UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ) Criminal Number:

)
vs. ) Count One:
) 18 U.S.C. § 371
TODD A. BOULANGER, ) (Conspiracy)
)
Defendant. )

PLEA AGREEMENT

The United States of America, by and through the undersigned attorneys for the Public

Integrity Section. Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, and Todd A. Boulanger

(hereinafter referred to as the 'defendant") enter into the following agreement:

Charges and Statutory Penalties

The defendant agrees to plead guilty to Count One of the Information, conspiracy to commit

honest services wire fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371.

2. The defendant understands that Count One has the following essential elements, each of

which the United States would be required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt at trial:

a. First, an agreement between two or more persons to commit an offense against the

United States, that is, devising and intending to devise a scheme and artifice to

defraud another of the intangible right to honest services, and, for the purpose of

executing that scheme and artifice to defraud, transmitting and causing to transmit

writings by means of interstate wire communications;

 b. Second, that the defendant knowingly participated in the conspiracy described in

paragraph a. above with the intent to commit honest services fraud; and

c. Third, an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.

3. The defendant understands that pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 371, Count

One carries a maximum sentence of 5 years of imprisonment, a fine of $250,000 or a fine

of twice the pecuniary gain or loss pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d), a $100 special

assessment, and a three-year term of supervised release, an order of restitution, and an

obligation to pay any applicable interest or penalties on fines or restitution not timely made.

4. lfthe Court accepts the defendant's plea of guilty and the defendant fulfills each of the terms

and conditions of this agreement, the United States agrees that it will not further prosecute

the defendant for any crimes described in the attached factual basis or for any conduct of the

defendant now known to the Public Integrity Section and to the law enforcement agents

working with the Public Integrity Section on the present investigation. Nothing in this

agreement is intended to provide any limitation of liability arising out of any acts of

violence.

Factual Stipulations

5. The defendant agrees that the attached 'Factual Basis for Plea" fairly and accurately

describes the defendant's actions and involvement in the offense to which the defendant is

pleading guilty. The defendant knowingly, voluntarily and truthfully admits the facts set

forth in the Factual Basis for Plea.

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Sentencing

6. The defendant is aware that the sentence will be imposed by the Court after considering the

Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Policy Statements (hereinafter "Sentencing Guidelines"

or "U.S.S.G."). The defendant acknowledges and understands that the Court will compute

an advisory sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines and that the applicable guidelines will

be determined by the Court relying in part on the results of a Pre-Sentence Investigation by

the Court's Probation Office, which investigation will commence after the guilty plea has

been entered. The defendant is also aware that, under certain circumstances, the Court may

depart from the advisory sentencing guideline range that it has computed, and may raise that

advisory sentence up to and including the statutory maximum sentence or lower that

advisory sentence. The defendant is further aware and understands that the Court is required

to consider the advisory guideline range determined under the Sentencing Guidelines, but

is not bound to impose that sentence; the Court is permitted to tailor the ultimate sentence

in light of other statutory concerns, and such sentence may be either more severe or less

severe than the Sentencing Guidelines' advisory sentence. Knowing these facts, the

defendant understands and acknowledges that the Court has the authority to impose any

sentence within and up to the statutory maximum authorized by law for the offense identified

in paragraph I and that the defendant may not withdraw the plea solely as a result of the

sentence imposed.

7. The United States reserves the right to inform the Court and the Probation Office of all facts

pertinent to the sentencing process, including all relevant information concerning the

offenses committed, whether charged or not, as well as concerning the defendant and the

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 defendant's background. Subject only to the express terms of any agreed-upon sentencing

recommendations contained in this agreement, the United States further reserves the right

to make any recommendation as to the quality and quantity of punishment.

8. The defendant is aware that any estimate of the probable sentence or the probable sentencing

range relating to the defendant pursuant to the advisory Sentencing Guidelines that the

defendant may have received from any source is only a prediction and not a promise, and is

not binding on the United States, the Probation Office, or the Court, except as expressly

provided in this plea agreement.

