TIP OF THE SPEAR:

PLA Special Operations Forces

Figure 1: A soldier from the "Sharp Sword of Southern China" SOF unit during a training exercise.

Andrew Mullikin

Prepared for: Dr. Philip Karber, Georgetown University 2012.05.10

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The highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy's plans1 Sun Tsu

I. Introduction Special operations forces (SOF) are present in the majority of the worlds finest militaries, from American Special Forces ODAs and Navy SEAL platoons to the British SAS Regiment and the Korean Special Forces Brigades. Their training regimes, individual members high degree of self-motivation, and unconventional mission set distinguish all of these units. In his thesis on the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) special operations forces for the Naval Postgraduate School, Smith describes the common threads woven through all SOF, writing: [T]he visual image and understanding of dedicated SOF remains predictably uniform. Dedicated SOF usually operate in relatively small units that can achieve with a few what conventional forces might not be able or willing with many; dedicated SOF are composed of highly-trained, skilled and motivated operators who underwent grueling rights of passage to gain admission into their particular units and often operate without the benefits of external support; dedicated SOF usually get the best most high-tech equipment and weapons that their countries can offer, but are fully capable of working the low-tech end of the spectrum; dedicated SOF operators are physically, mentally and spiritually tougher than most and are assigned the most difficult and dangerous missions to accomplish, often within enemy-controlled territory, so are usually considered the elite of their respective military services.2 [Emphasis added.] Essentially, all special operations units are constituted and trained to act as both the vanguard of a conventional fighting force and a reliable, readily deployable force for 1 Sun Tsu, Art of War, (Giles translation; London, UK: British Museum, 1910) at < http://www.textfiles.com/etext/NONFICTION/suntx10.txt > [Accessed: 2012.05.10] 2 Xavier G. Smith, Special Operations Forces in the Peoples Liberation Army and the Development of an Integral Unconventional Warfare Mission, Naval Postgraduate School, June 2005, p. 1.

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unconventional operations. In keeping with the Sun Tsu quote above, special operations units are trained to disrupt the enemys plans, acting as a force multiplier on complex battlefields. Yet, despite their reputation for superior training and battlefield efficacy, SOF have only recently been incorporated into major strategic military operations within the US defense establishment; prior to the September 11th, 2001 attacks, special operations units were usually disdained by higher command, the leaders of which were generally drawn from conventional forces that found operators undisciplined and lacking a sufficient military bearing. All of this changed during the US engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, as SOF found their skills highly sought- after in conflicts that required unconventional means to achieve tactical goals in an asymmetric environment. As American special operations units have become more frequently utilized, their status within the overall US military has expanded significantly, to the point that President Obamas most recent national security strategy explicitly calls for an increase in the number of SOF units despite cuts in the Department of Defenses budget and in the number of conventional troops employed by the US military. Warfare is rapidly evolving, and Lind and his coauthors at the Marine Corps Gazette were correct when they wrote: The fourth generation battlefield is likely to include the whole of the enemys society [requiring] even the lowest level [of military units] to operate flexibly on the basis of the commanders intent.3 Special operations forces are capable of that autonomy, and they are rapidly becoming critical tools in modern warfare. The PLA appears to have taken notice of this shift in the paradigms of war. At the end of the 1980s, the Chinese leadership in Beijing recognized the waning utility of a peoples war strategy and began to develop a new concept of local wars under high-tech conditions, in which smaller, better-equipped and more highly- trained forces were believed to have a greater impact on battlefield success than 3 William Lind, et. al. Fourth Generation Warfare Marine Corps Gazette 1989.10, p. 23.

