Teaching The Craft of Argument
Teaching The Craft of Argument
Teaching The Craft of Argument
ur aim in The Craft of Argument with Readings is to help students integrate the skills of writing, thinking, and arguing so that they learn not only how to read arguments critically, but to craft them clearly, soundly, and persuasively. In Part 1, we discuss arguments along several dimensions, ranging from their elements, to the problems that motivate us to make them in the first place, to their role in organizing the texts that present them, to their importance in critical thinking, to their proper and improper use of emotion. Throughout this discussion, we focus students on what readers expect, or even demand, of their arguments and on how they can accommodate readers' need to their goals. In Part 2, we give students the experience of reading and responding to the arguments of others. The readings in this part introduce students to a variety of topics and types of argument that not only serve as models of coherent arguments, but also encourage them to approach argument from varying viewpoints.
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ing and shaping arguments. We make arguments not just to gain our readers agreement but to enlist them in solving a problem. The nature of the problem determines the kind of agreement we seek, which in turn determines the kind of argument we make. So far as we know, no other book, ancient or modern, puts problem finding, framing, and solving at the heart of planning, drafting, and revising written arguments. From beginning to end, we emphasize that only when we understand the problem we address from our readers point of view can we make an argument that they will take seriously. Our focus on problems lets you help students new to academic argument overcome the special difficulties they often have with academic problems, which can seem to them merely theoreticaltoo abstract to be relevant to their perceived needs and interests. We show students the differences between the kind of problem most familiar to them, pragmatic problems, and the kind of problem that may be less familiar to them, conceptual problemsthat most teachers will expect them not only to address, but find and formulate on their own. Throughout, we help students address the demands of finding academic, conceptual problems that first of all they can care about, but that they can also imagine their readers caring about as well. Unlike many other books on argument, we also place a steady emphasis on ethos. We show students how they project an ethos through every element of their argument: by how clearly they write, how baldly they state their claim, how thoroughly they support it with evidence, how candidly they acknowledge and respond to objections. We emphasize that even when their argument fails to achieve agreement, they can still call it a success if readers think that they made it in ways that seem reasonable, thoughtful, and fair. At some point, what readers remember from the ethos of individual arguments adds up to their lasting reputation, an important force of persuasion in its own right. A third difference is that instead of offering an elaborate account of formal deductive logic, we devote considerable attention to informal reasoning. And instead of focusing on fallacies as the only way to think about sound thinking, we integrate sound critical thinking into our discussion of argument and writing in every chapter. To that end, we have not segregated advice about reasoning and arguing from advice about writing, because we believe that the skills of writing support and illuminate the skills of reasoning, and vice versa. The Writing Process section in each chapter shows students how the processes of planning, drafting, and revising can help them not only generate the substance of an argument, but reflect critically on the thinking it represents. We have also tried to synthesize two aspects of argument that most books on argument keep distinct: dialectic and rhetoric. Dialectic is commonly defined as a process of two people questioning each other in search for as-yet undiscovered truth (a claim that they can support), a topic now pursued by those calling their work pragma-dialectical. In contrast, rhetoric traditionally focuses on one persons finding and arranging support for a known claim in order to persuade another to accept it. In our view, dialectic and rhetoric present two perspectives on the same process. Questioning and being questioned helps students both to discover a claim worth making and to find the support that gives them and others good reasons to accept it. It is a process students engage in every time they have a conversation with friends about an issue they care about. We show students how they can create sound written arguments from those familiar speech genres by imagining questioning exchanges with readers or their surrogates (a thread that may remind some of Bakhtin).
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As important as those three insights are, we believe that teachers of argument who embrace Toulmins formal layout make a pedagogical mistake. Recall that he represents an argument in a figure of six elements: Backing Grounds [Data] Warrant so (Qualifier) Rebuttal Students and teachers alike have found it difficult to apply some aspects of Toulmins account of argument to the task of producing their own arguments and or analyzing the arguments of others. To make Toulmins insights more useful to students at all levels, we have modified his layout in five ways. Claim
We removed the arrows. Toulmin may have wanted to represent the movement of an argument, but what he describes seems closer to an alleged process of reasoning, a mental movement from one set of beliefs to a another. Forms of reasoning, however, are not forms of argument, which is a written or spoken event. Most arguments start not with a statement of grounds but with a problem, followed by a claimed solution, followed by intertwined grounds, warrants, and rebuttals. But even as a model of reasoning, his layout is psychologically unrealistic. But even when we reason about a problem, we do not start with grounds, then think our way to a claim (its solution). We begin with the problem that motivates us to search for a solution in the first place, and find a tentative hypothesis based on the facts then available to us. We then use that hypothesis (C. S. Peirce called it a hypothesis on probation) to find more data that we hope will confirm or disconfirm it. Its called abductive thinking, a kind of reasoning that Toulmins layout cannot represent. We do not intend our layout to represent any real time process, not of reasoning, drafting, reading, or analyzing an argument. It represents only the five elements required in every argument and some formal relationships among them. We intend it as a tool for understanding and discovering arguments, for planning and drafting them, and for thinking about the arguments of others. We dropped backing. Toulmin needed backing to explain how arguments differ among different fields, but that is not our major concern. Moreover, backing refers to the grounds that support a warrant viewed as a claim in its own argument. We can more usefully analyze that arrangement as two distinct arguments, one embedded in the other. So backing is redundant. We dropped qualifier as a distinct element. Qualifications such as probably, most, and may are crucial not just to the accuracy of an argument, but to our experience of its writers ethos. But qualifiers are not a singular element of an argument like a claim or a reason; qualifiers color every elementclaims, reasons, evidence, warrants, and rebuttals. Far from ignoring qualification, we show its crucial role in projecting a thoughtful ethos in every element of an argument.