Sentencing Guidelines Stipulations

9. The defendant understands that the sentence in this case will be determined by the Court,

pursuant to the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including a consideration of the

guidelines and policies promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission,

Guidelines Manual 2003. The parties agree that the 2003 Edition of the Sentencing

Guidelines is the edition that should apply to sentencing in this case. U,S.S.G. §

1 B 1 .11 (b)( I). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure ii (c)( I )(B), and to assist the

Court in determining the appropriate sentence, the parties also agree to the following:

a. Offense Level under the Guidelines

The parties agree to recommend that the total offense level applicable to the defendant's

offense conduct is level 18. This calculation is based upon U.S.S.G. § 2C1.7(a), which prescribes

a base offense level of 10, and U.S.S.G. § 2C1,7(b)(1)(B), which provides for an 8-level upward

adjustment where the offense involves an official holding a high-level decision-making or sensitive

position. The parties agree that this adjustment applies because it is greater than or equal to any

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adjustment which might otherwise have applied based on value under U.S.S.G. § 2C1 .7(b)(1)(A)

and 2B1.I.

b. Acceptance of Responsibility

Provided that the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility, to the

satisfaction of the United States, through the defendant's allocution and subsequent conduct prior

to the imposition of sentence, the United States agrees that a 2-level reduction would be appropriate,

pursuant to U.S.S.G § 3E1.1(a).

The United States, however, may oppose any adjustment for acceptance of responsibility if

the defendant:

i. fails to admit a complete factual basis for the plea at the time the defendant

is sentenced or at any other time;

ii. challenges the adequacy or sufficiency of the United States' offer of proof at

any time after the plea is entered;

iii. denies involvement in the offense;

iv. gives conflicting statements about that involvement or is untruthful with the

Court, the United States or the Probation Office;

v. fails to give complete and accurate information about the defendant's

financial status to the Probation Office;

vi. obstructs or attempts to obstruct justice, prior to sentencing;

vii. has engaged in conduct prior to signing this plea agreement which reasonably

could be viewed as obstruction or an attempt to obstruct justice, and has

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 failed to fully disclose such conduct to the United States prior to signing this

plea agreement;

viii. fails to appear in court as required;

ix. after signing this plea agreement, engages in additional criminal conduct; or

x. attempts to withdraw the plea of guilty.

If the defendant has accepted responsibility as described above, and the defendant's offense

level is sixteen or greater, the United States agrees that an additional 1-level reduction would be

appropriate, pursuant to § 3E1.1(b), U.S.S.G., because the defendant has assisted authorities by

providing timely notice of the defendant's intention to enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting the

United States to avoid preparing for trial and permitting the Court to allocate its resources

efficiently.

In accordance with the above, the applicable Guidelines Offense Level is 15 (after a 3-level

reduction for acceptance of responsibility). The United States agrees that no other Chapters Two

or Three adjustments are warranted.

c. Criminal History Category

Based upon the information now available to the United States (including representations

by the defense), it appears that the defendant has no prior criminal history.

In accordance with the above, the defendant's Criminal History Category is I.

d. Applicable Guideline Range

Based upon the calculations set forth above, the defendant's applicable Sentencing

Guidelines range is 18 to 24 months (the 'App1icab1e Guidelines Range"). In addition, the parties

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agree should the Court impose a fine, at Guidelines level 15, the applicable fine range is $4,000 to

$40,000.

Agreement as to Sentencing Allocution

10. The parties further agree that a sentence within the Applicable Guidelines Range would

constitute a reasonable sentence in light of all of the lactors set forth in Title 1 8, United

States Code, Section 3553(a). However, the United States also agrees that the defendant

may seek a sentence lower than the Applicable Guidelines Range and suggest that the Court

consider a sentence lower than the Applicable Guidelines Range, based upon the factors to

be considered in imposing a sentence pursuant to Title 1 8, United States Code, Section

3553(a).

11. If the defendant seeks a sentence lower than the Applicable Guidelines Range (to include

any reduction that the United States may recommend pursuant to paragraphs 13 and 14

below), the United States reserves the right to oppose defendant's position. Additionally,

if the defendant elects to seek such a sentence, the defendant agrees to provide to the United

States reports, motions, memoranda of law and documentation of any kind on which the

defendant intends to rely at sentencing not later than twenty-one days before sentencing.

Any basis for sentencing with respect to which all expert reports, motions, memoranda of

law and documentation have not been provided to the United States at least twenty-one days

before sentencing shall be deemed waived.