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larger, less professional forces. Speaking in the terms of Lind and his coauthors, the PLA was attempting to leap from a military largely designed to fight first-generation wars that relied upon sheer mass to the fourth-generation warfare described above. The development of a PLA SOF capacity logically followed in their attempts to build a competitive twenty-first century military. In the following paper, I submit an in-depth overview and analysis of PLA special operations units, including sections covering the units initial development and force structure, training and equipment, and the way the PLA leadership has deployed their SOF forces and integrated these units into their overall strategic plans, especially with regards to their ongoing dispute with Taiwan. Throughout the paper, I compare PLA SOF units to their most prominent Western counterparts, including US Army Special Forces (Green Berets), US Navy SEALs, and the British Special Air Service (SAS). I close with a brief discussion of the degree to which American SOF Truths are compatible with perceived Chinese strategic values, and thus the degree to which PLA SOF units will be utilized in the overall strategy of the PRC. My research results in several major conclusions, namely that, despite the PLAs attempts to build a special operations capability on par with that of the United States, their relatively amateurish level of tactical proficiency, obsession with developing new hardware rather than investing in human capital, and complicated command structure has resulted in a special operations community with major organizational problems. These conclusions are discussed in detail in the final section of the paper. II. Early Development and Force Structure Beijing established its first true special operations forces in the late 1980s, and the development of these units was prioritized following the First Gulf War in

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1991, during which Coalition forces deployed special operations units with outstanding success. According to Henderson: Major transformations in Chinas elite special forces began taking place in the late 1980s and early 1990s. [Since then] The Peoples Liberation Army, or PLA, has concentrated on selecting the highest quality individuals within the military, providing them with the most advanced equipment available, and training them in a wide range of military disciplines.4

Despite the fact that the PRCs dedicated SOF units are not even a half-century old, ad hoc units were used with notable success during the Japanese occupation of

China has had extensive historical experience with special operations tactics. Early WWII, when temporary composite teams were constituted from conventional PLA units for a broad variety of special operations taskings, including long-range penetrations, tactical reconnaissance, raids on vital enemy positions, [and] prisoner rescue.5 The major transformations of the late 1980s were brought on by three basic driving factors: (1) A doctrinal shift in the way the Chinese perceived warfare, from a concept of peoples war to a more offensively-oriented, technology-heavy concept of local limited war; (2) the modernization and professionalization of the PLA following the disastrous punitive war against Vietnam in 1979; and (3) the Western military success during the First Gulf War. Smith describes the PLA reaction to this conflict writing: The doctrine of Local Limited War was upgraded to Local War Under High Tech Conditions to address the dominance of American technology in every facet of the conflict and to emulate it on a smaller scale within select units of the PLA. The creation and development of 4 Scott J. Henderson, In the Shadow: Chinese Special Forces Build a 21st-Century Fighting Force, Special Warfare, July-August 2006, at <fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/ChinaSF.pdf> [Accessed: 2012.05.10], p. 30. 5 Op. Cit. Smith 2005, p. 2.

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a dedicated PLA SOF capability got a boost from the First Gulf War. As a result PLA SOF contingents emulate American dedicated SOF units in many regards, particularly in the emphasis on using high- technology gear to give itself a qualitative advantage over its adversaries.6 The first PLA special operations unit in Guangzhou was, according to Smith: designed and trained to support the contemporary doctrine of Local Limited War by serving as a limited and relatively inexpensive alternative to modern high-tech force projection tools that the PRC did not have at the time.7 Thanks largely to the success of this experimental unit (metrics to measure these successes have not been disclosed by the PLA), additional SOF groups were stood up around the country in the early 1990s. Under the current PLA special operations force structure, each military region is assigned one special operations group, which according to Henderson have reportedly ranged from battalion to division size.8 The blog China Arsenal offers a second estimate of PLA special operations units, stating that PLA operators are organized into brigade equivalents, each divided into three battalions of about 1,000 soldiers each.9 Given these varied numbers it is difficult to ascertain the exact size of the PLA special operations units; according to Smith, the PLA has the second- largest SOF element of any Asian country, with somewhere between 25,000 and 30,000 operators on hand. (North Korea reportedly has 100,000 special operations soldiers.) This overall number includes as many as 25,000 PLA Special Forces;10 these forces are the primary subject of this paper simply because they are the units for which the most reliable information is available. However, in addition to these troopswhich are similar to US Army Rangers in terms of both organization and 6 Op. Cit. Smith 2005, pp. 5-6. 7 Ibid, p. 28. 8 Op. Cit. Henderson 2006, p. 31. 9 China Arsenal, Chinas Special Forces and Elite Units, 10 December 2009, at <http://china-arsenal.blogspot.com/2009/12/chinas-special-forces-and-elite- units.html> [Accessed: 2012.05.10] 10 Op. Cit. Smith 2005, p. 36.

