OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY

Culpable Homicide and Murder

Homicide (Latin homa- man, cide- I Cut) is the killing of a human being by a human
being. Causing the death of an animal is not murder. It might amount to the offence of
mischief or to cruelty to animals. Homicide may be lawful or unlawful. Lawful
homicide (cases falling under General Exceptions- Sec. 76-106)) is of two types —
excusable and justified homicide.

Lawful homicide.—Homicide may be either (1) lawful or (2) unlawful.

In the first case, law will set the culprit free; in the second case he will be held
criminally responsible for his criminal act. The distinction between lawful and unlawful
homicide depends on whether the offender’s act was intentional, careless or otherwise.
Lawful homicide may further be classified into:—
(i) Excusable homicide, and
(ii) Justifiable homicide.

Excusable homicide Justified homicide Unlawful Homicide

Accident (Sec- 80) Mistake of fact U/S Culpable Homicide

76and 79 (Sec- 299, 301 and 304)

Act of Minor, Insane, Judicial Act U/S 77and Murder U/S 300
Intoxicated Persons 78 and also Includes
( Sec- 82, 83, 84, and Necessity under Sec- 81
85 )

Act in good Faith as in Act of Private defence Culpable Homicide not

Sec- 87, 88 and 89 and U/S 96 to 106 amounting to Murder
sec- 92) (Sec- 300 Exceptions 1
to 5 )

Unlawful homicide.—An unlawful homicide may be classified into different categories

according to the nature and gravity of the offence and its heinousness in order to attach
a suitable punishment for each type viz.:—
(a) Culpable homicide (sections 299, 301, I.P.C.);
(b) Murder (section 300, I.P.C.);
(c) Culpable homicide not amounting to murder (section 300, Exceptions 1 to 5);
(d) Death by negligence (section 304A, I.P.C.)
(e) Dowry Death (section 304B, I.P.C.);
(f) Abetment of suicide and attempt to commit suicide (sections 305, 306 and 309,
(g) Attempt to murder and attempt to commit culpable homicide (sections 308, I.P.C.);
(h) Attempt to suicide (section 309, I.P.C.).
The distinguishing features of these different categories of
unlawful homicides are: the degree of intention, knowledge, or recklessness with which
a particular homicide is committed. If the probability of death resulting from a bodily
injury is of a very high degree (i.e., where death is a certainty) this constitutes murder,
and if the probability is not of that order, it is culpable homicide and if murder is
committed under grave provocation and consent, it is culpable homicide not amounting
to murder’ For instance, if A attacks B with a sharp-edged knife in his heart, resulting in
B’s death, A would be guilty of murder.2 On the other hand, if A causes injury to B with
a stick fracturing his skull, resulting in B’s death, A would be liable for culpable
homicide not amounting to murder.3 In the first case, from the nature of the injury and
the instrument used for the purpose, it is certain that the injury will cause the death of
the victim; this is not so in the second case.

Culpable homicide—Meaning.—The Penal Code has first defined culpable homicide

simpliciter (section 299, l.P.C.) termed as manslaughter under English law which is the
genus, and then murder (section 300, I.P.C.) which is a species of culpable homicide.
The residuary of culpable homicide after the special characteristics of murder have been
removed from it, is culpable homicide not amounting to murder (Section 300,
Exceptions I to 5).
Culpable homicide may broadly be classified into two classes:—
(i) Culpable homicide amounting to murder ( section 300), and
(ii) culpable homicide not amounting to murder2 (section 300, Exceptions 1 to 5).
As explained by Shuarfuddin, J., in Reaz-ud-din Shaikh v. Emperor,
All murder is culpable homicide, but all culpable homicide is not murder. Subject to the
five exceptions to section 300, Indian Penal Code every act that falls within one or more
of the four clauses of that section is murder, and also falls within the definition of
culpable homicide in section 299, Indian Penal Code. Every act which falls within any
one or more of the four clauses of section 300, Indian Penal Code in respect of which
there co-exist one or more of the sets of circumstances described in the five exceptions
of that section is, by that fact taken out of section 300, Indian Penal Code but the act not
withstanding continues to be within section 299, and since it is not murder, it is
culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Every act that falls within section 299 and
does not fall within section 300, since it is not murder, is culpable homicide not
amounting to murder.
For the purpose of fixing punishment proportionate to the gravity of this generic
offence, the Code has recognized three degrees of culpable homicide, These are:—
(i) Culpable homicide of the first degree, which is the gravest form of culpable
homicide and is termed ‘murder’. It is defined in section 300 and punishable under
section 302 with death or imprisonment for life to either of which fine may be added.
(ii) Culpable homicide of the second degree (culpable homicide not amounting to
murder) as defined in section 300. Exceptions 1 to 5 and section 299, clauses (i) and (ii)
is punishable under section 304 (First part) with imprisonment for life or imprisonment
of either description for a term which may extend to 10 years, to either of which fine
may be added.
(iii) Culpable homicide of the third degree, which is defined in section 299, clause (iii)
and is punishable under the latter part of section 304 with fine only or with
imprisonment up to a limit of ten years or with both.

Culpable homicide—Meaning.—The Penal Code has first defined culpable homicide

simpliciter (section 299, l.P.C.) termed as manslaughter under English law which is the
genus, and then murder (section 300, I.P.C.) which is a species of culpable homicide.
The residuary of culpable homicide after the special characteristics of murder have been
removed from it, is culpable homicide not amounting to murder (Section 300,
Exceptions I to 5).
Culpable homicide may broadly be classified into two classes:—
(i) Culpable homicide amounting to murder ( section 300), and
(ii) culpable homicide not amounting to murder2 (section 300, Exceptions 1 to 5).

