Via Electronic Filing
Via Electronic Filing
Elizabeth M. Murphy
Secretary
Securities and Exchange Commission
100 F Street, N.E.
Washington, DC 20549-1090
This comment letter3 addresses the proposed amendments to Form ADV, Part 1,
including regulatory assets under management (AUM), as well as private fund
1
The IAA is a not-for-profit association that exclusively represents the interests of investment adviser firms
registered with the SEC. Founded in 1937, the Association’s membership consists of more than 500 firms
that collectively manage in excess of $10 trillion in assets for a wide variety of individual and institutional
clients, including pension plans, trusts, investment companies, private funds, endowments, foundations, and
corporations. For more information, please visit our web site: www.investmentadviser.org.
2
Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940; Proposed Rules, Rel. No. IA-
3110; File No. S7-36-10 (Dec. 10, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2010/ia-
3110fr.pdf .
3
We address the proposed amendments to the pay to play rule in a separate letter.
1050 17th Street, N.W.; Suite 725; Washington, DC 20036-5503 · (202) 293-4222 ph · (202) 293-4223 fx · www.investmentadviser.org
Ms. Elizabeth M. Murphy
January 24, 2011
Page 2
information, data about an adviser’s business, and additional information about advisers’
non-advisory activities and their financial industry affiliations.
The Dodd-Frank Act provides the Commission with increased responsibility for
oversight of private funds. The Commission is proposing amendments to Part 1 of Form
ADV in order to enable it to better focus its examination and enforcement resources,
particularly with respect to the collection of information about private funds, and to
enhance its oversight of investment advisers. The IAA fully supports the Commission’s
goals.
The Commission has not made substantial revisions to the information collected
in Part 1 of Form ADV since 2000, when the Investment Adviser Registration Depository
(IARD), the electronic filing system for investment advisers, was established, and IARD
filing for Part 1 was implemented.4 We applaud the Commission for taking steps to
improve the collection of information from advisers in order to improve its risk
assessment process and investment adviser examination program. We are concerned,
however, with certain aspects of the proposed revisions and suggest a number of
modifications to the Proposal.
Specifically, we encourage the Commission to: (1) not subject private fund
information submitted by advisers on Part 1 of Form ADV to public disclosure on the
Investment Adviser Public Disclosure web site (IAPD); and (2) streamline the
information it collects from advisers. These general recommendations regarding the
Proposal are set forth below. In addition, we have set forth our specific item-by-item
comments with respect to Part 1 in the attached Appendix.
4
Electronic Filing by Investment Advisers; Proposed Amendments to Form ADV, Rel. Nos. IA-1862, 34-
42620 (Apr. 5, 2000).
Ms. Elizabeth M. Murphy
January 24, 2011
Page 3
We submit, however, that the Commission should limit the public availability of
private fund information provided on Part 1 of Form ADV. First, certain of the proposed
disclosure regarding private funds could expose internal, sensitive, and/or confidential
information if it becomes publicly available. Beneficial ownership information, for
example, could be used by competitors to ascertain information about a fund’s seed
capital. In addition, beneficial ownership information, along with other identifying
information provided in the Form, could be used by another firm to identify investors in a
fund. It also could be used to track an investor’s market movements, thereby exposing or
potentially compromising an adviser’s investment decision-making process, to the
detriment of the investor. Treating the private fund information as confidential will
enable the Commission to collect the information it deems necessary while protecting the
proprietary nature of the information. Furthermore, keeping the information confidential
will not harm current investors due to the fact that they are already provided with
meaningful disclosure in Part 2 of Form ADV, the offering documents, and through due
diligence efforts.
Second, the disclosure will unduly focus the attention of a firm’s non-fund adviser
clients on what may be just one aspect of a firm’s business. For example, private funds
may constitute less than 10% of an adviser’s business, but could be 90% of the adviser’s
Part 1 disclosure. This could give investors a distorted view of an adviser’s business. In
addition, the volume of public disclosure will highlight private funds that are not publicly
available, and that are only available to sophisticated investors. The disclosure draws
attention to information that is not relevant or appropriate for most clients.
