Table 10-2.

Classifying the Adoption of Computer Scheduling at Troy School by Stages in the Innovation Process

experience. Widespread awareness of Santa Clara County's Dial-A-Ride was achieved almost entirely by word of mouth, through the interpersonal networks of transportation professionals.

Summary An organization is a stable system of individuals who work together to achieve common goals through a hierarchy of ranks and a division of labor. Although behavior in organizations is relatively stable, innovation is going on all the time.

Until about the mid-1970s, innovation in organizations was mainly studied by means of variance research; independent variables were correlated with organizational innovativeness in cross-sectional data analysis. The chief executive in an organization was asked to provide information in these large-scale surveys. Rather low relationships of characteristics variables with organizational innovativeness were found, and today this type of research is largely passe. It has been replaced by process research on the innovation process in organizations. We divide the innovation process into (1) initiation, all of the information gathering, conceptualizing, and planning for the adoption of an innovation, leading up to the decision to adopt, and (2) implementation, all of the events, actions, and decisions involved in putting an innovation into use. The two initiation stages are agenda setting and matching, and the three implementation stages are redefining/restructuring, clarifying, and routinizing.

CHAPTER 11 Consequences of Innovations

CONSEQUENCES ARE THE CHANGES that occur to an individual or to a social system as a result of the adoption or rejection of an innovation. An innovation has little effect until it is distributed to members of a system and put to use by them. Thus, invention and diffusion are but means to an ultimate end: the consequences from adoption of an innovation. In spite of the importance of consequences, they have received very little study by diffusion researchers. Further, the data that we have about consequences are rather "soft" in nature; many investigations are case studies, although in recent years survey researchers are also studying consequences. Lack of research attention and the nature of the data make it difficult to generalize about consequences. We can describe consequences and establish categories for classifying consequences, but cannot predict when and how these consequences will happen. Not only have researchers given little attention to consequences, change agents have as well. They often assume that adoption of a given innovation will produce only beneficial results for its adopters. This assumption is the pro-innovation bias, discussed in Chapter 3. Change agents should recognize their responsibility for the consequences of the innovations that they introduce. They should be able to predict the advantages and disadvantages of an innovation before introducing it to their clients, but this is seldom done.
The introduction of snowmobiles to Lapp reindeer herders in Northern Finland illustrates the difficulty of predicting the effects of technology. Every innovation produces social and economic reactions that run throughout the social structure of the client system. The Snowmobile Revolution in the Artie In the United States we think of the snowmobile as an important instrument for winter recreation. Since the invention of the "Ski-Doo," a oneperson snow vehicle, by Joseph-Armand Bombadier of Quebec in 1958, the adoption of snowmobiles spread dramatically, and within a dozen years over a million were in use in North America. Some outcry against the ski-doo (which became a

generic name for snowmobiles) was voiced, owing to the noise pollution they caused in reviously peaceful outdoor areas of the United States and Canada.