For the purpose of fixing punishment proportionate to the gravity of this generic
offence, the Code has recognized three degrees of culpable homicide, These are:—
(i) Culpable homicide of the first degree, which is the gravest form of culpable
homicide and is termed ‘murder’. It is defined in section 300 and punishable under
section 302 with death or imprisonment for life to either of which fine may be added.
(ii) Culpable homicide of the second degree (culpable homicide not amounting to
murder) as defined in section 300. Exceptions 1 to 5 and section 299, clauses (i) and (ii)
is punishable under section 304 (First part) with imprisonment for life or imprisonment
of either description for a term which may extend to 10 years, to either of which fine
may be added.
(iii) Culpable homicide of the third degree, which is defined in section 299, clause (iii)
and is punishable under the latter part of section 304 with fine only or with
imprisonment up to a limit of ten years or with both.

Essential ingredients of C.H :- (a) Causing of death,

(b) by doing an act,
(c) the act of causing death must be done:—
(i) with the intention of causing death,
(ii) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or
(iii) with the knowledge that such act is likely to cause death.
Thus though an act may cause death, it will not amount to culpable homicide unless the
above conditions are satisfied.’
A. Causing death.—In order to hold a person liable under the impugned section there
must be causing of death of a human being as defined under Section 46. ( The word
"death" denotes the death of a human being unless the contrary appears from the
context). The causing of death of a child in the mother’s womb is not homicide as stated
in Explanation 3

The causing of the death of child in the mother's womb is not homicide. But it may
amount to culpable homicide to cause the death of a living child, if any part of that
child has been brought forth, though the child may not have breathed or been
completely born.

appended to section 299, I.P.C. But the person would not be set free. He would be
punishable for causing miscarriage either under section 312 or 315, I.P.C depending on
the gravity of the injury. The act of causing death amounts to culpable homicide if any
part of that child has been brought forth, though the child may not have breathed or
been completely born. The clause ‘though the child may not have breathed’ suggests
that a child may be born alive, though it may not breath (respire), or it may respire so
imperfectly that it may be difficult to obtain clear proof that respiration has taken place.
Causing of death must be of a living human being which means a living man, woman,
child and at least partially an infant under delivery or just delivered.
Death caused of person other than intended.—To attract the provisions of this section it
suffices if the death of a human being is caused whether the person was intended to be
killed or not. For instance, A counsels B to poison his mother. B accordingly obtains
poison from A and gives it to his mother in a roasted apple. The mother gives the apple
to a child of B, not knowing it contains poison, and the child eats it and dies. The act of
A amounts to murder by B, though he never intended to kill the child (section 301,
1.P.C.). Similarly, illustration (a) to section 299 says that a person can be guilty of
culpable homicide by causing the death of a person whose death he did not intend.

B. By doing an Act.—Death may be caused by a hundred and one means, such as by

poisoning, drowning, striking, beating and so on and so forth. As explained under
section 32, I.P.C. the word ‘act’ has been given a wider meaning in the Code inasmuch
as it includes not only an act of commission, but illegal omissions as well. Hence, death
may also be caused by neglect of duty, such as a parent not supplying food and medical
care to his child, a husband starving his wife,’ that results in the voluntary causing of
the child’s and wife’s death. For instances, where a Life Guard on Swimming poll, not
following his duty and that’s caused death of person.

Death caused by effect of words.—There may be instances whereby death can be

caused by the effect of words in the particular circumstances of a case or as resulted
into nervous shock which cause death. In such a situation the accused will be liable to
the same extent as in the case of a physical assault causing death. For example, in the
reasonable course, is to consider speaking as an act, and in that a loud sound by
suddenly awake the old age person or can cause a heart attack intentionally will
amounting to Offence of culpable homicide
Death caused inadvertently without intention while doing an Unlawful Act— The Penal
Code has made it clear in illustration (c) attached to section 299, I.P.C. that a person
will not be liable for culpable homicide, if he causes the death of a person while doing
an unlawful act, provided he did not intend to kill or cause death by doing an act that he
knew was likely to have that effect. For instance, if A while shooting at a fowl with the
intent to kill and steal it, kills B, who is behind a bush, A is not liable for B’s death.
When an act is in itself innocent, to punish the person who does it because of bad
consequence, which no human wisdom could have foreseen, it would be in the highest
degree barbarous and absurd. Thus, when a person engaged in the commission of an
offence causes the death of another person by pure accident, he shall suffer only the
punishment of his offence, no addition on account of such accidental death. A, a
pickpocket attempts to take out purse of B, while B, was boarding a train. B has a
loaded pistol in his pocket. As soon as the thief puts his hand into B’s pocket, the pistol
goes off and B is shot dead. The thief will be liable for attempt to pick pocketing
(stealing purse) and not for murder or culpable homicide. The death of B is purely on
account of an accident or misfortune for which thief is not accountable

Intention—. The intension means expectation of consequence in question. Intention is

a question of fact which is to be gathered from the acts of the parties (viz. nature of the
weapon used, the part of the body on which the blow was given, the force and number
of blows, etc.). The legal maxim is that everyone must be presumed to intend the
normal consequences of his act. Intention does not imply assume the, existence f some
previous design, it means an actual intention, the existing intention of the moment. Thus
a deliberate firing by a loaded gun at once leads to inference that the intention was to
cause death. The existence of intention is not to be inferred unless death follows as a
natural and probable consequence from the act

An intention also includes foresight of certainty. A

consequence is deemed to be intended though it is not desired when it is foreseen as
substantially certain. Intention of causing death is not the intention of causing the ‘death
of any particular person. Illustration (a) to this section shows that a person can be guilty
of culpable homicide of a person whose death he did not intend .