Third, the public nature of this disclosure may lead to confusion as to what
constitutes a public offering of a private fund. Advisers will be required to provide very
specific information regarding private funds. As a result, it is not difficult to envision a
scenario in which an adviser’s current clients or other members of the public not eligible
to invest in the funds would approach an adviser about potential investment opportunities
in private funds. Keeping the disclosure confidential will address this concern. At a
minimum, the Commission should confirm that providing the requested disclosure will
not constitute a public offering within the meaning of the private placement exemption
(as provided in Form D).
5
The Commission has scheduled an open meeting on January 25, 2011 to consider proposing additional
reporting requirements for advisers to private funds to implement the requirements of Sections 404 and 406
of the Dodd-Frank Act. It is possible that the private fund information that the Commission has proposed
to include in Part 1 of Form ADV could instead be reported in conjunction with the systemic risk and other
Ms. Elizabeth M. Murphy
January 24, 2011
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advisers to provide the requested information apart from the IARD would address the
confidentiality issues as well as the regulatory burden issues outlined below, while still
providing the Commission with the information it seeks. We would be glad to meet with
the staff to further discuss these issues.
Given the volume of information requested, the process of submitting the data on
the IARD will also be time consuming. Advisers will be required to manually keystroke
data into the IARD system. The combined burden of collecting, reviewing, coordinating
with affiliates or other entities, managing the information and responding to the
disclosure requirements is already substantial for Part 1 and will be even more significant
under the Proposal. Accordingly, we do not agree that the new requirements “should
impose few additional regulatory burdens.”6 The overall regulatory burden is even more
substantial when the disclosure obligations imposed by the recently revised Part 2A and
Part 2B of Form ADV are also taken into consideration, as well as other recently adopted
regulations.
In order to address these issues, the Commission could eliminate questions that
ask for information that is not of high value to the SEC’s oversight program. For
example, information regarding regulatory AUM attributable to each type of client, the
summary of private fund investments by asset and liability class categorized in fair value
hierarchy, and beneficial ownership information will be extremely difficult for advisers to
capture and report, but will be of limited utility to the Commission. In the Appendix we
reporting imposed by Sections 404 and 406. We would be glad to discuss this alternative with the staff
once we have had the opportunity to review any additional reporting requirements proposed on January 25.
6
Proposal at 48.
Ms. Elizabeth M. Murphy
January 24, 2011
Page 5
discuss our concerns regarding these reporting requirements and suggest a number of
additional ways to streamline the disclosure requested.7
Conclusion
We commend the Commission for issuing this important proposal and we urge the
Commission to modify the Proposal as suggested herein. We would appreciate the
opportunity to meet with the Commission to discuss our comments. In the meantime,
please do not hesitate to contact us if we may provide additional information or
clarification regarding these matters.
Respectfully submitted,
Valerie M. Baruch
Associate General Counsel
7
Of course, the Commission can seek more detailed information from advisers at any time.
Appendix
Specific Form ADV Comments
General Instructions
Accelerated Filing Deadlines: The Proposal requires advisers to amend Form ADV
each year by filing an annual updating amendment within 90 days after the end of the
adviser’s fiscal year. The Commission requests comment regarding whether the
filing deadlines should be accelerated so that advisers would be required to file their
amendments to Form ADV in less than 90 days after the end of the adviser’s fiscal
year. We strongly oppose accelerating the filing deadline for Form ADV for any
timeframe less than 90 days after an adviser’s fiscal year end. Many advisers need
the full 90 days to review their businesses and provide the disclosure required by the
current Form ADV and will need at least that much time to respond to the proposed
disclosure requirements, particularly if they have multiple affiliates or private funds.