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Substantial Assistance

2. The defendant agrees to cooperate fully with the United States by:

a. providing truthful and complete information and testimony, and producing

documents, records and other evidence, when called upon by the United States,

whether in interviews, before a grand jury, or at any trial or other court proceeding;

b. appearing at such grand jury proceedings, hearings, trials, depositions, and other

judicial proceedings, and at meetings, as may be required by the United States

continuing through any period of probation or supervised release;

c. if requested by the United States, working in an undercover role to contact and

negotiate with others suspected and believed to be involved in criminal misconduct

under the supervision of, and in compliance with, law enforcement officers and

agents; and

d. waiving any right to a prompt sentencing and joining in any requests by the United

States to postpone the defendant's sentencing until the defendant's cooperation is

complete. The defendant understands that the date of sentencing is within the sole

discretion of the Court, and that this agreement may require the defendant to

cooperate even after the defendant has been sentenced. The defendant's failure to

cooperate pursuant to the terms of this agreement after sentence has been imposed

shall constitute a breach of this agreement.

13. The United States reserves the right to evaluate the nature and extent of the defendant's

cooperation and to make the defendant's cooperation, or lack thereof, known to the Court

at the time of sentencing. If in the sole and unreviewable judgment of the United States the

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 defendant's cooperation is of such quality and significance to the investigation or

prosecution of other criminal matters as to warrant the Court's downward departure from the

advisory sentence calculated under the Sentencing Guidelines, the United States may at or

before sentencing make a motion consistent with the intent of Section 5K1.l of the

Sentencing Guidelines prior to sentencing, or Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure subsequent to sentencing, reflecting that the defendant has provided substantial

assistance and recommending that the defendant's sentence be reduced from the advisory

sentence suggested by the Sentencing Guidelines. The defendant acknowledges and agrees,

however, that nothing in this agreement may be construed to require the United States to file

any such motion(s) and that the United States' assessment of the nature, value, truthfulness,

completeness, and accuracy of the defendant's cooperation shall be binding insofar as the

appropriateness of the United States' filing of any such motion is concerned.

14. The defendant understands and acknowledges that the Court is under no obligation to grant

the Section 5K 1.1 or Rule 35 motions referenced above should the government exercise its

discretion to file any such motion. The defendant also understands and acknowledges that

the Court is under no obligation to reduce the defendant's sentence because of the

defendant's cooperation.

15. Pursuant to § IBL8(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines, the United States agrees that self

incriminating information provided by the defendant pursuant to this agreement to cooperate

will not be used in determining the applicable guideline range, except as may be provided

in this agreement and under § lB 1.8(b) of the Sentencing Guidelines.

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Court Not Bound by the Plea Agreement

16. It is understood that pursuant to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure I 1(c)(1)(B) and

11 (c)(3)(B) the Court is not bound by the above recommendations or stipulations, either as

to questions of fact or as to the parties' determination of the Applicable Guidelines Range,

or other sentencing issues. In the event that the Court considers any Guidelines adjustments,

departures, or calculations different from any recommendations or stipulations contained in

this agreement, or contemplates a sentence outside the Applicable Guidelines Range based

upon the general sentencing factors listed in Title 18, United States Code, Section 3553(a),

the parties reserve the right to answer any related inquiries from the Court.

Appeal Waiver

17. The defendant is aware that the defendant has the right to challenge the defendant's sentence

and guilty plea on direct appeal. The defendant is also aware that the defendant may, in

some circumstances, be able to argue that the defendant's guilty plea should be set aside, or

sentence set aside or reduced, in a collateral challenge (such as pursuant to a motion under

28 U.S.C. § 2255). Knowing that, and in consideration of the concessions made by the

United States in this agreement, the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives his right

to appeal or collaterally challenge: (a) any defect in the criminal charge or the timing,

manner, or venue in which the charge is brought by the United States; and (b) the

defendant's sentence or the manner in which his sentence was determined pursuant to 18

U.S.C. §3 742. Notwithstanding the waiver above, the defendant shall be able to appeal his

sentence if(i) the Court sentences the defendant to a period of imprisonment longer than the

statutory maximum, or (ii) the Court departs upward from the Applicable Guidelines Range

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 pursuant to the provisions of U.S.S.G. §SK.2 or the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a).

18. The defendant further understands that nothing in this agreement shall affect Public

Integrity's right and/or duty to appeal as set forth in Title 18, United States Code, Section

3742(b). However, if the United States appeals the defendant's sentence pursuant to Section

3742(b), the defendant shall be released from the above waiver of appellate rights. By

signing this agreement, the defendant acknowledges that the defendant has discussed the

appeal waiver set forth in this agreement with the defendant's attorney. The defendant

further agrees, together with the United States, to request that the district court enter a

specific finding that the waiver of the defendant's right to appeal the sentence to be imposed

in this case was knowing and voluntary.

