Addendum 3 Transit Corridor Safeguarding

Procurement Strategy for Implementation of

Metro System
Report No. 243011/F3/C3/010
Revision A
November 2008

Department of Transport
PO Box 20
Abu Dhabi
United Arab Emirates

Surface Transport
Master Plan
Addendum 3 - Transit
Corridor Safeguarding
Procurement Strategy
for Implementation of
Metro System
November 2008

Mott MacDonald
PO Box 47094
Abu Dhabi
United Arab Emirates
Tel: 971 2 6262 966
Fax: 971 2 6269 192

Report No. 243011/F3/C3/010/A

ABC

Executive Summary
The purpose of this report is to identify an appropriate strategy to allow the Abu Dhabi authorities to
implement the overall metro system. It aims to outline how DOT should engage designers,
contractors, operators etc, to allow the metro to be developed, and to advise on the timescale that they
should allow for the various phases of the project.
In order to identify the optimum implementation process, the methods used by other metro authorities
have been studied to highlight the successes and difficulties that they have experienced.
It is clear that there is no one procurement process that fits all projects around the world, but the
successful schemes over the past 20 years have certain similarities which would seem to be worth
replicating. These include ensuring that Government Policy is in place which allows the early
establishment of a Metro Authority, and grants this Authority the necessary powers to build and
operate the metro.
It is understood that the goal of the DOT is to have the first section of the metro operational by 2015.
This is considered to be ambitious but achievable. Other projects have completed the construction and
commissioning of similar length mass transit railways as that envisaged for the Initial System in Abu
Dhabi in approximately five years. However, these schemes had all gone through a significantly
longer gestation period than that for the Abu Dhabi Metro system, and the planning and preliminary
concepts had developed over many years prior to the letting of design and construction contracts.
The engagement of a shadow operator from an early stage of the project development has been key
to the success of other metro systems. The principles of RAMS (reliability, availability,
maintainability and safety) are the building blocks upon which the metro is built. All these impact on
the civil and structural facilities associated with the railway. The selection of the rolling stock that
will be used on the operational system is fundamental to the design of the project.
The Initial System for any new metro scheme would generally be located through the residential areas
and the main transportation corridors to business districts. For the Abu Dhabi Metro this would
appear to be along Airport Road (2nd Street) and into Hamdan Street. However, at the present time
there would be no obvious location for a depot, which is fundamental to the operating of the system.
It may be possible to construct a remote depot which will serve the entire network on its completion,
and provide intermediate stabling along the alignment to hold trains overnight. An alternative initial
system would be an airport express between the Central Business District and the new International
Airport via Saadiyat and Yas Islands. These considerations would be benefited by having an operator
on board.
It is considered that the establishment of a proper Metro Authority and, in the absence of an existing
railway operator in Abu Dhabi, the appointment of consultants who can act as a shadow operator are
key to realising the goals of the DOT. Similarly the appointment of consultants to act as a
Project/Programme Manager until the Metro Authority has become a fully developed organisation
would also appear to be a priority for the DOT.

Report No. 243011/F3/C3/010/A

S-1

ABC

By putting together the correct organisational structure as quickly as possible, it will be possible to
drive the project forward in a logical and structured manner, and the goals of the DOT to achieve an
operational metro by 2015 can be realised.

Report No. 243011/F3/C3/010/A

S-2

ABC

List of Contents

Page

Introduction

Other Similar Metro Projects

2.1

Singapore

2.2

Bangkok, Thailand

2.3

Kaohsiung, Taiwan

2.4

Dubai, United Arab Emirates

Optimum Development Process?

(i)
Government Policy
(ii) Establishment of a Transit Authority
(iii) Project Funding

6
6
6
6

Possible Forms of Project Procurement

4.1

Conventional Tendering / International Competitive Bidding

4.2

Turnkey Bid

4.3

Private Investment

4.4

Public, Private Partnerships (PPP)

Lessons Leaned from Previous Projects

11

Development of the Abu Dhabi Metro System

13

6.1

Developments to Date

13

6.2

Initial System

14

6.3

Implementation Programme

15

Recommendations

17

Figures
Figure 6.1: Overall Programme to Achieve 2015 Initial System

15

Tables
Table 4.1: Acronym Definition
Table 4.2: Simplistic Comaprisons (Indicative Only)