With the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death - It means
an intention to cause a particular injury, which injury is, or turns out to be, one likely to
cause death. Thus, where bodily injury sufficient to cause death is actually caused, it is
immaterial to go into the question of whether the accused had intention to cause death.
The connection between the ‘act’ and the death caused by the act must he direct and
distinct; and though not immediate it must not be too remote. If the connection between
the act and death is obscure or if it is obscured by concurrent causes, ‘or if it is broken
by the intervention of the subsequent causes, or if the time gap between the act and the
death is too long, the above condition is not fulfilled.

The difference between the two

expressions ‘intention of causing death’ and ‘intention of causing such bodily injury as
is likely to cause death’ is a difference of degrees in criminality. The latter is a lower
degree of criminality than the former. But as, in both the cases, the object is the same,
the law does not make any distinction in punishment.
The expression ‘intention to cause such bodily
injury as is likely to cause death’ merely means an intention to cause a particular injury,
which injury is, or turns out to be. one likely to cause death. It is not the death itself
which is intended, nor the effect of injury. It is not necessary that the consequences., of
the injury are foreseen.

With the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death - Knowledge in
comparison to intention is strong word-and imports a certainty and not means a
probability. Knowledge is an awareness of the consequences of the act. A person who
voluntarily inflicts injury such as to endanger life must always, except in the most
extraordinary circumstances, be taken to know that he is likely to cause death (e.g. when
the accused fired his gun in the air to scare away the opposite party and in the act one
stray pellet caused gunshot wound to a person killing him). The word ‘knowledge’
includes all cases of rash acts by which death is caused, for rashness’ imports a
knowledge of the likely result of an act which the actor does in spite of the risk. in some
cases, gross negligence may amount to knowledge. For example, where The accused
kills a person by hitting him under the belief that he was hitting at a ghost.
Section 300. Murder

Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by
which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or-

2ndly:- If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender
knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or-

3rdly:- If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the
bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death, or-

4thly:- If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it
must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and
commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such
injury as aforesaid.
Clause (1) Intention of Causing Death:- As of C.H

Clause 2—With the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender know be
likely to cause death.—In case of an offence falling under this clause the mental attitude
of the accused is two-fold. First, there is intention to cause bodily harm and secondly,
there is the subjective knowledge that death ,will be the likely consequence of the
intended injury. Here the offender knows that bodily injury intended to be inflicted is
likely to cause death of the person. It applies to those special cases where the person
injured is in such a condition or state of health that his death would be likely to be
caused by an injury which would not ordinarily cause the death of a person in sound
health and where the person inflicting the injury knows that owing to such condition or
state of health, he is likely to cause the death of the person injured. A case would fall
under this clause if the offender, having knowledge that a person was suffering from
some disease or was of unsound health, causes hurt to him which may not have been
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death had the deceased been of
sound health, but which with the special knowledge of the diseased condition of the
deceased, his assailant must have known to be likely to cause his death. Here
knowledge on the part of the offender imports certainty and not merely a probability.

Clause 3.”Injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause. death”.—

Where a man intentionally inflicts bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course
of nature to cause death, he would be liable for murder. If the probability of death ‘is
very great then the requirement of third clause are satisfied and the fact that a particular
individual may because of specially ski1led treatment or being in possession of a
particularly strong constitution have survived an injury, which would prove fatal to the
majority of persons subjected to it, is not enough to prove that such an injury is not
“sufficient in the ordinary course of nature” to cause death.

Virsa Singh vs. State of Punjab AIR 1958 SC 465

Facts: The appellant was allegedly guilty of the murder of one Khem Singh. There was
only one injury on his person, which was a result of a spear thrust. The doctor said that
the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
Medical Report: The injury was a punctured wound 2- x transverse in direction on the
left side of the abdominal wall in the lower part of the iliac region just above the
inguinal canal. Three coils of intestine were also coming out.The appellant was
convicted by the first court under section 302 IPC and his conviction was upheld by the
High Court. He was granted special leave to the Supreme Court on the following:

Issue: On the finding of High Court what offence is made out as having been
committed by the petitioner

The court gave a four-point test which prosecution must observe and prove in order to
bring the case under this section:

i) First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present;

ii) Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved; These are purely objective
investigations.

iii) Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily
injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind
of injury was intended. Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry
proceeds further and,

iv) Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the
three elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.
This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with
the intention of the offender.

Once these four elements are established by the prosecution (and, of course, the burden
is on the prosecution throughout) the offence is murder under s. 300, thirdly.

This four point test is applied in many such subsequent cases . It is mainly after this
judgment that clear guidelines were provided for the application of this section. These
observations of Vivian Bose, J. have become locus classicus. Under clause thirdly of
Section 300 IPC, culpable homicide is murder, if both the following conditions are
satisfied: i.e. (a) that the act which causes death is done with the intention of causing
death or is done with the intention of causing a bodily injury; and (b) that the injury
intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. It
must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury which,
in the ordinary course of nature, was sufficient to cause death, viz. that the injury found
to be present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted.