But among the Skolt Lapps, a reindeer-herding people in Northern Finland who live above the Artie Circle, the rapid introduction of snowmobiles caused far-reaching consequences that an anthropologist who studied them termed "disastrous" (Pelto, 1973). We seek to recapture something of the play-by-play course of events in our present account, in order to illustrate one method of investigating the consequences of technological innovation. In this approach, as in many other investigations of consequences, a social scientist (usually an anthropologist) intensively, studies a small and isolated community. Dr. Pertti Pelto of the University of Connecticut had lived among the Skolt Lapps in the Sevettijarvi region of Northern Finland for several years, beginning in 1958, prior to the introduction of snowmobiles in 1962-1963. Pelto returned to this community repeatedly over the next decade in order to assess the impact of the snowmobile revolution through participant observation, personal interviews with the Lapps, and via collaboration with a research assistant/key informant (who was the first Skolt Lapp to buy a snowmobile). Pelto chose to concentrate on a single technological innovation because its consequences were so striking and hence relatively easier to trace. Many of these impacts were unfavorable. Pelto argues that the snowmobile is representative of a class of technological innovations that shift energy sources from local and autonomous origins (for example, reindeer sleds in this case) to a dependence upon external sources (snowmobiles and gasoline). Prior to the introduction of snowmobiles, the Skolt Lapps depended upon the herding of semidomesticated reindeer for their livelihood. Along with fish, reindeer meat was the main food. Reindeer sleds were the principal means of transportation, and reindeer hides were used for making clothing. and shoes. Surplus meat was sold at trading stores for cash to buy flour, sugar, tea, and other staples. The Lapps saw themselves mainly as reindeer herders, and prestige was accorded men with good strings of draught reindeer. Lapp society was an egalitarian system in which each family had approximately equal numbers of animals. Skolt children received a "first tooth reindeer," a "name-day reindeer," and gifts on other occasions, including wedding gifts of reindeer, so that a new household began with a small herd of the beloved animals. The Lapps felt a special relationship with their reindeer, and treated them with much care. Certainly the reindeer was the central object in Lapp culture. In late 1961 a Bombadier Ski-Doo from Canada was displayed in Rovaniemi, the capital city of Finnish Lapland. A schoolteacher purchased this snowmobile for recreational travel, but soon found that it was useful for hauling wood and storebought supplies. Snowmobiles soon were used for reindeer herding by Lapps living just to the north of Sevettigarvi, where the terrain consisted of a treeless tundra. Within a year (in 1962-1963), two skidoos were purchased for reindeer herding in Sevettigarvi, where the land was forested and rocky. The Lapp reindeer-men had to drive their machines by standing up on the footboards or else by kneeling on the seat, instead of riding in the usual straddle position (like on a motorcycle). Snowmobiles were designed for recreational use, and the Lapps had to drive them erect so that they could spot reindeer at a greater distance and so as to steer around rocks, trees, and other obstacles. But the erect riding style of the Lapps was dangerous when they hit an obstruction, as the driver was thrown forward. Breakdowns of the snowmobiles occurred often in the rough terrain of Sevettigarvi. Despite these problems, the rate of adoption of snowmobiles was very rapid among the Lapps. Three snowmobiles were adopted the second year of diffusion (1963-1964), five more

in 1964-1965, eight more in 1965-1966, and then sixteen in 1966-1967; by 1971, almost every one of the seventy-two households in Sevettigarvi had at least one snowmobile. 19661967 was a landmark year in which the rate of adoption of the innovation spurted, in part because an improved model, the Motoski, was introduced from Sweden. It had a more powerful motor and was better suited to driving in rough terrain. The main advantage of the snowmobile was much faster travel. The round trip from Sevettigarvi to buy staple supplies in Norwegian stores was reduced from three days by reindeer sled, to five hours by snowmobile. Within a few years of their initial introduction, snowmobiles completely replaced travel by skis and reindeer sleds in herding reindeers. Unfortunately, the effect of the snowmobiles on the Lapps' reindeer was disastrous. The noise and the smell of the machines drove the reindeer into a near-wild state. The friendly relationships between the Lapps and their animals was disrupted by the high-speed machines. Frightened running by the reindeer decreased the number of reindeer calves born each year. As a result, the average number of reindeer per household in Sevettigarvi dropped from fiftytwo in presnowmobile days, to only twelve in 1971, a decade later. In fact, this average is misleading because about two-thirds of the Lapp households completely dropped out of reindeer raising as a result of the snowmobile; most could not find other work and were unemployed. On the other hand, one family in Sevettigarvi, who were relatively early to purchase a snowmobile, built up a large herd, and by 1971 owned one-third of all the reindeer in the community. Not only did the frightened reindeer have fewer calves, but the precipitous drop in the number of reindeer also occurred because many of the animals were slaughtered for the sale of meat, in order to purchase the snowmobiles, gasoline for their operation, and spare parts and repairs. A new machine cost about $1,000, and gas and repairs typically cost about $425 per year. Despite this relatively high cost (for the Skolt Lapps, who lived on a subsistence basis), snowmobiles were considered a household necessity, and the motorized herding of reindeer was considered much more prestigious than herding by skis or reindeersleds. The snowmobile revolution pushed the Skolt Lapps into cash dependency, debt, and unemployment. One might wonder why the Lapps, given their love for the reindeer and the disastrous effects on reindeer herding caused by snowmobiles, did not resist this technological innovation. The reason, Dr. Pelto (1973, p. 192) suggests, is because there was no point in the introduction and diffusion of snowmobiles when the Skolt Lapps could have studied and discussed the possible future outcomes of the technology, and decided on whether the innovation should proceed unchecked. Such an assessment of the technology's impact could have been made in the early 1960s, but it was not, in part because the Lapps were not technically able to anticipate the far-reaching consequences of the snowmobile. Further, Lapp society is very individualistic, and given the technology's advantages for the first adopters (who tended to be wealthier and younger than the average), complete adoption was impossible to prevent. So today, the reindeer-centered culture of the Skolt Lapps has been severely disrupted. Most families are unemployed and depend upon the Finnish government for subsistence payments. The snowmobile revolution in the arctic led to disastrous consequences for the reindeer and for the Lapps who depended on them for their livelihood.

