Deceit, Deception, and Strong Opinions: Trivers on This, That, and Almost Everything but Biology

A review of

The Folly of Fools: The Logic of Deceit and Self-Deception in Human Life by Robert Trivers New York, NY: Basic Books, 2011. 397 pp. ISBN 978-0-465-02755-2. $28.00

Reviewed by Johannes I. (Hans) Bakker

The Folly of Fools: The Logic of Deceit and Self-Deception in Human Life by Robert Trivers is about the logic of deceit in human life. It is based on the idea that a great deal about everyday life could be explained much better if we paid more attention to the ways in which we human beings tend to deceive others and even ourselves. We seem to do so not only in our personal lives and as citizens, but even in our professional lives. It is certainly true that this book is provocative, as Richard Dawkins is quoted as saying on the book jacket. But it is not a work of broad science or deep scholarship; there are other books that teach far more about biology (Bell, Futuyma, Eanes, & Levinton, 2011). There are interesting comments on

biological topics, but there is no systematic effort to support the central thesis with biological evidence. Trivers offers all kinds of interesting arguments about a diverse range of topics, ranging from aerial bombing, apes, and the benefits of strong outbreeding for African Americans, to insects, false memory syndrome, male infanticide, and Zionism. But the general biological theory does not really help to explain most of the subjects in a truly scientific manner. Is it true that the logic of deceit and self-deception can contribute to a possible explanation for many aspects of human life? Yes, of course. We should never ignore the possibility that we lie to ourselves. Nor should we forget that collectivities, such as nation-states or corporations, sometimes (perhaps frequently) distort the truth. However, to attempt to explain just about everything human on the basis of deceit and deception is a kind of monocausal determinism that makes the notion of a logical explanation of social behavior (and social action) seem entirely elusive or perhaps redundant. If the biology of deceit explains most of the things that we study in the social sciences, then most social scientists have been wasting their time for at least a century. On the other hand, if the biology of deceit does not explain almost everything, then Trivers is making exaggerated claims. Trivers rarely engages with any significant social science literature outside of a select subset of psychological research articles. For example, he shows no awareness of the vast literature on popular culture (Rojek, 2012). The intriguing information he uses to try to support the general idea of deceit as THE monocausal determinant of just about everything is anecdotal information, often mixed with basic historical facts. This is not a monograph that reports research results, inside or outside of the lab. It is also not a work of carefully nuanced, well-documented scientific theory. Hence, I question whether the life scientists cited on the book jacket actually read the whole book. The Folly of Fools is not a work of true scholarship or even an excellent presentation of basic scientific ideas to a wider audience. Instead, it is a motley assemblage of opinions on this, that, and just about everything but biology. One does not learn very much about molecular biology or genetics. There is no extended discussion about the descent of human beings. There is no exploration of ecological theory and the importance of the natural environment. There is not even very much about Darwin or neo-Darwinism. There is no defense of the modern evolutionary synthesis against contrary minority scientific opinions or fundamentalist Evangelical nonscientific theories such as creationism. The book does tend to illustrate the idea that it is often difficult for someone who is utterly convinced of the truth of his or her position to even begin to explore other paradigms. Trivers does not attempt to do much more than present one aspect of the life sciences to the general public. In a popular book of this kind, meant for a broad audience, it is not uncommon for a well-known writer to make assertions that might not easily be accepted in a major scientific journal such as Nature or Science, or even a less prestigious journal such as The Scientist or Scientific American.