If the filing timeframe is accelerated, the quality of the disclosure could be negatively
impacted.
Information Timeframe: The Commission should clarify the “as of” date or
timeframe for all of the information submitted on Part 1 of Form ADV.
Glossary
Client. The Form ADV instructions state that “you” means the investment adviser
(i.e., the advisory firm). Accordingly, the reference to “members of your family”
does not make sense in the context of the firm. Instead, the instructions should state
“such as family members of your supervised persons.”
Part 1A, Instruction 5.b and Item 5.F: Calculating Regulatory AUM
We generally support the implementation of a uniform method of calculating AUM in
order to maintain consistency for registration purposes and for risk assessment
purposes. In addition, we support the Commission’s proposal to include in AUM the
value of any private fund over which the adviser exercises continuous and regular
supervisory or management services, regardless of the nature of the assets held by the
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fund. However, we have a number of concerns about the specific components of
regulatory AUM as set forth below.
Instruction 5.b.(1)(a). Securities Portfolios. Given that “you” refers to the advisory
firm, the reference to “your family” accounts is not technically correct in this
instruction. The instruction should refer to your “supervised persons’ or employees’”
family accounts and “your proprietary accounts.”
Instruction 5.b.(2) Value of Portfolio. The Commission should clarify what it means
when it states, “Do not deduct any outstanding indebtedness or other accrued but
unpaid liabilities.” It is not clear what constitutes “accrued but unpaid liabilities” or
how an adviser would treat mutual funds, for example, which deduct accrued fees and
expenses in calculating net asset value. Furthermore, in the Proposal, the
Commission indicates that advisers should not deduct any borrowings. The
Commission should clarify the treatment of borrowing and leveraging for purposes of
regulatory AUM. Including borrowing in a gross asset value context would limit
comparison with other investment vehicles, such as mutual funds, that do not reflect
borrowing in financial statements.
Item 4: Successions
This item has long been a source of confusion and does not apply neatly to a wide
range of transactions. The Commission has not issued guidance regarding this
succession process since 1992. We would be happy to work with the Commission
and its staff to revise this question and the accompanying guidance to more
appropriately reflect a broader range of business transactions.
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Item 5: Information About Your Advisory Business
A and B. The Commission should clarify the “as of” date to identify the approximate
number of employees. In addition, the Commission should modify the form to allow
advisers to round responses up or down in order to provide additional flexibility with
respect to an adviser’s response. The Commission states that the additional
employee data “would, for instance, permit us to develop ratios (e.g., number of
employees to assets under management of clients) that we can use to identify advisers
to inform our risk-based examination program.” We note that this ratio does not
necessarily indicate risk, as some advisers may leverage the personnel of their
affiliates or use the services of third parties for a wide range of functions.
D. Most advisers typically do not attribute AUM to particular types of clients (or
where they do, their internal categories may differ from the Commission’s
categories). Also, most advisers do not have this type of information readily
available and would be required to undergo significant system enhancements in
order to be able to provide this information. Accordingly, the Commission should
not require advisers to provide AUM for particular types of clients. In addition, as
noted below, the list of investors in Item 5.D does not match the client types listed in
Item 7.B.1.A.17 of Schedule D.
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adviser invested in the type of security only once. Nor would the disclosure
necessarily indicate what types of investments the adviser is likely to make in the
coming year. As a result, without a materiality or de minimis standard, the disclosure
may be misleading for clients and is not likely to be valuable from a regulatory
perspective.
B. The IAA supports the proposed instruction that enables an adviser to identify a
fund by code in order to preserve the anonymity of a private fund client. The
Commission should confirm, however, that the disclosure of a private fund’s name
by an adviser will not constitute a public offering within the meaning of the private
placement exemption.
