reveal how flawed the supposed arraignment
actually was. For instance, there is no showing whether or not appellant or his counsel de oficio was
furnished a copy of each complaint with the list of witnesses against him, in order that the latter
may duly prepare and comply with his responsibilities. Of more troublous concern is the fact that
appellant was not specifically warned that on his plea of guilty, he would definitely and in any event

be given the death penalty under the "New Law," as the trial court calls Republic Act No. 7659. He
was also not categorically advised that his plea of guilty would not under any circumstance affect or

reduce the death sentence as he may have believed or may have been erroneously advised.
Such an erroneous notion on the part of appellant which may have impelled him to plead guilty is not
improbable or conjectural, especially when we consider his mental state and the environmental
situation. This is precisely what People vs. Dayot 17 cautioned against, thus:
A "searching inquiry," under the Rules, means more than informing cursorily the
accused that he faces a jail term (because the accused is aware of that) but so also,
the exact length of imprisonment under the law and the certainty that he will serve
time at the national penitentiary or a penal colony. Not infrequently indeed, an

accused pleads guilty in the hope, as we said, of a lenient treatment, or upon a bad
advice or promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit
guilt or express "remorse." It is the duty of the judge to see to it that he does not
labor under these mistaken impressions, . . . . (Emphasis supplied).
Likewise of very serious importance and consequence is the fact that the complaints were
supposedly read to appellant in "Ilonggo/local dialect." Parenthetically, there was no statement of
record that appellant fully understood that medium of expression. This assumes added significance
since Ilonggo, or properly called Hiligaynon, is a regional language,

18

spoken in a major part of Iloilo

province, Negros Occidental and, with variations, in Capiz. Within a province or major geographical
area using a basic regional language, there may be other local dialects spoken in certain parts
thereof. If said indication in the aforequoted portion of the transcript intended to convey that
Ilonggo is merely a local dialect and was also the idiom referred to, the same is egregious error; it
would be different if "local dialect" was used to denote an alternative and different medium but,
inexplicably, without identifying what it was.
The significance of this distinction is found right in the provisions of Section 1(a) of Rule 116 which,
cognizant of the aforestated linguistic variations, deliberately required that the complaint or
information be read to the accused in the language or the dialect known to him, to ensure his
comprehension of the charges. The Court takes judicial notice, because it
is either of public knowledge or readily capable of unquestionable demonstration,

19

that in the

central and northwestern part of Iloilo province and all the way up to and throughout Antique,
including necessarily San Joaquin where the offenses were committed and of which appellant and
his family are natives, the local dialect is known as "kinaray-a."
Barring previous exposure to or as a consequence of extended social or commercial intercourse,
"kinaray-a" is not readily understandable to nor spoken by those born to the Hiligaynon regional
language or who have lived in the areas under its sway for an appreciable period of time. The
converse is true for those whose native tongue is the dialect of " kinaray-a," since they are generally
not well-versed in Ilonggo, or Hiligaynon. Since all the complaints are not only in English but in
technical legal language, we are again at sea as to whether and how the indictments were translated
to Ilonggo and/or to "kinaray-a," or that the appellant was truly and honestly made aware of the
charges and, especially, the consequences of his guilty plea thereto. The records are silent and do
not reveal anything on this point, nor how the dialogue between the presiding judge and appellant
was translated. Yet a man's life is at stake while this Court wrestles with that dilemma created by
an omission of official duty.
4. The foregoing discussion brings us to the strict injunction that the trial court must fully
discharge its duty to conduct the requisite searching inquiry in such a way as would indubitably show
that appellant had made not only a clear, definite and unconditional plea, but that he did so with a
well-informed understanding and full realization of the consequences thereof. To ask an accused

about his educational attainment and then warn him that he might have admitted the crime because
of his poor intelligence is certainly not the logical approach in assaying the sufficiency of his plea of
guilty.
In the same manner, a mere warning to him that he could possibly face extreme retribution in the
form of death or face a life sentence in jail is not even enough.

20

The trial judge should ascertain

and be totally convinced that, for all intents and purposes, the plea recorded has all the earmarks
of a valid
and acceptable confession upon which an eventual judgment of conviction can stand.

21

Although

there is no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge may go about the matter of a proper
"searching inquiry," it would be well for the court, for instance, to require the accused to fully
narrate the incident that spawned the charges against him, or by making him reenact the manner in
which he perpetrated the crime, or by causing him to furnish and explain to the court missing
details of significance.

22

The trial court should also be convinced that the accused has not been coerced or placed under a
state of duress either by actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent or avenging
quarters and this it can do, such as by ascertaining from the accused himself the manner in which
he was subsequently brought into the custody of the law; or whether he had the assistance of
competent counsel during the custodial and preliminary investigations; and, ascertaining from him
the conditions under which he was detained and interrogated during the aforestated investigations.
Likewise, a series of questions directed at defense counsel as to whether or not said counsel had
conferred with, and completely explained to the accused the meaning of a plea and its
consequences, would be a well-taken step along those lines.

23

Questions of these nature are undoubtedly crucial and no truer is this than in the case of appellant
for, again, the original records and rollo of this case now under review are completely bereft of any

document or record concerning his apprehension, detention and prior investigation , whether
custodial or preliminary. The foregoing circumstances must be taken in addition to the appropriate
forewarnings of the consequences of a plea of guilty, as well as the questions by the court regarding
the age, educational attainment and socio-economic status of the accused which may reveal
contributory insights for a proper verdict in the case.
And, on this latter aspect, we are inclined to quote from Alicando since, as stated in limine the
defective arraignment in the cases now before us is virtually a reprise of what the same trial court
with its presiding judge did or did not do in that previous case:
Section 3 of Rule 116 which the trial court violated is not a new rule for it merely
incorporated the decision of this Court in People vs. Apduhan Jr. and reiterated in
an unbroken line of cases. The bottom line of the rule is that a plea of guilt must be
based on a free and informed judgment. Thus, the searching inquiry of the trial

court must be focused on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea; and (2) the full
comprehension of the consequences of the plea. The questions of the trial court
failed to show the voluntariness of the plea of guilt of the appellant nor did the
questions demonstrate appellant's full comprehension of the consequences of the
plea. The records do not reveal any information about the personality profile of the
appellant which can serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and
informed plea of guilt. The age, socio-economic status, and educational background
of the appellant were not plumbed by the trial court. . . . . (Citations omitted).
It will be readily observed, if one would analyze appellant's responses during his irregular
arraignment, that his low intelligence quotient and lack of education combined to deprive him of
fully understanding what obviously appeared to him as mysterious rituals and unfamiliar jargons.
This was also what happened, and what we duly noted, in People vs. Albert, supra.
In the transcripts of said proceeding which are earlier quoted extensively, there are italicized
portions showing not only the grossly inadequate or ambiguous, if not indifferent, questions of the
lower court but also the erratic answers of appellant which are neither responsive nor rational..
There is no need to belabor them here since they speak for themselves, but we are not impressed
by the formulary questions posed by the lower court while going through the motions of
interviewing appellant. The Court would want to stress here, therefore, that the judicial conscience
cannot accept as valid a plea of guilty to a charge with a mandatory death penalty when entered by
an accused with a befuddled state of mind at an arraignment with reversible lapses in law.
5. Adverting once again to Alicando, we reiterated therein that pursuant to Binabay vs. People, et

al., 24 no valid judgment can be rendered upon an invalid arraignment. Since in Alicando the
arraignment of appellant therein was void, the judgment of conviction rendered against him was
likewise void, hence in fairness to him and in justice to the offended party that case was remanded
to the trial court for further proceedings. The case at bar being on all fours with the
aforementioned cases on the particular determinant issue, we have perforce to yield to the same
doctrine and disposition.
Let it be clearly understood, however, especially by the censorious: This Court will not hesitate to
impose the capital punishment when all the requisites therefor have been met in accordance with
the law of the land. It cannot, therefore, hold a life forfeit, no matter how despicable the
offender, when effective protection for his basic rights was denied because of poverty or
ignorance. Nor will the Court render a death sentence just to make a meretricious obeisance to the
vengeful call for blood. Judicious verdicts evolve from the privacy of reasoned reflection in
chambers and not from the publicity of emotional acclaim on the podium.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo in Criminal Cases Nos. 43568 and 43571 convicting
accused-appellant Melchor Estomaca y Garque of two crimes of rape is hereby SET ASIDE. Said

cases are REMANDED to the trial court for further and appropriate proceedings, with instructions
that the same be given appropriate priority and the proceedings therein be conducted with
deliberate dispatch and circumspection.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Hermosisima, Jr.
and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Kapunan, J., concurs in the result.
Torres, J., took no part.
Francisco, J., is on leave.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 126389 July 10, 1998

SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JUANITA DE JESUS VDA. DE DIMAANO, EMERITA DIMAANO,
REMEDIOS DIMAANO, CONSOLACION DIMAANO and MILAGROS DIMAANO, respondents.

PURISIMA, J.:
Petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision

promulgated on July 31, 1996, and Resolution 2 dated September 12, 1996 of the Court of Appeals

in CA-G.R. No. 41422, entitled "Juanita de Jesus vda. de Dimaano, et al. vs. Southeastern College,
Inc.", which reduced the moral damages awarded below from P1,000,000.00 to P200,000.00. 4 The
Resolution under attack denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Private respondents are owners of a house at 326 College Road, Pasay City, while petitioner owns a
four-storey school building along the same College Road. On October 11, 1989, at about 6:30 in the
morning, a powerful typhoon "Saling" hit Metro Manila. Buffeted by very strong winds, the roof of
petitioner's building was partly ripped off and blown away, landing on and destroying portions of the
roofing of private respondents' house. After the typhoon had passed, an ocular inspection of the
destroyed building was conducted by a team of engineers headed by the city building official, Engr.
Jesus L. Reyna. Pertinent aspects of the latter's Report 5 dated October 18, 1989 stated, as
follows:
5. One of the factors that may have led to this calamitous event is the formation of
the building in the area and the general direction of the wind. Situated in the
peripheral lot is an almost U-shaped formation of 4-storey building. Thus, with the
strong winds having a westerly direction, the general formation of the building
becomes a big funnel-like structure, the one situated along College Road, receiving
the heaviest impact of the strong winds. Hence, there are portions of the roofing,
those located on both ends of the building, which remained intact after the storm.

6. Another factor and perhaps the most likely reason for the dislodging of the
roofing structural trusses is the improper anchorage of the said trusses to the roof
beams. The 1/2' diameter steel bars embedded on the concrete roof beams which
serve as truss anchorage are not bolted nor nailed to the trusses. Still, there are
other steel bars which were not even bent to the trusses, thus, those trusses are
not anchored at all to the roof beams.
It then recommended that "to avoid any further loss and damage to lives, limbs and
property of persons living in the vicinity," the fourth floor of subject school building be
declared as a "structural hazard."
In their Complaint 6 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 117, for damages based
on culpa aquiliana, private respondents alleged that the damage to their house rendered the same
uninhabitable, forcing them to stay temporarily in others' houses. And so they sought to recover
from petitioner P117,116.00, as actual damages, P1,000,000.00, as moral damages, P300,000.00, as
exemplary damages and P100,000.00, for and as attorney's fees; plus costs.
In its Answer, petitioner averred that subject school building had withstood several devastating
typhoons and other calamities in the past, without its roofing or any portion thereof giving way;
that it has not been remiss in its responsibility to see to it that said school building, which houses
school children, faculty members, and employees, is "in tip-top condition"; and furthermore, typhoon
"Saling" was "an act of God and therefore beyond human control" such that petitioner cannot be
answerable for the damages wrought thereby, absent any negligence on its part.
The trial court, giving credence to the ocular inspection report to the effect that subject school
building had a "defective roofing structure," found that, while typhoon "Saling" was accompanied by
strong winds, the damage to private respondents' houses "could have been avoided if the
construction of the roof of [petitioner's] building was not faulty." The dispositive portion of the
lower court's decision 7 reads, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court renders judgment ( sic) in favor of
the plaintiff (sic) and against the defendants, (sic) ordering the latter to pay jointly
and severally the former as follows:
a) P117,116.00, as actual damages, plus litigation
expenses;
b) P1,000,000.00 as moral damages;
c) P100,000.00 as attorney's fees;

d) Costs of the instant suit.

The claim for exemplary damages is denied for the reason that the defendants ( sic)
did in a wanton fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.
In its appeal to the Court of Appeals, petitioner assigned as errors, 8 that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT TYPHOON "SALING", AS AN ACT
OF GOD, IS NOT "THE SOLE AND ABSOLUTE REASON" FOR THE RIPPING-OFF
OF THE SMALL PORTION OF THE ROOF OF SOUTHEASTERN'S FOUR (4)
STOREY SCHOOL BUILDING.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT "THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE
ROOF OF DEFENDANT'S SCHOOL BUILDING WAS FAULTY"
NOTWITHSTANDING THE ADMISSION THAT THERE WERE TYPHOONS
BEFORE BUT NOT AS GRAVE AS TYPHOON "SALING" WHICH IS THE DIRECT
AND PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE INCIDENT.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ACTUAL AND MORAL DAMAGES AS
WELL AS ATTORNEY'S FEES AND LITIGATION EXPENSES AND COSTS OF
SUIT TO DIMAANOS WHEN THEY HAVE NOT INCURRED ACTUAL DAMAGES
AT ALL AS DIMAANOS HAVE ALREADY SOLD THEIR PROPERTY, AN
INTERVENING EVENT THAT RENDERS THIS CASE MOOT AND ACADEMIC.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF
EXECUTION INSPITE OF THE PERFECTION OF SOUTHEASTERN'S APPEAL
WHEN THERE IS NO COMPELLING REASON FOR THE ISSUANCE THERETO.
As mentioned earlier, respondent Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the trial court's
disposition by reducing the award of moral damages from P1,000,000.00 to P200,000.00. Hence,
petitioner's resort to this Court, raising for resolution the issues of:

1. Whether or not the award of actual damages [ sic] to respondent Dimaanos on the
basis of speculation or conjecture, without proof or receipts of actual damage, [ sic]
legally feasible or justified.
2. Whether or not the award of moral damages to respondent Dimaanos, with the
latter having suffered, actual damage has legal basis.
3. Whether or not respondent Dimaanos who are no longer the owner of the
property, subject matter of the case, during its pendency, has the right to pursue
their complaint against petitioner when the case was already moot and academic by
the sale of the property to third party.
4. Whether or not the award of attorney's fees when the case was already moot
academic [sic] legally justified.
5. Whether or not petitioner is liable for damage caused to others by typhoon
"Saling" being an act of God.
6. Whether or not the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal, ex-parte or
without hearing, has support in law.
The pivot of inquiry here, determinative of the other issues, is whether the damage on the roof of
the building of private respondents resulting from the impact of the falling portions of the school
building's roof ripped off by the strong winds of typhoon "Saling", was, within legal contemplation,
due to fortuitous event? If so, petitioner cannot be held liable for the damages suffered by the
private respondents. This conclusion finds support in Article 1174 of Civil Code, which provides:
Art 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise
declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the
assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not
be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.
The antecedent of fortuitous event or caso fortuito is found in the Partidas which defines it as "an
event which takes place by accident and could not have been foreseen." 9 Escriche elaborates it as
"an unexpected event or act of God which could neither be foreseen nor resisted."