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mission-setthe PLA maintains other branch-specific special operations units. The PLA Marine Corps has a SOF detachment numbering roughly 1,500 total operators organized in four battalions and capable of amphibious operations similar to the missions of both modern MARSOC operators and the Navys disbanded Underwater Demolition Teams; likewise, the PLAAF has a smaller organic special operations unit with airborne and air assault capabilities.11 These numbers do not include the variety of special mission unitssimilar to the US Armys 10th Mountain Divisionthat perform tasks including rapid reaction and amphibious landings. It is also unclear to what degree the capabilities of these different units overlap, given the maritime and airborne capabilities of the larger PLA SOF groups. The following table provides some basic information regarding the locations and classifications of PLA SOF: Organization of the PLA Special Forces Groups12 Military Region Beijing Shenyang Lanzhou Jinan Nanjing Guangzhou Chengdu 11 Op. Cit. Smith, 2005, pp. 38-40. 12 Reproduced (with slight modifications) from: Jens Hohmann, PLA Special Operations Forces Overview, GlobalDefence.net, 11 February 2008, at <http://www.globaldefence.net/artikel-analysen/sondereinheiten/asien/5909- china-pla-special-operations-forces-english-version.html?start=1> [Accessed: 2012.05.10] Group Army 38th 39th Unknown 54th Unknown 42nd 13th Unit Name Divine Sword Tigers of the Northeast Tigers of the Night Eagle Flying Dragons Sharp Sword of Southern China Falcons of the Southeast

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In addition to this information, Henderson offers some brief background on each PLA SOF group:13 The Beijing Military Regions Recon and Strike Force: trained to assault airfields and eliminate command-and-control elements using helicopters and powered parachutes. Known to target key enemy infrastructure including communications centers, radar systems, and ammunition depots. They are considered to be endurance swimmers who are proficient at underwater demolitions and can pilot boats. The Nanjing Military Regions Flying Dragons: in 1997, carried out a simulated attack on a concealed enemy airfield in the Zijin Mountains of Nanjing. During the exercise, the group used UAVs to relay battlefield intelligence back to headquarters and assaulted the site using parawings and helicopters. The Guangzhou Military Regions Sword of Southern China: capable of carrying out long-range airborne operations, underwater crossings, and capturing beachheads. Soldiers of the unit cross-train in multiple subject areas of the PLAN and PLAAF. The unit additionally employs several hundred personnel trained to fly aircraft, perform stunt driving, and pilot boats. The Jinan Military Regions Black Berets/Heroic Falcons: trained in special reconnaissance and in amphibious warfare. The Shenyang Military Regions Fierce Tigers of the Northeast: a marine special-forces unit trained to perform airborne and commando SEAL type assault operations on airfields, command-and-control sites, and radar warning sites using powered parachutes and SCUBA equipment. Members undergo extensive survival training in jungle, desert, mountain, and urban conditions. The Chengdu Military Regions Falcons of the Southwest: uses high-tech equipment to carry out special combat reconnaissance. Credited with 13 Op. Cit. Henderson 2006, p. 33.