For example, if a reputable scientist makes some off-the-cuff remarks about false historical narratives related to such topics as the failure of mass aerial bombing during the Vietnam War, Zionism, the (Armenian and Jewish) Holocausts, or Gaza and the PalestinianIsraeli conflict, then we usually just ignore such comments as a bit of selfindulgence in an otherwise useful book; after all, the author is not a professional academic historian. But when the ratio of solidly acceptable scientific and/or historical assertions to bold conjectures and speculative assumptions becomes extreme, the result is a book like this one. Apart from some short summaries of the results of some biological research projects concerning insects and a few interesting discussions of matters commonly found on blog sites, most of what is said by the author is misleading, one-sided, or wrong. Social psychologists will, for example, find that Trivers does not seem to believe that selfpresentation and self-perception are much more than the product of deceit and self-deceit. Hence, all one can obtain are ill-defined variables that are poorly measured (p. 316). Luckily, this era [in social psychology research] is coming to a close, with new methodologies that access unconscious biases directly (p. 316; Greenwald 1980; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003; Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009). The Implicit Association Test may be a step in the right direction. That must be a relief to social psychologists everywhere. On the other hand, it is unlikely that we will really be able to access unconscious biases directly in any empirically relevant manner. The functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) research that provides a better operationalization of certain neurobiological processes may be a step in the right direction (Klein et al., 2003; Kovalev, Kruggel, & von Cramon, 2003). But most fMRI findings are tentative, and they do not provide direct access. Valid measurement of the kinds of variables Trivers emphasizes may be a long way off. The title of this book is The Folly of Fools. The idea seems to be that unless one is a mathematician, a natural scientist, or, at the very least, a life scientist, then one is a fool. Even the natural and life scientists get it wrong sometimes, but, it is argued, the social and social psychological approach to social science is almost invariably incorrect. Trivers maintains that we are all deceiving ourselves. But he does not base that argument on a deep study of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Nietzsche, Stirner, Marx, Kierkegaard, Sartre, Derrida, Foucault, or other relevant thinkers. He has seemingly chosen to not mention a host of thinkers who have examined epistemological problems directly relevant to his main theme. He seems to be ignorant of giants in social science such as Jrgen Habermas (Ungureanu, Guenther, & Joerges, 2011). Trivers says we are fooling ourselves in trying to create a social science, but there is very little actual discussion of anthropology, sociology, or economics. The social science that Trivers advocates is one that is based almost entirely on his own rather idiosyncratic personal version of the theory of natural selection, a theory he feels many biologists have gotten wrong for quite a long time. He argues that biologists need to learn that the basic unit

of natural selection is the individual organism and not the social group. He contends that there is no such thing as altruism among bees or bonobos. Trivers does not even accept Wilsons (1994) general viewpoint. Richard Dawkins states on the book jacket that Triverss Darwinian theory of selfdeception is arguably his most provocative and interesting idea so far. If that is true, then earlier ideas put forward by Trivers must be sorely lacking. As mentioned, his theory is provocative, but it is probably also largely incorrect. If anyone is fooled by this book, he or she will find out that reducing everything to natural selection is a strategy that cuts both ways. How can we know that Trivers himself is not lying to us? Why does he not reveal when he is almost completely ignorant of a topic? Trivers uses evidence in an unsystematic manner. He marshals information as if it were conclusive evidence, a bit like a lawyer arguing a brief. His offhand comments on parenting seem better suited to a blog. He makes assertions about group dynamics that would not pass muster in a refereed journal article. He frequently makes assertions about topics such as religion that cannot possibly be anything other than conjectures. There is no sustained discussion of the function of world religions to provide the basis for nonkin societal legitimate authority (Weber, 1968). He does not really attempt to even begin to survey the relevant literature on the sociology of religion or political science. He does not adequately cite the literature for the disciplines he discusses (e.g., general psychology, social psychology, history). Trivers often uses homey examples concerning his own personal dishonesty with others and with himself in order to give the general thesis an air of authenticity and honesty. But the anecdotal evidence does not amount to anything more than a set of suggestive hypotheses. He claims that his version of biological evolutionary theory can unravel the riddles of human life to an extent that no other paradigmatic position can possibly do. Although, according to Trivers, biologists themselves have not always gotten their interpretation of Darwin right, particularly when writing about altruism, at least the modern evolutionary synthesis has a solid-enough basis in molecular biology and genetics that it can be seen as clearly connected to chemistry and, in turn, physics. Hence we can have what E. O. Wilson, following William Whewell, has called consilience (Wilson, 1998). (Whewell was the first person to coin the term scientist. Previously scientists had been known as natural philosophers or men of science.) Trivers (p. 316) is fundamentally incorrect in his assertion that deceit and selfdeception have had a significant retarding effect on disciplines with more social content. He uses the term social to not only mean humanly social but indeed the social aspect of all animal species. Examples are drawn from entomology and ornithology for biological social theory. Hence, biology is also flawed, but not nearly as severely as anthropology, psychoanalysis, psychology, economics, sociology, and political science. Trivers relies on a kind of scientism that is rarely defended anymore in print. The author says that the social sciences should in principle be based on biology, whereas