10

Civilist Arturo

M. Tolentino adds that "[f]ortuitous events may be produced by two general causes: (1) by nature,
such as earthquakes, storms, floods, epidemics, fires, etc. and (2) by the act of man, such as an
armed invasion, attack by bandits, governmental prohibitions, robbery, etc."

11

In order that a fortuitous event may exempt a person from liability, it is necessary that he be free
from any previous negligence or misconduct by reason of which the loss may have been occasioned.

12

An act of God cannot be invoked for the protection of a person who has been guilty of gross

negligence in not trying to forestall its possible adverse consequences. When a person's negligence
concurs with an act of God in producing damage or injury to another, such person is not exempt
from liability by showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the damages or injury was a
fortuitous event. When the effect is found to be partly the result of the participation of man
whether it be from active intervention, or neglect, or failure to act the whole occurrence is
hereby humanized, and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God.

13

In the case under consideration, the lower court accorded full credence to the finding of the
investigating team that subject school building's roofing had "no sufficient anchorage to hold it in
position especially when battered by strong winds." Based on such finding, the trial court imputed
negligence to petitioner and adjudged it liable for damages to private respondents.
After a thorough study and evaluation of the evidence on record, this Court believes otherwise,
notwithstanding the general rule that factual findings by the trail court, especially when affirmed
by the appellate court, are binding and conclusive upon this Court.

14

After a careful scrutiny of the

records and the pleadings submitted by the parties, we find exception to this rule and hold that the
lower courts misappreciated the evidence proffered.
There is no question that a typhoon or storm is a fortuitous event, a natural occurrence which may
be foreseen but is unavoidable despite any amount of foresight, diligence or care.

15

In order to be

exempt from liability arising from any adverse consequence engendered thereby, there should have
been no human participation amounting to a negligent act.

16

In other words; the person seeking

exoneration from liability must not be guilty of negligence. Negligence, as commonly understood, is
conduct which naturally or reasonably creates undue risk or harm to others. It may be the failure
to observe that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justify demand,
17

or the omission to do something which a prudent and reasonable man, guided by considerations

which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would

do. 18 From these premises, we proceed to determine whether petitioner was negligent, such that if
it were not, the damage caused to private respondents' house could have been avoided?
At the outset, it bears emphasizing that a person claiming damages for the negligence of another
has the burden of proving the existence of fault or negligence causative of his injury or loss. The
facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by competent evidence,

19

not

merely by presumptions and conclusions without basis in fact. Private respondents, in establishing
the culpability of petitioner, merely relied on the aforementioned report submitted by a team which
made an ocular inspection of petitioner's school building after the typhoon. As the term imparts, an

ocular inspection is one by means of actual sight or viewing.

20

What is visual to the eye through, is

not always reflective of the real cause behind. For instance, one who hears a gunshot and then sees
a wounded person, cannot always definitely conclude that a third person shot the victim. It could

have been self-inflicted or caused accidentally by a stray bullet. The relationship of cause and
effect must be clearly shown.
In the present case, other than the said ocular inspection, no investigation was conducted to
determine the real cause of the partial unroofing of petitioner's school building. Private
respondents did not even show that the plans, specifications and design of said school building were
deficient and defective. Neither did they prove any substantial deviation from the approved plans
and specifications. Nor did they conclusively establish that the construction of such building was
basically flawed.

21

On the other hand, petitioner elicited from one of the witnesses of private respondents, city
building official Jesus Reyna, that the original plans and design of petitioner's school building were
approved prior to its construction. Engr. Reyna admitted that it was a legal requirement before the
construction of any building to obtain a permit from the city building official (city engineer, prior to
the passage of the Building Act of 1977). In like manner, after construction of the building, a
certification must be secured from the same official attesting to the readiness for occupancy of
the edifice. Having obtained both building permit and certificate of occupancy, these are, at the
very least, prima facie evidence of the regular and proper construction of subject school building.

22

Furthermore, when part of its roof needed repairs of the damage inflicted by typhoon "Saling", the
same city official gave the go-signal for such repairs without any deviation from the original
design and subsequently, authorized the use of the entire fourth floor of the same building.
These only prove that subject building suffers from no structural defect, contrary to the report
that its "U-shaped" form was "structurally defective." Having given his unqualified imprimatur, the
city building official is presumed to have properly performed his duties

23

in connection therewith.

In addition, petitioner presented its vice president for finance and administration who testified
that an annual maintenance inspection and repair of subject school building were regularly
undertaken. Petitioner was even willing to present its maintenance supervisor to attest to the
extent of such regular inspection but private respondents agreed to dispense with his testimony
and simply stipulated that it would be corroborative of the vice president's narration.
Moreover, the city building official, who has been in the city government service since 1974,
admitted in open court that no complaint regarding any defect on the same structure has ever been
lodged before his office prior to the institution of the case at bench. It is a matter of judicial
notice that typhoons are common occurrences in this country. If subject school building's roofing
was not firmly anchored to its trusses, obviously, it could not have withstood long years and several
typhoons even stronger than "Saling."
In light of the foregoing, we find no clear and convincing evidence to sustain the judgment of the
appellate court. We thus hold that petitioner has not been shown negligent or at fault regarding the

construction and maintenance of its school building in question and that typhoon "Saling" was the
proximate cause of the damage suffered by private respondents' house.
With this disposition on the pivotal issue, private respondents' claim for actual and moral damages
as well as attorney's fees must fail.
event.

25

24

Petitioner cannot be made to answer for a purely fortuitous

More so because no bad faith or willful act to cause damage was alleged and proven to

warrant moral damages.

Private respondents failed to adduce adequate and competent proof of the pecuniary loss they
actually incurred.

26

It is not enough that the damage be capable of proof but must be actually

proved with a reasonable degree of certainty, pointing out specific facts that afford a basis for
measuring whatever compensatory damages are borne.

27

Private respondents merely submitted an

estimated amount needed for the repair of the roof their subject building. What is more, whether
the "necessary repairs" were caused ONLY by petitioner's alleged negligence in the maintenance of
its school building, or included the ordinary wear and tear of the house itself, is an essential
question that remains indeterminable.
The Court deems unnecessary to resolve the other issues posed by petitioner.
As regards the sixth issue, however, the writ of execution issued on April 1, 1993 by the trial court
is hereby nullified and set aside. Private respondents are ordered to reimburse any amount or
return to petitioner any property which they may have received by virtue of the enforcement of
said writ.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the challenged Decision is REVERSED. The complaint
of private respondents in Civil Case No. 7314 before the trial court a quo is ordered DISMISSED
and the writ of execution issued on April 1, 1993 in said case is SET ASIDE. Accordingly, private
respondents are ORDERED to return to petitioner any amount or property received by them by
virtue of said writ. Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Romero and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 128720

January 23, 2002

S/SGT. ELMER T. VERGARA, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Petitioner seeks the reversal of the Court of Appeals decision dated October 31, 1996, in CA-G.R.
No. CR 18318, which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167, in
Criminal Case No. 86163, convicting him of robbery, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused S/Sgt. Elmer Vergara GUILTY
beyond peradventure of doubt of the crime of Robbery defined and penalized under Art. 294, No.
(5), in relation to Art. 295, of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of Four (4) years of prision correcional, as minimum, to Eight (8) years and Twenty-One (21)
days of prision mayor, as maximum; to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P106,000.00; to
suffer all the accessory penalties appurtenant thereto; and, to pay the Costs.
SO ORDERED.1
The facts of the case are as follows:
On March 19, 1991, an information charging S/Sgt. Elmer Vergara, PC, C1C Nicasio Custodio y
Abrera, PC and Leonido Losanes y Vasquez of robbery in band was filed by the Rizal Provincial
Prosecutors Office with the RTC of Pasig, Metro Manila. The information reads:
That on or about the 19th day of October, 1990, in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together with John Doe, whose true identity and present whereabout
is still unknown, and mutually helping and aiding one another, armed with high powered handguns,
with intent of gain, by means of violence and intimidation employed upon the person of one
Catherine F. Manalo, an employee of J & E Manalo Construction Co., Inc., who was then aboard a
private car, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and divest from
Catherine F. Manalo the payroll money amounting to P89,000.00 belonging to J & E Manalo
Construction Company, Inc. and a gold necklace with two (2) pendants, 18K valued at P17,000
belonging to Catherine F. Manalo, to the damage and prejudice of J & E Manalo Construction

Company, Inc. and Catherine F. Manalo in the aforementioned amounts of P89,000.00 and P17,
000.00 respectively.
Contrary to law.2
Although all the suspects were brought into police custody, petitioners co-accused managed to
extricate themselves from police control and remain at large. Only petitioner was left to face the
charges. On May 21, 1993, he was arraigned. With the assistance of counsel de oficio, he pleaded
"not guilty" to the charges. Following the pre-trial conference on August 20, 1993, trial on the
merits ensued.
The prosecution relied on the positive identification made by private complainant who testified in
court. As found by the court a quo:
xxx
On October 27, 1990, during the police line-up at the San Juan Police Stationshe positively
identified herein accused Elmer Vergara as the armed man who pointed the gun at her after he
approached the left side of the car and wearing an army fatigue uniform with black hat and who got
her car keys, thereafter, she executed another statement implicating accused Elmer Vergara as
one of the four armed men who robbe[d] her.
On March 16, 1994, during the hearing of the case, she (Catherine F. Manalo) again pointed to
accused Elmer Vergara to be one of the robbery/hold-up gang members (HULIDAP), who took the
payroll money of the J & E Manalo Construction Co., Inc., and her gold necklace, his participation
being that of the person who pointed the gun at her and got the keys to her car; she remembered
him to be about 56" to 57" in height, with dark features, chubby and heavily built. 3
Petitioner claimed an alibi, while denying any participation in the offense. The trial court summed up
his defense as follows:
Accused Elmer Vergara lays a serious doubt on his identity as one of the perpetrators of the
robbery hold-up in questionClaiming innocence, he presented evidence showing that he was at
some other place during the occurrence of the robbery. His alleged presence at the Pacita Complex
at San Pedro, Laguna, being a member of the narcotic operatives engaged in a surveillance of a
suspected drug pusher, was corroborated by no less than the team leader Captain, now Major
Christopher Laxa. Major Christopher Laxa was definite in declaring that S/Sgt. Elmer Vergara was
physically present inside the Pizza Hut restaurant at Pacita Complex, San Pedro Laguna, at about
3:00 oclock in the afternoon of October 19, 1990 and, that he did not leave the area from the time
of their arrival at around 1:00 oclock in the morning until 11:30 oclock in the evening. 4

The trial court chose to believe the prosecution and disregarded petitioners alibi. On March 29,
1995, it convicted Vergara not of robbery in band as charged in the information, however, but of
robbery as defined and penalized under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. As explained by the
trial court:
Under Art. 295 of the Revised Penal Code a robbery shall be deemed to have been committed by a
band when more than three armed malefactors (underline supplied) take part in its commission. The
prosecutions evidence demonstrates that only three (3) in the group were armed, although there
was another member inside the car at the time of the commission. However, there is no indication
that the person inside the car was armed. Conceding in gratia argumenti, therefore, that the group
of the accused Elmer Vergara was composed of more than three (3) malefactors, the evidence
disclosed that only three (3) were armed, and hence, the crime cannot be considered to have been
committed by a band and does not come within the purview of Article 296 of the Revised Penal
Code, which requires more than three (3) armed malefactors to constitute the crime of robbery
committed by a band.5
In convicting petitioner for robbery, the trial court stated:
Both the defenses of negative identification and alibi are unavailing. Contrary to these
protestations, complainant Catherine Manalo had a vivid recollection of the identity of S/Sgt. Elmer
Vergara as the person who accosted her on the left side of the car or at the drivers seat and who
poked a gun at her neck and was also the one who took the key from the ignition. It was a clear day,
3:00 oclock in the afternoon, and the probability of a poor recollection is nil. Catherine Manalo was
able to see Sgt. Elmer Vergara while on board the Gallant (sic) Sigma Car when it was trailing her
car and also at the time it was passing her car until her path was blocked and the three (3) armed
malefactors disembarked. She had sufficient time to recollect the faces of the persons who
approached the car and their respective positions. There is no reason to doubt her unerring
testimony that she was able to positively remember and then later on identified the robbers.
Between the positive declaration of Catherine Manalo and the denial of accused Elmer Vergara, the
former deserves more credence, notwithstanding minor inaccuracies as to the height and weight
and styling of the hair of accused Elmer Vergara.
xxx
Conceding the fact that accused Elmer Vergara was in San Pedro, Laguna, it is not physically
impossible for him to have gone to Pasig, Metro Manila, considering that he had an available means
of transportation. The distance between San Pedro, Laguna where the accused claimed he was at
the time the robbery took place, and Pasig, Metro Manila, where the crime was committed, is less
than an hour drive by car and can easily be reached by one who, like the accused Elmer Vergara, had
a car available to him.6