The intent requirement

The ingredient 'intention' in that Clause is very important and that gives a clue in a
given case whether offence involved is murder or not . Supreme Court also discussed
the intent element required for this section in great detail. The argument that
prosecution must prove an intention to inflict only that kind of injury that was sufficient
to cause death in the ordinary course of nature was found to be fallacious by the court.
It was argued that the intention that the section requires must be related, not only to the
bodily injury inflicted, but also to the clause, "and the bodily injury intended to be
inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.? Court totally
disagreed with such an argument calling it to be a fallacious argument. According to the
rule laid down in Virsa Singh's case, even if the intention of accused was limited to the
infliction of a bodily injury sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature,
and did not extend to the intention of causing death, the offence would be murder.
Illustration (c) appended to Section 300 clearly brings out this point.

The court read the clause 3 of section 300 of IPC disjunctively and separating intention
being read as linked to the second part in the following way::- If there is an intention to
inflict an injury that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, then the
intention is to kill and in that event, the "thirdly" would be unnecessary because the act
would fall under the first part of the section, namely - "If the act by which the death is
caused is done with the intention of causing death."

In our opinion, the two clauses are disjunctive and separate. The first is subjective to the
offender: "If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person." It
must, of course, first be found that bodily injury was caused and the nature of the injury
must be established. These are purely objective facts and leave no room for inference or
deduction and to that extent the enquiry is objective; but when it comes to the question
of intention, that is subjective to the offender and it must be proved that he had an
intention to cause the bodily injury that is found to be present.
Once that is found, the enquiry shifts to the next clause - "and the bodily injury intended
to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death." The first
part of this is descriptive of the earlier part of the section.

So the crux is that what needs to be proved is not that the accused had an intention to
inflict the injury that was sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature but that
he had an intention to cause the same bodily injury that is found to be present on the
body of the deceased. Then it is the later part of the enquiry which is objective in nature
to find out that whether the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death or not. Thus, intention is only linked up and is restricted to the causing of
the bodily injury and not to the knowledge or intention of causing such bodily injury
that is sufficient to cause bodily injury that is sufficient to cause death in ordinary
course of nature. What needs to be proved is that the accused had an intention to cause
the same bodily injury found to be present on the person of deceased which was later
found to be sufficient to cause death. Such a principle is based on broad lines of
common sense because if intention is considered to be of causing an injury which is
sufficient to cause death; then any person could always plead that he never had an
intention to cause such a injury and it would have been very difficult to prove him
wrong.

Once these four elements are established by the prosecution the offence is
murder under s. 300, thirdly. It does not matter that there was no intention to cause
death. It does not matter that there was no intention even to cause an injury of a kind
that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. It does not even matter
that there is no knowledge that an act of that kind will be likely to cause death. Once the
intention to cause the bodily injury actually found to be proved, the rest of the enquiry
is purely objective and the only question is whether, as a matter of purely objective
inference, the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. No one
has a license to run around inflicting injuries that are sufficient to cause death in the
ordinary course of nature and claim that they are not guilty of murder. If they inflict
injuries of that kind, they must face the consequences; and they can only escape if it can
be shown, or reasonably deduced that the injury was accidental or otherwise
unintentional.

Clause 4—Knowledge of imminently dangerous act.—This clause comprehends

generally the commission of imminently dangerous acts which must in all probability
cause death or cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. When such an act is
done with the knowledge that death might be the probable result and without any
excuse for including the risk of causing death or injury as is likely to cause death, the
offence is murder, This clause applies to cases of dangerous action without an intention
to cause specific bodily injury to any person, e.g., furious driving or firing at a target
near the public road.’ However, the act done must be accompanied with the knowledge
that the act was so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause (i) death,
or (ii) such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Further, the accused must have
committed the act without any excuse for incurring the risk of (a) causing death or (b)
such injury as is likely to cause death. Thus a man who strikes another in the throat with
a knife, must be taken to know that he is doing an act imminently dangerous to the life
of the person at whom he strikes and that a probable result of his act will be to cause
that person’s death.

Difference B/W Culpable Homicide and Murder:- According to Sir James Stephen
the definition of culpable homicide and murder are the weakest part of the Code, as they
are defined in forms closely resembling each other and at times it becomes difficult to
distinguish between the two, ‘as the causing of death’ is common to both. Further, there
must necessarily be criminal intention or knowledge in both culpable homicide and
murder. However, the difference between culpable homicide and murder is real though
very fine and based upon a very subtle distinction of the intention and knowledge
involved in these crimes. The true difference lies in the degree, there being the greater
intention or knowledge of the fatal consequences in the one case than the other. The
four cases describing the offence under section 300, I.P.C. attempt to explain this
difference.

In the scheme of the IPC culpable homicide is

genus and 'murder' its specie. All 'murder' is 'culpable homicide' but not vice-versa.
Speaking generally, 'culpable homicide' sans 'special characteristics of murder is
culpable homicide not amounting to murder'. For the purpose of fixing punishment,
proportionate to the gravity of the generic offence, the IPC practically recognizes three
degrees of culpable homicide. The first is, what may be called, 'culpable homicide of
the first degree'. This is the greatest form of culpable homicide, which is defined in
Section 300 as 'murder'. The second may be termed as 'culpable homicide of the second
degree'. This is punishable under the first part of Section 304. Then, there is 'culpable
homicide of the third degree'. This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and the
punishment provided for it is, also the lowest among the punishments provided for the
three grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable under the second part of
Section 304. The academic distinction between 'murder' and 'culpable homicide not
amounting to murder' has always vexed the Courts. The confusion is caused, if Courts
losing sight of the true scope and meaning of the terms used by the legislature in these
sections, allow themselves to be drawn into minute abstractions. The safest way of
approach to the interpretation and application of these provisions seems to be to keep in
focus the keywords used in the various clauses of Sections 299 and 300, the following
comparative table will be helpful in appreciating the points of distinction between the
two offences.