9
10

ABC

Report No. 243011/F3/C3/010/A

Introduction

The Abu Dhabi Department of Transport (DOT) is the sole authority responsible for planning and
operation of the public transport system within Emirate of Abu Dhabi. It is the aim of the DOT to
implement the Worlds best public transport system in Abu Dhabi, as well as the links with
neighbouring Emirates and other states, and to establish a showcase to the World in terms of public
transport service levels, quality and information.
Mott MacDonald was commissioned by the DOT in February 2008 to undertake the Abu Dhabi
Surface Transport Master Plan (STMP). The purpose of the STMP is to develop the conceptual
transportation strategy outlined in Plan Abu Dhabi 2030 into a detailed master and implementation
programme for Abu Dhabi. Included in the brief is the metro system which would serve Abu Dhabi
island, the Capital District and the surrounding islands. It is understood that the metro procurement
process is targeted to commence in Q1 2009, to allow the opening of the first section of the system at
the beginning of 2015.
The purpose of this report is to identify an appropriate strategy to allow the Abu Dhabi authorities to
implement the overall metro system. It aims to outline how DOT should engage consultants,
contractors, operators etc, to allow the metro to be developed, and to advise on the timescale that they
should allow for the various phases of the project.
In order to identify the optimum route for the implementation process, the methods used by other
metro authorities have been studied to highlight the successes and difficulties that they have
experienced.

Report No. 243011.F3/C3/010/A

ABC

Other Similar Metro Projects

A number of metro projects have been developed in Asia during the past 20 30 years and the forms
of implementing these schemes have varied greatly, in the methods of procurement and funding, and
in the approach adopted by each metro authority in its management and control of construction and
operation. Some examples are presented in the following sections.
2.1

Singapore

Both Hong Kong and Singapore have adopted similar practices in the development of their metro
systems. In Singapore early studies for a metro system were undertaken in the 1970s, and a
provisional transit authority was set up. The Mass Rapid Transit Corporation (MRTC) was
established in Singapore in 1983 to develop the new metro system. They initially engaged the services
of international consultants to advise them on the route planning, engineering and operations of the
new lines. These included Mott MacDonald, Wilbur Smith and London Transport International.
MRTC established a large team to address the engineering, procurement and operation of the new
lines from the outset of the project. Their procurement process comprised numerous relatively small
contracts for the civil works, generally one station and a length of tunnel as a design-and-build
contract for the underground works, but several stations for the elevated sections. The Mechanical and
Electrical (M&E) installations were let as a single system-wide contract, and rolling stock was
procured separately. All interfaces were managed by the in-house MRTC team, and the consultants
engaged on the initial planning were free to work for the contractors on the design work.
Construction commenced in 1982 and the first length of line in Singapore was opened to the public in
1987. The initial system was completed in 1990 and comprised a 67 km long route with 42 stations.
All subsequent lines in Singapore have generally been procured using similar processes. Sometimes
the MRTC have engaged external consultants to undertake the feasibility studies and route planning
for new lines, but the overall administration and management of the contracts have been handled by
the in-house organisation. They have also continued with the concept of relatively small construction
packages for the civil works, generally on a design-and-build basis, although this concept has changed
in recent times to full design by consultants and build-only construction contracts.
Since its inception the Singapore MRT has completed over 138km of metro line, is currently
constructing 70km of new lines, and has plans for a further 63km by 2020.
All the lines are operated by the MRTC which was incorporated into the Land Transport Authority in
1995, a statutory board under the Ministry of Transport, that spearheads land transport developments
in Singapore.
2.2

Bangkok, Thailand

In 1976, the Thai Government resolved that three lines of Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) system with a
total length of 50 km should be constructed in five years.

Report No. 243011.F3/C3/010/A

ABC

In 1978 the cabinet approved the Expressway and Rapid Transit System of Thailand (ETA) to conduct
a detailed design for three lines of MRT, total length of 60 km. After completion of the detailed
design, the cabinet had set an investment policy to let the project go privatized and eventually ETA
had signed a concessionary contract (February, 1992) with a Canadian firm "Lavalin lnternational.
However, the contract was called null and void (July, 1992) due to the private firm failing to raise
funds for the project.
Shortly after it became clear that the Lavalin project was stalled, the Bangkok Metropolitan Authority
(BMA) decided to create a new feeder system with a route along Sukhumvit and Silom Roads. BMA
found an investor to build it and the city also supervised the project. The investor founded Bangkok
Transit System Corporation (BTSC) and this company successfully financed the system and grew it
from a feeder system to a full mass transit project. With Siemens as supplier of the railway
technology, the Thai contractor Italian Thai Development built the system for BTSC. This line
opened in 1999.
In August 1992, the Thai Government established Metropolitan Rapid Transit Authority (MRTA)
responsible for urban mass transportation in Bangkok and vicinity, which is nowadays called Mass
Rapid Transit Authority of Thailand. MTRA conducted the feasibility studies, and preliminary
designs and tender documents for the Blue Line MRT in Bangkok. In November 1996, MRTA started
the first construction contract. A Project Management Consultant was brought on board to support the
MRTA and the proposed implementation was for a small number of very large contracts. Each civil
contract comprised seven stations and all tunnelling works between, with one of these contracts also
including the depot. A concessionary contract was awarded for private investment in the project's
system works and system operation for 25 years. This was awarded to Bangkok Metro Public
Company Limited (BMCL), a different operator to that of the system developed by BMA. The Blue
Line began operation in July 2004.
In September 2004 the Government gave approval in principle for MRT network of 291 km (248 km
as new lines). Consultants have conducted numerous studies and designs. However, no new
construction has taken place since the opening of the Blue Line.
The most recent development is that the Bangkok Government has purchased the BTSC system and
MRTA has taken over the running of this line. The MRTA remains a fairly small firm compared with
other metro authorities, and they intend to appoint a Project Management Consultant to assist in the
implementation of the next project when construction commences.
2.3

