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AUTHORITY

Mr. Ed Burgess, Archives Manager, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS. July 21, 1999.

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

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' PAGEM'am; DA"n.r..)

This research project is designed to examine the available evidence concerning the employment of a Soviet Army reinforced motorized rifle battalion in the conduct of a meeting engagement.

Specifically addressed herein are three questions: (1) what is the doctrine for the employment of a reinforced motorized rifle battalion in a meeting engagement; (2) do the units involved train to comply with the doctrin1 and (3) how well do they train? In order to answer these questions, this study has concentrated on available Soviet writings published sifice the Middle East War of 1973.. The investigation of the available material indicates there is some

very specific doctrine for the employment of the battalion that has been considered for modification since the Yom Kippur War of 1973. The typical motorized rifle battalion generally follows the doctrine during its training cycle. However, their training seems to leave much to be desired.

)-k

I.

I 1

IN THE MEETING ENGAG124ENT

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

1977

AU-X" 1, BE AI M

1JUCi16

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE Name of Candidate Title of Thesis Major John A. Kimball The Soviet Motorized Rifle Battalion e'
the

Meetinit Enzaitement
Approved by: A-I* Research Advisor

LA

Member, Graduate Faculty

Member, Consulting Faculty

day of If 19
Accepted this / Director, Master of Military Art nd Science.
I The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the
individual student author and do not necessarily represent the
views of either the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
(References to this study
or any other governmental agency. should Include the fore oing statement.)

~~~t

seliiOl~'OCti

i'

::)...

................ .............. . .

"--Dist.:'

_gild, AVAIL, X

ABSTRACT

K,

This research project is

deeigned to examine the available

evidence concerning the employment of a type unit of the Soviet Army in a particular offensive action. This paper is the result of this

author's efforts to understand the use of a Soviet Army reinforced motorized rifle battalion in the conduct of a meecing engagement. (1) what

Specifically addressed herein are three questions: is

the doctrine for the employment of a reinforced motorized rifle (2) do the units involved train how well do they train? In

battalion in a meeting engagement; to comply with the doctrine; and (3)

order to answer these questions, this study has concentrated on avail able Soviet writings published since the Middle East War of 1973. The investigation of the available material indicates there is some very specific doctrine for the employment of the battalion that has been considered for modification since the Yom Kippur War of 1973. The typical motorized rifle battalion generally follows the doctrine during its training cycle. much to be desired. However, their training seems to leave

'4

s. . ...'. .... .,........ ...... . .....",: . .: . ... . .. .. ' = '" ...... "'' "" "i'" . . ... ,. . ..,. . .... ....... :..... . ..

' ' ' ''I

I."

ACKNOWLEDGMEMNTS

It

is

difficult to remain steadfast to the task of writing such

a paper when others are busily engaged in enjoying "the best year of your life." The critical examination of small unit operations of the in its infancy. My perseveorance hopefully has

Soviet Army is still

been rewarded by providing a better understanding of how one type unit conducts one particular offensive action. The fact that I have not faltered, but followed the research to some conclusion is due largely to the efforts of Lieutenant Colonel George F. Steger-, Threats Division, Combined Arms Combat Development Kansas. For the great deal of time he

Activity, Fort Leavenworth,

withdrew from his own activities to work with me and for guidance and assistance, I wish to express my sincere appreciation. To Captain Harry L. Wolbers, also of the Threats Division,

Combined Arms Combat Development Activity, and to Professor Harry J.

Psomiades, consulting faculty advisor from the Political Science Depart

ment of Queens College, who provided me with valuable assistance in the structural formulation of this project, gratitude. I wish to express my

Additionally, I wish to express my thanks to the staff of

the Command and General Staff College Library for their aid in obtainIng research material. Finally, to my family who was so patient and understanding, support, editing, and iv

particularly to my wife for her encouragement,

typing, I owe an
immense debt.
To the combined efforts of all these people, can only say thank you.

I.

I
I

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Title Page ......................... .................. ............
.. . .
. .

i
ii

Thesis Approval Page . Abstract . .

. .

...........

....... . .......

III

iv
vi

Acknowledgements........... Table of Contents. ..

. . . . ..................

;Definitions

. . . .. .. . . . .. .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .vlii

. . .

List

of Illustrations.

.. . .

.....

ix

INTRODUCTION

. .

. .

..

2 !

SBACKGROUND
Chapter

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

I.

EMPLOYMENT OF THE MOTORIZED RIFLE BATTALION. ....

.........

7
8
10
12
13
13

................ Principles of Military Art. Mobility and high rate of combat operations ........... .................. Concentration of efforts ...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Surprise . . . . .. Combat activeness ................................. Preservation of combat effectiveness of friendly
. . . troops. . . . . . . . . . ............

Conformity of the goal and plan of the operation to the conditions of the actual situation ....

......

15

Int~erworking . . . . . . .. Fundamentals of . the . Offensive . Action

. . ...... . . . .

. . . .. .

16
18

18
18

....... . Speed. . . . ........... Combined arms. . . . . . . ................ Reconnaissance and security ..... ............. Fire power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... . . . Maneuver ...... ..................... Echelons . .. . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. Continuous operations .. ................

.19

. ..

19
20
20
21

By-passing of built-up areas and strong points Scenario Setting of Meeting Engagement ..............

.....

21
... 21
vi

11.

THE MEETING ENGAGEMENT .......

..

..

25

.. Concept of Meeting Engagement*

..
. . .

25
28

1*

........... MecPhysical configuration .R.lainh.

MechBattalion
'ntRole

I
III

. . . . . . . . . organization . . .ship . Relationship.t..... ............. Metachaniedngine Battalion task organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ of each element . .... fMarch recaitulation ............................. . ............. EnliThe Meeting Engagement .... Commaned anm control .. . . . . . ............

75

30

81

36
38
39
55

TFire power involved. *

...............

61

COMBINED ARM RELATIONSHIP C

............. Mechanized-Tank Relationship .. Mechanized-Artillery Relat ionship ............ Defense Relationship ............ Mechanized-Anttank Reola.t.ionship Relationship .. Interworking Summary . . . . .

62
63
66
73
75

SMechanized-Air

SMechanized-Engineer
SMechanized-NBC

Relationship . ......
.. ............
......

........

78

81
82
84
85 93
95

. . . .

SIV.

TRAINING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Officer .aining . . ...................

. Enlisted Training . . . . . . . ..

. . . .

. . . . .

. . .

SCombined Training V.

Unit Training .......

Arms Training .. .. .. .. Summary .. . . ... .. .. .. ..

........................

.. .. .. .. ..... .. .. ..

..

.. 99
. .. 102
. .. 104

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ..

Summary . . . . . ..... . ..

... ....

. . . . . . . .
........

. . . .
104 . . . . ... . . . . lo 112

Conclusions . . ... . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . .. . i108 .

Command and control . . . . . ......

Maneuver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 . . . . . . . . . 110

BFire
SBIBLIOGRAPHY

power ........... g .. . . .. . . . . .

..

. .

...

15

.-vii

S
! .

.....
Chast'
-

DEFINITIONS
Administrative, line and supply unit of the (branches) of troops, which has a number and a banner, e. g. a regiment, separate battalion,

.'
;: 'i

and troop organiza.ions equal to them.

Podrasdelenive(i)
-

Troop unit of permanent organization and homogeneous composition in each branch of troops, which unit

forms a larger podrazdeleniye or a chas__t'.

* Zam1olit = The political officer found in battalion upward.

all units from

"Stakhanovism

The perpetual pressure to ov.fulf and pressures.

ill work norms

i"i

.+1

}: ~I

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS : Figure

[j

TileA
Scenario Setting
........... ...

Za~e
23f
. .

Motorized Rifle Battalion

31

3
4
5

Battalion Task Organization

e.

6.*....a.
. .

33 401
42

Forces at Initiation of Meeting Engagement

Advance Detachment Deployment
.
.

6
7
8

Typical Meeting Engagement

Main Force Deployment
. .

..

45
47

...
..

'

...

Battalion Force Deployment

...

49

9
10

MountedA

ttack.........
. .

......

54
.

Dismounted Attack

. .

......

56

atloIakO.niatn.

.3

ix

INTRODUCT ION

does not make the difference. Equipment of itself It is the people in whose hands this equipment is located, in their knowledge and ability to employ this equipment with greatest effect, to squeeze from it everything it can give. Marshal Grechko 1 The Soviet motorized rifle battalion has been equipped,

ct least in part, by the most nodern armored personnel carrier in the world. It is supported by new self-propelled artillery This quality improvement, every battle for the Soviet

and by more than adequate tanks.

however, will not guarantee success in Army.

As Marshal Grechko said, people and their training still

make the difference. This paper is Soviet motorized rifle an attempt to determine how well the battalion in one type of offensive its equipment capabil

action--the meeting engagement--combines ities and its ing force. is

personnel talents to proluce an effective fight The paper will focus on three questions: of this battalion? (1) (2) What Does

the doctrine for the employment

1

A.

Bessarad,

"Class Rating is for USA,

an Important Component of 11-75,

Combat Readiness," trans.

Military Herald, no.

pp. 124-5. Bessarad takes a quote from a speech given by Marshal Grechko at the All-Army Conference of Otlichniki of Combat and Political Training. (Throughout the paper, the number of the Military Herald will reflect the number of the original version
when published in Moscow as Voyenny- Vestnik. Page numbers will correspond to page numbers in translated copy.)

.
.

it

train to comply with the doctrine? and

(3)

How well does it

train?

BACKGROUND
The Soviet Army has 110 motorized rifle divisions 2 in various stages of combat readiness stationed throughout the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; and, though Soviet political writings affirm that the Soviet Union will not be the first to attack in an EastWest confrontation, its ground force definitely are oriented on the

offensive. action: (3)

Soviet military writings contain three forms of offensive (2) the breakthrough, and

(1) the meeting engagement,

the pursuit.

offnsThe meeting engagement has been defined "as the most common offensive action and is likely to occur when one or both forces meet unexpectedly and enter immediately into the battle." 3
Because of the importance attached to the meeting engage

ment,

this paper will be limited to that single form of offensive Contemporary Soviet military writers reinforce the im

action.

pression that the meeting engagement is of premier importance in the offensive. Col. Savkin in his boolh Operational Art and Tactics "Maneuverable combat

has this to say abovt the meeting engagement,

operations of troops along axes have begun to have decisive impor tance in attaining high rates of advance, as opposed to the methodical 2 Milit Balance 1975-76 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975), p. 8. The International

I:

USAITAD report no.

S., Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Military Operations of the Soviet Union,
14-U-76 (1976), pp. 13-14. 2

3 U.

breakthrough of the past.' 4

Col.

Sidorenko in

his book The Offensive

writes at some length on the methods by which troops will launch offensive action. natural evolution in He suggests that the meeting engagement is offensive warfare because artillery ranges a

are increased and,

therefore, weapons do not have to be positioned The impli

so close to the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).

cation of his comments are that the meeting engagement adds to the speed of maneuver and thus aids the desired rate of advance and provides a relative degree of surprise and secrecy. He further

acknowledgos there are certain weaknesses such as counterbattery fire, coordination of movement, and simultaneous action on the

part of all elements of the task force in going directly into battle, but believes the advantages outweigh the disadvantages.
Thus the paper proceeds from two, assumptions at this point:

(1)

Both Col. Savkin and Sidorenko's writings are accepted as

doctrine, and (2) is a desire to know as much as possible there

about how the combined arms team, led by the motorized rifle battalion,
will conduct the meeting engagement.

This desire to know what the Soviet forces do in this par ticular type of offensive action and how they do it importance following the Arab-Israeli War of 1973.
4V.

took on added The lethality

Y. Savkin, The Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics, trans. for the USAF, Soviet Military Thought Series, no. 4 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 198.
5 A.

A. Sidorenko, The Offensive, trans.

for the USAF,

Sovict

Military Thought Series, no. 1 (Washington: Printing Office, 1975), pp. 64-70.

United States Government

i
r

of that three-week encounter left an indescribable impact on the minds of military planners. Suddenly planners In the Defense

Department realized the United States could not fight such a war and expect to win by winning the last battle. might not be a second battle. In fact, there

The first battle had to be won.

Y_-

If the forces of the Middle EasL, equipped and supplied by the

Soviet Union and the United States, could create such a holo caust with these weapons of destruction, what would war be like
I.

in the hands of the troops of the two superpowers?

For example,

more tanks were lost in those three weeks than the United States has in Europe. Destructiveness of the modern weapons of convert

tional forces lent impetus to finding new ways to prepare for

next "first battle."

The new-found impetus has resulted in a number of studies

rithat

being made throughout the Army as to the doctrine of the Soviet armed forces. Certainly some very valuable information has been

uncovered, but equally as certain is that there are many questions which remain unanswered. basic Soviet Army tactics. Many of the unanswered questions involve
This study attempts to add to that

body of knowledge by examining the tactics of the motorized rifle

battalion in the meeting engagement.
I

For a number of years, the United States intelligence

.

comuunity analyzed and wrote about the strategic posture in terms of numbers of divisions, amounts of equipment, and tactics of armies and fronts. Thus, until recently (mid 1974) little or no informa

I I,

U
~

tion uas available on how smaller units were designed and equipped

to fight (and what was available was often classified so as not Since that time, a number to be available to the average aoldier). 6 but a number of gaps of articles have appeared, still exist. Therefore, there is not an abundance of source material about either

the meeting engagement or the motorized rifle battalion. Because of the perceived threat, United States Army interest is focused on Europe and the Warsaw Pact forces. Therefore, the

data collection effort for this study has been limited to a revie,4 of material providing insight into European operations. The fic

titious scenario is portrayed along the edges of the North German Plains. This countryside is characterized as being relatively flat Rivers and valleys do not canalize cross-country Such conditions as are

and open terrain.

movement as is the situation further south.

present make the area ideally suited to armor operations and provide Warsaw Pact forces with the best terrain to conduct high-speed offensives across Western Europe to the major port facilities along the coast. The m, .ing engagement is the form of the offensive which best supports the high-speed attack. The battalion is the

basic organizational unit and in many respects corresponds to a company in the United States Army. Studies of this nature are, of course, greatly dependent upon the validity of the sources of material used for research.
t

A.

Such an assumption becomes even more important when studying

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

of the more recent worthwhile publications de voted to small unit tactics include: TC 30-102, The Motorized Rifle Company; TC 30-4, The Motorized Rifle Regiment; DDI-1100 77-76, The Soviet Motorized Rifle Company; DDI-1120-129-76, Soviet Tank Company Tactics; and FM 30-40, Handbook on Soviet Ground Forces. 5 ..
...... . . ...

6 Examples

facets of the USSR because of the closed nature of the society& Therefore, three general areas, all unclassified. are used for source material. (1) They are:

Interviews with persons who have served with the Military Liaison Mission (USMIM) in the Democratic

United Sct*.I-e

Republic of Germany. (2) L in Soviet publications which for the most part were printed

Russian for internal consumption and subsequently were available in English translations. The most significant of these is the

MilitarM Herald which Is published monthly as Voyennyy Vestnik. (3) Writings of those individuals in the West who have become

recognized experts in the field of Soviet armed forces.

'

Sf~~ I6

IV

____________r__________

--

"

ry

--

S.

CHAPTER I
SaPLOIIBR OF THE HOTORIZED RIFLE BATTALION

"The principles of military art are a consequence of the reflections in people's heads of demands of laws of warfare and laws of armed conflict and of those conditions under which it is conducted and under which the armed forces operate." Col. Savkin7 In finding a point from which to launch an analysis of the Soviet motorized rifle battalion in the meeting engagement, it is

Sappropriate

to discuss briefly two points:

(1)

the tactical and

offensive principles of war and (2) talion action will be staged. A.

the scenario in which the bat

Principles of Military Art

Col. V. Y. Savkin enumerates in his book Operational Art and Tactics the following seven principles of military art: 8 r

(1)

mobility and high rates of combat operations,

(2)

concentra

tion of main efforts and creation of superiority in and means over the enemy at the decisive place and at the decisive time, prise, (4) combat activeness, (5) (3) sur

preservation of the combat (6) conformity of the goal and

effectiveness of friendly forces,

plan of the operation to the conditions of the actual situation, and (7) interworking.
7 Savkin, 8 Tbid.,

Operational Art, p. 121. p. 165.

It

is

well to have an appreciation of these seven principles of offensive action

prior to a discussion of either the fundamentals or the conduct of the meeting engagement,

for they furnish the frame

work upon which the fundamentals of the offensive can be developed. Maj. Gen. Voznenko, in his contribution to the book The Revolution

in Military Affairs, writes that to assume the soldier will find a method for using new weapons and tactics at the time of battle is to doom that soldier's unit to defeat. He then writes further and

explains that new methods of armed combat are not created spontaneous

10

ly.

To understand how these thoughts affect the relationship be one has only to realize The term

tween the principles and the fundamentals,

the relationship between operational art and tactics. operational art is

a tool whereby the Soviet thought process moves From a Soviet viewpoint, an understand-

from strategy to tactics. ing of operational art is apply the tactics.

necessary before one can successfully in order to understand the fundamentals the battalion will of

Therefore,

of the offensive and how the junior officers in apply the tactics, these principles. It is

necessary to have some understanding

Mobility and High Rate of Combat Operations The Soviets do not limit this term simply to the maneuver and the speed necessary to move from point A to point B. Rather

they look upon the term as representing a measure of a commander's

SA. Lomov, ed. Scientific-Technical Pro-ross and the Revolution in Military Affairs, trans. for USAF, Soviet Military Thought Series, no. 4 (Uwshington: United States Government PrintOffice, 1974), p. 131.
lo0rbid.

IA

efficiency in conducting a battle from beginning to end.

It in-

t.

cludes all the inherent decision-making processes with changing instructions and shifts in organization. Technology has had a

prfound impact on the ability of troops to move rapidly (personnel cariers, self-propelled artillery, helicopters), and this speed 1 a decreased the time commanders and staffs of all units will have V. tl make appraisals of battle situations.

The rate of advance phrase deserves special consideration.

The daily speed goals established in the tactics of the 1960's, when nuclear warfare was considered the only option, varied from 9711 to 121 kilometers. More recent writings scale dow these figures roughly fifty percent to "29 kilometers in a conventional role and 58 kilometers in a nuclear environment." 13 Col. Savkin writes,
.

o o the most important methods of troop operations

directed toward attaining high rates of advance are: reliable neutralization of the enemy by fire and timely
exploitation of results of nuclear fires, , , , the

conduct of maneuverable combat operations along axes; swift crossing of zones of radioactive contaminat$tn; and nonstop assault crossings of water obstacles." "Trevor Cliffe, "Military Technology and the European Balance," Adelphi Papers, no. 89 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1972), p. 33. (Where miles have been converted to kilometers ,a conversion factor of one kilometer - .621 mile has
been used. )
12 Malcolm

Union (New York:

Mackintosh, Juggernaut: A History of the Soviet The Macmillan Co., 1967), p. 306.

5L

i 13U. S., Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant ",Chief of taff for.Intelligence, Handbook on Soviet Ground Forces . pp. 5-13...
FM 30-40, 1975,

S14Oavkin, 0perational Art, p. 190. 9 i:. i ,

To attain these rates of advance it

is

necessary for "the personnel

carriers to move immediately behind the tanks not only before the battle, but during It as well1 " 1 5 and for the troops not to fight in a dismounted attack; a meeting engagement, for if they do, the attack is no longer

but a deliberate attack.

In recent months,

there has been quite a discussion as to which arm should spear head the assault. 1 6 Soviets' This reconsideration is an outgrowth of the The lethality

review of tactics since the Yom Kippur War.

of the antitank weapons presented such a wall of steel that obvious ly somo Soviet thinkers are now beginning to wonder if enough tanks will be left after a successful breakthrough to support or lead the exploitation and pursuit. 1 7

Concentration of Efforts The Soviets describe this principle as follows: To attain victory over the enemy one must not dissipate his forces and means equally across the entire front, but the main efforts must be concentrated on the most important axis or sector and at the right time in order to form there the necessary superiority over the enemy in man and weapons. 151bid.,
16

18

p. 197.

A
discussion of this doctrinal point can be found in Phillip Karber's article "The Soviet Anti-Tank Debate" in the May/June 1976

issue of Survival.
17A. Grechko, Armed Forces of the Soviet State, 2d ed. (Moscow, 1975), p. 198 cited by P. Kerber, "The Soviet Anti-Tank Debate," Survival (May/June 1976): 106, in which Grechko writes "that the main striking force of the attackers--tanks--has become more vulner able, and the use of them on the battlefield, more complicated. The continuing process of perfecting the anti-tank weapon has placed before science and technology a serious task in the business of tangibly raising the viability of tank troops and developing more effective ways and means of reliably suppressing anti-tank defense."

18 Savkin, O 'rational Art, p. 201. 10

Note the author does not define this concentration simply

in terms of men and weapons. Rather he chooses to say it is

through concentration of effort to gain superiority in men and weapons. There seems to be a rathur subtle difference between

Sthe term concentration of effort and the term concentration of mass. Therefore, to the Soviets the term has passed from strictly Such

a quantitative measurement to a more qualitative character. a change has been completed in since World War II. Before, and to some extent during,

an evolutionary manner primarily

the "Great Patriotic

War", the front line unit commanders had only to worry about those forces directly in Therefore, However, it front of their units to determine combat power.

was much easier to speak of concentration of mass. such as the mechanization

seve'ral important improvements,

of the infantry, warhead,

the development of the long range missile and its the capability to see the depth of the

the increase in

battle, and finally the development of the self-propelled artil lery, have changed the character of the concentration. These improvements increase the capability of the command er to place more troops and weapons at a given point in time at the expense of other areas. However, it is the realization that

the defense can do the same thing which makes the concentration

one of effort. This effort becomes a key point when measured in terms of
such things as increased fire power, mobility, morale, training, and equipment characteristics. It is leadership,

these factors

which must be added to the concentration of mass--men and weapons-

il

to build the concentration that Col. Savkin writes about when

he uses the term. Surprise
i
*This

principle is

the heart of the meeting engagement.

By

definition, the meeting engagement is set apart from other forms

of offensive action by the fact that one or both sides meets the other unexpectedly. It

consists of the attempt to begin and resolutely conduct military operations unexpectedly for the enemy with the most expedient grouping of fully combat effec tive troops against the weakest or the strongest but poorly trained enemy groupings that axis and at that time when they least expect it. Col. Savkin writes that "Surprise steadily rises with the