Aggrieved by his conviction, Vergara elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CAG.R. CR No. 18318, on the sole issue of whether or not petitioner committed the crime charged
against him. The appeal was anchored on two grounds: (1) the alleged dubious identification of
Vergara by the private complainant, and (2) failure of the trial court to appreciate Vergaras alibi
that he was on an intelligence mission in San Pedro, Laguna at the time the alleged robbery, specially
in view of the corroboration of his alibi by his commanding officer.
Finding no reversible error in the findings and conclusions of the trial court, the Court of Appeals
affirmed Vergaras conviction. The appellate court said:
In the case at bench (sic), the prosecution had proven the identity of accused-appellant beyond
reasonable doubt through the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Villanueva and Manalo. Appellant
failed to controvert the testimony of prosecution witness Villanueva that accused-appellant was
pointed to by witness Manalo out of nine (9) persons. Thus, the trial court had no reason to consider
the identification made by witness Manalo in the police station as one that stemmed from a
suggestive identification procedure used by the police.
The trial court was correct in regarding the difference in height as a minor matter. What is vital is
that the witness recognized accused in the line-up and reiterated her identification of accusedappellant in open court. In the absence of ill-motive on her part to testify falsely against accusedappellant, the trial court is correct in giving full faith and credence to the testimony of witness
Manalo.7
Petitioner timely filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the appellate court in its
resolution of March 26, 1997.
Insisting on his innocence, petitioner now submits to this Court the following sole assignment of
error:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING MORE CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONY OF COMPLAINANT CATHERINE MANALO THAN THE TESTIMONIES OF THE
ACCUSED AND HIS WITNESS AND CONSEQUENTLY FURTHER ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE CRIME BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 8
The issue of whether or not the guilt of the accused had been proven beyond reasonable doubt
hinges, in our view, on the credibility of witnesses presented by the prosecution and the defense.
Crucial in this regard is the identification made by the complaining witness, Catherine Manalo, of
the petitioner, Sgt. Elmer T. Vergara, as one of the malefactors.
Petitioner vehemently insists that the contradictions in Catherine Manalos testimony are not mere
minor inconsistencies. According to petitioner, while private complainant below described him as

around 56"-57" tall, weighing about 160-165 lbs., and sporting a military haircut; in truth, he is only
53-1/2" tall, tips the scale at less than 150 lbs., and had long hair at the time of the incident. Given
these discrepancies, petitioner insists that private complainant below must have been referring to
another person and not to him.
Basically, petitioners contention raises questions of facts, which traditionally fall within the
province of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. After reviewing the records of this case, we
find no reason to disturb the assessment of the trial court of all the pieces of evidence submitted
before it, particularly as its findings and conclusions had been affirmed by the appellate court.
In this case, petitioner has been convicted on the basis of the positive identification made by
private complainant below. As the Court of Appeals stressed, petitioner was categorically identified
by the private complainant not just once, but twice, as one of the armed men who robbed her. The
first time was during the police line-up of nine (9) persons on October 27, 1990 and the second time
was during her testimony in open court. The records show that private complainant had no motive to
falsely testify against petitioner. We agree with the lower courts that the discrepancies in the
private complainants description are not decisive. Her description was based on visual estimates,
which cannot be expected to be perfect. What is decisive is that petitioner was positively and
categorically identified as one of the robbers, not just once but twice, by private complainant,
Catherine Manalo. Her recollection of his description might suffer from imperfection regarding his
height, weight and personal appearance. But we note less. Jurisprudence recognizes that victims of
crime have a penchant for seeing the faces and features of their attackers, and remembering
them.9 That some variance as to petitioners height and weight might exist in her recollection, in
comparison to his statistical measurement does not destroy her credibility. That the trial court
found this variance inconsequential does not render its findings on the credibility of witnesses
erroneous. Such findings are accorded great respect and will be sustained by the appellate courts
unless the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of
weight and substance which could alter the decision or affect the result of the case. 10 Here, the
important thing is that complaining witness Catherine Manalo identified the petitioner as one of the
perpetrators of the robbery twice, without any presumptions or suggestion from the police at the
line-up or the court at the trial.
Petitioner also argues that the prosecution failed to contradict his alibi. He submits that the
prosecution failed to prove that he had a car available to him, or that he drove one from San Pedro,
Laguna to Pasig, Metro Manila. Petitioner further insists that the trial courts finding that the place
where the crime was committed is less than an hours drive by car and can easily be reached by one
who, like petitioner, had a car available to him, is erroneous and unsupported by the evidence on
record.
Judicial notice could be taken of the travel time by car from San Pedro, Laguna to Pasig City, Metro
Manila, because it is capable of unquestionable demonstration, and nowadays is already of public

knowledge, especially to commuters.11 We find no error in the trial courts finding that it was not
impossible for petitioner to be at the scene of the crime, despite his alibi that he was engaged in
intelligence work in San Pablo Laguna that same afternoon of October 19, 1990.
For alibi to prosper, it would not be enough for the accused to prove that he was elsewhere when
the crime was committed. He must further demonstrate that it would have been physically
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. 12 It is
essential that credible and tangible proof of physical impossibility for the accused to be at the
scene of the crime be presented to establish an acceptable alibi. 13 Petitioner failed to meet this
test. While petitioner could have been working as intelligence agent in San Pedro, Laguna from
October 19 21, 1990, contrary to his claim, it was not physically impossible for him to have been in
Pasig City, Metro Manila on the day of the commission of the crime.
Petitioners insistence that he had no vehicle available to him is not supported by the testimony of
his own commanding officer who testified in petitioners defense, to wit:
FISCAL: CROSS EXAMINATION:
Q: Mr. Witness, what mode of transportation did you take in going to Laguna in (sic) October 19,
1990.
A: We used cars.
Q: What vehicle?
A: Toyota Corona 78 model and a Galant, old model.
Q: And in what particular vehicle did you yourself used?
A: Toyota Corona and another car as a back-up vehicle.
xxx
Q: Who arrived ahead, your car or the car of the accused?
A: We arrived together because we traveled not far with each other, we maintained the distance of
three to five meters, mam.
Q: How many were you?
A: Normally, up to nine members of the team, but in that operation I think, seven or six members,
mam.

xxx
Q: Who were the companions of Vergara where he was riding?
A: It was Sgt. San Jose who was driving the car, together with Sgt. Magno and Sgt. Rubi.
Q: How about you, who were your companions?
A: I was with the other car, with a civilian driver, and I cannot recall anymore whom I was with at
the time.14
Nor was his commanding officers corroborative testimony of much help in sustaining petitioners
alibi, as shown by the following:
FISCAL:
What is your basis that Vergara was with you at about 3:00 in the afternoon of October 19, 1990?
A: What do you mean basis? His physical presence in the area is my basis, mam, that he was there.
Q: Do you keep an attendance record or attendance book of the members of the team?
A: We do not normally do it once we left for an operation, we believe it is not necessary to account
every minute every hour of the operation, so long as we are in the area, target area and every body
(sic) is posted on our designated position, as soon as the signal is already given then thats the time
we will respond or arrest the guy, but I can say that Sgt. Vergara never left the place until the 21st
of October, he was there in Pacita Complex, mam.
Q: In other cases where you conducted surveillance do you maintain a logbook?
A: The log book is filled up only, I mean we do the logging prior and after the operation, thats the
time we placed the preparations or extent of our operation, thats the time we entered this in the
log book and when we returned from the operation, we also registered about the result of the
operation.
xxx
Q: You do not likewise keep a call or make a roll call or keep attendance record?
A: It is automatic mam, everytime, during the operation we see to it that all the persons were in
the area at the time we registered ourselves in the logbook.

Q: In your team, who in particular is assigned to keep track of the attendance?

A: Being the team leader, I am the one in charge to keep the movements of every members (sic) of
the team, but when I left on 19th October proceeding to Makati, I specifically gave instructions to
maintain the operation and see to it that they have new informations (sic) or new development of
the case they have to call me by radio so that I can come back in the area, that was the instruction
to the assistant team leader whenever I left the area.
Q: So I understand that you do not go with the members of the team during the whole period or
duration of the surveillance.
A: Sometimes, mam, there are instances. In that particular instance I left my men at about 1130 in
the evening of 19th October, I left my team and back again in the early morning of 20 October. 15
There were far too many glaring lapses in the testimony of petitioners corroborative witness for
petitioners alibi to be given much weight, thus:
Q: And what was that particular mission in San Pedro, Laguna on October 19, 1990?
A: We were supposed to conduct a buy-bust operation with the aid of our informant, an errand boy
of the subject pusher.
Q: Do you know the name of that informant?
A: I cannot recall.
xxx
Q: And in what particular place in Laguna was this suppose(d) surveillance that you will conduct?
A: I cannot recall the name of the street but I know the place, but the street name and the exact
number I cannot recall.
xxx
Q: What place?
A: I cannot recall.
Q: What is the number?
A: I cannot recall.

Q: Who was the subject?

A: It was a certain alias German, mam.
xxx
COURT:
Is a certain Nicasio Custodio y Abrera a member of your team?
A: I think during that time.
xxx
COURT:
On October 19, 1990, will you recall if he was with you?
A: I cannot recall, your honor.16
In the case of alibi, it is elementary that the requirements of time and place be strictly complied
with by the defense, meaning that the accused must not only show that he was somewhere else but
that it was also physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time it
was committed.171wphi1
In the light of private complainants positive identification of petitioner as the perpetrator of the
crime, the latters defense of bare denial and alibi must necessarily fail, as her positive testimony
overrides his negative testimony.18 Alibi is a weak defense that becomes even weaker in the face of
positive identification of the accused.19 Further, an alibi cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the petitioner by a credible witness who has no motive to testify falsely. 20
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. No. CR 18318 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 130550 September 2, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANDRES PEAFLORIDA, accused-appellant.

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

Accused-appellant Andres Peaflorida (hereafter ANDRES) appeals from the decision 1 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, Malolos, Bulacan, in Criminal Case No. 2683-M-94, dated 12
May 1997, finding him guilty of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion

perpetua and indemnify the heirs of the victim, SPO3 Eusebio Natividad, in the amount of P50,000.
The information, 2 filed on 13 October 1994, charged ANDRES together with two other persons,
whose identities are still unknown, with murder, allegedly committed in this manner:
That on or about the 5th day of October, 1994, in the municipality of San Ildefonso,
province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused together with two (2) other persons, whose true names
are still unknown and against whom the preliminary investigation has not yet been
completed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan, armed with guns,
and with intent to kill one SPO3 Eusebio Natividad, conspiring, confederating
together and mutually helping one another did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with treachery, evident premeditation and use of superior strength,
attack, assault and shoot with guns the said SPO3 Eusebio Natividad, hitting him on
different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him mortal wounds which
directly caused death.
ANDRES pleaded not guilty upon arraignment.

At the trial, the prosecution presented its eyewitness, Rodolfo de la Cruz (hereafter RODOLFO).
He testified that at around 4:00 p.m. on 5 October 1994, he was resting on the terrace of his house
at Pinaod, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, when he noticed an oncoming owner-type jeep. On board were the
driver SPO3 Eusebio Natividad, RODOLFO's former CAFGU trainer and an unknown companion
passenger. Suddenly, three men, each armed with a short pistol, blocked and stopped the jeep. One
of the three armed men shouted: "Natividad katapusan mo na ito," (Natividad, this is your end).
After which, the three gunmen simultaneously fired upon Natividad. When the assault ceased, one
of the gunmen took Natividad's wallet and gun. The attackers then fled on board a vehicle.

RODOLFO claimed that the killing took place in a small market (talipapa) about five armslength
from his terrace, hence, he was able to see clearly the faces of Natividad's assailants.

RODOLFO also recounted that seven days after the shooting incident or on 12 October 1994, he
voluntarily proceeded to the 175th PC Detachment upon the invitation of the police authorities who
were conducting the investigation on the matter. There, the police officers presented a man whom
RODOLFO instantly recognized as one of NATIVIDAD's assailants, in particular, the one who took
Natividad's gun and wallet. The police then informed RODOLFO that the man's name was ANDRES
Peaflorida. Armed with the name to match one of the faces he remembered as one of Natividad's
attackers, RODOLFO voluntarily and promptly executed on that same day, a sworn statement
narrating the events pertaining to the attack. 6 In open court, RODOLFO once again specifically
pointed to ANDRES as one of the assailants of Natividad who seized the latter's gun and wallet.

After RODOLFO's testimony, the prosecution formally offered in evidence his aforementioned
sworn statement as Exhibit "A" and Exhibit
"A-1." 8 It also offered in evidence the death certificate of Natividad as Exhibit "B," 9 which
indicate that the cause of his death was massive hemorrhage due to multiple gunshot wounds. The
defense raised no objections and admitted the exhibits. The prosecution then rested its case.

10

The defense thereafter presented its witnesses ANDRES and his brother, Roberto Peaflorida.
ANDRES interposed alibi. He claimed that at around 4:30 p.m., on 5 October 1994, he was in the
house of his brother, Roberto in Marulas, Bulacan where he assisted the latter in the repair of the
chassis of some automobiles. He did not leave Marulas that day hence, he could not be physically
present in some other place, much less in San Ildefonso. He left Marulas only on 11 October 1994
upon his cousin's request to harvest palay at Sapang Palay. He was arrested on said date.

11

ANDRES further denied ever knowing both Natividad and RODOLFO. Natividad certainly was not
his enemy hence, ANDRES could not think of any reason why RODOLFO implicated him in the killing
of Natividad.

12

Roberto Peaflorida corroborated the alibi of ANDRES. He maintained that he was working with
ANDRES the whole day of 5 October 1994 in the repair of a Motherland bus. Roberto further
declared that ANDRES had been living with him since December, 1993. There had been no occasion
for ANDRES to leave Marulas except on 11 October 1994 when he was invited by a friend to go to
San Ildefonso. A week later, Roberto learned that ANDRES had been arrested.

13

The trial court considered said evidence of the defense as unworthy of belief. It instead gave full
faith and credit to the evidence of the prosecution, particularly the testimony of the lone
prosecution witness RODOLFO. It is convinced that RODOLFO positively identified ANDRES as one
of the culprits who, using a short firearm, riddled the different parts of Natividad's body with
bullets that led to his untimely demise. It assessed the testimony of RODOLFO as "clear,
unequivocal, unmistakable and overwhelming leaving no room for doubt as to its veracity and
conclusiveness"

14

The trial court then reiterated in its decision, the jurisprudential doctrine that

RODOLFO's positive identification prevails over the uncorroborated and self-serving denial and
alibi interposed by the defense.

15

The trial court also appreciated that treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strength attended the killing of Natividad. It then convicted ANDRES of the crime of murder and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Natividad
in the amount of P50,000. The dispositive portion of the decision

16

reads, as follows:

Wherefore, based on the evidence on record, this Court finds the accused, ANDRES
PEAFLORIDA, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER
punishable under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the killing having been
attended with aggravating circumstances of alevosia, evident premeditation and
abuse of superior strength, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of

reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided by law and to indemnify
the heirs of SPO3 Eusebio Natividad the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.
ANDRES seasonably appealed from the decision. In his Appellant's Brief, ANDRES contends that
the trial court erred in convicting him since he was not positively identified by RODOLFO. There
was no positive identification because (a) RODOLFO could not have remembered the physical
features of the three (3) gunmen, particularly ANDRES, given the short time that he (RODOLFO)
had seen them and that previous to the incident he did not know any one of them;

17

(b) RODOLFO

did not identify ANDRES from a police line-up but was introduced to him (RODOLFO) alone;

18

and

(c) RODOLFO belatedly executed the sworn statement (Exhibit "A" and Exhibit "A-1"), albeit seven
days after the shooting incident. With this, ANDRES insinuates that the police authorities
"coached" RODOLFO in the identification for he executed the sworn statement, propitiously on 12
October 1994, a day after ANDRES arrest. ANDRES additionally points out that he was arrested
not by virtue of a warrant of arrest but upon mere invitation by a certain police officer Palarca who
brought him immediately to the 175th PC Detachment.

19

In its Appellee's Brief, the Office of the Solicitor general supports the trial court's decision and
prays that the assailed decision be affirmed in toto.
The appeal is without merit.
Well settled is the rule that the ascertainment of the credibility of witnesses is best left to the
determination of the trial court. This is so because the trial court is in a distinct advantageous
position to examine the witnesses' deportment and manner of testifying. On appeal, its evaluation
or assessment of the testimonies of witnesses is accorded great respect and finality in the absence
of any indication that it overlooked certain facts or circumstances of weight and influence which, if
considered, would alter the results of the case.

20

In this case, no cogent reasons were presented to disturb the factual findings of the trial court
particularly on the assessment of the credibility of the prosecution eyewitness. The trial court
ascertained that RODOLFO "categorically, unequivocably and repeatedly pointed to" ANDRES as
one of the three armed men who ambushed and gunned down Natividad. It declared that RODOLFO
positively identified ANDRES. We agree.
RODOLFO had all the opportunity to observe the horrible occurrence as he was only about five
armslength from the scene of the crime. He had a good view of the assailants' physical and facial
features. True, he had seen their faces for only a short span of time but that was all RODOLFO
needed in order to remember their faces. Even if he did not know any one of the assailants previous
to the incident, such a fact would not deter RODOLFO from remembering them. In fact, RODOLFO
was so certain of the attackers' faces that he easily and quickly recognized ANDRES as one of
them when he saw the latter at the 175th PC Detachment. It is therefore unnecessary for
RODOLFO to have identified ANDRES from the police line-up. Besides, there is no law requiring a
police line-up as an essential requisite for proper identification.