Since the anthropological study of the snowmobile revolution by Pertti Pelto, certain further technological developments have occurred in Lapland. During the summer months, some Lapps have begun using motorcycles to herd their reindeer. And certain of the affluent Lapps have even begun to use helicopters. An increasing number of reindeer that are slaughtered for meat have been found to have stomach ulcers. A Model for Studying Consequences We argue in this chapter that the consequences of innovation have generally been understudied in past diffusion research. Much past research has asked: "What variables are related to innovativeness?" While such inquiry has played a useful role in the past, future investigations need to ask: "What are the effects of adopting innovations?" Figure 11-1 contrasts these two research objectives, which are quite different. Innovativeness, the main dependent variable in much past research, now becomes only a predictor of a more ultimate dependent variable, consequences of innovation. This new model seeks to explain consequences, a research goal that is closer to the objectives of most change agencies. They usually want to bring about desirable consequences among their clients, not simply the adoption of innovations per se. An illustration of the use of the new model of consequences is provided by Mason and Halter (1968), who first determined variables related to innovativeness among Oregon farmers. Then they include innovativeness, along with other variables, to explain farm production levels, one type of desired consequence of the adoption of agricultural innovations. They predicted about 50 percent of the variance in farm production, and found that innovativeness made a unique contribution in raising yields. Inquiries such as this demonstrate an approach that could potentially provide quantifiable and predictive generalizations about consequences. But there are relatively few such quantitative investigations of the impact of innovations (we shall discuss several of them later in this chapter). Most diffusion research stopped with an analysis of the decision to adopt a new idea, ignoring how this choice was implemented into action, and to what consequences. So most diffusion research falls one step short of consequences (Goss, 1979). Why Haven't Consequences Been Studied More? When the last careful content analysis was made of all the diffusion publications then available (in 1968), only 38 of the nearly 1,500 reports (less than 3 percent) dealt with the consequences of innovations. My reading of all diffusion publications as of the present writing indicates that this imbalance has not changed much since then. Why are there so few studies of consequences? Three main reasons are: 1. Change agencies, often the sponsors of diffusion research, overemphasize adoption per se, tacitly assuming that the consequences of innovation decisions will be positive. Typically, diffusion researchers devote much attention to the antecedents of adoption, including socioeconomic and personal characteristics of the respondents and their communication behavior, for example. Change agencies assume that the innovation is needed by their clients, that its introduction will be desirable, and that adoption of the innovation represents "success." But we know that these pro-innovation assumptions are not always valid.

2. Perhaps the usual survey research methods are inappropriate for the investigation of innovation consequences. Extended observation over time can prove useful, or an indepth case-study approach might produce more insights about consequences. The participantobservation technique used widely by anthropologists may be helpful, in that it does not depend so heavily upon the receivers' perceptions of an innovation's consequences.* Because diffusion researchers have been highly stereotypical in relying almost entirely upon survey methods of data gathering, they have ignored studying consequences, a type of inquiry for which the usual one-shot survey method is not very effective. But the anthropological approaches suffer in that they largely yield idiosyncratic, descriptive data from which generalization to other innovations and to other systems is difficult or impossible. The study of consequences is complicated by the fact that they usually occur over extended periods of time. The study of an innovation's consequences cannot be accomplished simply by adding an additional question to a survey instrument, another one hundred respondents to the sample population, or another few days of data gathering in the field. Instead, a longrange research approach must be taken in which consequences are analyzed as they unfold over time. Otherwise, the consequences of an innovation can be neither properly assessed nor predicted. A panel study (which is really a "double survey" in that the respondents to be interviewed both before and after an innovation is introduced and thus can yield desired information about consequences.*Firm data about consequences could also come from carefully conducted field experiments in which an innovation is introduced to a system on a pilot basis and its results evaluated under realistic conditions prior to its widespread diffusion and adoption. These studies over time, like the panel study and the pilot field experiment, can provide more quantifiable "firm" data about expected consequences. Such data can lead to generalizations about consequences, rather than mere description. And they are predictive to a future point in time, rather than being simply post-mortems of consequences that have already occurred. In fact, we draw upon several panel studies and field experiments in our discussion (below) of the equality consequences of innovations. Consequences are difficult to measure. Individuals using an innovation are often not fully aware of all the consequences of their adoption. Therefore, any attempt to study consequences that rests only on respondents' reports may lead to incomplete and misleading conclusions. * Judgments concerning consequences are almost unavoidably subjective and value laden, regardless of who makes them. Cultural norms, personal preferences, and biases are an integral part of the frame of reference of every observer of a social scene, in spite of efforts to be free of such prejudicial attitudes. To some degree every judge of the desirable or undesirable impacts of an innovation is influenced by his or her personal experiences, educational background, philosophical viewpoint, and the like. A researcher from one culture may find it particularly hard to make completely objective judgments of the desirability of an innovation in another country. The concept of cultural relativism is the viewpoint that each culture should be judged in light of its own specific circumstances and needs. No culture is actually "best" in an absolute sense; each culture works out its own set of norms, values, beliefs, and attitudes that function most effectively for itself. Conditions in a particular country may therefore seem strange and