Sdevelopment

of the means of combat .

. Its role is

especially

great in brief operations and battles where the time factor is of decisive importance.", 2 0 If such be the caseb surprise is a war between NATO and

likely to assume an added significance in * 'Warsaw Pact forces.

For the intensity of such a war just may be Savkin enumerates three methods to

too great to last very long. achieve surprise:

imost

(1) a moss build up in weapons in a particular location may lead to surprise when used, (2) a search for the skillful and original method for the unexpected use of available weapons may be the answer, or (3) the commanders and staffs might employ new or unexpewd organizations and tactics to surprise the enemy.
19

Ibid.,

p.

230.

I20

20

Ibid., p. 232.
p. 236-7..

2 1 bid.,

i~i12

Combat Activeness
Soviet doctrine emphasizes the importance of the attack in providing a psychological boost to the attacking

"sideby Ihowing a stronger will than the opposing

forces.2 Savkin, success in else being equal, combat is

According to Col. that side which, with all

achieved by

acts more aggressively

firmly.

and resolutely by tak.ng the initiative and holding it

The abilities of commanders to make bold decisions and put them into effect, the energetic, the desire to win victories decisive actions of the troops, and through total defeat of the enemy

23

are the keys to this principle.

, 24

However, there seems to be a major gap between the doctrine

"and practice of this principle.

Writers in

the monthly publica-

tion Voyennyy Vestnik describe numerous situations in which the Soviet officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) are chastised

for not adequately implementing the doctrine of combat activeness

during the course of the unit training cycle.

Preservation of Combat Effectiveness of Friendly Troops In the course of an operation or battle the combat
effectiveness of troops must be constantly maintained at the level which insures sscessful accomplishment of assigned combat missions. This principle seems to have become much more significant M. Frunze, Selected Works, (Moscow, Voyenizdat, cited by Savkin, Operational Art, p. 242.
22

1950),

p.

206,

~~23Sakn
24

Savkin, Operational Art, 1bid., p. 241.

p.

240.

2 5Ibid.,

p. 258.

13

for Soviet planners since the 1950's and the development of nuclear warfare. Col. Savkin writes that combat effectiveness

can no longer be considered simply a major duty of comanders and their staffs, but it has to be elevated to an independent principle and be included in the basic guiding rules of troop ""26 operations. This fear of nuclear weapons and their ability to destroy entire units on an ever increasingly lethal battlefield seem to be foremost in Col. Savkin's mind tlarougnuut his writings subject. In fact, he writes that: If it is violated, it become practically unbelievable to apply all other principles of operational art and tactics since troops who have lost combat iffective neos cannot conduct successful operations. In order to preserve combat effectiveness, the Soviet '28 Army seem to divide the probles into four areas: Methods of combat operations. Prvotection against NBC weapons. Constant combat readiness. Restoration of troop effectiveness. The first can be accomplished by the use of active and forceful combat operations which tend to disrupt the enemy's use of tactical nuclear weapons. The second is achieved through on the

better protective clothing and equipment and the development of tactics which do not leave troops grouped in open areas for any extended periods of time.
6 I bid., 2 27 28

The third measure to maintain readiness

p. 259.

Ibid., p. 258. 1"id., ... p. 260.

14

is through high physical and psychological training standards coupled with equipment that is simple and rugged. group of measures is to restore effectiveness. The fourth

This is done by

sound management principles which basically involve knowing where all assets are located and their conditions. ledge, units can quickly be battle.29 Conformity of the Goal and Plan of the Operation to the Conditions of the Actual Situation The goal of the operation or battle must fully conform to the conditions of the actual operational (combat) situation and be commensurate with the forces and means in their correlation with the enemy's forces and means and with consideration of the factors of space and time. 3 0 In many ways this is what leadership is all about, an* only those who skillfully apply the principle are successful leaders. Tho measure of combat effectiveness and how quickly a unit's effectiveness can be lost or restored involves a very subjective evaluation. It can vary over time depending on many factors. B. H. Liddell Hart, in his book, The Red Army (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1957), pp. 236-237, has this to say about the Russian soldier: "Russians, especially Soviet Russians, react to battle differently from civilized city dwellera. They remain unaffected by high casualties, by threats to their flanks, by close combat, by battles at night, in villages and in forests. They were used to misery, to lack of care, to absence of leave and mail, to suffering cold and hunger." To day it may be doubtful if such is an accurate characterization. The modernization of the USSR has made the society much more urban and such more attuned to a softer life. The result may be that those things which Hart cites as being somewhat peculiar have changed and with the change has come about a way of life that may decrease the legendary hardness of the individual. The result is that the Soviet Army's control of combat effective ness may have been altered, possibly not to the betterment of the combat power of the force.
3 0 Savkin, 29

With such know retrained for

reconstituted and

Operational Art, p. 266. 15

It

is

a skill, which "presumes thorough and profound estimate

of the situation, making a substantiated decision, and precise organization of support of combat operations and troop control." ,31 The adherence tc the principle,
r

or problems adhering to it,

are There, or

found

in many of the monthly issues of Voyennyy Vestnik.

much is written each month about leaders showing initiative,

the lack thereof, which presumably would allow them to make the changes needed to orient their forces to the actual situation Such initiative seems particularly desirable for the commander of the unit in
V

the meeting engagement since that force is

out some

distance from the senior commander.

Yet month after month bat

talion commanders are chastised for failure to display initiative when exercises do not go as planned by the senior staff.
I

The Soviets plan operations to the nth degree with all forms of fire power and control measures against what they see as the enemy's strength. Assignments of missions to first and second recognized as

I
-~

echelons certainly are done according to what is the enemy threat. However, it if is intelligence is

incorrect and the

goal becomes unrealistic,

possible that the Soviet command

structure may be too rigid to alter the goals until too late.

Interworking

The success of contemporary combat operations may be achieved only through the joint efforts of all forces and means participating in an operation or battle on

Ibid., p.

266.

S~16

S...++++; . ,; .

++ ,+

+,+.:++ +,+ + ,+,

,,

+ :::: + -r

, +!+ ,, ::= +--++,

++ +++ +++ + +

' +"+ + +"r' +

..

.+-+

'

+ = l r

+. . .

. ..... r

... .. ..o . ..

-.

'..-

interworking the basis of their close and continuous 3 2 and fullest use of combat capabilities. Col. Savkin is, of course, saying that .combined arms teams are the only way to get the mission accomplished. The

I,!
related

Soviets have been much better at writing about this than they have been about putting it into practice if the amount of practice is praised or faulted

to the number of times the principle is in open literature.

The combined arms team of the motorized rifle

battalion usually will consist of the motorized rifle battalion; an artillery battalion; a tank company; engineer, and chemical elements. Col. and antitank, air defense,

Sidorenko writes of the of each the

"positioning of these forces by saying, "podrazdeleniya

combat arm and of special troops are assigned that place in

combat formation which under given conditions provides for their

33 closest coordination and control."'

The methods by which this formation is

put together is

being reviewed and changed constantly as technology makes qual itative changes in equipment possible. Such is the case in the

on-going discussion of which should go into battle first--the personnel carrier or the tank--and bow close should they be posi tioned? There are times, however, when the Soviets believe

speed of advance outweighs combined arms; and in such cases the interworking relationships are not so important and should not be

t
S

used.

At least one advocate of this separation of the combined

32 33

Ibid.,

p. 273.

p. 92.

Sidorenko, The Offensive,

17

arms team is
7

Lt.

Gen. Bukharenko who mades such a point in a recent

article in

Voyennyy Vestnik.34

B.

Fundamentals of the Offensive Action

The principles of military art have then provided a basis upon which to build some of the mere important fundamentals of the offensive. as the list ing: (1) is A list of these fundamentals would vary as often might well include the follow (3) reconnaissance and (6) echelons, (7) con

made; but each list (2)

speed, (4)

combined arms, (5)

security,

fire power, and (8)

maneuver,

tinuous operations, strong points. is to follow in

by-passing of built-up areas and

In a discussion of the imeeting engagement which the subsequent chapter, each fundamental will be

reflected in the conduct of that engagement.

Speed
Speed is the cornerstone of all offensive action. Forces

are organized and equipped to provide for a maximum rate of ad vance, which will take them quickly to and through enemy positions- the objective being to destroy the enemy rather than to seize key terrain.

Combined Arms Much is written of the massive numbers of tanks and the shock action provided. However, the Soviets still view the

motorized rifle troops as the basic arm of the ground forces. With such a combination to form the backbone of the combined arms
__

Bukharenko, "Emrloyment of the ICV in Combat," Military Herald, no. 11-75, pp. 103-104.

3 4 V.

team,

the Soviets tend to organize all formations into a combined Most open literature indicates the motorized rifle

arms unit.

battalion positioned as the advance guard will contain a tank company, an antitank battery, an artillery battalion, an air de3 5

"

fense battery,

an engineer platoon,

and a chemical squad.

Reconnaissance and Security to One of the roles of the battalion in is to fulfill the meeting engagement As a recon

a reconnaissance and security mission. its mission is

naissance element,

to find the shortest, most As a security

unimpeded route for the main force to follow.

force,

it

is

designed to prevent the main force from being attacked It is also designed to keep the force moving at A

unexpectedly.

maximum speed by overrunning those defensive positions encountered which are designed to force the main body to deploy for a deliberate attack. is Where the enemy cannot be overrun, the by-pass technique

practiced.

Fire Power Fire power in volume is a trademark of Soviet offensive Artillery and

operations in both the nuclear and conventional role. t'

has been provided to forces down through regimental level, mortars are in the companies and battalions.

All major offensive and roll

actions are preceded by lengthy and heavy preparations,

ing barrages moving Just ahead of the attacker are standard for 35I. Garbuz, D. F. Loza, and I. F. Sazonoy, The Motorized Rifle Battalion in Modern Combat, trans. Foreign Science and Technology Center. Published in Moscow in Russian in 1965, p. 5.

breakthrough operations.
is varied,

The selection of conventional fire power

but includes the standard tube artillery (122mm available

"atbattalion level), rocket launchers, mortars, and superior tank rounds.

The conventional rounds are also supported by a wide variety of nuclear

weapons. i Maneuver
Maneuver is stressed over and over again in literature. practiced often. However, Training

in this area supposedly is

descriptions

"of battalion level attacks often show little

in meeting engagements.

fire and maneuver except

The Soviets obviously tie this doctrine to

that of speed and attempt to move quickly from assembly areas into the attack. Support such as river crossing equipment is in abundance

and used extensively in practice.

Axes and routes of advance are

provided to lower echelons to ensure the proper movement to arrive at the new position in an expedient manner.

Echelons Soviet offensive doctrine calls for the attacking force regimental level and higher to be organized into three waves. The first each is two are referred to as first and second echelons, and at

provided a specific mission when operational orders are

prepared.

This third wave is the reserve and is committed by the The first and second ech
The reserve is small

unit commander when and where needed.

elons are divided on a two to one ratio.

and usually will consist of a force two units lower

than the

20

 .!WW...

.- .

. .

...

. ............

parent unit, reserve in

I. a platoon reserve for a battalion or a company e., Such organization lends depth to the

the regiment.

attacking force and allows for a concentration of force.

Continuous Operations The Soviets view their offensive as being a continuous day and night operation. Based on the provided fire power, the

mechanization of the total force,

and the extensive night train conducted,

ing and river-crossing practice which supposedly is

round-the-clock operations are an integral part of Soviet strategy.

By-passing of Built-Up Areas and Strong Points V Attacking forces of the first echelon of the division--the the meeting engagement- In an most

most likely location of the battalion in

are given the primary task of destroying the enemy force. effort to inflict maximum casualties, important; and all effort is speed of advance is

made to by-pass strong points and Battalions involved in

built-up areas which will slow the rate.

the meeting engagement have a primary role of assisting higher units in avoiding such locations.

C.

Scenario Setting of Meeting Engagement

;I

In studying the terrain, the battalion commander deter mines the camouflage conditions for the entire length of the route of march and, proceeding from this, he establishes those sectors along the routes at which it is necessary to cover the podrazdeleniye against enemy air strikes most dependably. Next, he analyzes the terrain from the point of view of protecting the battal ion against weapons of mass destruction and he deter mines the areas which have the most favorable conditions for the landing and operations of enemy tactical air borne assaults and reconnaissance-sabotage groups.

"t

'

21

V: .. .....,V. . . ... .

.. .. ...

.... . . ...

The battalion commander devotes considerable attention to evaluating the terrain 5 the line (lines) of possible clashes with the enemy. The Soviet concept for the attack would allow a motorized rifle

"A

1
i

battalion to be positioned In one of three locations in V. 'ch It become involved in a meeting engagement: (2) an advance guard or flank detachment, (1)

could

a forward detachment, in the main column

Ii

or (3)

at either the head or tail of formation. In the role of the advance guard, the battalion should:

assure the unhindered movement of the main body, warn it against surprise enemy attack, assure it of suitable conditions for commitment to battle, and also prevent the penetration of enemy ground reconnaissance.3 7 For purposes of discussing in some detail the interworkings of

the combined battalion force, a scenario setting has been fictitiously created. The battalion in the setting has been successful in the

breakthrough operation of a first echelon division and is

now moving

as a portion of the exploitation force. Enemy reinforcements have been hurried forward to act as a blocking force. In some low hills five to eight kilometers forward of the battalion headquarters, * the

point element or reconnaissance platoons of the two forces have become engaged. The Soviet battalion commander coming over the crest of the

hill has a view down the valley of the contested area (Figure 1). The lead element (reinforced motorized rifle platoon) in the distant hills (Pt. 36Garbuz, onth
37

is back

1).

Approximately one kilometer

Motorized Rifle Battalion in Modern Combat,

p.

9.

G. Garbuz, D. Losa, and I. Saconoy, The Motor Rifle Battalion on the March and in the Meeting Enpagement, (undated), p. 5.
Si

FIGURE 1
SCENARIO SETTING

(2

I:D

GI

lTI

A B

(5)

23

(Pt. 2)

is the vanguard of the advance guard.

This force is

composed of a motorized rifle company minus the platoon in con tact. Now just coming into the area is the main portion of the

battalion, which is approximately five to six kilometers to the rear of the vanguard (Pt. 3). There is one squad of flank security The terrain is forested to the To the right of the highway

located at points four and five. left of the main highway (Rt. A).

the terrain consists of gently sloping open fields with two roads (Rts. B and C) running parallel to the main highway. The commander of the motorized rifle battalion now no longer commands a battalion in a movement to contact role. is now involved in a MEETING ENGAGEMENT. He

Subsequent chapters

deal with how he utilizes various elements of this force to prevent any slowdown in the rate of advancement of the main formation of troops which are following.

I
_.I I'

I
I

t2

ri?

'

..

CHAPTER II

THE MEETING ENGAGEMENT The meeting engagements usually are of a fast Their duration depends on the moving nature. quantity and quality of means of armed combat

the and the basic means enemy by parts. enemy is the destruction of the of routing
Maj. Gen. Reznichenko 3 8

fomThe Soviet Army expects the meeting engagement to be the

form of offensive action most frequently encountered on the modern

battlefield. By definition the two opponents will approach each

j
I

other at relatively high speeds with at least one of the forces

entering the fray unsuspectedly. As each commander attempts to

seize and hold the initiative, the contact will be fast-paced, lack
clarity, and be filled with sudden changes in the situation. 3 9

A.

Concept of Meeting Engagement

The Soviet concept stems from their belief that there will be an absence of static front lines which were characteristic of

World War II.

Instead, troops will be constantly on the move,

re-

inforcing weak spots or gaps that exist, moving reserves forward

to concentrate on strong points, or conducting exploitation and

USA,

38V. Reznichenko, "Tactics During World War II," trans. for Military Herald, no. 4-75, p. 86.

39This definition represents an aggregate of the various individual definitions noted in numerous articles by Soviet authors. 25

U"

pursuit roles.

The Soviet's desire for speed and a specific rate

of advance necessitates near constant movement.

Gen.

Pavlovskiy

points out that under present conditions units must always be ready to march rapidly over long distances, to change direction of

movement quickly, and to deploy and be committed in short periods of time.

40

Certainlx this offensive action is

currently practiced exten

sively.

It

is a carry-over from We ,

War II where it was used in The key goal of the meeting

both gttack and defensive operatlns.

engagement is the retention of the initiative and the desire to put

constant pressure on the enemy. 4 1

The motorized rifle battalion

may be assigned one of several roles in which a meeting engagement could occur. It may have a regimental assigned mission of acting as

the advance guard or the flank or rear guard during the course of a regimental march, in which case it would be the lead battalion of the first echelon regiment. It might assume a role following the

breakthrough in which it

would be in a position to encounter r6eerve could meet

forces being sent forward to bolster the defense, or it

unexpectedly withdrawing enemy forces during the pursuit operation. There is also a new theory involving a tactic called the "daring

thrust," which envisions regiments being used more or less independ ently in surprise, non-reinforced attacks designed to penetrate deep

401. Pavlovskiy, Commander in Chief of the Soviet Ground Forces, "A High Degree of Field Training is a Guarantee of Constant Combat
Readiness,"
4 1 See

trans.

for USA,

Military Herald, no.

6-75,

p. 6.

Major John F. Concannon's student research report, The Soviet Concept of the Meeting Engagement, Garmisch: USA Insti tute for Advanced Russian and East European Studies, 1976.
26

into the enemy's rear area.

42

If such a maneuver were employed,

the

lead battalions of such regiments would conduct meeting engagements against enemy forces being hastily deployed to prevent the capture of key terrain features or facilities in the rear areas.

Since the initial NATO contact with Soviet ground forces will first forces encountered will be the result of a Soviet offensive, the be those organized in a march formation. As such, a division will

have out an advance guard positioned between the division reconnaissance and the division main which is ready to engage the enemy forces. Division Reconnaissance Advance Guard Main Body Rear Guard
43

Flank Protection Thus, for the purpose of analysis, the advance guard will be the

focus in the fictitious scenario setting which has been created (Figure 1). The Soviet motorized rifle battalion will be examined is organized in the march to conduct the meet

to determine how it

ing engagement; and once into the fray, how its command and control operates, what are its intended maneuvers, is applied. new theory is apparently based on statements made in a series of articles concerning the employment of the BMP, which appeared in Military Herald during the period June 1975-March 1976. In this series of articles, several authors discussed "raid tactics" and the need for BMP-equipped units to operate in advance of other units. Of the seven articles, three deserve particular note: A. Molozev, "Employ ment of the ICV in Combat," trans. for USA, Military Herald, no. 11-75, pp. 105-107; V. Bukharenko, "Employment of the ICV in Combat," trans. for USA, Military Herald, no. 11-75, pp. 102-104; V. Merimskiy, "The BMP in Combat," trans. for USA, Military Herald, no. 3-76, pp. 32-37.
4 3 V. 4 2 This

and how its fire power

USAF,

Reznlchenko, Tactics, (Moscow, 1966), p. 143.

trans. by Foreign Technology Division, 27

Physical Confiluration

Just as the division to which the selected battalion belongs

employs a security screen, so, too, does the motorized rifle battalion

when in the advance guard. follows: Reconnaissance

Normally the battalion is deployed as

Advance Battalion Detachment Main

-Flank

Rear Guard

Security

The reconnaissance element may be positioned out to a distance of ten kilometers from the advance detachment. The advance detach

mentwhich has more of a security mission than a reconnaissance on% is usually out five to ten kilometers beyond the main body.
44

, 45

The rear guard is positioned approximately three kilometers behind the end of the main body, and the flank security can be out as far as five kilometers.46' 47 All the distance figures provided are dependent Within the various elements of this force,

upon terrain and situation.

particularly the main body, the vehicles involved will be spaced twenty-five to thirty meters apart. Such spacing, therefore, indicates

that the distance from the leading reconnaissance elements to the end of the rear guard is approximately twenty-five kilometers at optimum

44Garbuz, The MUB in Modern Combat, pp. 12-13.

45For a slightly different version of the reconnaissance organization, see Military Operations of the Soviet Army, USAITAD report no. 14-U-76: pp. 108, 122, 158. Diagrams on pp. 108 and 158 indicate the reconnaissance element is composed of both a point and a reconnaissance patrol. The diagram on p. 122 tends to disagree and indicates this author's configuration of the force.

S~~~~~46bd.,p1.

4 Ibid.,

p. 18
p. 105. 28

471bid.,

conditions.. In such a configuration, the motorized rifle battalion is

48

expected to perform the following missions:

prevent enemy main forces from occupying key terrain. conduct reconnaissance. insure unimpeded movement of the main force. / warn the main force of uurprise attack. assure the main force of suitable conditions for combat. prevent the penetration of enemy ground force reconnaissance. Battalion Organization The motorized rifle battalion is the basic combined arms force of the Soviet army. and equipment. It is a pure motorized rifle unit in organization

The battalion consists of 441 officers and enlisted

49

men organized as follows:

Battalion

-3x Motorized Rifle Companies

Mortar Battery

Antitank Platoon

Supply and Maintenance

Elements

The battalion is usually commanded by a senior major or lieutenant colonel.

50

From an operational view, his two principal staff The

officers are the executive officer and the chief of staff.

three company commanders are senior lieutenants or captains, and

4 8 Garbuz, 4 9 HB

The MRB in Modern Combat,

p. 5.

550-2 Organization and Equipment of the Soviet Army, p. 2-3. This total of 441 is in contrast to the 891 in the current US Army battalion (TOE 07-045H). command level is made based on content analysis of the MilitarX Heralds reviewed. 29
5 0 This

-.-'M

each commands a company of 108 persons within the motorized rifle

ti

battalion.

51

Depending on the type available, (APCs)

the number of armored Where the newer present for a

personnel carriers APC, the BMP, is

varies within battalions. one vehicle per squad is

deployed,

total of ten BMPs per company and thirty-one BMPs in the battalion. As production schedules permit, replace the older model APC in the BMP could perhaps all the motorized rifle eventually battaliorn

Attachments When assigned the mission of the advance guard, rifle battalion is the motorized

given considerable reinforcement in anticipation This attached force will likely consist and elements of anti

of the meeting engagement.

of an artillery battalion, a tank company, aircraft and antitank forces. most likely reinforced, squad.
52

There will also be an engineer platoon,

and a radiation and chemical reconnaissance

This force will consist of some 500 personnel and give the

combined arms battalioi a strength of approximately 940 (Figure 2). The artillery battalion might consist of 321 personnel and eighteen 122mm towed guns with a range of 15.3 kilometers. of the self-propelled 122mm guns are produced, replace the towed version found in As more