21

Further, no proof was adduced

indicating that RODOLFO was coached by the police officers or improperly motivated in identifying
ANDRES as one of Natividad's slayers.
As to the alleged delay in the execution of RODOLFO's sworn statement, it does not and will not
impair his credibility as witness. This Court takes judicial notice of the actuality that witnesses in
this country are usually reluctant to volunteer information about a criminal case or are unwilling to
be involved in or dragged into criminal investigations.

22

Indeed, RODOLFO exhibited a natural

human reaction. Although there was delay in the execution of his sworn statement, what matters is
RODOLFO overcame his initial reluctance and fear to be involved by voluntarily participating in the
police investigation and then openly testifying in court.
In sum, RODOLFO's positive identification of ANDRES as one of the authors of the crime prevails
over his defense of alibi.

23

Settled is the rule that alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is

easy to contrive and difficult to prove.

24

For such a defense to prosper, it is not enough for

ANDRES to prove that he was somewhere else when the crime occurred, i.e., at Marulas, Bulacan
but he must also demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of
the crime at San Ildefonso, Bulacan, at the time of its commission.

25

This, ANDRES failed to

establish.
We will now discuss the trial court's assessment that all the aggravating circumstances alleged in
the information attended the commission of the crime. We approve the trial court's correct
appreciation of alevosia, but disapprove its determination of evident premeditation and abuse of
superior strength.

For treachery to be considered, two elements must concur: (1) the employment of means of
execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) the
means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.

26

Natividad's assailants unexpectedly appeared from nowhere to ambush him. The assailants were
able to immediately establish strategic positions from which vantage point they simultaneously fired
upon the victim, taking him by surprise. The stratagem ensured Natividad's helplessness,
defenselessness and immobility. Thus, it can be said that ANDRES and his two (2) still unknown
companions employed means of execution which gave Natividad no opportunity at all to defend
himself and that the manner of execution was deliberately and consciously adopted. The fact that
the attack was preceded by a cry or signal of "Natividad katapusan mo na ito," from ANDRES and
his companions did not make such attack less treacherous. In the same vein, the frontal attack did
not negate or lessen the presence of treachery.

27

Like treachery, evident premeditation should be established by clear and positive evidence. Sifting
through the records, we found a dearth of evidence establishing the requisites of evident
premeditation, to wit: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act
manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of
time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of
his act.

28

Hence, the finding thereof by the trial court in the absence of any evidentiary basis was

but speculation. We have already ruled that mere presumptions and inferences, no matter how
logical and probable they might be, would not suffice to establish evident premeditation.

29

For the similar reason that there must exist proof that the attackers deliberately took advantage
of their superior strength, their apparent superiority in number vis--vis that of the victim,
notwithstanding,

30

the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength cannot be

appreciated. Again, the records disclosed no such proof. In any event, even if abuse of superior
strength was proved, it would still be absorbed by the qualifying aggravating circumstance of
treachery.

31

One final point, ANDRES assails the regularity and validity of his arrest. He claims that his arrest
without a warrant circumscribes the conditions for a valid warrantless arrest which are set forth in
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 5. Arrest without a warrant when lawful. A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and

he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who
has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
In Filoteo v. Sandiganbayan,

32

petitioner therein impugned the validity of his arrest on the ground

that it was effected not by virtue of a warrant but by mere invitation. We observed therein that
the claim was belatedly made, stressed that petitioner should have questioned the validity of his
arrest before he entered his plea, and ruled that his failure to do so constituted a waiver of his
right against unlawful restraint of liberty. We reiterate herein said ruling. Anyway, even if
ANDRES was illegally arrested, it would not affect his culpability since an allegation of a
warrantless arrest could not deprive the State of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts
on the record pointed to his guilt.

33

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the challenged 12 May 1997 decision
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Malolos, Bulacan, in Criminal Case No. 2683-M-94, finding
herein accused-appellant Andres Peaflorida guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the victim in the
sum of P50,000 is hereby AFFIRMED.1wphi1.nt
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Puno, Kapunan, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 100901-08. July 16, 1998]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JAILON KULAIS, CARLOS

FALCASANTOS @ Commander Falcasantos, AWALON KAMLON HASSAN @
Commander Kamlon, MAJID SAMSON @ Commander Bungi, JUMATIYA AMLANI DE
FALCASANTOS, NORMA SAHIDDAN DE KULAIS, SALVADOR MAMARIL y
MENDOZA, HADJIRUL PLASIN y ALIH, JAINUDDIN HASSAN y AHMAD, IMAM
TARUK ALAH y SALIH, JALINA HASSAN DE KAMMING, FREDDIE MANUEL @ Ajid
and several JOHN and JANE DOES, accused, JAILON KULAIS, appellant.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The trial courts erroneous taking of judicial notice of a witness testimony in another case, also
pending before it, does not affect the conviction of the appellant, whose guilt is proven beyond
reasonable doubt by other clear, convincing and overwhelming evidence, both testimonial and
documentary. The Court takes this occasion also to remind the bench and the bar that reclusion
perpetua is not synonymous with life imprisonment.
The Case
On August 22, 1990, five Informations for kidnapping for ransom (Crim. Case Nos. 10060,
10061, 10062, 10063 and 10064) and three Informations for kidnapping (Crim Case Nos. 10065,
10066 and 10067), all dated August 14, 1990, were filed [1] before the Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga City against Carlos Falcasantos, Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani, Norma Sahiddan de
Kulais, Jalina Hassan de Kamming, [2] Salvador Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin, Jaimuddin Hassan, Imam [3]
Taruk Alah, Freddie Manuel alias Ajid, and several John and Jane Does. The Informations for
kidnapping for ransom, which set forth identical allegations save for the names of the victims, read
as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of December, 1988, in the City of Zamboanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
being all private individuals, conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and
assisting one another, with threats to kill the person of FELIX ROSARIO [in Criminal Case
No. 10060] [4] and for the purpose of extorting ransom from the said Felix Rosario or his
families or employer, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, KIDNAP the
person of said Felix Rosario, [5] a male public officer of the City Government of Zamboanga,
who was then aboard a Cimarron vehicle with plate No. SBZ-976 which was being
ambushed by the herein accused at the highway of Sitio Tigbao Lisomo, Zamboanga City,
and brought said Felix Rosario [6] to different mountainous places of Zamboanga City and
Zamboanga del Sur, where he was detained, held hostage and deprived of his liberty until
February 2, 1989, the day when he was released only after payment of the ransom was
made to herein accused, to the damage and prejudice of said victim; there being present

an aggravating circumstance in that the aforecited offense was committed with the aid of
armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity.
The three Informations for kidnapping, also under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code,
likewise alleged identical facts and circumstances, except the names of the victims:
That on or about the 12th day of December, 1988, in the City of Zamboanga and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being all private
individuals, conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting one
another, by means of threats and intimidation of person, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously KIDNAP, take and drag away and detain the person of MONICO
SAAVEDRA Y LIMEN [Criminal Case No. 10065] [7] a male public officer of the City
Government of Zamboanga, against his will, there being present an aggravating
circumstance in that the aforecited offense was committed with the aid of armed men or
persons who insure or afford impunity.
Of the twelve accused, only nine were apprehended, namely, Jailon Julais, Jumatiya Amlani,
Norma Sahiddan de Kulais, Salvador Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin, Jainuddin Hassan, Imam Taruk Alah,
Jalina Hassan and Freddie Manuel. [8]
On their arraignment on September 13, 1990, all the accused pleaded not guilty. Joint trial on
the merits ensued. On April 8, 1991, Judge Pelagio S. Mandi rendered the assailed 36-page Decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, above premises and discussion taken into consideration, this Court
renders its judgment, ordering and finding:
1.
FREDDIE MANUEL, alias AJID and IMAM TARUK ALAH y SALIH [n]ot [g]uilty
of the eight charges of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom and for [k]idnapping, their guilt not
having been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Their immediate release from the City Jail, Zamboanga City is ordered, unless
detained for some other offense besides these 8 cases (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10067).
2.
JAINUDDIN HASSAN y AHMAD, JAILON KULAIS, SALVADOR MAMARIL y
MENDOZA and HADJIRUL PLASIN y ALIH [g]uilty as principals by conspiracy in all these
8 cases for [k]idnapping for [r]ansom and for [k]idnapping (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10067).
Their guilt is aggravated in that they committed the 8 offenses with the aid of armed
men who insured impunity. Therefore, the penalties imposed on them shall be at their
maximum period.
WHEREFORE, for the five charges of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom, and pursuant to Art.
267 of the Revised Penal Code, five life imprisonments are imposed on Jainuddin Hassan y
Ahmad, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y Mendoza and Kadjirul Plasin y Alih (Crim. Cases
Nos. 10060-10064).
For kidnapping Mrs. Virginia San Agustin-Gara, a female and public officer and
pursuant to Art. 267, Revised Penal Code (par. 4.), another life imprisonment is imposed on
Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y Mendoza and Hadjirul Plasin y
Alih (Crim. Case No. 10066)

For kidnapping Monico Saavedra y Limen, and Calixto Francisco y Gaspar, and their
kidnapping not having lasted more than five days, pursuant to Art. 268, Revised Penal
Code, and the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the same four accused - Jainuddin Hassan y
Ahmad, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y Mendoza and Hadjirul Plasin y Alih - are
sentenced to serve two (2) jail terms ranging from ten (10) years of prision mayor as
minimum, to eighteen (18) years of reclusion temporal as maximum (Crim. Cases Nos. 10065
and 10067).
3.
JAMATIYA AMLANI DE FALCASANTOS [n]ot [g]uilty in the three charges of
[k]idnapping and she is acquitted of these charges. (Crim. Cases Nos. 10065, 10066 and
10067).
But Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos is [g]uilty as accomplice in the five charges of
[k]idnapping for [r]ansom.
WHEREFORE, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos is sentenced to serve five (5)
imprisonments, ranging from TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor as minimum to EIGHTEEN
(18) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10064).
4.
NORMA SAHIDDAN DE KULAIS, 18 years old, and JALIHA HUSSIN (charged
as Jalina Hassan de Kamming), 15 years old, [n]ot [g]uilty in the three charges for
[k]idnapping and are, therefore, ACQUITTED of these three charges. (Crim. Cases Nos.
10065, 10066 & 10067).
But Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jalina Hussin are found [g]uilty as accomplices in
the five charges for [k]idnapping for [r]ansom. Being minors, they are entitled to the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority which lowers the penalty imposable on them
by one degree.
WHEREFORE, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jalina Hussin are sentenced to serve
five imprisonments ranging from SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional as minimum to
TEN YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY OF prision mayor as maximum (Crim. Cases Nos. 1006010064).
Due to the removal of the suspension of sentences of youthful offenders convicted of
an offense punishable by death or life by Presidential Decree No. 1179 and Presidential
Decree No. 1210 (of which [k]idnapping for [r]ansom is such an offense) the sentences on
Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jaliha Hussin de Kamming are NOT suspended but must be
served by them.
Januddin Hassan, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril and Hadjirul Plasin are sentenced
further to return the following personal effects taken on December 12, 1988, the day of
the kidnapping, or their value in money, their liability being solidary.
To Jessica Calunod:
One (1) Seiko wrist watch

P 250.00

One Bracelet

P 2,400.00

One Shoulder Bag

P 200.00

Cash

P 200.00

To Armado C. Bacarro:
One (1) wrist watch
One Necklace

P 800.00
P 300.00

One Calculator

P 295.00

Eyeglasses

P 500.00

One Steel Tape

P 250.00

To Edilberto S. Perez
One (1) Rayban

P 1,000.00

One Wrist Watch

P 1,800.00

Cash

P 300.00

To Virginia San Agustin-Gara

One (1) Wrist Watch

P 850.00

The benefit of Art. 29, Revised Penal Code, on preventive suspension, shall be
extended to those sentenced.
The cases against Majid Samson, alias Commander Bungi Awalon Kamlon a.k.a.
Commander Kamlon Carlos Falcasantos and several John Does and Jane Does are
ARCHIVED until their arrest.
Costs against the accused convicted.
SO ORDERED. [9]
On May 7, 1991, Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and
Jaliha Hussin filed their joint Notice of Appeal. [10] In a letter dated February 6, 1997, the same
appellants, except Jailon Kulais, withdrew their appeal because of their application for amnesty. In
our March 19, 1997 Resolution, we granted their motion. Hence, only the appeal of Kulais remains
for the consideration of this Court. [11]
The Facts
The Version of the Prosecution
The solicitor general summarized, in this wise, the facts as viewed by the People:
On December 12, 1988, a group of public officials from various government agencies,
organized themselves as a monitoring team to inspect government projects in Zamboanga
City. The group was composed of Virginia Gara, as the head of the team; Armando Bacarro,
representing the Commission on Audit; Felix del Rosario, representing the non-government;
Edilberto Perez, representing the City Assessors Office; Jessica Calunod and Allan Basa
of the City Budget Office and Monico Saavedra, the driver from the City Engineers
Office. (p. 3, TSN, October 22, 1990.)

On that particular day, the group headed to the Lincomo Elementary School to check
on two of its classrooms. After inspecting the same, they proceeded to the Talaga
Footbridge. The group was not able to reach the place because on their way, they were
stopped by nine (9) armed men who pointed their guns at them (p. 4, TSN, ibid.).
The group alighted from their Cimarron jeep where they were divested of their
personal belongings. They were then ordered to walk to the mountain by the leader of the
armed men who introduced himself as Commander Falcasantos (p. 5, TSN, ibid.)
While the group was walking in the mountain, they encountered government troops
which caused their group to be divided. Finally, they were able to regroup themselves.
Commander Kamlon with his men joined the others. (pp. 7-8, TSN, ibid.).
The kidnappers held their captives for fifty-four (54) days in the forest. During their
captivity, the victims were able to recognize their captors who were at all times armed
with guns. The wives of the kidnappers performed the basic chores like cooking. (pp.9-10.
TSN, ibid.)
Commander Falcasantos also ordered their victims to sign the ransom notes which
demanded a ransom of P100.000.00 and P14,000.00 in exchange for twenty (20) sets of
uniform. (p.15, TSN, ibid.)
On February 3, 1989, at around 12:00 oclock noontime, the victims were informed
that they would be released. They started walking until around 7:00 o clock in the evening
of that day. At around 12:00 o clock midnight, the victims were released after Commander
Falcasantos and Kamlon received the ransom money. (p. 19, TSN, ibid.) The total amount
paid was P122,000.00. The same was reached after several negotiations between Mayor
Vitaliano Agan of Zamboanga City and the representatives of the kidnappers. (pp. 2, 6,
TSN, Nov. 11, 1990)
x x x. [12]
The prosecution presented fifteen witnesses, including some of the kidnap victims themselves:
Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro, Edilberto Perez, Virginia San Agustin-Gara, Calixto Francisco,
and Monico Saavedra.