unsuitable to a foreign observer, when many of these conditions result from centuries of experiment, trial and error, and evolution. Most are quite reasonable, given the conditions in which they exist. For instance, many newcomers to India are puzzled by the millions of sacred cows that roam the countryside freely, while many people live under famine conditions. The foreigner is unlikely to understand that the Indian cattle provide manure for fuel, fertilizer, and housing construction, and thus may be a very positive element in India. So the holiness of cows in the Hindu religion may be functional, rather than just a cultural oddity. The concept of cultural relativism has implications for the measurement of consequences. For whether data about the results of an innovation are gathered from clients, change agents, or scientific observers, the view by these observers of an externally introduced innovation is likely to be subjectively flavored by their own cultural beliefs. Consequences should be judged as to their functionality in terms of the users' culture, without imposing outsiders' normative beliefs about the needs of the client system. Such cultural relativism, however, is extremely difficult to accomplish. A further problem in measuring the consequences of an innovation is that they are often confounded with other effects. For example, in assessing the results of an innovation like chemical fertilizer on crop yields, one cannot ignore the consequences caused by natural events like droughts or volcanic eruptions. This confounding is difficult or impossible to avoid completely, even with carefully conducted field experiments with before-and-after measurements and a control group. So one of the problems in measuring the consequences of innovations is that of untangling cause-and-effect relationships. Ideally, we should only measure the consequences that are exclusively the outcome of an innovation, the changes that would not have occurred if the innovation had not been introduced. But as we shall argue shortly, many important consequences are unanticipated and indirect; these effects of an innovation are very difficult to determine in a precise manner. For instance, the classification of unanticipated consequences rests on an investigator's ability to determine the original objectives for introducing an innovation in a system; such purposes may be partly concealed by subsequent rationalizations on the part of the members of the system (Goss, 1979). Classifications of Consequences One step toward an improved understanding of the consequences of innovations is to classify them into a taxonomy. Consequences are not unidimensional; they can take many forms and are expressed in various ways. In this book we find it useful to analyze consequences according to three dimensions: (1) desirable versus undesirable, (2) direct versus indirect, and (3) anticipated versus unanticipated, although this is by no means the only way to classify the consequences of innovations. Desirable Versus Undesirable Consequences Desirable consequences are the functional effects of an innovation to an individual or to a social system. On the other hand, undesirable consequences are the dysfunctional effects of an innovation to an individual or to a social system. The degree to which an innovation is desirable or undesirable ultimately depends, of course, on how the innovation affects the members of the system. The determination of whether consequences are functional or dysfunctional depends on how the innovation affects the adopters. It is possible, of course, for an innovation to cause consequences for individuals other than its adopters. For instance,