Kaohsiung, Taiwan

The Kaohsiung City Government undertook a feasibility study to construct a rapid transit system in
Kaohsiung in 1987, and in 1990 approval was obtained to establish the Kaohsiung City Mass Rapid
Transit Bureau (KMRT) and planning of the rapid transit network started. This was officially
established in 1994, to coincide with the project's move into the final scoping and detail design stages.
Taiwans Central Government ordered KMRT to look into constructing the project via the Build,
Operate, Transfer (BOT) method, and in 1999 the City Government put out a request for the BOT
Contract to construct the first phase of the metro system. Kaohsiung Rapid Transit Corporation
(KRTC) was determined to be the top bidder and received the priority negotiating rights with the city

Report No. 243011.F3/C3/010/A

ABC

government in constructing the system. In January 2001, KRTC signed the "Construction and
Operation Agreement" and "Development Agreement" with the Kaohsiung City Government,
signalling the beginning of construction of the KMRT system.
The Kaohsiung MRT system is made up of two lines (Orange and Red) with 36 stations covering a
distance of 40.4km. Twenty seven of these stations are underground, with eight elevated and one at
grade level. The Red Line opened for traffic in March 2008 and the Orange Line in September 2008.
The concessionaire who is running the metro system will maintain the concession and operate the
metro for a period of 30 years.
Although seen as a BOT scheme, 85% of the project has been funded by Central Government, mainly
to cover the costs of the land acquisition, infrastructure and civil works.
The KMRT organisation is a relatively small unit, approximately 50 people, as the day to day
operations of the metro are undertaken by the concessionaire KRTC.
2.4

Dubai, United Arab Emirates

From studies started in 1997, Dubai Municipality identified the need for a rail system to relieve
growing motor traffic and support continuing urban development. However, the project only really
started in 2002 with the Dubai Transit Options Study PS002. Later in that year a consulting firm,
Systra, was awarded the preliminary engineering contract, and developed the concept of two lines, the
Red Line (52km with 29 stations) and the Green Line (22km and 18 stations). The remit of the
commission was to:

Confirm viability of system and develop wider PT network;

Take project to Preliminary Engineering Stage (30%);

Propose system management and scheme financing options.

One of the great concerns of the Dubai Municipality was the poor quality of some of the rolling stock
especially where provided as part of a DBFO approach. As such it was decided that the procurement
of the project would be driven considering two key aspects - retaining control of the vehicle
specification/choice, and the speed of implementation. Because vehicle choice is intrinsically linked
to system requirements these elements were tendered separately from the main civils works.
Effectively two contracts were published with bidders going through a prequalification stage which
included a financial offer. This enabled Dubai Municipality to review the vehicles being offered and
reject those they did not like (irrespective of how cheap they were) while in parallel obtaining low
prices for the civils works. They pre-qualified six or seven from each group and then asked the two
groups to pair up in a marriage of convenience to offer joint bids but with limited opportunity to alter
their specification or financial offer. A number of the contractors/suppliers were not happy with this
approach and some dropped out. Five joint bids were submitted and unsurprisingly the cheapest was
offered by the only group pre-qualified in both sections.
In 2005 a consortium of four companies headed by Japan's Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) won
the single construction contract to build the Red Line, the first of the two lines of the high-tech

Report No. 243011.F3/C3/010/A

ABC

driverless rapid transit system. As explained above, the contract included all civil and rail systems
works and rolling stock, i.e. a complete metro system.
The Metro is intended to be fully integrated within the network operated by the Roads & Transport
Authority (RTA), a body created in 2005. The RTA appointed SERCO earlier this year to operate the
metro and light rail projects.
After the start of construction of the Red Line, the RTA appointed a consultancy firm to undertake the
Project Management role for the implementation of other metro schemes. The preliminary
engineering of the Purple Line is now underway, an express line between the existing Dubai airport
and the new Jebel Ali International Airport, and is being undertaken on behalf of RTA by external
consultants. Also an 11km extension to the Green Line is being planned together with the 40km long
Blue Line.
It should be noted that a number of monorail systems are also being undertaken in Dubai, with the
Palm Jumeirah Monrail now nearing completion. This project has been undertaken by a separate
developer, Nakheel, and its planning has not been integrated with that of the metro system.