Item 7, Schedule D
A. The Commission should confirm that the guidance previously issued for advisory
firms that are part of a large organization that has hundreds of related persons that
meet the definition of investment adviser under the Investment Adviser's Act of 1940
also applies to the financial services affiliates disclosure. Specifically, the
Commission should confirm that an adviser can omit a related person from Section
7.A of Schedule D if the adviser (1) has no business dealings with the related person,
(2) does not conduct joint operations with the related person, (3) does not provide
advice that is formulated, in whole or in part, by the related person, and (4) the
related person does not present any potential for conflict of interest with the adviser's
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clients. See Frequently Asked Questions on Form ADV and IARD, on the SEC’s
web site at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/iard/iardfaq.shtml#item7a.
7.A.6. The way the question regarding shared personnel and information is worded
is confusing. We would be glad to work with the staff to suggest alternative
wording.
7.B.1.A.13. In private offering documents, the manager often has the discretion to
reduce minimum investment commitments. The Commission should modify the
language in the Form to reflect that discretion.
7.B.1.A.14. The Commission should not require advisers to list the number of a
private fund’s beneficial owners. The adviser may not have access to the beneficial
ownership information, particularly if the investor in the fund is a fund of funds or a
charitable trust. As an alternative, the Commission could consider requiring firms to
state the number of limited partners or LLC members or equivalent record owners
(for private funds organized using other legal entity forms). Furthermore, the
Commission should clarify that advisers are not required to report non-U.S.
beneficial owners.
7.B.1.A.16 and 17. Advisers should not be required to indicate the percentage of the
private fund that is beneficially owned by funds of funds or by certain groups of
investors. Such information, to the extent it is available to the adviser, is
confidential and proprietary. Particularly with respect to funds owned by relatively
few large institutions, this information could be used to discern the identities,
investment strategies, and movement of funds of certain clients. Public disclosure of
this type of information could serve as a deterrent to investment in private funds by
certain institutional clients. Furthermore, the list of investors in A.17 does not match
the client types listed in Item 5.D.
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marketplace and advisers would not necessarily have access to ownership
information. In addition, to the extent it is available, ownership information may
change frequently and would not be meaningful to the Commission.
7.B.1.B.28(e). The Commission asks about whether account statements are sent to
investors in the private fund. There is no requirement to send account statements to
investors if the fund is audited and distributes its audited financial statements in
accordance with the requirements. This question should be amended accordingly.
Item 9: Custody
As we noted in our comment letter on the custody rule,3 Item 9 is confusing in its use
of the terms “you” and “your related persons.” Pursuant to the custody definition,
“you” have custody if your related person has custody. The distinctions between Item
9A and 9B are therefore unclear. In addition, the custody definition limits imputed
1
See, e.g., IAA Letter to Florence Harman, Secretary, SEC, re Commission Guidance re Duties and
Responsibilities of Investment Company Boards of Directors with respect to Investment Adviser Portfolio
Trading Practices, IA-2763 (Oct. 1, 2008).
2
See, e.g. IAA Letter to Department of Labor re: DOL Revisions to Form 5500, RIN 1210-AB06 (Sept. 19,
2006).
3
IAA Letter to SEC re: Custody of Funds or Securities of Clients by Investment Advisers, File No. S7-09-
09, Release No. IA-2876 (July 24, 2009).
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custody to situations where “your related persons” have custody “in connection with
advisory services you provide to clients.” Items 9B and 9C do not include this “in
connection with” component.
C(4). This question should be amended to clarify that the accountant’s report refers
to the report issued for the most recent fiscal year.
Item 9, Schedule D
9.C.6. For consistent wording, we suggest including the phrase “or that performed a
surprise examination of clients’ assets” in the question. In addition, this question
should be amended to clarify that the accountant’s report refers to the report issued
for the most recent fiscal year.
9.D. Because the instruction to Item 7.A states that advisers should include foreign
affiliates and requests additional detail about related persons that are qualified
custodians, it is not clear why Section 9.D is needed or how it relates to Item 7.A.
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