biology is based on chemistry, chemistry is based on physics, physics is based on mathematics, and there you have it (p. 306). Yet there is no advanced mathematics in this book, either. Trivers says that religions hold a recipe for self deception (pp. 282283). Nevertheless, religious practice appears to be correlated with health. At the same time, religions are also correlated with disease. His speculative theory of parasite load is interesting. Trivers argues that when there is a high degree of human loss of life due to parasites, then we will find many more religions (and languages) than when the parasite load is low. Parasites also help to explain ingroup deceit and self-deception. This may be especially true of the polytheistic religions, but with monotheism came additional forces of self-deception associated with global conquest and a single, dominant spirit (p. 280). It is well known in comparative religious studies that there is no simple evolution from polytheism to monotheism, despite the 19th-century belief in such unilinear evolutionism. Trivers mentions at the outset that the chapter on religion (Chapter 12) is very tentative: He does not really know very much about polytheism or the great Eastern religions (p. 277). He does not consider the idea that death due to parasites has been part of the human condition throughout human evolution (not to mention before). If his theory were correct, then there would be little reason for Protestant denominations to remain divided in a world where the parasite ratio is very low. The Folly of Fools is a provocative and often-stimulating book, notable for what it omits as well as for what it includes. But this book would not be a good textbook for students. If it is cited in an academic paper, it will hopefully not be to bolster a position with an argument by authority. Trivers has been a creative and innovative thinker, and this book gives some indication of his important gadfly function, but we will have to wait for a more theoretically grounded, empirically based monograph to be able to fully evaluate the scientific part of the contribution.

References
Bell, M. A., Futuyma, D. J., Eanes, W. F., & Levinton, J. S. (Eds.). (2011). Evolution since Darwin: The first 150 years. Sunderland, MA: Sinhauer Associates. Greenwald, A. G. (1980). The totalitarian ego: Fabrication and revision of personal history. American Psychologist, 35, 603618. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.35.7.603 Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. L. K. (1998). Measuring individual differences in implicit cognition: The Implicit Association Test. Journal of Personality

and Social Psychology, 74, 14641480. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.74.6.1464 Greenwald, A. G., Nosek, B. A., & Banaji, M. R. (2003). Understanding and using the Implicit Association Test: I. An improved scoring algorithm. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85, 197216. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.85.2.197 Greenwald, A. G., Poehlman, T. A., Uhlmann, E., & Banaji, M. R. (2009). Understanding and using the Implicit Association Test: III. Meta-analysis of predictive validity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97, 1741. doi:10.1037/a0015575 Klein, S., Smolka, M. N., Wrase, J., Grusser, S. M., Mann, K., Braus, D. F., & Heinz, A. (2003). The influence of gender and emotional valence of visual cues on fMRI activation in humans. Pharmacopsychiatry, 36(Suppl. 3), S191S194. doi:10.1055/ s-2003-45129 Kovalev, V. A., Kruggel, F., & von Cramon, Y. (2003). Gender and age effects in structural brain asymmetry as measured by fMRI texture analysis. NeuroImage, 19, 895905. doi:10.1016/S1053-8119(03)00140-X Rojek, C. (Ed.). (2012). Popular culture: Critical concepts in media and cultural studies. London, England: Routledge. Ungureanu, C., Guenther, K., & Joerges, C. (Eds.). (2011). Jrgen Habermas. London, England: Ashgate. Weber, M. (1968). Economy and society. Berkeley: University of California Press. Wilson, E. O. (1994). Naturalist. Washington, DC: Island Press. Wilson, E. O. (1998). Consilience: The unity of knowledge. New York, NY: Knopf.

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July 4, 2012, Vol. 57, Release 26, Article 3 2012, American Psychological Association