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attaining amazing results in: reconnaissance, airborne insertion, surprise attacks, and emergency evacuations. The Chengdu Military Regions Hunting Leopards: carried out an antiterrorism exercise in 2002 in the Xiling Mountains; may have ties to the Peoples Armed Police force. The Daggers (military region unknown): amphibious unit, formed in 2001; described as one of the ace cards for dealing with Taiwanese independence. In 2004, carried out an exercise involving the capture of a coastal island in which the unit set up an electronic interference system, followed by the arrival of armed helicopters and airborne troops. The unit destroyed the islands airport, oil-storage facilities, command center and ammo dumps. The island was then secured for follow-on forces by removing the enemys biological and chemical weapons. According to Smith, PLA special operations units fall under the direct command and control of the Central Military Commission (CMC); however, there are no references to a unified Chinese SOF commandwhich would be analogous to the United States JSOC or US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)that would both coordinate all SOF activities and advocate on the behalf of the PLA SOF community within the CMC. Furthermore, the PLAs special operations units lack organic transportation units that would be comparable to the American 160th SOAR Regiment or the Navys Special Boat Unit, meaning that all PLA SOF must coordinate their operations carefully with assets from the PLAN and PLAAF. This situation is very similar to the status of American special operations units prior to the creation of JSOC in December 1980, indicating a relatively uncoordinated PLA SOF community. III. Training and Equipment Training is a key component of all SOF units. Most selection courses including the US Armys Special Forces Assessment and Selection course, the Navys

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Basic Underwater Demolitions/SEAL training, and the British Special Air Service course simply called Selectiontest the candidates ability to endure grueling physical hardship and intense mental stress. The PLA special operations training regimes are no different: The PLA has placed a high degree of emphasis on the physical and mental abilities of the candidates: The training can be grueling, and those who are found to be unsuited are cut from the program immediately. The dropout rate during initial training is said to average between 50 and 90 percent.14 These training programs can last for as many as three years, and include extensive physical conditioning and training in airborne and nighttime operations, in addition to specific environment training (i.e. desert, mountain, jungle, etc.).15 Multiple online videos display clips from various PLA SOF training evolutions; several screenshots from these videos are included here to provide examples of this training. For example, Figure 2 shows PLA SOF candidates from an
Figure 2

unknown unit performing log PT, a standard training evolution, variations of which are used heavily by American SOF training programs. Other videos show Chinese SOF units training in cold weather environments, such as that demonstrated in Figure 3. Again, these practices have parallels in American SOF

14 Op. Cit. Henderson 2006, p. 30. 15 Op. Cit. Smith 2005, p. 36.

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training, where units are conditioned to operate effectively in cold-weather environments. The majority of this basic assessment or qualification training is just a preparation for the advanced operations these units execute in the field. PLA SOF units spend considerable time in advanced tactical training, not unlike the SEAL Qualification Training undertaken by all BUD/S graduates. Again, like their American counterparts in the SEALs and Army Ranger battalions, PLA SOF units focus on close-quarters battle (CQB) drills, which involve clearing houses or other targets rapidly and
Figure 3

with extreme precision; figure 4 shows a small Chinese SOF element taking down a simulated target using standard CQB tactics. However, it is at this point that a clear distinction can be made between the PLA units and similar American SOF troops. Despite their intense training regimes and high training attrition rates, PLA SOF units

Figure 4

appear significantly less competent in executing tactical exercises than do American SOF. Furthermore, their training locations appear to be very basic, especially compared to the complex, real-world training compounds used by American SOF

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units to develop CQB tactics (see figure 5 for an example of an Army Special Forces shooting house). These shortcomings in training will almost certainly directly translate to decreased combat effectiveness. In terms of equipment, PLA special operations are again quite similar to their
Figure 5

American counterparts. Smith writes: PLA SOF is often on the leading edge of technological and tactical innovation within the Chinese military and receives the best most sophisticated equipment that the PRC can produce, buy or steal [Including] the new Type 95 5.8mm modular weapon system.16