Culpable Homicide section 299 Murder Section 300

. A. With the intention of causing (1) With the intention of causing

death; death;

B. with the intention of causing (2) With the intention of causing

bodily injury as is likely to cause such bodily
death injury as the offender knows to be
likely to cause
the death of the person to whom the
harm is
caused;

3. If it is done with the intention of

causing bodily injury to any person
and the bodily injury intended to be
inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death, or-

c. with the knowledge that the act is 4. If the person committing the act
likely to cause death knows that it is so imminently
dangerous that it must, in all
probability, cause death or such
bodily injury as is likely to cause
death, and commits such act without
 any excuse for incurring the risk of
causing death or such injury as
aforesaid.

Reg Versus govinda:-

(i) Death caused intentionally: Murder: Clause (a) to section 299 I.P.C. and
clause (1) to section 300, LP.C. show that where there is an intention to kill,
the offence is always murder. [Illustration (a) to section 300(1).

(ii) Injury caused resulting in death knowing the peculiar conditions of the victim
— Murder: Clause (2) to section 300: The essence of clause (2) to section
300, I.P.C. is found in the italicized words. The offence is murder, if the
offender knows that the particular person injured is likely, either from
peculiarity of constitution, or immature age or other special circumstances
could be killed by an injury which would not ordinarily cause death. As given
in Illustration (b) to section 300, where A knowingly with intention of causing
death strikes Z, who is labouring under such a disease that a blow is likely to
cause his death, and Z dies in consequence of the blow, A is guilty of murder,
although the blow might not have been sufficient in the ordinary course of
nature to cause the death of a person in a sound state of health.

(iii) Risk to human life resulting in Death (a) if death likely result—Culpable
homicide (b) if ostjrbablyj1t—Murder: Clause (c) to section 299, I.P.C. and
clause (4) to section 300, I.P.C.: Clause (c) to section 299, I.P.C. and clause
(4) to section 300, I.P.C. is intended to apply to cases in which there is no
intention to cause death, nevertheless death has resulted. In such a case
whether the offence is culpable homicide or murder depends upon degree of
risk to human life. If death is a likely result, it is culpable homicide
[Illustration (b) to 299]; if it is the most probable result, it is murder
[Illustration (d) to 3001. For example, death caused as a result of furious
driving will be culpable homicide; whereas death caused as a result of firing at
a mark near a public road would be a case of murder under section 300, I.P.C.
 (Abdul waheed khan V/s state of Andhra Pradesh)

(iv) Injury likely to cause death—Culpable homicide: and Injury sufficient in

the ordinary course of nature to cause death—Murder clause (b) to section
299 and clause (iii) to section 300: It is on a comparison of clause (b) to
section 299 and clause (iii) to section 300 that the decision of doubtful cases
like the present must generally depend. It is culpable homicide if the bodily
injury intended is likely to cause death; it is murder, if such injury is sufficient
in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The word ‘likely’ means
‘probably’. When the chances of the happening of a thing are fifty-fifty, it
may be said that the thing may ‘probably happen’; when the chances of its
happening are almost certain, it is said that it will ‘most probably happen’.
Sufficiency is the high probability of death in the ordinary course of nature
and when this exists and death ensues and the causing of such injury is
intended, the offence is murder. Sometimes the nature of the weapon used,
sometimes the part of the body on which the injury is caused, and sometimes
both are relevant. The determining factor is the international injury which
must be sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. If the
intended injury cannot be said to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature
to cause death, that is to say, the probability of death is not so high, the
offence does not fall within the definition of murder but Culpable homicide
not amounting to murder or something less.( Virsa Singh V/s state of
Punjab) and (jagriti Devi V/s State of Himachal Pardesh )

(v) Distinction between section 299(c) and section 300 clause (4); Relate to the
Degree
of knowledge of the consequences.—The Code contemplates in clause (c) to
section 299,
I.P.C. and clause (4) to section 300, I.P.C. as to when an act is culpable
homicide and murder by reason of the act being done with the knowledge
described in the respective clauses. The knowledge used in clause (c) to
section 299, I.P.C., and clause (4) to section 300, I.P.C. refers to personal
knowledge. The difference between the two clauses relate to the words: (i)
‘likely to cause death’ in section 299 clause (c); and (ii) ‘must in all
probability cause death.’ (under section 300, clause (4).
The fourth clause to section 300 contemplates the doing of an imminently
 dangerous act in general and not the doing of any bodily harm to any
particular individual. It is designed to provide for rarest of rare cases wherein
the accused puts, in jeopardy lives of many persons as envisaged in
illustration (d) to section 300, I.P.C. and the like. This clause is usually
invoked in those cases where there is no intention to cause death of any
particular person, but the act is done with such callousness towards the result
and the risk taken is such that it may be stated that the person knows that the
act is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death, or
such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. For example, where death is
caused by firing a loaded gun into a crowd [vide lllustratiod7], or by
poisoning a well from which people are accustomed to draw water, or by
opening the grid of a bridge just as a railway passenger train is about to pass
over it. In such and like cases, the imminently dangerous act, the extreme
depravity of mind regardless ness of sanctity of human life, and property that
place the crime upon the same level as the taking of life by intention.(
William Slaney case)

Knowledge v. Intention:- The distinction between knowledge and intention.