19. The defendant's waiver of rights to appeal and to bring collateral challenges shall not apply

to appeals or challenges based on new legal principles set forth in the cases of the United

States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit or Supreme Court, which are decided after the

date of this agreement and which are held by the D.C. Circuit or Supreme Court to have

retroactive effect.

Release/Detention

20. The defendant acknowledges that while the United States will not seek to detain the

defendant or otherwise change the defendant's release conditions pending sentencing, the

final decision regarding the defendant's bond status or detention will be made by the Court

at the time of the defendant's plea of guilty. Should the defendant engage in further criminal

conduct or violate any conditions of release prior to sentencing, however, the United States
 may move to change the defendant's conditions of release or move to revoke the defendant's

release.

Breach of Agreement

21. The defendant understands and agrees that if, after entering this plea agreement, the

defendant fails specifically to perform or to fulfill completely each and every one of the

defendant's obligations under this plea agreement, or engages in any criminal activity prior

to sentencing, the defendant will have breached this plea agreement. In the event of such a

breach: (a) the United States will be free from its obligations under the agreement; (b) the

defendant will not have the right to withdraw the guilty plea; (c) the defendant shall be fully

subject to criminal prosecution for any other crimes, including perjury and obstruction of

justice; and (d) the United States will be free to use against the defendant, directly and

indirectly, in any criminal or civil proceeding, all statements made by the defendant and any

of the information or materials provided by the defendant, including such statements,

information and materials provided pursuant to this agreement or during the course of any

debriefings conducted in anticipation of, or after entry of this agreement, including the

defendant's statements made during proceedings before the Court pursuant to Fed. R. Crim.

P. 11.

22. The defendant understands that Federal Rule ofCriminal Procedure I 1(0 and Federal Rule

of Evidence 410 ordinarily limit the admissibility of statements made by a defendant in the

course of plea discussions or plea proceedings if a guilty plea is later withdrawn. The

defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives the rights which arise under these rules.

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23. The defendant understands and agrees that the United States shall only be required to prove

a breach of this plea agreement by a preponderance of the evidence. The defendant further

understands and agrees that the United States need only prove a violation of federal, state,

or local criminal law by probable cause in order to establish a breach of this plea agreement.

24. Nothing in this agreement shall be construed to permit the defendant to commit perjury, to

make false statements or declarations, to obstruct justice, or to protect the defendant from

prosecution for any crimes not included within this agreement or committed by the defendant

after the execution of this agreement. The defendant understands and agrees that the United

States reserves the right to prosecute the defendant for any such offenses. The defendant

further understands that any perjury, false statements or declarations, or obstruction of

justice relating to the defendant's obligations under this agreement shall constitute a breach

of this agreement. However, in the event of such a breach, the defendant will not be allowed

to withdraw this guilty plea.

Waiver of Statute of Limitations

25. It is further agreed that should any conviction following the defendant's plea of guilty

pursuant to this agreement be vacated for any reason, then any prosecution that is not time-

barred by the applicable statute of limitations on the date of the signing of this agreement

(including any counts that the United States has agreed not to prosecute or to dismiss at

sentencing pursuant to this agreement) may be commenced or reinstated against the

defendant, notwithstanding the expiration of the statute of limitations between the signing

of this agreement and the commencement or reinstatement of such prosecution. It is the

L)
 intent of this agreement to waive all defenses based on the statute of limitations with respect

to any prosecution that is not time-barred on the date that this agreement is signed.

Miscellaneous

26. Other than those contained in writing herein, no agreements, promises, understandings, or

representations have been made by the parties or their counsel, nor will any such agreements,

promises, understandings, or representations be made unless committed to writing and

signed by the defendant, defense counsel, and a prosecutor for the Public Integrity Section.

27. The defendant understands that the United States will offer to enter into a non-prosecution

agreement with defendant's spouse if defendant's spouse's cooperation is required in this

investigation, in exchange for that individual's full and complete cooperation, pursuant to

which the United States will agree not to charge that individual with any offenses arising

from facts disclosed at her interview(s) with the United States, with the exception of perjury,

false statements, obstruction, or any charge relating to an act of violence.

