IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS

MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENT, FIRST DISTRICT

XXX )
)
Defendant. )

PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS IN LIMINE

NOW COMES THE PLAINTIFF by and through her attorneys and moves this Honorable

Court for an order in limine before commencement of voir dire of this matter as follows:

1. Medical opinions/Prior and subsequent injuries.

a. To prohibit Defendant from attempting to elicit or argue any medical opinion or

conclusion as to any medical condition of Plaintiff as there are none disclosed under
Rule 213 by the Defendant and unless there is a showing of relevancy outside the
presence of the jury. Under Voykin v. Estate of Deboer , 192 Ill. 2d 49, 733 N.E.2d
1275, 248 Ill. Dec. 277 (2000), evidence of the subsequent or prior injuries or medical
conditions cannot be admissible without competent medical proof as to a causal link
between that injury and condition and the injury complained of at trial.

b. Limit the defendant’s attorney from asking questions of the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s
treating physician on cross-examination regarding preexisting injuries or illnesses,
unless there is a prior showing by the defendant, outside the presence of the jury, that
there will be a connection between this line of questioning by competent medical
testimony. Marut v. Costello, 53 Ill.App.2d 340, 202 N.E.2d 853 (1st Dist.), aff’d, 34
Ill.2d 125 (1964); Simpson v. Johnson, 45 Ill.App.3d 789, 360 N.E.2d 144, 4 Ill.Dec.
397 (3d Dist. 1977); Caley v. Manicke, 29 Ill.App.2d 323, 173 N.E.2d 209 (2d Dist.
1961), rev’d on other grounds, 24 Ill.2d 390 (1962); Gordon v. Checker Taxi Co., 334
Ill.App. 313, 79 N.E.2d 632 (1st Dist. 1948); Voykin v. Estate of Deboer,192 Ill. 2d
49, 733 N.E.2d 1275, 248 Ill. Dec. 277 (2000).

c. Bar any reference to an alleged connection between preexisting physical condition

and the instant injury. Rehak v. City of Joliet, 52 Ill.App.3d 724, 367 N.E.2d 1070, 10
Ill.Dec. 461 (3d Dist. 1977).

2. Medical Bills.

a. Bar any reference to medical insurance benefits. Bireline v. Espenscheid, 15

Ill.App.3d 368, 304 N.E.2d 508 (3d Dist. 1973); Biehler v. White Metal Rolling &
Stamping Corp., 30 Ill.App.3d 435, 333 N.E.2d 716 (3d Dist. 1975).

1
 b. Bar any evidence or suggestion that the plaintiff need not know or prove who paid her
medical bills. Elberts v. Nussbaum Trucking, Inc., 97 Ill.App.3d 381, 422 N.E.2d
1040, 1043, 52 Ill.Dec. 831 (1st Dist. 1981).

c. Prohibit any evidence that the plaintiff received benefits from sources unrelated or
collateral to the defendant, and such evidence will not be admitted to reduce the
plaintiff’s recoverable damages. Lang v. Lake Shore Exhibits, Inc., 305 Ill.App.3d
283, 711 N.E.2d 1124, 1128, 238 Ill.Dec. 463 (1st Dist. 1999) (evidence of disability
payments by collateral source properly excluded even if offered as evidence of
malingering); Boden v. Crawford, 196 Ill.App.3d 71, 552 N.E.2d 1287, 1291, 142
Ill.Dec. 546 (4th Dist. 1990). See also Muranyi v. Turn Verein Frisch-Auf, 308
Ill.App.3d 213, 719 N.E.2d 366, 241 Ill.Dec. 505 (2d Dist. 1999) (applying collateral
source rule under Dramshop Act); Bireline v. Espenscheid, 15 Ill.App.3d 368, 304
N.E.2d 508, 510 (3d Dist. 1973) (applying collateral source rule to private medical
insurance payments).

d. Prohibit evidence that the plaintiff’s medical bills were paid by some person or entity.
Phelan v. Santelli, 30 Ill.App.3d 657, 334 N.E.2d 391, 398 (3d Dist. 1975); see also
Rylander v. Chicago Short Line Ry., 19 Ill.App.2d 29, 153 N.E.2d 225, 239 (1st Dist.
1958), aff’d, 17 Ill.2d 618 (1959); Biehler v. White Metal Rolling & Stamping Corp.,
30 Ill.App.3d 435, 333 N.E.2d 716, 723 (3d Dist. 1975) (suggesting that if such cross-
examination occurs, it may be sufficient to sustain plaintiff’s objection and instruct
jury to disregard question and answer).

e. Bar any evidence or argument that plaintiff should not recover the full amount a
medical provider charged for medical treatment. Arthur v. Catour, 216 Ill. 2d 72, 833
NE2d 847 (2005).

f. Bar any argument that the defense should receive a benefit or discount for any lesser
amount paid for plaintiff’s medical bills that may have been negotiated. Arthur v.
Catour, 216 Ill. 2d 72, 833 NE2d 847 (2005).

3. Bar any reference to how judgment may be satisfied or to the current financial status of a
defendant. Lukich v. Angeli, 31 Ill.App.2d 20, 175 N.E.2d 796 (1st Dist. 1961).

4. Bar any reference that damages awarded will not be subject to income taxes. Newlin v.
Foresman, 103 Ill.App.3d 1038, 432 N.E.2d 319, 59 Ill.Dec. 735 (3d Dist. 1982);
Christou v. Arlington Park-Washington Park Race Tracks Corp., 104 Ill.App.3d 257, 432
N.E.2d 920, 60 Ill.Dec. 21 (1st Dist. 1982).