rejectors of a new idea may be affected because the innovation gives a boost to the other members of a system that adopt it, widening a socioeconomic gap over the rejectors. So consequences do not occur exclusively to those individuals or systems that decide to adopt an innovation. Often everyone in the system is touched by the consequences. Certain innovations seem to have undesirable impacts for almost everyone in a social system. Our previous example of the snowmobile might provide such a case, although a few Lapps became very rich reindeer owners as a result of the innovation. But the ski-doo was disastrous for the Finnish Lapps in general. Every social system has certain qualities that should not be destroyed if the welfare of the system is to be maintained. These might include family bonds, respect for human life and property, maintenance of individual respect and dignity, and appreciation for others, including appreciation for contributions made by ancestors. Certain other sociocultural elements are more trivial and can be modified, discontinued, or supplanted with little impact, either positive or negative. And finally, every system has certain desired qualities like providing for individuals' basic needs, improving the quality of life, and so on, that are widely acknowledged as functional for individuals and for the system. An innovation that enhances one or more of these desiderata is certainly functional for the system. Nevertheless, we must recognize that it is difficult to avoid making value judgments as to the desirable versus undesirable consequences of an innovation for individuals and their social system. An innovation may be functional for a system but not functional for certain individuals in the system. Consider the example of the adoption of "miracle" varieties of rice and wheat in India and other nations that led to what is called the "Green Revolution." These innovations provided higher crop yields and more income to the farmers who adopted. Yet the Green Revolution also led to fewer farmers, migration to urban slums, higher unemployment rates, and political instability. So although certain individuals profited from the adoption of the new seeds, they caused important but unequal conditions for the system. Are the consequences desirable or undesirable? The answer depends on whether one takes certain individuals or the entire system as the point of reference. WINDFALL PROFITS An innovation may be more functional for some individuals than for others; certain positive consequences may occur for certain members of a system at the expense of others. For instance, laggards are the last to adopt innovations; by the time they adopt a new idea, they are often forced to do so by economic pressures. By being the first in the field, innovators frequently secure a kind of economic gain called windfall profits. In a more general sense, windfall profits can be measured in social as well as economic terms. An example is the prestige that the innovator of a consumer product (like a new clothing fashion) may obtain by being the first to use the new idea. Windfall profits are a special advantage earned by the first adopters of a new idea in a social system. Their unit costs are usually lowered and their additions to total production have little effect on the price of the product. But when all members of a social system adopt a new idea, total production or efficiency increases, and the price of the product or service often goes down. This offsets the advantage of lowered unit costs. The innovator must take risks in order to earn windfall profits. All new ideas do not turn out successfully, and occasionally the innovator's fingers get burned. It is possible that adoption of a noneconomic or unsuccessful innovation could result in "windfall losses" for the first

individuals to adopt. An example of windfall losses occurred in the diffusion of pocket calculators. The first model sold (in September 1971) measured three-by-five inches and cost $249; this calculator was a "four-banger," as they are called in the industry, that could add, subtract, multiply, and divide. Within a year, by late 1972, the price of such a four-function calculator dropped to $100; in another year the price was only $50, and by 1981 a fourbanger cost less than $10 (and the size shrunk to the thickness of a credit card). The precipitous decrease in the price of pocket calculators was due (1) to cheaper transistors (the most expensive component), and (2) highvolume production (in 1981 pocket calculators totaled $700 million annual sales and were the fourth largest-selling consumer product). So later adopters gained a windfall profit in this case. Windfall profits are a relative type of gain that one individual in a social system receives and others do not. Windfall profits are a reward for innovativeness and a penalty for laggardness. We know that innovators are initially wealthier than laggards. Usually new ideas make the rich richer and the poor poorer, widening the socioeconomic gap between the earlier and later adopters of a new idea. In order to illustrate the nature of windfall profits, data from the Iowa hybrid seed corn study by Gross (1942) were reanalyzed by Rogers (1962, p. 276). The innovators of this new idea, who adopted in the late 1920s, earned almost $2,500 more than the laggards, who adopted hybrid seed in 1940-1941. The innovators earned these windfall profits because of: (1) a higher market price for corn which lasted only until most farmers adopted hybrid seed and corn production was increased; (2) their larger corn acreages (for example, the innovators who adopted in 1927 average 124 acres of corn while the typical laggard who adopted in 1941 raised only 70 acres of corn); and (3) the greater number of years they received the higher yields from hybrid seed. Other illustrations of how an innovation's consequences often benefit certain individuals in a system more than others, thus widening socioeconomic gaps in a system, are provided later in this chapter. THE ERRONEOUS ASSUMPTION OF SEPARABILITY Most innovations cause both desirable and undesirable consequences. Understandably, individuals generally want to obtain the functional effects of an innovation and to avoid the dysfunctional effects. But this assumes that certain of the desired consequences from a technological innovation can be separated from the consequences that are not wanted. Such an assumption of separability usually involves desired advantages from a new technology such as increased effectiveness, efficiency, or convenience, versus such unwanted consequences as changes in social values and institutions. An illustration is provided by the 1979 revolution against the Shah of Iran, led by the Ayatollah Khomeini. This political and religious movement made extensive use of such communication technology as long-distance, direct-dial telephone calls, through which the Ayatollah's daily messages were conveyed from his place of exile in France to his Iranian followers, who tape-recorded them and then clandestinely distributed them in the form of cassette tapes, and mimeographed and xeroxed sheets. One Iranian observed: "We are struggling against autocracy, for democracy, by means of xerocracy" (Tehranian, 1979). With the help of such communication technology, the Iranian revolutionaries were able to organize massive demonstrations in Tehran against the Shah, involving several million protesters on several occasions.

