Error in Personae (Cases)
Error in Personae (Cases)
Error in Personae (Cases)
plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
accused-appellant.
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On the other hand, Silvino claims that it was Zareen who was
flirting with him. His version is that while at
, whenever Enrico was not looking, Zareen would
whisper to him and place her arm on his shoulder. She would talk
to him about her stay in Boracay with her sister Lucila and the
men she met there. In turn, he spoke to her about his former
girlfriends. When Enrico invited him to go spearfishing he went
with the group but after a while he returned to the beach saying
he was feeling cold and dizzy having imbibed one too many. He
even stumbled and fell on the sand. As a result, he got sand all
over his body so he proceeded to the public restroom for a
shower. On the way to get his t-shirt and cigarettes he saw
Zareen lying on the hammock. She asked him for a cigarette and
insisted that he take his shower inside her cottage instead of the
public restroom which was about a hundred meters away. He
hesitated for a while but finally acceded.
)j, the complaining witness was not below twelve (12) years of
age at the time of the alleged commission of the offense. She was
already thirty (30) years old. Neither was she demented.
Zareen herself claimed that she woke up when she felt someone
removing her panties. This means she was&
j when
somebody approached her bed, removed her panties, spread her
legs "although not far apart but just enough to get her underwear
off," and then proceeded to perform coital movements with her.
Her testimony that she knew that the "intruder" removed his own
briefs; that his penis was already erect; that no effort to foreplay
was made before penetrating her in his first attempt; that the man
did not kiss her nor touch her breasts; that she did not even guide
his penis into the trough of her ferminity; and, that he "pushed-
and-pulled" on top of her for approximately less than a minute, all
validate our conviction that she was fully conscious ² not asleep
nor even half-asleep ² of what was being done to her from the
beginning. She was also aware that there was no light as the gas
lamp inside the cottage was not lighted and the electricity was
already shut off.
Zareen had known Enrico for three (3) weeks and since then had
been making love with him almost every night. It strains credulity
and understanding that she could have mistaken Silvino for
Enrico. Their constant lovemaking and togetherness would have
already made her familiar with the physical attributes of Enrico
and accustomed to his fornicating peculiarities. Zareen even
asserted that Enrico was not inclined to sexual intercourse when
drunk and would usually indulge in foreplay before actual
copulation. These oddities are cues which reasonably engender
suspicion that the man she was having carnal communication with
was not her lover but someone else. She had the moral
responsibility not only to herself but to society itself to ascertain
first the identity of her "ravisher" before yielding completely to him.
It can hardly be said that she was not imprudent, reckless and
irresponsible in giving in to her own sexual impulses. Moreover,
being almost a stranger in the place, Zareen should have been
leery of her surroundings especially at night. In this regard, she
should not have left her cottage door unlocked as much as she
did leave pregnable and unshielded the portals of her
womanhood.
In . ,
-, the accused boxed his victim into
unconsciousness. When the victim regained her consciousness
she felt the flaccid penis of her ravisher still inside her vagina and
that thereafter he removed his sexual organ. He then warned her
not to divulge what had happened or else she and her family
would be killed. Force, which was used to knock the victim into
unconsciousness, was employed before the act was done to
ensure its consummation. In .
j the complaining
witness was
and when she woke up the organ of
the accused was already inside her genitalia. In .
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the victim was&
when the accused had
carnal communication with her, such that when she woke up the
crime of rape was already consummated. The same was true in
. .! In . .
, the rapist's organ was
already in the vagina of the offended party when she woke up, so
she pushed him away and screamed. But the accused pulled out
his revolver and threatened to kill her if she made any further
outcry. She fainted, and the accused continued having sex with
her. In fine, in all these cases raped was already consummated
before the offended parties could even exercise their volition to
grant or deny access to erotic
j.
But even from the narration of Zareen, the elements of the crime
of rape are, regretfully, miserably wanting. There was no force nor
intimidation; Zareen was not deprived of reason nor otherwise
unconscious; and, she was not below twelve nor demented.
SO ORDERED.
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ï dissenting:
PROSECUTOR SENA:
A Yes, Sir.
COURT:
The trial court must have borne in mind the fact that on two
previous occasions, accused had carnal knowledge of two
foreigners of the opposite sex at the same Mary's Cottage
where Zareen claimed to have been raped by accused. On
questions by the trial court, accused volunteered the
information that he had sex with two foreigners, thus:
COURT:
Q Both foreigners?
A Yes, Sir.
Q White?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Americans?
A No, Sir.
COURT:
Q What happened?
The
j
makes much of Zareen's testimony that she
was aware that someone pulled off her underwear and
spread her legs, then concludes that she must have been
&
jand could not have been mistaken as to her
partner's identity. However, to take this at face value would
not serve the ends of justice. Plainly, despite Zareen's
awareness of$
was being done to her, the question of
$was doing it to her was a totally different matter. Her
accession to the$
was premised on the belief, in good
faith, that it was her boyfriend$lay with her in bed. Her
failure to ascertain the identity of her partner was a mistake
in good faith for which she should not be faulted; neither
should it result in the acquittal of accused-appellant.