5. Bar any reference that damages awarded can be invested to produce additional income or
a "stream of income" in the future. Schaffner v. Chicago & North Western
Transportation Co., 129 Ill.2d 1, 541 N.E.2d 643, 133 Ill.Dec. 432 (1989).

6. Bar any reference as to the pecuniary circumstances of any of the parties. Hedge v.
Midwest Contractors Equipment Co., 53 Ill.App.2d 365, 202 N.E.2d 869 (1st Dist. 1964);

2
 Illinois Central R.R. v. Slater, 129 Ill. 91, 21 N.E. 575 (1889); Hickey v. Chicago Transit
Authority, 52 Ill.App.2d 132, 201 N.E.2d 742, 746 (1st Dist. 1964).

7. Bar any mention, reference, inference or suggestion by defense counsel or defense

witnesses, and to instruct the refraining from eliciting any such mention, reference,
inference or suggestion as to any illness or medical condition of the decedent Ronald
Borcovan at the time the accident. The only purpose to introduce that defendant was
deathly ill at the time of the accident is to inflame the jury against the plaintiff. There is
no probative value as the guilt or innocence of the defendant and this admission is
substantially outweighed by its danger of unfair prejudice to the plaintiff.

8. Bar any reference by the defendant, particularly in closing argument, that holds the
plaintiff up to ridicule. Raucci v. Connelly, 340 Ill.App. 280, 90 N.E.2d 735 (1st Dist.
1950).

9. Bar any reference by the defendant, particularly in closing arguments, that the plaintiff
has asked for a greater amount of money than the plaintiff actually expects to be awarded.
Kallas v. Lee, 22 Ill.App.3d 496, 317 N.E.2d 704 (1st Dist. 1974); Carlasare v. Wilhelmi,
134 Ill.App.3d 1, 479 N.E.2d 1073, 89 Ill.Dec. 67 (1st Dist. 1985).

10. Bar any reference to any comment, comparison, or mention that an award to the plaintiff
would amount to winning the lottery, or that the plaintiff’s request for damages
constitutes any type of get-rich-quick scheme, welfare program, or the like. Principato v.
Rudd, 102 Ill.App.3d 362, 430 N.E.2d 63, 58 Ill.Dec. 121 (1st Dist. 1981); Bochantin v.
Schroeder, 12 Ill.App.3d 738, 299 N.E.2d 47 (1st Dist. 1973).

11. Bar any reference by the defendants arguing that the trier of fact or jury place itself in the
defendant’s shoes. Offutt v. Pennoyer Merchants Transfer Co., 36 Ill.App.3d 194, 343
N.E.2d 665 (1st Dist. 1976).

12. Bar any reference by the defendants arguing that the defendant’s counsel is "shocked" or
outraged by the plaintiff’s damage request. Baumgartner v. Ziessow, 169 Ill.App.3d 647,
523 N.E.2d 1010, 120 Ill.Dec. 99 (1st Dist. 1988).

13. To have the court take judicial notice of certain ordinances and state statutes, which were
in effect at the time of the occurrence, that are matters of public record. As the authority
cited below indicates, the court has a duty to take judicial notice of the applicable statutes
and ordinances. Judicial notice is an evidentiary concept that operates to admit matters
into evidence without formal proof. National Aircraft Leasing, Ltd. v. American Airlines,
Inc., 74 Ill.App.3d 1014, 394 N.E.2d 470, 31 Ill.Dec. 268 (1st Dist. 1979). Judicial notice
denotes the duty and power of the court to accept for purposes of trial the truth of well-
known facts, commonly or generally known, without proof thereof. Thurman v. Illinois
Department of Public Aid, 25 Ill.App.3d 367, 323 N.E.2d 502 (1st Dist. 1974). For a
court to take judicial notice of a statute, law, ordinance, or other item, reference to it need
not be stated in the pleading. Rosborough v. City of Moline, 30 Ill.App.2d 167, 174
N.E.2d 16 (1961); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Village of Melrose Park, 21 Ill.App.2d 125, 157

3
 N.E.2d 273 (1st Dist. 1959); People ex rel. Krajci v. Kelly, 279 Ill.App. 22 (1st Dist.
1935).

14. Bar counsel for Defendant from making any reference to counsel’s personal experience
with back or neck injuries, or counsel’s personal opinion about Plaintiff’s injuries;

15. Bar any argument or reference by defense counsel that Plaintiff has filed a lawsuit and is
going to trial because it was an opportunity to make money or make an insurance claim.

16. Bar any argument or reference by defense counsel about other similar lawsuits.

17. Bar any argument or reference by defense counsel about the effect of personal injury
lawsuits on the economy or insurance rates.

WHEREFORE, the plaintiff respectfully requests the court to instruct each of the

defendants through their respective counsel and their respective counsel individually not to

mention, refer to, interrogate concerning, voluntarily answer, or attempt to convey before the

jury, at any time during these proceedings in any manner either directly or indirectly the subject

matters as stated above without first informing the court and obtaining permission of the court

outside the presence and hearing of the jury, and further, to instruct each of the defendants,

through their respective counsel and their respective counsel individually not to make any

reference or inference to the fact that this motion has been filed, argued, or ruled on by the court,

and further that each respective counsel be instructed to warn and caution each and every witness

appearing in their phase of this litigation to strictly comply with the ruling of the court.