The Version of the Defense

The facts of the case, according to the defense, are as follows: [13]
On May 28, 1990, at about 10:00 o clock in the morning, while weeding their farm in
Sinaburan, Zamboanga del Sur, accused-appellant Jumatiya Amlani was picked up by
soldiers and brought to a place where one army battalion was stationed. Thereat, her five
(5) co-accused, namely Salvador Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin, Jainuddin Hassin, Imam Taruk
Alah and Freddie Manuel were already detained. In the afternoon of the same day,
appellants spouses Jailon Kulais and Norma Sahiddan were brought to the battalion station
and likewise detained thereat. On May 30, 1990, the eight (8) accused were transported
to Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City. Here on the same date, they were joined by accusedappellant Jaliha Hussin.

At the time Amlani was picked up by the military, she had just escaped from the
captivity of Carlos Falcasantos and company who in 1988 kidnapped and brought her to the
mountains. Against their will, she stayed with Falcasantos and his two wives for two
months, during which she slept with Falcasantos as aide of the wives and was made to cook
food, wash clothes, fetch water and run other errands for everybody. An armed guard was
assigned to watch her, so that, for sometime, she had to bear the ill-treatment of
Falcasantos other wives one of whom was armed. After about two months, while she was
cooking and Falcasantos and his two wives were bathing in the river, and while her guard
was not looking, she took her chance and made a successful dash for freedom. (TSN,
January 29, 1992, pp. 2-15)
Likewise a kidnap victim herself is accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin, who was thirteen
years old at the time (she was fifteen years old when the trial of the instant cases
commenced). She was kidnapped by Daing Kamming and brought to the mountains where he
slept with her. She stayed with him for less than a month sleeping on forest ground and
otherwise performing housekeeping errands for Kamming and his men. She made good her
escape during an encounter between the group of Kamming and military troops. She hid in
the bushes and came out at Ligui-an where she took a bachelor bus in going back to her
mothers house at Pudos, Guiligan, Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur. One day, at around 2:00 o
clock in the afternoon, while she was harvesting palay at the neighboring village of
Tigbalangao, military men picked her up to Ticbanuang where there was an army battalion
detachment. From Ticbawuang, she was brought to Vitali, then to Metrodiscom, Zamboanga
City, where on her arrival, she met all the other accused for the first time except Freddie
Manuel. (Ibid., pp. 16-21)
Another female accused is appellant Norma Sahiddan, a native of Sinaburan,
Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur. At about 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of a day in May, while
she and her husband were in their farm, soldiers arrested them. The soldiers did not tell
them why they were being arrested, neither were they shown any papers. The two of them
were just made to board a six by six truck. There were no other civilians in the truck. The
truck brought the spouses to the army battalion and placed them inside the building where
there were civilians and soldiers. Among the civilians present were her six co-accused
Hadjirul Plasin, Salvador Mamaril, Jaimuddin Hassan, Ima[m] Taruk Alah, Freddie Manuel
and Jumatiya Amlani. That night, the eight of them were brought to Tictapul, Zamboanga
City; then to Vitali; and, finally, to the Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City where they stayed
for six days and six nights. On the seventh day, the accused were brought to the City Jail,
Zamboanga City. (TSN, January 30, 1991, pp. 6-11)
The husband of Norma Sahiddan is Jailon Kulais who, as heretofore narrated, was
arrested with his wife the day the soldiers came to their farm on May 28, 1990. He has
shared with his wife the ordeals that followed in the wake of their arrest and in the
duration of their confinement up to the present. (TSN, January 22, 1991 pp. 2-4).
The Trial Courts Ruling
The trial court found Appellant Kulais guilty of five counts of kidnapping for ransom and one
count of kidnapping a woman and public officer, for which offenses it imposed upon him six terms of

life imprisonment. It also found him guilty of two counts of slight illegal detention for the
kidnapping of Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco. The trial court ratiocinated as follows:
Principally, the issue here is one of credibility - both of the witnesses and their
version of what had happened on December 12, 1988, to February 3, 1989. On this pivotal
issue, the Court gives credence to [p]rosecution witnesses and their testimonies.
Prosecution evidence is positive, clear and convincing. No taint of evil or dishonest motive
was imputed or imputable to [p]rosecution witnesses. To this Court, who saw all the
witnesses testify, [p]rosecution witnesses testified only because they were impelled by [a]
sense of justice, of duty and of truth.
Contrarily, [d]efense evidence is weak, uncorroborated and consisted only of alibis.
The individual testimonies of the nine accused dwel[t] principally on what happened to each
of them on May 27, 28 and 29, 1990. None of the accused explained where he or she was
on and from December 12, 1988, to February 3, 1989, when [p]rosecution evidence
show[ed] positively seven of the nine accused were keeping the five or six hostages named
by [p]rosecution evidence.
The seven accused positively identified to have been present during the course of the
captivity of the five kidnap-victims-complainants are: (1) Jumatiya Amlani; (2) Jaliha
Hussin; (3) Norma Sahiddan; (4) Jailon Kulais; (5) Hadjirul Plasin; (6) Salvador Mamaril and
(7) Jainuddin Hassan.
The two accused not positively identified are: Freddie Manuel alias Ajid, and Imam
Taruk Alah. These two must, therefore, be declared acquitted based on reasonable doubt.
The next important issue to be examined is: Are these seven accused guilty as
conspirators as charged in the eight Informations; or only as accomplices? Prosecution
evidence shows that the kidnapping group to which the seven accused belonged had formed
themselves into an armed band for the purpose of kidnapping for ransom. This armed band
had cut themselves off from established communities, lived in the mountains and forests,
moved from place to place in order to hide their hostages. The wives of these armed band
moved along with their husbands, attending to their needs, giving them material and moral
support. These wives also attended to the needs of the kidnap victims, sleeping with them
or comforting them.
xxx xxx

xxx

II) The guilt of Jainuddin Hassan, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril and Hadjirul Plasin.
The Court holds these four men guilty as conspirators in the 8 cases of kidnapping. Unlike
the three women-accused, these male accused were armed. They actively participated in
keeping their hostages by fighting off the military and CAFGUS, in transferring their
hostages from place to place, and in guarding the kidnap hostages. Salvador Mamaril and
Jailon Kulais were positively identified as among the nine armed men who had kidnapped
the eight kidnap victims on December 12, 1988.
The higher degree of participation found by the Court of the four accused is
supported by the rulings of our Supreme Court quoted below.
(1) The time-honored jurisprudence is that direct proof is not essential to prove

conspiracy. It may be shown by a number of infinite acts, conditions and circumstances

which may vary according to the purposes to be accomplished and from which may logically
be inferred that there was a common design, understanding or agreement among the
conspirators to commit the offense charged. (People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil 64; People vs.
Carbonel, 48 Phil. 868.)
(2) The crime must, therefore, in view of the solidarity of the act and intent which
existed between the sixteen accused, be regarded as the act of the band or party created
by them, and they are all equally responsible for the murder in question. (U.S. vs. Bundal,
et. al. 3 Phil 89, 98.)
(3) When two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether through
the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively, each individual
whose evil will actively contribute to the wrongdoing is in law responsible for the whole,
the same as though performed by himself alone. (People vs. Peralta, et. al. 25 SCRA 759,
772 (1968).) [14]
The Assigned Errors
The trial court is faulted with the following errors, viz:
I
The trial court erred in taking judicial notice of a material testimony given in another case
by Lt. Melquiades Feliciano, who allegedly was the team leader of the government troops
which allegedly captured the accused-appellants in an encounter; thereby, depriving the
accused-appellants their right to cross-examine him.
II
On the assumption that Lt. Felicianos testimony could be validly taken judicial notice of,
the trial court, nevertheless, erred in not disregarding the same for being highly
improbable and contradictory.
III
The trial court erred in finding that accused-appellants Jumatiya Amlani, Jaliha Hussin
and Norma Sahiddan provided Carlos Falcasantos, et. al., with material and moral comfort,
hence, are guilty as accomplices in all the kidnapping for ransom cases.
IV
The trial court erred in denying to accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin and Norma Sahiddan
the benefits of suspension of sentence given to youth offenders considering that they
were minors at the time of the commission of the offense. [15]
As earlier noted, Jumatiya Amlani, Jaliha Hussin and Norma Sahiddan had withdrawn their
appeal, and as such, the third and fourth assigned errors, which pertain to them only, will no longer
be dealt with. Only the following issues pertaining to Appellant Jailon Kulais will be discussed: (1)
judicial notice of other pending cases, (2) sufficiency of the prosecution evidence, and (3) denial as
a defense. In addition, the Court will pass upon the propriety of the penalty imposed by the trial

court.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
First Issue:
Judicial Notice and Denial of Due Process
Appellant Kulais argues that he was denied due process when the trial court took judicial notice
of the testimony given in another case by one Lt. Melquiades Feliciano, who was the team leader of
the government troops that captured him and his purported cohorts. [16] Because he was allegedly
deprived of his right to cross-examine a material witness in the person of Lieutenant Feliciano, he
contends that the latters testimony should not be used against him. [17]
True, as a general rule, courts should not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in
other proceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending in the same court, or have been
heard and are actually pending before the same judge. [18] This is especially true in criminal cases,
where the accused has the constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against
him.
Having said that, we note, however, that even if the court a quo did take judicial notice of the
testimony of Lieutenant Feliciano, it did not use such testimony in deciding the cases against the
appellant. Hence, Appellant Kulais was not denied due process. His conviction was based mainly on
the positive identification made by some of the kidnap victims, namely, Jessica Calunod, Armando
Bacarro and Edilberto Perez. These witnesses were subjected to meticulous cross-examinations
conducted by appellants counsel. At best, then, the trial courts mention of Lieutenant Felicianos
testimony is a decisional surplusage which neither affected the outcome of the case nor
substantially prejudiced Appellant Kulais.
Second Issue:
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
Appellant was positively identified by Calunod, as shown by the latters testimony:
CP CAJAYON D MS:
Q

And how long were you in the custody of these persons?

We stayed with them for fifty-four days.

And during those days did you come to know any of the persons who were with the group?

We came to know almost all of them considering we stayed there for fifty-four days.

And can you please name to us some of them or how you know them?

For example, aside from Commander Falcasantos and Commander Kamlon we came to know
first our foster parents, those who were assigned to give us some food.

You mean to say that the captors assigned you some men who will take care of you?

Yes.

And to whom were you assigned?

To lla Abdurasa.

And other than your foster [parents] or the parents whom you are assigned to, who else did
you come to know?

Pagal and his wife; Tangkong and his wife Nana; the two (2) wives of Commander Falcasantos
- Mating and Janira - another brother in-law of Commander Kamlon, Usman, the wife of
Kamlon, Tira.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Now, you said that you were with these men for fifty-four days and you really came to know
them. Will you still be able to recognize these persons if you will see the[m] again?

Yes, maam.

Now will you look around this Honorable Court and see if any of those you mentioned are
here?

Yes, they are here.

Some of them are here?

Some of them are here.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Where is Tangkong? What is he wearing?

White t-shirt with orange collar. (witness pointing.) He was one of those nine armed men
who took us from the highway.

RTC INTERPRETER:
Witness pointed to a man sitting in court and when asked of his name, he gave his name as
JAILON KULAIS.
CP CAJAYON D MS:
Q

Aside from being with the armed men who stopped the vehicle and made you alight, what
else was he doing while you were in their captivity?

He was the foster parent of Armando Bacarro and the husband of Nana.

COURT:
Q

Who?

Tangkong.

xxx

xxx

x x x [19]

Likewise clear and straightforward was Bacarros testimony pointing to appellant as one of the
culprits:

FISCAL CAJAYON:
xxx

xxx

xxx

And what happened then?

Some of the armed men assigned who will be the host or who will be the one [to] g[i]ve food
to us.

[To] whom were you assigned?

I was assigned to a certain Tangkong and [his] wife Nana.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Now, you said you were assigned to Tangkong and his wife. [D]o you remember how he looks
like?

Yes.

Now, will you please look around this Court and tell us if that said Tangkong and his wife are
here?

Yes, maam.

Could you please point this Tangkong to us?

Witness pointed to a person in Court. [W]hen asked his name he identified [himself] as
Jailon Kulais.

Why did you say his name is Tangkong? Where did you get that name?

Well, that is the name [by which he is] usually called in the camp.

xxx

xxx

xxx

ATTY. FABIAN (counsel for accused Kulais)

Q

When did you first meet Tangkong?

That was on December 11, because I remember he was the one who took us.

When you were questioned by the fiscal a while ago, you stated that Mr. Mamaril was one of
those who stopped the bus and took you to the hill and you did not mention Tangkong?

I did not mention but I can remember his face.

xxx

xxx

xxx

And because Tangkong was always with you as your host even if he did not tell you that he
[was] one of those who stopped you, you would not recognize him?

No, I can recognize him because he was the one who took my shoes.

COURT:
Q

Who?

Tangkong, your Honor.

xxx

xxx

x x x [20]

Also straightforward was Ernesto Perez candid narration:

FISCAL CAJAYON:
xxx

xxx

xxx

Who else?

The last man.

Did you come to know his name?

Only his nickname, Tangkong. (Witness pointed to a man in Court who identified himself as
Jailon Kulais.)

And what was Tangkong doing in the mountain?

The same, guarding us.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. SAHAK

Q

Engr. Perez, you stated that you were ambushed by nine armed men on your way from [the]
Licomo to [the] Talaga Foot Bridge. [W]hat do you mean by ambushed?

I mean that they blocked our way and stopped.

They did not fire any shots?

But they were pointing their guns at us.

And among the 9 armed men who held you on your way to [the] Talaga Footbridge, you
stated [that] one of them [was] Commander Falcasantos?

Yes.

Could you also recognize anyone of the accused in that group?

Yes.

Will you please identify?

That one, Tangkong. (The witness pointed to a man sitting in court who identified himself as
Jailon Kulais.)

xxx

xxx

xxx

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. FABIAN

Q

You said Jailon Kulais was among those who guarded the camp?

FISCAL CAJAYON:
Your Honor, please, he does not know the name of Julais, he used the word Tangkong.
ATTY. FABIAN
Q

You said Tangkong guarded you[. W]hat do you mean?

He guarded us like prisoners[. A]fter guarding us they have their time two hours another
will be on duty guarding us.

Where did you meet Tangkong?

He was one of the armed men who kidnapped us.

xxx

xxx

x x x [21]

It is evident from the foregoing testimonies of Calunod, Bacarro and Perez that kidnapping or
detention did take place: the five victims were held, against their will, for fifty-three days from
December 12, 1988 to February 2, 1989. It is also evident that Appellant Kulais was a member of
the group of armed men who staged the kidnapping, and that he was one of those who guarded the
victims during the entire period of their captivity. His participation gives credence to the
conclusion of the trial court that he was a conspirator.