they will likely The tank company

the battalion.

consists of fifty-eight personnel and thirteen T-62 tanks with one

5

lbid.

See both Garbuz, The MRB in Modern Combat, p. 5, and C. H. Donnelly, "The 'March' in Soviet Tactical Doctrine," Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies 119 Jseptember, 1974): pp. 77-80. iA

52

30

FIGURE 2 MOTORIZED RIFLE BATTALION

0,,

4J

N 4)
4J '-P4

CuC

to

0)0
-r4 4)

W4J

jC

04

'r4

14

CC

14

00

0 -4J

31

I
I
S},

for the company commander and four in

each of three platoons.

The

T-62 carries forty rounds of main gun (115mm) tive range of 2,000 meters.

ammunition with an effec likely to

The antiaircraft element is

be a mixture of the ZSU-23-4 and the newer SA-9. of each system in the motorized riffle regiment. of approximately thirty people. The ZSU-23-4 is

There are four weapons

Each battery consists a self-propelled, The SA-9 is launched

four barrel, 23mm gun with a range of 3000 meters.

from a quadruple canister mounted on a modified BRDM. battery is

The antitank

likely to be the battery from the motorized rifle regiment. but both

These would be the total antitank assets of the regiment,

the Soviet sources as well as unclassified Western sources reflect

a battery of antitank weapons.
53

The regimental battery consists of

some sixty persons and contains nine BRU4 antitank missile launcher
vehicles, each equipped with the AT 2/3 missile.
5 4

When provided this amount of reinforcement, capable of operating well in

the battalion is It

advance of the following regiment.

has the means to detect and cross or by-pass contaminated areas. Engineer support allows the force to maintain movement by overcoming * ,obstacles along the route, and it can conduct combat operations for

a limited period of time even when outnumbered.

Battalion Task Organization The motorized rifle battalion commander, attachments, having recjived the the mission Since +
;i

has the task of combining the forces to fit which the battalion will operate

and the terrain in

53 54

(Figure 3).

Ibid. HB 550-2, p. 2-2..3..

i3

K....

-.

FIGURE 3 BATTALION TASK ORGANIZATION

'

RECONNAISSANCE

SJADVANCE

DETACHMENT

FLAN

SECRITYFLANK

SECURITY

FIANK SECURITY

BATTALION MAIN

REAR GUARD

33

....

this paper is

limited to the advance guard situation in Western Europe, Soviet writings are basically to organize in advance, such a but

all examples of task organization noted in the same.

The key thought for the commander is

manner as to be able to maintain the desired rate of

simultaneously to allow for the commitment of the unit into combat

in the proper manner. the following lines:

Reconnaisssnci
55

Thus,

the organization will likely be along

Motorized rifle platoon (Three BMPs, each with an eightman squad plus BliP driver and gunner and a platoon

leader or platoon sergeant).

5 6

Chemical reconnaissance element (Composition unknown, possibly

a single vehicle, BHDM-rkh with two technicians to monitor
the air for NBC effects).57
Engineer reconnaissance section (Composition not fixed;
dependent upon intelligence estimate of terrain and forces
ib front of the battalion).
Advance detachment: Motorized rifle company minus the platoon in the recon 58 naissance patrol (Seven BMPs). Tank platoon (Four T-62 tanks).
59 60

Artillery battery (Six tubes of 122mm artillery).

5 5 Garbuz, 5 6 U.

The MRB on the March, p. 33; and Donnelly.

S., Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Command, The Motorized Rifle Company, TC 30-102, 1.975, p. 9. with former member of the US Military Liaison Mission in Democratic Republic of Germany.
58

5 7 Conversation

TC 30-102, id.

p.

9.

59

60H

550-2, p. 32. 34

Antitank element (Three BNDM missile launcher vehicles with AT 2/3). Combat engineer section (Composition unknown). Chemical reconnaissance sections (Probably two vehicles of 6 the type in the reconnaissance element). 1 Battalion Main: Battalion headquarters (Sixteen personnel; one BMP). composition,
62

Field engineer platgon (Would vary in on perceived need).

depending

Antitank battery minus one platoon (This would be the remain ing six vehicles from regiment). Tank company minus one platoon (Nine T-62 tanks). A bridge-laying tank.65 Antiaircraft battery (The battery is reflected here; however, a ZSU-23-4 and an SA-9 could be located in the advance guard, and the remaining ZSU-23-4 and an SA-9 could be dispersed in the main column to give better
64

61USML -

member and Donnelly,

p.

79.

62HB 550-2, p. 2-3; there are other transportation assets, which could be an armored command vehicle or one or more GAZ 66 vehicles or both. A slightly different variationls provided 'by Donnelly, p. 80, where he reflects a signal platoon following the engineer platoon. Garbuz makes no reference to this signal platoon in The MRB on the March, p. 33.
63
A

TC 30-102, p. 9; and U. S., Department of Defense, Defense Intelligence Agency, Soviet Tank Company Tactics, DDI-1120-129-76, (May 1976), p. 2.
I,

64

65This vehicle becomes all important, for there are water barriers "of ten to twenty meters every ten kilometers in Western Europe, accord ing to U. S., Department of Defense, Defense Intelligence Agency, 'Soviet River-Crossing Mobility Doctrini" Defense Intelligence Digest, (March 1968), p. 26. 35
i ...
...

protection since this element is more likely to be organized to protect the march than to be used in the meeting engage ment.)
The artillery battalion minus one battery (twelve 122mm howitzers, possibly the D-30 towed type, but more likely

the newer self-propelled version).

r
t

A motorized rifle company. (The company could be intact, or it might be minus two squads which woulg be posted to the flanks to serve as flank security.) A mortar battery.
mortars. )67

(This unit consists of six 120mm

A motorized gifle company minus a platoon which is the

rear guard. Rear services followed by one vehicle from the last rifle company which operates between the rear of the main body 69 and the rear guard platoon. Rear Security

rifle company in the main body.

It

is doubtful if

all

three BMPs will be together, but rather the vehicles will spread singularly over the prescribed route. Role of Each Element The role of each element is defined by the position it occupies in the march formation. However, there are several points to be to reconnaissance and security. as that of the company in the advance
The MRB on the March,

noted, particularly with regard

6 6 Composit"

d: ,e

guard.

Flank security ina:cated by Garbuz, 67HB 550-2, p. 2-3. It is

p. 26.
reflected here as maintaining unit integrity and moving in the mn

body.

"68Composition is
69

like cnat of the company in the advance guard.

The rear services consist of repair and evacuation equip ment, medical personnel, trucks carrying ammunition, automotive supplies, and fuels and lubricants.

36
-

".

 ...

:: ,

,:,:

..

W.

.fl_

-flfl!:

*P :W

,.z

:. ..

zz..

/.

U 4lbS,.

The overall mission of the battalion force as a whole has been

outlined; however, element, in assigning the mission to the reconnaissance the detailed type of information

the following represents

expected to be gathered: R . [Determining Finding the enemy. the grouping of his units.

Determining the presence of nuclear weapons, tanks, and artillery. Determining the locations of artillery, mortars, antitank
guided missiles. Locating the span of deployment and determining the direction of advance. Once any of this information is noted, it should be reported,

but to whom is

unclear.

If

it

is

first

detected by the division

reconnaissance force,

there is no indication of any communications

from the division reconnaissance back to the reconnaissance of the advance guard. is The information provided by division reconnaissance

made available to the forward detachment,but passed by the division

70

intelligence officer to regiment and then to battalion. probability,

In all

the rate of advance would preclude such a warning from Therefore, this reconnaissance

taking place in timely enough manner.

element of the advance guard probably might not benefit from the information provided by elements of the division reconnaissance battalion. The method of reporting information between elements of the advance guard is not discussed inamilable sources; however, there is sufficient

radio equipment aboard the BMPs for information to be passed to the commander of the detachment.
70

As this information is

passed,

the

Garbuz, The MRB on the March, p. 15.

37

r
if

*-.

-.

-r

.r..

2.T 2

T.. ....

_- _

,.......

reconnaissance element of the battalion moves forward, by-passing initial enemy elements. The advance detachment is the first element of the Soviet Army

which will be organized and assigned the mission of engaging the enemy

in decisive combat.

It will do so based on the information provided Moving to meet the enemy, it will

by the reconnaissance element.

attempt to insure the selected road network is it

free of obstacles; and

will make hasty repairs and alert the main body as to the work to Contaminated areas will be marked and by-passed where

ji

be accomplished.

Once the decision has been made to by-pass Spossible. such or cross areas, the main body is notified.

March Recapitulation The march characteristics provided have reflected a typical organizational assembly. Naturally, this composition will vary to the surrounding conditions. For example, if nuclear weapons have been deployed at the onset of the war, * *' more NBC elements involved. If there will be
through such

rIaccording

the division mission is

terrain as to require more engineer support,

such support of the type

needed will be available in both the forward detachment and the main body of the batt.aliori-organization. It is unlikely that additional or artillery units

fire power in terms of mechanized rifle, armored, will be located in

-in

the march column.

There may be some minor changes

j
9

the positioning of units in

the main body depending on the personal

preference of the senior commander who approves the battalion command er's plans. For example, the armor unit could be positioned directly ready for immediate employment. A

behind the battalion headquarters

38

similar possibility would be to move the two rifle companies ahead of the artillery battalion.
71

However,

if

that were done,

the commander

would be putting himself in a position in which his armor and motorized forces might be ready and, in fact, have to attack before the artillery could be ready to fire in support.
Even with these variations, the Soviet commander is now organized

to fulfill the battalion missions of decisively engaging the enemy. As the reconnaissance elements report the advancing enemy forces, march is ready to develop into the meeting engagement. B. The Meeting Engagement the

Garbuz and his fellow authors write: To achieve success in a meeting engagement, it is necessary to discover the advancing enemy troops in time and establish continuous observation of them. It is important to forestall the enemy in seizing a position suitable for the engagement and in opening artillery and tank fire. The podrazdeleniye (units) of the battalion deploy quickly into combat formations and move into the attack immediately after nuclear strikes launched by the weapons of the senior commanders and conduct They operate boldly and decisively, fire from their own weapons. striving to break up the enemy into individual groups and de 72 stroy them in detail. As the meeting engagement opens, the forces could be displayed on the terrain as indicated in Figure 4. The reconnaissance element

passes to the commander of the advance detachment the information concerning the approaching enemy unit. following actions are likely to occur: Up until this time, the battalion has operated under radio
7 1 Donnelly,

In a sequence of events,

the

p. 80.

7 2Garbuz,

The MRB on the March, pp.

17-18.

39

FIGURE 4
FORCES AT INITIATION OF MEETING ENGAGEMENT

REONISAC

ADVANCE DETACHMENZ

40

silence for the most part. The only radio exchanges have been short prearranged signals. Where possible, hand and arm and flag signals have been used. At this-time, restrictions have been lifted; and the radio is 73 ence to the detailed coded map. used with extensive refer

Pe

V'

The advance detachment up until this time has been moving under

from short halts.

Built-up areas,

such as the village just passed,

are reconnoitered with special care. 7 4

With the report from the recon such careful advance stops;

naissance element of the advancing enemy,

and the detachment increases the rate of advance as the artillery p'ills out of the formation to prepare to fire. There being no evidence
the

of artillery forward observers with the reconnaissance element, artillery battery will fire initially with no adjustment.

The tank

platoon will make a frontal attack against the enemy, while the rifle company will attempt to move to the flank and attack (Figure 5).

There will be no immediate need for the chemical and engineer elements. The air defense element will follow the tanks as will the antitank
platoon. The attack by the tanks will be most effective for the Soviets The rifle company

as they approach the range of 1500-1200 meters.

73 74

1bid., 1bid.,

p. 39.
p. 86.

There are artillery scouts, but their mission does not appear to be that of the forward observer as is known in US artillery doctrine.
For those who have an interest in this particular point, the following

75

three sources are provided to support the belief that there is

presently

no forward observer: Maj. Gen. of Artillery N. Besedin, "Striking of Fixed Targets," trans. for USA, Military Herald, no. 10-75, p. 142; Col. S. Ostroumov, "Firing for Effect," trans. for USA, Military Herald, no. 1-76, p. 131; and Col. G. Litvinovich, "Battalion Firing at Observed Targets," trans. for USA, Military Herald, no. 1-76, p. 137.
41

FIGURE 5 ADVANCE DETACHMENT DEPLOW4ENT

424

'777

* will move off to the flank in a company column formation breaking down to nine BMPs on line, with no reserve to attack the flank by surprise. The company will attempt to carry out the maneuver without the dis mount of the infantry squad. The air defense platoon will move behind the tanks and the antitank platoon. Such positioning will give the tanks and antitanks

weapons space to deploy, but will not degrade the antiaircraft pro

tection.

76

Becausc the terrain is relatively flat in the area,

the

guns will likely operate one behind the other.

The guns will remain

77

within 400 meters of the tanks and separated hy about 150 meters.
The commander of the rifle company is also the commander of the advance guard.

He will report by radio to the battalion commander when approval is given, he will then

the proposed action; and, move with the rifle combat,

company.

Upon being notified of the impending

the battalion commander will start to move forward to direct The three major subunit commanders--motorized infantry,

the operation.

armor, and artillery--all

seem to be free at this point to perform as In the main, the

they see the situation from their respective areas. advance guard has fulfilled its role. from surprise attack,

It has protected the main body for deployment, and

insured favorable conditions

hopefully prevented enemy reconnaissance from further advances. This form of offensive is in one of the few times company commanders They are

the Soviet Army have any opportunity to show initiative.

R. Roditrov, "Battle Formations in Offensive Combat," for USA, Military Herald, no. 1-76, p. 156. 77Ibd. , p. 154.

76

trans.

43

Tif

out in the front far enough to act independently until the battalion

commander arrives.
As the battalion commander moves forward to take command of the battle, the reconnaissance, the advance detachment, enemy formations. The battalion commander now has to make a quick estimate of now forward of the combat involving

reports the approach of the main body of the

the situation.

As the enemy formation approaching is of sufficient

size, it will cause the deployment of the battalion into a full meeting engagement (Figure 6). The limited high ground to the front is the There

key terrain which will significantly aid the side occupying it. are parallel roads to the right that can be used; however,

these roads

are separated from the major route by one of the numerous streams that flow across the West European countryside. roads, By using the two secondary

he can reduce the time required to move troops forward by nearly Since his rate of march in daylight is twenty to

one half (Figure 6).

thirty kilometers per hour and the distance is some ten kilometers to the hill mass, the utilization of the other routes means he can reach
78

the hills in about twenty minutes. on all three routes,

Deploying the maneuver element

the battalion commander has created sufficient

maneuver space to block the enemy's advance with his own advance guard and send his main body on a flanking attack.
7 8 Garbuz, 79

By using The

The MRB on the March, p. 7, provides the speed. twenty minutes is based on Time - Distance " speed. Sve
7 9U.

S.,

Department of Defense, Defense Intelligence Agency, DDI-II00-143-76, (Dec. 1976),

Soviet Tactics: The Meeting Engagement, p. 10, figures C and D.

44

TYPICAL MEEING~d. ENGAGEXENT

7D

45

this

flanking maneuver,

the commander has avoided

the commitment of mass

the battalion in

piecemeal

deployment as they arrive at the hill deployed.

80

where the advance guard is

Having reached his decision as to the manner of engaging the enemy, the battalion commander notifies his chief of staff (battalion

operations

officer) of the plan and moves on to join the combat being As he moves, he informs both the and
8

conducted by the advance guard. artillery

commander and the commander of the advance detachment; informs the remaining elements

the chief of staff In

of the main body.

this manner there will be no need to interrupt the movement of the

main body. ; i tasks. As missions are assigned, It units begin to move to their assigned support

becomes clear the commander intends to move his fire

forward to where the advance detachment has halted or is

Senemy

halting

the

advance and

intends to use his two remaining motorized rifle to move to the right and attack

companies and the tank company minus the left

i~

flank of the enemy (Figure 7). including the bridge-laying tank, moves

The engineer platoon,

80

This mental estimate made by the battalion commander may be implemented; however, there is some doubt about the time lag involved. Though writers in the Military Herald emphasize the initiative allowed commanders In meeting engagements, Garbuz infers that the senior commander will also play a part in this decision-making process. leading a regimental force, commander. If such is the Since the battalion as described here is this senior commander will be a regimental J-

of lack of case, the procedure indicates a weakness (as a result timeliness) in the effective command and control. Garbuz, The MRB on the March, p. 78. Bogdanov, Military Herald, no.

~81A SA.

"Coordination 9-75, p. 54.

in

Combat,"

trans.

for USA,

46
J f3A~..

FIGURE 7 MAIN FORCE DEPLOYMENT

(4) ADVANCE GUARD

FW31
As

90C
B

L,

itk~ (( IP~D
{'*1

i4

Sw

Ok

(20

47

;;,,

;............. ....

..

,',

..

...........

..-

out to the right to use its bulldozer and the bridge-laying tank to provide a crossing of the stream and hedgerow for the tank company and two motor rifle companies (Figure 7). As the tanks pass the to the

engineer-prepared crossing, one section of engineercontinues

far road to support the third motor rifle company, while the engineer commander and one section move to the head of the second motor rifle company. The tanks and motorized rifle units move with all possible

speed, using folds in protect: the advance.

the terrain and artillery and mortar fire to The rifle troops will remain mounted as long as The dismount will be made only

possible as they go into the attack.

when the fire power of the tanks and BMPs is

the destruction of the enemy.

insufficient to effect

The antitank battery of BRDM/SAGGERS will continue to move

"forward until it

can deploy within a 300.0 me.ter range of the advancing It will join the base of

enemy armored vehicles (Figures7 and 8).

fire already being provided by the platoon of tanks and antitank guns of the advance detachment. The air defense element has two weapons forward with the advance detachment, and 8). probable thus leaving two with the battery headquarters it is (Figures 7 highly "

Depending on the decision of the commander,

these latter two guns were divided during the march with one
82

near the front of the main body and one near the rear.

To give

proper coverage to the force throughout the attack, the trailing pair of guns might be given the mission of moving with the third company. Such a mission would afford protection against helicopters being
82

Rodurov,

p.

155.
48 48

FIGURE 8
BATTALION FORCE DEPLOYMENr

LI
FE.BATtALION____
____

_____________________________________MAIN____BODY(

: I '

('~)

IeO

49

deployed by the enemy.

However,

since artillery is

such a prime

target for enemy helicopters,

several Soviet writers hinted that anti

aircraft guns remain near the artillery to give it air defense sup port.83 (Figure 8)
The artillery battalion is not concerned with moving forward Instead, its employment will able to

to the location of its advance battery.

be rapidly accomplished so as to hit the enemy before he is employ his own forces and weapons.
8

Therefore,

having advanced

beyond the point in which the main body deploys from the march column,
4 the artillery will deploy quicklyto the side of the road to fire

(Figure 8).

As it

does,

likely targets will be determined by the

battalion control platoon based on information from both the recon naissance elements well ahead of the combat and from the forward bat

tery commander.

85

During the elapsed time of some fifteen to twenty minutes, 8 6 as the two batteries of artillery prepare to fire (remember the Soviets do not use the "hip-shot" method or a similar terhnique)8 7 83V. Ivanov and V. Nesterov, "A Question on the Survivability of Artillery Podrazdeleniye," trans. for USA, Military Herald, no. 10-75, p. 143-49. 84P. Kunitskiy, Herald, no. 8-74, p.
8 5M.

"On Meeting Battles," trans. 117.

for USA, Military

Sidorov, "Collection and Analysis of Reconnaissance Data in the Artillery Battalion," trans. for USA, Military Herald, no. 4-76, pp. 128-49, 86Y. Yardashevskiy, "Providing Fire When Deploying from the Move," trans. for USA, Military Herald, no. 9-75, p. 49. 87U. S., Department of the Army, The Field Artillery Cannon Battery FM 6-50 (July 1976), pp. 6-1 and 6-2. The "hip-shot" is a term long known for what is now also called the Emergency Occupation. It is the ability of an artillery battery to provide immediate fire support while moving. For more details on the technique see the additional information on the cited pages.

5Q.

the battalion commander continues to move forward so as to be adjacent to the motorized rifle battalion commander.
forward observers (as characterized in
88

Without the aid of

8 9

US artillery terminology,

the

battalion commander becomes

important to the adjustment of the artil

lery fire. 9 0

Several authors have noted that where the commander

was to. visually adjust the fires, the initial rounds should be smoke

Sthe

or high explosive so as to see better the burst in relationship to

target. In addition, the use of smoke rounds serves to mask the

deployment of the rifle troops from the enemy and aids in suppressing the gunners of the antitank weapons. maneuver force,
91

Once positioned to support the

the battalion will remain in place until moved by the

motorized rifle battalion commander. The mortar battery organic to the motorized rifle battalion presents somewhat of a mystery as to its place in the scheme of maneuver. The weapon has a range of 5,700 meters which indicates it cannot stop 88p. Kunitsal,
8 9 The

p. 118.

Soviets devote large portions of their artillery writings to the acquioition of targets through various reconnaissance means, However, support a firing starts, little detailed information Artillery is avail able to once the description of the manner of adjustment.
reconnaissance is defined at length in the GreatSoviet Encyclopedia,

Third ed. , Vol. II, "Artillery Reconnaissance," as being carried out by reconnaissance subunts wilth the aid of optical and electronic optical instruments, sound-ranging observation posts, radar and radio technical stations, artillery reconnaissance groups, and the crews of reconnabsance fire-correction helicopters. Ostroumov, "Firing for Effect," trans. for USA, Military Herald, no. 1-76, p. 131. S91See both the article by V. Koritchuk, "Combat with Antitank System in the Offensive," trans. for USA, Military Herald, no. 6-74,
-9S.

p. 119, and A. Rodin, "Peculiarities of Firing at Maximum Range," trans. for USA, Military Herald, no. 7-75, p. 124.
15

and fire at any vignificicant distance short of the aresin which the advance guard is engaged in combat. One article available in Military

Herald refers to the battery being at the end of the advance party; however, this article is
92

concerned with the utilization of the battery maneuver space might be so critical as to The authors of The Motorized Rifle Bat the Meeting Engagement sugr,-. there are

in the mountains.

There,

require such a positioning. talion on the March and in no mortars in in

the advance guard, but rather show a platoon of mortars

93

the main body.

The latter positioning (in The mortar is is

the main body) seems to

be the more correct. vehicle and, where it

towed by the thin-skinned GAZ-66 the advance guard

therefore,

unlikely to be forward in

might be subjected to a surprise attack by antitank weapons.

Placing the mortars in the main body during the march gives the com mander a bit more leeway as to their positioning in in the assault phase He

case advance Vuard action does not clear enemy resistance.

can bring them forward to serve as a base of fire (as is

done in this

scenario), or he can have the battery follow the two motorized rifle companies used in the flanking attack (Figure 8). While the rifle the mortars can

companies deploy from column to on-line positions, deploy to support the attack. Thus as the deployment phase ends, is arranged as indicated in Figure 8.

the motorized rifle battalion

Provided the meeting engage

ment follows the expected course,

the battalion has fulfilled the the Mountains," trans. for

USA,

920. Begoyan, "A Mortar Battery in Military Herald, no. 1-76, p. 122.
93

Garbuz,

The MRB on the March,

p.

33. 52

requirements of the meeting engagement.

The march has been made,

the direction of movement has suddenly been changed, and the forces * have been deployed and committed in a relatively short period of time. The battalion is now ready to deliver the final blow by striking the flank of the enemy with the motorized rifle troops while stopping the advance with the advance detachment and fire power.