Report No. 243011.F3/C3/010/A

ABC

Optimum Development Process?

As demonstrated by the case studies described in Section 2 of this report, there are numerous options
for the procurement of a metro project, and there is no single methodology that will fit all schemes.
However, the successful metro projects have certain similarities which would appear to be worth
replicating for any new system.
(i)

Government Policy

A metro project requires huge amounts of investment cost, and as other mega projects, it needs to be
initiated and carried forwards by a confirmed National Policy. First of all a clearly identified policy
and commitment to go for a transit programme needs to be announced and relevant undertakings needs
to be actioned by the Government (e.g. land use law and regulations to support a public transportation
network, approval of budget for public transport projects, etc.)
(ii)

Establishment of a Transit Authority

The case histories show that the successful projects have been coordinated developed and controlled
by a single Agency. A government owned transit organization, albeit supported by external
consultants at various stages of the project development, possesses the necessary authority to drive the
project forward.
It has also been demonstrated that, for large rail and transit projects mostly initiated by a public sector
organization and endorsed by the government, the most successful model involves the transit operating
agency from an early stage in the planning and design process. They will set the operating timetable,
frequency and quality of services and maintenance regimes to establish the infrastructure that needs to
be constructed. A number of the newer mass transit projects in Asia are involving the private sector as
concessionaire to manage and operate the system, and this can be an attractive option for metros where
high volumes of passengers are expected to use the system. However, this is more difficult for a
private operator should there be sections of the network where low patronage is anticipated but the
government requires a public transport system to serve the community. This can be simply controlled
when then government agency runs the system. Therefore, a government run agency is preferred to
fully benefit the created metro system.
(iii)

Project Funding

When the government agrees to go forwards with a transit project, it should provide a fund to finance
the project investment cost. Generally a fund can be arranged by the government from many sources,
e.g. a national budget, domestic or foreign loans, (including government bond or other public credit
instruments). For Abu Dhabi, funding is not seen to be the problem that other countries and cities
have experienced, and this should not be a serious issue although all options should be investigated.

Report No. 243011.F3/C3/010/A

ABC

Possible Forms of Project Procurement

As demonstrated by the case studies described previously, a transit project can be procured in various
forms tendering/contracting. The selection of the most appropriate procurement strategy will
ultimately be determined by factors such as:

The Owners preferences and previous history of similar projects;

The relative size of the project compared with recent similar projects;

Sources of construction expertise and level of activity in the construction marketplace;

Available cash and cash-flow;

In service time horizon and schedule/delivery date certainty;

Out-turn cost certainty;

Construction risk sensitivity and construction Conditions of Contract;

Flexibility to modify the asset specification during construction e.g. in response to advent of
new technology;

Attitude of workforce and unions, and the political perspective;

Project interfaces.

The method to be adopted also has variations in the size and involvement of the owners organisation.
The case histories have shown that the owner organisations have adopted very different approaches in
the implementation of their metro systems. The options available to the owner will be influenced by
the level of control that he wishes to adopt in the day-to-day decision making and overall management
of the project. Some of the issues to be considered and the main forms of procurement are described in
the following sections.
4.1

Conventional Tendering / International Competitive Bidding

Conventional tendering/international competitive bidding, where the project owner can invite bids for
a conventional bidding procedure, or design and build tender, for which the project owner has
provided engineering design and tender documents for tenderers to submit bids in conformity with the
requirements.
Generally, this would require the establishment of a fairly large in-house team from the outset of the
project to manage all issues relating to the planning, design, construction and operation of the system.
The in-house organisation can either be all full time employees of the Metro Authority, or a smaller
core team of employees supported by external consultants who would act as project / programme
managers for the early development of the initial system. The latter approach has been the norm in

Report No. 243011.F3/C3/010/A

ABC

recent years. The successful models also include a metro operator to be part of the management team,
and many Metro Authorities around the world offer these consultancy services. It should be
recognised that London Underground International were engaged on the Singapore MRT, and Hong
Kong MTRC have advised numerous authorities, including Dubai.
Procurement Options where the Owner is the sole source of funding can still encompass a wide variety
of approaches such as:

4.2

T Traditional approach in which design is a separate function from construction and both are
procured directly by the owner;

EPC Engineer Procure Construct a Contractor led design and manage Contract with the
works contracts being let by the EPC contractor who may also procure long lead or critical
items;