Knowledge in the context of Section 299 would, inter alia, mean consciousness
or realization or understanding. The distinction between the terms 'knowledge'
and 'intention' again is a difference of degrees. An inference of knowledge that it
is likely to cause death must be arrived at keeping in view the fact situation
obtaining in each case. The accused must be aware of the consequences of his
act. Knowledge denotes a bare state of conscious awareness of certain facts in
which the human mind might itself remain supine or inactive whereas intention
connotes a conscious state in which mental faculties are roused into activity and
summed up into action for the deliberate purpose of being directed towards a
particular and specific end which the human mind conceives and perceives
before itself. 'intention' is different from 'motive' or 'ignorance' or' negligence'.
It is the 'knowledge' or 'intention' with which the act is done that makes
difference, in arriving at a conclusion whether the offence is culpable homicide
or murder. Therefore, it is necessary to know the meaning of these expressions
as used in these provisions. The 'intention' and 'knowledge' of the accused are
subjective and invisible states of mind and their existence has to be gathered
from the circumstances, such as the, weapon used, the ferocity of attack,
multiplicity of injuries and all other surrounding circumstances. The framers of
the code designedly used the words 'intention' and 'knowledge' and it is
accepted that the knowledge of the consequences which may result in doing an
act is not the same thing as the intention that such consequences should ensue.
Firstly, when an act is done by a person, it is presumed that he must have been
aware that certain specified harmful consequences would or could follow. But
that knowledge is bare awareness and not the same thing as intention that such
consequences should ensue. As compared to 'knowledge', 'intention' requires
something more than the mere foresight of the consequences, namely the
purposeful doing of a thing to achieve a particular end."

Kesar singh versus state of Haryana Air 2008 SC

Culpable Homicide Not Amounting to Murder:-

As stated earlier, section 300, I.P.C. after laying down the cases in which culpable
homicide becomes murder, states certain exceptional situations under which, if murder
is committed, it is reduced to culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable
under section 304, I.P.C. and not under section 302, I.P.C. The exceptions are:—
(1) Grave and Sudden Provocation;
(2) Private Defence;
(3) Exercise of Legal Power;
(4) Without Premeditation in a sudden fight; and
(5) Consent.
In general the onus of proving the guilt of the accused
always rests upon the prosecution. But the burden of proving the existence of
circumstances bringing the case within an exception under section 300, I.P.C. (as .in
case of general exceptions) lies upon the accused.

Exception I: Provocation is some act, or series of acts, done by the dead man to the
accused which would cause in any reasonable person, and actually causes in the
accused, a sudden and temporary loss of self-control, rendering the accused so subject
to passion as to make him or her for the moment not master of his mind..

The test of grave and sudden provocation is

(i) Whether a reasonable man, belonging, to the same class of society as the accused,
placed in the situation in which the accused was placed would be provoked as to lose
his self-control.

(ii) In certain circumstances words and gestures may also cause grave and sudden
provocation.

(iii) The mental background created by the previous act of the victim may be taken into
consideration in ascertaining whether the subsequent act caused grave and sudden
provocation, for committing the offence.

(iv) The fatal blow should be clearly traced to the influence of passion arising from that
provocation and not after the passion had cooled down by lapse of time, or otherwise
giving room and scope for premeditation and calculation.

It may he stated that the defence of provocation is further limited by the following three
provisos. That is to say, the Exception is not available:—
(i) If the accused courts (gives) provocation or uses it as an excuse for assaulting
another; or
(ii) If the act is legally done by a public servant in the exercise of his legal right as a
public servant; or
(iii) If the act is done in the exercise of the right of private defence.

Grave and Sudden Provocation—Meaning.—: what amounts to grave and sudden

provocation, in consequence of which the accused is deprived of his power of self-
control which will entitle him to the benefit of the exception, is still undefined in IPC
and even court cant succeed to answer it completely ,and it changes from facts to facts
and circumstances to circumstances,
The answer to this depends on a number of factors and is mainly a question of fact to be
decided according to the facts and circumstances of each case. It is not all provocation
that will reduce the crime of murder to manslaughter (culpable homicide) Provocation,
to have that result, must be such as temporarily deprives the person provoked of the
power of self-control, as the result of which he commits the unlawful act which causes
death.
The test to be applied is
that of the effect of the provocation on a reasonable man, as was laid down by the Court
of Criminal Appeal in Rex v. Lesbini,3 so that an unusually excitable or pugnacious
individual is not entitled to rely on provocation which would not have led an ordinary
person to act as he did. In applying the test, it is of particular importance to:
(a) consider whether a sufficient interval has elapsed since the provocation to allow a
reasonable man time to cool, and
(b) take into account the instrument with which the homicide was effected.

Holmes v. Director of Public Prosecutions explained the rationale behind the doctrine
in the following words:—
The whole doctrine relating to provocation depends on the fact that it causes, or may
cause, a sudden and temporary loss of self-control, whereby malice, which is the
formation of an intention to kill or to inflict grievous bodily harm, is negatived.
Consequently, where the provocation inspires an actual intention to kill.... or to inflict
grievous bodily harm, the doctrine that provocation may reduce murder to manslaughter
seldom applies.’