Other PLA SOF equipment includes the PPC, a portable parachute capable of transporting a soldier and his full combat load up to forty-five miles using an

internal motor capable of speeds of between 11 and 21 miles per hour, despite being as light and as quiet as a traditional parachute. Chinese special operations units have also taken advantage of new backpack UAV technologies, which provide units with real-time over-the-next-hill combat intelligence.17 (As discussed in the preceding section, the Nanjing MRs Flying Dragons SOF unit is reported to have used these devices with stunning success in assaults on a simulated mountainous terrorist compound.) All of this information confirms that the PLA is obsessed with military hardware, even in its special operations forces. Despite their grueling assessment and selection training, PLA SOF are relatively poorly trained tactically, and their leadership seems to value equipment over operational capabilities. 16 Op. Cit. Smith 2005, p. 34. 17 Ibid, p. 35.

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VI. Mission Set and Operational Deployments In the seminal text The Science of Campaigns, which details a variety of PLA operational plans, special operations forces are considered force multipliers, affecting battlefield posture and pushing forward campaign progress; in their efforts to achieve these goals, special operations units are ordered: [T]o raid the enemys vital area targets, paralyze the enemys operational systems, reduce the enemys operational capability, and interfere, delay and disrupt the enemys operational activities in order to create favorable conditions for the main force force-units.18 These requirements demonstrate that PLA SOF units are primarily organized for direct action (DA) raids. While special reconnaissance (SR)a key role of many American SOFis treated as a core competency of PLA SOF units, it is outweighed by raid attacks, sabotage attacks, and raid-harassments, all of which fit with the traditional responsibilities of US direct action units. However, the PLA also includes special technical warfare, such as cyber-warfare, that US special operations units are not tasked to execute. Another paper, published by two Chinese military commentators, holds that the PRC classifies special operations as those adhering to: [D]etailed battle theories, such as special forces reconnaissance, attacks and sabotage, and comprehensive battle theories, such as integrated land-sea-air-space-electronic combat, all-dimensional simultaneous attacks, nonlinear combat, no-contact long-range warfare, asymmetrical combat, large-scale night combat and surgical strikes.19 This analysis confirms Smiths assertion that PLA special operations units are primarily a reconnaissance and raiding force, one capable of supporting 18 [Science of Campaigns], edited by hang Yuliang, (English translation; Beijing, PRC: National Defense University Press, 2006), p. 202. 19 Henderson 2006 p. 30.

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conventional operations or conducting them, albeit on a smaller scale and higher intensity than the conventional military.20 This is in sharp contrast to the unconventional warfare capabilities of the US Armys Green Berets, which are organized specifically to provide training and other support to foreign militaries and insurgent groups. In other words, the PLA special operations forces are trained to execute the same missions as only about half of the US special operations forces, primarily the Army Rangers and Navy SEALs. In terms of operational deployment, PLA SOF are relatively unproven, in large part thanks to the PLAs limited international military footprint; this severely constrains the degree to which Western analysts are able to compared these units to their American or British counterparts. Among those that have been deployed, SOF units from the Peoples Liberation Army Navy are among the most prominent of the Chinese SOF community, serving aboard commercial vessels in an anti-piracy capacity. Their initial deployment was announced in late 2008, when Chinese officials dispatched a small fleet of three warships to the Gulf of Aden to combat Somali pirates. The three ships were equipped with guided missiles and cannon, [in addition to] two helicopters and a detail of special forces.21 These units have seen some (albeit limited) combat action, with one commentator reporting: On February 6 [2009], seven embarked special operations forces organized crew members of Oriental Oil Explorer 1 [a PRC against an oncoming pirate speedboat, fired three warning shells, and prepared to fight when the speedboat, deterred, sped away. While this action is significant in that it is the first operational deployment of a Chinese special operations unit, and the first time a modern Chinese warship deployed in a combat operation outside of East Asia, the operational experience 20 Op. Cit. Smith, 2005, p. 57. 21 China ready to use force on Somali pirates, Channel News Asia, 23 December 2008, at <http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/398100/1/.html > [Accessed 2012.05.10]