In Zareen's case, she was still "half-asleep" or drowsy when
she was penetrated by the accused, having been awakened
when he removed her underwear and mounted her, which
she acceded to believing, in good faith, that it was her
boyfriend Ricky, with whom she had nightly intercourse.
When this belief turned out to be erroneous when accused
announced, in the midst of the act, that he was not Ricky,
but Jun (the accused), that was the only time that Zareen
became fully aware of the totality of circumstances ²
critically, that of her partner's identity ² at which time she
intelligently and freely exercised her will by immediately and
unequivocally rejecting the accused.
Ê
c "#$% !!!
plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
&
c&'
()*+ accused-
appellant.
&ï ,
Contrary to law.
Contrary to law.
On May 28, 1996 and August 28, 1996, Armando Gemoya and
Ronilo Tionko, respectively, entered their pleas of "not guilty", and
the two criminal cases were thereafter jointly tried, following
which, judgment was rendered disposing:
I.
II.
IV.
(p. 15)
1. By
when the offender has inflicted physical
injuries which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor
from one to nine days, or shall require medical attention
during the same period.
2. By
or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos and
censure when the offender has caused physical injuries
which do not prevent the offended party from engaging in his
habitual work nor require medical attendance;
3. By
in its minimum period or a fine not
exceeding 50 pesos when the offender shall ill-treat another
by deed without causing injury.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of murder
is punished by
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to death. Where there are no
aggravating and no mitigating circumstances attendant in the
commission of the crime the medium penalty shall be imposed.
For the crime of murder, the medium as well as the minimum
penalty are the same because the lower range penalty
j
is an indivisible penalty.
Applying the rule to the case at bar where there is the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender and the absence of any
aggravating circumstances other than those already absorbed in
the circumstances which qualified the killing to murder ( 0
, 279 SCRA 129 [1997l), the minimum penalty of
j
should be imposed.
Finally, as correctly pointed out in the People's brief. when death
occurs as a result of a crime, the heirs of the deceased are
entitled to the amount of as P50,000.00 indemnity for the death of
the victim without need of any evidence or proof of damage
( 0
, G.R. No. 126932, November 19, 1999;
0
7
, 271 SCRA 689 [1997]). Thus, civil
indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 for the death of Wilfredo
Alferez will have to be awarded in favor of his heirs. Accused-
appellants being convicted as co-principals for the crime of
murder, the two shall be held solidarily liable for the civil
indemnity.
.
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plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
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accused-
appellants.
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These are the principles relied upon by the Court in resolving this
appeal from the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision dated September 28, 1995,
convicting Rolusape Sabalones and Timoteo Beronga of murder and frustrated murder. The convictions
arose from a shooting incident on June 1, 1985 in Talisay, Cebu, which resulted in the killing of two
persons and the wounding of three others, who were all riding in two vehicles which were allegedly
ambushed by appellants.
Alegarbes died in the course of trial; thus, the cases against him
were dismissed. Accused Cabanero remained at large.
Sabalones, on the other hand, was eventually arrested.
Subsequently, he jumped bail but was recaptured in 1988 and
thereafter pleaded not guilty during his arraignment.
SO ORDERED.
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The solicitor general quoted the following factual findings of the trial court:
After firing at the jeep, the assailants shot the ear they
were riding[,] hitting Nelson Tiempo on the throat and
Rogelio Presores on the breast. Despite the injury he
sustained, Nelson Tiempo was able to maneuver the
car back to their residence. (pp. 17-19,j%j.)
When the shots were directed [at] their car[,] they were
able to bend their heads low. When the firing stopped,
he directed Nelson Tiempo to back out from the place.
As the latter was maneuvering the car, the shooting
continued and he was hit in the breast while Nelson
Tiempo, in the neck, and the windshield of the vehicle
was shattered. (p. 10, j%j.)
They buried his son, who was then barely 14 years old,
at Cebu Memorial Park and had incurred funeral
expenses (Exhs. "K", "L", "O"). (pp. 7-8,j%j.)
He ran away but the latter chased him and kicked the
door of the house where he hid. He was able to escape
through the back door and took refuge in Mandaue at
the residence of Nito Seno, a driver of Gen. Emilio
Narcissi. (Tsn-Abangan, pp. 4-17, October 19, 1989)
After the lull of gunfire, she went to the terrace and saw
people in civilian and in fatigue uniforms with firearms,
gathered around the place. One of these men even
asked her about the whereabouts of her husband,
whom she left sleeping in the house of the deceased.
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In his Brief, Appellant Sabalones raised the following errors allegedly committed by the trial
court:
The court
+ erred in finding that accused
Sabalones and his friends left the house where his
brother Sabalones Junior was lying in state and "went
to their grisly destination amidst the dark and positioned
themselves in defense of his turf against the invasion of
a revengeful gang of the supporters of Nabing Velez.
II
The court
+ erred in finding that accused
Sabalones and his two co-accused were identified as
among the four gunmen who fired at the victims.