After the fall of the Shah, the famous Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci (1979) interviewed the Ayatollah and asked him why he used such harsh words when speaking of the West. He replied: "We got many bad things from the West, a lot of suffering, and now we have good reasons to fear the West, to keep our youth from getting too close to the West . . . where they become corrupted by alcohol, by the music that blocks out thought, by drugs, and uncovered women." But, the Ayatollah continued, "We are not afraid to use [such Western technologies as television, air conditioning, and the telephone], and we do. We are not afraid of your science and your technology" (Fallaci, 1979). The Iranian leader here implies the assumption of separability of the desired effects of Western technology from the social values and institutions in which the technological innovations are embedded in Western nations. Many change agents make this assumption, and usually it turns out to be wrong. Earlier in this chapter, we discussed the desired advantages of the snowmobile among the Finnish Lapps such as faster transportation, which unfortunately brought with it the decline in reindeer raising and its accompanying consequences of widespread unemployment and other social problems. We conclude with Generalization 11-1: It is usually difficult or impossible to manage the effects of an innovation so as to separate the desirable from the undesirable consequences. The Old Order Amish in the United States exemplify a social system that has successfully maintained its distinctive culture for several hundred years. The Amish generally avoid adopting technological innovations like cars and tractors, electricity, and household conveniences, because they understand that the social consequences of these innovations would lead to the breakdown of Amish society. So the Amish wisely take account of the principle of inseparability in managing technological consequences; they willingly forego the desired advantages of tractors and modern farm equipment (such as higher crop yields and larger incomes) in order to avoid the undesirable consequences of increased dependence on non-Amish businesses (such as farm machinery dealers), lessened farm labor requirements, and the pressure for larger-sized farms (Ericksen and others, 1980). The Amish live in tight-knit communities in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Iowa, and several other states. In these locales, the Amish have successfully and self-consciously striven to maintain their ideology of a belief in farming, high fertility, and a plain, "nonworldy" lifestyle. For example, the Amish speak a German dialect, do not send their children to public schools, believe in hard work, and try to produce everything that they consume. The public stereotype of the Amish is of bearded men, dressed in drab-colored, homemade clothes, riding in a horse-drawn buggy along the shoulder of a modern highway. The most noted Amish community is Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, where this religious sect has survived for over 200 years by following a general rule of not adopting innovations. The fertile soil allows the Amish to succeed financially on small-sized farms of about fifty acres, which they operate labor-intensively; their high fertility (the average family has more than seven children) provides the work force, so that mechanized equipment is not needed. In the face of recently skyrocketing land prices, however, Amish parents now are frequently unable to set up their children in farming, and when they enter urban occupations the young people often drop out of Amish society. So the Old Order Amish, who have coped by following an antiinnovation policy in the past, now face an uncertain future (Ericksen and others, 1980).