9 4

With the advance of the enemy forces halted, the two companies

"involved in the flanking movement are now ready to attack the main

body of enemy troops. Under cover of fire from the artillery battalion,
the two companies can

the mortar battery, and the antitank battery,

attack in one echelon, with the tanks leading the BMPs on a front up
to 2,000 meters.95 Such a front presupposes a distance of 100 meters

between vehicles in a platoon with 100 meters between platoons in a

company. meters. The distance between companies may be as much as 400 to 500
However, since one platoon is being used as the battalion

reserve, width of the assault force will be reduced to 1,700 meters 9 6

(Figure 9).
Obviously, as the attack is made, the troops will remain mounted in the BMP9. The BMPs should follow the tanks at a distance of not
of

more than 400 meters in a mounted attack, according to Lt. Gen. Tank Troops A. Bondarenko.
9 4 A. 97

However,

for the purpose of the scenario,

for USA,

Zheltoukov, "Conditions for Success," trans. Military Hlerald, no. 8-74, p. 124-25.

9 5 Garbuz,

The MRB on the March, p. 79. The distance may be

reduced to approximately 100 meters if nuclear weapons have not been
employed.

96

bid,

p.

79.

Bondarenko, "Concerning the Employment of BMP in Combat,"

trans. for USA, Military Herald, no. i0-75, p. 109. _________ 534

9 7A.

-- ; d .L ,"-. : . ,', .

....... .... . . . . "

.'' ..... ... ' .

........... ' '''..

. . . . . . .... ...

. ... .....

....

...

.....

.........
.

FIGURE 9

MOUNTED ATTACK

I
x

0
00 0 OX

xo
0

50 -O0

voo

1 800

X - TANK

L:

0-

BMP

54

it

is assumed the enemy fire is

sufficiently strong to cause a dis

mounted attack.
L

As the tanks approach to approximately 400 meters the BMPs which have been trailing by the the

from the enemy position,

required distance suddenly rush forward to join the tanks;

infantry squad dismounts; and the BMPs follow the troops at about 200 meters, adding its fire power to the assault. the assault is successful,
98

(Figure 10)

If

the BMPs move forward to join with the tanks squad to begin the pursuit oper

and pick up the members of the rifle ation. If all has gone well,

the forces involved should perform in

the

following manner: Artillerymen destroy the enemy's weapons, primarily anti

tank weapons, depriving them of the opportunity of offering organized resistance and hindering the swift advance of motor

ized rifle and tank podrazdeleniye. The artillerymen also neutralize personnel. Motorized rifle podrazdeleniya move
behind the tanks Rnd in turn do battle with antitank weapons,

while with their fire and shock power,

the tanks neutralize

weapons which interfere with the advance of the motorized riflemen. Antiaircraft artillerymen cover the attackers against air attack, and combat engineer podrazdeleniye support tle crossing of mine fields, natural and artificial obstacles, 99 log obstacles and centers of fire.

Command and Control Recalling the previous chapter, one of the principles of operational art was that of coordination. In effect, how is the

commander expected to maintain a close successful working relation

ship among the elements of this reinforced motorized rifle battalion? 981bid, p. 110.
99 Bogdanov, p. 55. Maj. Gen. Bogdanov was the deputy commander for combat training, Turkestan Military District, in 1975,

55

I,.

"

FIGURE 10 DISMOUNTED ATTACK

x
x
#

x
# 0n 0

o
S4-500M

500M

FEN

~&0\

\
800H

it

4!
x
x

#
#
0IL

0
00
#

S0A

X
#

TANK RIFLE SQUAD

0-

E"

56

%,.-,

Maj.

Gen.

of Signal Troops Pavlov expresses that task in 'irm,

this manner, and flexible

"High combat readiness of troops supposes constcit,

1 control ., , 00

The Soviet writers note that increases in mobility and maneu verability, rapid changes in situations, and the need for instant Thus,

reactions have greatly increased the task of troop control. the Soviet training theme in

this area seems to be one of constant

repetition to the point that what the battalion does and what the enemy does no longer is caught unprepared. Command and control of the meeting engagement is of this preparedness theme in that it a reflection unexpected; and, thus, the troops are not

starts back at the point the Upon the receipt of the

battalion commander is mission,

given the mission.

the planning sequence indicates the commander will provide guidance. One author indicates the tasks which

the subunit commanders with initial the following is

provided by the battalion commander:

must be done and when tzhey must be done, the length and composition of the column, and where and when the combat mission is The battalion commanders' (in this case, guidance is to be supplied.
1 0 1

supplied by the senior commander

02 the regimental commander) in the following terms:1

The plan of operation on meeting the enemy. The organization of the march formation and the distribu

tion of forces and weapons.

100

trans.

Yu. Pavlov, "Tactics and Communications are Inseparable for USA, Military Herald, no. 6-74, p 165. no. 6-75, p. 82.

01 "1 N. Chernov, "Increasing the Rate of March" trans. fir USA,

Military Herald,
10 2

School,

U. S., Department of the Army, United States Army Infantry Opposuing Forces Handbook ST-7-288, (FY77), p. 2-6. 57

The tasks of the forward detachment and the march security

troops.
The tasls of all subordinate elements on the march.
The movements routes, initial line, and control points.

As a planning factor, Col. A. Demidov writes, "Experience has

shown that a company commander requires up to two hours in order to

evaluate a situation, make his decision, assign combat tasks and pre pare the subunits for the march. of the advance guard. As . Gen. Bogdanov further stated, organization of this The more com
10

He was referring to the commander

coordination is

only one side of the commander's job.

difficult side is bat. 1 0 4

constantly to maintain the coordination in

Missions are passed usually in person and in

sufficient time

to allow the units to maneuver outside the range of antitank weapons.

As the advance guard is deployed into combat, the battle assignments

come down in a way that allows the platoon commanders to receive

1 missions by the time subunits arrive at the deployment line. 05

Of primary importance is the position of the battalion commander.

In the Soviet concept of one-man command, the key to the meeting engage

ment is the location of the command post.

As was shown in the scenario,

in combat;

the commander moves forward as soon as the advance guard is for until he has a full understanding of the action, ment takes place.
103

no other deploy

Once he is

in position to conduct the meeting

A.

Demidov,

"In

a Forward Patrol of Advance Guard," trans.

for

USA, Military Herald, no. 11-73,

10 4

p. 37-38.

Bogdanov, p. 50. The MRB on the March, p. 88. 58

10 5 Garbuz,

engagement,

he assigns the fire mission to the artillery and maneuvers Because of the great importance the Soviets

the rest of the force. place on artillery, *

the key to this problem of coordination seems to

be one of insuring that both the motorized rifle battalion commander and the artillery battalion commander are fairly closely located and exchanging information. For the rest of the units, the emphasis seems

to be on receiving information,

not providing feedback.

Before a discussion of the manner of maintaining control through limited communications, it seems appropriate to discuss briefly the The Soviets point

degree of flexibility available to the battalion.

out the fact that the advance guard commander and the battalion command er are among the privileged few small unit commanders who have the opportunity to adjust the plans already given. to allow some initiative and flexibility, with these words: The exhibition of initiative, as a rule, is connected with risk. However, risk does not mean operating at odds with the goal to be obtained. Risk leads to success only if it is based on knowledge of te nature of modern warfare, con sideration of the condition and capabilities of the enemy podrazdeleniye and our own troops, if there is a profound analysis of the situation, proper calculations and firm belief in success. In short, risk is the highest manifestation of military mastery of thg commander, his skill in predicting the Yet while they pretend

they caution the commanders

development of events.106 Having thus explained the degree of preparation the Soviet commander
makes to exercise control, what then about the communications used? During movement before the engagement, it is by a variety of means- lights; and

radio with short, prearranged signals; signal flags;

in

106I. Combat,"

Voloshin, "Initiative and Independence of the Commander

trans. for USA, Military Herald, no. 4-75, p. 96.

,..gj

. ..

~59q

4-,

audio signals. used. However, caution is given concerning the systems

Tbe number of signals should be small., should consist of no and be so simple as to

more than six visual and six radio signals, avoid confusion and misunderstanding. has commenced,

ce the meeting engagement

the visual signals and the shortE, prearranged radio Unrestricted use of the radio is allowed.
10 7

signals can cease.

This non-restriction applies only to the radios of the battalion commander, his company commander (platoon and squad leaders will receive communications and only transmit in the commanders of the attached units. an emergency), and

The authors of the articles in Military Herald note the radio

often is misused in heat of battle. They cite examples of commanders

going off and leaving it behind, expecting it to provide guidance to the point of eliminating all decision making, failing to insure that all nets mesh together when working as a combined arms force, and finally not devoting the same degree of attention to the training of the operators that they do for the other combat elements.
108

Such an approach to the command and control of the battalion and its attachments prevails for several reasons.
is available for use once the meeting engagement is that inadequate training is

Though the radio

initiated, This degree, the

belief is

devoted to its use. is condoned to some

inadequacy (this author's evaluation)

10 7 108

Garbuz, The MRB on the March,

p. 39.

Examples of such training can be found in the following articles: Voloshin, p. 98; B. Kutsenko, "In Step with the Times," trans. for USA, Military Herald, no. 1-75, p. 197; V. Kalinin, "But Where are the Tanks," trans. for USA, Military Herald, no. 1-75, p. 134; and B. Gudymenko and M. Voronov, "Commanders Work over the Radio," trans. for USA, Military Herald, no. 4 -76,.p. 181.

S.60

F`

as the training system substitutes repetitiveness of combat drills, detailed planning, and limited use of initiative as a replacement for sufficient training and competent communications operations.

Fire Power Involved Having brought a number of units into play during the course of the scenario, it seems appropriate to recapitulate the fire

power the reinforced motorized rifle battalion has within its structure:1
Number 18 2 2 13 31 9 2 6 2 27 30 27
0 9

Description 122mm Self-propelled howitzers SA-9 Air defense weapons ZSU-23-4 Air Defense weapons T-62 Tanks with 115mm main gun BMP-armored personnel carriers
73mm main gun

Range in Meters 15,300 7,000 3,000 2,000

1,000

SAGGER AT missile BRDM SAGGER Missile launchers vehicles BACKPACK SAGGER AT Missile 120mm Mortars SPG-9 AT guns (72mm) RPG-7 AT grenade launchers (40mm) SGQ Heavy machine guns RPK Light machine guns

3,000 3,000 3,000 5,700 1,000 500 1,000 800

ii

1 0 9 FM

30-40,

Handbook on Soviet Ground Forces,

(June 1975),

pp. 6-11, 6-27, 6-43, 6-47, 6-51, 6-55, 6-6t, and 6-71; RB 30-2, Selected US and Soviet Weapons and Equipment, (July 1976), p. 18; and RB 30-3, Soviet Artillery Doctrine, (May 1976), p. A-12.

tb

61

CHAPTER III

Another pattern (in the revolution in military affairs)

is the ever increasing diversity and complexity of the
methods for conducting combat and operations. This has accelerated the development of such a trend as the
necessity of coordinated efforts by different branches
of arms . . .

110 Ma4. Gen. Voznenko

The motorized rifle battalion commander charged with a

mission of being the advance guard has approximately 500 additional
people under his command. As has been described earlier, this in

cludes the following units:

A tank company. An artillery battalion.
An air defense element.
An antitank battery. An engineer element. An NBC element. This attached force means six additional commanders have to be
directed, including the artillery commander who could be as senior in
Because of the nature of Soviet
common

rank as the rifle battalion commander. combined operations, there is

no cross attachment as is

llOv. Voznenko, "The Dependency of the Methods of Conducting

Combat Operations upon the Development of Weapons and Military
Equipment," in The Revolution in Military Affairs, ed. N. A. Lomov,
trans. for USAF, Soviet Military Thought Series, no. 3 (Washington:

United States Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 133.

62

iA

'

practice in

the United State's Army; but rather the additional units For example, in the previous

are simply added to the battalion. chapter g,,

when the tank company minus and two motorized rifle companies attacked the flank of the advancing unit, the battalion commander

2:had
i!:+chapter '

an additional company commander in the scheme of maneuver.

is an attempt to determine if

This

the reinforcement of such a

large number of forces presents any real difficulty to the command

and control structure of the reinforced motorized rifle battalion.

A.

Mechanized-Tank Relationship

A Military Herald writer defines the relationship between the infantry and armor when ltawrites that armor protects the motorized e infantrymen with its tanks and defends them with both machine gun

and main'vi

fire, while motorized riflemen protect the tanks from

antitank adapons, look for mine felds, and aid tank crews in over
coming various obstacles.1ll

Such an arrangement has worked well historically; however, with the introductuor of the reMP with its speed and mobility, several

Soviet writers are suggesting the meeting engagement may be a place where the BwP-equipped unit can dll maneuverable and slower tanks.112
in the concept stage.

afford to wait on the less g Such thoughts still seem to bed

Descriptions of exercises noted in available

literature do not indicate the maneuver forces practice piecemeal

111M. Tyfhkov, "The Landing of Riflemen Mounted on Tanks," trans for USA, Mlontary Herald, no. 1-75, p. 119. w i12An example of such writing is Lt. Gen. Bukharenko, p. 103.

63

commitment of the combined arms team.

This conceptual thinking is

reflected in a recently concluded series of articles that appeared in the Military Herald during the period June 1975 to March 1976 Presently, the produc

concerning the role of the BMP in combat.

tion rate of the BMP has allowed only one regiment per division to be

i'.'
equipped with the vehicle. As more are entered into the inventory, will assume the Soviets seem to have difficulty deciding the role it in relationship to the tank.

The Soviets recognize the greater speed as Phillip Karber

and maneuverability of the BMP over the tank; and, points out, "What is clearly illustrated in

recent Soviet writings

on antitank weapons is not so much concern over the survival ability of the tank, as of the operational viability of motorized infantry. Therefore, because of the concern for the survival of the BMP and the lack of strong evidence of use of the BMP ahead of the tanks, it still seems the two arms will work together in Where they do work together, it may be in the meeting engage either of the two In
A

114

ment.

ways illustrated in Figures 5 and 8 of the previous chapter. one situation, maneuver. the tanks provide a base of fire, and the BMPs

In the second situation,

the tanks and BMPs maneuver and

fire together as a single unit. The command and control of the tank company with the battalion is worthy of discussion. The tank company, be it the ten or thirteen

1 3 l The series of articles began with an article by V. Pishakov and L. Kirpach, "Infantry Combat Vehicle in Battle," trans. for USA, Military Herald, no. 6-75, pp. 72-79; and ended with an article by Merimskiy, pp. 32-37. 1 14

Karber,

p.

108. 64

tank variety, by necessity is to be divided during the course of the

11 5

march and subsequent meeting engagement. L

Because of the normal

cohesion of this unit, the dividing of the tanks makes the commun ication between the two forces especially important. Communications between the tankers and infantry include the normal radio signals, flares, and messengers. Under normal conditions,

when the tank company is working as a single unit, the tank platoon leaders would be able to initiate conversation only in emergencies, due to strict traffic discipline. receive communications only. The individual tank crews will

Also, this same VHF system in the com

p,y will allow the tank company commander to communicate with the motorized rifle commander.
1 16

Just as the tanker communications The

work downward, so does that of the motorized rifle battalion.

supporting artillery has the capability to enter the company nets of both the tank company and the motorized rifle battalion. troops are mounted, one.
117

When the

there is no company net, but a single battalion

The procedure as to who can initiate communications in the

tank battalions for a number of years contained thirty-one tanks--ten tanks per company and one in the battalion headquarters. As more tanks are made available to the force in the field, the number of tanks in the various tank battalions has changed. The tank battalion of the motorized rifle regiment has forty tanks. This increase has resulted in thirteen tanks to the company and one in the battalion headquarters. The tank battalions of the tank regiments still have thirty-one tanks. The independent tank battalion of the motorized rifle division has a total of fifty-one tanks. A difference in the three battalion organizations can be seen on pp. 2-5, 2-7, and 2-11 of 11 550-2. Where there is a company of thirteen tanks, each platoon contains four tanks as reflected in the diagrams and drawings of TC 30-102.
1 1 6 DDI-1120-129-76,

1 15 Soviet

Soviet Tank Company Tactics,

p. 5.

117U. S., Department of Defense, Defense Intelligence Agency,

The Soviet Motorized Rifle Company DDI-II00-77-76, October 1976, p. 28. 65

Zthere

Obviously, rifle battalion is the same as that in the tank company. is need to make some modification to such a system during a meeting engagement when sub-elements of both the tank and motorized rifle units are separated. Such a modification is necessary to allow

tank platoon leaders and motorized rifle company commanders to commun icate with each other. There have been no data uncovered reflecting

the modification, but the communications equipment is available. Therefore, it seems likely the tank platoon leader in the advance guard will be able to communicate directly with the motorized rifle company commander. The tank company commander will be able to commun

icate with the battalion commander and the other two motorized rifle company commanders. In the control of various elements, it should

be noted that only the officers are equipped with maps; and such limited distribution may account for the way the communications procedure is structured. During the course of the assault if the infantrymen are

forced to dismount,

only the platoon leader and the company commander

can maintain radio communications, both between themselves and with the tanks. Squad leaders will be forced to use other signal means,
118

1 since they have no radios when dismounted.* 1

B.

Mechanized-Artillery Relationship

A German writer in a recent article on Soviet artillery writes that the Soviets have done all possible to strengthen and modernize their artillery since World War II. Then he ad,,-, that with the

build up of this material, the problem of effective artillery operations 1181bi., p. 25. 66

S~still

;',"4fires,

is merit.

not solved.1l

What the writer says seems to have some

Much has been written about the massive Soviet Army artillery

and no doubt there is every reason for NATO planners to cone'

eider this fire power. However, at the lower unit level, there do a battalion i

.i

to be problems S~~seem in combined arms operatdon,. example, in

S~For the meeting

engagement,

there is

~of divisional artillery (122mm)

battalion as was illustrated. are examined,

attached to the motorized rifle When the operations of this battalion

the Soviets artillery does not look nearly so formi

' i

dable as it There is

does when viewed en masse firing a preparation fire.

no doubt that when firing pre-planned fire at both point

and area targets, a tremendous amount of divisional artillery can be brought to bear on the enemy target with a high degree of accuracy. However, in the meeting engagement, pre-planned fire may not be pos

sible, since the two forces may not meet at the location selected dur ing the planning phase. When the actual contact point and the prethere seems to be no way effective

planned point do not coincide,

fire can be placed on the enemy in a timely manner because of the lack of an adjustment mechanism. Such a lack during the meeting

engagement greatly detracts from this formidable power capability. The Soviet concept of one-man command seems most overworked in this particular relationship. There is Just so much proficiency and the complexity of

a middle-level grade officer can attain, l 1 gErich Sobik,

kI

"The Concept of Artillery Utilization and trans. for USA, Trurp 67 p. 11.

Artillery Fire in !

the Soviet Land Forces,"

~penipraxis (May 1976):

artillery seems to create difficulties, Military Herald.

120

according to writers in

the

Contrary to the United States Army system in

which the supporting artillery commander moves and shoots his artil lery to support the maneuver force, in the Soviet Army this is the

responsibility of the maneuver force commander. this to say:

Col. Krysanov has

it

Experience gained in combined exercises of motorized rifle and artillery units shows there are many deficiencds in the organization of their cooperation. Some commanders do not assign missions to the attached artillery at the proper time (especially in the meeting engagement) and do not always order displacement in time for the artillery to support the attack. As a result the attack is slowed, the pace of the Regardless of how effectively the motorized rifle battalion commander employs the artillery,

offensive is slowed and unnecessary losses are encountered. 1 2 1

numerous writers indicate that his com

mand post and that of the supporting artillery battalion commander

should be reasonably close together.

12 2

Since all writers reflect

the need for the motorized rifle battalion commander to be near the front where he can direct the battalion, the artillery post will be equally close to the front. Of course, the artillery commander
for he has no forward ob

has to be as near the action as possible, servers to direct the Though this explanation
12

artillery has

fire and must do so himself. on the two battalion

focused

0Difficulties in using the artillery are noted by both V.

Krysanov, "Artillery in a Tactical Attack Formation," trans. for USA, Military Herald, no. 12-75, p. 133; and R. Kiudmaa and V. Selyavin, 'Supporting the Advance Party," trans. for USA, Military Herald, no. 8-74, p. 173.
12 1

Krysanov.

12 2

Kunitskiy, p.

118. 68

S..

. .

-, . .: ..:,.

.........

commanders, the same relationship will exist between the commander Sof the ad-rance detachment and the supporting artillery battery.12 The apparent lack of a forward observer would seem to create enormous command and control problems.124 If tho battery and bat

talion commanders have to be with their counterparts at company and battalion to relay targets to the firing units from the maneuver force, one tends to wonder who really controls the firing units. Certainly it staff. becomes a heavier responsibility for the unit chief of referred to as an artillery scout though

The Soviets have what is

or reconnaissance scout in the artillery or'ganization; and, he is

trained to detect targets, he does not seem to be located with His role seems

the maneuver force for the purpose of fire control. to be one of pure reconnaissance

to provide information back to the This control platoon is in charged

artillery battalion control platoon.

with the preparation of intelligence which is

turn shared with attached. 125 Thus,

the combined arms unit to which the battalion is

whatever has been perceived as a target by the scout is

reported to

the artillery battalion and passed through the motorized rifle bat talion commander, who then tells the artillery to fire--obviously something the artillery would have done earlier if have allowed it.
12 3

the system would it

If

this procedure is

ever utilized in a war,

trans.

A. Sedykh, "Continuity of Attack by Fire on the Enemy," for USA, Military Herald, no. 11-75, p. 164. is the failure of a western-crained mind to under would be done any other way. Gen. of Artillery), pp. 124-130.

Or maybe it stand how or why it

12 5

Sidorov (Lt.

69

seems likely that those expedient measures always learned as soon as one is target. Reznichenko, in his book Tactics, writes that it may take shot at will include a simpler way to get fire to the

twenty-five to thirty minutes to prepare the firing batteries of the artillery battalion.
12 6

Lt.

Gen.

Kardashevskiy,

in

a much more

recent article, writes that as much as fifteen to twenty-two minutes is required for the battalion to undergo full preparation to fire. The writer implies the timing is made possible by the use of "a specially equipped topometeorological vehicle (TMM) which contains a computer, a reconnaissance scout as an operator, chemical specialist."' 1 2 7 and a dosimeter-

The additional information in Kardashevskiy's

article seems to suggest that his example involves all three batteries of the battalion. However, such a situation is not likely to be

found, since one battery is forward withthe motorized rifle company in the advance guard. If the commander does not prepare to fire until

all batteries are co-located, the criticism of employing artillery in a timely manner seems valid. Reznichenko says the artillery must

quickly set up firing sites along the march route regardless of con venience, however, insuring that the guns are not less than one half 128 of their range from the enemy. He also suggests that speed is so important that batteries should fire on their own it a matter of
12 6 Reznichenko, 127

Tactics, p. 49.

p.

150.

Kardashevskiy,

1 2 8 Reznichenko,

Tactics, pp.

147-149. 70

... .
~.

'W'7

'7

eight to ten minutes.

There is no available data to suggest the time

Nor is there data available

the batteries need to prepare for firing.

to reflect the accuracy of thib battery fire central battalion control mechanism.