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itself is relatively limited, especially when compared to American SOF deployments, even those not in support of the wars in Afghanistan or Iraq. Given the very low degree of operational use of the PLA special operations units, the majority of the open-source information regarding these units operational readiness focuses on military exercises rather than combat deployments. In addition to joint readiness exercises with the PRCs allies throughout the regionin which special operations units often play a key role in assaulting headquarters elements and other key strategic targets22the PLA has also tasked its special operations units with specific strategic objectives in a potential conflict with Taiwan. The perceived role of The Daggers SOF group has already been discussed, but in addition to that specialized unit, PLA SOF have spent considerable time preparing for an invasion of the island. According to an analyst with The Jamestown Foundation: In a Taiwan conflict, PLA special operations units would probably play a particularly important role in strategic reconnaissance and battle damage assessment (BDA) missions by supplementing Chinas growing space-based and airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. For example, SOF units could provide targeting data for precision strikes against critical military targets such as Taiwans major airbases or other government and military facilities. Potential direct action missions would include attacks on Taiwans airbases, command and control facilities, ISR assets, and key logistics and transportation targets such as major highways and bridges. PLA SOF could also support the efforts of main forces by seizing control of ports or airfields to facilitate their arrival on the island.23 22 The PLA At Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of Chinas Military, ed. Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell. US Army Strategic Studies Institute, 2010.06, at <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub995.pdf> [Accessed: 2012.05.10]. 23 Michael S. Chase, Chinese Special Operations Forces: Lessons Learned and Potential Missions, The Jamestown Foundation, 2007.05.09. At <http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news %5D=4033&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=197&no_cache=1> [Accessed: 2012.05.10]

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While the overall capabilities of the Chinese special operations forces are unclear at best, these units could have a major impact on the outcome of a conflict with Taiwan, if their capabilities are as comprehensive as their military exercises indicate. According to Henderson, the PLA may infiltrate, or special-forces units into Taiwan to capture or kill key government leaders in the days just before the outbreak of conventional war between the two states.24 Such a strategy has the potential to decapitate Taiwans leadership; given the PLA SOF core competencies in direct action raids, they appear to haveat least on paperthe ability to execute such an assault relatively easily. Regardless of these capabilities and shortcomings, Smiths analysis of the current PLA special operations force structure is that, for the time being, it is exactly what the Central Military Commission wants it to be: It is an interim and relatively inexpensive (though limited) power projection tool that the PRC can use while it continues to slowly modernize and acquire more conventional, expensive and technologically advanced power projection capabilities (long-range fighter-bombers, nuclear submarines, aerial refueling, modern C4ISR). PLA SOFs emphasis on DA, SR and IW make it directly attributable to the contemporary doctrine of Local War Under High Tech Conditions.25 Given that the PLA special operations forces were initially constituted as a low-cost alternative to high-tech weapons systems (which the Chinese can now easily afford) it remains to be seen whether these capabilities will be improved or expanded.

24 Op. Cit. Henderson 2006, p. 31. 25 Op. Cit. Smith 2005, p. 41.

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V. Conclusion: The Strategic Implications of PLA Special Operations Forces The United States Special Operations Commandthe organization that essentially coordinates the role of American SOF within the overall military structurehas released five SOF Truths that are used to succinctly describe the fundamental beliefs of special operations personnel. They are: (1) Humans are more important than Hardware; (2) Quality is better than Quantity; (3) Special Operations Forces cannot be mass-produced; (4) Competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after emergencies occur; (5) Most Special Operations require non-SOF assistance. Given what we know about the PLA special operations forces, how closely does their strategic role fit with these basic principles? Working backward, we see that the PLAs organizational structure does not appear to provide their special operations units with a high degree of non-SOF support. PLA special operations units lack organic transportation elements, and are controlled directly by the Central Military Commission, likely a decision effected more by politics than in the best operational interests of the state or the units. This seems to have created a relatively isolated organizational structure. On the other hand, the next three major points are closely followed: PLA SOF are subjected to rigorous training programswhich weeds out all but the top tier candidates, emphasizing quality over quantityand their establishment as part of an ongoing military modernization program was pragmatic, not reactionary. It is the first point, then, that is most problematiceven in the PLAs best-trained units, human capital is outweighed by technology, a point that is emphasized by the special operations units focus on technology-driven insertion and extraction at the expense of developing their tactical skills once on-target. This framework of analysis thus begs the question, should we even categorize these troops as special operations forces or simply as better-equipped, more rigorously trained units with specialized missions?