28. The defendant further understands that this agreement is binding only, upon the Criminal

Division, United States Department of Justice and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District

of Maryland. This agreement does not bind the Civil Division or any 'other United States

Attorney's Office, nor does it bind any other state, local, or federal prosecutor. It also does

not bar or compromise any civil, tax, or administrative claim pending or that may be made

against the defendant.

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29. If the foregoing terms and conditions are satisfactory, the defendant may so indicate by

signing the agreement in the space indicated below and returning the original to me once it

has been signed by the defendant and by you or other defense counsel.

Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM M. WELCH II
Chief
Public Integrity Section

By: 11_JJLc
M. Kendall Day (3
Peter C. Sprung
Trial Attorneys
Public Integrity Section
1400 New York Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 514-1412

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 DEFENDANT'S ACCEPTANCE

I have read this agreement in its entirety and discussed it with my attorney. I hereby

acknowledge that it fully sets forth my agreement with the United States. I further state that no

ajditional promises or representations have been made to me by any official of the United States

in connection with this matter. I understand the crime to which I have agreed to plead guilty, the

maximum penalties for that offense and Sentencing Guideline penalties potentially applicable to

it. I am satisfied with the legal representation provided to me by my attorney. We have had

sufficient time to meet and discuss my case. We have discussed the charge against me, possible

defenses I might have, the terms of this plea agreement and whether 1 should go to trial. I am

entering into this agreement freely, voluntarily, and knowingly because I am guilty of the offense

to which I am pleading guilty, and I believe this agreement is in my best interest.

Date A.Boulaer
Defendant

ATTORNEY'S ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I have read each of the pages constituting this plea agreement, reviewed them with my

client, and discussed the provisions of the agreement with my client, fully. These pages accurately

and completely sets forth the entire plea agreement. I concur in my client's desire to plead guilty

as set forth in this agreement.

Date:
T. Mark Flan4in, Jr., E
McKenna Lg & Aldri
Attorney f the Defend

16
 FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE PLEA
OF TODD BOULANGER

This statement is submitted to provide a factual basis for my plea of guilty to the

conspiracy charge filed against me.

All dates in this Factual Basis are "on or about" the specific date stated.

1. From 1999 to 2004, defendant TODD BOULANGER was a Washington, D.C. lobbyist.

In 1999, defendant BOULANGER joined a law and lobbying firm ("Firm A") to work

with other lobbyists, including Jack Abramoff. In January 2001, defendant

BOULANGER left Firm A with Abramoff to take a lobbying job at Firm B, another law

and lobbying firm in Washington, D.C.

2. From December 1999 to 2004, Kevin Ring was a Washington, D.C. lobbyist. From 1999

through March 2004, Ring worked with Abramoff, defendant BOULANGER, and other

lobbyists, first at Firm A and later at Firm B.

While working at Firms A and B and continuing until at least early 2004, defendant

BOULANGER, together with Abramoff, Ring, and other lobbyists working at Firms A

and B, established contacts with federal legislative branch and executive branch public

officials who could use their influence and positions to perform official actions that

would assist defendant BOULANGER and the other lobbyists to promote their clients'

interests. Defendant BOULANGER and other lobbyists working at Firms A and B

offered and provided a stream of things of value to certain of these public officials in an

effort to reward those public officials for actions they had taken, to influence those public

officials in their official actions, and to make those public officials more receptive to

requests for official actions in the future.

The things of value defendant BOULANGER, Abramoff, Ring, and other lobbyists

working at Firms A and B offered and provided to the public officials included, but were

not limited to, all-expensespaid travel; tens of thousands of dollars worth of tickets to

professional sporting events, music concerts, and other events; and frequent and

expensive meals and drinks at Washington, D.C. area restaurants and bars.

The official actions defendant BOULANGER and other lobbyists working at Firms A

and B sought and obtained from the public officials included, but were not limited to, the

insertion or protection of legislative appropriations; the insertion, protection, removal, or

prevention of legislative amendments; and lobbying by the public officials of other

legislative and executive branch officials to take or abstain from taking official action.

Defendant BOULANGER and the other lobbyists attempted to conceal, and did conceal,

their practice of providing things of value to certain public officials as a means of

influencing and rewarding official action. For example, defendant BOULANGER filed

expense reimbursement reports that attempted to conceal the identity of the public

officials who received things of value in order to conceal these facts from the public.

Defendant BOULANGER believed that if the public learned of the things of value given

to certain of the public officials, the officials would be less willing to accept things of

value in the future and to take action for the benefit of the clients of Firms A and B.