.- not tied into some

n

Regardless of the timeliness of the initial firing, the battery

currently uses one of three deployment schemes: FEBA, in a "V", or in a "U" formation. 1 2 9 on-line parallel to

This deployment pattern, Two

however, may be a topic under consideration for possible change. writers

indicate the lessons learned in the Middle East War show the

normal deployment pattern to be extremely vulnerable to counter-

0
battery fire. 1 3

Realizing there are problems associated with the artillery

firing once the motorized rifle commander gives the order, a matter of training before the problems are reduced. it seems

Part of this
4

reAiction can be overcome by accepting advice from the artillery rom..nander and having a better knowledge of when to order deployment.
Two authors suggest the rifle commander should never order deplcy for if it is done, the artil

ment and fire on enemy reconnaissance;

lery will be deployed too far to the rear to develop the attack in
depth. Additionally, firing at long range is
13 1

a waste of ammunition,

because it

is ineffective.

Finally, a description should be added concerning the fird that

!29U. S., Department of the Army, The Thre__t, TO--C United States Army Field
AT--OIl, February 1976,

Artillery School,

TO 01CS,

p.

19. 1301vanov and Nesteruv, p.

13

14/.

1Kiudmaa and Selyavin,

p. 173.
71

S ... ............ ,.. :. .. .........:

.... ,.,9 : .s e ,:, :.,i,,-,.

,,, -.,': . .,

.,. .--:: -,r4 : ,--. . .,'

..

--.

is

finally delivered.

One author suggests that artillery delivered

*:

along the depth of the march where a meeting engagement will most likely begin prevents the enemy from using his weapons tG the full est.
1 32

Such a statement implies that fires other than from the attached

artillery battalion will be made available to the rifle battalion com mander. Such a situation does not seem likely because of the distance

between the lead elements of this advance guard and the main body of troops. In any event, first regardless of where the artillery is located, the

rounds to be called for by the commander should be amoke.l1 3 3

This will better enable the artillery battalion commander to adjust the next salvo and at the same time possibly impair the enemy force
in the effective use of their antitank weapons. Once the smoke rounds

have been fired,

the high explosive fires are maintained on the enemy 300-500 metera.
134

until the distance between the troops is

At that

point, the fires are ordered to be shifted. Thus, it bears repeating:

the Soviets have huge amounts of the meeting engagement there are

artillery and rifle troops; but in

some very real problems to be solved before effective coordination is attained. battalion The problems knvolve the difficulty for the motorized rifle commander in employing the artillery support properly;

1 3 2 Kunitskiy, p.
133 134

117.

Koritchuk. Sedykh, p. 163.

72

the apparent lack of a forward observer, other than the commander, to adjust fires; and quite possibly the timely delivery of fire power once the command to deploy has been given.

C. Col. Gen.

Mechanized Air Defense Relationship of Artillery Levchenko, Chief of the Air Defense the Soviet

Troops of the Ground Forces,

places this relationship in

perspective when he writes that the combined arms commander must continuously control the air defense weapons at his disposal and take all the steps necessary to insure the air defense battery is ready to open up timely and effective fire against the enemy. In the scenario used,
135

the air defense weapons of the attached element

are moved from point to point with no clear indication that they are specifically positioned by the motorized rifle battalion commander. Whereas in United States Army doctrine the battalion commander would be given an overall mission to the air defense, the Soviet doctrine

seems to direct the battalion commander to make the decisions on exact ly where and how the guns are to be used. Several writers, among them Maj. Gen. of Artillery Kutsenko,

seem to reflect a new approach to assigning missions to air defense units.136 In effect, these writers indicate it is no longer possible

to base the operations of antiaircraft gunners solely on the air sit uation, but also on the ground activity as well. As has been illustrated, 135P. Levcbenko, the guns assigned to the battalion

"Problems of Modern Combat," Military Herald, no. 4-76, p. 70. 13'B. Kutsenko, "In Step with the Times," pp. articles also appeared in Military Herald in

trans. 196-201.

for USA, Other

early 1975.

73

are broken up and committed in and one pair in the main body. way of employment. engagement,

pairs--one pair to the advance guard This manner seems to be the ideal

Once the battalion deploys for the meeting

the battery can consolidate on a narrow front or spread

of the rifle battalion commander.

wide depending on the desires

Distance can be adjusted within the restrictions

imposed by the 400

38

meter depth and 150-200 meter separation distances.1

Locating the
the scenario

element at a single firing position as reflected in Sentire

makes it

easier to control the fire and increases the effectiveness Where the enemy is using attack helicopter" it seems

of the unit.139
the air

defense battery will move only one gun at

a time during dis

placement.

Such a procedure does not degrade the capability to a though it takes longer to complete the move.

great extent, Finally,

as the battalion commander studies the deployment a fact to be recognized

and utilization of this air defense element, is

that there will be no friendly fixed-winged aircraft over his As he assigns

position within the range of these particular weapons. the mission,

the commander can give the unit a free-fire mission on for the Soviet doctrine does not use However, as more

all of this type of aircraft,

close air support inside the air defense umbrella. HINID helicopters are produced, it

would seem likely this doctrine

would be modified to allow close air support from these attack 13 7 V. Gatsolayev, Are Airborne," trans. 138Rodurov,
139

(Lt. Gen.

of Artillery),

"When Helicopters no. 11-73, p. 123.

for USA, Military Herald,

p. 154.

1bid.,

p.
155.

74

14

helicopters.140

The helicopter seems particularly valuable in

meeting engagement, where the motorized rifle battalion and its attached forces are out beyond the range of the weapons of the regimental artil lery group (RAG).

D.

Mechanized-Antitank

Relationship

The use of the attached antitank battery seems to be the most confusing of all the attached forces. and his fellow authors, in Both C. H. Donnelly and Garbuz indicate the

their respective articles,

presence of an antitank battery in rifle battalion.

the march column of the motorized is the

The only battery likely to be available

antitank battery from the regiment to which the battalion belongs. Therefore, in the description of the battalion organization in the

previous chapter, the entire battery is to the battalion. As a force,

reflected as being attached

this batterycontains nine BRDM vehicles,

14 2

each equipped with fourteen SAGGER missiles.

These nine vehicles

are believed to be divided into three platoons of three vehicles

S40U. S.,
US and

Department of the Army,

and Equipment

Fort Leavenworth,
(July, 1976),

Selected
p. 99.

Soviet Weapons

RB 30-2

The HIND A and B are the first helicopter gunships deployed by the Soviets. The HIND-A is the antitank version that can carry the SAGGER antitank missile as part of its armament. The HIND-B carries rocket pods but not the SAGGER. Both versions can carry between eight and twelve troops in addition to their weapons load, and both have an automatic weapon in the chin turret (believed to be a 23mm weapon). The HIND A and B have an estimated cruising speed of 122 knots and a range of approximately 260 nautical miles. The closest US counterpart

is the Cobra.
l 4 lDonnelly, "The 'MarcW in Soviet Tactical Doctrine," p. 79; and Garbuz, The MRB on the March, p. 33. 14 2 FM 30-40, p. 6-61; and U. S. Department of the Army, Train ing and Doctrine Command, TRADOC Bulletin #2 (April, 1975), p. 8.

75

each.

The above organization varies with the organization shown in

in another Training and Doctrine Command publication, TC 30-102,

which only two BRDM SAGGER vehicles are noted operating with a motor ized rifle company. 1 4 4 There is some evidence to support the former organization in the book Antitank Warfare. 1 4 5 The authors give an example of deployment using a three-vehicle illustration with vehicle capability approximating that of the BRtDM/SAGGER. In addition to this regimental battery, there are a number of antitank weapons available to the force. There are the tank company,

the thirty-one BMPs, each containing one missile rail (four missiles), the twenty-seven RPG-7 antitank grenade launchers, and the organic antitank platoon with two SPG-9s. Because there is so little documentation available on the

organization and deployment of this battery and because of the number of antitank weapons of the battalion, the4 understanding of the employ situation. The

ment of these weapons becomes somewhat of a "what if"

authors of Antitank Warfare in their discussion of antitank combat in the meeting engagement write that there have to be sufficient antitank weapons in the advanced detachment to cause the enemy force to deploy. If the battalion commander attaches his antitank platoon of SPG-9s to 1431bid., p. 17. p. 11-13.
14 6

144TC 30-102,
1 4 5 G.

Biryukov and G. Melnikov, Antitank Warfare, trans. by David Myshne, (Moscow, 1972), p. 97. (It should be noted that this book is not considered as authoritative as some of the other Russian books used as source material.)
1 4 6 1bid.,

p.

152. 76

the rifle company in

the advance detachment and provides a platoon the requirement to have the enemy force The remaining two platoons are

from the antitank battery,

deploy seems to have been satisfied.

free to deploy in the flanking movement with the rifle companies. Or they can be used, at least in part, to cover the gap between the

I'

/advance

detachment and the main body of the battalion when the gap exceeds five kilometers.
14 7

By filling the gap that exists,

the pla

toons are able to move forward quicker to reinforce the blocking posi tion established by the advance detachment.
14 8

An alternate deployment scheme which could be utilized would be to attach only one platoon from the regimental battery to the motorized rifle battalion. Such an'attachment would increase the survival

of the battery by insuring that accurate or lucky counter-battery fire would not eliminate the entire regimental asset. Withholding a portion

of the battery, the commander can position it column and rush it

at the head of the march Biryukov and

forward to support the battalion.

Melnikov write that the motorized rifle company should be able to hold back an enemy tank battalion for one hour.
14 9

ii

it

This delay would

allow these remaining two platoons to be sent forward to reinforce the battalion force. * Viewing the command and control situation, would seem to be only .1

more advantageous to the motorized rifle battalion commander if one platoon were attached
147

to the battalion.

By attaching the platoon

1bid.

14 8 14 9

DDIlII00-143-76,

p.

10. p, 52.
77477 1

Biryukov and Melnikov,

i,

.,..

.*-

. ,.

',,

,'.

-.

'..

'

. ..

--.

V...

. . .

to a motorized rifle commander to control.

company,

the battalion commander has one less

The one platoon concept must be balanced

against the confusion which would occur when attempting to reinforce the battalion with the remaining elements of the battery once the meeting engagement begins. tery is To attach or not attach the entire bat

one of those command decisions which must be made based on the involved.

situation and personalities

E.

Mechanized-Engineer Relationship in his effort to main

The motorized rifle battalion commander,

tain the desired rate of advance,

is

greatly dependent for such pur

poses upon the engineer assets in talion.

the platoon attached to the bat the and

Under condition of an anticipated meeting engagement,

combined arms commander has to insure he has requested,

received,

positioned the correct engineer assets; for once he commits his various elements to battle from the march, there will be no time for any re
1 50

arrangement of these particular assets.

The attached platoon may have a number of squads and pieces of equipment. It is not likely to be a set organization. The base

of the platoon comes from a platoon in of the regiment, and is

the combat engineer company

reinforced as needed with equipment and In the illustrated

personnel from the engineer battalion at division.

scenario of the previous chapter, only a portion of those missions of

1 5 0 1. F. Lysukhin, V. Ya. Plyaskin, Support of Combined-Arms Combat (Moscow: USA, 1973 (FSTC-HT-23-1122-73).

and V. A. Rvinskiy, Engineer Voyenizdat, 1970), trans. for

78

engineer support as listed by Garbuz and his fellow authors will need
to be performed. 1 5 1 they will include:

The reconnaissance and obstacle clearance of routes.

The preparation of terrain for cross-coun~try movement.
The possible preparation for crossing contaminated areas.
The battalion moving forward will be moving across unfamiliar

Itmarch,
Itax)
,

terrain.

Therefore, in an effort to insure the Ideaired rate of

considerable equipment has to be available.

Within the

battalion there are the pioneer tools (crowbar, shovel, saw, and
on each vehicle. A power saw is available in each company.

Attached heavy equipment includes a road grading machine, one half set of heavy mechanized bridges, a bulldozer equipped tank, three to

., - ' L ,&.... ,.. : .,, ,,,,, .. ,,, .- r'.,:,,,," ..:'. : . .. . . *.... **"**-'

six mine plows with blade sections, a mine plow with drag sections,
and a truck-mounted crane.l52

In order to obtain the proper utilization of engineer,-assets,

the battalion commander will create a movement support detachment

(MSD) commanded by the platoon leader of the attached engineer platoon. This MSD is organized into a reconnaissance group, a barricade-,
These groups can be

clearing group, and a highway-bridge group.

organized and positioned in the march column as the situation demands.

Many times the reconnaissance group will consist of one engineer
squad mounted on an APC and equipped with mine detectors, sign kits', a mine-clearing claw,
151

road

and a number of small high

Garbuz, Mfl in the Meeting Engagement, p. 52.A'

Belokin and V. Kalayda, Engineering Support of the

Motorized Rifle (Tank) Battalion on the Marrh and in the Meeting
Engagement, trans. for USA, (Moscow, 1975), pp. 14, 67, 105.
79

15 2A.

153

element of the battalion.

The barricade-clearing group may be with

the reconnaissance or between the reconnaissance and the advanced detachment. This group will be part of the squad and be furnished It is also possible that The highway-

mine detactors and a tank with a mine plow.

the bridge-laying vehicle will be with this group.

bridge group composed of the platoon minus the one squad holds the rest of the equipment. ible. body, It Its position and organization is highly flex

could move with the advance detachment or with the main could divide and move some equipment and personnel with

or it

each group. A battalion conducting a meeting engagement at the end of a long march will have considerable equipment, and there is likely to have been considerable interplay between the commander and the engi neer. In the scenario provided, there has been no nuclear exchange;

and the meeting engagement to occur is likely to be on relatively uncluttered terrain, thus requiring little engineer effort. The

meeting engagement will last at this level only two or three hours, which reinforces the need to get engineer effort organized right the first time. Once the battle commences, there is likely to be A
*1

little or no interface between the battalion commander and his engi neer. Engineer support requirements usually will be clear enough so

as to need no further dialogue. The Soviet concern for protection of equipment in training means that little of this engineer equipment will be used in routine
1 5 3 Ibid.,

p. 66. 80

-.

training.

Instead, the equipment and the functions it

performs will

be simulated,and ship will occur.

therefore, no training in a combined arms relation

F.

Mechanized-NBC Relationship

The Soviet Army in recent years has shifted its doctrine for the conduct of war to include a non-nuclear phase in addition to the massive nuclear war. As such, they have shifted the training effort In the process, they

for the possibility of a non-nuclear phase.

seem to have increased NBC training and improved the equipment in volved. 154 In the battalion, NBC protection is limited to the protective

suit and gas mask issued to individuals and to the qualitative im provement of many of its vehicles. At the regimental level, a

twenty-seven man chemical defense company is available155 from which a squad is dispatched to the battalion. For a battalion expecting to become involved in a meeting engagement, a squad from the chemical defense company is provided.

This squad is divided between the battalion reconnaissance and the advance detachment. The reconnaissance NBC representation is likely

to be one BPZM-rhk--a vehicle with crew capable of monitoring the because of the nature of the subject, either very little is known about actual operational aspects or it is highly classified. As a result a paucity of information is avail For example, note the limit able in both US and USSR publications. ed information found in the DIA reports The Soviet Motorized Rifle Compan DDI-1100-77-76 and Soviet Tank Company Tactics, DDI-1120 129-76; and in Garbuz, The MRB in Modern Combat. 155HB 550-2, p. 2-13.
1 5 4 However,

81

surrounding area for NBC effects.

At the advance detachmeut,

there

may be two of the same vehicles to continue to probe far Because of thenature of the work of this squad. it

C effects. w*IL !ike

ly work in very close harmony with the engineer eletmts of the reconnaissance ana advance detachment. This work is limited to
4

providing support to the reconnaissance and security missio.-

!he

chemical scouts will attempt to assure the movement of the follow ing units through the most direct route providing the least conThe engineers will supplement the work by adding the S~tamination. markers where contaminated areas are discovered and doing limited engineer work to degrade the effect of the NBC agent. No clear indication is squad. However, noted on the command and control of this it will likely

because of its size and mission,

belong to the MSD and function under the control of the engineer plat~on leader.

Interworking Summary The size of the motorized rifle battalion more than doubles

1
Because there is no cross attachment

with the attachment of the six units reflected in Figure 2 and

described in this chapter.

in the Soviet Army, these added units also serve to nearly double the span of control. Each attached element is there not to support

in an unsupervised method, but to be directed in all decision mak-

ings and tasks.

Some attachments apparently are easier for the

battalion commander to control than others.

For some units,

the

mission is clear enough that the attached units can do it with

little exchange of command level guidance. Other attached units 82

present real difficulties, how to use their assets.

and the commander often does not know

As will be noted In the next chapter..

the amount of Joint training between the battalion and the attached
units wakes a huge difference in determining how well a battalion

comander functions when his unit increases from 441 to 940 personnel.

r KI
i

i8

83

CHAPTER IV
TRAINING
r4

it is apparent that during a meeting engagement special importance is attached to orienting oneself to the existing situation, being able to develop the plan

strikes against the enemy and in the most vulnerable areas.

in a rapid manner and acquainting the podrazdeleniye with their tasks, so that they will be able to carry out surprise

Such actions require that all commanders be familiar with the nature of a meeting engagement and that they constantly improve their technical knowledge and their ability to employ that knowledge in actual practice.

Lt. Col. V. Kokhanovl56

Having described what the motorized rifle battalion does iii
one variation of a meeting engagement, of how well is there is then a question does. The

the battalion trained to do what it

answer to that question is that it does not do it very well.

But

then, no army does very well in training when measured against the capabilitier of the weapons it uses, which is the only valid measure This conclusion is not

ment one can use in a peacetime situation.

based upon a comparison with other services; rather it

as subjective a judgment as can be made. Col. Gen.

is based upon

Yakushin makes a sufficient attempt to define combat is a very broad concept.157 He then goes

readiness when he says it

156V. Kokhanov, "Meeting Engagement of a Motorized Rifle Bat talion," trans. for USA, Military Herald, no. 3-57, p. 103.
157

V. Yakushin,

"Staff and Combat Readiness of the Troops,"

trans.

for USA, Military Herald, no. 2-75,

p.

1.
84

'

. ....

on to make a list

of many of the factors one has to evaluate in

15 8

determining combat readiness.

Without becoming involved in such a wide range of subjects, it still seems possible to determine the combat readiness of the To do so seems possible from

average motorized rifle battalion. the standpoint of not what is

right about the unit, but what is In

wrong and, therefore, where the weaknesses are likely to be. order to make a determination, areas of training: Officer. Enlisted. Unit. Combined Arms. it

seems reasonable to look at four

A.

Officer Training

Two items immediately come into focus when examining the training received by the officers. and what it is One is the term one-man command The second

implies to the Soviet concept of training.

the dichotomy of the training goals found both in

the junior

officer schooling and in battalion level field training in which

1 58

1n his article, Yakushin indicates the concept ". . . com prises a high moral-combat quality for all personnel, their instruc tion, discipline, organization, and physical hardening. Such ques tions enter here as the equipping of the chast' and Podrazdeleniye with arms, combat equipment and their maintenance in precise condi tion; the coordination of companies, battalions and regiments; a high level of combat and special preparation of the commanding cadres, their ability to direct the troops, their skill in guiding their activities, and to organize and secure a regular supply of material facilities; and the readiness of political workers, party organiza tion and all comunists to inspire the troops in the fulfillment of combat tasks with words and by personal example." 85

one faction indicates that initiative and creativity are taught and another faction indicates none is on the conduct of the battalion in allowed. Both items have an impact

the meeting engagement.

There has been an earlier reference to the theme of one-man command and to the possibility of that principle representing a weakness.
159

V.

Drozdov, writing in

the Soviet Military Review,

characterizes one-man command as the most important principle in the development of Soviet Armed Forces.16 0
1 59

He then goes on to this paper means cen

The term one-man command as used in

tralized control, which is the conscious effort of the commander to retain for himself the authority to make all decisions affecting his subordinates. The evolution of the term had ito beginning with the Soviet revolution of 1917 and the subsequent cvil war. At that time, the Red Army had to rely on military commanders who could not be trusted politically. In an effort to counter this unreliability, the Soviets placed a Communtst Party member in the unit with command authority equal to the tactical commauder. By 1934, the Soviet officer corps was considered reliable; and the political commissar was removed. By 1937-38, the commissar was back; and over the next twenty years, the situation changed several times. At present, there is one-man command with a single commander and a deputy commander for political affairs or zampolit. There is a view that duel command exists because the zampolit is tasked with preparing political reports on both the commander and the unit and sending these reports up the chain of command of the Main Political However, it seems the command structure is willing to Administration. accept the prying eye of the zampolit so long as the zampolit does not attempt to exercise command over the subordinate unit commanders. In an effort to maintain the present situation, the tactical commanders insure that command authority is not relaxed at all for fear of the power of the political officer increasing. By not releasing this author ity, the term one-man command can be used to describe this centralized control. (The United States Army also operates on the principle of one-man command, although its commanders delegate authority much better. The willingness to delegate is not hampered by the presence of forces seeking to gain more authority.)

160V. Drozdov, "The Soviet Officer Corps," Review, no. 2-77, p. 8.

Soviet Military

86

,..

Ag..i

M.j{za

I
write:

. . .

one-man command secures in

the best possible way

the unity of the personnel's actions, maximum flexibility, operational efficiency, and the strictest centralization of all links of the complicated army struggle from top 16 1
to bottom . . . and combat readiness of troops.

Drozdov's statement is an adequate summation of other writings

which characterize the battalion commander as a one-man show. The

commander is expected to be the senior trainer in the battalion or the company and as such should be able to perform all facets of the operation better than anyone else in the unit. As a trainer, he has

to remain abreast of all the increased sophistication of weapons and tactics and be able to score excellent grades when evaluated. As a battalion or company trainer, it appears that there is little room for flexibility in what subjects are taught and when. Ivanov, writing about the Port Arthur Guards Regiment, Col.

indicates

the regimental commander meets every Tuesday with his commanders "and provides detailed instruction on the training forthe next week.
This control over the instructional content and technique of the training schedule is amplified by the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Infantry for Training, Col. Gen. Salmanov, who points out four items necessary to insure quality training methodology: Knowledge of subject matter. Knowledge of personal examples of senior officers who have training experience.
1 6 1 Thid. 162

162V. Ivanov, "Port Arthur Regiment Wins Socialist Competition," trans. for USA, Military Herald, no. 12-75, pp. 31-33.

87