Kidnapping
for Ransom
That the kidnapping of the five was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom is also
apparent from the testimony of Calunod, who was quite emphatic in identifying the accused and
narrating the circumstances surrounding the writing of the ransom letters.
CP CAJAYON D MS:
Q

Now, you were in their captivity for 54 days and you said there were these meetings for
possible negotiation with the City Government. What do you mean by this? What were you
supposed to negotiate?

Because they told us that they will be releasing us only after the terms. [22]

And what were the terms? Did you come to know the terms?

I came to know the terms because I was the one ordered by Commander Falcasantos to
write the letter, the ransom letter.

At this point of time, you remember how many letters were you asked to write for your
ransom?

I could not remember as to how many, but I can identify them.

Why will you able to identify the same?

Because I was the one who wrote it.

And you are familiar, of course, with your penmanship?

Yes.

Now we have here some letters which were turned over to us by the Honorable City Mayor
Vitaliano Agan. 1,2,3,4,5 - there are five letters all handwritten.

COURT:
Original?

CP CAJAYON D MS:
Original, your Honor.
Q

And we would like you to go over these and say, tell us if any of these were the ones you
were asked to write.

(Witness going over [letters])

This one - 2 pages. This one - 2 pages. No more.

Aside from the fact that you identified your penmanship in these letters, what else will
make you remember that these are really the ones you wrote while there?

The signature is there.

There is a printed name here[,] Jessica Calunod.

And over it is a signature.

That is your signature?

Yes, maam.

How about in the other letter, did you sign it also?

Yes, there is the other signature.

There are names - other names here - Eddie Perez, Allan Basa, Armando Bacarro, Felix
Rosario, Jojie Ortuoste and there are signatures above the same. Did you come up to know
who signed this one?

Those whose signatures there were signed by the persons. [sic]

And we have here at the bottom, Commander Kamlon Hassan, and there is the signature
above the same. Did you come to know who signed it?

[It was] Commander Kamlon Hassan who signed that.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Jessica, I am going over this letter ... Could you please read to us the portion here which
says the terms? ...

(Witness reading) Mao ilang gusto nga andamun na ninyo and kantidad nga P100,000 ug
P14,000 baylo sa 20 sets nga uniforms sa Biyernes (Pebrero 3, 1989). [23]

xxx

xxx

xxx

INTERPRETER (Translation):
This is what they like you to prepare[:] the amount of P100,000.00 and P14,000.00 in
exchange [for] 20 sets of uniform on Friday, February 3, 1989.
xxx
Q

xxx

xxx

Now you also earlier identified this other letter and this is dated January 21, 1988. [24] Now,
could you please explain to us why it is dated January 21 1988 and the other one Enero 31,

1989 or January 31, 1989?

A

I did not realize that I placed 1989, 1988, but it was 1989.

January 21, 1989?

Yes

xxx

xxx

xxx

Now, in this letter, were the terms also mentioned? Please go over this.

(Going over the letter)

Yes, maam.
Q

Could you please read it aloud to us?

(Witness reading)
Gusto nila and P100,000.00 ng kapinan nu ug 20 sets nga completong uniformer (7 colors
marine type wala nay labot ang sapatos), tunga medium ug tunga large size. [25]

xxx

xxx

xxx

INTERPRETER:
They like the P100,000.00 and an addition of 20 sets of complete uniform (7 colors, marinetype not including the shoes), one half medium, one half large.
xxx

xxx

xxx

After having written these letters, did you come to know after [they were] signed by your
companions and all of you, do you know if these letters were sent? If you know only.

I would like to make it clear. The first letter was ordered to me by Falcasantos to inform
the City Mayor that initial as P500,000.00, and when we were already - I was asked again to
write, we were ordered to affix our signature to serve as proof that all of us are alive. [26]
[sic]

Calunods testimony was substantially corroborated by both Armando Bacarro [27] and Edilberto
Perez.[28] The receipt of the ransom letters, the efforts made to raise and deliver the ransom, and
the release of the hostages upon payment of the money were testified to by Zamboanga City Mayor
Vitaliano Agan [29] and Teddy Mejia. [30]
The elements of kidnapping for ransom, as embodied in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code,
having been sufficiently proven, and the appellant, a private individual, having been clearly
identified by the kidnap victims, this Court thus affirms the trial courts finding of appellants guilt
on five counts of kidnapping for ransom.
[31]

Kidnapping of
Public Officers
Victims Virginia San Agustin-Gara, Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco were members of
the government monitoring team abducted by appellants group. The three testified to the fact of

kidnapping; however, they were not able to identify the appellant. Even so, appellants identity as one
of the kidnappers was sufficiently established by Calunod, Bacarro and Perez, who were with Gara,
Saavedra and Francisco when the abduction occurred.
That Gara, Saavedra and Francisco were detained for only three hours [32] does not matter. In
People vs. Domasian, [33] the victim was similarly held for three hours, and was released even before
his parents received the ransom note. The accused therein argued that they could not be held guilty
of kidnapping as no enclosure was involved, and that only grave coercion was committed, if at all. [34]
Convicting appellants of kidnapping or serious illegal detention under Art. 267 (4) of the Revised
Penal Code, the Court found that the victim, an eight-year-old boy, was deprived of his liberty when
he was restrained from going home. The Court justified the conviction by holding that the offense
consisted not only in placing a person in an enclosure, but also in detaining or depriving him, in any
manner, of his liberty. [35] Likewise, in People vs. Santos, [36] the Court held that since the appellant
was charged and convicted under Article 267, paragraph 4, it was not the duration of the
deprivation of liberty which was important, but the fact that the victim, a minor, was locked up.
Thus, in the present case, the detention of Gara, Saavedra and Francisco for only a few hours
is immaterial. The clear fact is that the victims were public officers [37] -- Gara was a fiscal analyst
for the City of Zamboanga, Saavedra worked at the City Engineers Office, and Francisco was a
barangay councilman at the time the kidnapping occurred. Appellant Kulais should be punished,
therefore, under Article 267, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, and not Art. 268, as the trial
court held.
The present case is different from People vs. Astorga, [38] which held that the crime committed
was not kidnapping under Article 267, paragraph 4, but only grave coercion. The appellant in that
case had tricked his seven-year-old victim into going with him to a place he alone knew. His plans,
however, were foiled, when a group of people became suspicious and rescued the girl from him. The
Court noted that the victims testimony and the other pieces of evidence did not indicate that the
appellant wanted to detain her, or that he actually detained her.
In the present case, the evidence presented by the prosecution indubitably established that
the victims were detained, albeit for a few hours. There is proof beyond reasonable doubt that
kidnapping took place, and that appellant was a member of the armed group which abducted the
victims.
Third Issue:
Denial and Alibi
The appellants bare denial is a weak defense that becomes even weaker in the face of the
prosecution witnesses positive identification of him. Jurisprudence gives greater weight to the
positive narration of prosecution witnesses than to the negative testimonies of the defense. [39]
Between positive and categorical testimony which has a ring of truth to it on the one hand, and a
bare denial on the other, the former generally prevails. [40] Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro and
Edilberto Perez testified in a clear, straightforward and frank manner; and their testimonies were
compatible on material points. Moreover, no ill motive was attributed to the kidnap victims and none
was found by this Court.
We agree with the trial courts observation that the appellant did not meet the charges against

him head on. His testimony dwelt on what happened to him on the day he was arrested and on
subsequent days thereafter. Appellant did not explain where he was during the questioned dates
(December 12, 1988 to February 3, 1989); neither did he rebut Calunod, Bacarro and Perez, when
they identified him as one of their kidnappers.
Reclusion Perpetua, Not Life Imprisonment
The trial court erred when it sentenced the appellant to six terms of life imprisonment. The
penalty for kidnapping with ransom, under the Revised Penal Code, is reclusion perpetua to death.
Since the crimes happened in 1988, when the capital penalty was proscribed by the Constitution,
the maximum penalty that could have been imposed was reclusion perpetua. Life imprisonment is not
synonymous with reclusion perpetua. Unlike life imprisonment, reclusion perpetua carries with it
accessory penalties provided in the Revised Penal Code and has a definite extent or duration. Life
imprisonment is invariably imposed for serious offenses penalized by special laws, while reclusion
perpetua is prescribed in accordance with the Revised Penal Code. [41]
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Jailon Kulais as principal in five counts of kidnapping
for ransom and in three counts of kidnapping is AFFIRMED, but the penalty imposed is hereby
MODIFIED as follows: Appellant is sentenced to five terms of reclusion perpetua, one for each of
his five convictions for kidnapping for ransom; and to three terms of reclusion perpetua, one each
for the kidnapping of Public Officers Virginia Gara, Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco. Like the
other accused who withdrew their appeals, he is REQUIRED to return the personal effects, or
their monetary value, taken from the kidnap victims. Additionally, he is ORDERED to pay the amount
of P122,000 representing the ransom money paid to the kidnappers. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.

Davide,Jr., (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug, and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 114776

February 2, 2000

MENANDRO B. LAUREANO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to reverse the
Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated October 29, 1993, in C.A. G.R. No. CV 34476, as well as its
Resolution dated February 28, 1994, which denied the motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case as summarized by the respondent appellate court are as follows:

Sometime in 1978, plaintiff [Menandro B. Laureano, herein petitioner], then Director of

Flight Operations and Chief Pilot of Air Manila, applied for employment with defendant
company [herein private respondent] through its Area Manager in Manila.
On September 30, 1978, after the usual personal interview, defendant wrote to plaintiff,
offering a contract of employment as an expatriate B-707 captain for an original period of
two (2) years commencing on January 21, 1978. Plaintiff accepted the offer and commenced
working on January 20, 1979. After passing the six-month probation period, plaintiffs
appointment was confirmed effective July 21, 1979. (Annex "B", p. 30, Rollo).
On July 21, 1979, defendant offered plaintiff an extension of his two-year contract to five
(5) years effective January 21, 1979 to January 20, 1984 subject to the terms and
conditions set forth in the contract of employment, which the latter accepted (Annex "C" p.
31, Rec.).
During his service as B-707 captain, plaintiff on August 24, 1980, while in command of a
flight, committed a noise violation offense at the Zurich Airport, for which plaintiff
apologized.(Exh. "3", p. 307, Rec.).
Sometime in 1980, plaintiff featured in a tail scraping incident wherein the tail of the
aircraft scraped or touched the runway during landing. He was suspended for a few days
until he was investigated by board headed by Capt. Choy. He was reprimanded.
On September 25, 1981, plaintiff was invited to take a course of A-300 conversion training
at Aeroformacion, Toulouse, France at dependant's expense. Having successfully completed
and passed the training course, plaintiff was cleared on April 7, 1981, for solo duty as
captain of the Airbus A-300 and subsequently appointed as captain of the A-300 fleet
commanding an Airbus A-300 in flights over Southeast Asia. (Annexes "D", "E" and "F", pp.
34-38, Rec.).
Sometime in 1982, defendant, hit by a recession, initiated cost-cutting measures. Seventeen
(17) expatriate captains in the Airbus fleet were found in excess of the defendant's
requirement (t.s.n., July 6, 1988. p. 11). Consequently, defendant informed its expatriate
pilots including plaintiff of the situation and advised them to take advance leaves. (Exh.
"15", p. 466, Rec.)
Realizing that the recession would not be for a short time, defendant decided to terminate
its excess personnel (t.s.n., July 6, 1988, p. 17). It did not, however, immediately terminate
it's A-300 pilots. It reviewed their qualifications for possible promotion to the B-747 fleet.
Among the 17 excess Airbus pilots reviewed, twelve were found qualified. Unfortunately,
plaintiff was not one of the twelve.

On October 5, 1982, defendant informed plaintiff of his termination effective November 1,

1982 and that he will be paid three (3) months salary in lieu of three months notice (Annex
"I", pp. 41-42, Rec.). Because he could not uproot his family on such short notice, plaintiff
requested a three-month notice to afford him time to exhaust all possible avenues for
reconsideration and retention. Defendant gave only two (2) months notice and one (1) month
salary. (t.s.n., Nov. 12, 1987. p. 25).
Aggrieved, plaintiff on June 29, 1983, instituted a case for illegal dismissal before the
Labor Arbiter. Defendant moved to dismiss on jurisdiction grounds. Before said motion was
resolved, the complaint was withdrawn. Thereafter, plaintiff filed the instant case for
damages due to illegal termination of contract of services before the court a quo
(Complaint, pp. 1-10, Rec.).
Again, defendant on February 11, 1987 filed a motion to dismiss alleging inter alia: (1) that
the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, and (2) that Philippine
courts have no jurisdiction over the instant case. Defendant contends that the complaint is
for illegal dismissal together with a money claim arising out of and in the course of
plaintiffs employment "thus it is the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC who have the jurisdiction
pursuant to Article 217 of the Labor Code" and that, since plaintiff was employed in
Singapore, all other aspects of his employment contract and/or documents executed in
Singapore. Thus, defendant postulates that Singapore laws should apply and courts thereat
shall have jurisdiction. (pp. 50-69, Rec.).
In traversing defendant's arguments, plaintiff claimed that: (1) where the items demanded
in a complaint are the natural consequences flowing from a breach of an obligation and not
labor benefits, the case is intrinsically a civil dispute; (2) the case involves a question that is
beyond the field of specialization of labor arbiters; and (3) if the complaint is grounded not
on the employee's dismissal per se but on the manner of said dismissal and the consequence
thereof, the case falls under the jurisdiction of the civil courts. (pp. 70-73, Rec.)
On March 23, 1987, the court a quo denied defendant's motion to dismiss (pp. 82-84, Ibid).
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. (p. 95 ibid.)
On September 16, 1987, defendant filed its answer reiterating the grounds relied upon in
its motion to dismiss and further arguing that plaintiff is barred by laches, waiver, and
estoppel from instituting the complaint and that he has no cause of action . (pp. 102-115) 1
On April 10, 1991, the trial court handed down its decision in favor of plaintiff. The dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Menandro Laureano and

against defendant Singapore Airlines Limited, ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the
amounts of
SIN$396,104.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the current rate of exchange at
the time of payment, as and for unearned compensation with legal interest from the filing
of the complaint until fully paid;
SIN$154,742.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the current rate of exchange at
the time of payment; and the further amounts of P67,500.00 as consequential damages with
legal interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid;
P1,000,000.00 as and for moral damages; P1,000,000.00 as and for exemplary damages; and
P100,000.00 as and for attorney's fees.
Costs against defendant.
SO ORDERED.2
Singapore Airlines timely appealed before the respondent court and raised the issues of
jurisdiction, validity of termination, estoppel, and damages.
On October 29, 1993, the appellate court set aside the decision of the trial court, thus,
. . . In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal termination was filed by
plaintiff-appellee only on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years after the effectivity
date of his dismissal on November 1, 1982. Clearly, plaintiff-appellee's action has already
prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint is
hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.3
Petitioner's and Singapore Airlines' respective motions for reconsideration were denied.
Now, before the Court, petitioner poses the following queries:
1. IS THE PRESENT ACTION ONE BASED ON CONTRACT WHICH PRESCRIBES IN TEN YEARS
UNDER ARTICLE 1144 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE OR ONE FOR DAMAGES ARISING FROM AN
INJURY TO THE RIGHTS OF THE PLAINTIFF WHICH PRESCRIBES IN FOUR YEARS UNDER
ARTICLE 1146 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE?