But their general adherence to the principle of inseparability has served them well. They forego most modern technological innovations in farming and household living because they fear the social consequences that would inevitably accompany them. Direct Versus Indirect Consequences Because of the intricate, often invisible web of interrelationships among the elements in a culture, a change in one part of a system often initiates a chain reaction of indirect consequences stemming from the direct consequences of an innovation. Direct consequences are the changes to an individual or a social system that occur in immediate response to an innovation. Indirect consequences are the changes to an individual or a social system that occur as a result of the direct consequences of an innovation. One might think of the adoption of an innovation as an independent variable that leads to certain direct consequences (these are a collection of dependent variables). Then, in a more complex sense, the effects of the independent variables (adoption of an innovation) are mediated through the intervening variables of the direct effects, so as to cause indirect consequences, which are now the dependent variables (Goss, 1979). An illustration of this framework for understanding the direct and indirect consequences of an innovation is diagrammed in Figure 11-2, based on an anthropological study of the adoption of wet rice farming by a tribe in Madagascar (Linton and Kardiner, 1952, pp. 222-231). The tribe had been a nomadic group that cultivated rice by dry-land methods. After each harvest they would move to a different location. Many social changes resulted in the tribe's culture after the adoption of wet-land rice farming. A pattern of land ownership developed, social status differences appeared, the nuclear family replaced the extended clan, and tribal government changed. The consequences of the technological innovation were both direct and far-reaching, in that several generations of consequences from wet rice growing spread from the more direct results. A contemporary example of direct and indirect consequences is provided by the use of semiconductors (that is, computers on a tiny silicon chip) in household appliances, automobiles, and in new communication technology such as home computers. The direct results of the semiconductors are to conserve energy, such as in "smart" appliances like hot water heaters that only provide heated water when it will be needed, and to prevent traffic accidents through a brake override system that is activated when an auto begins to skid. The home computer, thanks to the semiconductors that it contains, allows an individual to tap data banks containing information about plane schedules, the weather, and financial news, and to conduct one's banking and grocery purchasing.* Each of these direct effects of semiconductors is likely to be accompanied by many indirect consequences. For example, the convenience of at-home banking and shopping may also lead to the possible invasion of household privacy; what if one's bank overdrafts were made known to one's employer? Further, some individuals fear that once computer-based data banks exist, the data they contain, such as one's automobile speeding violations, college grades, and the consumer products that one has purchased, might be made available to potential employers and/or to other authorities. Certainly, the indirect consequences of such a beneficial innovation as small, lowpriced computers (that are made possible by semiconductors) may turn out to be problematic, including both desirable and undesirable consequences to various individuals and social systems. The "electronics revolution" made

possible by semiconductors in modern society may lead to numerous generations of consequences, as did wet rice farming in Madagascar. The indirect consequences of an innovation are often especially difficult to plan for, and manage, as they are often unanticipated. Anticipated Versus Unanticipated Consequences Anticipated consequences are changes due to an innovation that are recognized and intended by the members of a social system. An example of such a manifest consequence is the snowmobiles' advantage to the Lapps of providing rapid transportation. They could not, however, anticipate such latent consequences of this innovation as its disastrous effects on reindeer raising. Although they are less discernible to observers, the "subsurface" consequences of an innovation may be just as important as the anticipated consequences. Unanticipated consequences are changes due to an innovation that are neither intended nor recognized by the members of a social system. The disintegration of respect for their elders among the Yir Yoront, in the case study that follows, is an example of an unanticipated consequence of the adoption of steel axes. This change in familiar relations was of tremendous importance to the tribe, even though such a consequence was not readily apparent when steel axes were first introduced by well-meaning missionaries. Almost no innovation comes with no strings attached. The more important and the more technologically advanced an innovation is (and therefore the more the change agent desires its rapid adoption), the more likely its introduction is to produce many consequencessome of them anticipated, but others unintended and latent. A system is like a bowl of marbles: move any one of its elements and the positions of all the others are also changed. This is often not fully understood by the adopters of an innovation, and may not be comprehended by the change agents who introduce a new idea in a system. Unanticipated consequences represent a lack of understanding of how an innovation functions and of the internal and external forces at work in a social system (Goss, 1979). In Chapter 1 we argued that awareness of a new idea creates uncertainty about how the innovation will actually function for an individual or other adopting unit in a system. This uncertainty motivates active information seeking about the innovation, especially through interpersonal peer networks. Individuals particularly seek innovationevaluation information, defined as the reduction in uncertainty about an innovation's expected consequences. Such uncertainty can be decreased to the point where an individual feels well informed enough to adopt the new idea. But uncertainty about an innovation's consequences can never be completely removed. The adopter is often able to obtain adequate information from peers about the desirable, direct, and anticipated consequences of an innovation. But the unanticipated consequences are by definition unknown by individuals at their time of adoption. Such unforeseen impacts of a new idea represent a type of innovation-evaluation information that cannot be obtained by an individual from other members of his or her system. Often professional change agents cannot know the unanticipated consequences until after widespread adoption has occurred (if then), as we see in the following case of the steel ax, introduced by missionaries to an Australian tribe.