III
The court
+ erred in overlooking or disregarding
physical evidence that would have contradicted the
testimony of prosecution witnesses Edwin Santos and
Rogelio Presores that the gunmen were shooting at
them from a standing position.
IV
The court
+ erred in holding that the instant case is
"one of aberratio ictus", which is not a defense, and that
the "defense of alibi" interposed by the accused may
not be considered.
The court
+ erred in not finding that the evidence of
the prosecution has not overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused.
VI
The court
+ erred in not acquitting the accused on
ground of reasonable doubt.
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Well-entrenched is the tenet that this Court will not interfere with
the trial court's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses,
absent any indication or showing that the trial court has
overlooked some material facts or gravely abused its discretion,
especially where, as in this case, such assessment is affirmed by the Court of Appeals. "As this Court has
reiterated often enough, the matter of assigning values to declarations at the witness stand is best and
most competently performed or carried out by a trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh
such testimony in light of the accused's behavior, demeanor, conduct and attitude at the trial." Giving
credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the trial court concluded:
We stress that "factual findings of the lower courts, the trial court
and the Court of Appeals are, as a general rule, binding and
conclusive upon the Supreme Court." We find nothing in the instant case to
justify a reversal or modification of the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that appellants
committed two counts of murder and three counts of frustrated murder.
COURT:
WITNESS:
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q Point at them.
COURT INTERPRETER:
FISCAL GABIANA:
COURT:
A Yes, sir.
A 3 to 4 meters.
A Alfredo Nardo.
A Yes, sir.
A Roling Sabalones.
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Appellants allege that the two witnesses could not have properly
identified the appellants because, after the first burst of shooting,
they both crouched down, such that they could not have seen the
faces of their assailants. This contention does not persuade. Both
eyewitnesses testified that the firing was not continuous; thus,
during a lull in the firing, they raised their heads and managed a
peek at the perpetrators. Edwin Santos testified as follows:
Like Santos, Rogelio Presores also stooped down when the firing
started, but he raised his head during a break in the gunfire:
Atty. Albino:
Q So, what did you do when you first heard
that one shot?
He further testified:
Presores:
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Hence, they were able to see and identify the appellants, having
had a good look at them after the initial burst of shots. We stress
that the normal reaction of a person is to direct his sights towards
the source of a startling shout or occurrence. As held in 0
.
, "the most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the looks and
faces of their assailants and to observe the manner in which the crime is committed.
Atty. Kintanar:
Canete:
A Yes, sir.
A No, sir.
Said witness even admitted that he could not recall if he did in fact
cut the electrical connection of the Mansueto Compound. The Court
of Appeals further noted that "none of the above witnesses were at the crime scene at or about the exact
time that the ambush occurred. Thus, none was in a position to state with absolute certainty that there
was allegedly no light to illuminate the gunmen when they rained bullets on the victims.
Even assuming
that the lampposts were not functioning
at the time, the headlights of the jeep and the car were more than
sufficient to illuminate the crime scene. The Court has previously held that the
light from the stars or the moon, an oven, or a wick lamp or
can give ample illumination to enable
a person to identify or recognize another. In the same vein, the headlights of a car or a jeep are
sufficient to enable eyewitnesses to identify appellants at the distance of 4 to 10 meters.
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rule, they also argue that the said statement is
inadmissible against Sabalones. Specifically, they challenge the
trial court's reliance on the following portions of Beronga's
statement:
rule under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:
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A Yes, sir.
A Two (2).
ATTY. KINTANAR:
Q Who shouted?
A The voice was very familiar to me.
Q Whose voice?
Atty. Kintanar:
In any event, the witnesses saw that the appellants were the
gunmen who were standing side by side firing at them. They
could have been in a different position and in another hiding place
when they first fired, but this is not important. They were present
at the crime scene, and they were shooting their rifles at the
victims.
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to
j why the appellants staged the ambush,
not to that appellants did in fact commit the crimes. Even
assuming that the trial court did err in explaining the motive of the
appellants, this does not detract from its findings, as affirmed by
the Court of Appeals and sustained by this Court in the discussion
above, that the guilt of the appellants was proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
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which means mistake in the blow, characterized by
aiming at one but hitting the other due to imprecision in the blow.
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For each of the two counts of murder, the trial court imposed the
penalty of fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of
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(medium), as minimum, to seventeen (17)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
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(maximum), as maximum. This is incorrect. Under Article 248 of
the Ravised Penal Code, the imposable penalty is
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, in its maximum period, to death. There being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstance, aside from the qualifying
circumstance of treachery, the appellate court correctly imposed
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for murder.
Although the Court of Appeals was silent on this point, the trial
court correctly ordered the payment of P50,000 as indemnity to
the heirs of each of the two murdered victims. In light of current
jurisprudence, this amount is awarded without need of proof other
than the fact of the victim's death. ! The trial court and the CA, however, erred in
awarding indemnity of P20,000 each to Nelson Tiempo, Rogelio Presores and Rey Bolo. There is no
basis, statutory or jurisprudential, for the award of a fixed amount to victims of frustrated murder. Hence,
they are entitled only to the amounts of actual expenses duly proven during the trial.
SO ORDERED.