Reasonable man’s — Test :- The Supreme Court in KM. Nanavati v. State of

Maharashtra, has extensively discussed the law relating to provocation in India and
observed that—
(1) The test of ‘grave and sudden provocation’ is whether a reasonable man, belonging
to the same class of society as the accused, placed in the situation in which the accused
was placed, would be so provoked as to lose his self-control.
(2) In India, words and gestures may also under certain circumstances, cause grave and
sudden provocation to an accused so as to bring his act within the first exception to
section 300 of the Indian Penal Code.
(3) The mental background created by the previous act of the victim may be taken into
consideration in ascertaining whether the subsequent act caused grave and sudden
provocation for committing the offence; and
(4) The fatal blow should be clearly traced to the influence of passion arising from that
provocation and not after the passion has cooled down by lapse of time, or otherwise
giving the accused room and scope for premeditation and calculation.

The Court further said: What a reasonable man will do in certain

circumstances depends upon the customs, manners, way of life, traditional values, etc.,
in short, the cultural, social and emotional background of the society to which an
accused belongs. In our vast country there are social groups ranging from the lowest to
the highest state of civilization. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any
standard with precision; it is for the court to decide in each case, having regard to the
relevant circumstances.

Muthu: The Supreme Court in Muthu v. State of Tamil Nadu,2 on 5th November, 2007
held that constant harassment may lead to deprivation of the power of self control
amounting to grave and sudden provocation. The accused Muthu angered by a rag
picker Shiva’s daily habit of throwing waste into his shop, took ouL a knife and stabbed
him to death. Differentiating between a pre-planned crime and a crime resulting from a
fit of rage the court said this was not a murder but C.H not amounting to murder.

Words and Acts amounting to provocation.—It is important to note that Indian courts
have not maintained the distinction between words and acts in the application of the
doctrine of provocation, The cases in which the defence of provocation are placed may
be considered from two angles, namely:—
(1) Whether words or gestures unaccompanied by acts can amount to provocation; and
(2) What is the effect of the time lag between the act of provocation and the
commission of the offence.

Offender deprived of his power of self-control--It must be shown distinctly that the
act was done while the person doing it was deprived of the power of self-control. It
must have been done under immediate impulse of the provocation. It must be of such a
nature as deprives a reasonable man of his. power of self-control. The power of self-
control should not have been lost as a result of anger or other emotion. The provocation
must be such as will upset not merely a hasty and hot-tempered or hyper-sensitive
person but one of ordinary sense and calmness.4 It must be shown not only that the act
was done under the influence of some feeling which took away from the person doing it
all control over his actions, but also that the ‘feeling had an adequate cause. If it appears
that the party, before any provocation is given, intended to use a deadly weapon
towards anyone who might assault him this would show that a fatal blow given
afterwards was not to be attributed to the provocation and the liability would be for
murder. However the mode of resentment must bear a reasonable relationship to the
provocation.

Exceptions:- First Proviso.—This proviso requires that ,provocation must not have been
sought by the accused, instead provocation must come to him. In a case the accused was
told one night that his sister and her paramour were together in a... He knew of their
intimacy for a long time. On getting the above
information he broke into that house with an axe and killed both of them. He was held
liable for murder because the provocation was not sudden and it had also been sought
by the accused.’ Provocation is an external stimulus which must be looked at as such.
Grave and sudden provocation does not arise merely by use of the defamatory words.-
Second proviso.—It is clear from second proviso that f the act is legal, any opposition
to it would be illegal/ —
Third Proviso.—Provocation is! not given by anything done in the lawful exercise of
the right of private defence. For example, if a person forcibly seizes a thief and confines
him till the arrival’ of police, the thief here cannot complain of any inconvenience that
he suffers.

Exceeding the Right of Private Defence.—Exception 2 deals with those cases

wherein a person exceeds the right of private defence. If the excess is intentional, the
offence is murder, if unintentional, it is culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
That is to say, this exception would apply, if the accused caused the death of a person
without premeditation and that, when the accused caused the death of the deceased, he
had no intention of causing more harm than was necessary for the purpose of defence
(even if he caused more harm than was necessary for the purpose of private defence),
and that the act was done in good faith.. The following conditions must be fulfilled :-

1.Act must be done is exercise of right of private defence of person or property.

(2) Act must have been done in good faith. /
(3) The person doing the act must have £exceeded his right given to him by law and
have thereby caused death.
(4) Act must have been done without premeditation and without any intention of
causing more harm than was necessary in self-defence.
The law contained in this exception is based on the rule that in a case in which the law
itself empowers an individual to inflict any harm short of death, it ought hardly to visit
him with the highest punishment if he inflicts death

Kashi ram and Others V/s state of Rajasthan AIR 2008 Supreme court.

Exception III: Public servant exceeding his powers.—This exception has been
provided to protect a public servant or a person aiding a public servant, if either of
them exceeds the power given for the advancement of public justice. The exception
clause will not apply if the act is illegal or against public policy and not authorised by
law, or the person glaringly exceeds the power given to him by law. the following
conditions must be fulfilled
(1) Offence committed by a public servant, or by some other person acting in the aid of
such public servant, in the advancement of public justice.
(2) Public servant or such other person exceeds the powers given to him by law. c—
(3) Death is caused by doing an act which he in good faith believes to be lawful and
necessary for the discharge of his duty as such public servant. ,_—‘
(4)’ The act must have been done without any ill-will towards the person whose death is
caused. L_—
This exception shall not apply where the act of a public servant is illegal and
unauthorized by law or if he glaringly exceeds the powers entrusted to him by law.