We conclude this discussion of the three classifications of consequences with Generalization 11-2: The undesirable, indirect, and unanticipated consequences of innovations usually go together, as do the desirable, direct, and anticipated consequences. Steel Axes for Stone-Age Aborigines* The consequences of the adoption of steel axes by a tribe of Australian aborigines vividly illustrates the need for consideration of the undesirable, indirect, and unanticipated consequences of an innovation. The tribe was the Yir Yoront, who traveled in small nomadic groups over a vast territory in search of game and other food. The central tool in their culture was the stone ax, which the Yir Yoront found indispensable in producing food, constructing shelters, and heating their homes. It is hard to imagine a more complete revolution than that precipitated by the adoption of the steel ax as a replacement for the stone ax. The method of study used by Sharp (1952) to investigate the Yir Yoront is that of participant observation, in which a scientist studies a culture by taking part in its everyday activities. In the 1930s an American anthropologist was able to live with the Yir Yoront for thirteen months without seeing another outsider. Because of their isolation, the tribe was relatively unaffected by Western civilization until the establishment of a nearby missionary post in recent years. The missionaires distributed many steel axes among the Yir Yoront as gifts and as payment for work performed. Before the days of the steel ax, the stone ax was a symbol of masculinity and of respect for elders. Only men owned the stone axes, but women and children were the principal users of these tools. The axes were borrowed from fathers, husbands, or uncles according to a system of social relationship prescribed by custom. The Yir Yoront obtained their stone ax heads in exchange for spears through bartering with other tribes, a process that took place as part of elaborate rituals at seasonal fiestas. When the missionaries distributed the steel axes to the Yir Yoront, they hoped that a rapid improvement in living conditions would result. There was no important resistance to the shift from stone to steel axes, because the tribe was accustomed to securing their tools through trade. Steel axes were more efficient for most tasks, and the stone axes rapidly disappeared among the Yir Yoront. But the steel ax contributed little to social progress; to the disappointment of the missionaries, the Yir Yoront used their new-found leisure time for sleep, "an act they had thoroughly mastered." The missionaries distributed the steel axes to men, women, and children alike. In fact, the young men were more likely to adopt the new tools than were the elders, who maintained a greater distrust for the missionaries. The result was a disruption of status relations among the Yir Yoront and a revolutionary confusion of age and sex roles. Elders, once highly respected, now became dependent upon women and younger men, and were often forced to borrow steel axes from these social inferiors. The trading rituals of the tribe also became disorganized. Friendship ties among traders broke down, and interest declined in the annual fiestas, where the barter of stone axes for spears had formerly taken place. The religious system and social organization of the Yir Yoront became disorganized as a result of the tribe's inability to adjust to the innovation. The men began the practice of prostituting their daughters and wives in exchange for use of someone else's steel ax.

THE FORM, FUNCTION, AND MEANING OF AN INNOVATION. We see, then, that many of the consequences of the innovation among the Yir Yoront were undesirable, indirect, and unanticipated; these three types of consequences often go together, just as desirable, direct, and anticipated consequences are often associated. The case of the steel ax also illustrates a common error made by change agents in regard to an innovation's consequences. They are able to anticipate the form and function of an innovation, but not its meaning for potential adopters. What do we mean by the form, function, and meaning of an innovation? 1. Form is the directly observable physical appearance and substance of an innovation. Both the missionaries and the Yir Yoront recognized the form of the new tool, perhaps in part because of its similarity to the appearance of the stone ax. 2. Function is the contribution made by the innovation to the way of life of members of a social system. The tribe immediately perceived the steel ax as a cutting tool, to be used in much the same way as the stone ax had been. 3. Meaning is the subjective and frequently unconscious perception of the innovation by members of a social system. "Because of its subjective nature, meaning is much less susceptible to diffusion than either form or [function]. . . . A receiving culture attaches new meanings to the borrowed elements of complexes, and these may have little relation to the meanings which the same elements carried in their original setting" (Linton, 1936).* What mistakes did the missionaries make in the introduction of the steel ax? The change agents seem to have understood the form and function of the steel ax. They believed the Yir Yoront would use the new tool in much the same way as they had the stone ax, such as for cutting brush. But the missionaries made an egregious error in not predicting the meaning of the new idea to the Yir Yoront. They did not anticipate that the steel ax would lead to more hours of sleep, prostitution, and a breakdown of social relationships and customs. Change agents frequently do not sense or understand the social meaning of the innovations that they introduce, especially the negative consequences that accrue when an apparently desirable innovation is used under different conditions. Change agents are especially likely to make this mistake if they do not empathize completely with the innovation's users, especially when the change agents are heterophilous with their clients. So we conclude with Generalization 11-3: Change agents can more easily anticipate the form and function of an innovation for their clients than its meaning. ACHIEVING A DYNAMIC EQUILIBRIUM. Perhaps the missionaries introduced too many
steel axes too rapidly. What rate of change will allow a