~~~~~~w~~~~~~~~~~d~~~~

................................................... ....... .... ... .................................

Constant daily supervision by senior officers. Testing and instrySional session critiques with the officers involved. If tion of the officer is undergoing such training himself, the ques

"When does he train his troops?" is

certainly a valid one. in its headquarters

I i
for

Though a battalion has a number of officers staff, this function still

rests solely with the battalion command

er and the various company commanders and platoon leaders in the organization. Nowhere does there appear to be a training special

ist such as a master gunner instructor for tank training as advo cated by Maj. Gen. Gorman for United States armor forces. 1 6 4 In addition to the military training, the commander is charged with the political training of his unit. At battalion level, there is

the political officer or zampolit, as he is

called; but the command

16 5

ers within the battalion are charged with the training. the commander, it

Thus,

becomes necessary to walk a very fine line to

balance these two diverse subjects. As a member of the Communist Party, or as a candidate member for the Party, depending on the age of the leader, he realizes the need to insure a demonstrated loyalty 163G. Salmanov, "Mastery of Training Methodology by Officers," for USA, Military Herald, no. 1?-15, pp. 4-5. 164p. Gorman, Command (TRADOC),
16 5

trans.

"How to Win Outnumbered," (Xeroxed.)

USA Training and Doctrine (MSS).

8 January 1974.

M. Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (Cambridge: Harvard Univer sity Press, 1967), pp. 490-496. In his book, Fainsod notes the friction generated by the conflict of the two subjects and how the zampolit can report the political situation through the Main Political Administration chain of command. The commander knows of this report ing system and of this perceived party loyalty on his military advancement.

88

to the party.

Yet,

at the same time,

this training must be balanced

j:

by the requirement to succeed in military subjects and strive for

an outstanding unit award and for a quota of specialists of various ranks.

Salmanov notes elsewhere in his article that the training

system is overworked and has problems.

Apparently both commanders

and political organs are either unaware of or ignore the need to improve the methodology. in exercises, Simplification and slackness are pecmitted and

little or no attention is devoted to maneuvers,

firing is done on ranges where the target position is known in advance.166 The dependence on one man for the entire operation, be 1

it at company or battalion level,

is underscored in further comments

concerning initiative and field training exercises. The second part of the officer training 6nd maybe the area which portends the greatest training weakness)is the dichotomy over the use of initiative. Group of Forces (SGF), Col. Gen. Ivanov, Commander-in-Chief, Southern

writes that the greatest disservice that can

be placed upon the professional honor of an officer is to accuse him of failing to display the required degree of initiative. an expression appears in a fitness report, it When such

iriplies that he is
16 7

unable to perform in battle as an organizer and leader.

At the opposite extreme is the reaction of a first lieutenant, who upon being asked about initiative, replied, "What initiative
1 6 6 Salmanov, 1 6 7 B.

pp. 2-3.
no. 1-75, pp. 68-69.

Ivanov, "If a Plan is Adopted or an Order is Issued,"

trans.

for USA, Military Herald,

89

! k'

All can we talk about? . . . The range of our operations was defined by the combined arms commander, and no deviation was allowed. 168 The two examples present a real dichotomy in the training of the junior officers found at battlaion and below and represent a

major weakness in the training of officers who will be commanding units involved in meeting engagement. John Erickson notes in one

of his articles the contradiction between initiative and strict conformity which indicates a commander's lack of confidence subordinates. Certainly a lack of confidence in in his

a commander's

ability to make proper judgments portends trouble for the required coordination. This would be particularly true for a battalion commander whose battalion is involved in a meeting engagement as a result oi being the advance guard of a first echelon regiment.

