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    Case Brief: Groves v. Slaughter (Thompson, 1841)

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    sunjingyu_661865190
    Groves v. Slaughter involved a case where a Mississippian purchased slaves but refused to pay, citing the state's constitution which seemed to forbid importing slaves for sale after a certain date. The Supreme Court issued a split decision, with various concurring opinions amounting to an implicit debate over federal power to limit slavery. Justice McLean argued that states had power to regulate slavery as a local issue detrimental to public health, while Chief Justice Taney asserted Congress had no power over slavery regulation. Justice Baldwin said states had "plenary power" over slavery but Congress could regulate interstate slave commerce consistent with property rights. The case was notable not for establishing precedent but for demonstrating the judiciary's struggle with

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    Case Brief: Groves v. Slaughter (Thompson, 1841)

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    sunjingyu_661865190
    67 views3 pages
    Groves v. Slaughter involved a case where a Mississippian purchased slaves but refused to pay, citing the state's constitution which seemed to forbid importing slaves for sale after a certain date. The Supreme Court issued a split decision, with various concurring opinions amounting to an implicit debate over federal power to limit slavery. Justice McLean argued that states had power to regulate slavery as a local issue detrimental to public health, while Chief Justice Taney asserted Congress had no power over slavery regulation. Justice Baldwin said states had "plenary power" over slavery but Congress could regulate interstate slave commerce consistent with property rights. The case was notable not for establishing precedent but for demonstrating the judiciary's struggle with

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    Groves v. Slaughter involved a case where a Mississippian purchased slaves but refused to pay, citing the state's constitution which seemed to forbid importing slaves for sale after a certain date. The Supreme Court issued a split decision, with various concurring opinions amounting to an implicit debate over federal power to limit slavery. Justice McLean argued that states had power to regulate slavery as a local issue detrimental to public health, while Chief Justice Taney asserted Congress had no power over slavery regulation. Justice Baldwin said states had "plenary power" over slavery but Congress could regulate interstate slave commerce consistent with property rights. The case was notable not for establishing precedent but for demonstrating the judiciary's struggle with

    Copyright:

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    Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as docx, pdf, or txt
    67 views3 pages

    Case Brief: Groves v. Slaughter (Thompson, 1841)

    Uploaded by

    sunjingyu_661865190
    Groves v. Slaughter involved a case where a Mississippian purchased slaves but refused to pay, citing the state's constitution which seemed to forbid importing slaves for sale after a certain date. The Supreme Court issued a split decision, with various concurring opinions amounting to an implicit debate over federal power to limit slavery. Justice McLean argued that states had power to regulate slavery as a local issue detrimental to public health, while Chief Justice Taney asserted Congress had no power over slavery regulation. Justice Baldwin said states had "plenary power" over slavery but Congress could regulate interstate slave commerce consistent with property rights. The case was notable not for establishing precedent but for demonstrating the judiciary's struggle with

    Copyright:

    Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
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    Download as docx, pdf, or txt
    of 3

    Groves v.

    Slaughter

    Added by cvickrey, last edited by acollins on Mar 02, 2008 (view change)

    Case Brief: Groves v. Slaughter (Thompson, 1841)


    I. Facts
    A Mississippian buys slaves, but decides he can get away without paying the slave-trader. The reason: the Missouri Constitution, adopted in 1832, seems to forbid the importation of slaves for in-state sale after a certain date.

    II. Issue
    The Commerce Clause (Art. 1, 8, cl. 3) If Congress possesses an exclusive right to regulate interstate commerce pursuant to this clause - as the Gibbons precedent would suggest - does it follow that states cannot constitutionally-regulate the slave trade? If the Court answers in the affirmative, on what basis can a state abolish slavery?

    III. Holding
    There is a split decision. Two opinions for the Court argue that the state had not executed its constitutional provision with legislation. Three opinions concur in the result, and amount to a veiled, euphemistic debate over which federal actors can limit or abolish slavery. Two opinions dissent.

    IV. Arguments
    (Justice McLean, concurring)
    McLean's decision is a tortured reconciliation of two neo-Federalist political biases, which in this case contradict: one towards an expansive national government, the other against slavery.

    To McLean, slaves are not an item of commerce--- and even if some states treat them as such, the Constitution gives them a "leading and controlling quality of persons," and so clearly places them outside the scope of the Commerce Clause (BLBAS 213). He then makes a Marshallian argument from political morality. The slave trade, and indeed slavery itself, are local phenomena deleterious to the health of the body politic. States must be able to regulate them, as sovereigns necessarily possess the means of self-preservation. The constitutional provision is therefore upheld.

    (Chief Justice Taney, concurring)


    Taney asserts that the power of regulating slavery "is exclusively with the several states" (214). Congress cannot make any law on the subject by "virtue of its power to regulate commerce, or by virtue of any other power" (214). (How the slave trade is different in kind from other forms of commercial traffic is unclear). Presumably, this dicta prefigures his argument in Dred Scott, wherein Congress cannot regulate slavery even in pre-statehood territories, except to protect masters' ownership rights.

    (Justice Baldwin, concurring)


    Baldwin begins with the premise that states have "plenary power" to allow or disallow slavery, viz. to decide whether or not slaves are a legitimate species of property. But when a state decides in favor a slavery, then it engages in an interstate commercial enterprise regulated by shared rules. Congress, for one, can regulate the slave trade, but only in a manner consistent with the Fifth Amendment, which protects the "right of disposing of property of all kinds" (214). States can regulate their internal slave trades as they please, but the Privileges and Immunities Cause (Art. IV, 2, cl. 1) prevents interstate free-riding: "when such a regulation purports to extend to other states or their citizens, it is limited by the constitution, putting the citizens of all on the same footing as their own" (214). If a state allows its own citizens to traffic in slaves, then it must allow out-of-state slaveholders to bring in slaves for the purpose of selling them. If on the other hand a state abolishes slavery, then it has zero constitutional obligation to allow the same. Baldwin then asserts that considering slaves "as persons merely, and not property," is against the logic of federalism - each state would be free to exercise police powers touching slavery in different ways, unless slaves are considered merchandise - and the first step to disunion (215). How these remarks are in any way consistent with the "plenary power" passage is unclear: if the Constitution considers slaves as only fugitives or bales of goods, how are manumission laws constitutional?

    V. Significance
    The case is more important in demonstrating the Judiciary's reaction to the dilemma of slavery jurisprudence, rather than in establishing a precedent. Two opinions avoid the explosive issues outright. Baldwin's, in particular, highlights the nave self-conception of the Supreme Court as the cool-headed national body able to settle this unfortunate sectional dispute.

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