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We divided the single element grounds into two: reasons and evidence. Careful readers accept a claim about a contested issue only when they see two distinct kinds of support: reasons and the evidence on which those reasons rest. This distinction reflects a psychological and social imperative: We consider a contestable claim only when it rests on something more solid than the arguers mere confidence in it; we ask for support, for reasons. But reasons provide only the logical structure of that support; evidence is the basis on which that structure of reasons rests, something brought in from outside the argument. An argument consisting only of a claim and reasons can seem unsubstantial, but it would seem opaque if it consisted only of a claim and raw evidence such as numbers or quotations. Readers need reasons to help them understand the logic and organization of an argument; they need evidence to understand the basis of those reasons in something they can think of as external reality. We replaced rebuttal with acknowledgment and response. Many have noted that Toulmins notion of rebuttals is a problem. He defines rebuttals as limits on the scope of a claim:
Since Harry was born in Bermuda, he is a British subject,claim unless he renounced his citizenship, or unless one of his parents was a diplomat, or unless . . . rebuttal
But in ordinary language, what we call a rebuttal responds to objections of any kindnot just to the scope of a claim, but to the source or sufficiency of its support, to the soundness of logic, to the definition of a problem, to alternative solutions. Rebuttals are essential to every thoughtful argument because they acknowledge and respond to a readers predictably different beliefs and interests. So as have some others, we expand Toulmins rebuttal to refer to responses to any anticipated alternative, objection, or criticism. We believe, however, that the term rebuttal can encourage responses that are too aggressive, so we substitute something more amiable and accurate: acknowledgment and response. This term encompasses two actions: first we acknowledge readers views by presenting them fairly; only then do we respond to them, and not always to refute them, since mature arguers concede the force of viable alternatives. In addition to those five modifications, we fill two gaps in Toulmins account. First, we explain the dual nature of evidence, which exists both inside and outside an argument. Readers are led by our prototypical image of evidence to want external evidence that is concrete, palpablea smoking gun, fingerprints, bones. But writers must recognize how that differs from the representations they can offer in its steada description of a smoking gun, an image of fingerprints. If students learn to distinguish between the evidence itself and the reports of evidence used in arguments, they will be better prepared to read others reports of evidence critically and, when they write, to report their own evidence so that their readers can know where and how they obtained it. No one asks where anyone found a reason; we must all ask where someone found evidence. The second gap is in Toulmins account of warrants. So far as we know, no book on argument has explained how a warrant that is true can nevertheless fail. For example,
You should eat fishclaim because it does not raise your cholesterol.reason As we all know, everyone should eat foods that provide roughage.warrant
Each of those three propositions is arguably true, but the warrant fails as a guarantee of the relevance of the reason to the claim. We offer what we think is the first intuitively satisfying explanation of how a warrant soundly establishes the relevance of reasons and evidence to a claim, and of how it can fail. We hope that this book can help students do more than write plausible academic papers. We hope that it encourages students to think about argumentation as a subject in its own right, as something at the
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heart of their public experience in their neighborhoods and workplaces as well as in larger civic arenas. Since argument is central to what it means to be not just a rational individual but a socially rational citizen, and since irrational persuasion has never been more widely used, we believe that there are few matters students need to know more about than how to makeand judgesound, rational arguments.
Instructors Resources
Youll find specific advice about teaching with this book in the Teachers Guide, including classroom activities for discussing issues, identifying questions and problems, generating and testing answers, and then developing the elements of argument needed to support them. We urge you to design your class meetings around activities like those, not around the chapters in this book and not even around the readings. Students already know a great deal about arguments. So if they read chapters after a class that activates that knowledge, it will help them organize, consolidate, and apply it to the task of writing formal arguments.