Defendant BOULANGER also generally was aware that the public officials' conduct was

governed by Congressional and Executive branch gift rules, some of which necessarily

were violated by the public officials' receipt olthe travel, tickets, meals and drinks

described above.

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7. As part of the course of conduct described above, defendant BOULANGER and others

committed acts involving multiple public officials, including, but not limited to, the

following:

Conduct Involving Staffer D and Person #1

In August 2003, defendant BOULANGER and James Hirni another lobbyist who then

worked for a different lobbying firm - were hired by a construction equipment rental

company (the "Equipment Rental Company") to lobby public officials in the U.S. House

of Representatives and the U.S. Senate to take official action favorable to Equipment

Rental Company.

In 2003, Person #1 worked at Equipment Rental Company, and Person #1 was the main

point of contact for defendant BOULANGER and Hirni.

10. Among other things, defendant BOULANGER, Hirni, and Person #1 sought a legislative

amendment that would encourage state public works agencies to rent rather than purchase

construction equipment (the "Equipment Rental Amendment"). Defendant

BOULANGER, Hirni, and Person #1 also sought a legislative amendment that would

encourage state public works agencies to contract only with those companies - such as

Equipment Rental Company - which had large dollar amounts of liability insurance

coverage (the "Liability Insurance Amendment"). Defendant BOULANGER, Hirni, and

Person #1 sought to have these amendments inserted into legislation re-authorizing a

federal highway funding bill which was pending before both chambers of Congress (the

"Federal Highway Bill").

11. Defendant BOULANGER assisted in identifying two staffers as important to the efforts

of him, Hirni, and Person #1 to insert these amendments into Federal Highway Bill. One

of those staffers was Staffer D, who worked in the House of Representatives Committee

on Transportation and Infrastructure, which had primary responsibility for the Federal

Highway Bill in the House. The other was Trevor Blackann, who worked for a Senator

on the Senate Committee on the Environment and Public Works (the "EPW

Committee"), which had primary responsibility for the Federal Highway Bill in the

Senate.

12. On October 18 and 19, 2003, Hirni and Person #1 of the Equipment Rental Company

provided an all-expenses-paid trip to Game One of the Baseball World Series in New

York City to Staffer D and Blackann, in part to influence Staffer D and Blackann to take

official action favorable to the Equipment Rental Company in connection with the

Federal I-lighway Bill. Although defendant BOULANGER did not go on the trip, it

occurred with his knowledge and approval. The things of value provided to Staffer D

and Blackann included round-trip airfare, use of a chauffeured vehicle, hotel

accommodations at a New York City hotel, dinner at a restaurant, tickets to Game One of

the Baseball World Series, souvenir baseball jerseys, and admission to and entertainment

at a strip club.

13. On October 22, 2003, defendant BOULANGER emailed a draft of the two amendments

to Blackann, Person #1, and Hirni, so that Blackann could use them as a place holder

with the EPW Committee.

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14. On October 22, 2003, Hirni emailed to Staffer D information about the two amendments

Equipment Rental Company sought to insert in Federal Highway Bill, seeking Staffer

D's assistance.

15. On October 27, 2003, Staffer D emailed Hirni that Equipment Rental Company's two

amendments needed "more work for anyone to be able to help with progress."

16. On October 30, 2003, defendant BOULANGER emailed Hirni and Person #1 a copy of

"the new amendment that was requested by the House authors" of the Federal Highway

Bill, explaining that the amendment offered in the House "opens the entire highway and

transit titles to construction equipment leasing."

17. In January 2004, defendant BOULANGER, Hirni, Blackann, Staffer D, and Person #1

took steps to protect the Equipment Rental Amendment, which by that time had been

inserted into the Senate version of Federal Highway Bill, from a challenge small business

owners and companies which sold and distributed - rather than rented - construction

equipment (the "Equipment Distributors") were mounting to the Amendment. The steps

taken to protect the Equipment Rental Amendment included, among other things, the

following:

a. On January 13, 2004, Person #1 forwarded to others at the Equipment Rental

Company an email that a representative of the Equipment Distributors had sent to

Blackann, alerting his colleagues to the Equipment Distributors' lobbying effort

to remove the Equipment Rental Amendment from the Federal Highway Bill.