D&B Design and Build whereby Constructors are required to bid a reference design and
then proceed to design, construct and commission a facility to a previously provided
specification;

DBOM Design Build Operate and Maintain;

CM Construction Management whereby the Authority appoints a Construction Manager

who packages and schedules the design and construction work and the package interfaces. The
design and construction are kept as independent packages;

P Partnering allowing full integration of the design, construction and operation functions.
Turnkey Bid

Turnkey bid is where tenders are invited to bid based on the owner's requirements. The project owner
may or may not have provided engineering design documents, it will vary depending on the strategy of
the project owner. The main objective of the project owner is to get the project and its requirements
completed and delivered according to the specified target, and payments to contractor(s) shall be made
at an agreed schedule (of payment) in the contract. This strategy can be suitable to a Government
which has a financial limitation, but the Government may have to pay more because of more risk
imposed on contractor and more interest incurred during construction and payment periods.
The Turnkey Contractor will sub-let the works to various designers and contractors. Upon completion
of the construction work, the Turnkey contractor shall handover the metro to the governing authority.
As seen from the Kaohsiung and Dubai projects, this form of procurement only requires a relatively
small owner team, but the owner has little influence on the implementation of the project.
4.3

Private Investment

Private investment in the project can be a form of Build Operate and Transfer (BOT), Build Own
Operate and Transfer (BOOT) or Build Transfer and Operate (BTO). Whatever the final arrangement

Report No. 243011.F3/C3/010/A

ABC

would be, the key factor is that a private entity (a company, a partnership ,a consortium, or a joint
venture) is awarded a concession based on the given government conditions, and selection of the
concessionaire is done according to the government standard procedure.
One of the considerations in the selection of the most appropriate model to be adopted is that it must
be recognised that the establishment of a metro system should be seen as a benefit to the economy of
the overall city and it is not strictly necessary for the metro itself to be profitable for it to be deemed a
success.
Abu Dhabi is not as densely populated as other cities, so is unlikely to generate the high patronage
figures experienced in the likes of London, Tokyo, Hong Kong, etc.. However, the majority of in-city
travel is currently undertaken by either private cars or taxis. The removal of a small percentage of
these vehicles from the roads by providing a metro system will obviously be of great advantage to the
environment and for the free-flowing of the surface traffic that remains on the roads. Thus the fare
structure for the metro will need to be tailored to ensure that the system will be regularly used, and the
revenue generated from the fare-box may not actually cover the running costs particularly in the
early stages of operation. These issues may distract potential concessionaires from the project.
Other options may be to include the property rights above the stations as part of the concession
package. Published data on other metro systems show that significant revenue can be generated from
other sources than the fare-box, with Hong Kong MTRC leading the way with over 20% of its annual
income generated in this manner. The MTRC non-fare revenue comes from property, advertising and
station retail, and other items such as the provision of feeder cables through the tunnels to allow the
use of mobile phones.
4.4

Public, Private Partnerships (PPP)

Tables 4.1 and 4.2 introduce PPP options for consideration assuming a 30 year concession.
Ref Acronym

Activity

Revenue recovery

DBFMO

Design Build, Finance, Maintain and

Operate

Fare-box or farebox + property

rights

DBFM-OO

Design, Build, Finance and Maintain Owner Operates rolling stock and railway
systems

Availability

DBFM-OBOM

Design, Build, Finance and Maintain civils

infrastructure Owner Builds, Operates and
Maintains the railway systems

Availability

Table 4.1: Acronym Definition

Report No. 243011.F3/C3/010/A

ABC

DBFMComparison criteria

DBFMO

DBFM-OO
OBOM

Out-turn cost certainty

Value for
money/Contingency

Delivery time certainty

Owner control/ flexibility to

change

Interface management

Workforce
resistance/cooperation

Totals

15

22

23

Table 4.2: Simplistic Comaprisons (Indicative Only)

Table 4.2 gives equal weight to all criteria, and apportions scores on a 1 to 5 scale and generally
oversimplifies very complex issues.