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While this last assertion is without doubt an overreaction to the reality facing

these units, it is critical for US strategic planners to examine the way SOF units fit within the overall PLA strategic posture, and the ways in which they will likely be used in potential conflicts. To achieve this goal we must first examine exactly what the PLA hopes to achieve with its military modernization programs. According to Smith: Local War Under High Tech Conditions emphasizes a violent, lightning-fast regional conflict that is over in a short amount of time; PLA SOF units are tailored to fit within that doctrine, focusing their efforts on DA [direct action] and SR [strategic reconnaissance] mission capabilities and the ability to strike hard and fast in support of the current military doctrine and PRC power projection objectives.26 Given this goal, even a somewhat sub-par SOF community should be capable of executing those missions for which they have been stood up. Provided the Chinese military establishment maintains its current strategic outlook, effectively preparing for any conflict with the PRC must involve preparing to counter their special operations forces. From this research, we can draw several conclusions from the current force C1: PLA special operations units are relatively similar to their American/NATO counterparts in terms of their selection and equipment. The PLA has successfully modeled their SOF training after that of their American counterparts, incorporating extensive physical and psychological assessment in these training programs, and equipping each unit with the most advanced weapons and equipment available. 26 Op. Cit. Smith 2005, p. 6. structure and tactical posture of Chinese SOF units.

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C2:

Despite these similarities, PLA SOF are shockingly one-dimensional in terms of mission requirements and are relatively poorly trained tactically, at least when compared to American SOF.

PLA SOF training styles and facilities are kept highly classifiedhowever, what information is available indicates that both are sub-standard when compared to other premier special operations units. Their mission set, too, is very one- dimensional; as opposed to American SOF, which are capable of nine primary mission types, PLA SOF are highly trained in only direct action, special reconnaissance, counter-terrorism, and information warfare. Other key SOF capabilitiesincluding foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare appear to be left out of the PLA SOF doctrine. C3: Future development of PLA SOF will likely be limited by the lack of a central organizational group comparable to the US Special Operations Command; furthermore, this disconnect will likely limit the combat utility of PLA SOF. Many of the recent successes of American SOF units are directly attributable to the establishment of Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), the organization that coordinates all of the United States special operations forces. According to Gen. Stanley McChrystal, former commander of JSOC and a major driver of organizational change within the US special operations community, the vast majority of American SOF successes would not have been possible without JSOCs strategic role.27 The lack of a comparable organization to direct PLA SOF units, combined with those units incredibly confusing organizationwith each unit having both tactical specialties and a regional designationwill likely set the stage for future operational failures not unlike Operation Eagle Claw. 27 Conversation with the author, 2012.02.03.

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C4:

The PLA continues to value hardware over human capital, even in their most highly trained military units.