Yet,

numerous inciderits can be found in which initiative is

sacri

ficed for discipline. From an historical perspective, Raymond Garthoff, in his book

Soviet Military Doctrine, notes that German accounts of World War II suggest a significant lack of initiative on the part of Soviet offi
1701

cers. found in
1 68

More current examples of this lack of initiative can be numerous articles of the Military Herald as typified by A. Sedykh, "There are no Instructions for Initiative," trans. no. 7-75, p. 134.

for USA, Military Herald,

169J. Erickson, "The Training of the Soviet Soldier," Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies 116 (Decem ber 1971), p. 46.
1 70

R.

Garthoff,

Soviet Military Doctrine (Glencoe,

Illinois:

The Free Press, 1953), p. 213.

90i

the following quotes. the comment,

From the commander of the Rocket Troops comes in training exercises more initiative should . .
*

"Therefore,

be accorded platoon leaders and battery commanders

"171

This

can be countered by the Head of the Main Staff of the Ground Troops

who writes,

"The daily routine is

the law of military life . . . The

least deviation from the demands of the regulations can be the cause
* of gross violations."
17 2

Finally, the Commander-in-Chief of Ground

Forces seems to contradict himself in one paragraph when he writes,

". . . the commander is called upon to create an imaginative enthusiasm," and tempers the call by adding,
interest in matters large and small
.

"and be guided by state

,173

the existence of the dichotomy of initiative by showing that much is

written about the need for the display of initiative,

This listing could continue, but the volume would only reinforce

when,

in

fact,

the Soviet military establishment discourages initiative, particularly at the lower spectrum of command.
1 7 1G.
17 4

Peredel'skiy, "The Main Directions in the Training of Rocket and Artillerymen Gunners," trans. for USA, Military Herald,
no. 2-74, p.
1 72 17 3 17 4

109. p.
10.

Yakushin,

pavlovskiy,

p.

9.

This noticeable in might be some war will last

dichotomy on the use of initiative seems particularly the peacetime force. In a wartime situation, there improvement, but there is a question as to whether the long enough for the improvements to be learned and

applied. In most issues of Military Herald, there are examples of acts of initiative on the part of individual soldiers during World
War II. There is a trend of thought existing in United States analyt ical circles wbich indicates this lack of initiative weakens command and control at division and below. At army and higher level, there is adequate display of initiative. Phillip Karber, in his articles "The

Soviet Antl-tank Debate", level of command where it

certainly alludes to this weakness and the is a problem area.

S91

-~

Therefore,

in a meeting engagement, Chapter I,

as portrayed

in

the faced with

scenario created in

the battalion commander is he is

a'-undamental dilemma.

In a march column,

far enough forward

(approximately twenty-five kilometers)

?

of the regiment's/division's

~main body to have to make timely decisions as to the deployment and

conduct of the motorized rifle battalion and its attached units. When.all activities go according to plan, the battalion is anS'1quipped to give a credible performance. organized,

However, how often is

the initial plan free from modification as the battle progresses?

When modifications have to be introduced, in trouble. the battalion commander is

Because of the heavy responsibilities placed on the

battalion commander and the increasing complexity of control caused by sophisticated weapons and the large number of attached units, the battalion commander, perhaps more than any other commander, will be hard pressed just to follow the plan, let alone show initiative. All will wai 4 (or the motorized rifle battalion commander because
he is the one with all responsibility. Much the same can be said

about the use of initiative and bold action on the part of the commander. Having never been allowed to show any initiative on he suddenly expected to do so in
175

the training field, why is It is

battle?

not likely to be done, at least initially. Here it should be mentioned that there is

the possibility that

the Soviets do not intend for any initiative to bo displayed, at' R. Hammel, "Lack of Initiative and Independence: in the Soviet Officer Corps," Fort Leavenworth, February, (Xeroxed) (MSS).
175

A Weakness 1977.

92

least at lower levels of command.

The void created by the lack of

initiative might be filled by the mass of troops and equipment. However, if such a possibility is not likely to be the case, since the issue would never be raised or at least not to the

initiative were not desired,

in publications such as the Military Herald, extent that it is.

B. Enlisted Training The Soviet Army's attitude toward their enlisted troops has been sammarized in an excellent statement by Maj. he writes, their NCOs, R. Frasche when

many junior officers do not properly utilize that is,they assume leadership in everything, large or

small, command individual soldiers, to the sergeants,

suggest ready-made decisions

176

and attempt to do everything themselves."

The theme of enlisted training is dent action. There are articles

rote memory and no indepen

in Military Herald in which the is dis

training of soldiers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) cussed.

While one may discuss the attention being devoted to the

177

creative andlntense training,

many more articles will be found

78

which imply simplified training condit'.ons.1

1 7 6 DDI,-110077-76, 1 7 7 G.

The Soviet Motorized Rifle Company,

p. 40.

Moiseev,

"The Effectiveness of Tactical Training," trans.

no. 6-74, p. 109.

for USA,
17 8

Military Herald,

Peredel'skiy, p. 112. Other examples of this simplification include S. Bulyzhkin, "Preparation Fire of the Antiaircraft Podrazdele niye," trans. for USA, Military Herald, no. 6-76; A. Bessarab, "High

Efficiency for Driving Classes," trans. for USA, Military Herald, no. 6-76; G. Salmanov, "Improve Training of Sergeants," trans. for USA,
Military Herald, no. 8-76; and .... "Increase the Cohesiveness

of Small Podrazdeleniye," trans.

for USA, Military Herald, no. 5-76. 93

ip

It

is a recognized fact that over the years the .Soviet Army

has had to train a number of soldiers who were not particularly mechanically minded. As their economy and living standards have However, the to some extent,

improved, so has the caliber of their new recruits. training institution has not changed as rapidly; and, training methods are outdated.

Officers assignee. to the United

States Military Liaison Mission accredited to the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG), often speak of seeing soldiers standing The training seems to-be

around while out at the training sites.

done in a rotating style from on* instructional area to another where an inordinate amount of time is devoted to the very basics of the tactics and skills. interest in learning.
17 9

The troops become bored and lose even more

In an effort to receive the unit award and reach the training goal, the unit commnder will often insure training is done under very simple conditions. In addition, the squad or platoon selected ]

to represent the unit will be filled with the most skilled soldiers. Often, when all troops have to compete, the pncil score satisfies
the requirement.180 Where this kind of trcinivi is conducted, al
. .

writer in Military Herald illustrates the results. checked on this.

"Teachers

The results indicated eighty percent of the trainees percent

could not overcome the three most difficult obstacles, ten

1 7 9 For

those who have access to the publication, the Special Research Detachment has assembled a multi-volume work, Soviet Tank Crew Training, done in 1975/76 and classified CONFIDENTIAL, which delves in considerable depth into the training cf the tank crew. 1801n many cases, grades recorded have no actual relationship
to that score actually obtained, except by accident, according to a
former Soviet soldier.

94

violated the rules at all points, and only :en percent succeeded in getting a high score."
181

In an article elsewhere in

Military Herald,

an incident is

related in which a lieutenant had scored his troops even though no tesc had been given. When questioned as to where the scores

were obtained, his defense was limited to the statement that he knew his men. concern, it
18 2

If

this kind of a problem is

not a source of

is

doubtful if

these )rticles would ever be published

in writings available for widespread Soviet consumption. Therefore, in the meeting engagement, the NCOs, not trained

to function as laaders, the battle.

will not likely do so under the stress of there will

Certainly, where the officers are present,

be a hesitancy to do anything without being told.

C. Unit Training Again referring to various conversations with former members of the United States Military Liaison Mission, the impression is

gained that the Soviet Army units do a great deal of unit training in the field. training? The question to be answered is how good is this unit

Apparently,

the answer depends on both the source snd

the particular facet of training being discussed. In an article entitled "The Battalion at the Training Center," the author writes that the conduct of training sessions at the N. Bal'shem, "Driving Over Obstacles and Through Narrow Gaps," trans. for USA, Military Heraid, no. 12-75, p. 119.
18 2
18 1

V. Postriganov, "H-:w They Achieved Success," trans. for USA,

no. 12-75, p. 47.

Military Herald,

95

battalion level with the units going out permits the best utilization

to the training centers The realiza .

of the training process. 183

tion of this author and others like him is the field makes

that troop training in quality. there remain

the training more effective and of better this is correct. However,

Probably for the most part, incidents in

which serious deficiencies

exist in

the unit training,

which once again reflect on the role of the units in

engagement. In fact, Col. Gen.

a meeting
the field

1. Ivanov characterizes

training this way: it would be frivolous to maintain that deficiencies in field

training have been eliminated throughout. To this very day
individual officers fail to struggle persistently to improve
traiging quality, tolerate simplifications and indulgences,

and conduct exercises at times on a low level, rudning through

combat operations according to a plan completely worked out

in advance.184

Note the author does not question the amount of time in field engaged in unit training, but rather he is

the

concerned about

how it

is done.

What has been summarized can be found individually

in various articles as indicated by these examples: Experience gained . . . shows the individual commanders . . .
often reduce everything to stereotyped orders concerning the
operation.185 Often firing is done by the best riflemen and not the entire

platoon . . . Targets often come in the same sequence and

186

officers and NCOs coach so as to get high scores.

1 8 3 N.

Karabut, "The Battalion at the Training Center," trans. for USA, Military Herald, no. 6-75, p. 103.
1 8 4 B.

Ivanov, "Skill is Forged on the Field," trans.

no.
,

for USA,
for

Military Herald, 185 USA,

1-76,

p. 65. trans.

'Improving Organization for Combat," Military Herald, no. 10-75, p. 6.

trans.

1861. Krepyshev, "Imaginatively Train Troops in Fire Exercise," for USA, Military Herald, no. 11-75, p. 175. 96

It

Commanders do not teach gunners t %ngage at longer ranges Comandatempt nobtai be lower. In to higchgrds heofcrspae
because the scores will At artillery practice some commanders pamper the young officers. under easy conditions. 8j

Combat training experien.:e has revealed that . . commanders

are unaware of the true status of these subunits, (second
echelons and reserves) . . . they often completely forget
about them. As a result they often lag behind during a
battle, communications with them is lost and finally when
a requirement exists for introducing them into the ba le,
they are tardy in moving out to the appropriate line.
. . . too many officers,

because of notional enemy.

not thinking, using poor tactics

190

There still are instances when units (antiaircraft) arrive at the firing positions long before the appearance of planes
in the air. They slowly deploy into a battle formation.2
The readiness of the physical stage for firing is checked
several times 9 and, furthermore, young commanders are placed

by officers.

These examples should be tempered somewhat by the conclusion that there are obviously units which do well in unit training be cause the commander is properly organized.
1 8 7 1bid., p. 178.
192

There seems to be no

V. Ivanov, "Battery Commanders Must be Trained," trans.

USA, Military Herald,
189

for

no.

3-74, p.

129. trans. for

V. Onisyuk,

"New Manual on Tactical Training," 11-73, p. 21. trans.

USA,

Military Herald, no. 190N. Akimov,

"The Value of Foresight"

for USA,

Military Herald, no. 1-76, p. 67. V. Pashkovskiy, "Fire While Carrying out a Complex Mission," trans. for USA, Military Herald, no. 1-75, p. 157.
t.1

Karabut, pp. 104-106. In his article, Col. Karabut uses

the tank company of a battalion commanded by Lt. Col. Kirienko to demonstrate a proper way of organizingthe unit training. He writes, "The battalion was allotted three days . . . When drawing up the

192

plan for the sessions in the training center, Lt. Col. M. Kirienko
provided for carrying out the following tasks: conduct combat firing of the platoons (fifty per cent day and fifty percent night),

"997

question of the various units involved in

the meeting engagement

spending a great deal of time in the field.

What becomes apparent

is that not a great deal of that time includes tactical training. check the coordination of the platoons in offensive and defensive aspects of tactical training, work out norms for the personnel of the platoon for OMP (weapons of mass destruction) and defense from them and for engineer and technical training, and to carry out among the members of the platoon an exercise in driving combat vehicles.
The plan also provided for throwing grenades, completing a firing exercise with automatic rifles, conducting a cross-country three kilometers charge while firing their individual weapons, and sprint training sessions and ing for six kilometers after completing all when returning to the location of the chast'. An examination in more detail of the content of one-day sessions tank company under the command revealed the following: The first platoon of Lt. V. Brusov occupied three tra.ning sites. The first Here the cbief of the chemical service site. trained at the first of the chast' checked the way the tankers satisfied the norms of OMP. At the second--the chief of the engineer service of the chast' checked the second platoon in engineer training, and the third site, Here the third platoon practiced the throwing of combat grenades. the inspector was one of the officers of the chast'. The exchange of training sites took place in the following sequence.

The first platoon went to the site of the second--to that of the third, and third--to that of the first. The second tank company under the command of Sen. Lt. V. Lobov occupied the fourth through sixth training sites. At the fourth, the chief of staff of the battalion checked the first platoon for
The second platoon tactical training on a model of the terrain. conducted subcaliber firing on the fifth training site (the inspector The third platoon ran the three was the battalion commander). The sports organizer of kilometers cross-country charge while firing. the battalion who was not on the regular staff calculated the results. The third tank company under the command of Sen. Lt. N. Alenin occupied the seventh through ninth training sites. At the seventh the first The platoon carried out an exercise in driving combat vehicles. deputy commander of the battalion for technical affairs did the check ing. At the eighth, an officer of the chast' staff checked the tankers They were working at the norms for technical of the second platoon. training. At the ninth, the third platoon fulfilled tactical norms Here the inspector was the deputy chief of staff on the equipment.

* itank

of the chast' ." 98

For troops such as those-stationed in

East Germany,

the lack of

tactical training may be influenced by the lack of nearby adequate

facilities.

There, many units are seen moving from barracks to field

the training is often oriented more toward

locations; but once moved,

the individual rather than the unit.

Where unit training is conducted

in a tactical simulation, the weakness caused by individual deficiences becomes apparent, and the unit does not appear to train well to do
the job it I is supposed to do. D. Combined Arms Training greatly dependent

-The success of the meeting engagement is

upon the success of the various units belonging to and attached to

the motorized rifle battalion and how they work with each other.

review of the available material reveals few instances of a combined . arms meeting engagement that lacks deficiencies. Once again, it seems

appropriate to defend such a statement by saying that the Military Herald would not contain articles of criticism unless enior command-

Sers

found the various illustrations

used were prompted by major

deficiencies in the training of the troops.

Military Herald combined arms training, contains a number of articles relating to and again, personal accounts of those who 4

have had the opportunity to observe the Soviet forces in training hiindicate a large amount of combined arms training. however, It is What is missing,

any indication of how often the units repeat the training. though it cannot be supported, that units combat

would seem likely,

train with the units they are likely to be associated with in

situations.

Therefore,

a particular motorized rifle battalion would

99

train with the same artillery, tank, or engineer unit so as to be come a more cohesive working force. In any event, regardless of how the units are combined, the

same problems are encountered enough times to be described in the literature. The one theme that comes out most forcefully is the

failure of the motorized rifle battalion to plan in sufficient time

b

the manner in which the attached units are to be employed; therefore, they are often left behind or committed too late. Maj. Gen. Bogdanov of the Turkestan Military District writes
"matters

tha.t as a result of inadequate prior planning supporting the unit with artillery fire
. . .

of

are often omitted,

and infantry combat vehicles and combat engineer units are not always employed intelligently.o.193 Gen. Pavlovskiy describes an incident in the Kiev Military District by writing"..
.

march training practiced during day insufficient study was

light was not conducive to secrecy...

made of the terrain which caused vehicles to lag behind, traffic control points worked in a slipshod way, and the engineers could not cope... "194 Chief of Staff, Group of Soviet Forces,

C&.Gen. Grinkevich,

Germany (GSFG), describes an incident in which the commander forgot the principle of combined arms combat; therefore, the actions of the attack ing forces were not coordinated in time, location or objective. .
1 9 3 A. 195

Bogdanov,

"Coordination in Combat," trans.

for USA,

Military lerald, no. 9-75, p. 57.

1 9 4 Pavlovskiy, 1 9 5 D.

p. 6.

Demand,"

Grinkevich, "Control of Troops at the Level of Modern trans. for USA, Military Herald, no. 4-76, p. 80. 100

Maj.

Gen. Akimov writes of a demonstration in which the troops In their carelessness, the

were so successful they became careless.

SL

commander of the motorized rifle battalion incorrectly appraised the situation and had major errors in his march plan. The conse

quences. of such action might have been overcome had not the commander also failed to organize reconnaissance and send out a security detachment.
196

Finally,

one more incident appliev, which is

an excellent ex The battalion

ample of the results of poor combined arms training.

commander was given ninety minutes to turn his unit nearly ninety degrees and make a thirty kilometer march. 1 9 7 Instead of being able to do so on the move, the commander stopped the unit, and spent forty minutes issuing the necessary instructions before attempting to make a combined arms attack on the flank of the enemy. This

I
4

illustration points out a major weakness in Soviet field training, and that is mistake, the fear of making a mistake. In order to preclude the Maj. A. McMullan,

the commander becomes extremely cautious.

* in
is

his report Soviet Tactics:

The Meeting Engagement,

indicates there

likely to be at least an hour between the time of the reconnais initial contact with the enemy and the decision to
198

sance element's

initiate a meeting engagement. decision has been made,

19 6 19 7 19 8

However, he then says once the critical

the initiative of subordinates is

Akimov, p. Grinkevich,

67. pp. 79-80. Soviet Tactics: The Meeting Engagement, p. 6. 101

M I-1100-143-76,

,k

I'

to the launching of the attack.

Scerned

199
Thus if

madrisocn
the commander is so con-

about aLking a mistake that he cannot become involved in

critical decision making, the meeting engagement is not going to be

successful.
200

E.

Training Summary

The Soviet Army's offensive is built to a large degree around the principle of speed and, thus, In principle, the all-important rate of advance.

the reinforced motorized rifle battalion's training In practice, that is so

appears to be in tune with the offensive concept. training falls considerably short of the goal. stifled as to preclude independent action,

Initiative which

appears to be a

1 9 9 Ibid.

In a recent symposium at Fort Leavenworth (Command and General Staff College, Symposium on Officer Responsibility in Training, 19-20
April 1977) some eighty discussion groups selected key training issues for discussion. Of the ten key issues most discussed, seven were: (1) Inability of field grade officers to manage resources. (2) Commanders have no program for development of subordinate leaders and trainers. (3) Unit commanders oversupervise rather than take a chance of failing a test or looking bad. (4) Junior officers and NCOs weak in training management skills. (5) Personnel turbulence and shortage of qualified NCOs. (6) Training realism weakness exists. (7) Mental cnpacity of soldiers. These seven issues are used to show a comparison of the training deficiencies of the Soviet motorized rifle battalion and its attached forces as compared to the training deficiencies the students of the 1976-77 CGSC class perceived as existing in the United States Army. There are many conclusions which can be made from such a comparison. For this paper, it is sufficient to suggest once again that armies do not train very well, not even the armies of the world's superpowers. 102

AA

--

- - - -- -.

......-

--

keystone of the meeting engagement.

Unit training, to include The

combined arms training, is designed to meet a training norm.

pressure for that success is so strong that coummanders will often train the unit as if that norm were the ultimate goal instead of

tactical proficiency on the battlefield.

ii

IIt

CHAPTER V SUO4ARY AND CONCLUSIONS

A. Summary

This paper on the motorized rifle battalion in the meeting engagement focused on three questions:

SDoes

What t the doctrine for the employment? it train to comply with the doctrine? train? and the research was con

How well does it

The three questions were addressed

ducted against a scenario setting on the North German Plains in which the battalion was the lead battalion of a regimental march column upon the initiation of hostilities. The evaluation of that

research permits the following responses to the questions posed. The doctrine for the employment of the motorized rifle talion in 'at

the meeting engagement can be determined with a reason The battalion commander envisions meeting which the battle

able degree of accuracy.

the enemy force often in an unexpected manner in will be violent, subject to sudden change,

and last only a few hours.