Report No. 243011.F3/C3/010/A

10

ABC

Lessons Leaned from Previous Projects

The new metro system in Abu Dhabi will need to be divided into manageable lengths for each stage of
development, and these will need to be of sufficient length to ensure that a useable system is
constructed. However, the stages of development should not be over ambitious, as this would lead to
very large construction contracts and, in the case of Abu Dhabi, pass through areas which are currently
being developed themselves and may not warrant a mass transit system. The overall metro system as
identified in the STMP study is over 100km in length. However, the initial system is likely to be
significantly shorter. To achieve the declared opening date of 2015, a system of the order of 20 30km in length only would appear reasonable and achievable, depending on the route and proposed
methods of construction.
Numerous very large contract packages have been awarded in recent years for the construction of
metro systems. These include Bangkok, up to seven underground stations and a depot in a single
contract; Kaohsiung, 36 stations; Dubai, 29 stations and 18 stations for the Red and Green Lines plus
depots. Elsewhere Delhi Metro Phase 1 included two main contracts comprising six underground
stations each, and Hyderabad Metro is also being packaged as a single concessionaire-led contract.
This size of contract requires the assembly of large consortia to undertake the project, and there would
appear to be considerable risk associated with such large contracts, particularly in the current
worldwide economic climate.
The tendering for such large contracts is also very costly for the contracting firms, and it may be
considered that a procurement process involving a number of smaller contracts would prove more
attractive to potential bidders, and could also involve more local contractors as well as the
international firms. This is the format that has been adopted to develop the systems in Singapore and
Hong Kong, and continues in these countries, and is also employed by the mature metro companies
such as London Underground.
Correct timing of the design works and the award of civil and systems contracts has been
demonstrated as a key to the success, or otherwise, in the implementation of the overall project.
Difficulties were encountered in Bangkok as the civil packages were well into the construction phase
before the concessionaire was appointed. It was the concessionaire that designed the rail systems, so
many of the completed structures needed retrofitting to accommodate the M&E plant. Problems have
also been experienced if the systems are designed up-front and the civil contractors are instructed to
accommodate the plant, without any adjustment to the designs. Compromise is required in all
construction works, and this is usually achieved by establishing firm leadership in a project.
The development of the metro in Abu Dhabi will need to take into account the other transport systems,
both existing and planned, so that a fully integrated network is realised. At the present time all
transport modes are being developed by DOT and the long term development of each system is being
coordinated through the STMP project. However, the experience in the Bangkok MRT is that when
the National Government failed in its implementation of the metro system, the local Government
developed its own scheme, and two separate transit systems were being constructed at the same time
and, after completion, were run by separate operating companies. The two schemes implemented
different fare structures, no common-ticketing was available, and the interchanges between the two
systems are not convenient for the public. It is highly unlikely that such a scenario could occur in Abu

Report No. 243011.F3/C3/010/A

11

ABC

Dhabi. However, the DOT needs to set in place a structure that, when the Metro Authority is
established, close coordination continues with any similar organisation for the other passenger rail
systems or airport express. Similarly an integrated ticketing scheme needs to be established for all
transport modes to enhance the usage of the public transport network.

Report No. 243011.F3/C3/010/A

12

ABC

Development of the Abu Dhabi Metro System

6.1

Developments to Date

Although the Department of Transport has been considering building a metro system to serve Abu
Dhabi City for some time, it is the current STMP commission being undertaken by Mott MacDonald,
which commenced in February 2008, that has enabled the DOT to focus on the implementation
process.
Many of the large developments in Abu Dhabi are currently in the advanced planning stages or already
under construction. The problem facing the DOT is that many of the developers have not considered
public transport within their designs, or if they have then the infrastructure provided is not adequate.
Due to this and the pressure from the developers, the DOT has commissioned Mott MacDonald to
undertake Addendum 3 to the main STMP project, Transit Corridor Safeguarding.
In order to safeguard the Abu Dhabi Metro and Abu Dhabi Rail corridors, the track sections (elevated,
at grade and tunnel sections) and the station areas are being defined using the most conservative
design parameters. The disciplines which have been considered include:

Alignment;

Civil works;

Structural Works;

Architecture;

Mechanical and Electrical Works; and

Safety.

Although the DOT is currently coordinating the development of the metro and the rail systems both
commuter rail and the high speed systems - a new organisation, Union Rail, has the remit to develop
the freight rail system within Abu Dhabi and the neighbouring Emirates and States. At this time it is
not believed that Union Rail will be involved in either the metro or the heavy rail passenger systems.
Preliminary alignments for the metro system have already been developed as part of the STMP
Safeguarding exercise mentioned above, by a series of meetings and workshops involving Mott
MacDonald, Department of Transport, the Urban Planning Council, and the developers and their
representatives of each of the major schemes being undertaken in the subject areas.
It is clear from these discussions that many of the developments are well advanced and construction is
already underway. Indeed, the bridges over the channels between Saadiyat and Yas islands for the
Shahama Expressway are substantially complete. The metro will be located in the central reserve of
the highway, and the construction logistics for completing the permanent way for the metro will be
complicated when the highway is open to traffic, and even more so for the crossings of the channels.
Elsewhere foundations and building works are being undertaken on a number of the developments