In Dukhi Singh v. State, the appellant, a constable of the RPF (Railway Protection
Force), while on duty arrested a man under suspicious circumstances, who was standing
near a goods wagon while the train had stopped at Hadida Khas Station near Allahabad,
and took him to his compartment. When the train had moved a few paces, the arrested
man jumped down from it. As’ soon as he escaped the appellant followed him with a
rifle. Suspecting that the train fireman had concealed th thief he enquired from the
fireman where the culprit was and further said that he would shoot him. The fireman
asked the appellant why he would shoot the thief, whereupon the appellant shot him
with his rifle. The fireman later died.
The appellant pleaded that he had been given orders, by Havildar Kashi Singh to shoot
at the thief and further contended that it was a case of pure accident that instead of
hitting the thief he hit the fireman. Held that, in effecting his arrest after the escape the
police officer had not had the right to cause the death of the suspected thief. Further
held, that the appellant exceeded the powers given to him by law, and he caused the
death of the fireman by doing an act

Exception IV: Sudden fight—Meaning.--—This exception applies to cases wherein

death is caused in a sudden fight without premeditation in the heat of passion upon a
sudden quarrel; so long as the fight is unpremeditated and sudden, the accused,
irrespective of his conduct before the quarrel, earns the mitigation provided for in
Exception 4 to section 300, I.P.C. subject to the condition that he did not in the course
of the fight take undue advantage of or act in a cruel or unusual manner.1
Essential ingredients.—To invoke the benefit of this clause, death must be caused:
(i) in a sudden fight;
(ii) in the heat of passion without premeditation, arising out of sudden quarrel;
(iii) without the offenders having taken undue advantage;
(iv) the offender should not act in a cruel or unusual manner; and
(v) the fight must have been with the person killed.

(i) Sudden Fight.—The most important element under this clause is that there should be
a sudden fight. The word ‘fight’ has not been defined in the Code. In ordinary parlance
the word ‘fight’ means a combat between two or more persons, whether with or without
weapons. But a mere verbal exchange of words preceding a stab with a knife will not
invoke the application of Exception 4 to section 300, I.P.C. Similarly, when the accused
had beaten the son of the deceased in a quarrel and the deceased came to scold him and
was struck dead, it was held that there was no fight and the act of the accused did not
fall under Exception 4 to section 300, l.P.C.

(ii) Death caused in the heat of Passion without Premeditation:- Suraj mal V/s U.T.
chandigarh it was held that when injury is caused resulting in death in a sudden fight
without premeditations and in the heat of passion and no undue advantage was taken by
the accused, nor had he acted in a cruel manner the case would fall under Exception 4 to
section 300, I.P.C. punishable under section 304, I.P.C., Part I.
(iii) Without taking any undue advantage: In Man/ce Rem v. State of Haniana) the
appellant who was a police inspector invited his subordinate, the deceased, to a drink in
his room. When they were drinking the nephew of the deceased came to the room and
called him for dinner. As the deceased got up to go the appellant got annoyed and
hurled abuses on the deceased in filthy language to which the deceased objected. This
further infuriated the appellant and a fight ensued between the two. The appellant
picked up his service revolver which was kept nearby and fired two shots at the
deceased causing his death. The appellant was convicted under section 302, I.P.C. and
awarded life imprisonment by the trial court which was confirmed by the High Court.
Accepting the appellant’s contention that it was because of the sudden provocation in
the heat of passion that the fight started and the deceased was killed. The Supreme
Court held that since both the persons were inebriated there was every possibility that
their action was beyond their control. Accordingly, considering the totality of the
factual matrix, the Court held that the appellant was entitled to the benefit of Exception
4 to section 300 because the incident took place in heat of passion.

(iv)Cruel and Unusual Manner: In Ghapoo Yadav v. State of Madhya Pradesl the
apex Court held that dispute having been arisen without premeditation in a sudden fight
upon a Sudden quarrel between the two groups, the infliction of injuries and their nature
proved the intention of the accused appellant but the manner of causing of such injuries
could not be termed either as cruel or unusual. It was found that only one injury out of
seven was of grievous nature which was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death of the deceased. The accused appellant had not come prepared and armed
for attacking the deceased. It was noticed that in the heat of passion upon a sudden
quarrel followed by a fight the accused had caused injuries on the deceased, but had not
acted in a cruel or unusual manner. The Court accordingly gave the benefit of Exception
4 to section 300, l.P.C. to the accused-appellant reducing his criminality to section 304,
Part I, I.P.C. and custodial sentence of 10 years was imposed in place of life
imprisonment.

Exception V: Consent.—The last exception to section 300, I.P.C. deals with causing
death by consent which is commonly known as euthanasia (mercy killing). The
exception is justified on the ground that a man’s life is not only valuable to himself, but
also to the family members, state and society. A man is therefore not entitled to give up
his life by consent; though consent has unquestionably the effect of mitigating the
intensity of crime, it can never exonerate the offender. For instance: The motives which
prompt men to the commission of this offence are generally for more respectable than
those which prompt men to the commission of murder. Sometimes it is the effect of a
strong sense of religious duty, sometimes of a strong sense of honour, not infrequently
of humanity. The soldier who, at the entreaty of a wounded comrade, puts that comrade
out of pain, the friend who supplies laudanum (sedative) to a person suffering the
torment of a lingering disease, the freedman who in ancient times held out the sword
that his master might fall on it, the highborn native of India who stabs the females of his
family at their own entreaty in order to save them from the licentiousness of a band of
marauders, would, ... scarcely be thought culpable