Person #1 informed the others at Equipment Rental Company that, "Our guys
 don't think it is going to be a problem. We have a much stronger relationship and

we are already in the bill, and soon to be in the house bill too."

b. On January 20, 2004, Blackann emailed defendant BOULANGER and Hirni

about a meeting Blackann had held with the Equipment Distributors'

representative referenced above. Blackann explained that he concealed from the

Equipment Distributors' representative the reason Blackann had supported the

Equipment Rental Amendment, and told defendant BOULANGER and Hirni:

"HE HAS NO IDEA THAT WE DID THIS FOR YOU. I TOLD HIM [that the

Senator for whom Blackann worked] CAME UP WITH IT HIMSELF. IN FACT,

I MAY HAVE SPECIFiCALLY SAID THAT I DID NOT DO IT FOR

[Equipment Rental Company]".

c. In January 2004, Staffer D suggested to defendant BOULANGER that

BOULANGER organize a letter writing campaign from the owners and operators

of individual Equipment Rental Company facilities to Congressional members, in

order to counter the Equipment Distributors' efforts to oppose the Equipment

Rental Amendment.

Conduct Involving a Legislative Assistant to a United States Senator

18. Defendant BOULANGER, Abramoff, Ring, and others in Firms A and B had as a

lobbying client a Native American Tribe located in Mississippi ("Mississippi Tribe").

Defendant BOULANGER, together with Abramoff, Ring, and others, established contact

with a legislative assistant who worked for a United States Senator from Mississippi

6
 ("Staffer E") and who could assist them in promoting Firm A's and B's interests in

representing the Mississippi Tribe.

19. On March 11, 2002, Staffer E emailed Ring a request for tickets to a variety of concerts

and sporting events, which read as follows:

McCartney: 2 or 4
Ice: 2, 3, 4 or 5
And, any of the following:
Floor tickets for the Circus any day except Saturday, March 23 at 7:30.
2, 4 or 6 tickets[.] I'm only interested in the floor for that event, if
available.
NSYNC - anything from 3 to 6 tickets
Hockey: Saturday, March 30: 5 to 7 tickets -. any floor.
Greenday [sic]: 3 to 6 tickets.

Ring forwarded Staffer F's email to Abrarnoff and BOULANGER, telling them "Wow,

We already told her she was fine on McCartney, ice skating, and Green Day - although

we need to let her know how many tix she can have for each. Also, please review the

other requests and let me know what we can do there." BOULANGER responded to

Ring and Abrarnoft "[Staffer F] should get everything she wants," to which Abrarnoff

replied, "She'll get everything she wants."

20. Thereafter, from March 2002 through early 2004, defendant BOULANGER, Ring,

Abramoff, and others in Firm B provided to Staffer E a stream of things of value which

included numerous tickets, meals and drinks - with the value of these things exceeding

$25,000 - to influence Staffer E to take official action favorable to Firm B and Firm B's

representation of the Mississippi Tribe, and Staffer E on repeated occasions during this

same time period provided and agreed to provide such official actions. The things of

value and official action included, for example, the following:

a. On September 11, 2002, Abramoffemailed defendant BOULANGER and Ring

asking if he could switch Staffer E's Washington Redskins football tickets from

the lower box suite to the upper suite (which was less desirable than the lower

box suite). In recommending that Abramoff not switch Staffer F to the upper box

suite, defendant BOULANGER responded to Ring and Abramoff, To be honest,

she's more valuable to us than a rank and file house member."

b. On December 9, 2002, defendant BOULANGER emailed Staffer E and one of her

colleagues requesting that they ask a different staffer to facilitate, among other

things, an additional $2 million to an existing appropriation for the Mississippi

Tribe.

c. On February 11,2003, Staffer E emailed defendant BOULANGER asking if she

could have the entire box suite at Camden Yards in Baltimore for a baseball game

in June. Defendant BOULANGER responded, 'I'll make it happen. BTW, did

[another staffer] pull out the [Mississippi Tribe's] IHS language [from an

appropriation's bill]?" Staffer E replied, [the other staffer] said this morning that

he'd triple check. I saw the notes, and there was a defiant note to take care of it.