During the course of the battle,

the commander will attempt to seize even a numer

and hold the initiative in order to defeat the enemy, ically superior one.

The battalion acting as an advance guard will air defense,

be reinforced with six additional units (armor, artillery,

104

antitank, engineer and NB0, thus increasing the personnel from 440 to approximately 940. The battalion commander will have his forces spread approx imately twenty-five kilometers along the selected route and divided into a reconnaissance element, and both rear and flank guards. an advance detachment, the main body,

The reconnaissance element will be

organized and equipped to provide advance warning of both approach ing enemy and impending engineer/NBC obstacles. The advance detach

ment is organized to conduct a security mission and stop the advance of the lead elements of the enemy force. The main body of the bat

talion contains the preponderance of the fire power and is capable of advancing to meet the enemy in a frontal or flanking attack. Unless stopped by terrain obstacles or the enemy, the motorized rifle battalion commander will attempt to conduct a flanking attack with the forces from the main body, while the advance detachment serves as a base of fire. The goal of the reinforced motorized rifle battalion is to destroy the enemy force in sufficient time to prevent a delay in the rate of advance of the following regimental force. Failing to do

that, hopefully it will succeed in the secondary mission of forcing the enemy to deploy and halt its forward movement. Generally, the training the motorized rifle battalion does to prepare for the meeting engagement follows the doctrine for that form of offensive action.
201

Various articles written in the Military Herald

2 0 1 Examples of the training conducted can be found in the follow ing articles: I. Vasko and A. Tyshechenko, "In the Interest of a Forward Detachment," trans. for USA, Military Herald, no. 5-74, pp. 207-211; K. Serikbayev and Yu. Kontsevoy, "A Company as an Advance Party," trans. for USA, Military Herald, no. 12-74, pp. 147-155; and V. Kokhanov, pp. 95-103.

105

describing training activities indicate organizations and formations similar to those organizations and formations described in the pub lications designed to present the doctrine.
20 2

The most frequent

grouping of arms noced in the literature on training includes the motorized rifle, artillery, and tank units. Articles indicating

the combined training of the antitank, air defense, and engineer/NBC troops with the motorized rifle battalion are considerably more scare. There are at least three possibilities for this apparent (1) perhaps the doctrine has been misinter perhaps the training

lack of joint training:

preted, but that does not seem likely; (2)

areas are so crowded that there is neither room nor time to exercise with these elements, (3) or quite possibly, there is not the em

phasis on the training of the battalion with the smaller attached units. In the accounts of the training conducted between the major

units of this reinforced battalion, the moat frequently observed

abnormality is the attaching of an artillery battery instead of an artillery battalion to the motorized rifle battalion. This variance

may well be explained by the size of the training area available to the unit involved. Frequently, in the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany,

the local training areas are quite small because of the crowded pop ulation near the unit's location. Therefore, when articles depicting

an artillery battery attached to a motorized rifle battalion appear in literature, it may be that the writer is suggesting such an
202 Examples of these doctrinal publications MRB on the March; Garbuz, The MEB on the March and include Meeting T1hjIe in the Garbuz.

Engagement; Savkin, Operational Art; Belokin and Kalayda, Engineer Support of the MUR; Concannon, The Soviet Concept of the Hleting Enia aemen t. 106

I
arrangement is an alternative training method. Though the personnel of the motorized rifle battalion train to comply with the doctrine for the conduct of the meeting engagement, most-reports indicate that they do not train very well. leadership, there are two problems. First, there is In terms of

the idea of onedelegated.

man command in which neither authority nor responsibility is Consequently, superior. so directs. leaders.

few subordinates do anything until told to do so by a

Nor does the superior usually want anything done until he Secondly, there is a dichotomy in the training of all One thought is The other thought

The division is

over the term initiative. taught.

that initiative is is

allowed. and therefore, allowed.

that no initiative is

The latter thought seems to be the Separated from the regiment

correct one,

at least at battalion level.

by a geographical distance and possibly isolated by communications pitfalls, it leader if would seem the battalion commander would be a much better Noncommissioned officers

allowed to display initiative.

and soldiers,as a general rule, improve in quality as each year passes.

However, the poor quality of the instruction and the techniques used

'1

tend to make the training very boring and inefficient. The fire power available to the battalion is terms of both direct and indirect artillery, formidable in

tank, and antitank fires.

Artillery fire, considered to be quite good when viewed en masse, seems to have some shortcomings when viewed at the battalion level

firing at unplanned targets.

These shortcomings--lengthy time to

initiate fire and poor adjustment of fire--seem to result from the

apparent lack of an artillery forward observer with the maneuver forces.

107

A-A"I

The battalion in the meeting engagement is expected to main tain a high rate of advance. However, In order to demonstrate the

capability to do so, training is made rather simple and few obstacles are placed in the way. Such artificial conditions may very well give Field training does seem

a false sense of success to the battalion.

to be conducted often enough to allow the units to practice the re quired maneuvers. Both tank and motorized units train to conduct

the expected on and off-road movements needed by the reinforced battalion in both the march and meeting engagement. B. Conclusions This study was designed to isolate a very small segment of the Soviet Army performing a particular function--a motorized rifle battalion in a meeting engagement--and to provide a better under standing of that segment and the way in which it operates. The paper

has in no way attempted to focus on one particular battalion,but rather represents a type unit. In an actual situation, it would be

unusual to find all the characteristics described in this paper in any one of the 1,132 motorized rifle battalions in the Soviet Army.
203

Considering the large number of battalions in the Soviet Army, there will be battalions that are curve busters at one end of the curve or the other. Therefore, combat commanders and their intel

libence officers should realize the descriptions and insights provided serve only as a gukle to understanding the actions of a potential foe. total is based on 110 motorized rifle divisions and 49 tank divisions (Military Balance, 1975-76, p. 8)and nine motorized rifle battalions per motorized rifle division and three motorized rifle battalions per tank division (HB550-2, pp. 2-1, 2-2, 2-9, and 2-10).
108
2 0 3 This

Command and Control

"The span of control for the motorized rifle battalion commander

is too large to be controlled effectively. Normally, the battalion

commander would have six subordinates; but by attaching the six additional units, the total is now twelve. The total size of the

force has more than doubled.

If a cross-attachment procedure were

utilized, the commander could lose one motorized rifle company command er when he gains a tank company commander. Because he only gains, he

is presented with the situation shown in Figure 8 in which the force attacks with two companies abreast; and the scheme of maneuver has to somehow accommodate a third commander. The term one-man command (in this context, meaning centralized control) can be used to describe the situation whereby no one in a unit moves without direct instruction from the commander. effort to insure that only he commands,
204

In an

the motorized rifle battalion

commander apparently retains not only all responsibility, but all authority as well.
incidents in

Such a policy may well account for the numerous

in which the commander

descriptions of training exercises

reacted too slowly or failed to employ a force in a timely manner.

The

reason for such a failure may simply be the inability of the commander to be everywhere at once. Little or no initiative is allowed the various commanders from the battalion commander downward. Much is written about the creative

thought that i0 taught; when, in fact, very little display of creativity is tolerated.
204

This seems particularly true the further down the chain

See f.n. no. 159. 109

[A

of command one happens to be. various commanders in

Under current training conditions,

the

the battalion,

as well as the motorized rifle i

battalion commander himself, are not allowed to make any significant decisions requiring judgment. Thus, in battle when the battalion is con

well forward of the regiment and the communications-electronics dition makea radio communications commander may find it practically impossible,

the battalion

difficult to seize or hold the initiative.

The communication practiced has both its good and bad points. The Soviet units apparently do an excellent job enforcing radio silence. Because they do, the forces learn to use a number of non This method of training may assist in

electronic signal devices.

overcoming the difficulties of operating through the communicationeleetronic environment on the battlefield.
ence on the signal devices,

Realizing their depend

NATO forces should consider using volumes

of smoke and high explosive artillery to force Soviet forces to keep

vehicles hatches closed. Where the radio is used, there may well be

detrimental effect on command and control due to the need to wait for all instructions to be provided before underta king any action. Maneuver The reinforced motorized rifle battalion is well organized 4o advance ahead of the main body and attempts to clear the route of advance. Its Lrajor combat forces move on modern equipment designed The to operate on both a nuclear and a conventional battlefield. BMP has no equal at present. lery.

A new generation tank, the T-72,'is being artil

introduced into the force, as well as new self-propelled 1'2mm The attached antitank capability is also quite mobile and

i
A "

llOA 110J

"

fi

J....... *"; r:.;

.. , r-

*.-. :

.. vinrw. 5. .

;..gnrr

.rsw-

.. t

r.....*

-~

FL
1.

and contains much fire power. The distance this battalion operates ahead of the main body may entail significant risk. It has support weapons, but these may

4'

be too few in number to protect the force against a strong antitank

force or an air attack. the air attack. of course,

The force seems particularly vulnerable to

There are only four air defense weapons (there are,

J

the 7.62mm and 12.7mm machine guns on certain vehicles); support from regiment because

and the battalion might count on little it is

operating near the maximum range of the SA-6 which might be It is also operating at the outer limits the regimental artillery group

attached to the regiment.

S,

of the artillery pieces contained in

(RAG).
The BMPs of the three motorized rifle ties in employment. companies create difficul

They are superior to the tanks and artillery in

both speed and maneuverability, but not built with the armor plating of the tanks. Writers within the doctrinal development areas of the

Soviet Army have considered allowing these BMPs to move independently of the armor and artillery. 2 0 5 However, as the noted author Jac Weller

once pointed out, "The BMP is not a tank; and until Soviet junior
officers realize such a fact, an unacceptable number will be lost in I combat.",
206

The physical relationship of this reinforced motorized rifle Tvpical of such writers is pp. 103-104.
20 6 20 5

Lt. Gen.

Bukharenko.

Bukharenko,

Mr. Weller's comment was made to this author in February, 1974, following Mr. Weller's visit to Israel after the Arab-Israeli War of October, 1973. 111

"battalion to the reconnaissance forces from both division and regiment

seems to provide little warning to the battalion. This conclusion is

reached based on the absence of any known communications between the elaments and their respective hendquarters which can Sreconaiaac be monitored by the radios in the battalion. In addition, no indica-

r -

tion of such a monitoring effort was noted in description of the various exercises contained in available literature. If reconnaissance

reports have to be passed to the parent unit and then down the chain of command to the battalion, the battalion will be upon the enemy or

obstacle before the reconnaissance report arrives.

Fire Power The battalion contains a tremendous amount of fire power, but possibly insufficient fire control mechanism. entire artillery battalion,
platoon equivalent of air

i
The attachment of an

up to a BRE!

antitank battery and a

places a tremendous burden

defense weapons,

on a battalion staff that normally operates only two SPG-9 antitank weapons and six 120mm mortars. If the battalion were going to attack

a defensive line and had the time to make detailed plans against stationary enemy units, easier. this additional fire power could be handled more of an

However, since both sides are moving and fire is

on-call arrangement than pre-planned,

the motorized rifle battalion

commander and staff are overtaxed to control this fire adejuately. This lack of control is further compounded by the lack of a for The

ward observer from the artillery dedicated to each maneuver company. battery or artillery battalion commander apparently acts as the for ward observer. Command functions may not be properly carried out

112

under such conditions, or so it Finally,

would appear, needed on a timely basis against The Soviet

the artillery fire is

targets 'of opportunity; and such does not seem possible.

artillery force apparently does not practice a hip-shot method to get off quick fire. If such a conclusion is correct, the United

States artillery should be able to fire first for greater effective SL ness. If the antitank forces attached to the battalion have been depicted there may be a problem of overkill. The regimental commander

correctly,

is- not likely to allow all of his available antitank assets to be com mitted by the battalion, fluence the battle. thereby leaving himself with no BIDMs to in

the decision by the regimental commander will be The thirty-one BMPs in the

influenced by the presence of the BMPs.

battalion used throughout this paper negate the need for large amounts of additionif .teapons from the antitank battery. On the other hand, if bat

this advance guard in a regimental march were a motorized rifle talion equipped with the older APC models,

the regimental commander bat-

might attach the entire antitank battery to the motorized rifle

t ali on.

Training

The training tests are often simplified in order to insure a high grade. well in There is considerable pressure on each unit to score
A

the ever-present socialist competition--a form of stakhanovism the armed forces even today. Under the pressure to exceed

present in the norms,

the unit commander will insure the established training

does not require his subordinates to take risks that might lead to
113

failure.

Instead,

the leaniing curve is

maintained on a moderate,

but

safe, incline. Far too much simulation is allowed to present a realistic In an effort to prevent wear and

setting for the meeting engagement. tear of the equipment, I'gun barrels of tanks, motion is applied.

small caliber inserts are placed in the main artificial models are fabricated, and simulated

In an effort to attain the desired rate of advance, the

engineer obstacles are played down; and where they are introduced,

terrain and the technique needed to overcome the obstacles are so well known that realism is not possible.

Training methodology stresses repetitiveness to the point of boredom. The small details are practiced over and over. This may be

a way of overcoming the apparent lack of initiative and creative thought. Soviet soldiers spend a great deal of time with their equipment, both in the garrison and in of training when, in fact, it the field. is This often gives the impression

frequently very routine and inefficient Additionally, a considerable amount of

maintenance that is time is

under way.

devoted to driving and road marches which does not really improve

training under combat conditions. Finally, one of the better features in Soviet ground forces train ing is the NBC training. The forces have a great deal of NBC equipment,

and they train

wh the equipment in an NBC environment.

114

BIBLIOGRAPHY

11

M- I

'

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY PRIMARY SOURCES

Books.
Engineeiring Support of the Motorized Belokin, A., and Kalayda, V. Rifle (Tank) Battalion on the March and in the Meeting Engage Moscow, 1975. ment. Translated for USA. Biryukov, G., and Melnikov G. Antitank Warfare. David Myshne. Moscow, 1972. Frunze, M. Selected Works. Moscow, 1950. Translated by

Garbuz, I.; Loza, D.; and Sazonoy, I. The Motorized Rifle Battalion Translated for Foreign Science and Technology in Modern Combat.
V Center.
.

Moscow, 1965.

The Motor Rifle Battalion on the March and in the Meeting

Engagement. Lomov',

Moscow, 1972.

N. Scientific-Technicdl Progress and the Revolution in Military Affairs. Translated for USAF. Soviet Military Thought Series, no. 3. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Oftice, 1975.

Lysukhin, I.; Plyaskin, V.,- and Rvinskiy, V. Engineer Support of Combined-Arms Combat. Translated for USA. Moscow, 1970. Reznichenko, V. Tactics. Translated by Foreign Technology Division, USAF. Moscow, 1966.

Savkin, V. The Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics. Translated for the USAF. Soviet Military Thought Series, no. 4. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1975. Shtemenko, S.

Daglish.

The Sovie't General Staff at War.

M~oscow, 1970.

Translated by Robert Soviet

Government

IPrinting

Sidorenko, A.

The Offensive.

Translated for the USAF.

no. 1. Washington: U. S.

Military Thought Series, Office, 1975.

'

i116

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Bal'shem, N. "Driving Over Obstacles and Through Narrow Gaps." Military Herald, no. 12-75. Translated for USA. Begoyan, 0. "A Mortar Battery in the Mountains." USA. Military Herald, no. 6-75. t Besedin, N. "Striking of Fixed Targets." no. 10-75. Translated for Translated for

Translated for USA.

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Bessarab, A. "High Efficiency for Driving Classes." USA. Military Herald, no. 6-75.
____

incas."

"Class Rating is an Important Component of Combat Read Translated for USA. Military Herald, no. 11-75. Translatti for USA. Military

Bogdanov A. "Coordination in Combat." Heraldsno. 9-75.

Bondarenko, A. "Concerning the Employment of BMP in Combat." lated for USA. Military Herald, no. 10-75. Bukharenko, V. "Employment of the ICV in Combat." USA. Military Herald, no. 11-75.

Trans

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Demidov, A. "In a Forward Patrol of Advance Guard." USA. Military Herald, no. 11-73. Drozdov, V. "The Soviet Officer Corps." "no. 2-77.

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Ivanov, B.

"If a Plan is Adopted or an Order is

Military Herald, no. 1-75.

Iasued."

Translated 117

for USA.

iT

"Skill is Forged on the Field. Military Herald, no. 1-76. Ivanov, V. USA.

"-

Translated for USA.

"Battery Commanders Must be Trained." Military Herald, no. 3-74.

Translated for

"Port Arthur Regiment Wins Socialist Competition."

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"A Question on the Survivability of Ivanov, V. and Nesterov, V. Military Translated for USA. Podrazdeleniye." Artillery no. 10-75. Herald, "But Where are the Tanks." Kalinin, V. Herald, no. 1-75. Translated for USA. Military

"The Battalion at the Training Center." Karabut, N. Military Herald, no. 6-75. for USA.

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Koritchuk, V. "Combat with Antitank System in the Offensive." Translated for USA. Military Herald, no. 6-74. "Imaginatively Train Troops in Fire Exercise." Krepyshev, I. Translated for the USA. Military Herald, no. 11-75. Krysanov, V. "Artillery in a Tactical Attack Formation." for USA. Military Herald, no. 12-75. Translated

Kunitakiy, P.
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"On Meeting Battles."

no. 8-74. no. 2-75.

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Military
Military

Kutsenko, B.

Herald,

"In Step with the Times."

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SL Litvinovich, G. "Battalion Firing at Observed Targets." for USA. Military Herald, no. 1-76.

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Military

Merimskiy,

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V.

"The BMP in Combat."

Translated for USA.

Moiseev, G. Molozev, A.

"The Effectiveness of Tactical Training."

Military Herald, no. 6-74.

Translated

for USA.

"Employment of ICV in Combet."

no. 11-75.

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1

Military Herald,

S~118

Onisyuk, V.
Ostroumov, S.

"New Manual on Tactical Training."

no. 3-74. "Firing for Effect."

Translated for USA.

Militarl

Military Herald,

Translated for USA.

Herald,

no. 1-76 "Fire While Carrying Out a Complex Mission."

Military Herald, no. 1-75.

Pashkovskiy, V.
3

Translated for USA.

Pavlov, Yu.

"Tactics and Communications are Inseparable."

Military Herald, no. 6-74. I. "A High Degree of Field Training is

Translated

for USA.

t
F

Pavlovskiy,

a Guarantee of

Constant Combat Readiness." Herald, no. 6-75.

Translated fcrUSA.

Military

SPeredel'skiy,

G. "The Main Directions in the Training of Rocket and Artillerymen Gunners." Translated for USA. Military Herald, "no. 2-74. Pishakov, V. and Kirpach, L. "Infantry Combat Vehicle in Battle." Translated for USA. Military Herald, no. 6-75. Postriganov, V. "How They Achieved SucceSs." Military Herald, no. 12-75. Reznichenko, V. "Tactics During World War II." Military Herald, no. 4-75. Translated for USA. Translated for USA. Translated Translated for Translated

Rodin, A. "Peculiarities of Firing at Maximum Range." for USA. Militnry Herald, no. 7-75. Rodurov, R. "Battle Formations in Offensive Combat." USA. Military Herald, no. 1-76.

S~Salmanov,

G. "Mastery of Training Methodology by Officers." for USA. Military Herald, no. 12-75.
."Improve Training of Sergeants."

Translated for USA.

Military

Herald,

no. 8-76. Translated

Translated

Sedykh, A. "There are no Instructions for Initiative." for USA. Military Herald, no. 7-75.

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______.

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122