2. CAN AN EMPLOYEE WITH A FIXED PERIOD OF EMPLOYMENT BE RETRENCHED BY HIS

EMPLOYER?
3. CAN THERE BE VALID RETRENCHMENT IF AN EMPLOYER MERELY FAILS TO REALIZE THE
EXPECTED PROFITS EVEN IF IT WERE NOT, IN FACT, INCURRING LOSSES?
At the outset, we find it necessary to state our concurrence on the assumption of jurisdiction by
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9. The trial court rightly ruled on the application of
Philippine law, thus:
Neither can the Court determine whether the termination of the plaintiff is legal under the
Singapore Laws because of the defendant's failure to show which specific laws of Singapore
Laws apply to this case. As substantially discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the
Philippine Courts do not take judicial notice of the laws of Singapore. The defendant that
claims the applicability of the Singapore Laws to this case has the burden of proof. The
defendant has failed to do so. Therefore, the Philippine law should be applied. 4
Respondent Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction when defendant filed its appeal before said
court.5 On this matter, respondent court was correct when it barred defendant-appellant below
from raising further the issue of jurisdiction. 6
Petitioner now raises the issue of whether his action is one based on Article 1144 or on Article 1146
of the Civil Code. According to him, his termination of employment effective November 1, 1982, was
based on an employment contract which is under Article 1144, so his action should prescribe in 10
years as provided for in said article. Thus he claims the ruling of the appellate court based on
Article 1146 where prescription is only four (4) years, is an error. The appellate court concluded
that the action for illegal dismissal originally filed before the Labor Arbiter on June 29, 1983, but
which was withdrawn, then filed again in 1987 before the Regional Trial Court, had already
prescribed.
In our view, neither Article 11447 nor Article 11468 of the Civil Code is here pertinent. What is
applicable is Article 291 of the Labor Code, viz:
Art. 291. Money claims. All money claims arising from employee-employer relations
accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the
time the cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever barred.
xxx

xxx

xxx

What rules on prescription should apply in cases like this one has long been decided by this Court.
In illegal dismissal, it is settled, that the ten-year prescriptive period fixed in Article 1144 of the

Civil Code may not be invoked by petitioners, for the Civil Code is a law of general application, while
the prescriptive period fixed in Article 292 of the Labor Code [now Article 291] is a SPECIAL LAW
applicable to claims arising from employee-employer relations. 9
More recently in De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals,10 where the money claim was based on a written
contract, the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the Court held:
. . . The language of Art. 291 of the Labor Code does not limit its application only to "money
claims specifically recoverable under said Code" but covers all money claims arising from an
employee-employer relations" (Citing Cadalin v. POEA Administrator, 238 SCRA 721, 764
[1994]; and Uy v. National Labor Relations Commission, 261 SCRA 505, 515 [1996]). . . .
It should be noted further that Article 291 of the Labor Code is a special law applicable to
money claims arising from employer-employee relations; thus, it necessarily prevails over
Article 1144 of the Civil Code, a general law. Basic is the rule in statutory construction that
"where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one
designed therefore should prevail." (Citing Leveriza v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 157
SCRA 282, 294.) Generalia specialibus non derogant.11
In the light of Article 291, aforecited, we agree with the appellate court's conclusion that
petitioner's action for damages due to illegal termination filed again on January 8, 1987 or more
than four (4) years after the effective date of his dismissal on November 1, 1982 has already
prescribed.
In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal termination was filed by plaintiffappelle only on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years after the effectivity date of his
dismissal on November 1, 1982. Clearly, plaintiff-appellee's action has already prescribed.
We base our conclusion not on Article 1144 of the Civil Code but on which sets the prescription
period at three (3) years and which governs under this jurisdiction.
Petitioner claims that the running of the prescriptive period was tolled when he filed his complaint
for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter of the National Labor Relations Commission. However,
this claim deserves scant consideration; it has no legal leg to stand on. In Olympia International,

Inc., vs., Court of Appeals, we held that "although the commencement of a civil action stops the
running of the statute of prescription or limitations, its dismissal or voluntary abandonment by the
plaintiff leaves in exactly the same position as though no action had been commenced at all." 12
Now, as to whether petitioner's separation from the company due to retrenchment was valid, the
appellate court found that the employment contract of petitioner allowed for pre-termination of
employment. We agree with the Court of Appeals when it said,

It is a settled rule that contracts have the force of law between the parties. From the
moment the same is perfected, the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has
been expressly stipulated but also to all consequences which, according to their nature, may
be in keeping with good faith, usage and law. Thus, when plaintiff-appellee accepted the
offer of employment, he was bound by the terms and conditions set forth in the contract,
among others, the right of mutual termination by giving three months written notice or by
payment of three months salary. Such provision is clear and readily understandable, hence,
there is no room for interpretation.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Further, plaintiff-appellee's contention that he is not bound by the provisions of the

Agreement, as he is not a signatory thereto, deserves no merit. It must be noted that when
plaintiff-appellee's employment was confirmed, he applied for membership with the
Singapore Airlines Limited (Pilots) Association, the signatory to the aforementioned
Agreement. As such, plaintiff-appellee is estopped from questioning the legality of the said
agreement or any proviso contained therein. 13
Moreover, the records of the present case clearly show that respondent court's decision is amply
supported by evidence and it did not err in its findings, including the reason for the retrenchment:
When defendant-appellant was faced with the world-wide recession of the airline industry
resulting in a slow down in the company's growth particularly in the regional operation (Asian
Area) where the Airbus 300 operates. It had no choice but to adopt cost cutting measures,
such as cutting down services, number of frequencies of flights, and reduction of the
number of flying points for the A-300 fleet (t.s.n., July 6, 1988, pp. 17-18). As a result,
defendant-appellant had to lay off A-300 pilots, including plaintiff-appellee, which it found
to be in excess of what is reasonably needed.14
All these considered, we find sufficient factual and legal basis to conclude that petitioner's
termination from employment was for an authorized cause, for which he was given ample notice and
opportunity to be heard, by respondent company. No error nor grave abuse of discretion, therefore,
could be attributed to respondent appellate court.1wphi1.nt
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.
CV No. 34476 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 138258

January 18, 2002

EDDIE HERRERA, ERNESTO T. TIJING, and CONRADO BOLLOS, petitioners,

vs.
TEODORA BOLLOS and RICO GO, respondents.
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 affirming
that of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, Dumaguete City, which reversed the ruling of the
municipal trial court that it has jurisdiction over the case of forcible entry.
The Facts
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
"Ab initio, on August 5, 1993, Teodora Bollos commenced before the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Bayawan-Basay Civil Case No. 993, for forcible entry, solely
against Eddie Herrera alleging that the latter, sometime in the second week of
1993, through stealth and strategy and taking advantage of the absence of Teodora,
entered and occupied her Sugarland known as Lot No. 20, GSS-615, located at
Camandagan, Maninyon, Bayawan, Negros Oriental. Teodora claims to have inherited
said parcel, being the only heir, from her deceased father, Alfonso Bollos, who died
on December 10, 1992.
"Defendant, Eddie Herrera, denied the allegations against him maintaining that he
entered and occupied not Lot No. 20, as claimed by Teodora, but Lot No. 21, GSS615, which is owned by Conrado Bollos, a brother of Teodoras father, Alfonso.
Further, Herrera said that his occupation of the property was not through stealth
or strategy but by virtue of a contract of lease executed between Conrado Bollos,
as lessor, and Ernesto Tijing, as lessee. Herrera is Tijings overseer on the land.
"As a consequence, the complaint was twice amended, first, on March 23, 1994 to
include Ernesto T. Tijing as a party-defendant and much later on October 4, 1995,
this time to implead Conrado Bollos as an additional defendant.
"After due proceedings, the first level court rendered its judgment dispositively
ruling:
ACCORDINGLY, in the light of the foregoing considerations for plaintiffs
failure to make-out a forcible entry case because of lack of jurisdiction the

above-entitled case is hereby DISMISSED. Plaintiffs remedy should be

reivendicatory (sic) action before the proper forum.
SO ORDERED.
Given this 30th day of June, 1997, at Bayawan, Negros Oriental, Philippines.
'(SGD.) RUDY T. ENRIQUEZ
'Circuit Judge'
(p. 11, MCTC Decision; p. 69, Rollo)
"On Appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, docketed as Civil Case
No. 12014, the challenged verdict was reversed in a Decision dated October 21,
1997, the decretal portion reads:
WHEREFORE, as prayed for by plaintiffs-appellants, judgment is hereby
rendered restoring Lot No. 20, GSS-615 to the plaintiffs and ejecting the
defendants from the said parcel of land. Defendants-appellees are
condemned to solidarily pay plaintiffs-appellants the following:
'Actual Damages

P50,000.00;

'Moral Damages

P25,000.00

'Attorney's Fees

P 5,000.00

Reasonable rental/month from the date of this judgment of P2,000.00 and

to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
GIVEN this 21st day of October, 1997, in the City of Dumaguete, Philippines.
'(SGD.) ALVIN L. TAN
'Judge'
(p. 13, RTC Decision; p. 27, Rollo)2
On March 12, 1998, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review assailing the
ruling of the regional trial court.3

On December 18, 1998, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed, except
that the award of actual and moral damages therein contained are deleted. No
pronouncement as to costs.
"SO ORDERED."4
On February 1, 1999, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of
the above-cited decision.5
On March 8, 1999, the Court of Appeals denied the motion. 6
Hence, this appeal.7
The Issues
The issues raised are:
(a) Is the municipal trial court vested with jurisdiction over a second amended
complaint impleading a new defendant filed beyond one year from dispossession
alleging a case of forcible entry in the original action?
(b) May the regional trial court award moral and exemplary damages against
defendants in an appeal from a dismissal of the case for forcible entry by the lower
court?8
The Courts Ruling
We deny the petition.
Resolving the first issue, we emphasize the basic rule that jurisdiction of the court over the
subject matter of the action is determined by the allegations of the complaint at the time of its
filing, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the
claims asserted therein.9 "What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action
pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the
character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted." 10
In the case at bar, plaintiffs complaint, both original and amended, contains sufficient allegations
constituting an action for forcible entry, as clearly alleged in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the complaint,
to wit:
"4. That plaintiffs and even their predecessor-in-interest Alfonso Bollos were in
peaceful, adverse, continuous possession of the property and in concepto de dueno

until the commission of the act or acts of dispossession or deprivation by the

defendant hereinafter mentioned.
"5. That sometime in the second week of June, 1993, defendant pursuant to an
avaricious intent of enriching himself at the expense of the plaintiffs, through
stealth and strategy, and taking advantage of the absence of the latter, entered
and occupied the property in question and without any legal justification therefore,
fertilized the sugar cane rations growing thereon and planted the vacant portions
with sugar cane.11
Thus, we find that the complaint alleged prior physical possession de facto which the defendants
disturbed by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, against the will or without the consent
of the plaintiffs, sufficient to constitute a cause of action for forcible entry.
In fact, defendants admitted the truth of the foregoing facts in their answer and first amended
answer. The thrust of their defense was that they had occupied Lot No. 21, not Lot No. 20, which is
the land in question.
On the second issue, the concept of damages in an action for forcible entry and detainer cases is
well defined in several cases.12 These damages mean "rents" or "the reasonable compensation for
the use and occupation of the premises," or "fair rental value of the property." 13 Temperate, actual,
moral and exemplary are neither rents nor reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of
the premises, nor fair rental value, and are not recoverable in such cases. 14
In the case at bar, the municipal trial court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, and the
regional trial court reversed the dismissal but rendered judgment ejecting the defendants from
the parcel of land involved, and condemning them to pay damages and attorneys fees. This is not
correct. In case of reversal, the case shall be remanded to the municipal trial court for further
proceedings.15 The regional trial court in reversing an appealed case dismissing the action cannot
decree the eviction of the defendants and award damages. A court cannot take judicial notice of a
factual matter in controversy. The court may take judicial notice of matters of public knowledge, or
which are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their
judicial functions.16 Before taking such judicial notice, the court must "allow the parties to be heard
thereon."17 Hence, there can be no judicial notice on the rental value of the premises in question
without supporting evidence.
The Judgment
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court DENIES the petition. However, the Court SETS ASIDE the
decisions of the Court of Appeals18 and the Regional Trial Court.19 The Court remands the case to
the municipal trial court for further proceedings.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 144458

July 14, 2004

MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
ATTY. RODRIGO B. LIBUNAO, respondent.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
59754 which modified the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 97, in Civil
Case No. Q-92-14114 and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated August 9, 2000 denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
On November 24, 1992, Atty. Rodrigo Libunao filed a complaint for damages with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City against the Mercury Drug Corporation; its President, Mariano Que; Store
Manager, Vilma Santos; and Security Guard Remigio Sido. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
Q-92-14114 and raffled to Branch 97. The respondent prayed that after due hearing, judgment be
rendered in his favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered:
1. Ordering defendants to, jointly and severally, pay plaintiff P1,000,000.00 in moral
damages, and P500,000.00 in exemplary damages;
2. Ordering defendants to, jointly and severally, reimburse plaintiff for his
acceptance fee expense in the amount of P50,000.00 and appearance fee expense at
the rate of P1,000.00 per appearance of undersigned counsel, and bear the cost of
his attorney's fee in the amount of P200,000.00.
3. Ordering defendants to, jointly and severally, bear the cost of the suit. 3
In its Answer to the complaint, the defendant corporation mainly alleged that it was not Sido's
employer, and that the latter's direct employer was the security agency, the Black Shield Security
Services Corporation (BSSC); hence, Mercury Drug Corporation could not be held liable for the
damages under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code.
The Case for the Plaintiff
At about 8:00 p.m. on May 25, 1992, Atty. Rodrigo B. Libunao, a corporate lawyer of Caltex
Philippines, and his friend, Jesus Bustos Atencio, the Secretary of the Senate Committee on