Report No. 243011.F3/C3/010/A

13

ABC

through which both the metro and the heavy rail lines are aligned, and the DOT has recognised that it
will need to work closely with these developers and their consultants to provide detailed guidelines to
ensure that the necessary infrastructure for the transit projects are incorporated into their works, and
that the implementation of the future rail and metro lines is not compromised. The result of this is that
a number of discrete structures for the future metro will be completed well before the required time,
and it may be several years before the additional infrastructure is constructed to complete the metro
line.
As stated previously, the aim of the DOT is to have the first section of the new metro system
operational by the beginning of 2015. At this time the expected population of Abu Dhabi City will be
approximately 1.3 million.
6.2

Initial System

The overall metro system as conceived during the STMP study will be approximately 100km in length
and serve Abu Dhabi City, the planned Capital District and the new developments on the islands of
Suwa, Reem, Saadiyat and Yas amongst others. However, it is likely that a staged implementation
process will need to be planned.
Generally it would be expected that the first length of any metro system would be constructed to
provide links to the existing most congested areas and the main transport corridors. For Abu Dhabi
this would be through the Central Business District (CBD) in the Hamdan Street areas, and along the
main Airport (2nd Street) Road. This routeing has a total length of approximately 20km, and involves
the construction of eight or nine stations. An alternative option for the initial system would be to the
International Airport which is currently undergoing an expansion and will be opened within the next
three years. Most modern airports have their express lines to the business district and amongst the
routes identified in the STMP to link the airport to the CBD is a route via Saadiyat and Yas islands,
with a long length of surface track. The developments on both Saadiyat and Yas would be expected to
be substantially complete by 2015 and this route could be built relatively quickly compared with the
long lengths of tunnelling required for other sections of the system.
Additionally a major issue with the alignment within Abu Dhabi Island itself, along Hamdan Street
and Airport Road, is the lack of any obvious site for a depot facility, which is fundamental to the
operation of the system. Two potential depot areas have been identified in the STMP project: the
largest of the sites is located between Yas Island and the International Airport, and a secondary site is
between Emerald Gateway and Capital City District. Therefore, for a system serving Abu Dhabi
Island itself, additional lengths of track and infrastructure would be required to connect the depot
facility. This would not be the case for the airport link to Saadiyat and the CBD.
Notwithstanding the above considerations, it will be the results of the modelling studies of the STMP
that will be the main factor in determining the most appropriate routeing for the Initial System of the
Abu Dhabi Metro. The output of the STMP will include the proposed stages of development of the
overall system in five year intervals.
In developing and expanding the Initial System the metro authority and operators should be cognizant
of how the next phase of the system can be built in safety and with the minimum of disruption to the
existing services, how the train frequencies or train lengths can be increased on the existing lines as

Report No. 243011.F3/C3/010/A

14

ABC

the patronage increases, and how the overall system can be developed and managed to provide the best
value to the owner. Although this report has been specifically targeted at the development of the
metro, similar considerations are required for the regional rail network.
6.3

Implementation Programme

The target opening date of the Initial System of the metro has been stated as Q1 2015. It is also
understood that the DOT intends to commence on the preliminary designs for the project during Q1
2009, which allows a total period of slightly less than six years to plan, design, construct and
commission a completely new system. This is ambitious but achievable, providing that the
organisational structure and management teams are in place to drive the project forward. Other
systems, including the initial system for Singapore have been constructed and commissioned within
five years. However, a significant amount of planning and preliminary design had taken place over a
number of years prior to the start of construction to ensure that most technical and logistical issues had
been resolved prior to the award of the construction contracts. It should be noted that the Singapore
and Hong Kong systems took approximately 30 years to extend to 100km length, which is slightly
longer than that being proposed for Abu Dhabi.
Although the alignment is being refined as part of the STMP study, the type of rolling stock that will
be used on the system has not yet been determined. Nor has a specific Metro Authority or a shadow
operating organisation been established to put into place the institutional requirements to allow the
project to be constructed, commissioned and operated, although it is understood that DOT is currently
acting as the Metro Authority.
The construction of the civil works, including tunnels and stations would be expected to extend for 2
3 years, depending upon the size of the contracts that are to be let. The procurement of large
construction plant including the tunnelling machines, together with the relocation of utilities and other
preparatory works often means that the construction process cannot commence for 12 - 15 months
after the award of the construction contracts. Some systems works and the fitting out of stations can
also be concurrent with the completion of the civil construction, but a period of at least 6 - 9 months
will be needed at the end of the civil works to complete the installations, and a further six months is
necessary for the testing and commissioning of the railway. So the five years period for the
construction and commissioning requires considerable overlap in activities.