The earlier discussion of PLA SOF training and equipment encompasses this point in full; these units training exercises appear more focused on leveraging technology to achieve tactical objectives instead of providing operators with the skills and experience to achieve these same objectives in austere environments. The implications of this training philosophy remain to be seen, but given the experience of other special operations units the Chinese special operations units are unlikely to achieve a high degree of success in actual combat environments. C5: Despite their shortcomings, PLA SOF units are especially well prepared for offensive military action against Taiwan; furthermore, the organization and training of The Daggers indicates that the PLA is specifically developing forces capable of executing a complex attack on the island. PLA SOF are specifically preparing to execute attacks against at least the United States allies, and likely to execute similar attacks against American targets in East Asia. Given the special relationship between the US and Taiwan, it is critically important that American strategists appreciate the capabilities of the PLAs special operations units and work to mitigate these capabilities in any potential conflict scenarios between the PRC and the US. This essay, and others that study Chinese special operations forces, is significantly limited by the lack of reliable information on a small community, the actions of which are kept highly compartmentalized. Further research is required to develop an accurate picture of Chinese SOF capabilities, and the strategic implications of their presence on the battlefield. However, any information that can be gleaned on this subject is critical in our attempts to study the units that will most likely play a major role in any conflict between China and her rivals in Asia or around the world.

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Bibliography Michael S. Chase, Chinese Special Operations Forces: Lessons Learned and Potential Missions, The Jamestown Foundation, 2007.05.09. At <http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt _news%5D=4033&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=197&no_cache=1> [Accessed: 2012.05.10] China Arsenal, Chinas Special Forces and Elite Units, 10 December 2009, at <http://china-arsenal.blogspot.com/2009/12/chinas-special-forces-and- elite-units.html> [Accessed: 2012.05.10] China ready to use force on Somali pirates, Channel News Asia, 23 December 2008, <http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/398100/1 /.html> [Accessed 2012.05.10] Scott J. Henderson, In the Shadow: Chinese Special Forces Build a 21st-Century Fighting Force, Special Warfare, July-August 2006, at <fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/ChinaSF.pdf> [Accessed: 2012.05.10]. Jens Hohmann, PLA Special Operations Forces Overview, GlobalDefence.net, 11 February 2008, at <http://www.globaldefence.net/artikel- analysen/sondereinheiten/asien/5909-china-pla-special-operations-forces- english-version.html?start=1> [Accessed: 2012.05.10]. William Lind, et. al. Fourth Generation Warfare Marine Corps Gazette 1989.10. The PLA At Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of Chinas Military, ed. Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell. US Army Strategic Studies Institute, 2010.06, at <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub995.pdf> [Accessed: 2012.05.10]. Sun Tsu, Art of War, (Giles translation; London, UK: British Museum, 1910) at < http://www.textfiles.com/etext/NONFICTION/suntx10.txt > [Accessed: 2012.05.10] Xavier G. Smith, Special Operations Forces in the Peoples Liberation Army and the Development of an Integral Unconventional Warfare Mission, Naval Postgraduate School, 2005.06.

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[Science of Campaigns], edited by hang Yuliang, (English translation; Beijing, PRC: National Defense University Press, 2006). Videos and Images Figure 1: PLA Special Operations Forces, SinoDefence.com, available at <http://www.sinodefence.com/army/organisation/special-forces.asp> [Accessed: 2012.05.10]. Figure 2: Mklookings, 2007. Training of Chinese special forces. [video online] Available at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9RaQzcB8i_A> [Accessed: 2012.05.10]. Figure 3: ITNNews, 2012. Chinese special forces show off their bizarre snow training rituals. [video online] Available at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7PKQCwdjkUg&feature=g-hist> [Accessed: 2012.05.10]. Figure 4: MegaCombat, 2012. Chinese PLA Special Forces CQB Training. [video online] Available at <http://megacombat.net/chinese-pla-special-forces-cqb- training/> [Accessed: 2012.05.10]. Figure 5: Wikipedia Commons, 2009.09.30. US Special Forces soldiers from 3rd Battalion, 10th SF Group (Airborne), conduct shoot-house training at Fort Carson Colo Sept 30 2009. Available at: <http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/eb/US_Special_Forces _soldiers_from_3rd_Battalion%2C_10th_SF_Group_%28Airborne%29%2C_co nduct_shoot-house_training_at_Fort_Carson_Colo_Sept_30_2009.jpg> [Accessed 2012.05.10]