Government Corporations, had dinner at the Robinson's Galleria along Ortigas Avenue, Pasig City.
Afterwards, they proceeded to the self-service section of the Mercury Drug Store where Libunao
purchased some items, including antibiotics. Libunao paid for his purchases and was issued a tape
receipt[4] by the cashier, who then placed the items inside the plastic bag. Libunao placed the
receipt inside his pocket. As Libunao and Atencio were exiting from the drugstore, they were
accosted by Sido, the security guard posted at the door. Sido was about 5 feet 5 inches tall,
twenty pounds heavier than Libunao, and was armed with a service gun. Sido held Libunao's upper
right arm and demanded the latter to show the receipt for his purchases, saying, "' Yong resibo
niyan." Libunao searched for the receipt in his pocket, but it took him some time to get hold of it
because Sido was still holding his right arm. Sido then remarked, " Wala yatang resibo yan!" Libunao
was able to get hold of the receipt after about ten seconds and showed it to Sido, close to the
latter's face. Sido inspected the receipt, and Libunao asked, "Satisfied ka na?" However, Sido
angrily reacted and hurled invectives at Libunao: "Putang-ina mo!" Libunao retorted, "Putang-ina mo!"
Sido lunged at him and again said: "Putang-ina mo!" Atencio tried to pacify the two, but Sido was
able to hit Libunao on the face twice, on the nose, the chin and on the mouth. Sido then pointed his
revolver at Libunao and said: "Putang-ina mo, pag hindi kayo lumabas dito papuputukin'ko to sa iyo !"
A male person held Sido back. Afraid for his life, Libunao fled from the scene with Atencio and
went to the Office of the Security Detachment of the Robinson's Galleria. Libunao reported the
incident to the chief of security and asked him to arrest Sido. The chief of security accompanied
Libunao back to the Mercury Drug Store and approached the store manager, Vilma Santos. When
informed of the incident and of Sido's need to surrender, she said: " Ako ang manager dito, hindi
ninyo puedeng arestuhin ang security guard kasi on duty pa siya. Magsi-alis nga kayo dito mga
buwisit kayo!" In the meantime, a crowd started to gather when they noticed the commotion.
Eventually, Santos relented and surrendered Sido. While the chief of security, Libunao, Atencio and
Sido were leaving, the sales ladies of the store surrounded Sido and tried to protect him. The chief
of security brought Sido to the police station where a criminal complaint was filed against him by
Libunao. Santos also arrived at the police station.
Libunao was so traumatized by the incident, which was exacerbated as Sido went to his house twice
to apologize. Libunao had to consult a psychiatrist, Dr. Patalinghod of the Philippine General Hospital
(PGH). After several sessions, Dr. Patalinghod found him to be suffering from post-traumatic
depression syndrome.
The Case for the Defendants
Sido testified that he was employed as a security guard by the Black Shield Security Corporation
and was assigned at the Mercury Drug Store in Robinson's Galleria. At about 8:30 p.m. on May 25,
1992, he saw Libunao and his companion exiting from the store. Libunao was holding a plastic bag,
and Sido noticed that no receipt was stapled thereto. He asked Libunao for the receipt, but the
latter handed the bag to him. Sido searched for the receipt in the bag, but failed to find any. He
then asked the two men to go back to the cashier to get a receipt. However, Libunao was able to
bring out the receipt from his pocket and angrily shoved it close to Sido's face. Sido explained to
them that he was just doing his duty. Libunao and his companion were about to leave, but Libunao
said, "Baka hindi mo ako kilala, security guard ka lang! Ano ba talaga ang problema mo ?" Sido tried to
explain, and in the process, a violent argument ensued. A sales attendant of the store pacified
them. The two men left, with a warning from Libunao, "Be ready because I will come back." After

about 15 minutes, Libunao returned with a security guard from the Enriquez Agency and a man in
civilian clothes, who turned out to be a policeman. The same policeman asked Sido to go with him to
the police station. He refused because he was still on duty. When Santos saw the incident, she told
Sido to go inside the store. But after talking to the policeman, Santos relented and told Sido to go
with them to the building security office. When confronted by the security officer, Sido denied
boxing Libunao and poking a gun at him. He was later brought to the police station and placed in jail.
Libunao approached him and said: "You see now how powerful I am?" Sido also testified that a
policeman later asked from him P2,000.00 so that he could get out of jail. He was able to give only
P1,500.00 which was his salary for that day. He was released from jail the next day at 4:00 p.m.
Santos testified that she was the Store Manager of the Mercury Drug Store at the Robinson's
Galleria. At about 8:30 p.m. on May 25, 1992, she was at the retail section of the store when her
attention was called by one of the pharmacy assistants, Geminiano de Leon, about an on-going
altercation between two men and the store security guard near the exit of the self-service section,
which was about 15 meters away from where she was. When she rushed to the scene, Libunao and
his companion were no longer there. However, Libunao returned with two policemen from Quezon
City who were in civilian clothes, and informed her that they were going to arrest Sido. She told the
policemen that they were about to close the store and asked them if they could wait for about ten
to fifteen minutes so that Sido could help them close up. The policemen agreed, but Libunao
objected and said that her refusal to surrender Sido amounted to obstruction of justice. Sido was
later brought to the security office of the building and then taken to the police station.
Santos also testified that she accompanied Sido to the security office and to the police station.
Libunao told her that she should not have accompanied Sido because he was not an employee of the
Mercury Drug Corporation. She apologized to Libunao on behalf of Sido and told him that she had
not expected the altercation between the two of them. She testified that one of her duties as the
store manager was to prevent injuries to their customers, more so those caused by any of its
employees. She also testified that one of Sido's duties as their security guard was to open and
close the store.
On April 18, 1997, the court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered
by this Court in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants Remigio Sido,
Mercury Drug Corporation, and Vilma Santos, and said defendants are hereby
ordered, as follows:
To pay to plaintiff, jointly and severally, by way of moral damages, the amount of
P300,000.00, by way of exemplary damages, the amount of P200,000.00 to
discourage disrespect of the public by such acts as were committed by defendants,
plus attorney's fees of P50,000.00 and costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.5

The court granted the motion for reconsideration filed by Store Manager Santos, and ordered the
dismissal of the complaint against her. It, however, denied the motion for reconsideration filed by
the defendant Corporation. Hence, the defendant Corporation appealed the decision to the Court of
Appeals contending that:
I. EVIDENCE ON RECORD CLEARLY SHOW (sic) THAT PLAINTIFF'S
ALLEGATIONS AGAINST DEFENDANT MERCURY DRUG IN HIS COMPLAINT
HAS (sic) BEEN DISPROVED BY PLAINTIFF'S OWN ADMISSION AND BY
UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING DEFENDANT MERCURY DRUG
CORPORATION JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH DEFENDANT SIDO
FOR MORAL DAMAGES.
III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING
MERCURY DRUG JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH DEFENDANT SIDO
TO PAY PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. 6
On June 9, 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment affirming with modification the decision
of the trial court, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the challenged decision of the trial court dated
April 15, 1997 is AFFIRMED with the modification that the award of attorney's
fees is DELETED, and the moral and exemplary damages awarded are reduced from
P300,000.00 to P150,000.00 and from P200,000.00 to P100,000.00, respectively.
SO ORDERED.7
The appellate court ruled that Sido was an employee of the Mercury Drug Corporation, and that
there was no sufficient evidence to prove that he was an employee of BSSC. As such, it held that
Mercury Drug Corporation was, jointly and severally, liable with Sido for the latter's delictual and
harmful acts.
The Present Petition
Mercury Drug filed the instant petition for review, asserting as follows:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
DISREGARDING THE JUDICIAL ADMISSION OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT
RODRIGO LIBUNAO THAT REMIGIO SIDO IS NOT AN EMPLOYEE OF
PETITIONER-DEFENDANT MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION AND IN RULING
CONTRARY TO SAID STIPULATION OF FACT OR JUDICIAL ADMISSION.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
DISREGARDING A DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE WHICH WAS NOT QUESTIONED

NOR CONTROVERTED AND IN RULING CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE ON

RECORD.
3. THE Court of appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion in holding petitioner
liable for the acts of the security guard under article 2181 (sic) of the new civil
code.8
The petitioner contends that based on the evidence on record, Sido was not one of its employees,
but an employee of BSSC. As such, the Court of Appeals misapplied the last paragraph of Article
2180 of the New Civil Code, and should have ruled in accordance with the ruling of this Court in
Soliman, Jr. v. Court of Appeals.9
In his Comment on the petition, the respondent sought the denial of the petition on the following
grounds: (a) the petition raises factual issues; (b) the petitioner failed to submit the appropriate
certification against forum shopping; and, (c) the Court of Appeals did not commit any reversible
error in holding the petitioner liable for damages for the tortious and delictual acts of Sido, over
whose acts the petitioner had direct control and supervision as employer.
The core issues for resolution are (a) whether the certification against forum shopping embedded
in the petition is sufficient compliance with Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; (b) whether
the remedy of the petitioner is proper; and, (c) whether the petitioner is liable for damages to the
respondent for the tortious and delictual acts of Sido.
On the first issue, the respondent avers that the verification/certification against forum shopping
executed by the petitioner's in-house counsel and counsel of record, Atty. Joy Ann Marie C.
Nolasco, is insufficient. We reject the contention of the respondent. The assailed verification and
certification states that Atty. Joy Ann Marie C. Nolasco is the legal officer and/or in-house counsel
of petitioner, as well as its counsel of record in the above-entitled case, and is duly authorized to
sign the said verification and certification.10 As the petitioner's in-house counsel, she is the officer
who is in the best position to verify the truthfulness and the correctness of the allegations of the
petition, and to determine if a similar petition has been filed and is pending with other courts. In
Robern Development Corporation v. Quitain,11 we held that the certification executed by an in-house
counsel is sufficient compliance with the Rules:
In this case, the questioned verification stated that Atty. Caete was the acting
regional legal counsel of NPC at the Mindanao Regional Center in Iligan City. He was
not merely a retained lawyer, but an NPC in-house counsel and officer, whose basic
function was to prepare legal pleadings and to represent NPC-Mindanao in legal
cases. As regional legal counsel for the Mindanao Area, he was the officer who
was in the best position to verify the truthfulness and the correctness of the
allegations in the Complaint for expropriation in Davao City. As internal legal
counsel, he was also in the best position to know and to certify if an action for
expropriation had already been filed and pending with the courts.12
On the second issue, we rule that the remedy of the petitioner under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
is proper. While only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court, review may nevertheless be granted under certain exceptions, namely: (a) when the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (b) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (c) where there is a grave abuse of
discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of
fact are conflicting; (f) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issue of
the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (g) when the
findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the findings of
fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed
by the respondents; (j) when the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the
supposed absence of evidence but is contradicted by the evidence on record; and (k) when the
Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. 13
We have reviewed the records of the RTC and the Court of Appeals and found that there was a
misapprehension of certain facts; that findings contrary to the admissions of the parties and the
evidence on record were made; and that the said courts overlooked certain relevant facts which
were not disputed by the parties, and, if properly considered, would necessarily have altered the
decision arrived at by both courts.

Based on the evidence on record, the petitioner was not Sido's employer; hence, the trial and
appellate courts erred in applying Article 2180 of the New Civil Code 14 against the petitioner and
holding it liable for Sido's harmful acts.
First. The respondent was burdened to prove that the petitioner was the employer of Sido but
failed to discharge this burden.
Second. During the hearing in the trial court on August 17, 1994, the respondent's counsel of
record, Atty. Caesar J. Poblador, admitted that Sido was not employed by the petitioner:
ATTY. GENER, JR.:
Your Honor, since the cause of action of plaintiff is based on alleged
negligence of the company, we will prove deliligence (sic) of the company; and
the part (sic) of Remigio Sido that she (sic) was not an employee of the
company so that she (sic) was not liable of the complaint.
COURT:
Could the parties stipulate that he was not an employee of said company?
ATTY. POBLADOR:
We admit that she (sic) is not an employee of the company, Your Honor.
COURT:

There is no need to present her; they are admitting? Now, what are you
going to prove?15
It must be stressed that the stipulations of facts of the parties in the course of the proceedings
are conclusive upon them unless there is a showing that the parties committed a palpable mistake or
that no such admission was made by them.16
Third. Santos testified that Sido was not an employee of the petitioner, but of BSSC.
Q

And referring to defendant Remigio Sido, who is his employer?

Black Shield Agency, Sir.17

She also testified that the respondent even chided her in accompanying Sido to the police station,
since the latter was not an employee of the petitioner.
Q

What happened at the Station No. 8?

A
They talked with our security guard then Mr. Libunao told me, "Why did you go
with them; you should not go with them because that is an agency; they are not your
employees."
Q

And what did you say, if any, to Mr. Libunao?

A
I apologized in (sic) behalf of our security guard; I told them that I did not
expect these things will happen.18
Indeed, the respondent does not deny the testimony of Santos.
Fourth. Sido testified that he was employed by BSSC as a security guard, which assigned him to the
Mercury Drug Store at Robinson's Galleria.
Q any?

On May 25, 1992, do you remember what was your work or employment, if

A -

Yes, Sir.

Q -

What was your employment?

A -

As a Security Guard, Sir.

Q -

And who was your employer?

A -

Blackshield Security Agency, Sir.19

...

Q And who assigned you there at that particular spot, Mercury Drugstore or
Blackshield Security Agency?
A -

Blackshield Security Agency, Sir.

Q that?

I mean, the area that you are suppose (sic) to stand, who instructed you

A -

The Blackshield Security Agency, Sir.20

Fifth. The petitioner adduced in evidence its contract with the BSSC, which contained the following
provisions:
1. THE AGENCY shall provide the CLIENT with the necessary number of armed,
uniformed and qualified security guards properly licensed by the Chief of Philippine
Constabulary; who shall provide security services to the CLIENT at its
establishment at SEE ATTACHED ANNEX A.
These security guards during the life of the Agreement shall be assigned in
accordance with arrangements to be made between the CLIENT and the AGENCY.
...
6. The AGENCY assumes full responsibility for any claim or cause of action which
may accrue in favor of any security guard by reason of employment with the
AGENCY, it being understood that security guards are employees of the AGENCY
and not of the CLIENT.21
The records show that the respondent did not object to the admission of the contract which was
offered in evidence to prove that Sido was the employee of BSSC, 22 and not of the petitioner.
On the third and last issue, it is thus evident that the respondent had no cause of action against
the petitioner for damages for Sido's illegal and harmful acts. The respondent should have sued
Sido and the BSSC for damages, conformably to Article 2180 of the New Civil Code.
In Soliman, Jr. v. Tuazon,23 we held that where the security agency recruits, hires and assigns the
works of its watchmen or security guards to a client, the employer of such guards or watchmen is
such agency, and not the client, since the latter has no hand in selecting the security guards. Thus,
the duty to observe the diligence of a good father of a family cannot be demanded from the said
client:
... [I]t is settled in our jurisdiction that where the security agency, as here,
recruits, hires and assigns the work of its watchmen or security guards, the agency
is the employer of such guards or watchmen. Liability for illegal or harmful acts
committed by the security guards attaches to the employer agency, and not to the
clients or customers of such agency. As a general rule, a client or customer of a

security agency has no hand in selecting who among the pool of security guards or
watchmen employed by the agency shall be assigned to it; the duty to observe the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of the guards cannot, in the
ordinary course of events, be demanded from the client whose premises or property
are protected by the security guards.24
Indeed, the petitioner had assigned Sido to help the management open and close the door of the
drug store; inspect the bags of customers as they enter the store; and, check the receipts issued
by the cashier to said customers for their purchases. However, such circumstances do not
automatically make the security guard the employee of the petitioner, and, as such, liable for the
guard's tortious acts. The fact that a client company may give instructions or directions to the
security guards assigned to it, does not, by itself, render the client responsible as an employer of
the security guards concerned and liable for their wrongful acts or omissions. 25
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated
June 9, 2000 and the Resolution dated August 9, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
59754 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint filed by the respondent against
petitioner Mercury Drug Corporation in Civil Case No. Q-92-14114 is DISMISSED. The
counterclaims of the latter are also DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.