Overall Programme to Achieve 2015 Initial System

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

Award of Design
Contracts
Award of Construction
Contracts
Pre-Quals Bid
Civil Works
Rail & Systems
Testing &
Commissioning

Open
Initial
System

Figure 6.1: Overall Programme to Achieve 2015 Initial System

Report No. 243011.F3/C3/010/A

15

ABC

To achieve a project opening in Q1 2015, and following the logic described above, means that the
construction contracts will need to be let in Q1 2010. Therefore, during the next 15 months the
alignment will need to be finalised, stations located and accurately sized, designs will need to be
undertaken, land appropriation and utility diversions etc. commenced, and the tender documents
prepared to allow contractors to be procured to build the metro. As seen from the case studies
presented in Section 2 of this report, this work could take anywhere from 12 18 months to similar
durations in years, but for Abu Dhabi a fast-track approach will be adopted to establish the required
public transportation systems.
The type of construction contracts to procure the metro has not yet been decided. As mentioned
above, the first contracts to take the project to a 30% design stage are scheduled to be let in Q1 2009.
However, it has been recognised that many major developments are currently underway throughout
Abu Dhabi and the DOT has already acknowledged that some early implementation of the metro
infrastructure will need to take place to ensure that these schemes have the necessary facilities
incorporated into their layouts. It is expected that the detailed designs of the metro structures at each
of these developments will be carried out by each of the developers consultants, based on guidelines
set by DOT. The type of contract that is selected for the completion of the lines, and the connection of
these discrete structures, may be considered to be more appropriate for a detailed design package
managed directly by DOT rather than deferring to a design-and-build or EPC approach. In this way
the DOT has direct control of the interfaces between the various structures and does not leave itself
open to claims from contractors on different conditions. However, the final choice of procurement
method for the Initial System may be determined by the actual route that is selected for the first metro
line.
The selection of the rolling stock that will be used on the operational system is fundamental to the
design of the project. To date, the Corridor Safeguarding exercise being undertaken as Addendum 3
of the STMP project has used generic rolling stock characteristics, based on other metro projects
worldwide. However, this is a conservative approach and may not be the most cost effective method
of developing a bespoke metro system for Abu Dhabi.
The rolling stock determines the size of all the tunnels and stations; the operational capacity of the
facilities that are to be provided; the rail systems including the fire & life safety considerations for the
overall network; the power supplies that will need to be provided; and the size and layout of the depot
and other stabling/ sidings along the alignment. Although the preliminary planning of the alignment
and station layouts has been using conservative assumptions for the safeguarding exercise, a number
of decisions will need to be made in the near future to allow the project to move into the preliminary
design phase, and one of these is considered to be the selection of the rolling stock.
It is also considered that the establishment of a proper Metro Authority and, in the absence of an
existing railway operator in Abu Dhabi, the appointment of consultants who can act as a shadow
operator are key to realising the goals of the DOT. The issue of the depot location, and the means of
stabling trains overnight puts even greater importance in the early appointment of operations
specialists. Similarly the appointment of consultant to act as a Project/Programme Manager until the
Metro Authority has become a fully developed organisation would also appear to be a priority for the
DOT.

Report No. 243011.F3/C3/010/A

16

ABC

Recommendations

The goals of having an operational metro by 2015 are ambitious but can be achieved by putting
together the correct organisational structure as quickly as possible to drive the project forward in a
logical and structured manner. This means prioritising the establishment of a Metro Authority which
has the powers and Government backing, together with related issues arranged accordingly to support
the programme, for example: land use law and enforcement to support and encourage public
transportation and users, etc. Other Metro Authorities around the world employ tens or hundreds of
people. To develop such an Authority for Abu Dhabi the DOT will need to establish a fledgling
organisation which will be supplemented by external consultants, either a consultancy firm acting as
Programme/Project Managers, or individuals seconded into the DOT, or a combination of both. In
time the Metro Authority will be able to dispense with the external parties and operate itself.
Early planning of the metro operational strategy is key to the ultimate success of the system. An
understanding is required of the type of rolling stock to be used, the timetabling and frequency of the
trains and the systems that are to be installed are fundamental in determining the infrastructure that
needs to be put in place. These systems are also instrumental in determining the safety and evacuation
plans and smoke control etc. that need to be put in place should an incident occur during the operation
of the metro. The principles of RAMS (reliability, availability, maintainability and safety) are the
building blocks upon which the metro is built.
The initial system also needs to be capable of expansion, and the new lines and stations need to be
built in a safe manner with the minimum disruption to service. The establishment of the fare structure
and the revenue stream will also influence the sequencing of the expansion.
Therefore the main recommendations of this report are: the engagement of systems operators together
with consultants who are experienced in this field to assist a build the fledgling organisation into a
dedicated government-established Metro Authority.

Report No. 243011.F3/C3/010/A

17

ABC

www.transportabudhabi.ae