On the other thing: you are awesome."

d. On February 27, 2003, Staffer E emailed defendant BOULANGER that she was

taking her special guests" to an upcoming Liza Mmdli concert and asking if the

box suite would have refreshments. in response, defendant BOULANGER asked

for Staffer E's thoughts on a Homeland Security appropriation which would

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 benefit a client who was seeking Congressional funding for a television network

that would cater to emergency first responders.

e. On May 4, 2003, Staffer E emailed defendant BOU LANCER that there was no

food in the MCI Center box suite for an ice skating event, telling him, 'Hey. I've

got no food and party of fourteen and no food. I'm freaking out here. Kevin

[Ring] said I was all set. I [am] ordering and I guess I [w]ill pay[.] [H]elp if you

can." Defendant BOULANGER responded in part, "[Staffer E], if you pay keep

the receipt and I'll get you reimbursed."

f. On June 10, 2003, Staffer E used the Camden Yards box suite to throw a party

during an Orioles game. While at Camden Yards, Staffer E emailed defendant

BOULANGER to complain about the suite's food, telling him, "Ackkk. Only

beer and no hebrew national hot dogs."

Conduct 1nvo1vin a Member of a Senator's Staff

21. On July 16, 2002, defendant BOLJLANGER first met a legislative director for a United

States Senator ('Staffer F"). Thereafter, from July 2002 through February 2004,

defendant BOULANGER provided to Staffer F numerous tickets, meals and drinks, with

the value of these things exceeding $10,000, to influence Staffer F to take official action

favorable to Firm B's lobbying clients, and Staffer F on repeated occasions during this

same time provided and agreed to provide such official actions. The things of value and

official action included, for example, the following:

a. On September 27, 2002, defendant BOULANGER emailed Staffer F that it was

good to see him the other night and seeking Staffer F's help in preserving a $3.5

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 million earmark that was favorable to one of BOULANGER's lobbying clients,

which earmark had been included in the House version of a defense

appropriations bill.

b. On January 22, 2003, defendant BOULANGER emailed Staffer F seeking his

help in defeating a proposed amendment to a defense appropriations bill which

would have enabled an Alaskan entity to establish a gambling casino, thereby

threatening the market share of Native American tribes represented by Firm B

which already owned or operated gambling casinos. Staffer F responded to

defendant BOULANGER that he would tell his Senator and that his office had the

proposed amendment "flagged."

c. On February 14, 2003, Staffer F emailed defendant BOULANGER asking if he

could "score some hockey tickets." Defendant BOULANGER forwarded the

email to one of Abramoff's assistants noting, "[Staffer F] is a priority," and

requesting, "Ice seats if possible." Defendant BOULANGER then responded to

Staffer F that Staffer F was getting front row hockey tickets, telling him, "This is

without a doubt the most in demand game of the season.... You, my friend, are in

debt to me for a while!" Several days later, Staffer F replied, "Thanks

[BOULANGER] - You the man. I got something for you too...."

d. On April 1, 2003, defendant BOULANGER emailed one of Abramoffs

assistants, asking if he could get two baseball tickets to an upcoming

Redsox/Orioles baseball game for Staffer F, along with a parking pass, noting,

"[Staffer F] is important." On April 2, 2003, Staffer F emailed defendant

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 BOULANGER, "thanks for thinking of me for the sox. Let me know if! can

return the favor..."

e. On June 12, 2003, Staffer F emailed defendant BOULANGER requesting tickets

to a July 6th baseball game in Camden Yards. When defendant BOULANGER

responded that Staffer F would get four tickets in the box suite, Staffer F replied,

"but could you make sure there's beer this time...? [l} mean, the red sox, crab

cakes, and fillet mignon's were nice but ..... haha."

f. On October 23, 2003, defendant BOULANGER emailed Abramoff that a

potential client wanted to retain him to help with favorable action from the

Senator for whom Staffer F worked. Defendant BOULANGER wrote, "easy

money. [Staffer F] practically lives in our various suites. We are shady."

g. On December 17, 2003, Staffer F emailed Hirni that he and another were going to

be at Abramoffs restaurant, Signatures, the following day, "if you're around -

likewise to [BOULANGER]." After Hirni forwarded Staffer F's email to

BOULANGER, BOULANGER responded to Hirni that Staffer F just should have

written, "'buy me some drinks."

 The preceding statement is a summary, made for the purpose of providing the Court with

a factual basis for my guilty plea to the conspiracy charge against me. It does not include all of

the facts known to me concerning criminal activity in which I and/or others engaged. I make

this statement knowingly and voluntarily and because I am in fact guilty of the crime charged.

DATE:
TODD A. BOIJLANG

T. Mark Flanan, Jr
Counsel for Lefendai

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